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CORROBORATION
SABRAH AND 2 OTHERS V R.1964-66 where a prosecution witness is an accomplice, the judge
must inform the jury about this fact and warn them about the dangers of convicting the accused on the
accomplice's uncorroborated evidence. He must also tell them who an accomplice is, what
corroboration is and indicate to them what evidence in the case is capable of corroborating the
accomplice's evidence. A conviction will not be set aside if he wrongly regards a piece of evidence as
corroborative as long as there is ample corroborative evidence.

DYING DECLARATIONS AND RES GESTAE

KAMARA V R 1950-56
When the victim of an attack at the time of the attack or in its immediate aftermath and either without
any opportunity to concoct or under a settled and hopeless expectation of death states a fact showing
the identity of his attacker, or the cause of the injuries such statement can be admitted in evidence as
either part of the res gestae of as a dying declaration to prove the identity of the assailant or the cause
of death as the circumstances of the case may permit. The accused was convicted of murder and applied
for leave to appeal. The prosecution's case was that at the time of the commission of the acts of violence
resulting in the murder and in its immediate aftermath, the prosecution witnesses had heard the
deceased say the accused was killing her. One of them saw the deceased clutching her protruded gut
and hurrying along the road from the place where she had been seen together with the accused.

STATEMENTS MADE BOONE ACCUSED IMPLICATING THEMSELVES AND OTHERS

JAMES GRANT AND OTHERS V R 1961
Where a statement is made by one accused exculpating himself and implicating the other, in a jury trial
there must be clear direction to jury as to its effect. They must be told that it is not evidence unless the
conditions referred to earlier are fulfilled. A failure to do so amounts to non-direction which lead to
the quashing of, a conviction on grounds of substantial miscarriage of justice.

VERBAL OR WRITTEN STATEMENTS OF ACCUSED NOT MADE ON OATH

IMPLICATING CO-ACCUSE
THE STATE V AHMED S. D. TURAY 1982
Whether the judge must warn himself in expressed words that the statement of one accused implicating
the other not made on oath is not evidence against that other.
Both respondents and one other were charged with 11 counts of larceny by servant and were convicted
with the cognate offence of obtaining money by false pretences. All 3 of them appealed to the Court
of Appeal and their appeals were allowed on all counts.
The State appealed against that decision on the following main grounds:
1. Whether there is any obligation on a trial judge sitting without a jury to warn himself that the
oral or written statement of one accused person is not evidence against a co-accused.
2. In what circumstances are challenged oral or written confession by an accused person
admissible in evidence at a trial?
3. If the confession of the first respondent was not properly admitted in evidence at the trial, what
is the effect?
Tejan J.S.C. stated in several parts of his judgment that there was an obligation on the trial judge to
warn himself that the statement of an accused person not on oath was not evidence against a co-
accused. He went further to state that where a judge had failed to give himself such warning, a
conviction will be quashed. Mr. Tejan-Cole submitted that there was no rule of law or practice that
imposed such obligation on a trial judge sitting alone.

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R. V BOWEN 1972 was a case where one of the accused persons changed his plea to guilty at the end
of the prosecution's case. The judge did not ask the jury to return a verdict on him at that stage. The
accused who changed his plea had made a number of statements admitting his guilt and implicating
his co-defendants and copies had gone to the jury during the prosecution's case. In his summing up the
judge used the statements of the accused who had changed his plea extensively to fill in the background
of the case, and also to fix the date of the offence which according to the statements had taken place
on a Saturday, though he repeatedly warned the jury that they were not evidence against the other
accused persons. The main point of the appellant's defence was that there was no admissible evidence
as to the time of the offence. It was held by the English Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) that it
was not open to him to use the statements as he did. So, although the judge gave the jury the requisite
warning, he was at the same time directing them to use the statement of one accused person against
another, thereby nullifying his previous warning.

ABRAHAM V THE QUEEN a judge sitting without a jury may be required to "direct himself in a
manner similar to that which would be required if he were summing up to the jury."

DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST

GRAINE V ABDULLAH MUCTAR 1950-56
A declaration, either by a party to an action or by his predecessor in title which tends against his
proprietary interest in a property is admissible against him to show the extent of his interest in that
property or that he has no interest therein at all.

DOCUMENTARY HEARSAY
UNITED AFRICA COMPANY LIMITED V METROPOLITAN INDUSTRIES (SI.)
The Documentary Evidence Act, Cap. 26 of the Laws of Sierra Leone makes provision in civil
proceedings, for statements made by certain persons who are absent from the trial to be admitted in
evidence subject to certain considerations. Such persons must by section 3 subsection (3) not be
interested in the proceedings. In determining whether or not a person is interested in the proceedings,
the facts and circumstances of the case, the pleadings and the evidence, including the contents of the
statement must be considered.
In re Hill, it was said that
... In every case the facts must be ascertained both as to the person whose statement it is sought to put
in evidence, and as to the character and subject matter of the 'proceeding and the relation of the person
to the subject matter of the proceeding, in order to decide the question of admissibility?"
Devlin, L.J. rightly pointed out in Bearmans Ltd. v Metropolitan Police Dist. Receiver
"The word "interested" is not a word which has any well-defined meaning, and everybody who was
asked what it meant would at once want to know the context in which it was used before he could
venture an opinion. It may mean a direct financial interest on the one hand, or on the other hand it may
mean nothing more than the ordinary human interest which everybody has in the outcome of
proceedings in which he is likely to be a witness."

EVIDENCE OF PREVIOUS PROCEEDINGS

MANSARAY V WILLIAMS 1968-69
A complete court record of previous proceedings between the parties or their privies concerning the
same subject matter is admissible to prove inconsistency or to contradict a witness.

BANDOE V JACOB 1950-56

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In civil cases, a criminal conviction for an offence arising out of the incident is irrelevant in proof of
liability. However, the defendant can be cross examined as to whether he pleaded guilty and why he is
now denying liability.

NEWLAND V SAVAGE 1920-36 evidence of a previous conviction should not be adduced either as
part of the prosecution's case or in cross-examination except in circumstances.
MCROBERTS, AG. C.J. In this case there is only one point of substance, namely whether the evidence
of the accused as to his previous conviction was rightly admitted.

RE-EXAMINATION
KAMARA V ROGERS-WRIGHT 1957-60
Where a witness has been cross-examined as to facts showing that he has bribed a witness to give
favourable testimony on his behalf, or to impeach his credit, he can be re-examined to restore his credit
or generally to explain any part of his evidence which appeared unfavourable during cross-
examination. The applicant brought an action against the respondent under the Legal Practitioners
(Disciplinary Committee) Ordinance (Cap.118). During cross-examination of the applicant his credit
was attacked by a suggestion that he had gone to a certain house in order to bribe one of the witnesses
for the respondent. The applicant was re-examined on this point by his own counsel and began his
explanation of the circumstances by telling the court what the owner of the house had said in inviting
him there. To which counsel for the respondent objected.
BAIRAMIAN, C.J.: Yesterday, Mr. Miller asked the appellant in re-examination to relate what John
Vincent said to him when inviting him to go to the house at Naimbana Road. When the witness began
his answer with the words - "He told me..." at that point Mr. Macaulay objected on the ground that it
would be hearsay. The usual meaning of hearsay is this sort of thing: if John, as a witness, states that
Henry said that James had struck Brown, then that, as a piece of evidence designed to prove that James
had struck Brown, is hearsay evidence and is excluded. Here we are not concerned with a question of
hearsay evidence. We are concerned with questions of the rights which counsel calling a witness has
in re-examination.

LIES TOLD BY A WITNESS OUT OF COURT

SEISAY AND SIAFFA V R 1967-68
In a criminal trial where a statement made by a witness out of court in the course of the investigation
is proved to be a lie, that is no proof of guilt and the judge must give a clear warning to the jury to this
effect. The failure to do so shall if there is no other evidence result in the conviction being quashed.
The appellants and one Namina were charged with manslaughter in connection allegedly with an
unlawful operation performed on the deceased. The said Namina was acquitted and discharged whilst
the appellants were convicted as charged and they appealed. During the investigation the first appellant
had made statement to the police that he had not seen the deceased earlier on and that he only saw her
when she was brought to the hospital in a cab dead. However, at the trial he said the deceased was at
his house where he had received her and allowed her to lie in a bed there and gave her some relief.
Both appellants were nurses. They both appealed. MARCUS-JONES, J.A. at 328: It appears to us that
so far as the first appellant is concerned, the jury must have taken into consideration the statement he
made to the police at the time of his apprehension, which differed from the evidence at the trial. He
however endeavoured to explain this change of front in his evidence at the trial. This no doubt
prompted learned counsel to raise the question of the failure of the learned trial judge to direct the jury
on the statement, which was at variance with his evidence at the trial. In his statement to the police the
first appellant had told the police that the only time he saw the deceased was when she was brought to
the hospital in a car, and that on feeling her pulse in the car he realized that she was dead and informed

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Namina, who had accompanied her to the car, of this fact. In his evidence at the trial, he stated for the
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first time that the deceased had been admitted into his house on the afternoon of 7 March 1966 and that
he had permitted her to lie on a bed in his room and had given her whatever help he could to bring
relief to her. This was at variance with the statement he had made to the police. He admitted this at the
trial but went to explain that the reason for making that statement to the police was because he was
afraid, he would be involved in the matter. He maintained that his evidence in chief was a correct
account of what transpired.

BROADHURST V R 1964 that it is very important that a jury should be carefully directed upon the
effect of a conclusion, if they reached it, that the accused is lying, for there is a natural tendency to
think that if he is lying, it must be because he is guilty, and accordingly to convict him without more
ado. It is the duty of the judge to make it clear to the jury that this is not so. The burden remains on the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused. Looking at the summing-up, the learned trial judge failed
to direct the jury on this aspect of the law, and this court cannot say the jury would have reached the
same conclusion had they been so directed.
Lord Devlin, giving reasons for the Privy Council's decision, said:
"Save in one respect, a case in which an accused gives untruthtul evidence is no different from one in
which he gives no evidence at all. In either case the burden remains on the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the accused. But if upon the proved facts two interences may be drawn about the accused's
conduct or state of mind, his untruthfulness is a factor which the jury can properly take into account as
strengthening the inference of guilt. What strength it adds depends, of course, on all the circumstances
and especially on whether there are other reasons other than guilt that might account for untruthfulness.
This is the sort of direction which is at least desirable to give to a jury. The directions of the judge in
the instant case were no less favourable to the appellants. In our view it cannot be said that the verdict
against the first appellant was unreasonable. We are of the opinion that the jury was in no doubt as to
who killed the deceased. Their difficulty was over the difference between murder and manslaughter in
relation to that killing. We are of the opinion that their verdicts must have been the same, had they
been directed as to their duty if unable to decide which of the two killed the deceased. The result is that
the appeal of the first appellant is dismissed.

GENET AND WILSON V R 1964 Where in a criminal trial an accused in his defence makes several
statements which are proved to be untrue or inconsistent with each other, the jury should be directed
that it is not evidence of guilt, and that the prosecution still bears the burden to prove the case against
him beyond reasonable doubt. But depending on the circumstances of the case, such as his conduct
after the offence, it will not be wrong for the judge to ask them to make whatever use they could of the
said inconsistent statements or lies and consider it together with the other evidence in the case for the
purpose of showing whether the accused was innocent or whether the lies by him told strengthen the
inference of guilt against him.

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