[G.R. No. 185379. November 27, 2009.

]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
appellee, vs. ZENAIDA QUEBRAL y
MATEO, FERNANDO LOPEZ y
AMBUS and MICHAEL SALVADOR
y JORNACION, appellants.
DECISION
ABAD, J :
p

This case is about the requirement of

authentication of seized prohibited drugs and the
conduct of warrantless search of a suspect by the
roadside based on probable cause.
The Facts and the Case
The provincial prosecutor of Bulacan charged the
accused Zenaida Quebral, Eusebio Quebral,
Fernando Lopez, and Michael Salvador before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, in
Criminal Case 3331-M-2002 with violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
At the trial of this case, the prosecution presented
PO3 Cecilio Galvez of the police force of Balagtas,
Bulacan, who testified that at 7:00 p.m. on
September 7, 2002, the Chief of the Drug
Enforcement Unit called him and other police
officers to a briefing regarding a police informer's

report that two men and a woman on board an

owner type jeep with a specific plate number
would deliver shabu, a prohibited drug, on the
following day at a Petron Gasoline Station in
Balagtas to Michael Salvador, a drug pusher in the
police watch list. 1
After a short briefing on the morning of
September 8, 2002, PO3 Galvez and six other
police officers went to the North Luzon
Expressway Balagtas Exit at Burol 2nd, watching
out for the owner type jeep mentioned. They got
there at around 7:45 a.m. Since the informer did
not give the exact time of the delivery of shabu,
the police officers staked out the expressway exit
until late afternoon. At around 4:00 p.m., such a
jeep, bearing the reported plate number and with
two men and a woman on board, came out of the
Balagtas Exit. Galvez identified the two men as
accused Eusebio Quebral, who drove the jeep,
and accused-appellant Fernando Lopez and the
woman as accused-appellant Zenaida Quebral.
The police trailed the jeep as it proceeded to the
town proper of Balagtas and entered a Petron gas
station along the McArthur Highway.
AaSIET

After a few minutes, a Tamaraw FX arrived from

which accused-appellant Michael Salvador
alighted. He walked towards the jeep and talked
to accused Zenaida Quebral, who then handed a
white envelope to him. On seeing this, PO3
Galvez, who was watching from about 15 meters
in a tinted car, signaled his back-up team to

move. The police officers alighted from their

vehicles and surrounded the jeep. Galvez took the
envelope from Michael, opened it, and saw five
plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance which he believed was shabu.
The Bulacan Provincial Crime Laboratory Office
later examined the substance and submitted a
chemistry report, 2 stating that it was shabu or
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a prohibited
drug.
Appellants denied having committed the crime,
claiming only that PO3 Galvez and his fellow
police officers merely framed them up.
On March 18, 2004 the RTC found all four accused
guilty of the crime charged and sentenced them
to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P5 million.
On May 20, 2005, while the Court of Appeals (CA)
was reviewing the case on appeal in CA-G.R. CRHC 01997, accused Eusebio Quebral died,
prompting it to dismiss the case against him. On
February 13, 2008, the CA rendered judgment, 3
entirely affirming the decision of the RTC. The
remaining accused appealed to this Court.
The Issues Presented
Appellants basically raise two issues for this
Court's resolution:
1.Whether or not the CA erred in not
excluding the evidence of the seized

shabu on the ground that, having

illegally arrested the accused, the
police officers' subsequent search of
their persons incident to such arrest
was also illegal; and
2.Whether or not the prosecution
presented ample proof of appellants'
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Rulings of the Court

One. The accused claim that since the police did
not have valid ground to arrest them, their
subsequent search of them was illegal and the
evidence of the seized shabu cannot be admitted
in evidence against them. With the exclusion of
the seized drugs, there would not be proof that
they were passing them.
The accused-appellants invoke the rule that a
person may be arrested even without a warrant
only a) if he is caught in the act of committing a
crime, b) if he has just committed a crime and the
arresting officer pursued him, or c) if he escaped
from a legal confinement. 4 But in the first two
instances, the officer must have personal
knowledge of the facts underlying the arrest. The
target person's observable acts must clearly spell
a crime. If no crime is evident from those acts, no
valid arrest can be made. An informant whispering
to the police officer's ear that the person walking
or standing on the street has committed or is
committing a crime will not do. The arresting
officer must himself perceive the manifestations

of a crime.

ETIHCa

The accused-appellants point out that in this case

the police officers cannot say that what they saw
from a distance constituted a crime. Two men and
a woman arrived on board a jeep at the gas
station. A third man approached the jeep, spoke
to the woman and she handed him a folded white
envelope that appeared to contain something.
These acts do not constitute a crime per se.
Consequently, their arrest at this point was illegal.
The subsequent search of their persons, not being
based on a valid arrest, was itself illegal.
But, actually, it was more of a search preceding
an arrest. The police officers had information that
two men and a woman on board an owner type
jeep would arrive in Balagtas and hand over a
consignment of shabu at a gas station in town to
a known drug dealer whose name was on the
police watch list. When these things unfolded
before their eyes as they watched from a
distance, the police came down on those persons
and searched them, resulting in the discovery and
seizure of a quantity of shabu in their possession.
In such a case, the search is a valid search
justifying the arrest that came after it.
This Court held in People v. Bagista 6 that the
NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and
search all vehicles coming from the north at Acop,
Tublay, Benguet, in view of the confidential
information they received from their regular
informant that a woman fitting the description of

the accused would be bringing marijuana from up

north. They likewise had probable cause to search
her belongings since she fitted the given
description. In such a case, the warrantless search
was valid and, consequently, any evidence
obtained from it is admissible against the
accused.
As the lower court aptly put it in this case, the law
enforcers already had an inkling of the personal
circumstances of the persons they were looking
for and the criminal act they were about to
commit. That these circumstances played out in
their presence supplied probable cause for the
search. The police acted on reasonable ground of
suspicion or belief supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man to believe that a crime has been
committed or is about to be committed. 7 Since
the seized shabu resulted from a valid search, it is
admissible in evidence against the accused.
It would have been impractical for the police to
apply with the appropriate court for a search
warrant since their suspicion found factual
support only at the moment accused Eusebio
Quebral, Fernando Lopez, and Zenaida Quebral
rendezvoused with Michael Salvador at the Petron
gas station for the hand over of the drugs. An
immediate search was warranted since they
would have gone away by the time the police
could apply for a search warrant. 8 The drugs
could be easily transported and concealed with

impunity.

The case of People v. Aminnudin 10 cannot apply

to this case. In Aminnudin, the informant gave the
police the name and description of the person
who would be coming down from a ship the
following day carrying a shipment of drugs. In
such a case, the Court held that the police had
ample time to seek a search warrant against the
named person so they could validly search his
luggage. In the present case, all the information
the police had about the persons in possession of
the prohibited drugs was that they were two men
and a woman on board an owner type jeep. A
search warrant issued against such persons could
be used by the police to harass practically
anyone.
EIDTAa

Two. The accused-appellants point out that the

testimony of PO3 Galvez cannot support their
conviction since it does not bear the corroboration
of the other officers involved in the police
operation against them. But the failure of these
other officers did not weaken the prosecution
evidence. The lone declaration of an eyewitness is
sufficient to convict if, as in this case, the court
finds the same credible. 11 Credibility goes into a
person's integrity, to the fact that he is worthy of
belief, 12 and does not come with the number of
witnesses. 13
The accused-appellants also point out that, since
the chemist who examined the seized substance
did not testify in court, the prosecution was

unable to establish the indispensable element of

corpus delicti. But this claim is unmeritorious. This
Court has held that the non-presentation of the
forensic chemist in illegal drug cases is an
insufficient cause for acquittal. 14 The corpus
delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes the
dangerous drug itself. This means that proof
beyond doubt of the identity of the prohibited
drug is essential. 15
Besides, corpus delicti has nothing to do with the
testimony of the laboratory analyst. In fact, this
Court has ruled that the report of an official
forensic chemist regarding a recovered prohibited
drug enjoys the presumption of regularity in its
preparation. Corollarily, under Section 44 of Rule
130, Revised Rules of Court, entries in official
records made in the performance of official duty
are prima facie evidence of the facts they state.
16 Therefore, the report of Forensic Chemical
Officer Sta. Maria that the five plastic sachets PO3
Galvez gave to her for examination contained
shabu is conclusive in the absence of evidence
proving the contrary. At any rate, as the CA
pointed out, the defense agreed during trial to
dispense with the testimony of the chemist and
stipulated on his findings. 17
Parenthetically, the accused-appellants raised
their objection to the police chemist's report only
on appeal when such objection should have been
made when the prosecution offered the same in

evidence. They may, thus, be considered to have

waived their objection to such report. 18 The
familiar rule in this jurisdiction is that the
inadmissibility of certain documents, if not urged
before the court below, cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal. 19
The accused-appellants take advantage of PO3
Galvez's testimony that they conducted their
operation on September 2, 2002, the date that
the informant gave them, and that the following
day was September 8, 2002 20 to attack his
credibility. But inconsistency is trivial and appears
to be a pure mistake. Lapses like this even
enhance the truthfulness of the testimony of a
witness as they erase any suspicion of a
rehearsed declaration. 21 Besides, PO3 Galvez
corrected this mistake on cross-examination. He
said that their informant gave them his tip at 7:00
p.m. of September 7, 2002. 22
Finally, the accused-appellants contend that the
prosecution evidence failed to show compliance
with the requirements of law for handling
evidence. But, as has been held in a recent case,
23 failure to comply strictly with those
requirements will not render the seizure of the
prohibited drugs invalid for so long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officers. Besides, the accused-appellants did not
raise it before the trial court, hence, they cannot
raise it for the first time on appeal. 24
ECaSIT

The CA and the RTC gave credence to the

testimony of PO3 Galvez and this Court finds no
reason for disagreement. His narration was clear
and candid. On the other hand, the accusedappellants' claim of a "frame-up" was easy to
concoct and so has been the common line of
defense in most cases involving violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. 25 Such defense requires
strong and convincing evidence which the
accused-appellants failed to satisfy.
As the trial court correctly observed, the accusedappellants failed to provide any reason why of all
the people plying through the roads they had
taken, the police chose to frame them up for the
crime. They also failed to explain why the police
would plant such huge amount of shabu if a small
quantity would be sufficient to send them to jail.
26 No arresting officer would plant such quantity
of shabu solely to incriminate the accused who
have not been shown to be of good financial
standing. 27
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the appeal and
AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated February 13, 2008 and of the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos dated March 18, 2004.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Leonardo-de Castro, Brion and Del
Castillo, JJ., concur.