1) The case involves a dispute over the appointment of a Provincial Budget Officer in Rizal province. The Governor recommended candidates but the DBM appointed someone else.
2) Under Executive Order 112, Budget Officers are appointed by the DBM upon recommendation of the local chief executive. However, the DBM claimed it could appoint anyone if the Governor's nominees were unqualified.
3) The Supreme Court ruled that the DBM's appointment was invalid. While it could reject unqualified nominees, it must appoint from the Governor's list of qualified candidates. The DBM does not have absolute discretion and overriding the Governor violates local autonomy.
1) The case involves a dispute over the appointment of a Provincial Budget Officer in Rizal province. The Governor recommended candidates but the DBM appointed someone else.
2) Under Executive Order 112, Budget Officers are appointed by the DBM upon recommendation of the local chief executive. However, the DBM claimed it could appoint anyone if the Governor's nominees were unqualified.
3) The Supreme Court ruled that the DBM's appointment was invalid. While it could reject unqualified nominees, it must appoint from the Governor's list of qualified candidates. The DBM does not have absolute discretion and overriding the Governor violates local autonomy.
1) The case involves a dispute over the appointment of a Provincial Budget Officer in Rizal province. The Governor recommended candidates but the DBM appointed someone else.
2) Under Executive Order 112, Budget Officers are appointed by the DBM upon recommendation of the local chief executive. However, the DBM claimed it could appoint anyone if the Governor's nominees were unqualified.
3) The Supreme Court ruled that the DBM's appointment was invalid. While it could reject unqualified nominees, it must appoint from the Governor's list of qualified candidates. The DBM does not have absolute discretion and overriding the Governor violates local autonomy.
1) The case involves a dispute over the appointment of a Provincial Budget Officer in Rizal province. The Governor recommended candidates but the DBM appointed someone else.
2) Under Executive Order 112, Budget Officers are appointed by the DBM upon recommendation of the local chief executive. However, the DBM claimed it could appoint anyone if the Governor's nominees were unqualified.
3) The Supreme Court ruled that the DBM's appointment was invalid. While it could reject unqualified nominees, it must appoint from the Governor's list of qualified candidates. The DBM does not have absolute discretion and overriding the Governor violates local autonomy.
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The key takeaways are that there is a dispute over the appointment of a Provincial Budget Officer between the Governor and the Department of Budget and Management. The Governor claims he has the sole right to recommend nominees while the DBM claims it can appoint anyone who meets the requirements.
The main issue is whether the appointment of Almajose as PBO of Rizal by DBM was valid without being nominated by the Governor.
San Juan argues that: 1) He has the sole right to recommend nominees based on EO 112. 2) His recommendation must be given mandatory application based on local autonomy. 3) DBM cannot invalidate his nominees through an administrative issuance.
SAN JUAN v.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
1. Petitioner San Juan is the Governor of the Province of Rizal 2. On March 22, 1988, the position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) for the province of Rizal was left vacant by its former holder, a certain Henedima del Rosario. 3. Gov. San Juan informed Director Reynaldo Abella of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Region IV that Ms. Dalisay Santos assumed office as Acting PBO since March 22, 1988 pursuant to a Memorandum issued by him (Gov. San Juan) 4. San Juan further requested Director Abella to endorse the appointment of the said Ms. Dalisay Santos to the contested position of PBO of Rizal. Ms. Dalisay Santos was then Municipal Budget Officer of Taytay, Rizal before she discharged the functions of acting PBO. 5. In a Memorandum addressed to the DBM Secretary, then Director Abella of Region IV recommended the appointment of the private respondent Almajose as PBO of Rizal on the basis of a comparative study of all Municipal Budget Officers of the said province which included three nominees of the petitioner. According to Abella, Almajose was the most qualified since she was the only CPA among the contenders. 6. DBM Undersecretary Nazario S. Cabuquit, Jr. signed the appointment papers of Almajose as PBO of Rizal upon the aforestated recommendation of Abella. 7. In a letter addressed to Secretary Carague, San Juan reiterated his request for the appointment of Dalisay Santos to the contested position unaware of the earlier appointment made by Undersecretary Cabuquit. 8. DBM RD Galvez wrote the petitioner that Dalisay Santos and his other recommendees did not meet the minimum requirements under Local Budget Circular No. 31 for the position of a local budget officer. Director Galvez whether or not through oversight further required the petitioner to submit at least three other qualified nominees who are qualified for the position of PBO of Rizal for evaluation and processing. 9. San Juan, after having been informed of the private respondent's appointment wrote Secretary Carague protesting against the said appointment on the grounds that Cabuquit as DBM Undersecretary is not legally authorized to appoint the PBO; that the private respondent lacks the required three years work experience as provided in Local Budget Circular No. 31; and that under Executive Order No. 112, it is the Provincial Governor, not the Regional Director or a Congressman, who has the power to recommend nominees for the position of PBO. 10. DBM through the Bureau of Legal & Legislative Affairs (BLLA) issued a Memo ruling that San Juan’s letter-protest is not meritorious considering that DBM validly exercised its prerogative in filling-up the contested position since none of the petitioner's nominees met the prescribed requirements. 11. San Juan moved for MR -denied. Thus, he wrote to CSC regarding the matter. 12. CSC issued resolutions upholding the appointment of Almajose as PBO of Rizal – also declared that San Juan’s nominees are not qualified; held that recommendation of Gov. is merely directory 13. San Juan’s argument before SC: a. he has the sole right and privilege to recommend the nominees to the position of PBO and that the appointee should come only from his nominees. EO No. 112 provides that: “ All budget officers of provinces, cities and municipalities shall be appointed henceforth by the Minister of Budget and Management upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, and they shall be placed under the administrative control and technical supervision of the Ministry of Budget and Management." b. the phrase "upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned" must be given mandatory application in consonance with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution. c. his power to recommend cannot validly be defeated by a mere administrative issuance of public respondent DBM reserving to itself the right to fill-up any existing vacancy in case the petitioner's nominees do not meet the qualification requirements as embodied in public respondent DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 31 dated February 9, 1988 d. both the public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding Almajose's appointment. ISSUE: WON the appointment of Almajose as PBO of Rizal by DBM was valid (in other words, in the event that the Governor recommends an unqualified person, is the Department Head Free to appoint anyone he fancies? SC: NO!) HELD: NO! - There is no question that under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112 the petitioner's power to recommend is subject to the qualifications prescribed by existing laws for the position of PBO. Consequently, in the event that the recommendations made by the petitioner fall short of the required standards, the appointing authority, the Minister (now Secretary) of public respondent DBM is expected to reject the same. Doubts must be construed in favor of local autonomy - Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy. Supervision v. Control (BASIC) - The 1935 Constitution had no specific article on local autonomy. However, in distinguishing between presidential control and supervision as follows: o "The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed." (Sec. 11, Article VII, 1935 Constitution) - the Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments to "general supervision . . . as may be provided by law." The President controls the executive departments. He has no such power over local governments. He has only supervision and that supervision is both general and circumscribed by statute. (Hebron v. Reyes, Tecson v. Salas) - The presidential competence is not even supervision in general, but general supervision as may be provided by law. He could not thus go beyond the applicable statutory provisions, which bind and fetter his discretion on the matter. Supervision goes no further than 'overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.' - Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate had done in the performance of their duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.' It would follow then, according to the present Chief Justice, to go back to the Hebron opinion, that the President had to abide by the then provisions of the Revised Administrative Code on suspension and removal of municipal officials, there being no power of control that he could rightfully exercise, the law clearly specifying the procedure by which such disciplinary action would be taken. APPLICATION: - When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the recommending power of the Provincial Governor as purely directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions on local autonomy. If the DBM Secretary jealously hoards the entirety of budgetary powers and ignores the right of local governments to develop self-reliance and resoluteness in the handling of their own funds, the goal of meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and set back. - The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31 which states: "SEC. 6.0 — The DBM reserves the right to fill up any existing vacancy where none of the nominees of the local chief executive meet the prescribed requirements." is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications. - DBM’s grave abuse of discretion is aggravated by the fact that Director Galvez required the Provincial Governor to submit at least three other names of nominees better qualified than his earlier recommendation. It was a meaningless exercise. The appointment of Almajose was formalized before the Governor was extended the courtesy of being informed that his nominee had been rejected. The complete disregard of the local government's prerogative and the smug belief that the DBM has absolute wisdom, authority, and discretion are manifest. Reason why PBO should be appointed upon recommendation of the Provincial Gov. - Provincial and municipal budgets are prepared at the local level and after completion are forwarded to the national officials for review. They are prepared by the local officials who must work within the constraints of those budgets. They are not formulated in the inner sanctums of an all-knowing DBM and unilaterally imposed on local governments whether or not they are relevant to local needs and resources. (boom) It is for this reason that there should be a genuine interplay, a balancing of viewpoints, and a harmonization of proposals from both the local and national officials. It is for this reason that the nomination and appointment process involves a sharing of power between the two levels of government. CONCLUSION: CSC resolutions set aside. Appointment invalid. DBM is ordered to appoint the PBO of Rizal from among qualified nominees submitted by the Provincial Governor.
Other shit (basin I ask sa recits)
Qualifications for PBO -- citizen of the Philippines, of good moral character, a holder of a degree preferably in law, commerce, public administration or any related course from a recognized college or university, a first grade civil service eligibility or its equivalent, and has acquired at least five years experience in budgeting or in any related field." Resolution sa CSC "As required by said E.O. No. 112, the DBM Secretary may choose from among the recommendees of the Provincial Governor who are thus qualified and eligible for appointment to the position of the PBO of Rizal. Notwithstanding, the recommendation of the local chief executive is merely directory and not a condition sine qua non to the exercise by the Secretary of DBM of his appointing prerogative. To rule otherwise would in effect give the law or E.O. No. 112 a different interpretation or construction not intended therein, taking into consideration that said officer has been nationalized and is directly under the control and supervision of the DBM Secretary or through his duly authorized representative. It cannot be gainsaid that said national officer has a similar role in the local government unit, only on another area or concern, to that of a Commission on Audit resident auditor. Hence, to preserve and maintain the independence of said officer from the local government unit, he must be primarily the choice of the national appointing official, and the exercise thereof must not be unduly hampered or interfered with, provided the appointee finally selected meets the requirements for the position in accordance with prescribed Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations. In other words, the appointing official is not restricted or circumscribed to the list submitted or recommended by the local chief executive in the final selection of an appointee for the position. He may consider other nominees for the position vis a vis the nominees of the local chief executive." (CSC Resolution No. 89-868, p. 2; Rollo, p. 31)
In The Matter of Save The Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement v. Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy-Digest