Duncan v. Cfi of Rizal, GR No. L-30576, February 10, 1976 - The Law Should Be Construed in Favor of The Adoption of Children

Download as pdf or txt
Download as pdf or txt
You are on page 1of 3

Duncan v. CFI of Rizal, GR No.

L-30576, February 10, 1976 - THE LAW SHOULD BE


CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF THE ADOPTION OF CHILDREN

DOCTRINE:

● Dura Lex sed lex, in adoption of children, however, this should be softened so as to
apply the law with less severity and with compassion and humane understanding,
for adoption is more for the benefit of unfortunate children, particularly those born
out of wedlock, than for those born with a silver spoon in their mouths. All efforts or acts
designed to provide homes, love, care and education for unfortunate children, who
otherwise may grow from cynical street urchins to hardened criminal offenders and
become serious social problems, should be given the widest latitude of sympathy,
encouragement and assistance. The law is not, and should not be made, an instrument
to impede the achievement of a salutary humane policy. As often as is legally and
lawfully possible, their texts and intendments should be construed so as to give
all the chances for human life to exist – with a modicum promise of a useful and
constructive existence.

FACTS:
● Sometime in May, 1967, a child, only 3 days old was given to petitioners Robin
Francis Radley Duncan and his wife Maria Lucy Christensen, for them to adopt,
by Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez. The child was later on baptized as Colin
Berry Christensen Duncan with the aforementioned spouses appearing in the
records of said baptism as the parents of said child.
● Atty. Velasquez on the other hand, received the infant from the child's unwed
mother who told the former never to reveal her identity because she wanted to
get married and did not want to destroy her future. The mother instructed Atty.
Velasquez to look for a suitable couple who will adopt the child. The mother did
not provide for the maintenance and support of her child.
● In the petition for adoption filed by petitioners in September, 1967, Atty.
Velasquez, as the de facto guardian or loco parentis of the child subject of the
adoption petition, gave the written consent required by law.

PROCEDURAL FACTS:
● During the proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the court after
learning from the testimony of witness Atty. Velasquez that the natural mother of
the child sought to be adopted was still alive, pressed upon Atty. Velasquez to
reveal the identity of said mother. Atty. Velasquez refused to divulge the same on
the ground that there existed an attorney and client relationship between them.
She had been instructed by her client not to reveal the latter's identity.
● On June 27, 1968, the CFI of Rizal ruled dismissing the adoption petition on the
ground that Art. 340 of the Civil Code was clear in mandatory terms that it SHALL
be necessary, and that it enumerates the persons who will give the consent to
adoption in order as follows: parents, guardian, or rgw person in charge of the
person to be adopted. Since either of the parents, in this case the mother, is
known to be alive and admittedly known to Atty. Velasquez, the mother is the
proper person to give parental consent to the adoption. It also ruled that there
was no attorney-client relationship that existed between the mother and Atty.
Velasquez so she was not under any compulsion to keep the name of the mother
confidential.

ISSUE:
● Whether or not the person who gave the consent for adoption, which in this case
is Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, is the proper person required by law to give
such consent.

RULING:
● The SC ruled GRANTING the petition DECLARING Colin Berry Christensen
Duncan as the adopted child and the heir of petitioners Robin Francis Radley
Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen, ANNULLING the decision of the CFI of
Rizal.
● The SC held Under Art. 340 of the Civil Code, the "parent, guardian or person in
charge of the person to be adopted" while the other one is that mentioned in
Section 3, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, describing it as each of the known living
parents "who has not abandoned such child." It is clear from the facts that the
mother, who has not inquired about the well-being of the child nor contributed to
its maintenance and care since the time the adoption proceedings started in
court, has abandoned the child. The mother also never made herself known to
the court nor to the petitioner spouses, nor made any representations in court
despite public notice of the proceedings. Therefore, there could not have been
anyone other than Atty. Velasquez who could, with reason, be called the de facto
guardian exercising patria potestas over the abandoned infant. Atty. Velasquez
then gave the proper consent as required by law to allow the adoption of Colin
Berry Christensen Duncan by the spouses Robin Francis Radley Duncan and
Maria Lucy Christensen.
● The SC held that the spouses appear to be qualified to adopt the child. There is
no showing that they suffer from any of the disqualifications under the law. Above
all, they have the means to provide the child with the proper support, care,
education and love that a growing child needs, even if they have previously
adopted another child as theirs.
● The SC held The trial court in its decision had sought refuge in the ancient
Roman legal maxim "Dura lex sed lex" to cleanse its hands of the hard and harsh
decision it rendered. While this old adage generally finds apt application in many
other legal cases, in adoption of children, however, this should be softened
so as to apply the law with less severity and with compassion and human
understanding, for adoption is more for the benefit of unfortunate children,
particularly those born out of wedlock, than for those born with a silver
spoon in their mouths. All efforts or acts designed to provide homes, love,
care and education for unfortunate children, who otherwise may grow from
cynical street urchins to hardened criminal offenders and become serious
social problems, should be given the widest latitude of sympathy,
encouragement and assistance. The Law is not, and should not be made,
an instrument to impede the achievement of a salutary humane policy. As
often as is legally and lawfully possible, their texts and intendments should
be construed so as to give all the chances for human life to exist – with a
modicum promise of a useful and constructive existence.

You might also like