Civillawreview 1 Casedigest

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)
Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
Prof. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
SUBMITTED BY: IV - LLB-4402

SURNAME 1 ABRINA 2 AQUILINO 3 BACARRA 4 BAET 5 BANOCAG 6 BARIA 7 BERMUDO 8 BUESER, AM 9 BUESER, JM 10 CARLOS 11 DAVID 12 DAYA 13 DE GUZMAN 14 DISTURA 15 GARCIA 16 GENUINO 17 GEREMIA 18 GONZAGA 19 GONZALES 20 GUILLERMO 21 GUTIERREZ 22 LAYSON 23 MALABANAN 24 MARTINEZ 25 MENDOZA 26 MOLINA 27 NEPOMUCENO 28 PATAUEG 29 PIO 30 RADOVAN 31 RODRIGUEZ 32 RONQUILLO 33 SACRAMENTO 34 SITJAR 35 TELOG 36 TOLENTINO 37 TORRES 38 YAMAT
CASES ASSIGNED for DIGEST TANADA V. TUVERA to VAN DORN V. ROMILLO QUITA V. CA to LLORENTE V. CA VELAYO V. SHELL CO. PHILS to RCPI V. CA MERALCO V. CA to REYES V. LIM NDC V. MADRIGAL to SPS. PAHANG V. METROBANK ABACAN V. NUI to REPUBLIC V. CA SILVERIO V. REPUBLIC to REPUBLIC V. ORBECIDO ATENZA V. BRILLANTES to CHING MING TSOI V. CA REPUBLIC V. MOLINA to FERRARIS V. FERRARIS ZAMORA V. ZAMORA to CALISTERIO V. CALISTERIO REPUBLIC V. NOLASCO to JIMENEZ V. REPUBLIC OCAMPO V. FLORENCIANO to PELAYO V. LAURON ILUSORIO V. ILUSORIO to ESTONINA V. CA AYALA INVESTMENT V. CA to RELUCIO V. LOPEZ HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS BANK V. DAILO to SAGUID V. REY HONTIVEROS V. RTC, BR.25 ILOILO to PATRICIO V. DARIO III ANDAL V. MACARAIG to CABATANIA V. REGODOS SAYSON V. CA to AGUSTIN V. PROLLAMANTE IN RE CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN LIN to TAMARGO V. CA LAHOM V. SIBULO to SANTOS V. CA PEREZ V. CA to ATOK V. IAC REPUBLIC V. GUZMAN to EVADEL REALTY V. SORIANO NAZARENO V. CA to HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO V. CA SERASPI V. CA to DBP V. CA VILLANUEVA V. CA to REPUBLIC V. SILIM QUILALA V. ALCANTARA to DIONISIO V. ORTIZ ROMAN CATHOLIC V. CA to CITY OF ANGELES REPUBLIC V. CA to DKC HOLDINGS V. CA ARUEGO V. CA to BUGNAO V. UBAG BAGTAS V. PAGUIO to NERA V. RIMANDI CANEDA V. CA to AZNAR V. GARCIA UNSON V. ABELLA to CANIZA V. CA PECSON V. CORONEL to ROSALES V. ROSALES FRANCISCO V. ALFONSO to DE PAPA V. CAMACHO LLORENTE V. RODRIGUEZ to DIAZ V. IAC DELA PUERTA V. CA to SARITA V. CANDIA ABLLENA DE BACAYO V. BORROMEO to SANCHEZ V. CA NAZARENO V. CA to BICARME V. CA

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. X. XI. XII. XIII. XIV. XV. XVI. XVII. XVIII. PRELIMINARY TITLE--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4 HUMAN RELATIONS--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15 PREJUDICIAL QUESTION-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 29 CIVIL PERSONALITY--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 35 CITIZENSHIP-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 36 MARRIAGE---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 39 VOID MARRIAGES------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 51 PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 53 VOIDABLE MARRIAGES---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 73 LEGAL SEPARATION-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 77 RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 82 PROPERTY RELATIONS---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 85 THE FAMILY AS AN INSTITUTION--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 108 PATERNITY AND FILIATIOIN---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 116 ADOPTION----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 136 PARENTAL AUTHORITY----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 143 CASES IN PROPERTY-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 152 CASES IN SUCCESSION----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 193

1) TAADA VS. TUVERA G.R. No. L-63915. April 24, 1985 Doctrine: The publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. Facts: The petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders. The respondents contend that the publication in the Official Gazette is not a requirement for the effectivity of the laws where the laws provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date that they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity based on Article 2 of the Civil Code. The interpretation of the respondent is in accord with the Courts construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, the Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in cases where the legislation itself does not provide for an effectivity date - for the date of publication is material in determining its date of effectivity which is the 15 th day following its publication - but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Issue: Whether there is still a need for publication of the presidential decrees with specified dates of effectivity. Held: Yes, there is still a need for publication. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Officila Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Section 1 of CA 638 provides that: Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication. The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.

become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided. " It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law be effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence. It must be noted at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government. 2. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. Thus, all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are: a. Presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution; b. Administrative rules and regulations, if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation; c. Charter of a city;
2) TAADA VS. TUVERA G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986 Facts: 1. In the first Tanada case the petitioners were invoking due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law, which is Art. 2 of the Civil Code. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of the case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. 2. Petitioners are now moving for a reconsideration/clarification of the aforementioned decision. Issue: 1. Whether or not the clause UNLESS IT IS OTHERWISE PROVIDED solely refers to the fifteen-day period and not to the requirement of publication. 2. Whether or not the word LAWS refer to all laws or only to those of general application. 3. Where should publication of said laws be made? Held: 1. The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did not

d. Circulars issued by the Monetary Board if meant to fill in the details of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce. However, no publication is required for the following: a. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public; b. Letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties; c. Municipal ordinances, which are covered by the Local Government Code. 3. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws, and publication is to be made in the Official Gazette as decided upon in the first Tanada case, however, the Court made this pronouncement: There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating, the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet been published. At any rate, the Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature. 3) PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and SERVICES CORPORATION v THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, VIVENCIO DE MESA, RODRIGO MIKIN and CEDRIC LEYSON G.R. No. 103144. April 4, 2001 Doctrine: All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution: Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the socalled letter of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties Facts: Petitioner Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment. Sometime in January 1985, private respondents, who were recruited by petitioner for employment in Saudi Arabia, were required to pay placement fees in the amount of P5,000.00 for private respondent Rodrigo L. Mikin and P6,500.00 each for private respondents Vivencio A. de Mesa and Cedric P. Leyson. After the execution of their respective work contracts, private respondents left for Saudi Arabia on January 29, 1985. They then began work for AlHejailan Consultants A/E, the foreign principal of petitioner. While in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were allegedly made to sign a second contract on February 4, 1985 which changed some of the provisions of their original contract resulting in the reduction of some of their benefits and privileges. On

April 1, 1985, their foreign employer allegedly forced them to sign a third contract which increased their work hours from 48 hours to 60 hours a week without any corresponding increase in their basic monthly salary. When they refused to sign this third contract, the services of private respondents were terminated by Al-Hejailan and they were repatriated to the Philippines. Upon their arrival in the Philippines, private respondents demanded from petitioner Philsa the return of their placement fees and for the payment of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contract. When petitioner refused, they filed a case before the POEA against petitioner Philsa and its foreign principal, Al-Hejailan. Several hearings were conducted before the POEA Hearing Officer. On the aspects of the case involving money claims arising from the employer-employee relations and illegal dismissal, the POEA rendered a decision dated August 31, 1988, ordering respondent PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT AND SERVICE CORPORATION to pay complainants, jointly and severally with its principal Al Hejailan. Almost simultaneous with the promulgation of August 31, 1988 decision of the POEA on private respondents money claim, POEA issued separate Order dated August 29, 1988 resolving the recruitment violation aspect of private respondents complaint. In this order, POEA found petitioner liable for three (3) counts of illegal exaction, two (2) counts of contract substitution and one count of withholding or unlawful deduction from salaries of workers. From the said Order, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was subsequently denied. After the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. However, public respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment affirmed en toto the assailed Order. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was likewise denied. Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari. Petitioner insists, however, that it cannot be held liable for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which may be collected from applicants, is void for lack of publication. Issue: Whether or not POEA Memorandum Circular No. 11 Series of 1983 is void for lack of publication? Held: Yes, the said memorandum circular is void for lack of publication. In Taada vs. Tuvera, the Court held, as follows: "We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution: Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the socalled letter of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties." POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 must likewise be declared ineffective as the same was never published or filed with the National Administrative Register. POEA Memorandum Order No. 2, Series of 1983 provides for the applicable schedule of placement and documentation fees for private employment agencies or authority holders. Under the said Order, the maximum amount which may be collected from prospective Filipino overseas workers is P2,500.00. The said circular was apparently issued in compliance with the provisions of Article 32 of the Labor Code. It is thus clear that the administrative circular under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not as yet been published or filed with the National Administrative Register, the same is ineffective and may not be enforced. The Office of the Solicitor General argues however that the imposition of administrative sanctions on petitioner was based not on the questioned administrative circular but on Article 32 and Article 34 (a) 28 of the Labor Code. The argument is not meritorious. The said articles of the Labor Code were never cited, much less discussed, in the body of the questioned Orders of the POEA and Secretary of Labor and Employment. In fact, the said Orders were consistent in mentioning that petitioner's violation of Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 was the basis for the imposition of administrative sanctions

against petitioner. Furthermore, even assuming that petitioner was held liable under the said provisions of the Labor Code, Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code presupposes the promulgation of a valid schedule of fees by the Department of Labor and Employment. Considering that, as, previously discussed, Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 embodying such a schedule of fees never took effect, there is thus no basis for the imposition of the administrative sanctions against petitioner The Office of the Solicitor General likewise argues that the questioned administrative circular is not among those requiring publication contemplated by Taada vs. Tuvera as it is addressed only to a specific group of persons and not to the general public. Again, there is no merit in this argument. The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group, namely private employment agencies or authority holders, does not take it away from the ambit of our ruling in Taada vs. Tuvera. In the case of Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Torres, the administrative circulars questioned therein were addressed to an even smaller group, namely Philippine and Hong Kong agencies engaged in the recruitment of workers for Hong Kong, and still the Court ruled therein that, for lack of proper publication, the said circulars may not be enforced or implemented. Our pronouncement in Taada vs. Tuvera is clear and categorical. Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not been shown to fall under any of these exceptions. 4) Unciano Paramedical College c CA G.R. No. 100335, April 7, 1993 Doctrine: Settled is the rule that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine is applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof Thus, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion. Facts: On April 16, 1990, private respondents Elena Villegas and Ted Magallanes, thru their mothers, Victoria Villegas and Jacinta Magallanes, respectively, filed before the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, a petition for injunction and damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioners Unciano Paramedical College, Inc., Mirando C. Unciano, Sr., Dominador Santos, Editha Mora, Dr. Evelyn Moral and Laureana Vitug, they alleged therein that: 1. On July 1989, the above-named students initiated a petition proposing to the school authorities the organization of a student council in the school. They solicited support of their petition from the studentry by asking the students to endorse the same with their signatures. They were able to get at least 180 signatures. 2. On August 18, 1989, the students were summoned to the Office of Dr. Moral and were admonished not to proceed with the proposal because, according to her, the school does not allow and had never allowed such an organization. 3. On October 28, 1989, in compliance with an announcement to see the Dean of Nursing, the above-named students met with Dean Vitug and Dr. Moral who informed them that they would be barred from enrollment for the second semester because the school does not allow their students to put up a student council. Dr. Moral advised them to get their Honorable Dismissal. 4. On November 6, 1989, the students again approached Dr. Moral who informed them that they were no longer allowed to enroll because they are allegedly members of the National Union of Students of the Philippines (NUSP) and the League of Filipino Students (LFS), officers of the student organization they organized, and, moreover 'drug addicts.' The students asked for proof of these accusations but were not given any. 5. On 29 November 1989, the students were informed that the President had unilaterally refused to allow them to enroll and it was up to their parents to request or appeal to the school officials to change their decision. Mrs. Victoria Villegas and Mrs. Jacinta Magallanes wrote to the school officials to request that their children be allowed to enroll . Dr. Moral informed them that the Board of Trustees will have to decide on these requests. 6. On 11 December 1989, the students were informed that the Board of Trustees had refused to grant the parents' request."

The trial court issued a temporary restraining order effective May 17, 1990, enjoining petitioner school from not enrolling private respondents in its College of Nursing and setting the hearing for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction on June 4, 1990. Petitioners filed an opposition but the RTC still ordered the school to allow the students to enroll. The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the RTC and based its the ruling in the recent case of Ariel Non, et al. vs. Hon. Sancho Dames II, , May 20, 1990, the Supreme Court, abandoned and overruled its decision in Alcuaz and declared thus: The contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions. When a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire school year 'Every student has the right to enroll in any school, college or university upon meeting its specific requirement and reasonable regulation: Provided, that except in the case of academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulation, the student is presumed to be qualified for enrollment for the entire period he is expected to his complete his course without prejudice to his right to transfer.' Hence the instant appeal. Issue: If the Ariel Non Doctrine should be applied retroactively to govern and invalidate the legal effects of the incidents that took place prior to its adoption and which incidents were proper and valid under the ALCUAZ doctrine prevailing at the time said incident took place. Held: No, the Non doctrine should not be applied to the instant case. Under the then prevailing Alcuaz doctrine which was promulgated on May 2, 1988, the contract between them and private respondents was validly terminated upon the end of the first semester of school year 1989-1990. Although said doctrine was later abandoned in Non, et al. v. Dames II, et al., supra, this case was promulgated much later, or on May 20, 1990, when the termination of the contract between them had long become fait accompli. Settled is the rule that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine is applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. Thus, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion. The ruling in the Non case should not be given a retroactive effect to cases that arose before its promulgation on May 20, 1990, as in this case, which was filed on April 16, 1990. If it were otherwise, it would result in oppression to petitioners and other schools similarly situated who relied on the ruling in the Alcuaz case, promulgated on May 2, 1988, which recognized the termination of contract theory. The contract between the parties was validly terminated upon the end of the first semester of school year 1989-1990, or in October, 1989. This is the status quo. The trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction which ordered petitioners to allow private respondents "to enroll for the first semester of school year 1990-1190." 16 Guided by the Capitol case, certainly, this writ will not restore the status quo but will go a step backward, then restore the condition preceding the status quo. Private respondents do not possess any clear legal right to re-enroll, corollarily, petitioners are not obliged legally to re-admit them. 5) Cui v Arellano University G.R. No. L-15127; May 30, 1961 Facts: Plaintiff enrolled in the College of Law of the defendant university from the school year 19481949. He finished his law studies in the defendant university up to and including the first semester of the fourth year. During all the time he was studying law in the defendant university, he was awarded scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition fees were returned to him after the end of each semester and when his scholarship grants were awarded to him. The whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff to defendant and refunded to him by the latter from the first semester up to and including the first semester of his last year in the college of law or the fourth year, is in total of P1,033.87. However, before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship grants as above stated, he was made to sign the following contract covenant and agreement which provides that in consideration of the scholarship granted to him by the University, he waives his right to transfer to another school without having refunded to the University (defendant) the equivalent of his scholarship cash.

For the last semester of his law studies, plaintiff enrolled in the college of law of the Abad Santos University and graduated therefrom. After graduating in law he applied to take the bar examination. Plaintiff then petitioned the defendant university to issue to him the needed transcripts. However, the defendant refused until after he had paid back the P1,033 87 which defendant refunded to him as above stated. As he could not take the bar examination without those transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under protest. This is the sum which plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant in this case. Issue: Whether or not the said provision of the contract is valid. Held: No, the stipulation in question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void. The practice of awarding scholarships to attract students and keep them in school is not a good custom nor has it received some kind of social and practical confirmation except in some private institutions as in Arellano University. The University of the Philippines which implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution with reference to the giving of free scholarships to gifted children, does not require scholars to reimburse the corresponding value of the scholarships if they transfer to other schools. The same goes for leading colleges and universities of the United States after which our educational practices or policies are patterned. In these institutions scholarships are granted not to attract and to keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda mine but to reward merit or help gifted students in whom society has an established interest or a first lien. 6) People vs Jabinal 55 SCRA 607 Facts: On September 5, 1964, the accused was found to be in possession of a revolver without the requisite license or permit. He claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had appointments as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the said firearm. The accused further contended that in view of his appointments, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Courts decisions in People vs. Macarandang and in People vs. Lucero. The trial court found the accused criminally liable for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition on the ground that the rulings in Macarandang* and in Lucero* were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa**. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the Supreme Courts rulings in the cases of Macarandang and of Lucero. Held: The appellant was acquitted. Decisions of the Supreme Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the law means; this is the reason why Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides that, Judicial decisions applying and interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form part of the legal system. The interpretation upon a law by the Supreme Court constitutes in a way a part of the law as of the date the law was originally passed, since the courts construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim legis interpretatio legis vim obtinetthe interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and in Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm and when he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967,but when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. Considering that the appellant possessed a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and in Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm, the appellant should be absolved. The appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable. *The accused were acquitted for through their appointment as confidential/secret agent they were deemed to be peace officers. Peace officers had the privilege of carrying firearms without license. **Mapa was convicted although he was a secret/confidential agent. The court ruled that thelaw
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did not explicitly provide that secret/confidential agents are among those who are exempted from acquiring a license to carry a firearm. abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 8) QUITA vs. CA G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998 Facts: Fe Quita and Arturo Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941, but not blessed with any children. Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, USA, submitting as evidence their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. A decree of divorce was granted on July 23, 1954. After 3 weeks, Fe married Felix Tupaz in San Francisco, but eventually ended into a divorce. For the third time, she married again in USA. April 16, 1972, Arturo died leaving no will. August 31, 1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed with RTC QC a petition for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Blandina Dandan, surviving spouse of Arturo, and their children opposed the petition. Later, Ruperto Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of deceased Arturo, intervened. October, 7, 1987, Fe moved fot the immediate declaration of heirs of deceased Arturo and distribution of his estate.
7) Van Dorn vs. Romillio 139 SCRA 139 Doctrine: It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law Facts: Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972. After the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines. They begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively. The parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982 and petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. In 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner alleging the petitioners business in Ermita (the Galeon Shop) is a conjugal property of the parties and prayed that private respondent be declared with right to manage said property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgement in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court. The Court below denied the motion to dismiss since the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree had no bearing in this case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding. Issue: Whether the foreign divorce on the parties has affected the alleged conjugal property in the Philippines? Held: It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
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The trial court disregarded the divorce between Fe and Arturo, and expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972. Issues: Whether or not Blandinas marriage to Arturo was void ab initio. Whether or not Fe can be declared the primary beneficiary of Arturos estate. Held: No, Blandinas marriage to Arturo was valid, thus, Fe cannot be declared a beneficiary to Arturos estate. At the time Fe obtained a divorce decree against Arturo in San Francisco, she was already an alien and no longer a Filipino citizen. Hence, the divorce decree is valid in the Philippines, since it is considered valid in Fes national law, which is the USA law. 9) CATALAN vs. BRAGANZA G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007 Facts: Felicitas Catalan married Orando on June 4, 1950. They migrated to USA and became naturalized citizens thereof. On April 1988, they divorced. June 16, 1988, Orlando married Merope in Pangasinan. Later, Felicitas filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with RTC Dagupan against Orlando and Merope, contending that Merope has a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol. RTC ruled in favor of Felicitas. Issue: Whether Felicitas has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of Orlando on the ground of bigamy. Held: There is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage under the New Civil Code, which is the law governing at the time of marriage between Orlando and Merope, nor even in the Family Code. however, only a party who can demonstrate proper interest can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. In the instant case, Felicitas personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained due to the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Thus, the case is remanded to trial court for reception of additional evidence necessary.
10) SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS G.R. No. 133743, February 6, 2007 Facts: The case involves the settlement of Felicisimos estate. During his lifetime, he contracted 3 marriages. First was with Virginia, who predeceased him. On May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, but ended to a divorce, when Merry filed a divorce complaint in Hawaii and was granted. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad. Felicisimo died on December 18, 1992. Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and settlement of Felicisimos estate. She filed with RTC Makati a petition for letters of administration. Rodolfo, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action, alleging that the petition should have been filed in the Province of Laguna where Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death, and that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress. Issue: Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the effectivity of the Family Code. Held: The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as the surviving spouse of Felicisimo. But there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce decree obtained by Merry, as well as the marriage of Felicidad and Felicisimo under the laws of USA. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient, proof of its authenticity and due execution must also be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
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by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. With regard to Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo solemnized in California USA, she only submitted photocopies of the Marriated Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California. The Court, however, cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. Therefore, this case was remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry and the marriage of Felicidad and Felicisimo. 11) AZNAR VS. GARCIA 7 SCRA 95 Facts: CIF of Davao directed the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C Borton, etc, in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. Helen Christensen Garcia filed an opposition, as it deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by the Court as one. The court ruled that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States of America and of the State of California at the time of his death and he was domiciled in the Philippines. Issue: Whether or not the Philippine Law shall govern the administration of the will of Edward Christensen. Held: The Court ruled that the Philippine Law shall govern the testamentary disposition of Edward Christensen. Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that the national law shall govern intestate and testamentary successions. National law refers to the private law of the state of which the decedent is a citizen, in the case at bar, the private law of the State of California. Article 94 of the Civil Code of State of California refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. 12) BELLIS vs. BELLIS 20 SCRA 358 Facts: Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, United States. He had 5 legitimate children with his first wife, 3 legitimate children with hi second wife, and had 3 illegitimate children. On August 5, 1952, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines. July 8, 1958, Amos died. On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children of Amos Bellis, and therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased. Under the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs of legitimes. Issue: Which law must apply Texas Law or Philippine Law? Held: The decedents national law, which is the Texas law, governs the order of succession, the amount of successional rights, the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and the capacity to succeed. It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. A provision in a foreigners will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine Law and not with his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law should govern. Since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas Law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos Bellis. 13) TESTATE ESTATE OF BOHANAN BOHANAN G.R. No. L-12105, January 30, 1960 vs.
Facts: On April 24, 1950, admitting to probate C. O. Bohanans last will and testament, executed on April 23, 1944 in Manila, CFI found that the testator was born in Nebraska and a citizen of California, but temporarily stayed in the Philippines for a long period of time. At the time of his death, he was a citizen of the United States and of the State of Nevada, and his will was executed in accordance
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with the laws of the state of Nevada. Out of his total estate of P211,639.33 in cash, the testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and of all shares of stock of several mining companies and to his brother and sister the same amount. To his children, he gave a legacy of only P6,000 each. Magdalena, his wife, and her 2 children opposed the validity of the testamentary provisions contending that the will deprived them of their legitime. Magdalena alleged that the trial court erred in recognizing the Reno divorce secured by the testator from his Filipino wife Magdalena, and that divorce should be declared a nullity in this jurisdiction. According to the laws of the State of Nevada, no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife. The divorce was granted to the testator on May 20, 1922. Issue: Whether Philippine laws or the law of the State of Nevada should apply. Held: The testator died in 1944, thus, the old Civil Code governs. The old Civil Code provides that successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law of the person whose succession is in question. The foreign law, specifically Section 9905, compiled Newada Laws, was introduced as evidence. That law can be taken judicial notice by the Court, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition. According to Article 10 of the Old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions are governed by the national law of the testator, and it has been decided without dispute that the national law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada, which allows a testator to dispose of all his property according to his will. 14) LLORENTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000 Facts: Lorenzo (enlisted serviceman of the US Navy from March 10, 1927 Septermber 30, 1957) and Paula were married on February 22, 1937. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo went back to the US while Paula stayed in the conjugal home at Camarines Sur. On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was naturalized as an American citizen. He visited the Philippines and discovered that his wife, Paula was pregnant and was living in with his brother Ceferino. On November 1, 1951, Lorenzo filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California and was granted. On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia in Manila and begot 3 children. On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a notarized Last Will and Testament. On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament, moving that Alicia be appointed as Special Administratrix of his estate, but was denied because Lorenzo was still alive. On January 24, 1984, trial court admitted the will to probate. On June 11, 1985, Lorenzo died. On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate in her favor, contending that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse and that the testamentary provisions in Lorenzos will encroached on her legitime and share in the conjugal property. Issue: Whether or not Paula is entitled to inherit from Lorenzos estate. Held: Foreign law should apply. Lorenzos divorce decree with Paula is recognized as valid. Foreign laws must be alleged and proved. Our courts do not take judicial notice of them. The fact is Lorenzo became an American citizen long before and at the time of 1) his divorce from Paula; 2) marriage to Alicia; 3) execution of his will; and 4) death. Issues arising from these incidents are governed by foreign law. Both RTC and CA decisions in hastily applying Philippine law are erroneous. Heres why: 1) Aliens may obtain divorces abroad provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, LORENZOs divorce from PAULA was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. 2) LORENZOs will is valid. Article 17 The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. In this case, whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated. The trial court should not that Congress did not intend to extend the same succession (system of legitime) to foreign nationals.
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II. HUMAN RELATIONS 15) ALFREDO M. VELAYO vs. SHELL G.R. No. L-7817, October 31, 1956. FACTS CALI, a domestic airline corporation, met with its creditors to inform them that the corporation was on the verge of insolvency and had to stop operations. To ensure payment of their claims against CALI, the creditors agreed that it would be advantageous not to present suits against CALI but to strive for a fair pro-rata division of its assets, although CALI announced that in case of non-agreement of the creditors on a pro-rata division of the assets, it would file insolvency proceedings. Right after the meeting, defendant Shell Philippines, one of CALIs creditors who was present in the meeting and who agreed to the pro-rata division, assigned its credit to its sister company, Shell USA. Shell USA then filed with a California court an action for collection of the assigned credit and applied for a writ of attachment against CALIs Douglas C-54 plane which was in California. Prior to the meeting with creditors, CALI had already offered the plane to Shell Philippine but the offer was rejected. Velayo, as assignee of the other creditors of CALI, filed this action for damages against defendant Shell Philippines. He claims that that fraudulent assignment of Shell Philippines credit to Shall USA prejudiced the other creditors and was contrary to the agreed pro-rata division of assets. ISSUE: WON Shell Philippines, taking advantage of its knowledge of the existence of CALI's airplane in the US, acted in bad faith in assigning its credit to its sister company effectively defeating the agreed pro-rata division of assets among the creditors of CALI. HELD: PROVISIONS ON HUMAN RELATIONS INTENDED AS CATCH-ALL PROVISIONS FOR ANY WRONG FOR WHICH NO SPECIFIC REMEDY IS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW. Defendant schemed and effected the transfer to its sister corporation in the United States, where CALI's plane C- 54 was. By that swift and unsuspected operation efficaciously disposed of said insolvent's property depriving the latter and the Assignee that was latter appointed, of the opportunity to recover said plane. Chapter 2 of the PRELIMINARY TITLE of the Civil Code, dealing on Human Relations, provides the following: "Art 19. Any person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performances of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith". It maybe said that this article only contains a mere declaration of principles and while such statement may be is essentially correct, yet We find that such declaration is implemented by Article 21 and sequence of the same Chapter which prescribe the following: "Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage". Another rule is expressed in Article 24 which compels the return of a thing acquired 'without just or legal grounds'. This provision embodies the doctrine that no person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another, which has been one of the mainstays of every legal system for centuries. It is most needful that this ancient principle be clearly and specifically consecrated in the Civil Code to the end that in cases not foreseen by the lawmaker, no one may unjustly benefit himself to the prejudice of another. Now, if Article 23 of the Civil Code goes as far as to provide that: "Even if an act or event causing damage to another's property was not due to the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited." with much more reason the Defendant should be liable for indemnity for acts it committed in bad faith and with betrayal of confidence. Arnel P. Bacarra 16) Albenson Enterprises Corporation vs. CA G.R. No. 88694, January 11, 1993 FACTS: Petitioner Albenson Enterprises delivered to Guaranteed Industries, located at 3267 V. Mapa St. Sta.Mesa, Manila, mild steel plates. As part payment, Albenson was given a check drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks. However, when the check was presented for payment, it was
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dishonored because of lack of funds. This led Albenson to trace the origin. This led them to a certain Eugenio Baltao. They made afterwards an extrajudicial demand to private respondent Baltao. But he denied that he signed on the check because Guaranteed Industries was already inexistent. This led Albenson to file a criminal complaint for violation of BP 22. However, it was later found out that his namesake, Eugenio Baltao III, his son, was the one who manages E.L. Woodworks located on the ground floor of the Baltao Building. Nevertheless, Assistant Fiscal Sumaway filed the information. But Provincial Fiscal Castro instructed the trial fiscal to dismiss the information. Because of the unjust filing of the criminal complaint, Baltao filed a complaint for damages against Albenson Enterprises. The trial court ruled in favor of Baltao. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the criminal complaint by Albenson Enterprises constituted an abuse of right? RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Under Article 19 of the Civil Code, the following are the requisites for abuse of right: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure. A closer look at the said articles and it can be revealed that Articles 19 and 21 share a common element: that the act is intentional. Article 20, however, does not distinguish. It is dependent on the circumstances of the case. By applying these to the case at hand, it cannot be said that Albenson Enterprises was abusing the rights of Baltao. The trial court and the appellate court made a mistake of lumping the three articles and used them as bases for the award of damages in a civil complaint filed against the petitioners. Albenson was prompted by its natural instinct and right to file a criminal complaint because it was not able to collect the payment of the mild steel plates it had delivered. It had every right to exhaust all legal remedies to collect its unpaid credit. Arnel P. Bacarra 17) GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS G.R No. 81262, August 25, 1983 FACTS: Private respondent Tobias was employed by Globe Mackay in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant. Petitioner discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos. Tobias was implicated as the number one suspect. Police investigations were conducted as a result of said anomaly. The police reports exculpated Tobias from any participation in the offense. Unsatisfied, petitioner still hired private investigators. Pending the investigation of the private detectives, petitioner filed a complaint for estafa against Tobias. Later, Tobias was terminated. Hence, he filed an action for illegal dismissal. While his case awaits resolution, he sought employment with RETELCO. However, petitioner, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed due to dishonesty. Thus, Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious and abusive acts of petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should indemnify private respondent for damages. HELD: Article 19 of the Civil Code known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. Violation of Article 19 can result to right to damages pursuant to Article 21 or Article 22. This article was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury. In the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since they were merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent.
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Nevertheless, the Court, after examining the record and circumstances of the case ruled that petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent. Notwithstanding the fact that it was private respondent Tobias who reported the possible existence of anomalous transactions, petitioner Hendry showed belligerence and told plaintiff that he was the number one suspect and to take a one week vacation leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave his keys to petitioner Hendry. The high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. And this reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue when private respondent returned to work after his one week forced leave. Upon reporting for work, Tobias was confronted by Hendry who said. "Tobby, you are the crook and swindler in this company." The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. Therefore, petitioners are liable for damages. Arnel P. Bacarra 18) BARONS MARKETING VS. CA G.R. No. 126486, February 9, 1998 FACTS Private respondent Phelps Dodge, Phil. Appointed petitioner Barons Marketing Corp as one of its dealers of electrical wires and cables. As such, petitioner was given by private respondent 60 days credit for its purchases reckoned from the date of delivery. During the period December 1986 to August 1987, defendant purchased on credit from plaintiff various electrical wires and cables in the total amount of P4,102,438.3. Of this amount, P300,000 was paid leaving a balance of P3,802,748.2. Respondent wrote petitioner demanding payment of its unpaid obligation. In response, petitioner requests to pay the amount in monthly installments of P500,000 plus 1% interest. Said offer was rejected by respondent. Thereafter, private respondent filed a complaint before the Pasig RTC against petitioner for recovery of P3,802,748.2, including interest with 25% attorneys fees, exemplary damages of P100,000 and cost of litigation. In its answer, petitioner admitted the purchase made but disputed the amount. Petitioner likewise interposed a counterclaim on the ground of abuse of rights since it suffered injury to its reputation. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of private respondent, which decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is guilty of abuse of rights or whether private respondent intended to prejudice or injure petitioner when it rejected petitioners offer and filed the action for collection. HELD: No. It is an elementary rule in jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the same. In the case at bar, petitioner has failed to prove bad faith on the part of private respondent. Private respondent was driven by legitimate reasons for rejecting petitioners offer and instituting the action for collection before the trial court. As pointed out by private respondent. The corporation had its own cash position to protect in order to pay its own obligations. Clearly, this would be inimical to the interests of any enterprise, especially profit-oriented one like private respondent. It is plain to see that this is a case of an exercise of rights, not an abuse thereof. As such, private respondent has not acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy as to violate Article 21 of the Civil Code. Arnel P. Bacarra 19) MWSS vs. Act Theater G.R. No. 147076, June 17, 2004 FACTS: On September 22, 1988, four employees of the respondent Act Theater, Inc., namely, Rodolfo Tabian, Armando Aguilar, Arnel Concha and Modesto Ruales, were apprehended by members of the Quezon City police force for allegedly tampering a water meter in violation of P.D. No. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg. 876. On account of the incident, the respondents water service connection was cut off. Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint for injunction with damages against the petitioner MWSS.
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In the civil case, the respondent alleged in its complaint filed with the court a quo that the petitioner acted arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously, in cutting off the respondents water service connection without prior notice. Due to lack of water, the health and sanitation, not only of the respondents patrons but in the surrounding premises as well, were adversely affected. The respondent prayed that the petitioner be directed to pay damages. The petitioner insists that in cutting off the respondents water service connection, the petitioner merely exercised its proprietary right under Article 429 of the Civil Code, which provides that the owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner validly exercised its right under Article 429 of the Civil Code. HELD: No, the petitioner did not validly exercise its right under Article 429 of the Civil Code. A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional law, or recognized as a result of long usage, constitutive of a legally enforceable claim of one person against the other. Concededly, the petitioner, as the owner of the utility providing water supply to certain consumers including the respondent, had the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. However, the exercise of rights is not without limitations. Having the right should not be confused with the manner by which such right is to be exercised. When a right is exercised in a manner, which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which actor can be held accountable. In this case, the petitioner failed to act with justice and give the respondent what is due to it when the petitioner unceremoniously cut off the respondents water service connection. Arnel P. Bacarra 20) Carpio vs. Valmonte G.R. No. 151866, September 9, 2004 FACTS: Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and Jon Sierra engaged her services for their church wedding. At about 4:30 p.m. on that day, Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel where the bride and her family were billeted. When she arrived, several persons were already there. Among those present was petitioner Soledad Carpio, an aunt of the bride who was preparing to dress up for the occasion. After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite. She proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant where the reception was to be held. She paid the suppliers, gave the meal allowance to the band, and went back to the suite. Upon entering the suite, Valmonte noticed the people staring at her. It was at this juncture that petitioner allegedly uttered the following words to Valmonte: "Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang and lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha." Petitioner then ordered one of the ladies to search Valmontes bag. It turned out that after Valmonte left the room to attend to her duties, petitioner discovered that the pieces of jewelry which she placed inside the comfort room in a paper bag were lost. The bags and personal belongings of all the people inside the room were searched. Valmonte was allegedly bodily searched, interrogated and trailed by a security guard throughout the evening. Later, police officers arrived and interviewed all persons who had access to the suite and fingerprinted them including Valmonte. During all the time Valmonte was being interrogated by the police officers, petitioner kept on saying the words "Siya lang ang lumabas ng kwarto." Valmontes car which was parked at the hotel premises was also searched but the search yielded nothing. After a futile attempt for a formal apology, Valmonte filed a suit for damages against Carpio. The trial court rendered dismissed Valmontes complaint for damages. It ruled that when petitioner sought investigation for the loss of her jewelry, she was merely exercising her right and if damage results from a person exercising his legal right, it is damnum absque injuria. The CA reversed, holding that petitioners verbal assault upon Valmonte was done with malice and in bad faith since it was made in the presence of many people without any solid proof except petitioners suspicion. Such unfounded accusation entitles Valmonte to an award of moral damages for she was publicly humiliated, deeply insulted, and embarrassed. ISSUE: Should Valmonte be entitled to
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Damages? HELD: Yes. The victim of a wrongful act or omission, whether done willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained. Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity but also universal moral precepts which are designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience and which are meant to serve as guides for human conduct. First of these fundamental precepts is the principle commonly known as "abuse of rights" under Article 19 of the Civil Code. It provides that "Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith." One is not allowed to exercise his right in a manner which would cause unnecessary prejudice to another or if he would thereby offend morals or good customs. In the case at bar, petitioners verbal reproach against respondent was certainly uncalled for considering that by her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside the paper bag. This being the case, she had no right to attack respondent with her innuendos which were not merely inquisitive but outrightly accusatory. By openly accusing respondent as the only person who went out of the room before the loss of the jewelry in the presence of all the guests therein, and ordering that she be immediately bodily searched, petitioner virtually branded respondent as the thief. True, petitioner had the right to ascertain the identity of the malefactor, but to malign respondent without an iota of proof that she was the one who actually stole the jewelry is an act which, by any standard or principle of law is impermissible. Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner which is contrary to morals and good customs. Her firmness and resolve to find her missing jewelry cannot justify her acts toward respondent. She did not act with justice and good faith for apparently, she had no other purpose in mind but to prejudice respondent. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for which she should be held accountable. Arnel P. Bacarra FACTS: Plaintiff-respondent Loreto Dionela alleges that the defamatory words on the telegram sent to him not only wounded his feelings but also caused him undue embarrassment and affected adversely his business as well because other people have come to know of said defamatory words. Defendantcorporation as a defense, alleges that the additional words in Tagalog was a private joke between the sending and receiving operators and that they were not addressed to or intended for plaintiff and therefore did not form part of the telegram and that the Tagalog words are not defamatory. The telegram sent through its facilities was received in its station at Legaspi City. Nobody other than the operator manned the teletype machine which automatically receives telegrams being transmitted. The said telegram was detached from the machine and placed inside a sealed envelope and delivered to plaintiff, obviously as is. The additional words in Tagalog were never noticed and were included in the telegram when delivered. The trial court ruled that in favor of the plaintiff holding that the liability of petitioner-companyemployer is predicated on Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, upon appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner-companyemployer is liable for damages under Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. HELD: Yes. The cause of action of the private respondent is based on Arts. 19 and 20 of the New Civil Code. As well as on respondent's breach of contract thru the negligence of its own employees. Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of receiving and transmitting messages. Every time a person transmits a message through the facilities of the petitioner, a contract is entered into. Upon receipt of the rate or fee fixed, the petitioner undertakes to transmit the message accurately. There is no question that in the case at bar, libelous matters were included in the message transmitted, without the consent or knowledge of the sender. There is a clear case of breach of contract by the petitioner in adding extraneous and libelous matters in the message sent to the private respondent. As a corporation, the petitioner can act only through its employees. Hence the acts of its employees in receiving and transmitting messages are the acts of the petitioner.
21) RCPI VS CA G.R No. L-44748, August 29, 1986
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To hold that the petitioner is not liable directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of petitioner's business is to deprive the general public availing of the services of the petitioner of an effective and adequate remedy. In most cases, negligence must be proved in order that plaintiff may recover. However, since negligence may be hard to substantiate in some cases, we may apply the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself), by considering the presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the injury. The decision is affirmed. 22) MERALCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-39019, January 22, 1988 FACTS: Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a public utility corporation providing electric power for the consumption of the general public in Metro Manila. Petitioner Pedro Yambao is a bill collector of MERALCO. Private respondents Isaac Chaves and Juana O. Chaves, husband and wife, filed the complaint for damages, together with their children, Isaac Chaves Jr. and Rosendo Chaves. Isaac Sr. And Isaac Jr. and Rosendo were members of the Philippine Bar; Isaac Sr. And Isaac Jr. were practicing lawyers and Rosendo was a legal officer at the Agricultural Productivity Commission. Juana O. Chaves was a public school teacher. Private respondents became the customer of petitioner MERALCO in the year 1953. At or about the end of March, 1965, petitioner Yambao went to the residence of private respondents and presented two overdue bills, one for January 11 to February 9, 1965, for the sum of P7.90, and the other for February 9 to March 10, 1965, for the sum of P7.20. On April 2, 1965, Isaac Chaves went to the main office of petitioner but paid only one bill, for January 11 to February 9, 1965, leaving the other bill unpaid. Thereafter, on April 21, 1965, petitioner caused the electric service in private respondents residence to be discontinued and the power line cut off. On the following day, Rosendo went to petitioners main office and paid the unpaid bill. The power line was restored at about 7:00 pm on the same day. Private respondents filed an action for recovery of damages for embarrassment, humiliation, wounded feelings and hurt pride by reason of the disconnection of their electric service by the petitioner. The CFI ordered rendered decision in favor of private respondent, ordering petitioner to pay private respondent moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees. The Court of Appeal, affirmed in toto the trial courts decision. Respondent Court stressed the importance and necessity of 48 hour advance written notification before the disconnection of service may be effected. ISSUE: Whether advance written notification before the disconnection of service may be effected? RULING: Yes. Petitioner being a public Utility having monopoly of the supply of electrical power in Metro Manila and some nearby municipalities. Being such, the State may regulate the conditions under which the manner by which a public utility such as MERALCO may effect a disconnection of service to delinquent customer. Among others, a prior written notice to the customer is required before disconnection of service. Failure to give such prior notice amounts to a tort. 23) CUSTUDIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996. FACTS: Herein private respondents owned a parcel of land wherein a two-storey apartment building was constituted therein, for this, tenants then were occupying the latter building. Such property was surrounded by other immovables (houses) owned by herein petitioners, Custidio and Santos. Before reaching the property of the private respondents from the P. Burgos St. there were two passage ways in between the said other immovable, but however, they were only narrow paths. After sometimes, the petitioners constructed adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses along their property which is also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. As a result, the tenants left the apartment because there was no longer a permanent access -ingress and engress to the public street. The private respondents filed an action for the grant of an easement of right of way. The trial court ordered the petitioner to give plaintiff permanent access ingress and egress, to the public street and that in turn, the private respondent will pay a
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sum of Php 8000 to the petitioner as an indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway. On appeal by the private respondent to the CA, the latter Court affirmed the decision of the lower court as to give a right of way to the private respondents and awarded the latter actual, moral and exemplary damages. For this, petitioner appealed to the SC questioning the award of damages. ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is proper? RULING: No. A reading of the decision of the Court of Appeals will show that the award of damages was based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of the passageway. However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury, and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that (e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon. At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that private respondents had no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation. It was only that decision which gave private respondents the right to use the said passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right. 24) GASHEM vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 97336. February 19, 1993. FACTS: On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is 22 years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; that the plaintiff is an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette, Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City and that the parties happened to know each other when the Manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johnny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff; the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with
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him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; as a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort the foetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. In his Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport. After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered a decision favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees. The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, (d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions made some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The CA affirmed in toto the trial court's ruling. Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. RULING: It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not possess good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law wife" is now his legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable. The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong . Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committee on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote: "The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American states .." This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
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human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Article 2176, of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus: "Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter." is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an AngloAmerican or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the AngloAmerican law on torts. In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction. We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, the private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing." These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstanced could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and so brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty
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and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations. No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions. The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto. We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity. 25) RELLOSA vs. PELLOSIS G.R. No. 138964 August 9, 2001. FACTS: Respondents were lessees of a parcel of land, owned by one Marta Reyes, located at Malate, Manila. Respondents had built their houses on the land which, over the years, underwent continuous improvements. After the demise of Marta, the land was inherited by her son Victor Reyes. Sometime in 1986, Victor informed respondents that, for being lessees of the land for more than twenty (20) years, they would have a right of first refusal to buy the land. Sometime in the early part of 1989, without the knowledge of respondents, the land occupied by them was sold to petitioner Cynthia Ortega who was able to ultimately secure title to the property in her name. On 31 May 1989, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a suit for the "Declaration of Nullity of the Sale," made in favor of petitioner Cynthia Ortega predicated upon their right of first refusal. The Office of the Building Official issued a resolution ordering the demolition of the houses of respondents. The following day Cynthia Ortega, together with her father and co-petitioner, Vicente Rellosa, hired workers to commence the demolition of respondents' houses. Due to the timely intervention of a mobile unit of the Western Police District, the intended demolition did not take place following talks between petitioner Rellosa and counsel who pleaded that the demolition be suspended since the order sought to be implemented was not yet final and executory. On 11 December 1989, respondents filed their appeal contesting the order of the Office of the Building Official. On 12 December 1989, petitioners once again hired workers and proceeded with the demolition of respondents' houses. Respondents filed Civil Case before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, praying that petitioners be ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees, for the untimely demolition of the houses. The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents and instead ordered them to pay petitioners moral damages. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered petitioners to pay respondents of moral damages, exemplary damages and Attorney's fees. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a premature demolition RULING: The Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals that there was a premature demolition. Hence, the petitioners should pay damages to the lessees. A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional law, or recognized as a result of long usage, constitutive of a legally enforceable claim of one person against another. The exercise of these rights is not without limitations. The abuse of rights rule established in Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person to act with justice, to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held accountable. At the time petitioners implemented the order of demolition, barely five days after respondents received a copy thereof, the same was not yet final and executory. The law provided for a fifteen-day appeal period in favor of a party aggrieved by an adverse ruling of the Office of the Building Official but by the precipitate action of petitioners in demolishing the houses of respondents (prior to the expiration of the period to appeal), the latter were effectively deprived of this recourse. The fact that
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the order of demolition was later affirmed by the Department of Public Works and Highways was of no moment. The action of petitioners up to the point where they were able to secure an order of demolition was not condemnable but implementing the order unmindful of the right of respondents to contest the ruling was a different matter and could only be held utterly indefensible. Digested by: Baet, Mark 26) NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION PHILIPP BROTHERS OCEANIC, INC. G.R. No. 126204, November 20, 2001 vs. damages due to the delay in the delivery of the first coal shipment. This prompted PHIBRO to file an action for damages with application for injunction against NAPOCOR with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Makati City. In its complaint, PHIBRO alleged that NAPOCOR's act of disqualifying it in the October 1987 bidding and in all subsequent biddings was tainted with malice and bad faith. ISSUE: Whether or not NAPOCOR abused its right or acted unjustly in disqualifying PHIBRO from the public bidding. RULING: No. NAPOCOR was not bound under any contract to approve PHIBRO's pre-qualification requirements. In fact, NAPOCOR had expressly reserved its right to reject bids as provided in its Instruction to Bidders found in the "Post-Qualification Documents/Specifications for the Supply and Delivery of Coal for the Batangas Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant I. 27) FRENZEL vs. CATITO G.R. No. 143958, July 11, 2003 FACTS: Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent who was married to Teresita Santos, a Filipino citizen. He works as a pilot for New Guinea Airlines. On the other hand, private respondent Ederlina P. Catito was married to Klaus Muller, a German national. She worked as a masseuse in the Kings Cross nightclub in Sydney, Australia. The two met when Alfred went on a vacation in Sydney. They met again and this time, Alfred was able to convince Ederlina to stop working and to go back to the Philippines. When she returned to the Philippines, she was given money by Alfred to put up a beauty salon. Later on, he also gave money to her to be able to purchase a house and lot in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. But since he was aware that aliens were prohibited to purchase lands, he agreed to have Ederlina as the sole vendee. Later also, they opened two bank accounts with the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation in Kowloon, Hong Kong. Also, there were subsequent purchases of other real and personal properties. These were made on the anticipation on the part of Alfred that he and Ederlina will get married soon. However, this failed to materialize because of the fact that Ederlina was still married to Klaus. Ederlina failed to secure a divorce from Klaus. This exasperated Alfred and eventually
FACTS: On May 14, 1987, the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) issued invitations to bid for the supply and delivery of 120,000 metric tons of imported coal for its Batangas Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant in Calaca, Batangas. The Philipp Brothers Oceanic, Inc. (PHIBRO) prequalified and was allowed to participate as one of the bidders. After the public bidding was conducted, PHIBRO's bid was accepted. NAPOCOR's acceptance was conveyed in a letter dated July 8, 1987, which was received by PHIBRO on July 15, 1987. On July 10, 1987, PHIBRO sent word to NAPOCOR that industrial disputes might soon plague Australia, the shipment's point of origin, which could seriously hamper PHIBRO's ability to supply the needed coal. From July 23 to July 31, 1987, PHIBRO again apprised NAPOCOR of the situation in Australia, particularly informing the latter that the ship owners therein are not willing to load cargo unless a "strikefree" clause is incorporated in the charter party or the contract of carriage. In order to hasten the transfer of coal, PHIBRO proposed to NAPOCOR that they equally share the burden of a "strike-free" clause. NAPOCOR refused. On August 6, 1987, PHIBRO received from NAPOCOR a confirmed and workable letter of credit. Instead of delivering the coal on or before the thirtieth day after receipt of the Letter of Credit, as agreed upon by the parties in the July contract, PHIBRO effected its first shipment only on November 17, 1987. Consequently, in October 1987, NAPOCOR once more advertised for the delivery of coal to its Calaca thermal plant. PHIBRO participated anew in this subsequent bidding. On November 24, 1987, NAPOCOR disapproved PHIBRO's application for pre-qualification to bid for not meeting the minimum requirements. Upon further inquiry, PHIBRO found that the real reason for the disapproval was its purported failure to satisfy NAPOCOR's demand for
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their relationship started to fade. Later on, Alfred filed a complaint before the RTC of Davao City for recovery of real and personal properties. He demanded from Ederlina that she return all the money that were used to purchase the properties and also the properties which were bought, especially the house and lot and three other lots. However, the complaint of Alfred was dismissed by the RTC. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. ISSUE: Whether or not Alfred is entitled to recover the said properties? RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The contention of petitioner Frenzel that to bar him from recovering the properties would be in violation of Article 22 of the Civil Code on unjust enrichment did not hold water. It must be remembered that a contract which violates the Constitution and the laws is void and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It does not produce any legal effect. His reliance on Article 22 is misplaced because in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or the parties are in pari delicto. This is founded on the general principles of public policy. It must be remembered that Alfred knew all along that he was disqualified from purchasing lands. His contention that he entered into the transaction because he was expecting that he and Ederlina will get married in the future is not a valid one. He also knew that he cannot get married to Ederlina because he still had a valid existing marriage with Teresita Santos. 28) REYES vs. LIM G.R. No. 134241, August 11, 2003 FACTS: Petitoner Reyes and private respondent Lim entered into a Contract to sell a parcel of land located in F.B. Harrison, St. The parties stipulated that Lim shall pay a down payment of P10 Million of the P28 Million purchase price. On one hand, Reyes shall ensure that the lessee of the property, Harrison Lumber, shall have vacated the lot upon payment of the balance. The day to consummate the contract arrived however Harrison Lumber has still not vacated the land. Worse, Lim found out that Reyes had already sold the lot to Line One Food Corporation. Aggrieved, Lim filed an action for specific performance and nullification of the subsequent contract of sale plus damages. The trial court and Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Lim. Hence, the present petition. Reyes primarily contends that the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision when it was based on equity. Petitioner argues that it is Rule 57 to 61 of the Rules on Civil Procedure which should be applied. ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of petitioner is tenable. RULING: According to the Supreme Court, the case involves an issue left unanswerable due to silence or insufficiency of the law and the rules of court. At this instance, Article 9 of the Civil Code expressly mandates the Court to make a ruling despite the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law. This calls for equity which fills open spaces in the law. Before rescission of the contract can be had, the parties must be restored to their status quo ante. This was ordered by the Court. To rule otherwise would improve Reyes to the detriment of Lim contrary to Article 22 of the Civil Code which provides that no person shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another. Article 22 applies to substantive as well as procedural remedies. Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 29) NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY vs. MADRIGAL WAN HAI LINES CORPORATION G.R. No. 148332, September 30, 2003 FACTS: The National Development Company, petitioner, is a government-owned and controlled corporation. petitioners Board of Directors approved the privatization plan of the NSCP. In May 1993, the Board offered for sale to the public its one hundred percent (100%) stock ownership in NSCP as well as its three (3) ocean-going vessels (M/V National Honor, M/V National Pride and M/V National Dignity). Consequently, petitioner released to the public an Information Package containing NSCPs background, assets, operational and financial status. During the public bidding the lone bidder was herein respondent, Madrigal Wan Hai Lines Corporation, a domestic private corporation. Mr. Willie J. Uy, respondents Consultant, submitted a bid of $15 million through the Proposal Letter Form. The respondents bid was rejected by petitioner and the Commission on Audit. But since there was no other bidder, petitioner entered into a negotiated sale with respondent. After
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several negotiations, respondent increased its offer to $18.5 million which was accepted by petitioner. Accordingly, petitioner issued a Notice of Award to respondent of the sale of the NSCP shares and vessels for $18.5 million.petitioner and respondent executed the corresponding Contract of Sale, and the latter acquired NSCP, its assets, personnel, records and its three (3) vessels. After a while, respondent was surprised to receive from the US Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service (US IRS), a Notice of Final Assessment against NSCP for deficiency taxes on gross transportation income derived from US sources for the years ending 1990, 1991 and 1992. Anxious that the delay in the payment of the deficiency taxes may hamper its shipping operations overseas, assumed and paid petitioners tax liabilities, including the tax due for the year 1993.Eventually, respondent demanded from petitioner reimbursement for the amounts it paid to the US IRS. But petitioner refused despite repeated demands. Hence, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court complaint against petitioner for reimbursement and damages the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondent and against petitioner. The trial court found, among others, that even before the sale, petitioner knew that NSCP had tax liabilities with the US IRS, yet it did not inform respondent about it. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the trial courts judgment with modification. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is legally bound to reimburse respondent for the amounts it paid corresponding to the formers tax liabilities to the US IRS. HELD: The case at bar calls to mind the principle of unjust enrichment Nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari potest. No person shall be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of others. This principle of equity has been enshrined in our Civil Code, Article 22 of which provides: Art. 22. Every person who through an act or performance by another or by any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. Justice and equity thus oblige that petitioner be held liable for NSCPs tax liabilities and reimburse respondent for the amounts it paid. It would be unjust enrichment on the part of petitioner to be relieved of that obligation. DIGEST BY: JIHAN A.M. BANOCAG 30) ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984 FACTS: That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, in the municipality of Jose Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo, Villanoac, Roberto Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo Celestino, Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by confederating and mutually helping one another, and acting without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats, force and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other massive instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise, to the damage and prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and his family in the amount of P30,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and moral damages, and further the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident premeditation. The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, rendered a decision finding the accused guilty. The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court decision but with modification hence this petition. ISSUE: whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.
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HELD: The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words, the civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime. Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623). Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that: When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious. If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground. There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act from which civil liability might arise did not exist. A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The offended party may, of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not exist in this case. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be filed. With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in awarding damages despite a judgment of acquittal. WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and dismiss the petition for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. DIGEST BY: JIHAN A.M. BANOCAG
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III. PREJUDICIAL QUESTION 31) DONATO VS. LUNA 160 SCRA 441 FACTS: Paz Abayan filed an information for Bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato. She also filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court a civil action for declaration of nullity of marriage to petitioner because of a prior marriage of petitioner. In his answer petitioner claimed that his 2nd marriage was void because it was solemnized without a valid marriage license and that violence, intimation and undue influence were employed by Paz to obtain his consent. Prior to the date set for the trial of the criminal case, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the case because the civil action raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined before the criminal case can proceed. ISSUE: Does a criminal case for bigamy suspend the civil case of annulment of marriage on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question? HELD: The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. I must be noted that the issue before the JDRC touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's 2nd wife, the herein private respondent Paz Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the 2nd marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit. He who contracts a 2nd marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. DIGEST BY: JIHAN A.M. BANOCAG 32) RICARDO QUIAMBAO vs. HON. ADRIANO OSORIO G.R. No. L-48157, March 16, 1988 FACTS: In a complaint for forcible entry filed by herein private respondents Zenaida Gaza Buensucero, Justina Gaza Bernardo and Felipe Gaza against herein petitioner Ricardo Quiambao before the then Municipal Court of Malabon, Rizal,it was alleged that private respondents were the legitimate possessors of a 30,835 sq. m. lot known as Lot No. 4, Block 12, Bca 2039 of the Longos Estate situated at Barrio Longos, Malabon Rizal, by virtue of the Agreement to Sell No. 3482 executed in their favor by the former Land Tenure Administration ; that under cover of darkness, petitioner surreptitiously and by force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, entered into a 400 sq. m. portion thereof, placed bamboo posts "staka" over said portion and thereafter began the construction of a house thereon; After hearing, the municipal court denied the motion to dismiss. It ruled that inasmuch as the issue involved in the case was the recovery of physical possession, the court had jurisdiction to try and hear the case. Dissatisfied with this ruling, petitioner filed before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, a petition for certiorari with injunction against public respondent Judge and private respondents, praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent judge to suspend the hearing in the ejectment case until after the resolution of said petition Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition, maintaining that the administrative case did not constitute a prejudicial question as it involved the question of ownership, unlike the ejectment case which involved merely the question of possession. Meanwhile, the Land Authority filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene in Civil Case No. C1576 alleging the pendency of an administrative case between the same parties on the same subject matter and praying that the petition for certiorari be granted, the ejectment complaint be dismissed and the Office of the Land Authority be allowed to decide the matter exclusively. ISSUE: whether or not the administrative case between the private parties involving the lot subject matter of the ejectment case constitutes a prejudicial question which would operate as a bar to said ejectment case. HELD: A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play generally in a situation where civil and criminal actions are pending and the issues involved in both cases are similar or so closely related that an issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case before the criminal action can proceed. Thus, the existence of a prejudicial question in a civil case
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is alleged in the criminal case to cause the suspension of the latter pending final determination of the former. The essential elements of a prejudicial question as provided under Section 5, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court are: [a] the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal action; and [b] the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The actions involved in the case at bar being respectively civil and administrative in character, it is obvious that technically, there is no prejudicial question to speak of. Equally apparent, however, is the intimate correlation between said two [2] proceedings, stemming from the fact that the right of private respondents to eject petitioner from the disputed portion depends primarily on the resolution of the pending administrative case. For while it may be true that private respondents had prior possession of the lot in question, at the time of the institution of the ejectment case, such right of possession had been terminated, or at the very least, suspended by the cancellation by the Land Authority of the Agreement to Sell executed in their favor. Whether or not private respondents can continue to exercise their right of possession is but a necessary, logical consequence of the issue involved in the pending administrative case assailing the validity of the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award of the disputed portion to petitioner. If the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award to petitioner are voided, then private respondents would have every right to eject petitioner from the disputed area. Otherwise, private respondent's light of possession is lost and so would their right to eject petitioner from said portion. Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more prudent course for the trial court to have taken is to hold the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after a determination of the administrative case. Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not jurisprudence, dictate such move. To allow the parties to undergo trial notwithstanding the possibility of petitioner's right of possession being upheld in the pending administrative case is to needlessly require not only the parties but the court as well to expend time, effort and money in what may turn out to be a sheer exercise in futility. Thus, 1 Am Jur 2d tells us: The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide the outcome of another pending in another court, especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for there is power inherent in every court to control the disposition of causes on its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights parties to the second action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled the second action should be stayed. While this rule is properly applicable to instances involving two [2] court actions, the existence in the instant case of the same considerations of Identity of parties and issues, economy of time and effort for the court, the counsels and the parties as well as the need to resolve the parties' right of possession before the ejectment case may be properly determined, justifies the rule's analogous application to the case at bar. If a pending civil case may be considered to be in the nature of a prejudicial question to an administrative case, We see no reason why the reverse may not be so considered in the proper case, such as in the petition at bar. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Civil Case No. 2526 of the then Municipal Court of Malabon, Rizal is hereby ordered DISMISSED. No Costs. SO ORDERED. DIGEST BY: JIHAN A.M. BANOCAG 33) ISABELO APA, MANUEL APA and LEONILO JACALAN vs. HON. RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ, HON. CELSO V. ESPINOSA, and SPS. FELIXBERTO TIGOL, JR. and ROSITA TAGHOY TIGOL G.R. No. 112381 March 20, 1995 FACTS: the above-named accused [herein petitioners Isabelo Apa, Manuel Apa and Dionisio Jacalan], conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another, without the knowledge and consent of the owner, ROSITA TIGOL, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take advantage of the absence or tolerance of the said owner by occupying or possessing a portion of her real property, Lot No. 3635-B. whereon they constructed their respective residential houses against the will of Rosita Tigol, which acts of the said accused have deprived the latter of the use of a portion of her land, to her damage and prejudice because despite repeated demands the said accused failed and refused, as they still fail and refuse to vacate the premises above-mentioned. Petitioners moved for the suspension of their arraignment on the ground that there was a
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prejudicial question pending resolution in another case being tried in Branch 27 of the same court. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 2247-L and entitled "Anselmo Taghoy and Vicente Apa versus Felixberto Tigol, Jr. and Rosita T. Tigol, et al.," concerns the ownership of Lot No. 3635-B. 1 In that case, petitioners seek a declaration of the nullity of TCT No. 13250 of Rosita T. Tigol and the partition of the lot in question among them and private respondent Rosita T. Tigol as heirs of Filomeno and Rita Taghoy. The case had been filed in 1990 by petitioners, three years before May 27, 1993 when the criminal case for squatting was filed against them. the trial court denied the petitioners' motion and proceeded with their arraignment. Petitioners, therefore, had to enter their plea (not guilty) to the charge. petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but their motion was denied by the court in its order dated September 21, 1993. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: whether the question of ownership of Lot No. 3635B, which was pending, in Civil Case No. 2247-L, is a prejudicial question justifying suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners. HELD: We hold that it is. A prejudicial question is a question which is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that its resolution is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. To justify suspension of the criminal action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution is based but also that the decision of the issue or issues raised in the civil case would be decisive of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 2 Rule 111, 5 provides: Sec. 6. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial questions are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. In the criminal case, the question is whether petitioners occupied a piece of land not belonging to them but to private respondent and against the latter's will. As already noted, the information alleges that "without the knowledge and consent of the owner, ROSITA TIGOL" petitioners occupied or took possession of a portion of "her property" by building their houses thereon and "deprived [her] of the use of portion of her land to her damage and prejudice. Now the ownership of the land in question, known as Lot 3635-B of the Opon cadastre covered by TCT No. 13250, is the issue in Civil Case 2247-L now pending in Branch 27 of the RTC at Lapulapu City. The resolution, therefore, of this question would necessarily be determinative of petitioners criminal liability for squatting. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and respondent judge is ordered to SUSPEND the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 012489 until the question of ownership in Civil Case No. 2247-L has been resolved with finality and thereafter proceed with the trial of the criminal case if the civil case is decided and terminated adversely against petitioners. Otherwise he should dismiss the criminal case. SO ORDERED. DIGEST BY: JIHAN A.M. BANOCAG 34) BELTRAN VS. PEOPLE 334 SCRA 106 FACTS: Petitioner Maynardo Beltran and Charmaiene Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City. After 24 years of marriage and four children, petitioner filed, in the RTC of Quezon City, Br. 87, a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. In her Answer to said petition, petitioners wife alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting. She then filed a criminal case for concubinage against petitioner and his paramour before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61. Petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Judge Alden Cervantes denied the motion, so was with a Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner then went to the RTC of Makati, on certiorari , questioning the Orders issued by Judge Cervantes. The RTC denied the petition also a Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this petition. ISSUE:
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Does the declaration of nullity of marriage a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage? HELD: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions. It has two (2) essential elements: a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioners marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS ( 226 SCRA 572) , the SC ruled that the import of Article 40 of the Family Code is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable bases for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. So, that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void. With regard to petitioners argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense. Analogous to this case is that of LANDICHO VS. RELOVA ( 22 SCRA 731), cited in DONATO VS. LUNA (160 SCRA 441), where the SC held that: xxx Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case of concubinage DIGEST BY: JIHAN A.M. BANOCAG 35) SPOUSES ANTONIO S. PAHANG and LOLITA T. PAHANG vs. HON. AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court- Branch 56, Mandaue City, DEPUTY SHERIFF, Regional Trial Court-Branch 56 and METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST COMPANY G.R. No. 148595, July 12, 2004 FACTS: the petitioners, Spouses Antonio and Lolita Pahang, received a short-term loan of one million five hundred thousand pesos (P1,500,000.00) from the respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company. The loan was covered by Non-Negotiable Promissory Note and was, likewise, secured by a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land covered . As the petitioners failed to pay the loan, the interest and the penalties due thereon, the respondent foreclosed the real estate mortgage extrajudicially. As a consequence, the mortgaged property was sold at public auction to the respondent bank as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was executed by Ex-Officio Sheriff in favor of the respondent and was registered with the Register of Deeds. the respondent wrote the petitioners that the oneyear redemption period of the property would expire on January 27, 1999. Instead of redeeming the property, the petitioners filed, a complaint for
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annulment of extrajudicial sale against the respondent bank and the Sheriff. After the expiration of the one-year redemption period, the respondent consolidated its ownership over the foreclosed property. Consequently, TCT No. 44668 was issued by the Register of Deeds in its name. On July 23, 1999, the respondent filed a Petition for Writ of Possession. ISSUE: whether or not the complaint of the petitioners in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 for annulment of extrajudicial sale is a prejudicial question to the petition of the respondent bank for the issuance of a writ of possession in LRC Case No. HELD: The contentions of the petitioners have no merit. A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. In the present case, the complaint of the petitioners for Annulment of Extrajudicial Sale is a civil action and the respondents petition for the issuance of a writ of possession of Lot No. 3-A, Block 1, Psd-07021410, TCT No. 44668 is but an incident in the land registration case and, therefore, no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of the two actions. It bears stressing that the proceedings in a petition and/or motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, after the lapse of the statutory period for redemption, is summary in nature.The trial court is mandated to issue a writ of possession upon a finding of the lapse of the statutory period for redemption without the redemptioner having redeemed the property. It cannot be validly argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it merely complied with its ministerial duty to issue the said writ of possession. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Cost against the petitioners. SO ORDERED. DIGEST BY: JIHAN A.M. BANOCAG 36) ABACAN vs. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC G.R. No. 140777. April 8, 2005 FACTS: Two opposing factions within respondent Northwestern University, Inc. (NUI), the Castro and the Nicolas factions, seek control as the legitimate board thereof. These two factions are parties to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Case No. 12-96-5469, which is an action filed by the Nicolas faction to nullify the election of the directors of NUI belonging to the Castro faction and SEC Case No. 12-96-5511 which is a counter-suit initiated by the Castro faction seeking the nullification of several board resolutions passed by the Nicolas faction. On December 19, 1996, SEC Hearing Officer Rolando G. Andaya, Jr., issued an Order authorizing the Castro faction and the Metropolitan Bank Laoag City branch to withdraw the amount of P2.5M from the account of NUI with said bank. Metrobank thru Petitioner Abacan, complied and released P1.4 M in favor of the Castro faction. The Nicolas faction then initiated a criminal complaint for estafa against the Castro faction as well as the petitioners herein who are officers of Metrobank, however the criminal case was later dismissed insofar as petitioners are concerned. Nicolas faction filed a suit for damages against Castro faction and petitioner on the ground that the corporate funds of NUI deposited with said bank in the sum of P1.4 M was withdrawn without the knowledge, consent or approval of NUI to the grave and serious damage and prejudice of the latter. Marieta Y. Palanca filed a motion to dismiss alleging that SEC Case No. 12-96-5469 must take precedence over the civil case since it is a logical antecedent to the issue of standing in said case. Petitioners then prayed for the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. 11296-14 against them, or in the alternative, to hold in abeyance the proceedings therein until after the final determination of SEC Case No. 12-96-5469. However, NUI avers that the rule on prejudicial question finds no application between the civil complaint below and the case before the SEC as the rule presupposes the pendency of a civil action and a criminal action; and even assuming arguendo that the issues pending before the SEC bear a similarity to the cause of action below, the complaint of NUI can stand and proceed separately from the SEC case
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inasmuch as there is no identity in the reliefs prayed for. ISSUE: Whether or not there is prejudicial question in this case. RULING: Yes. Considering the rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question, being to avoid two conflicting decisions, prudence dictates that we apply the principle underlying the doctrine to the case at bar. A prejudicial question is that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it must be lodged in another court or tribunal. In the case at bar, the question of which between the Castro and the Nicolas factions are the de jure board of directors of NUI is lodged before the SEC. The complaint before the RTC of Laoag meanwhile alleges that petitioners, together with their co-defendants, comprised of the Castro faction, wrongfully withdrew the amount of P1.4 M from the account of NUI with Metrobank. Moreover, whether or not Roy Nicolas of the Nicolas faction is a duly elected member of the Board of NUI and thus with capacity to institute the herein complaint in behalf of the NUI depends on the findings of the SEC in the case pending before it. It would finally determine whether Castro, et al. legally withdrew the subject amount from the bank and whether Nicolas lawfully initiated the complaint in behalf of herein respondent NUI. It is petitioners claim, and we agree, that the presence or absence of their liability for allowing the withdrawal of P1.4 M from the account of NUI with Metrobank in favor of the Castro faction is reliant on the findings of the SEC as to which of the two factions is the de jure board. Since the determination of the SEC as to which of the two factions is the de jure board of NUI is crucial to the resolution of the case before the RTC. Hence, the trial court should suspend its proceedings until the SEC comes out with its findings.
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IV. CIVIL PERSONALITY 37) Antonio Gelus v. Court of Appeals No. L-16439. July 20, 1961 Doctrine: Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could deliberately accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked of juridical personality under Article 40 of the Civil Code, which expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently alive. Reyes, JBL, J. FACTS: Nita Villanueva came to know the petitioner, a physician, for the first time in 1948 through her aunt Paula Yambot. The said physician made three abortions on Villanueva on the following circumstances: (1) In 1950, when she became pregnant by her present husband, Oscar Lazo, before they were legally married, and she deisred to conceal her pregnancy from her parents; (2) after their marriage, her second pregnancy proved to be inconvenient as she was then working for the COMELEC; and lastly (3) on February 21, 1955 she was aborted of a 2-month old fetus for the amount of P50.00. Upon knowing of the last abortion, Lazo filed a complaint for damages against Geluz, claiming that he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Lazo and against Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the award. ISSUE: W/N the award of damages was proper. HELD: NO. the Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This the Court believes to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality; being incapable of having rights and obligations. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could deliberately accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked of juridical personality under Article 40 of the Civil Code, which expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently alive. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because of Lazos indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the petitioner herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee Lazo was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated. It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.
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V. CITIZENSHIP 38) Mercado vs. Manzano G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999 Doctrine: Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition. FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship. It would appear that respondent Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship. ISSUE: Whether or not Private Respondent Manzano is disqualified from the position for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. HELD: NO. He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States. It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition. The phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.Petition dismissed
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39) Republic v. Chule Lim G.R. NO. 153883, January 13, 2004 Facts: Chule Lim claimes that she was born on October 29, 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth was registered in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but the Municipal Civil Registrar of Kauswagan transferred her record of birth to Iligan City. She alleged that both her Kauswagan and Iligan City records of birth have four erroneous entries, and prays that they be corrected. During the hearing, respondent testified thus: First, she claims that her surname "Yu" was misspelled as "Yo". She has been using "Yu" in all her school records and in her marriage certificate. 2 She presented a clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)3 to further show the consistency in her use of the surname "Yu". Second, she claims that her fathers name in her birth record was written as "Yo Diu To (Co Tian)" when it should have been "Yu Dio To (Co Tian)." Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that her father and mother never got married. Only her deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina. She claims that her being a registered voter attests to the fact that she is a Filipino citizen. Finally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a legitimate child when she should have been described as illegitimate considering that her parents were never married. Placida Anto, respondents mother, testified that she is a Filipino citizen as her parents were both Filipinos from Camiguin. She added that she and her daughters father were never married because the latter had a prior subsisting marriage contracted in China. In this connection, respondent presented a certification attested by officials of the local civil registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte that there is no record of marriage between Placida Anto and Yu Dio To from 1948 to the present. The Republic, through the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, did not present any evidence although it actively participated in the proceedings by attending hearings and cross-examining respondent and her witnesses. On February 22, 2000, the trial court granted respondents petition and rendered judgment. Issue: whether or not lims citizenship should be changed from Chinese to Filipino? Held: YES. To digress, it is just as well that the Republic did not cite as error respondents recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to effect what indisputably are substantial corrections and changes in entries in the civil register. To clarify, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. This is our ruling in Republic v. Valencia7 where we held that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite partys case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.8 As likewise observed by the Court of Appeals, we take it that the Republics failure to cite this error amounts to a recognition that this case properly falls under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court considering that the proceeding can be appropriately classified as adversarial. Instead, in its first assignment of error, the Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the constitutional requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship.9 Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."10 Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the
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case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. As such, she was not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. In Ching, Re: Application for Admission to the Bar, 11 citing In re Florencio Mallare,12 we held: Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543; Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952; Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic , L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled.13 This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. She registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years old.14 The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.15 In its second assignment of error, the Republic assails the Court of Appeals decision in allowing respondent to use her fathers surname despite its finding that she is illegitimate. The Republics submission is misleading. The Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to use her fathers surname. What it did allow was the correction of her fathers misspelled surname which she has been using ever since she can remember. In this regard, respondent does not need a court pronouncement for her to use her fathers surname. Court of Appeals is was correct when it held: Firstly, Petitioner-appellee is now 47 years old. To bar her at this time from using her fathers surname which she has used for four decades without any known objection from anybody, would only sow confusion. Concededly, one of the reasons allowed for changing ones name or surname is to avoid confusion. Secondly, under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, the law regulating the use of aliases, a person is allowed to use a name "by which he has been known since childhood."
While judicial authority is required for a change of name or surname,18 there is no such requirement for the continued use of a surname which a person has already been using since childhood.19 The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general.20 In this case, the Republic has not shown that the Yu family in China would probably be prejudiced or be the object of future mischief. In respondents case, the change in the surname that she has been using for 40 years would even avoid confusion to her community in general.
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VI. MARRIAGE 40) Balogbog vs. CA G.R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997 FACTS: Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935, predeceasing their parents. In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition and accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents. In their answer, petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that their brother Gavino died single and without issue in their parents residence at Asturias, Cebu. To support their claim, the petitioners obtained a certificate from the Local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that that office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina. The certificate was prepared by Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga, who testified that there was no record of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina in the Book of Marriages. On the other hand, the private respondents presented several pieces of testimonial evidence to bolster their claim. ISSUE: Whose claim, as supported by their respective pieces of evidence, will prevail? HELD: The claim of the private respondents will prevail. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary. In this case, petitioners claim that the pieces of evidence presented by private respondents was belied by the production of the Book of Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer of Asturias. Petitioners argue that this book does not contain any entry pertaining to the alleged marriage of private respondents parents. This contention has no merit. In Pugeda v. Trias, the defendants, who questioned the marriage of the plaintiffs, produced a photostatic copy of the record of marriages of the Municipality of Rosario, Cavite for the month of January, 1916, to show that there was no record of the alleged marriage. Nonetheless, evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove marriage. Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929; that they had three children, one of whom died in infancy; that their marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private respondents, were recognized by Gavinos family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino. Neither is there merit in the argument of the petitioners that the existence of the marriage cannot be presumed because there was no evidence showing in particular that Gavino and Catalina, in the presence of two witnesses, declared that they were taking each other as husband and wife. An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the witnesses who state that a wedding took place, since the very purpose for having a wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitment. It would indeed be unusual to have a wedding without an exchange of vows and quite unnatural for people not to notice its absence. The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the preservation of the family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional concern. 41) VDA. De Jacob V. CA 312 SCRA 772 FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased. Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil. During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo in Case No. T-46 (entitled "Tomasa vda. de Jacob v. Jose Centenera, et al) herein defendant-appellee Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the
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deceaseds estate as Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo. Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint for injunction with damages (Civil Case No. T-83) questioning appellee's claim as the legal heir of Alfredo. appellant claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could not however present the original copy of the Marriage Contract stating that the original document was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. In lieu of the original, Tomasa presented as secondary evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978. No copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the local civil registrar by the solemnizing officer thus giving the implication that there was no copy of the marriage contract sent to, nor a record existing in the civil registry of Manila; In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo Jacob merely placed his "thumbmark" on said contract purportedly on 16 September 1975 (date of the marriage). However, on a Sworn Affidavit executed between appellant Tomasa and Alfredo a day before the alleged date of marriage or on 15 September 1975 attesting that both of them lived together as husband and wife for five (5) years, Alfredo [af]fixed his customary signature. Thus the trial court concluded that the "thumbmark" was logically "not genuine". In other words, not of Alfredo Jacobs; Issue: Whether the marriage between the plaintiffappellant and deceased Alfredo Jacob was valid? Held: Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to collateral attack, while a voidable one may be assailed only in a direct proceeding.8 Aware of this fundamental distinction, Respondent Pilapil contends that the marriage between Dr. Alfredo Jacob and petitioner was void ab initio, because there was neither a marriage license nor a marriage ceremony.9 We cannot sustain this contention. To start with, Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues that the marriage was void because the parties had no marriage license. This argument is misplaced, because it has been established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.10 An affidavit to this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner. 11 Clearly then, the marriage was exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code.12 The Civil Code governs this case, because the questioned marriage and the assailed adoption took place prior the effectivity of the Family Code. "It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy or a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by recollection of witnesses." 13 Upon a showing that the document was duly executed and subsequently lost, without any bad faith on the part of the offeror, secondary evidence may be adduced to prove its contents.14 The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when they (1) excluded the testimonies of petitioner, Adela Pilapil and Msgr. Florencio Yllana and (2) disregarded the following: (a) photographs of the wedding ceremony; (b) documentary evidence, such as the letter of Monsignor Yllana stating that he had solemnized the marriage between Dr. Jacob and petitioner, informed the Archbishop of Manila that the wedding had not been recorded in the Book of Marriages, and at the same time requested the list of parties to the marriage; (c) the subsequent authorization issued by the Archbishop through his vicar general and chancellor, Msgr. Benjamin L. Marino ordaining that the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner be reflected through a corresponding entry in the Book of Marriages; and (d) the Affidavit of Monsignor Yllana stating the circumstances of the loss of the marriage certificate. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath,15 the Court clarified this misconception thus: . . . [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the document . It is the contents, . . . which may not be prove[n] by secondary evidence when the instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs precede proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence of the
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contents. The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete.16 But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence."17 Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof.18 The Court has also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost." 19 In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as well as by petitioner's own declaration in court. These are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence testimonial and documentary may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. The trial court pointed out that on the face of the reconstructed marriage contract were certain irregularities suggesting that it had fraudulently been obtained.20 Even if we were to agree with the trial court and to disregard the reconstructed marriage contract, we must emphasize that this certificate is not the only proof of the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner. Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on the absence of an entry pertaining to 1975 in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO).26 He finds it quite "bizarre" for petitioner to have waited three years before registering their marriage.27 On both counts, he proceeds from the wrong premise. In the first place, failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate for record purposes does not invalidate the marriage. 28 In the second place, it was not the petitioners duty to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the civil registrar. Instead, this charge fell upon the solemnizing officer.29 The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is . . . of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage. This jurisprudential attitude31 towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.32 Given the undisputed, even accepted,33 fact that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife,34 we find that the presumption of marriage was not rebutted in this case. 42) Republic Of The Philippines v. CA G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992 Facts: On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six (6) years old and who had been living with her family since he was four (4) months old, before the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City. The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2, 1988, when the law applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them. However, after the trial court rendered its decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. Petitioner contends that the petition for adoption should be dismissed outright for it was filed solely by private respondent without joining her husband, in violation of Article 185 of the Family Code which
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requires joint adoption by the spouses. It argues that the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of her petition for adoption. Issues: 1.) Can the Family Code be applied retroactively to the petition for adoption filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles and; 2.) Granting that the FC should be applied retroactively should the adoption in favor of private respondent only, her husband not being a petitioner. Held: 1.)Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions thereof, subject to the qualification that such retrospective application will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. The term expresses the concept of present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested. Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right to file a petition for adoption by herself, without joining her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law. When private respondent filed her petition in Special Proceeding No. 1386, the trial court acquired jurisdiction thereover in accordance with the governing law. Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. We do not find in the present case such facts as would constitute it as an exception to the rule. 2.)Petitioner argues that, even assuming that the Family Code should not apply retroactively, the Court of Appeals should have modified the trial court's decision by granting the adoption in favor of private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles only, her husband not being a petitioner. We do not consider this as a tenable position and, accordingly, reject the same. Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the petition for adoption filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to the petition as Annex "B" and expressly made an integral part thereof, shows that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child. The pertinent parts of his written consent and the foregoing declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court, are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Under the circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of his foreign residence, he must have yielded to the legal advice that an affidavit of consent on his part sufficed to make him a party to the petition. This is evident from the text of his affidavit. Punctiliousness in language and pedantry in the formal requirements should yield to and be eschewed in the higher considerations of substantial justice. The future of an innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the form of pleadings. 43) SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 174689, October 22 2009 FACTS Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The petition impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent. Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male." He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a mans body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined
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by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female." On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was made. During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses. On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read: Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex. Firstly, the court is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him. Likewise, the court believes that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the muchawaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fianc] and the realization of their dreams. Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any opposition. ISSUE Whether or not sex reassignment is a ground for change of entry in the birth certificate? HELD No, there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment and its effect. The sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant Civil Register Law (Act 3753). If the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth is not attendant by error, the same is immutable and may not be changed by reason of a sex reassignment surgery. 44) SY vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000 FACTS: Petitioner and respondent contracted marriage on November 15, 1973. both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two children. Respondent left their conjugal dwelling, since the they lived separately. Petitioner filed a petition for legal separation. Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouse. The trial court granted custody of the children to Filipina. Petitioner filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband, which RTC convicted him for lesser offense of slight physical injuries. Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. RTC denied. CA affirmed. The petitioner for the first time on appeal, the issue with regard to the absence of marriage license. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is valid? HELD: No. The marriage is not valid on the ground that there is no marriage license. Although, the petitioner raises the issue for the first time on appeal the issue on lack of marriage license. The petitioner states that though she did not categorically state her petition for annulment of marriage before the trial court that the inconguinoty in the dates of the marriage license and the celebration of the marriage itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to respondent was void from the beginning, she pointed out that these critical dates were contained in the documents she submitted before the Court. The marriage license was issued one year after the ceremony took place. Hence the marriage was celebrated without the marriage license. Petition granted. 45) SEVILLA vs. CARDENAS G.R. No. 167684. July 31, 2006. FACTS: Herein petitioner, Jaime Sevilla and respondent Carmelita Cardenas were allegedly married without a valid marriage license. The former contended that
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his marriage with the latter was contracted through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. That they never applied or obtained a marriage license for their supposed marriage, thus no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer. In support for his contention, petitioner further argued that although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated in the marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he never applied for any marriage license, Upon verifications made by him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by said office." However, Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan, identified the Certificates issued by Rafael Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have been registered. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void for lack of a valid marriage license? HELD: No. It has been held by the Court that the certificates issued by the Local Civil Registrar were not sufficient as to invalidate the marriage license no. 2770792 which had been secured by the parties. It could be easily implied from the said statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work and that they failed to locate the book in which the marriage license was entered. Likewise, both certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not such license was issued. This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the said person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the material contents therein, had been exerted. It is required that the custodian of the document is authorize to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. 46) MALLION vs. EDITHA ALCANTARA G.R. No. 141528. October 31, 2006 FACTS: On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition with the RTC, Branch 29, of San Pablo City seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara under Article 36 of the Family Code, citing respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. After trial on the merits, the RTC denied the petition in a decision dated November 11, 1997 upon the finding that petitioner "failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking." The appeal filed with the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed for failure of petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period. After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality, petitioner filed on July 12, 1999 another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license. For her part, respondent filed an answer with a motion to dismiss, praying for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of res judicata and forum shopping. In an order dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted respondent's motion to dismiss. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied. Petitioner argues that while the relief prayed for in the two cases was the same, that is, the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent, the cause of action in the earlier case was distinct and separate from the cause of action in the present case because the operative facts upon which they were
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based as well as the evidence required to sustain either were different. Because there is no identity as to the cause of action, petitioner claims that res judicata does not lie to bar the second petition. In this connection, petitioner maintains that there was no violation of the rule on forum shopping or of the rule which proscribes the splitting of a cause of action. On the other hand, respondent, in her comment counters that while the present suit is anchored on a different ground, it still involves the same issue raised in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, that is, the validity of petitioner and respondent's marriage, and prays for the same remedy, that is, the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Respondent thus contends that petitioner violated the rule on forum shopping. Moreover, respondent asserts that petitioner violated the rule on multiplicity of suits as the ground he cites in this petition could have been raised during the trial in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95. ISSUE: The issue before this Court is one of first impression. Should the matter of the invalidity of a marriage due to the absence of an essential requisite prescribed by Article 4 of the Family Code be raised in the same proceeding where the marriage is being impugned on the ground of a party's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code? HELD: Petitioner insists that because the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity and the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of absence of marriage license constitute separate causes of action, the present case would not fall under the prohibition against splitting a single cause of action nor would it be barred by the principle of res judicata. The contention is untenable. Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. It also refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the former suit." This doctrine is a rule which pervades every wellregulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon the following precepts of common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation, and (2) the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness. Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; and (4) there is between the first and the second actions identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three requisites. What is in issue is the presence of the fourth requisite. In this regard, the test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action. Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the two petitions brought by him seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage are anchored on separate causes of action for the evidence necessary to sustain the first petition which was anchored on the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is different from the evidence necessary to sustain the present petition which is anchored on the purported absence of a marriage license. Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action. By definition, a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What differs is the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated. These grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the key to the resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual status of petitioner and respondent's marriage. Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void because no valid celebration of the same took place due to the
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alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have been adjudged in that case. It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the application of res judicata by simply varying the form of his action or adopting a different method of presenting his case. It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to place in issue in his pleading, all the issues existing when the suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is bound to set forth in his first action every ground for relief which he claims to exist and upon which he relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in successive action to recover for the same wrong or injury. 47) NAVARRO vs. DOMAGTOY A.M. No. MTJ-96-108. July 19, 1996 FACTS: The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife. Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. Respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question. The marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, MTC of Basey, Samar. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead. ISSUE: 1.Whether or not the joint affidavit is sufficient proof of the wife's presumptive death? 2.Whether or not the respondent judge erred when he solemnized the marriage outside his court's jurisdiction? HELD: 1. The Supreme Court ruled that the joint affidavit is insufficient proof to declare wife's presumptive death. Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides that for the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
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provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law. Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. 2. The Supreme Court ruled that Judge Domagtoy erred when he soemnized the marriage outside his court's jurisdiction. According to article 8 of the Familiy Code The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. There is no proof that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in the remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. One of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage. Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. Respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. The Supreme Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law. Judge Domagtoy is SUSPENDED for a period of 6 months. The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda. 48) BESO vs. DAGUMAN A.M. No. 99-1211, January 28, 2000 FACTS: On August 28, 1997, the marriage between Zenaida Beso and Bernardito Yman was solemnized by Judge Juan Daguman at J.P.R. Subdivision in Calbayog City, Samar. After the wedding, Yman abandoned Petitioner. Thereafter, Petitioner found that her marriage was not registered at the Civil Registry. She then filed an administrative complaint against the Respondent charging him with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority for solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Registrar. In his Comment, Respondent averred that the civil marriage had to be solemnized outside his territory because on that date respondent was physically indisposed and unable to report to his station in Sta. Margarita and that Beso and Yman unexpectedly came to his house urgently requesting the celebration of their marriage rites since the complainant, who is an overseas worker, would be
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out of the country for a long period and their marriage license would lapse before she could return to the Philippines. He further averred that after handling to Yman the first copy of the marriage certificate, he left the three remaining copies on top of the desk in his private office intending later to register the duplicate and triplicate copies and to keep the fourth in his office but said copies were lost; that he diligently searched for them and even subpoenad Yman to further inquire but was told that Complainant put the copies of the marriage certificate in her bag during the wedding party and that Complainant already left for abroad. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority? HELD: Yes. As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar, his authority to solemnize marriage is only limited to those municipalities under his jurisdiction. Considering that respondents Judge's jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the City of Calbayog. As provided by Article 8 of the Family Code, wherein a marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his chamber[s] or at a place other than his sala, to wit: (1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death;(2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place; (3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. The foregoing circumstances are unavailing in the instant case. Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when he failed to register the marriage. Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Code requiring the same not later than fifteen days after the marriage. The records show that the loss was occasioned by carelessness on respondent Judge's part. Hence, Respondent is guilty of neglect of duty and abuse of authority. FACTS: Private respondent Crasus Iyoy filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, in relation with Articles 68, 70, and 72, with Fely Ada Rosal. According to him, they got married in 1961. The marriage produced five children. But the marriage faded because Fely was a nagger, extravagant and hot-tempered. In 1984, Fely left for the United States. Barely a year after she left, Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the divorce papers. But he ignored the request Sometime in 1985, he was informed that Fely had already married an American. In 1987, she came back to the Philippines with her American family. In 1990, she came back to attend the wedding of their eldest son, but in the invitations, she used the surname of her American husband. She returned in 1992 for the operation of their fourth child. In her Answer to the Complaint, she asserted that she was already an American citizen in 1988, that she was no longer hot-tempered, nagger and extravagant and that the only reason she went to the United States was that their income was not enough to sustain their family, that it was Crasus who was irresponsible and in fact living with another woman who bore her a child. She also denied that she sent a letter requesting him to sign the divorce papers. After hearing both sides, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the marriage null and void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court but this time it had added a ratiocination, stating that Article 26, 2nd paragraph of the Family Code is applicable also to this case. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not there was psychological incapacity on the part of Fely? 2. Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is applicable? HELD 1. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. It was held in previous rulings that irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not
49) REPUBLIC vs. IYOY G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005
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warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article. 2. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The second paragraph of Article 26 is not applicable. As plainly worded, the provision refers to a special situation wherein a foreigner divorces his or her Filipino spouse. However, in this case, it cannot be applied because of the simple fact that at the time Fely secured a divorce decree, she was still a Filipino. Fely admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she married her American spouse in 1985 but she also admitted that she became and American citizen only in 1988. Thus, she was still a Filipino citizen and Article 15 of the Civil Code applies, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity, even though she was already living abroad. 50) REPUBLIC vs. ORBECIDO III GR No. 154380 October 5, 2005 FACTS: In 1981, Cipriano Orbecido and Lady Myros Villanueva were married in Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Krsitoffer and Kimberly. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married an American, Innocent Stanley. Thereafter, Cipriano filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. Finding merit on the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied. In this petition, the Republic contends that Par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino and an alien. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent can remarry pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code? HELD: The Supreme Court was unanimous in holding that par. 2, Art. 26 of the Family Code should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. The twin elements of Par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code are as follows: (1) there is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner and (2) a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship at the time of the celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Lady Myros was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. Subsequently, the wife obtained a divorce capacitating him to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites are both present in the case. Thus, Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry. However, for respondents plea to prosper, he must prove that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen and must show sufficient proof of the divorce decree. Cipriano failed to do this so the petition of the Republic was granted. 51) Atienza vs. Brillantes A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, 29 March 1995 Quiason, J.: FACTS: A complaint file by complainant Lupo A. Atienza (Atienza) for gross immorality and appearance of impropriety against respondent Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr. (Brillantes). Atienza has two children with Yolanda De Castrp (De Castro). There was a time when Atienza chanced upon Brillantes sleeping on his bedroom and was later on informed by their houseboy that Brillantes is cohabiting wioth De Castro. Atienza claims that Brillantes was married to Zenaida Ongkiko (Ongkiko) whom the latter has five children. Brillantes denied having married Ongkiko, because it was celebrated without a marriage license, the same incident also happened on their second marriage. Brillantes was thereafter abandoned by Ongkiko seventeen years ago.
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Brillantes claims that when he married De Castro in Los Angeles, California, he believed in good faith and for all legal purposes that he was single because his marriage with Ongkiko was celebrated without a license. ISSUE: Wether a judicial declaration that the previous marriage was void is under Article 40 of the Family Code required before entering into a second marriage. RULING: YES, respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines, while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code. Article 40 of the Family Code is applicable to marriages entered into after the effectively of the Family Code on 3 August 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said article is given retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other Laws. This is particularly true with Article 40 of the Family Code, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article of the Family Code in this case. >Digest by: Allan Matthew G. Bueser 52) Borja-Manzano vs. Sanchez A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329, 8 March 2001 David, Jr. C,.J.: FACTS: Complainant-petitioner Herminia BorjaManzano (Herminia) was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano being married on 21 May 1966. On 22nd of March 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez (Judge Sanchez). That Judge Sanchez should have known that the marriage was a bigamous one as the marriage clearly stated that both contracting parties were Separate. Judge Sanchez claims innocence as to the fact of the previous marriage, and solemnized their marriage in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code. ISSUE: Whether Judge Sanchez should be held liable. RULING: YES, for Article 31 of the Family Code to apply the provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must apply: 1.) The man and woman have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage; 2.) The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other; 3.) The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage; 4.) The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they lived together for at least five years and are without legal impediment to marry each other. 5.) The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage. Not all this requirement are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 nd of March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself. David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were separated. Digest by: Allan Matthew G. Bueser
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VII. VOID MARRIAGES 53) Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay G.R. No. 132524, 29 December 1998 Martinez, J: FACTS: Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio), son of petitioner Federico Suntay (Federico), was married to Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay (Isabel:) their marriage was celebrated in the Portuguese Colony of Macao. Subsequently it was declared as void ab initio or null and void. The basis of the Court of First Instance for such a ruling was that Emilio suffers from a mental aberration known as schizophrenia. Emilio predeceased his mother, decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Isabel, herein respondent, the daughter of Emilio and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of her late grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Petitioner Federico moved to dismiss the case on the ground of Article 922 of the Civil Code an illegitimate child has no right to succeed by right of representation the legitimate relatives of her father or mother. Federico contends that Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, respondent Isabels father predeceased his mother, the late Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. It opened a path to succession by representation, as a consequence of declaration by the Court of First Instance that the marriage of respondent Isabels parents is null and void. Making Isabel an illegitimate child and has no right nor interest in the estate of her paternal grandmother the decedent. ISSUE: Whether Isabel Aguinaldo CojuangcoSuntay is a legitimate child despite the declaration that her parents marriage was void ab initio denying her succession right from her grandmother. RULING: YES. the marriage of Emilio Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay was annulled on the basis of Article 85 par. 3 of the Civil Code which refers to marriages which are considered voidable. Being conceived and born of a voidable marriage before the decree of annulment, she is considered legitimate. The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89 which provides that: Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered as legitimate The annulment of the marriage by the court abolishes the legal character of the society formed by the putative spouses, but It cannot destroy consequences which marital union produced during its continuance. Digest by: Allan Matthew G. Bueser 54) Nial vs. Bayadaog G.R. No. 133778, 14 March 2000 Ynares Santiago, J.: FACTS:Pepito Nial (Pepito) and Teodulfa Bellones was married on September 26, 1974 whereby petitioners Babyline, Ingrid, Archie and Pepito Jr., a;; surnamed Nial were born. Pepito shot Teodulfa resulting to the latters death. One year and eight months after the incident Pepito and Norma Bayadog, herein respondent (Bayadog) got married without any marriage license. Pepito and Bayadog executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 state that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years thus exempting them from securing a marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident. Thereafter petitioners question the validity of the subsequent marriage of Pepito and Bayadog due to the absence of a marriage license as it was void. ISSUE: Whether the cohabitation of Pepito and Bayadog is that one in contemplation of the law. RULING: No, the five year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third part was involved at any time within the five years and continuity that is unbroken. In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to this wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and respondent had started living with each other the fact remains that their five year period of cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union
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that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of a marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being as husband and wife. Digest by: Allan Matthew G. Bueser 55) Ty vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 127406, 27 November 2000 Quisumbing, J.: FACTS: Private Respondent Edgardo M. Reyes married in a civil ceremony Anna Maria Regina Villanueva thereafter a church wedding was celebrated. The marriage was subsequently declared null and void ab initio for lack of marriage license and lack of consent of the parties. Even before the decree was issued nullifying the marriage, private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes married Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on 4 April 1979. The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maira was rendered only on 4 August 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner Ofelia P. Ty took place on 4 April 1979. ISSUE: Whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validity. RULING: YES, a declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. (Art. 39 of the Family Code). Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contacting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring previous marriage void. In the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into 1979, before Wiegel, at that time the prevailing rules was found In Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondents second marriage to petitioner was valid. >Digest by: Allan Matthew G. Bueser 56) Terre vs. Terre A.M. No 2349, 3 July 1992 Per Curiam FACTS: Complaint Dorothy B. Terre met respondent Atty. Jordan Terre for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates; Dorothy was then married to Merillo Bercellina. Dorothy and Atty. Jordan went to manila to pursue their education of personal choosing. Atty. Jordan took up law at Lyceum Univsersity, still courting Dorothy on the process this time with more persistence. Jordan explained to Dorothy that their marriage is void ab initio due to the reason that Dorothy and Merlito were first cousins, convince by his explanation and having secured a favorable advice from her mother and ex in-laws, Dorothy agreed to marry Atty. Jordan. In their marriage license Atty. Jordan wrote single as her status explaining that since her marriage was void ab initio, no need to go to court for a declaration. Later on Dorothy found out that Atty. Jordan was already married to one Helina Malicdem. When Atty. Jordan prior marriage with Dorothy was subsisting, no judicial declaration was obtained as to nullity of or any judicial declaration obtained as to nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with complainant. ISSUE: Whether Atty. Jordan Terre should be liable for gross immorality. RULING: Yes, respondent Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an agreement ran counter to the prevailing case law of the court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first a marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. Even if we are to assume , arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character. >Digest by: Allan Matthew G. Bueser
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VIII. PSCYHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY 57) Santos vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995 En Banc: FACTS: Petitioner Leouel Santos (Leouel), a first lieutenant in the Philippine Army, and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos (Julia) were married. The ecstasy did not last long because of the frequent interference of Julias parents into the young spouses family affairs. Julia left for United States of America to work as a Nurse despite Leouels pleas to dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, Julia called up Leoule for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States during a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, he desperately tried to locate Julia but his efforts were in vain. Having failed, Leouel filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for Voiding of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. ISSUE: Whether Leouels petition to declare their marriage with Julia void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code will prosper. RULING: No, Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precept un our law on marriage. Thus correlated, psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorder clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psycholigic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate. The factual setting in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. Digest by: Allan Matthew G. Bueser 58) Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 119190, 16 January 1997 Torres, Jr.: FACTS: Petitioner Chi Ming Tsos (Petitioner) and private respondent Gina Lao-Tsoi (Respondent) were married at the Manila Cathedral. They went and proceeded to the house of petitioners mother and slept together on the same room in the first night of their married life. Instead of enjoying the night of their marriage, petitioner just went to bed and slept on his side then turned his back and went to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights. In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited to join them. There was no sexual intercourse between them, since petitioner avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or just by sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. Respondent claims that she never seen her husbands private parts. They submitted themselves to medical examinations, respondent was found to be healthy and still a virgin but petitioner was told to return but never did. It was found that petitioner is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman. Respondent claims that petitioner is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be declared as null and void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. RULING: Yes, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate
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children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligations is equivalent to incapacity. It is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations. It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each others feelings at a time is needed by the other can go along way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love, amor gignit amore, respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution. >Digest by: Allan Matthew G. Bueser 59) REPUBLIC VS. CA and MOLINA GR No. 108763. February 13, 1997 FACTS: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility on the early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances. Thereafter, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986. Roridel became the sole breadwinner of the family. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple are separated-in-fact for more than three years. On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTCs decision. Hence, the present recourse. ISSUE: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity HELD: In Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State. The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision; concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to
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Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid. 60) BARCELONA vs. CA & TADEO R. BENGZON G.R. No. 130087. September 24, 2003 FACS: On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner petitioner Diana before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87. On 9 May 1995, respondent Tadeo filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition which the trial court granted. On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana. Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the second petition on two grounds. First, the second petition fails to state a cause of action. Second, it violates Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 on forum shopping. Respondent Tadeo opposed the Motion to which petitioner Diana filed Additional Arguments in Support of the Motion. The trial court issued on 18 September 1996 an Order deferring resolution of the Motion until the parties ventilate their arguments in a hearing. Petitioner Diana filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the trial court issued on second order denying the motion. Petitioner Diana filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court of Appeals assailing the trial courts first order deferring action on the Motion and the second order denying the motion for reconsideration on 14 February 1997. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner Diana that the trial court in its first order erred in deferring action on the Motion until after a hearing on whether the complaint states a cause of action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the trial courts second order corrected the situation since in denying the motion for reconsideration, the trial court in effect denied the Motion. The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the allegations in the second petition state a cause of action sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven to be true. The Court of Appeals also held that there was no violation of Circular No. 04-94. To determine the existence of forum shopping, the elements of litis pendentia must exist or a final judgment in one case must amount to res judicata in the other. In this case, there is no litis pendentia because respondent Tadeo had caused the dismissal without prejudice of the first petition before filing the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because there is no final decision on the merits. ISSUE: Whether the allegations of the second petition for annulment of marriage sufficiently state a cause of action. HELD: The petition has no merit. Petitioner Dianas contention that the second petition fails to state a cause of action is untenable. We find the second petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. The petition alleged that respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally married at the Holy Cross Parish after a whirlwind courtship as shown by the marriage contract attached to the petition. The couple established their residence in Quezon City. The union begot five children, Ana Maria, born on 8 November 1964; Isabel, born on 28 October 1968; Ernesto Tadeo, born on 31 March 1970; Regina Rachelle born on 7 March 1974; and Cristina Maria born in February 1978. The petition further alleged that petitioner Diana was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage to comply with the essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present time. Petitioner Diana argues that the second petition falls short of the guidelines set forth in Santos and Molina. Specifically, she contends that the second petition is defective because it fails to allege the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. The second petition also fails to state that the alleged psychological incapacity existed from the celebration of the marriage and that it is permanent or incurable. Further, the second petition is devoid of any reference of the grave nature of the illness to bring about the disability of the petitioner to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Lastly, the second petition did not even state the marital obligations which petitioner Diana allegedly failed to comply due to psychological incapacity. The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that expert opinion need not be alleged in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to determine the root cause of
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psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity. The second petition states a cause of action since it states the legal right of respondent Tadeo, the correlative obligation of petitioner Diana, and the act or omission of petitioner Diana in violation of the legal right. 61) MARCOS vs. MARCOS G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000 FACTS: Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service. They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts. After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she was still single. After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately. All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens. When she was discharged from the military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation. On October 16, 1994 the spouses had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house. On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions. Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even beat her driver. At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella, Paraaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong. In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as cruel and physically abusive to them. The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation while the appellant on the other hand, did not. The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children. CA reversed the RTC and held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the evidence presented on the basis that there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which was psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity was grave, had preceded the marriage and was incurable." Hence, this Petition. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation.
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2) Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition. HELD: 1)The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. 2) We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code. Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void. Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina. 62) REPUBLIC vs. LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO G.R. No. 149498. May 20, 2004 FACTS: On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. In October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child. On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child. The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer residing at his given address. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent filed a motion dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. The trial court granted the motion on November 7, 1996. On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando
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I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no collusion existed between the parties. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted respondents motion to present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her testimony. The trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage between petitioner Lolita and Toshio null and void on the basis of the records that respondent spouses failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family. The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was denied. The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support" pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina and Santos vs. Court of Appeals. In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national. Hence, this petition, ISSUE: Whether or not the mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them constitute psychological incapacity. HELD: We rule in favor of petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondents case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do. We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage. According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality. 63) DEDEL vs. DEDEL G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004 FACTS: Petitioner David met respondent Sharon while he was working in the advertising business of his father. Eventually, their relationship resulted in the exchange of marital vows before the City Court of Pasay on September 28, 1966 and followed by civil marriage in a church wedding on May 20, 1967. The union produced four children. The conjugal
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partnership, nonetheless, acquired neither property nor debt. Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the AFP; a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian national. Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she had two children. When Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back and even considered the two illegitimate children as his own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions. Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the Family Code, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 149. Summons was effected by publication in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of general circulation in the country considering that Sharon did not reside and could not be found in the Philippines. Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation of petitioner and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he does. On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of AntiSocial Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. The trial court declared the marriage between the spouses Dedel null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent. Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, appealed alleging that THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA CASE. The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered dismissal of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated January 8, 2002. Hence, the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding that respondent is psychologically incapacitated HELD: No. The petition is DENIED. The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity. Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable. Respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children. Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of
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the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity. 64) CARATING-SIAYNGCO vs. SIAYNGCO G.R. NO. 158896. October 27, 2004 FACTS: Petitioner Juanita and respondent Manuel were married at civil rites on 27 June 1973 and before the Catholic Church on August 11 1973. After discovering that they could not have a child of their own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they named Jeremy. On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life together, respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude towards him. In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still living with her at their conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories against her so that he could be free to marry his paramour. The trial court denied respondent Manuels petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner Juanita. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita psychologically incapacitated. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity against petitioner Juanita and/or respondent Manuel. HELD: The petition for review is hereby granted. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wifes lack of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling nature, and her inability to endear herself to his parents are grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Neither is there any showing that these defects were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. In fact, the psychiatrist reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and essential obligations of marriage. The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that respondent Manuel is psychologically incapacitated. The psychological report of Dr. Garcia, which is respondent Manuels own evidence, contains candid admissions of petitioner Juanita, the person in the best position to gauge whether or not her husband fulfilled the essential marital obligations of marriage. Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that respondent Manuels unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. In herein case, respondent Manuel has admitted that: "I had [extra-marital] affairs because I wanted to have a child at that particular point The psychological report of respondent Manuels witness, Dr. Garcia, showed that the root cause of petitioner Juanitas behavior is traceable not from the inception of their marriage as required by law but from her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in-laws disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the priesthood, her husbands philandering, admitted no less by him, and her inability to conceive. Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have been allowed a window into the Siayngcoss life and have perceived therefrom a simple case of a married couple drifting apart, becoming strangers to each other, with the husband consequently falling out of love and wanting a way out. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. 65) VILLALON VS. MA. CORAZON VILLALON G.R. No. 167206. November 18, 2005 FACTS: Petitioner was married to respondent for 18 years. Petitioner filed a petition for annulment of his marriage to respondent, citing psychological incapacity on his part as a ground. Petitioner alleged
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the psychological disorder as that of Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder with Cassanova Complex. On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to respondent Ma. Corazon before the RTC of Pasig City on the ground of petitioners psychological incapacity which he claimed existed even prior to his marriage. According to petitioner, the manifestations of his psychological incapacity were: (a) his chronic refusal to maintain harmonious family relations and his lack of interest in having a normal married life; (b) his immaturity and irresponsibility in refusing to accept the essential obligations of marriage as husband to his wife; (c) his desire for other women and a life unchained from any spousal obligation; and (d) his false assumption of the fundamental obligations of companionship and consortium towards respondent. Petitioner thus prayed that his marriage to respondent be declared null and void ab initio. Respondent filed an answer denying petitioners allegations. She asserted that her 18year marriage to petitioner has been fruitful and characterized by joy, contentment and hopes for more growth in their relationship and that their marital squabbles were normal based on community standards. Petitioners success in his professional life aided him in performing his role as husband, father, and provider. Respondent claimed that petitioners commitment to his paternal and marital responsibilities was beyond reproach. On October 7, 1996, the trial court directed the prosecutor to conduct an investigation on whether there was collusion between the parties. As a result of the report, there was no collusion. The OSG opposed to the petition. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. Petitioner testified that he met respondent sometime in the early seventies when he applied for a job at Metrobank, where respondent was employed as a foreign exchange trader. They began dating in 1975 and had a romantic relationship soon thereafter. After going steady for about two years, petitioner and respondent were married at the San Pancracio Chapel in Paco, Manila on April 22, 1978. In the middle of 1993, petitioner decided to separate from respondent because their marriage reached a point where there was no longer any communication between them and their relationship became devoid of love, affection, support and respect due to his constant urge to see other women. Moreover, their relationship tended to be one-sided since respondent was unresponsive and hardly ever showed her love, needs, wants and emotions. Petitioner admitted that on certain occasions before his marriage, he had two girlfriends at the same time. He also saw other women even when he became engaged to and, later on, married respondent. Respondent learned of his affairs but reacted in a subdued manner. Petitioner surmised that it was respondents nature to be silent and withdrawn. In January 1994, petitioner left the conjugal abode and moved into an apartment located five to ten minutes away. Before he left, he and his wife spoke to their three children who, at that time, were 14, 8, and 6 years old, respectively. Petitioner consulted a child psychologist before talking to his children. He considered himself as a good and loving father and described his relationship with the children as great. Despite the separation, petitioner would regularly visit his children who stayed with him on alternate weekends, voluntarily gave monthly support to the children and paid for their tuition fees and also shouldered the childrens medical expenses as well as the maintenance and miscellaneous fees for the conjugal abode. Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to testify on his alleged psychological disorder of Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder with Casanova Complex. Dr. Dayan submitted a psychological report on both petitioner and respondent based on clinical interviews and psychological tests. Respondent testified that she first learned of her husbands infidelity in 1980. She discovered that he was having an affair with one of her friends who worked as a trader in her husbands company. The affair was cut short when the woman left for the United States to work. Eventually, she and petitioner were able to rebuild their relationship and overcome the crisis. When asked about the womanizing ways of her husband, respondent averred that she did not know whether her husbands acts could be deemed womanizing since there were only two instances of infidelity which occurred 13 years apart. She also theorized that petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled so he could marry her old friend. She stated that she has not closed her doors to petitioner but the latter would have to give up his extra-marital relationship. To controvert the findings of petitioners expert witness, respondent presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, who testified that Dr. Dayans findings were incomplete because a team
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approach was necessary in evaluating an individuals personality. An evaluation of ones psychological capacity requires the expertise of a psychiatrist and social worker. The trial court declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of petitioner. Thereafter. The respondent and the OSG seasonably filed an appeal from the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision reversed and set aside the trial courts decision. Contrary to the trial courts findings, the appellate court held that petitioner failed to prove the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of his alleged psychological incapacity. Petitioners sexual infidelity was made to appear as symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder when, in reality, the same merely resulted from a general dissatisfaction with the marriage. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision but it was denied. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was indeed psychologically incapacitated to render his marital obligations HELD: The petition has no merit. The totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage Petitioner failed to establish the incurability and gravity of his alleged psychological disorder. He simply fall out of love and has consequently refused to stay married to her. Refusal to comply with the essential obligations of marriage is not psychological incapacity within the meaning of law. G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006 FACTS: On February 20, 2001, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a Decision denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioners marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated April 20, 2001 where the trial court reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court on the basis that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity or that his defects were incurable and already present at the inception of the marriage. The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayans testimony failed to establish the substance of respondents psychological incapacity; that she failed to explain how she arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral element in respondents character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the essential marital obligations. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit; thus, she filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court. Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration. The Court required respondent Brix Ferraris to file comment but failed to comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived the opportunity to file comment. Further, the Court directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on petitioners motion for reconsideration which it complied on March 2, 2006. After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the OSG, the Court resolves to deny petitioners motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not Brix is psychologically incapacitated as to render his marriage with Amy void. 66) A. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS VS. BRIX FERRARIS HELD: No. The Court found Brixs alleged mixed personality disorder, the"leaving-the-ho use" attitude whenever he and Amy quarreled, the violent
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tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 67) ZAMORA VS. CA and Norma ZAMORA G.R. NO. 141917. February 7, 2007 Facts: Bernardino Zamora and Norma Zamora were married on June 4, 1970. Their union was not blessed of a child. Two years after, Norma left the country and went to the US to work as a nurse. After two years she did come back in the Philippines and thereafter she made periodic visits until she was already a US citizen. Bernardino filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage anchored on the alleged psychological incapacity of Norma. To support his position, he alleged that his wife was horrified by the mere thought of having children as evidenced by the fact that she had not borne him a child. Furthermore, he also alleged that she abandoned him by living in the US and that throughout their marriage they live together for not more than three years. He alleged that Art.36 of the Family Code provides that the marriage contracted by any party who at that time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations of the marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization and that one of the essential marital obligations is to procreate children through sexual cooperation which is the basic end of marriage. On the other hand, Norma denied that she refused to have a child. She portrayed herself as one who loves children as she is a nurse by profession and that she would from time to time borrow her husbands niece and nephews to care for them. Issue: Whether or not Norma was suffering from psychological incapacity, hence their marriage be declared void? Held: No. Norma was not psychologically incapacitated. Under the law, the facts alleged in the petition and the evidence presented, considered totality, should be sufficient to convince the court of the psychological incapacity of the party concerned. In the case at bar the petition filed by Bernardino was not sufficient as to substantiate his allegations that Norma is psychologically incapacitated. His allegations relating to her refusal to cohabit with him and to bear a child was strongly disputed, as the records undeniably bear out. Furthermore, the acts and behavior of Norma that Bernardino cited occurred during the marriage, and there is no proof that the former exhibited a similar predilection even before or the inception of the marriage. 68) DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 104818. September 17, 1993 FACTS: Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition on May 29, 1991 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against Roberto Domingo. The petition alleged among others that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January 23, 1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer; since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties with a total
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amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the possession and administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact. The petition prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of administration and ownership over said properties; their marriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void marriage and such properties be placed under the proper management and administration of the attorney-in-fact. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage. HELD: Yes, a judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary and it can be filed even if not for the purpose of remarriage. Under the law, parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. Article 40 of the Family Code provides: "ART. 40.The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." (n). That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latter's presumptive legitimes. Therefore, in the instance where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. 69) BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000 Facts: Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City. They were blessed with four children. After 24 years of marriage, Beltran filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code before the RTC of Quezon City. Charmaine Felix answer she alleged that it was Meyanard who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against Meynard and his paramour before the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a Resolution found probable cause and ordered the filing of an Information against them. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 236176, was filed before the MTC of Makati City. On March 20, 1998, Meynard filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. He argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Issue: Whether or not the pending case involving a declaration of nullity of marriage based on article 36 is a prejudicial question to a criminal action of concubinage involving identical parties. Held: No. It is not a prejudicial question. Under the law, the pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a
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civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In the case at bar, the parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy." Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. 70) MARBELA-BOBIS vs. ISAGANI BOBIS G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000 FACTS: On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda MarbellaBobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioner's complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against respondent on February 25, 1998, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, Quezon City. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal case in an Order dated December 29, 1998. ISSUE: Whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy. HELD: No, it is not a prejudicial question. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concur, two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it not been for the existence at the material time of the first marriage. Therefore, Isagani cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him. The court should then immediately proceed with the criminal case without waiting for the result of the civil case. 71) MERCADO vs. CONSUELO TAN G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000 FACTS: Ma. Consuelo Tan and Vincent Mercado were married in 1991. However, at the time of the marriage of Tan with Mercado, the latter was actually a married man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva on 1976. In the first marriage he have two children and in the second marriage he has one child. On October 5, 1992, a complaint for bigamy was filed by Tan against Mercado. A month later, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was filed by Mercado against Oliva. On May 6, 1993, the trial court declared the marriage of Mercado and Oliva as void ab initio. Nevertheless, the lower court found accused Mercado guilty of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court by stating that accused Mercado failed to comply with Article 40 of the Family Code.
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ISSUE: Whether or not accused Mercado is guilty of bigamy despite of his having obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage? RULING: Yes, Mercado is guilty of bigamy. Under Article 40 of the Family Code and the rulings enunciated in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy and Domingo vs. Court of Appeals which expressly state that in order to re-marry, one must first obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage. In the case at bar, accused Mercado failed to comply with the requirement because he married Tan without first securing a judicial declaration of his marriage with Oliva. He only filed for such a month after he was charge with the crime of bigamy. Therefore, the crime of bigamy was already consummated when he contracted a second marriage while the first was still subsisting. The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. 72) MORIGO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004 Facts: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates four years.. After the school year 1977-1978 they lost contact with each other. Yet, after some time, when Lucia was in Singapore she sent a letter to Lucio, their friendship was rekindled. They became sweethearts and on 1986 Lucia returned to the Philippines. On 1990 they eventually got married. After their marriage celebration, Lucia once again left for Canada. After a year, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against Lucio which was granted on January 17, 1992. In October of the same year, Lucio married Maria Lumbago. Thereafter, he filed a petition for nullity of his marriage to Lucia on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. In 1993, an Information for Bigamy was filed against Lucio. He moved for the suspension of the arraignment alleging that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was denied. Subsequently, Lucio was convicted by the Trial Court and on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of Bigamy. It ruled that what is sought to be punished by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Issue: Whether or not Lucio is guilty of bigamy by contracting a marriage with Maria, considering that there was no marriage ceremony took place with his marriage with Lucia. Held: No, he is not guilty. Under the law, the first element of Bigamy is that the offender has been legally married and under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. In the case at bar, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Lucio and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Legally speaking, Lucio was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Therefore, Lucio is acquitted by the Supreme Court from the charge of Bigamy because Lucio was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted his marriage with Maria, 73) CALISTERIO vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO G.R. No. 136467, April 6, 2000 Facts: On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land with an estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife, Marietta Calisterio. Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James William Bounds. James Bounds disappeared without a trace on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having priorly secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead.
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On 09 October 1992, Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas claiming to be the sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, and that the marriage between the latter and Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void. Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of the estate of the decedent. On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of petitioner Antonia and declared the latter as the sole heir of the estate of Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos. Respondent Marietta appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals which ruled in her favor. Issue: Whether or not the second marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds. Held: The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and Marietta was solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force at that time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 (2) of the New Civil Code which provides: Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: (2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court. Under the foregoing provisions a judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It follows that the burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the second marriage. Therefore, it remained undisputed that Mariettas first husband, James Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Theodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the civil code should thus be deemed valid. 74) REPUBLIC vs. NOLASCO 220 SCRA 21 FACTS: On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the RTC of Antique a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void. The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess a "well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead," 2 and second, Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a "cunning attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage. During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent on his ship for six (6) months until they returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique after his seaman's contract expired. Respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
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Respondent further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately asked permission to leave his ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983. Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica. On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later married Janet Monica Parker despite his lack of knowledge as to her family background. He insisted that his wife continued to refuse to give him such information even after they were married. He also testified that he did not report the matter of Janet Monica's disappearance to the Philippine government authorities. Respondent presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness. She testified that her daughter-in-law Janet Monica had expressed a desire to return to England even before she had given birth to Gerry Nolasco. When asked why her daughter-in-law might have wished to leave Antique, respondent's mother replied that Janet Monica never got used to the rural way of life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that she had tried to dissuade Janet Monica from leaving as she had given birth to her son just fifteen days before, but when she (Alicia) failed to do so, she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left for England. She further claimed that she had no information as to the missing person's present whereabouts.The trial court granted Nolasco's petition declaring Janet Monica Parker Nolasco as presumptively dead, without prejudice to her reappearance. The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well founded belief for such declaration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence this Petition for Review. ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead. HELD: Four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code: 1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code; 2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry; 3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and 4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead. In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there. In Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused London for Liverpool and this casts doubt on his supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. The Court of Appeal's justification of the mistake, to wit: Well, while the cognoscente would readily know the geographical difference between London and Liverpool, for a humble seaman like Gregorio the two places could mean one place in England, the port where his ship docked and where he found Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they leave home to visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan City, or Paraaque, would announce to friends and relatives, "We're going to Manila." This apparent error in naming of places of destination does not appear to be fatal. Is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring cities, on one hand, and London and Liverpool, on the
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other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around three hundred fifty (350) kilometers apart. We do not consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope of somehow bumping into one particular person there which is in effect what Nolasco says he did can be regarded as a reasonably diligent search. The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her personal background even after she had married respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances. Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from their friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not synonymous with credibility. As noted before, there are serious doubts to respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said testimony merely tended to show that the missing spouse had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and not that she was dead. Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter sometime in January 1983, he cut short his employment contract to return to San Jose, Antique. However, he did not explain the delay of nine (9) months from January 1983, when he allegedly asked leave from his captain, to November 1983 when be finally reached San Jose. Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet Monica Parker without inquiring about her parents and their place of residence. 19 Also, respondent failed to explain why he did not even try to get the help of the police or other authorities in London and Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and respondent's subsequent behavior make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica was dead a well-founded one. The spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that one of them leave the conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage. The Court notes that respondent even tried to have his marriage annulled before the trial court in the same proceeding. While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry Nolasco, for maternal care, still the requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death must be denied. In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead. 74) REPUBLIC VS. LORINO G.R. No. 160258 January 19, 2005 FACTS: Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino filed, On August 14, 2000, nine (9) years after she left her husband, a verified petition with the RTC under the rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law provided for in the Family Code, for a Court declaration that her husband is judicially presumed dead for the purpose of remarriage. She alleged that: A) she and FRANCISCO LORINO, JR. were married on June 12, 1987 and begot three (3) children. B) Before they got married she was unaware that her husband was a habitual drinker, possessed with violent character/attitude, and had the propensity to go out with friends to the extent of being unable to engage in any gainful work. C) Because of her husbands violent character, Gloria found it safer to leave him behind and decided to go back to her parents together with her three (3) children. D) From the time of her physical separation from her husband in 1991, Gloria has not heard of him at all. She had absolutely no communications with him, or with any of his relatives. She believes that he is already dead and is now seeking through this petition for a Court declaration that her husband is judicially presumed dead for the purpose of remarriage. On August 28, 2000, the RTC issued an order directing, the publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation. On September 16, 2000, the order for hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation in this province once a week for three consecutive weeks and be posted in the bulletin boards of the Hall of Justice and the Municipal Hall, San Mateo, Rizal. Finding the said petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the same is hereby set for hearing before the Court on September 18, 2000. The trial court
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ruled declaring the presumptive death/absence of Francisco Lorino, Jr. pursuant to Art. 41 of the New Family Code but subject to all restrictions and conditions provided therein. The judgment being immediately final and executory under the provisions of Article 247 of the Family Code, thus: Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory, Despite the decision of the trial court having become final, the Office of the Solicitor General, nevertheless filed a Notice of Appeal. The RTC had the records elevated to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, treating the case as an ordinary appealed case under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, denied the Republics appeal and accordingly affirmed the appealed decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals duly acquired jurisdiction over the appeal on a final and executory judgment of the Regonal Trial Court. HELD: No. In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code, are "immediately final and executory". It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course to the Republics appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals. An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of law, is immediately final and executory. The right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege." Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are "immediately final and executory", the right to appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001. Nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and whether made by the highest court of the But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar, let it be stated that the RTCs decision dated November 7, 2001, was immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was erroneous for the OSG to file a notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course thereto. The Court of Appeals acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and should have dismissed the appeal outright on that ground. 76) TY VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 127406. November 27, 2000 FACTS: As shown in the records of the case, private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties. Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila. Private respondent filed a petition, which alleged that his marriage with petitioner was void for lack of marriage license and his marriage with Anne Maria was still subsisting. ISSUE: Whether or not nullity of first marriage is required before obtaining 2nd marriage. HELD: In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986), the Court held that there is a need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972. In 1978, she married another man, Wiegel. Wiegel filed a petition with the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court to declare his marriage to Lilia as void on the ground of her previous valid marriage. The Court, expressly relying on Consuegra, concluded that: There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration (citing Consuegra) of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the
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time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law. At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code. Our rulings in Gomez, Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code. Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. In Terre v. Terre (1992) the Court, applying Gomez, Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary. Thus, we disbarred a lawyer for contracting a bigamous marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. He claimed that his first marriage in 1977 was void since his first wife was already married in 1968. We held that Atty. Terre should have known that the prevailing case law is that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. In the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondents second marriage to petitioner is valid. 77) CARINO vs. CARINO 351 SCRA 131 FACTS: SPO4 Santiago S. Carino contracted two marriages during his lifetime, the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao, with whom he had two children, and the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee and had no children at all in their 10 years of cohabitation. On November 23, 1992, SPO4 Santiago Carino passed away in the care of Susan Yee who paid the medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies, petitioner was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 and respondent has collected P21,000.00 On December 14, 1993, respondent filed the instant case for the collection of money against petitioner to return to respondent at least one half of the money she has collected from the government agencies. Petitioner failed to file her answer and was declared in default. Respondent then admitted that her marriage with the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without the judicial declaration of nullity of the 1st marriage. She also claimed that she was not aware that the deceased has a previous marriage and only found out when petitioner introduced herself as the wife. To bolster her action for collection of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner with the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number, and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila. RTC ruled in favor of respondent. And on appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the lower court in toto. Hence, the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the two marriages contracted by the deceased are valid HELD: Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for the purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable by law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensible to the validity of their marriage. Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the valid marriage license. It does not follow from the foregoing
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disposition , however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the death benefits under the scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent. Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and the petitioner does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnize without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent and the deceased is likewise, void ab initio. As to the death benefits that the deceased obtained from the government agencies, it should be given to his legal heirs as it was declared an intestate succession. The children from the first marriage shall be the ones obtaining the said benefits.
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IX. VOIDABLE MARRIAGES 78) ANAYA vs. PALAROAN 36 SCRA 97 FACTS: Plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on 4 December 1953; that defendant Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on 7 January 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation; that judgment was rendered therein on 23 September 1959 dismissing the complaint of Fernando, upholding the validity of the marriage and granting Aurora's counterclaim; that (per paragraph IV) while the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated "to settle the judgment," Fernando had divulged to Aurora that several months prior to their marriage he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his; and that "the non-divulgement to her of the aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part of defendant that definitely wrecked their marriage, which apparently doomed to fail even before it had hardly commenced ... frank disclosure of which, certitude precisely precluded her, the Plaintiff herein from going thru the marriage that was solemnized between them constituted 'FRAUD', in obtaining her consent, within the contemplation of No. 4 of Article 85 of the Civil Code" (sic) (Record on Appeal, page 3). She prayed for the annulment of the marriage and for moral damages. Failing in its attempt to have the parties reconciled, the court set the case for trial on 26 August 1966 but it was postponed. Thereafter, while reviewing the expendiente, the court realized that Aurora's allegation of the fraud was legally insufficient to invalidate her marriage. The court dismissed the complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage. HELD: We must agree with the lower court that it is not. For fraud as a vice of consent in marriage, which may be a cause for its annulment, comes under Article 85, No. 4, of the Civil Code, which provides: ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: xxx xxx xxx (4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as her husband or his wife, as the case may be; This fraud, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively by law to those kinds or species of fraud enumerated in Article 86, as follows: ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article: (1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties; (2) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for two years or more; (3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband. No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage. The intention of Congress to confine the circumstances that can constitute fraud as ground for annulment of marriage to the foregoing three cases may be deduced from the fact that, of all the causes of nullity enumerated in Article 85, fraud is the only one given special treatment in a subsequent article within the chapter on void and voidable marriages. If its intention were otherwise, Congress would have stopped at Article 85, for, anyway, fraud in general is already mentioned therein as a cause for annulment. But Article 86 was also enacted, expressly and specifically dealing with "fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article," and proceeds by enumerating the specific frauds (misrepresentation as to identity, non-disclosure of a previous conviction, and concealment of pregnancy), making it clear that Congress intended to exclude all other frauds or deceits. To stress further such intention, the enumeration of the specific frauds was followed by the interdiction: "No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby
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cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not. On the merits of this second fraud charge, it is enough to point out that any secret intention on the husband's part not to perform his marital duties must have been discovered by the wife soon after the marriage: hence her action for annulment based on that fraud should have been brought within four years after the marriage. Since appellant's wedding was celebrated in December of 1953, and this ground was only pleaded in 1966, it must be declared already barred. 79) AQUINO vs. DELIZO 109 Phil. 21 FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Rizal which dismissed petitioner's complaint for annulment of his marriage with respondent Conchita Delizo. The dismissed complaint, which was filed on September 6, 1955, was based on the ground of fraud, it being alleged, among other things, that respondent, at the date of her marriage to petitioner Aquino, on December 27, 1954, concealed from the latter that fact that she was pregnant by another man, and sometime in April, 1955, or about four months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. In her answer, defendant claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and the plaintiff. At the trial, the attorney's for both parties appeared and the court a quo ordered Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco to represent the State in the proceedings to prevent collusion. Only the plaintiff however, testified and the only documentary evidence presented was the marriage contract between the parties. Defendant neither appeared nor presented any evidence despite the reservation made by her counsel that he would present evidence on a later date. On June 16, 1956, the trial court, noting that no birth certificate was presented to show that the child was born within 180 days after the marriage between the parties, and holding that concealment of pregnancy as alleged by the plaintiff does not constitute such fraud that would annul a marriage, dismissed the complaint. Through a verified "petition to reopen for reception of additional evidence", plaintiff tried to present the certificates of birth and delivery of the child born of the defendant on April 26, 1955, which documents, according to him, he had failed to secure earlier and produce before the trial court thru excusable negligence. The petition, however, was denied. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court held that there has been excusable neglect in plaintiff's inability to present the proof of the child's birth, through her birth certificate, and for that reason the court a quo erred in denying the motion for reception of additional evidence. On the theory, however, that it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual intercourse during their engagement so that the child could be their own, and finding unbelievable plaintiff's claim that he did not notice or even suspect that defendant was pregnant when he married her, the appellate court, nevertheless, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Plaintiff filed a motion praying that the decision be reconsidered, or, if such reconsideration be denied, that the case be remanded to the lower court for new trial. The Court of Appeals denied the motion. From that order, the plaintiff brought the case to this Court thru the present petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage. HELD: The court held that the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint cannot be sustained. Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage. The defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged by plaintiff. According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is
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hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent. If, as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is "naturally plump", he could hardly be expected to know, merely by looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time of their marriage more so because she must have attempted to conceal the true state of affairs. Even physicians and surgeons, with the aid of the woman herself who shows and gives her subjective and objective symptoms, can only claim positive diagnosis of pregnancy in 33% at five months. and 50% at six months. The appellate court also said that it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual intercourse before they got married and therefore the child could be their own. This statement, however, is purely conjectural and finds no support or justification in the record. Upon the other hand, the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial, taken together with what has already been adduced would, in our opinion, be sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by plaintiff. The Court of Appeals should, therefore, not have denied the motion praying for new trial simply because defendant failed to file her answer thereto. Such failure of the defendant cannot be taken as evidence of collusion, especially since a provincial fiscal has been ordered to represent the Government precisely to prevent such collusion. As to the veracity of the contents of the motion and its annexes, the same can best be determined only after hearing evidence. In the circumstance, we think that justice would be better served if a new trial were ordered. 80) JIMENEZ vs. REPUBLIC 109 PHIL 273 FACTS: The plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant Remedios Cazares contracted on 3 August 1950 before a judge of the municipal court of Zamboanga City, upon the ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was to small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation; that the condition of her genitals as described above existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist; and that for that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had been married. The wife was summoned and served a copy of the complaint. She did not file an answer. On 29 September 1956, pursuant to the provisions of article 88 of the Civil Code, the Court directed the city attorney of Zamboanga to inquire whether there was a collusion, to intervene for the State to see that the evidence for the plaintiff is not a frame-up, concocted or fabricated. On 17 December 1956 the Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit to a physical examination by a competent lady physician to determine her physical capacity for copulation and to submit, within ten days from receipt of the order, a medical certificate on the result thereof. On 14 March 1957 the defendant was granted additional five days from notice to comply with the order of 17 December 1956 with warning that her failure to undergo medical examination and submit the required doctor's certificate would be deemed lack of interest on her part in the case and that judgment upon the evidence presented by her husband would be rendered. After hearing, at which the defendant was not present, on 11 April 1957 the Court entered a decree annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant. The city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration of the decree thus entered, upon the ground, among others, that the defendant's impotency has not been satisfactorily established as required by law; that she had not been physically examined because she had refused to be examined; that instead of annulling the marriage the Court should have punished her for contempt of court and compelled her to undergo a physical examination and submit a medical certificate; and that the decree sought to be reconsidered would open the door to married couples, who want to end their marriage to collude or connive with each other by just alleging impotency of one of them. He prayed that the complaint be dismissed or that the wife be subjected to a physical examination. Pending resolution of his motion, the city attorney timely appealed from the decree. On 13 May 1957 the motion for reconsideration was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and is impotent. HELD: The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds, that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at
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securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. This the Court may do without doing violence to and infringing in this case is not selfincrimination. She is not charged with any offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself. "Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency." The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife. The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision, without pronouncement as to costs.
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X. LEGAL SEPARATION 81) DE OCAMPO vs. FLORENCIANO G.R. No. L-13553, February 23, 1960 FACTS: In 1938, Jose and Serafina were married and lived together as husband and wife. They were blessed of several children who are now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, Jose discovered on several occasions that Serafina was maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. For this reason, Jose sent his wife Serafina to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for a year. However, Jose discovered that his wife, while in Manila was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. After Serafina finished her study in 1952, she and her husband lived separately. On June 18, 1955, Jose surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Jose signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which Serafina agreed provided she is will not be charged with adultery. On July 5, 1955, a petition for legal separation was filed by Jose in conformity with the condition requested by Serafina. The Court of Appeals found that in the night of June 18, 1955, the husband upon discovering the illicit happening has expressed his wish to file a petition for legal separation and defendant readily agreed to such filing. And when she was questioned by the Fiscal upon orders of the court, she reiterated her conformity to the legal separation even as she admitted having had sexual relations with one Nelson Orzame. Interpreting these facts virtually to mean a confession of judgment the Appellate Court declared that under Art. 101, legal separation could not be decreed. ISSUE: Whether or not the committed a reversible error. appellate court evidence of the adultery independently of such statement, the decree may and should be granted, since it would not be based on her confession, but upon evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or mainly on defendant's confession. If a confession defeats the action ipso facto, any defendant who opposes the separation will immediately confess judgment, purposely to prevent it. The mere circumstance that defendants told the Fiscal that she "like also" to be legally separated from her husband, is no obstacle to the successful prosecution of the action. When she refused to answer the complaint, she indicated her willingness to be separated. Yet, the law does not order the dismissal. Allowing the proceeding to continue, it takes precautions against collusion, which implies more than consent or lack of opposition to the agreement. 82) BROWN vs. JUANITA YAMBAO G.R. No. L-10699, October 18, 1957 FACTS: William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to obtain legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas internment camp, his wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl that Brown learned of his wifes misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from internment; that thereafter the spouse lived separately and later executed a document liquidating their conjugal partnership and assigning certain properties to the erring wife as her share. The complaint prayed for confirmation of the liquidation agreement; for custody of the children issued of the marriage; that the defendant be declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; and for their remedy as might be just and equitable. Upon petition of the plaintiff, the court subsequently declared the wife in default, for failure to answer in due time, despite service of summons; and directed the City Fiscal or his representatives to investigate, in accordance with Article 101 of the Civil Code, whether or not a collusion exists between the parties and to report to this Court the result of his investigation within fifteen (15) days from receipt of copy of this order. The City Fiscal or his representative is also directed to intervene in the case in behalf of the State. As ordered, Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Jose appeared at the trial, and cross-examined plaintiff
RULING: Yes. As we understand the article, it does not exclude, as evidence, any admission or confession made by the defendant outside of the court. It merely prohibits a decree of separation upon a confession of judgment. Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's demand. Yet, even supposing that the above statement of defendant constituted practically a confession of judgment, inasmuch as there is
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Brown. His questions (strenuously objected to by Brown's counsel) elicited the fact that after liberation, Brown had lived maritally with another woman and had begotten children by her. Thereafter, the court rendered judgment denying the legal separation asked, on the ground that, while the wife's adultery was established, Brown had incurred in a misconduct of similar nature that barred his right of action under Article 100 of the new Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in permitting the Assistant Fiscal Rafel Jose of Manila to act as counsel for the defendant, who defaulted. RULING: NO. Appellant Brown argues that in cross-examining him with regard to his marital relation with Lilia Deito, who was not his wife, the Assistant Fiscal acted as counsel for the defaulting wife, "when the power of the prosecuting officer is limited to finding out whether or not there is collusion, and if there is no collusion, which is the fact in the case at bar, to intervene for the state which is not the fact in the instant case, the truth of the matter being that he intervened for Juanita Yambao, the defendantappellee, who is private citizen and who is far from being the state. The court below also found, and correctly held that the appellant's action was already barred, because Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of the new Civil Code, action for legal separation can not be filed except within one (1) year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred. Appellant's brief does not even contest the correctness of such findings and conclusion. It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the courts can take cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment of marriage, involve public interest and it is the policy of our law that no such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record. 83) LERMA vs. CA G.R. No. L-33352 December 20, 1974 FACTS: Petitioner Lerma and respondent Diaz are husband and wife. Petitioner filed a complaint for adultery against the respondent and a certain Teodoro Ramirez. Respondent a complaint against the petitioner for legal separation and/or separation of properties, custody of their children and support, with an urgent petition for support pendente lite for her and their youngest son, Gregory, who was then and until now is in her custody. The respondent's complaint for legal separation is based on two grounds: concubinage and attempt against her life.The petitioner filed his opposition to the respondent's application for support pendente lite, setting up as defense te adultery charge he had filed against the respondent.Judge Luciano of CFI of Rizal granted the respondent's application for support pendente lite to the following effect: (1) the respondent was declared entitled to support pendente lite from the date of the filing of the complaint; and (2) the amount of such monthly support was reduced from P2,250.00 to P1,820.00. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals and requested for prohibition and preliminary injunction to annul the aforementioned orders. Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition and issued a writ of preliminary injunction to stop Judge Luciano from enforcing said orders. Moreover, on opposition of the respondent , the Court of Appeals dismissed such petition of the petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not adultery is a good defense against the respondent's claim for support pendente lite. RULING: Yes. The probable failure of the respondent's suit for legal separation can be foreseen since she is not an innocent spouse, having been convicted of adultery by the Court of First Instance. It is true that the judgment of conviction is on appeal in the Court of Appeals, but the same undoubtedly satisfies the standard of provisional showing set by the aforesaid Rule. If legal separation cannot be claimed by the guilty spouse in the first place, the fact that an action for that purpose is filed anyway should not be permitted to be used as a means to obtain support pendente lite, which, without such action, would be denied on the strength of the decisions of this Court recognizing adultery as a good defense. Otherwise, as pointed out by the petitioner, all that an erring spouse has to do to circumvent such defense would
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be to file a suit for legal separation no matter how groundless. The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partnership property, presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to live separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of the Civil Code, which states that after the filing of the petition for legal separation the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty of an act which constitutes a ground for legal separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be considered as within the intendment of the law granting separate support. In fact under Article 303 of the same Code the obligation to give support shall cease "when the recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance;" and under Article 921 one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when the spouse has given cause for legal separation." The loss of the substantive right to support in such a situation is incompatible with any claim for support pendente lite. 84) BUGAYONG vs. GINEZ G.R. No. L-10033, December 28, 1956 FACTS: Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to defendant Leonila Ginez on August 27, 1949, at Asingan, Pangasinan, while on leave. Immediately after their marriage, the couple lived with their sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila. After some time, or about July, 1951, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-inlaw and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan, from which place she later moved to Dagupan City to study in a local college there. As early as July, 1951, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco and some from anonymous writers informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife which he did not even care to mention. In August, 1952, plaintiff went to Asingan, Pangasinan, and sought for his wife whom he met in the house of one Mrs. Malalang, defendant's godmother. She came along with him and both proceeded to the house of Pedro Bugayong, a cousin of the plaintiff-husband, where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. Then they repaired to the plaintiff's house and again passed the night therein as husband and wife. On the second day, Benjamin Bugayong tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received that she had committed adultery but Leonila, instead of answering his query, merely packed up and left, which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. After that and despite such belief, plaintiff exerted efforts to locate her and failing to find her, he went to Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, "to soothe his wounded feelings". On November 18, 1952, Benjamin Bugayong filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a complaint for legal separation against his wife. The motion to dismiss was answered by plaintiff and the Court, considering only the second ground of the motion to dismiss i. e., condonation, ordered the dismissal of the action. ISSUE: Whether or not there is condonation on the part of the husband with respect to the legal separation case on account of adultery of the wife. RULING: Yes. The Court considered plaintiff's line of conduct under the assumption that he really believed his wife guilty of adultery. What did he do in such state of mind. In August, 1952, he went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife and after finding her they lived together as husband and wife for 2 nights and 1 day, after which he says that he tried to verify from her the truth of the news he had about her infidelity, but failed to attain his purpose because his wife, instead of answering his query on the matter, preferred to desert him, probably enraged for being subjected to such humiliation. And yet he tried to locate her, though in vain. A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband, especially those portions quoted above, clearly shows that there was a condonation on the part of the husband for the supposed "acts of rank infidelity amounting to adultery" committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument that the infidelities amounting to adultery were committed by the defendant, a reconciliation was effected between her and the plaintiff. The act of the latter in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she went with him and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and together they slept there as husband and wife for one day and one night, and the further fact that in the second night they again slept together in their house likewise as husband and wife all these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to know of the acts
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of infidelity amounting to adultery. There is no merit in the contention of appellant that the lower court erred in entertaining condonation as a ground for dismissal inasmuch as same was not raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss, because in the second ground of the motion to dismiss. 85) LAPERAL vs. REPUBLIC G.R. No. L- 18008. October 30, 1962 FACTS: After several years of marriage with Enrique Sta. Maria, a decree of legal separation was granted by the court. On the other hand, Elisea Laperal has also ceased to live with him. A special procedure for change of name and /or permission to resume the maiden name of herein petitioner Elisea Laperal, was filed. The petition was opposed on the ground that the same violates the provisions of Art. 372 of the New Civil Code. The court however granted the petition on the ground that her continued use of her married name will give rise to confusion in her affairs and in the eventual liquidation of their conjugal assets. The State appealed. That in view of the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria and has likewise ceased to live with him for many years, it is desirable that she be allowed to change her name and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden name to ELISEA LAPERAL. In its decision of October 31, 1960, the court denied the petition for the reason that Article 372 of the Civil Code requires the wife, even after she is decreed legally separated from her husband, to continue using the name and surname she employed before the legal separation. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for the change of name should be granted. RULING: No, Art. 372 of New Civil Code is written in a language that is mandatory, that the wife, even after the legal separation has been decreed should continue using her name and surname employed before legal separation. This is so because her married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. It seems to be the policy of the law that the wife should continue to use the name indicative of her unchanged status for the benefit of all concerned. The Supreme Court decided that from the petition quoted in full at the beginning of these opinion, the only reason relied upon for the change of name is the fact that petitioner is legally separated from her husband and has, in fact, ceased to live with him for many years. It is doubtful, to say the least, whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general, may prevail over the specific provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code with regards to married women legally separated from their husbands. Even, however, applying Rule 103 to this case, the fact of legal separation alone which is the only basis for the petition at bar is, in the opinion of the Court, not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of herein petitioner, for to hold otherwise would be to provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory provisions of Article 372. 86) ONG vs. LUCITA G. ONG G.R. No. 153206, October 23, 2006 FACTS: Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita) were married on July 13, 1975 at the San Agustin Church in Manila. They have three children: Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the age of majority. In 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation alleging that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct. Lucita claimed that she and William quarreled almost every day, with physical violence being inflicted upon her; William would shout invectives at her like "putang ina mo", "gago", "tanga", and he would slap her, kick her, pull her hair, bang her head against concrete wall and throw at her whatever he could reach with his hand; the causes of these fights were petty things regarding their children or their business.William would also scold and beat the children at different parts of their bodies using the buckle of his belt; whenever she tried to stop William from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her and box her In 1995, after she protested with Williams decision to allow their eldest son Kingston to go to Bacolod, William slapped her and said, "it is none of your business". In the same year, she asked William to bring Kingston back from Bacolod; a violent quarrel ensued and William hit her on her head, left cheek, eye, stomach, and arms; when William hit her on the stomach and she bent down because of the pain, he hit her on the head then pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house; she then went to her sisters house in Binondo where she was fetched by her other siblings and brought to their parents house
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in Dagupan; the following day, she went to her parents doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzano for treatment of her injuries. William for his part denied that he ever inflicted physical harm on his wife, used insulting language against her, or whipped the children with the buckle of his belt. RTC rendered its Decision decreeing legal separation. It found that "it is indubitable that plaintiff (Lucita) and defendant (William) had their frequent quarrels and misunderstanding which made both of their lives miserable and hellish. This is even admitted by the defendant when he said that there was no day that he did not quarrel with his wife. Defendant had regarded the plaintiff negligent in the performance of her wifely duties and had blamed her for not reporting to him about the wrongdoings of their children." The CA found that the testimonies for Lucita were straightforward and credible and the ground for legal separation. William filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA. ISSUE: Whether a decree of legal separation should not be granted following Art. 56(4) of the FC which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation. HELD: A decree of legal separation should be granted in this case. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision. As correctly observed by the trial court, William himself admitted that there was no day that he did not quarrel with his wife, which made his life miserable, and he blames her for being negligent of her wifely duties and for not reporting to him the wrongdoings of their children. Lucita and her sister, Linda Lim, also gave numerous accounts of the instances when William displayed violent temper against Lucita and their children; such as: when William threw a steel chair at Lucita threw chairs at their children slapped Lucita and utter insulting words at her use the buckle of the belt in whipping the children; pinned Lucita against the wall with his strong arms almost strangling her, and smashed the flower vase and brick rocks and moldings leaving the bedroom in disarray shouted at Lucita and threw a directory at her, in front of Linda and the employees of their business, because he could not find a draft letter on his table got mad at Charleston for cooking steak with vetchin prompting William to smash the plate with steak and hit Charleston, then slapped Lucita and shouted at her "putang ina mo, gago, wala kang pakialam, tarantado" when she sided with Charleston. William also posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal separation is in order for her side of the family to gain control of the conjugal properties; that Lucita was willing to destroy his reputation by filing the legal separation case just so her parents and her siblings could control the properties he worked hard for. The Court finds such reasoning hard to believe. The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his reputation and label him as a wife-beater and childabuser also does not elicit sympathy from this Court. If there would be such a smear on his reputation then it would not be because of Lucitas decision to seek relief from the courts, but because he gave Lucita reason to go to court in the first place.
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XI. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS HUSBAND AND WIFE BETWEEN to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invalid, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal rights of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and the experience of these countries where the court of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to the original complaint and the crossbill, it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to returnNo. The court ruled in the negative. The authorities are convinced that it is not within the province of the court to compel the wife to live with her husband because such obligation is purely personal in nature. However the court can declare her to be absent from the marital home without sufficient cause. She is further admonished that it is her duty to return. 88) PELAYO vs. MARCELO LAURON G.R. No. L-4089, January 12, 1909 FACTS: Arturo Pelayo, a physician, filed a complaint against Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella setting forth that on or about the 13th of October of said year, at night, the plaintiff was called to the house of the defendants, situated in San Nicolas, and that upon arrival he was requested by them to render medical assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth to a child; that therefore, and after consultation with the attending physician, Dr. Escao, it was found necessary, on account of the difficult birth, to remove the fetus by means of forceps which operation was performed by the plaintiff, who also had to remove the afterbirth, in which services he was occupied until the following morning, and that afterwards, on the same day, he visited the patient several times; that the just and equitable value of the services rendered by him was P500, which the defendants refuse to pay without alleging any good reason therefor; that. In answer to the complaint counsel for the defendants denied all of the allegation therein contained and alleged as a special defense, that
87) ARROYO vs. DE ARROYO G.R. No. L-17014, August 11, 1921 FACTS: In 1910 Mariano and Dolores married each other and lived together as husband and wife. In 1920 Dolores went away and left their common home with the intention of living separately from her husband Mariano. After failing to convince and induce Dolores to come back and resume her marital obligations, Mariano filed an action to compel her to live with him. Dolores answered by claiming that her husband was very cruel and in turn prayed for a decree of separation. The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him, reached the conclusion that the husband was more to blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of marital relations with him. The Court has carefully examined and weighed every line of the proof, and is of the opinion that the conclusion stated is wholly untenable. The evidence shows that the wife is afflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree; and to his cause are chiefly traceable without a doubt the many miseries that have attended their married life. During the trial it was found out that the husband was not cruel to the wife. Furthermore, it was the wife who was excessively jealous without any proof of infidelity of the husband. Therefore the wife is morally and legally obligated to live with her husband. ISSUE: Whether or not the wife can be ordered by the court to live with her husband and failure of which will constitute contempt of court? RULING: No. The Supreme Court in this case is unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo is entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has presented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return. Moreover, upon examination of the authorities the court ruled that it is convinced that it is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights
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their daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the said childbirth, and that when she was alive she lived with her husband independently and in a separate house without any relation whatever with them, and that, if on the day when she gave birth she was in the house of the defendants, her stay their was accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances ISSUE: Whether or not father and mother-in-law may be compelled to pay the fees concerning the services performed with the daughter-in-law. RULING: No. In the face of the above legal precepts it is unquestionable that the person bound to pay the fees due to the plaintiff for the professional services that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants during her childbirth, is the husband of the patient and not her father and mother- in-law, the defendants herein. Father and mother-in-law are strangers with respect to the obligation that devolves upon the husband to provide support, among which is the furnishing of medical assistance to his wife at the time of her confinement; and, on the other hand, it does not appear that a contract existed between the defendants and the plaintiff physician, for which reason it is obvious that the former can not be compelled to pay fees which they are under no liability to pay because it does not appear that they consented to bind themselves. The foregoing suffices to demonstrate that the first and second errors assigned to the judgment below are unfounded, because, if the plaintiff has no right of action against the defendants, it is needless to declare whether or not the use of forceps is a surgical operation. From the foregoing it may readily be understood that it was improper to have brought an action against the defendants simply because they were the parties who called the plaintiff and requested him to assist the patient during her difficult confinement, and also, possibly, because they were her father and mother-in-law and the sickness occurred in their house. The defendants were not, nor are they now, under any obligation by virtue of any legal provision, to pay the fees claimed, nor in consequence of any contract entered into between them and the plaintiff from which such obligation might have arisen. 89) ILUSORIO V. ILUSORIO GRN 139789, May 12, 2000 FACTS: Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many years, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of thirty (30) years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board . Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City. Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children. On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano's arrival from the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda, alleged that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of an antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor. As a consequence, Potenciano's health deteriorated. On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the RTC Antipolo City a petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latter's advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati. On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that respondents refused petitioner's demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City. CA granted visitation rights in favor of Erlinda though she did not pray for such and the administration of the Cleveland Condominium ISSUE: May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss? HELD: The answer is no. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention or by which the
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rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. "Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his capture and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf. The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio's liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no unlawful restraint on his liberty. Likewise, Potenciano Ilusorio did not request the administrator of the Cleveland Condominium and not to allow his wife and other children from seeing or visiting him. He made it clear that he did not object to seeing them. Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of his family members but these are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano. He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right. In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman's free choice.
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XII. PROPERTY RELATIONS 90) MOISES JOCSON V. C.A 170 SCRA 333 FACTS: Emilio Jocson during his lifetime sold parcels of land to his daughter Agustina. One said parcels of land bears and entry in the TCT Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete. These parcels of land are claimed by one of the surviving heirs of Emilio to have been sold fictitiously and without any or insufficient consideration. Futhermore he claimed that when his father sold one of the land, it was still part of the conjugal property of their parents which has not been liquidated. Agustina on the otherhand claim that the sale was with sufficient consideration and rebutted the allegation that she has no source of income by alleging she is engaged in playa buying business. This was not controverted by Moises. ISSUE: Will the presumption that a property is conjugal arise based on the entry in the registry which states that the owner is Married to thereby making it conjugal. HELD; In order for the presumption to apply, it must first be proven that the property was acquired during the marriage. The description married to does not vest title but merely serves to describe the civil status. Registration does not vest ownership but merely confirms one already vested. The allegation that the sale is fictitious due to insufficient consideration must be proven by the one who allege the same. In this case Moises failed to prove this fact which likewise fails to overcome the presumption that a sale is with sufficient consideration. 91) TODA JR V. ROSEMARIE TUASON-TODA 153 SCRA 713 FACTS: Benigno Toda, Jr and Rose Marie TuasonToda were married on June 9, 1951 and were blessed with two children. Individual differences and the alleged infidelity of Benigno, however, marred the conjugal union thereby prompting Rose Marie to file on December 18, 1979 in the CFI of Rizal, a petition for termination of conjugal partnership for alleged mismanagement and dissipation of conjugal funds against Benigno. In order not to lengthen the proceedings, the parties entered into a compromise agreement. However said agreement caused further litigation due to the question on its effectivity. This is material to determine when and how much certain shares of stock is payable. ISSUE: When is the effectivity of a compromise agreement entered into by the husband and wife? Is it when the court approves of the same or when the spouses signed it? HELD: The compromise agreement separating their properties is given effect only upon the approval of the court. Under Article 190 of the Civil Code, "(i)n the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order." Hence, the separation of property is not effected by the mere execution of the contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree of the court approving the same. It, therefore, becomes effective on y upon judicial approval, without which it is void. Furthermore, Article 192 of said Code explicitly provides that the conjugal partnership is dissolved only upon the issuance of a decree of separation of property 92) WONG V. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ROMARICO HENSON 200 SCRA 792 FACTS: Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda on January 6, 1964. They have three children but even during the early years of their marriage, Romarico and Katrina had been most of the time living separately. The former stayed in Angeles City while the latter lived in Manila. During the marriage or on January 6, 1971, Romarico bought a 1,787 square-meter parcel of land in Angeles City for P11,492 from his father, Dr. Celestino L. Henson with money borrowed from an officemate. Meanwhile, in Hongkong sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan whereby the latter consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale valued at 199,895 Hongkong dollars or P321,830.95. 4 When Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry within the 20-day period agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their value. Thereafter Anita and her husband filed an action for collection of sum of money. After trial, the court promulgated a decision in favor of the Wongs. It ordered Katrina and Romarico Henson to pay the Wongs.
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A writ of execution was thereafter issued. Levied upon were four lots in Angeles City all in the name of Romarico Henson ... married to Katrina Henson. ISSUE: WON the judgment of execution extends to the properties owned by the husband HELD: The Court disagrees with the CA that the said properties are exclusively owned by Romarico. Having been acquired during the marriage, they are still presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership even though Romarico and Katrina had been living separately. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that Romarico exclusively owns the properties. While there is proof that Romarico acquired the properties with money he had borrowed from an officemate, it is unclear where he obtained the money to repay the loan. If he paid it out of his salaries, then the money is part of the conjugal assets and not exclusively his. Proof on this matter is of paramount importance considering that in the determination of the nature of a property acquired by a person during covertrue, the controlling factor is the source of the money utilized in the purchase. The conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding, Katrina's indebtedness may not be paid for with them her obligation not having been shown by the petitioners to be one of the charges against the conjugal partnership. In addition to the fact that her rights over the properties are merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the consent of her husband and her authority to incur such indebtedness had not been alleged in the complaint and proven at the trial. Furthermore, under the Civil Code (before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988), a wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family or when she borrows money for the purpose of purchasing things necessary for the support of the family if the husband fails to deliver the proper sum; 32 when the administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts 33 or by the husband 34 and when the wife gives moderate donations for charity. 35 Having failed to establish that any of these circumstances occurred, the Wongs may not bind the conjugal assets to answer for Katrina's personal obligation to them. 93) BELCODERO V. CA 227 SCRA 303 FACTS: Alayo D. Bosing, married Juliana Oday on 27 July 1927, with whom he had three children. In 1946, he left the conjugal home, and he started to live instead with Josefa Rivera with whom he later begot one child, named Josephine Bosing, now Josephine Belcodero. On 23 August 1949, Alayo purchased a parcel of land on installment basis from the Magdalena Estate, Inc. In the deed, he indicated his civil status as, "married to Josefa R. Bosing," the common-law wife. In a letter which he addressed to Magdalena Estate, Inc., he authorized the latter to transfer the lot in the name of his "wife Josefa R. Bosing." The final deed of sale was executed by Magdalena Estate, Inc. A few days later, or on 09 November 1959, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 48790 was issued in the name of "Josefa R. Bosing, . . . married to Alayo Bosing, . . ." On 06 June 1958, Alayo married Josefa while his prior marriage with Juliana was still subsisting. Alayo died on 11 March 1967. About three years later, or on September 1970, Josefa and Josephine executed a document of extrajudicial partition and sale of the lot in question, which was there described as "conjugal property" of Josefa and deceased Alayo. In this deed, Josefa's supposed one-half (1/2) interest as surviving spouse of Alayo, as well as her one-fourth (1/4) interest as heir, was conveyed to Josephine for a P10,000.00 consideration, thereby completing for herself, along with her one-fourth (1/4) interest as the surviving child of Alayo, a full "ownership" of the property. A new TCT No. 198840 was issued on June 1974 in the name of Josephine. On October 1980, Juliana (deceased Alayo's real widow) and her three legitimate children filed with the court a quo an action for reconveyance of the property. TC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. CA affirmed. ISSUE: WON THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION BELONGS EXCLUSIVELY TO THE PETITIONERS. HELD: It cannot be seriously contended that, simply because the Property was titled in the name of Josefa at Alayo's request, she should thereby be deemed to be its owner. The property unquestionably was acquired by Alayo. Alayo's letter, dated 06 October 1959, to Magdalena Estate, Inc., merely authorized the latter to have the title to the property transferred to her name. More importantly, she implicitly recognized Alayo's
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ownership when, three years after the death of Alayo, she and Josephine executed the deed of extrajudicial partition and sale in which she asserted a one-half (1/2) interest . The property remained as belonging to the conjugal partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife Juliana. Under both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the old Civil Code (Article 1407), "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." This presumption has not been convincingly rebutted. As regards the property relation between common-law spouses, Article 144 of the Civil Code merely codified the law established through judicial precedents under the old code. In both regimes, the co-ownership rule had more than once been repudiated when either or both spouses suffered from an impediment to marry. The present provisions under Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code did not much deviate from the old rules; in any case, its provisions cannot apply to this case without interdicting prior vested rights (Article 256, Family Code). It was at the time that 'the adjudication of ownership was made following Alayo's demise (not when Alayo merely allowed the property to be titled in Josefa's name which clearly was not intended to be adversarial to Alayo's interest), that a constructive trust was deemed to have been created by operation of law under the provisions of Article 1456 of the Civil Code. Article 1456. If the property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. AFFIREMED. 94) VALDEZ V. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ 260 SCRA 221 FACTS: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in January 1971 and had five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family code. After the hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court, in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition, declaring among others that (1) the marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdez null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations; and (2) the petitioner and the respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51, and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision. Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage." In an order, the TC made the following clarification: Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their "family home" and all their properties for that matter in equal shares. In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply. The TC said that considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the rules on coownership. In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code should be held controlling. ISSUE: WON Article 147 of the Family Code apply to cases where the parties are psychologically incapacitated. HELD: The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 provides: Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership
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In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof in the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership. Thus, petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. AFFIRMED. 95) ESTONINA V. COURT OF APPEALS 266 SCRA 627 FACTS: The controversy involves Lot C situated in Barrio Santisima Cruz, Sta. Cruz, Laguna with an area of 273 square meters. The said parcel of land was in the name of Santiago Garcia who died on October 2, 1967. Some six years after Santiago Garcia's death, or on March 10, 1973, the then CFI of Manila issued an order granting Trinidad Estonina's application for a writ of preliminary attachment. Consequently, a notice of attachment was inscribed in favor of Trinidad Estonina covering all the rights, title, interest, and participation that Consuelo Garcia, the widow of Santiago Garcia, may have in and to the parcel of land covered by the said title. On August 14, 1977, the children of Santiago Garcia with his first wife, Adela Isoreta, namely Ofelia, Remedios, Elvira and Castor all surnamed Garcia, executed a deed selling, transferring and conveying unto the spouses Celso Atayan and Nilda Hicban their "title, rights, interest and participation which is four tenths (4/10) pro indiviso share" in the said parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-82229. About a year after, Santiago Garcia's second wife and widow, Consuelo Garcia and their children, Virgilio, Marilou and Lolita, all surnamed Garcia, followed suit and also sold to the spouses Atayan, their four-tenths (4/10) pro indidviso share in the same parcel of land. On February 22, 1980, Estrella R. Garcia, the widow of Santiago Garcia, Jr. (Santiago Garcia's son from his first marriage), and their children, Roderick, Elizabeth, Dorothy and Erlinda, likewise sold to the spouses Atayan, their one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T82229. Subsequent to a favorable decision obtained by Trinidad Estonina against Consuelo Garcia, execution pending appeal was made on the parcel of land formerly covered by TCT No. T-82229 on July 20, 1979. The said parcel of land was sold at a public auction where Trinidad Estonina was the highest bidder. Consuelo Garcia appealed the decision in Civil Case before the IAC which, however, ruled in favor of Trinidad Estonina. Upon the finality of the said decision, TCT No. T-82229 was cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Laguna and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-99961 was issued in favor of "Trinidad Estonina married to Paulino Estonina". On July 25, 1985, the spouses Atayan filed a complaint for annulment of sheriff's sale and transfer certificate of title with damages before Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna, impleading as defendants therein the spouses Trinidad and Paulino Estonina , Nicanor E. Silvano, Reynaldo G. Javier, Edmund R. Solidum, the Register of Deeds of Laguna, and the heirs of Santiago Garcia who sold to the spouses Atayan their pro indiviso shares in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-82229. RTC:dismissed the complaint. It found the lot covered by TCT No. T-82229, was acquired during the marriage of Santiago Garcia and Consuelo Gaza, and is presumed to be conjugal in nature. Upon the death of Santiago Garcia on October 2, 1967, his conjugal share of one-half (l/2) of the said parcel of land was transmitted to his heirs by intestate succession. By the law on intestate succession, his nine children, five by his first wife and four out of the subsequent marriage, and Consuelo Garcia, his second wife and widow, inherited the same at one-tenth (1/10) each pro indiviso. The remaining one-half (1/2) pertained to the conjugal share of Consuelo Garcia. Thus, inasmuch as Consuelo Garcia inherited one-tenth (1/10) of her husband's conjugal share in the said
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property and is the owner of one-half (1/2) thereof as her conjugal share, she owns a total of 55% (or 1/10 plus 1/2) of the said parcel of land. What could be attached by the spouses Estonina and later levied on execution and sold at public auction was only Consuelo Garcia's rights and interests which is fifty five per cent (55%) of the property. CA: the parcel of land in question was not the conjugal property of Santiago and Consuelo Garcia, but was the former's exclusive property. It was therefore the entire property that formed part of Santiago Garcia's estate upon his death. When Santiago Garcia died, his nine children and Consuelo Garcia inherited the said property each to the extent of one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share. Hence, it was only Consuelo Garcia's one-tenth(l/l0) pro indiviso share in the parcel of land in question which could be validly attached, levied and sold in execution to satisfy the judgment against her and in favor of Trinidad Estonina in Civil Case No. 88430. ISSUE: WON the land is a conjugal property of Santiago and Consuelo HELD: The property involved in this dispute is indeed the exclusive property of the deceased Santiago Garcia. It has been repeatedly held that the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code that all property of the marriage belong to the conjugal partnership applies only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. In the case at bench, the petitioners have been unable to present any proof that the property in question was acquired during the marriage of Santiago and Consuelo. They anchor their claim solely on the fact that when the title over the land in question was issued, Santiago was already married to Consuelo as evidenced by the registration in the name of "Santiago Garcia married to Consuelo Gaza". This, according to the spouses Estonina, suffices to establish the conjugal nature of the property. In the case of Jocson v. Court of Appeals The fact that the properties were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already erdsting. The words "married to" preceding "Alejandra Poblete" are merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson. In other words, the import from the certificates of title is that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, the same having been registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Alejandra Poblete. Being the exclusive property of Santiago Garcia, it was the entire parcel of land in question that formed part of his estate and which passed to his ten heirs by compulsory succession upon his death. And as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, what could therefore be attached and sold at public auction in Civil Case No. 88430 was only the onetenth (1/10) pro indiviso share of Consuelo Garcia in the said parcel of land. The sale at public auction of the disputed property in its entirety by the Sheriff in favor of Trinidad Estonina over and above the onetenth (1/10) share of Consuelo Garcia is null and void, belonging as it does to the other heirs of Santiago Garcia and later to the spouses Atayan. Anent the contention that the spouses Atayan are guilty of laches, suffice it to state that this residual argument deserves scant consideration. Being strangers to Civil Case No. 88430 where the writ of execution over the land in question was issued, they cannot be faulted for filing the "proper action" only in 1985 or six (6) years after the levy on execution. Besides, it was only in 1984 that the Court of Appeals rendered a decision finally cancelling the title of their predecessors-in-interest and issuing another one in favor of Trinidad Estonina. The action filed by the spouses Atayan seeking the annulment of the sheriffs sale and the transfer certificate of title with damages immediately thereafter or on July 25, 1985 cannot be considered as undue delay nor does it imply a lack of interest to enforce their claim over the disputed property. 96) AYALA INVESTMENT VS. CA & SPS. SHING GR NO. 118305, FEBRUARY 12, 1998 DOCTRINE: If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50,300,000 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). As added security for the credit line extended to PBM,
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respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM, executed security agreements, making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBM's indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and respondenthusband Alfredo Ching with the CFI of Pasig. After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount of P50,300,000 with interests. Upon motion of AIDC, the lower court issued a writ of execution pending appeal. Upon AIDC's putting up of an P8,000,000 bond, a writ of execution was issued. Thereafter, petitioner Abelardo Magsajo, Sr., Deputy Sheriff of Pasig, caused the issuance and service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal properties. Petitioner Magsajo then scheduled the auction sale of the properties levied. Private respondents filed a case of injunction against petitioners to enjoin the auction sale alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the conjugal partnership levied on the ground that, among others, the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. The lower court issued a temporary restraining order. AIDC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, questioning the order of the lower court enjoining the sale. Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the lower court from enforcing its Order, thus paving the way for the scheduled auction sale of respondentsspouses conjugal properties. The auction sale took place. AIDC being the only bidder, was issued a Certificate of Sale. Upon expiration of the redemption period, petitioner sheriff issued the final deed of sale which was registered. AIDC filed a motion to dismiss the petition for injunction filed before the CFI of Pasig on the ground that the same had become moot and academic with the consummation of the sale. Respondents filed their opposition to the motion arguing, among others, that where a third party who claim is ownership of the property attached or levied upon, a different legal situation is presented; and that in this case, 2 of the real properties are actually in the name of Encarnacion Ching, a non-party to the civil case. RTC: the conjugal partnership of gains of respondents-spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching is not liable for the payment of the debts secured by respondent-husband Alfredo Ching. Thus, the sale on execution null and void. CA: Affirmed decision of the trial court. ISSUE: WON a surety agreement entered into by the husband in favor of his employer is within the contemplation of Art. 161 of the Civil Code and considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership? HELD: No. The surety agreement entered into by the husband in favor of his employer is not considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. We do not agree with petitioners that there is a difference between the terms "redounded to the benefit of" or "benefited from" on the one hand; and "for the benefit of" on the other. They mean one and the same thing. Art. 161 (1) of the Civil Code and Art. 121 (2) of the Family Code are similarly worded, i.e., both use the term "for the benefit of." On the other hand, Art. 122 of the Family Code provides that "The payment of personal debts by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family." As can be seen, the terms are used interchangeably. From the jurisprudential rulings of this Court, we can derive the following conclusions: (A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term . . . . obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. (B) On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is "for the benefit of the conjugal
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partnership." Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership. The provisions of the Family Code is applicable in this case. These provisions highlight the underlying concern of the law for the conservation of the conjugal partnership; for the husband's duty to protect and safeguard, if not augment, not to dissipate it. This is the underlying reason why the Family Code clarifies that the obligations entered into by one of the spouses must be those that redounded to the benefit of the family and that the measure of the partnership's liability is to "the extent that the family is benefited." Here, the property in dispute also involves the family home. The loan is a corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of administration for the benefit of the family. 97) GUIANG VS. CA AND GILDA COPUZ G.R. No. 125172, June 26, 1998 DOCTRINE: The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The absence of the consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable. Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect. FACTS: Private respondent Gilda Corpuz and Judie Corpuz are legally married spouses. They have three children, namely: Junie (18 years old), Harriet (17), and Jodie (15). The couple bought a 421 sq. meter lot in Koronadal, South Cotabato from Manuel Callejo through a conditional deed of sale. The consideration was payable in installment. In 1988, the couple sold one-half portion of their Lot to petitioner-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. Since then, Guiang occupied the one-half portion and built their house thereon. They are thus adjoining neighbors of the Corpuzes. Gilda Corpuz left for Manila to look for work abroad. Unfortunately, she became a victim of an unscrupulous illegal recruiter. She was not able to go abroad. She stayed for sometime in Manila. After his wife's departure for Manila, Judie Corpuz seldom went home to the conjugal dwelling. He stayed most of the time at his place of work. Harriet Corpuz learned that her father intended to sell the remaining one-half portion including their house to Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her mother. Gilda Corpuz replied that she was objecting to the sale. Harriet, however, did not inform her father about this; but instead gave the letter to Luzviminda Guiang so that she would advise her father. However, in the absence of his wife Gilda, Judie Corpuz pushed through the sale. He sold to Luzviminda Guiang thru a "Deed of Transfer of Rights" remaining one-half portion of their lot and the house. Gilda returned home. She found her children staying with other households. Only Junie was staying in their house. Harriet and Joji were with Mr. Panes. Gilda gathered her children together and stayed at their house. Her husband was nowhere to be found. She was informed by her children that their father had a wife already. For staying in their house sold by her husband, spouses Guiang complained before the Barangay authorities for trespassing. The parties thereat signed a document for amicable settlement stating that Gilda Corpuz and her three children must leave voluntarily the house without any charge. Thereafter, Gilda approached the Barangay Captain for the annulment of the settlement. Annulment not having been made, they stayed put in her house and lot. Spouses Guiang filed a motion for execution of the amicable settlement with the MTC. However, Private Respondent Gilda Corpuz filed a Complaint against her husband Judie Corpuz and Petitioner-Spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The said Complaint sought the declaration of a Deed of Transfer of Right, which involved the conjugal property, null and void. The trial court ruled in favor of private respondent. CA affirmed. ISSUE: WON the assailed Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly executed. HELD: NO Petitioners insist that the questioned Deed was validly executed by the parties in good faith and for valuable consideration. The absence of private respondent's consent merely rendered the Deed voidable under Article 1390 of the Civil Code. The provision in par. 2, refers to contracts visited by vices of consent, i.e., contracts which were entered into by a person whose consent was obtained and vitiated through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. In this instance, private respondent's consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent. The contract falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code, which provides that "...In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void..." Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the
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intimidation referred to by petitioners were perpetrated in the execution of the document embodying the amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz alleged during trial that barangay authorities made her sign said document through misrepresentation and coercion. In any event, its execution does not alter the void character of the deed of sale between the husband and the petitioners-spouses. The fact remains that such contract was entered into without the wife's consent. In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private respondent's consent. To constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements: cause, object, and consent, the last element being indubitably absent in the case at bar. Doctrinally, a void contract cannot be ratified. By Art.1390 of the Civil Code, the Deed to Transfer of Rights cannot be ratified, even by an amicable settlement. Neither can the amicable settlement be considered a continuing offer that was accepted and perfected by the parties, following the last sentence of Article 124. The order of the pertinent events is clear: after the sale, petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing against private respondent, after which the barangay authorities secured an "amicable settlement" and petitioners filed before the MTC a motion for its execution. The settlement, however, does not mention a continuing offer to sell the property or an acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that private respondent would vacate the property. By no stretch of the imagination, can the Court interpret this document as the acceptance mentioned in Article 124. Petition denied. 98) FERRER VS. FERRER G.R. No. 166496, November 9, 2006 It is the owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership or the spouse who expended the acts or efforts, as the case may be. FACTS: In her Complaint for payment of conjugal improvements, sum of money, and accounting with prayer for injunction and damages, petitioner alleged that she is the widow of Alfredo Ferrer (Alfredo), half-brother of respondents Manuel M. Ferrer (Manuel) and Ismael M. Ferrer (Ismael). Before her marriage to Alfredo, the latter acquired a piece of lot. He applied for a loan with the Social Security System (SSS) to build improvements thereon, including a residential house and a twodoor apartment building. It was during their marriage that payment of the loan was made using the couples conjugal funds. From their conjugal funds, petitioner posited, they constructed a warehouse on the lot. Moreover, petitioner averred that respondent Manuel occupied one door of the apartment building, as well as the warehouse; however, in September 1991, he stopped paying rentals thereon, alleging that he had acquired ownership over the property by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by Alfredo in favor of respondents, Manuel and Ismael and their spouses. It is petitioners contention that when her husband was already bedridden, respondents Ismael and Flora Ferrer made him sign a document, purported to be his last will and testament. The document, however, was a Deed of Sale covering Alfredos lot and the improvements thereon. Learning of this development, Alfredo filed with the RTC a Complaint for Annulment of the said sale against respondents. The RTC dismissed the same. The RTC found that the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, and public policy, and should be complied with by the parties in good faith, there being no compelling reason under the law to do otherwise. The dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Further, in support of her Complaint, petitioner alluded to a portion of the Decision of the RTC, which stated, that in determining which property is the principal and which is the accessory, the property of greater value shall be considered the principal. In this case, the lot is the principal and the improvements the accessories. Since Article 120 of the Family Code provides the rule that the ownership of accessory follows the ownership of the principal, then the subject lot with all its improvements became an exclusive and capital property of Alfredo with an obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership of the cost of improvements at the time of liquidation of [the] conjugal partnership. Clearly, Alfredo has all the rights to sell the subject property by himself without need of Josefas consent. According to petitioner, the ruling of the RTC shows that, when Alfredo died she had the right to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements on Alfredos lot. Hence, one-half thereof should be reimbursed and paid by respondents as they are now the registered owners of Alfredos lot. She averred that respondents cannot claim lack of
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knowledge about the fact that the improvements were constructed using conjugal funds as they had occupied one of the apartment buildings on Alfredos lot, and even paid rentals to petitioner. For their part, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending that petitioner had no cause of action against them, and that the cause of action was barred by prior judgment. RTC rendered an Order, denying the Motion to Dismiss. According to the RTC, no pronouncement as to the improvements constructed on Alfredos lot has been made and the payment of petitioners share in the conjugal partnership constitutes a separate cause of action. A subsequent Order was issued by the RTC, denying respondents Motion for Reconsideration. Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by way of a Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the RTC in denying the dismissal. Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the Petition. It held that petitioners Complaint failed to state a cause of action. The appellate court rationalized as follows: [W]e believe that the instant complaint is not the proper action for the respondent to enforce her right of reimbursement of the cost of the improvement[s] on the subject property. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the same should be made and directed in the settlement of estate of her deceased husband Alfredo Ferrer pursuant to Article 129 of the Family Code. Such being the case, it appears that the complaint herein fails to state a cause of action against the petitioners, the latter not being the proper parties against whom the subject action for reimbursement must be directed to. xxx Albeit the respondent herein has the legal right to be reimbursed of the cost of the improvements of the subject property, it is not the petitioners but the estate of her deceased husband which has the obligation to pay the same. The complaint herein is therefore dismissible for failure to state a cause of action against the petitioners. Needless to say, the respondent is not without any further recourse as she may file her claim against the estate of her deceased husband. In light of the foregoing, we find that the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon. Court of Appeals rendered a Resolution denying the motion. Hence, the present recourse. ISSUE: Whether or not he Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioners Complaint for failure to state a cause of action. HELD: NO.After a reading of the allegations contained in petitioners Complaint, we are convinced that the same failed to state a cause of action. According to petitioner, while the RTC recognized that the improvements constructed on Alfredos lots were deemed as Alfredos exclusive and capital property, the court also held that petitioner, as Alfredos spouse, has the right to claim reimbursement from the estate of Alfredo. It is argued by petitioner that her husband had no other property, and his only property had been sold to the respondents; hence, she has the legal right to claim for reimbursement from the respondents who are now the owners of the lot and the improvements thereon. In fine, petitioner asseverates that the Complaint cannot be dismissed on the ground of failure to state a cause of action because the respondents have the correlative obligation to pay the value of the improvements. Petitioner was not able to show that there is an obligation on the part of the respondents to respect or not to violate her right. While we could concede that Civil Case No. 61327 made a reference to the right of the spouse as contemplated in Article 120 of the Family Code to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements, the obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of the entire property is vested. There is no obligation on the part of the purchaser of the property, in case the property is sold by the owner-spouse. Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Thus, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. The subject property was precisely declared as the exclusive property of Alfredo on the basis of Article 120 of the Family Code.
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What is incontrovertible is that the respondents, despite the allegations contained in the Complaint that they are the buyers of the subject premises, are not petitioners spouse nor can they ever be deemed as the owner-spouse upon whom the obligation to reimburse petitioner for her costs rested. It is the owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership or the spouse who expended the acts or efforts, as the case may be. Otherwise stated, respondents do not have the obligation to respect petitioners right to be reimbursed. It can be said, thus, that respondents act of acquiring the subject property by sale was not in violation of petitioners rights. The same can also be said of the respondents objection to reimburse petitioner. Simply, no correlative obligation exists on the part of the respondents to reimburse the petitioner. Corollary thereto, neither can it be said that their refusal to reimburse constituted a violation of petitioners rights. As has been shown in the foregoing, no obligation by the respondents under the law exists. Petitioners Complaint failed to state a cause of action against the respondents, and for this reason, the Court of Appeals was not in error in dismissing the same. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. 99) DOCENA VS. HON. RICARDO LAPESURA GR NO. 140153, MARCH 28, 2001 FACTS: On June 1, 1977, private respondent, Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land against lessees, petitionerspouses Docena. The petitioners clamed ownership of the land based on occupation since time immemorial. A certain Guillermo Abuda intervened in the case. In a decision dated November 24, 1989, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and the intervenor Abuda. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered the petitioners to vacate the land they have leased from plaintiff-appellant. On May 22, 19995, Hombria filed a Motion for Execution of the above decision which has already become final and executory. The above motion was granted by judge Lapesura and a Writ of Execution was issued therefore. An alias Writ of Demolition was then filed by the Sheriff. A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the petitioners eith the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge in issuing the orders and the sheriff in issuing the Alias Writ of Demolition. CA dismissed the petition on the grounds that the petition was filed beyond the 60-day period provided under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by Bar Matter No. 803 and that the certification of non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by the husband alone. the The Motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. HELD: YES. Under the New Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. In fact, he is the sole administrator, and the wife is not entitled as a matter of right to join him in this endeavor. The husband may defend the conjugal partnership in a suit or action without being joined by the wife. Corollarily, the husband alone may execute the necessary certificate of non-forum shopping to accompany the pleading. The husband as the statutory administrator of the conjugal property could have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition alone, without the concurrence of the wife. If suits to defend an interest in the conjugal prperties may be filed by the husband alone, with more reason, he may sign the certficate of non-forum shopping to be attched to the petition. Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband and the wife jointly. However, an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is required, joint management or administration does not require that the husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may validly exercise full power of management alone, subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases as provided under Article 124 of the Family Code. It is believed taht even under the provisions of the Family Code, the husband alone could have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition to contests the writs of demolition issued against the conjugal property with the Court of Appeals without being joined by his wife. The signing of the attached certificate of nonforum shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect.
100) MANALO VS. CAMAISA GR No. 147978, January 23, 2002 FACTS:
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Thelma A. Jader-Manalo was interested in buying the two properties of Spouses Camaisa. So she negotiated for the purchase through a real estate broker, Mr. Proceso Ereno. She made a definite offer to buy the properties to respondent Edilberto Camaisa with the knowledge and conformity of his wife, respondent Norma Camaisa in the presence of the real estate broker. After Edilberto signed the contracts, Manalo delivered to him two checks as down payments. The contracts were given to Edilberto for the formal affixing of his wife's signature. However, the following day, petitioner received a call from respondent Norma, requesting a meeting to clarify some provisions of the contracts. To accommodate her queries, petitioner, accompanied by her lawyer, met with Edilberto and Norma and the real estate broker at Cafe Rizal in Makati. During the meeting, handwritten notations were made on the contracts to sell, so they arranged to incorporate the notations and to meet again for the formal signing of the contracts. When petitioner met again with respondent spouses and the real estate broker at Edilberto's office for the formal affixing of Norma's signature, she was surprised when respondent spouses informed her that they were backing out of the agreement because they needed "spot cash" for the full amount of the consideration. Petitioner reminded respondent spouses that the contracts to sell had already been duly perfected and Norma's refusal to sign the same would unduly prejudice petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property of the without the wifes written consent. HELD: NO. The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. Thus, Article 124 of the Family Code provides: Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur. Even granting that respondent Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. Significantly, petitioner herself admits that Norma refused to sign the contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties. However, being merely aware of a transaction is not consent. 101) CARLOS VS. ABELARDO GR NO. 146504, April 9, 2002 DOCTRINE: The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership FACTS: In October 1989, respondent and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached him and requested him to advance the amount of US$25,000.00 (P625, 000. 00) for the purchase of a house and lot. To enable and assist the spouses conduct their married life independently and on their own, petitioner, in October 31, 1989, issued a check in the name of a certain Pura Vallejo, seller of the property, who acknowledged receipt thereof. When petitioner inquired from the spouses in July 1991 as to the status of the amount he loaned to them, the latter acknowledged their obligation but pleaded that they were not yet in a position to make a definite settlement of the same. Thereafter, respondent expressed violent resistance to petitioners inquiries on the amount to the extent of making various death threats against petitioner. Despite formal demand for the payment of the said loan, spouses were unable to pay their obligation. Hence, this prompted petitioner to institute a collection suit against respondent and his wife. As they were separated in fact for more than a year prior to the filing of the complaint, respondent and his wife filed separate answers. Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo admitted securing a loan together with her husband, from petitioner. She claimed, however, that said loan was payable on a staggered basis so she was surprised when petitioner demanded immediate payment of the full amount. In his separate Answer, respondent admitted receiving the amount of US$25,000.00 but claimed that the said US$25,000.00 was never intended as
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loan of defendant. It was his share of income on contracts obtained by defendant. RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. CA reversed. ISSUE: Whether or not the loan is chargeable to the conjugal partnership. HELD: Yes. The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Article 121 of the Family Code: Article 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other; (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. While respondent did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the house and lot which became the conjugal home of respondent and his family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent, under Art. 21 of the Family Code, he shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife. Early in time, it must be noted that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. The defendants never denied that the check of US$25,000.00 was used to purchase the subject house and lot. They do not deny that the same served as their conjugal home, thus benefiting the family. On the same principle, acknowledgment of the loan made by the defendant-wife binds the conjugal partnership since its proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family. Hence, defendant-husband and 102) RELUCIO VS. ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ G.R. NO. 138497 January 16, 2002 FACTS: Angelina Mejia Lopez filed a petition for "APPOINTMENT AS SOLE ADMINISTRATIX OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES, FORFEITURE, ETC.," against defendant Alberto Lopez and petitioner Imelda Relucio. Angelina alleged that sometime in 1968, defendant Lopez, who is legally married to her, abandoned the latter and their four legitimate children; that he arrogated unto himself full and exclusive control and administration of the conjugal properties, that defendant Lopez maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with petitioner since 1976. It was further alleged that defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio, during their period of cohabitation have amassed a fortune consisting mainly of stockholdings in Lopez-owned or controlled corporations, residential, agricultural, commercial lots, houses, apartments and buildings, cars and other motor vehicles, bank accounts and jewelry. These properties, which are in the names of defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio singly or jointly or their dummies and proxies, have been acquired principally if not solely through the actual contribution of money, property and industry of defendant Lopez with minimal, if not nil, actual contribution from petitioner Relucio. On December 8, 1993, a Motion to Dismiss the Petition was filed by herein petitioner on the ground that private respondent has no cause of action against her.An Order dated February 10, 1994 was issued by herein respondent Judge denying petitioner Relucio's Motion to Dismiss on the ground that she is impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party because some of the subject properties are registered in her name and defendant Lopez, or solely in her name. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari assailing the trial court's denial of her motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals promulgated a decision denying the petition. ISSUE: Whether respondent's petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the conjugal property, accounting, etc. against her husband Alberto J. Lopez established a cause of action against petitioner. defendant-wife are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan.
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HELD:: No. The complaint is by an aggrieved wife against her husband. Nowhere in the allegations does it appear that relief is sought against petitioner. Respondent's causes of action were all against her husband. The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of respondent as administratrix of the conjugal partnership or absolute community property arising from her marriage to Alberto J. Lopez. Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause of action. Article 128 of the Family Code refers only to spouses, to wit: "If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property xxx". The administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between them, to the exclusion of all other persons. Respondent alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is her husband. Therefore, her first cause of action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There is no right-duty relation between petitioner and respondent that can possibly support a cause of action. The second cause of action is for an accounting "by respondent husband." The accounting of conjugal partnership arises from or is an incident of marriage. Petitioner has nothing to do with the marriage between respondent Alberto J. Lopez. Hence, no cause of action can exist against petitioner on this ground. Respondent's alternative cause of action is for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez' share in the coowned property "acquired during his illicit relationship and cohabitation with [petitioner]" and for the "dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains between him [Alberto J. Lopez] and the [respondent]." The third cause of action is essentially for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez' share in property co-owned by him and petitioner. It does not involve the issue of validity of the co-ownership between Alberto J. Lopez and petitioner. The issue is whether there is basis in law to forfeit Alberto J. Lopez' share, if any there be, in property co-owned by him with petitioner. Respondent's asserted right to forfeit extends to Alberto J. Lopez' share alone. Failure of Alberto J. Lopez to surrender such share, assuming the trial court finds in respondent's favor, results in a breach of an obligation to respondent and gives rise to a cause of action. Such cause of action, however, pertains to Alberto J. Lopez, not petitioner. The respondent also sought support. Support cannot be compelled from a stranger. The action in Special Proceedings M-3630 is, to use respondent Angelina M. Lopez' own words, one by "an aggrieved wife against her husband." 103) Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank vs. Miguela C. Dailo G.R. No. 153802, March 11, 2005 Facts During their marriage, respondents Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. purchased a house and lot with the Deed of Absolute Sale executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee. Without the knowledge and consent of respondent Miguela Dailo, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing her to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot. Gesmundo was able to obtain a loan from petitioner and as security executed a Real Estate Mortgage on the subject property in favor of petitioner. Upon maturity, the loan remained unpaid and as a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the death of her husband, during one of her visits to the subject property, respondent learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Roldan Brion to clean its premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises. Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted a case for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the latters Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent, and upon elevation, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts finding in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that the subject property was conjugal in nature. Hence, the appellate court declared as void the mortgage on the subject property because it was constituted without the knowledge and consent of respondent, in accordance with Article 124 of the Family Code. With respect to the damage to respondents car, the appellate court found petitioner to be liable because it is responsible for the consequences of the acts or omissions of the person it hired to accomplish the assigned task. All told, the appellate court affirmed
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the trial courts Decision, but deleted the award for damages and attorneys fees for lack of basis. As a response to above decision, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner argues that although Article 124 of the Family Code requires the consent of the other spouse to the mortgage of conjugal properties, the framers of the law could not have intended to curtail the right of a spouse from exercising full ownership over the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to him under the concept of co-ownership. Thus, petitioner would like the Court to uphold the validity of the mortgage to the extent of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.s share in the conjugal partnership. In addition, petitioner imposes the liability for the payment of the principal obligation obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on the conjugal partnership to the extent that it redounded to the benefit of the family. Issues 1. Whether or not the mortgage constituted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on the subject property as co-owner thereof is valid as to his undivided share. 2. Whether or not the conjugal partnership is liable for the payment of the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. the same having redounded to the benefit of the family. Held On the first issue, the Court cited the case, Guiang v. Court of Appeals, where it was held that the sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and wife and the same principle shall squarely applies to the instant case. Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relations between respondent and her late husband. With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established before its effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on coownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter. The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void. The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court are correct in declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject property for lack of respondents consent. On the second issue, the Court cited that under Article 121 of the Family Code, The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . . (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . . For the subject property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit. The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies
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with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Other than petitioners bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation. 104) In Re: Petition For Separation Of Property Elena Buenaventura Muller vs. Helmut Muller G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006 Facts Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Germany. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by respondents parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner. Due to incompatibilities, respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before the Regional Trial Court. The trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute community of property between the petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the separation of properties between them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution. However, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse during the marriage shall be excluded from the community property. The real property, therefore, inherited by respondent-petitioner in Germany is excluded from the absolute community of property of the herein spouses. Necessarily, the proceeds of the sale of said real property as well as the personal properties purchased thereby, belong exclusively to the respondent-petitioner. However, the part of that inheritance used by the respondent-petitioner for acquiring the house and lot in this country cannot be recovered by the respondent-petitioner, its acquisition being a violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution which provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." The law will leave the parties in the situation where they are in without prejudice to a voluntary partition by the parties of the said real property. Hence, as regards the property situated in Antipolo and the improvements thereon, the Court shall not make any pronouncement on constitutional grounds. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed decision modifying the trial courts Decision. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It also considered petitioners ownership over the property in trust for the respondent. As regards the house, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits respondent from acquiring the same. Issue Whether or not the respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the amount used to purchase the land as well as the costs for the construction of the house. Held The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by operation of law in view of petitioners marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondents disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the constitutional prohibition. Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity is likewise misplaced. He who seeks equity must do equity,
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and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition. Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on respondents part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own. In view of the foregoing, the Court ordered the Decision of the Court of Appeals to be REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court terminating the regime of absolute community between the petitioner and respondent, decreeing a separation of property between them and ordering the partition of the personal properties located in the Philippines equally, is REINSTATED. 105) Agapay vs. Palang 276 SCRA 341 Facts Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage with private respondent Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol in 1949. A few months after the wedding, he left to work in Hawaii. The trial court found evidence that as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. On July 15, 1973, the then sixty-three-year-old Miguel contracted his second marriage with nineteen-year-old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. Two months earlier, on May 17, 1973, Miguel and Erlinda, as evidenced by the Deed of Sale, jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located in Pangasinan. Consequently, a Transfer Certificate of Title covering said rice land was issued in their names. A house and lot in Pangasinan was likewise purchased on September 23, 1975, allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. A Transfer Certificate of Title covering said property was later issued in her name. On October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter. The parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang. Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son, Kristopher A. Palang. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlinas complaint and two years later, Miguel died. On July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz, herein private respondents, instituted an action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court. Private respondents sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. Petitioner, as defendant below, contended that while the riceland is registered in their names (Miguel and Erlinda), she had already given her half of the property to their son Kristopher Palang. She added that the house and lot is her sole property, having bought the same with her own money. Erlinda added that Carlina is precluded from claiming aforesaid properties since the latter had already donated their conjugal estate to Herminia. After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint after declaring that there was little evidence to prove that the subject properties pertained to the conjugal property of Carlina and Miguel Palang. On appeal, respondent court reversed the trial courts decision. The Court of Appeals declared the plaintiffs-appellants as the owners of the riceland and the house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with defendant appellee. Issue Whether or not petitioner can be considered as the rightful co-owner of the riceland and the house and lot. Held The Court held that under Article 148 of the Family Code, providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares. In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade the Court that she actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around twenty years of age
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and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject property, there being no proof of the same. Petitioner again claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda actually cohabited. In the nature of an afterthought, said added assertion was intended to exclude their case from the operation of Article 148 of the Family Code. Proof of the precise date when they commenced their adulterous cohabitation not having been adduced, the Court cannot state definitively that the riceland was purchased even before they started living together. In any case, even assuming that the subject property was bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still apply and proof of actual contribution would still be essential. Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland, the Court finds no basis to justify her coownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland should revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang. With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase price and directed that Erlindas name alone be placed as the vendee. The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. Herein respondents were the plaintiffs in an action for ejectment filed before the MTC of Valenzuela against herein Petitioner Guillerma Tumlos, Toto Tumlos, and Gina Tumlos. In their complaint, the said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building located at ARTE SUBDIVISION III; that through tolerance they had allowed the defendants-private respondents to occupy the apartment building for the last seven (7) years without the payment of any rent; that it was agreed upon that after a few months, defendant Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a month while the other defendants promised to pay P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which agreement was not complied with by the said defendants; that they have demanded several times for the defendants to vacate the premises, as they are in need of the property for the construction of a new building; and that they have also demanded payment of P84,000.00 from Toto and Gina Tumlos representing rentals for seven (7) years and payment of P143,600.00 from Guillerma Tumlos as unpaid rentals for seven (7) years, but the said demands went unheeded. Petitioner Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an answer to the complaint. She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a co-vendee of the property in question together with Respondent Mario Fernandez. Thus, she asked for the dismissal of the complaint. After an unfruitful preliminary conference, the MTC required the parties to submit their affidavits and other evidence on the factual issues defined in their pleadings within ten (10) days from receipt of such order and thereafter promulgated its judgment. Upon appeal to the RTC, petitioner and the two other defendants alleged in their memorandum on appeal that Respondent Mario Fernandez and Petitioner Guillerma had an amorous relationship, and that they acquired the property in question as their love nest. It was further alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their two (2) children for around ten (10) years, and that Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the other apartments, until she discovered that Respondent Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage. In the same memorandum, petitioner and the two other defendants further averred that it was only recently that Toto Tumlos was temporarily accommodated in one of the rooms of the subject premises while Gina Tumlos acted as a nanny for
106) Tumlos vs. Fernandez 330 SCRA 718 Facts
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the children. In short, their presence there was only transient and they were not tenants of the Fernandez spouses. The RTC subsequently rendered a decision affirming in toto the judgment of the MTC. The petitioner and the two other defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the decision of affirmance by the RTC was constitutionally flawed for failing to point out distinctly and clearly the findings of facts and law on which it was based vis-vis the statements of issues they have raised in their memorandum on appeal. They also averred that the Contract to Sell presented by the plaintiffs which named the buyer as Mario P. Fernandez, of legal age, married to Lourdes P. Fernandez, should not be given credence as it was falsified to appear that way. According to them, the Contract to Sell originally named Guillerma Fernandez as the spouse of Respondent Mario. As found by the RTC in its judgment, a new Contract to Sell was issued by the sellers naming the respondents as the buyers after the latter presented their marriage contract and requested a change in the name of the vendee-wife. Such facts necessitate the conclusion that Guillerma was really a co-owner thereof, and that the respondents manipulated the evidence in order to deprive her of her rights to enjoy and use the property as recognized by law. The RTC subsequently ruled that the Contract to Sell submitted by the Fernandez spouses appeared not to be authentic, as there was an alteration in the name of the wife of Respondent Mario Fernandez. Hence, the contract presented by the respondents cannot be given any weight. The court further ruled that Guillerma and Respondent Mario acquired the property during their cohabitation as husband and wife, although without the benefit of marriage. From such findings, the court concluded that Petitioner Guillerma Tumlos was a co-owner of the subject property and could not be ejected therefrom. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that from the inception of the instant case, the only defense presented by private respondent Guillerma is her right as a co-owner of the subject property, which was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma. It was only on appeal that Guillerma alleged that she cohabited with the petitionerhusband without the benefit of marriage, and that she bore him two (2) children. Attached to her memorandum on appeal are the birth certificates of the said children. Such contentions and documents should not have been considered by the RTC, as they were not presented in her affidavit/position paper before the MTC. Even if the said allegations and documents could be considered, the claim of coownership must still fail as Respondent Mario Fernandez is validly married to Respondent Lourdes Fernandez as per Marriage Contract. Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated to marry each other. Thus, the property relations governing their supposed cohabitation is that found in Article 148 of the Family Code. It is clear that actual contribution is required by this provision. Hence, if actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares. In the instant case, no proof of actual contribution by Guillerma Tumlos in the purchase of the subject property was presented. Her only evidence was her being named in the Contract to Sell as the wife of Respondent Mario Fernandez. Since she failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the subject apartment building, the Court finds no basis to justify her co-ownership with Respondent Mario. The said property is thus presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership property of Mario and Lourdes Fernandez, it being acquired during the subsistence of their marriage and there being no other proof to the contrary. The RTC also found that Respondent Mario has two (2) children with Guillerma who are in her custody, and that to eject them from the apartment building would be to run counter with the obligation of the former to give support to his minor illegitimate children, which indispensably includes dwelling. Such finding has no leg to stand on, it being based on evidence presented for the first time on appeal. Even assuming arguendo that the said evidence was validly presented, the RTC failed to consider that the need for support cannot be presumed. Article 203 of the Family Code expressly provides that the obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. Issues 1. Whether or not the petitioner is a co-owner of the property pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code. 2. Whether or not the petitioners claim for support bar the subject ejectment suit. Held On the first issue, the Court held that it cannot accept petitioners submission that she is a coowner of the disputed property pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code. As correctly held by the CA, the applicable law is not Article 144 of the Civil Code, but Article 148 of the Family Code. Under
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Article 148 of the Family Code, a man and a woman, who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together conjugally, may be deemed co-owners of a property acquired during the cohabitation only upon proof that each made an actual contribution to its acquisition. Hence, mere cohabitation without proof of contribution will not result in a co-ownership. Article 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a man and a woman, who are not incapacitated to marry each other, or to one in which the marriage of the parties is void from the beginning. It does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife. Based on evidence presented by respondents, as well as those submitted by petitioner herself before the RTC, it is clear that Mario Fernandez was incapacitated to marry petitioner because he was legally married to Lourdes Fernandez. It is also clear that, as readily admitted by petitioner, she cohabited with Mario in a state of concubinage. Therefore, Article 144 of the Civil Code is inapplicable. In this case, petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual contribution to purchase the subject property. Likewise, her claim of having administered the property during the cohabitation is unsubstantiated and in any event, this fact by itself does not justify her claim, for nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides that the administration of the property amounts to a contribution in its acquisition. Clearly, there is no basis for petitioners claim of co-ownership. The property in question belongs to the conjugal partnership of respondents. Hence, the MTC and the CA were correct in ordering the ejectment of petitioner from the premises. On the second issue, the Court disagree with the petitioner that the childrens right to support, which necessarily includes shelter, prevails over the right of respondents to eject her. The Court emphasized that the case at bar is an ejectment suit whereby respondents seek to exercise their possessory right over their property. It is summary in character and deals solely with the issue of possession of the property in dispute and it has been shown that they have a better right to possess it than does the petitioner, whose right to possess is based merely on their tolerance. Further, Article 298 of the Civil Code expressly provides that the obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same need it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial and extrajudicial demand. In this case, none was made. 107) Eustaquio Mallilin vs. Ma. Elvira Castillo 333 SCRA 628 Facts On February 24, 1993, petitioner Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. filed a complaint for "Partition and/or Payment of Co-Ownership Share, Accounting and Damages" against respondent Ma. Elvira Castillo. The complaint alleged that petitioner and respondent, both married and with children, but separated from their respective spouses, cohabited after a brief courtship sometime in 1979 while their respective marriages still subsisted. During their union, they set up the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation, with petitioner as president and chairman of the board of directors, and respondent as vice-president and treasurer. The business flourished and petitioner and respondent acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in respondent's name. In 1992, due to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Petitioner demanded from respondent his share in the subject properties, but respondent refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her name. In her Amended Answer, respondent admitted that she engaged in the customs brokerage business with petitioner but alleged that the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation was organized with other individuals and duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1987. She denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife because the fact was that they were still legally married to their respective spouses. She claimed to be the exclusive owner of all real personal properties involved in petitioner's action for partition on the ground that they were acquired entirely out of her own money and registered solely in her name. On November 25, 1994, respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, in accordance with Rule 34 of the Rules of Court. She contended that summary judgment was proper, because the issues raised in the pleadings were sham and not genuine. The respondent contended that even if she and petitioner actually cohabited, petitioner could not validly claim a part of the subject real and personal properties because Art. 144 of the Civil Code, which provides that the rules on co-ownership shall govern the properties acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which is void ab initio, applies only if the parties are not in any way incapacitated to
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contract marriage. In the parties' case, their union suffered the legal impediment of a prior subsisting marriage. Thus, the question of fact being raised by petitioner, i.e., whether they lived together as husband and wife, was irrelevant as no coownership could exist between them. Further, respondent maintained that petitioner cannot be considered an unregistered co-owner of the subject properties on the ground that, since titles to the land are solely in her name, to grant petitioner's prayer would be to allow a collateral attack on the validity of such titles. Petitioner opposed respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. 8 He contended that the case presented genuine factual issues and that Art. 144 of the Civil Code had been repealed by the Family Code which now allows, under Art. 148, a limited coownership even though a man and a woman living together are not capacitated to marry each other. Petitioner also asserted that an implied trust was constituted when he and respondent agreed to register the properties solely in the latter's name although the same were acquired out of the profits made from their brokerage business. Petitioner invoked Articles 1452 and 1453 of the Civil Code. On January 30, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision granting respondent's motion for summary judgment. It ruled that an examination of the pleadings shows that the issues involved were purely legal. The trial court also sustained respondent's contention that petitioner's action for partition amounted to a collateral attack on the validity of the certificates of title covering the subject properties. It held that even if the parties really had cohabited, the action for partition could not be allowed because an action for partition among coowners ceases to be so and becomes one for title if the defendant, as in the present case, alleges exclusive ownership of the properties in question. For these reasons, the trial court dismissed Case. On appeals, the Court of Appeals, ordered the case remanded to the court of origin for trial on the merits. It cited the decision in Roque v. Intermediate Appellate Court to the effect that an action for partition is at once an action for declaration of coownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved. If the defendant asserts exclusive title over the property, the action for partition should not be dismissed. Rather, the court should resolve the case and if the plaintiff is unable to sustain his claimed status as a co-owner, the court should dismiss the action, not because the wrong remedy was availed of, but because no basis exists for requiring the defendant to submit to partition. Resolving the issue whether petitioner's action for partition was a collateral attack on the validity of the certificates of title, the Court of Appeals held that since petitioner sought to compel respondent to execute documents necessary to effect transfer of what he claimed was his share, petitioner was not actually attacking the validity of the titles but in fact, recognized their validity. Finally, the appellate court upheld petitioner's position that Art. 144 of the Civil Code had been repealed by Art. 148 of the Family Code. Respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision of Court of Appeals. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals granted respondent's motion and reversed its previous decision. Issue Whether or not the fact that the petitioner and respondent indeed cohabited is material to determine co-ownership of properties between the parties. Held The Court held that although Art. 144 of the Civil Code, applies only to cases in which a man and a woman live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage provided they are not incapacitated or are without impediment to marry each other, or in which the marriage is void ab initio, provided it is not bigamous, therefore, does not cover parties living in an adulterous relationship. Art. 148 of the Family Code, however, provides for a limited co-ownership in cases where the parties in union are incapacitated to marry each other. It was error for the trial court to rule that, because the parties in this case were not capacitated to marry each other at the time that they were alleged to have been living together, they could not have owned properties in common. The Family Code, in addition to providing that a co-ownership exists between a man and a woman who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, likewise provides that, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is thus co-ownership even though the couples are not capacitated to marry each other. In this case, there may be a co-ownership between the parties. Consequently, whether petitioner and respondent cohabited and whether the properties involved in the case are part of the alleged coownership, are genuine and material. All but one of the properties involved were alleged to have been
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acquired after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. With respect to the property acquired before the Family Code took effect if it is shown that it was really acquired under the regime of the Civil Code, then it should be excluded. 108) Elna Mercado-Fehr vs. Bruno Fehr G.R. No. 152716, OCTOBER 23, 2003 Facts This case arose from a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code filed by petitioner Elna Mercado-Fehr against respondent Bruno Fehr before the Regional Trial Court of Makati in March 1997. After due proceedings, the trial court declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of property. Custody over the two minor children was awarded to petitioner. After a careful scrutiny of the inventory of properties submitted by both parties, the Court finds the following properties to be excluded from the conjugal properties: a) The Bacolod property, considering that the same is owned by petitioners parents; and b) Suite 204 of the LCG Condominium, considering that the same was purchased on installment basis by respondent with his exclusive funds prior to his marriage, as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983. In view of the above decision, Suite 204, LCG Condominium was declared the EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY of respondent. Accordingly, petitioner was directed to transfer ownership of Suite 204 in the name of respondent. The Petitioner and Respondent are further enjoined to jointly support their minor children, Michael and Patrick Fehr, for their education, uniforms, food and medical expenses. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Order with respect to the adjudication of Suite 204, LCG Condominium and the support of the children. Petitioner alleged that Suite 204 was purchased on installment basis at the time when petitioner and respondent were living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, hence the rules on co-ownership should apply in accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code. Resolving said motion, the trial court held that since the marriage between petitioner and respondent was declared void ab intio, the rules on co-ownership should apply in the liquidation and partition of the properties they own in common pursuant to Article 147 of the Family Code. The court, however, affirmed its previous ruling that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium was acquired prior to the couples cohabitation and therefore pertained solely to respondent. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal questioning the order of the trial court but subsequently withdrew the notice and instead filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, questioning the findings of the trial court. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Decision, which was also denied by the appellate court. Issue Whether or not Suite 204 of LCG Condominium should be governed by the rules on co-ownership and what rules should be applied in the settlement of the common properties? Held It appears from the facts, as found by the trial court, that in March 1983, after two years of long-distance courtship, petitioner left Cebu City and moved in with respondent in the latters residence in Metro Manila. Their relations bore fruit and their first child, Michael Bruno Fehr, was born on December 3, 1983. The couple got married on March 14, 1985. In the meantime, they purchased on installment a condominium unit, Suite 204, at LCG Condominium, as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983 executed by respondent as the buyer and J.V. Santos Commercial Corporation as the seller. Petitioner also signed the contract as witness, using the name "Elna Mercado Fehr". Upon completion of payment, the title to the condominium unit was issued in the name of petitioner. In light of these facts, the Court gave more credence to petitioners submission that Suite 204 was acquired during the parties cohabitation. Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family Code, said property should be governed by the rules on coownership. Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in the case at bar. This provision creates a co-ownership with respect to the properties they acquire during their cohabitation. This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as
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husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Article 37 and 38" of the Code. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Thus, for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. All these elements are present in the case at bar. It has not been shown that petitioner and respondent suffered any impediment to marry each other. They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife when petitioner moved in with respondent in his residence and were later united in marriage. Their marriage, however, was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code because of respondents psychological incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations. The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was purchased on installment basis on July 26, 1983, at the time when petitioner and respondent were already living together. Hence, it should be considered as common property of petitioner and respondent. Further, the Court held that the property regime of the parties should be divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership. 109) Saguid vs. Rey G.R. No. 150611.JUNE 10, 2003 Facts Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband, when she met petitioner Jacinto Saguid sometime in July 1987. After a brief courtship, the two decided to cohabit as husband and wife in a house built on a lot owned by Jacintos father. Jacinto made a living as the patron of their fishing vessel Saguid Brothers. Gina, on the other hand, worked as a fish dealer, but decided to work as an entertainer in Japan from 1992 to 1994. In 1996, the couple decided to separate. On January 9, 1997, private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against the petitioner. She alleged that from her salary as entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute P70,000.00 in the completion of their unfinished house. Also, from her own earnings as an entertainer and fish dealer, she was able to acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture and household effects, with a total value of P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to her. Private respondent stated that she had a total of P35,465.00 share in the joint account deposit which she and the petitioner maintained. Gina declared that said deposits were spent for the purchase of construction materials, appliances and other personal properties. Petitioner, on the other hand, claimed that the expenses for the construction of their house were defrayed solely from his income. He averred that private respondents meager income as fish dealer rendered her unable to contribute in the construction of said house. Petitioner further contended that Gina did not work continuously in Japan from 1992 to 1994. When their house was repaired and improved sometime in 1995-1996, private respondent did not share in the expenses because her earnings as entertainer were spent on the daily needs and business of her parents. Petitioner further claimed that his savings from his income in the fishing business were the ones used in purchasing the disputed personal properties. The respondent was allowed to present evidence ex parte after the trial court declared the petitioner as in default for failure to file a pre-trial brief. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Subsequently, a decision was rendered in favor of the private respondent. On appeal, said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals except for the award for moral damages. Issue What provision of the Family Code shall governed the property regime of the petitioner and private respondent? Held The Court held that the property regime of Jacinto and Gina, who was validly married to another man at
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the time of her cohabitation with the former, should be governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, as it applies to adulterous relationships and under this regime, proof of actual contribution is required. In the case at bar, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1987, which is before the date of the effectivity of the Family Code, Article 148 still applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties. Private respondent alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in the record are receipts in her name for the purchase of construction materials in the total amount of P11,413.00. On the other hand, both parties claim that the money used to purchase the disputed personal properties came partly from their joint account. While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal. Here, the disputed personal properties were valued at P111,375.00, the existence and value of which were not questioned by the petitioner. Hence, their share therein is equivalent to one-half, which is P 55,687.50 each. On the basis of the evidence established, the extent of private respondents co-ownership over the disputed house is only up to the amount of P11,413.00, her proven contribution in the construction thereof. While for the personal properties, her participation should be limited only to the amount of P55,687.50.
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XIII. THE FAMILY AS AN INSTITUTION 110) Hontiveros vs. RTC Br. 25, Iloilo City & Spouses Gregorio Hontiveros & Teodora Ayson G.R.No. 125465, June 29, 1999 Facts: Spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson before the RTC Iloilo City. Petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a land located at the town of Jamindan, Province of Capiz, as shown by OCT No. 0-2124, issued pursuant to the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court which modified decision of CFI Capiz, in a land registration case filed by private respondent Gregorio Hontivero. Also, that they were deprived of income from the land as a result of the filing of the land registration case. The income consisted of rentals from tenants of the land in the amount of P66,000.00 per year from 1968 to 1987, and P595,000.00 per year thereafter; and that private respondents filed the land registration case and withheld possession of the land from petitioners in bad faith. Private respondents denied that they were married and alleged that private respondent Hontiveros was a widower while private respondent Ayson was single. They denied that they had deprived petitioners of possession of and income from the land. They alleged that possession of the property in question had already been transferred to petitioners on August 7, 1985, by virtue of a writ of possession, dated July 18, 1985, issued by the clerk of court of the RTC Capiz, Mambusao, the return thereof having been received by petitioners counsel. Since then, petitioners have been directly receiving rentals from the tenants of the land. The complaint failed to state a cause of action since it did not allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made, considering that petitioner Augusto Hontiveros and private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros are brothers. The decision of the IAC in Land Registration Case was null and void since it was based upon a ground which was not passed upon by the trial court. That petitioners claim for damages was barred by prescription with respect to claims before 1984; that there were no rentals due since private respondent Hontiveros was a possessor in good faith and for value; and that private respondent Ayson had nothing to do with the case as she was not married to private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros and did not have any proprietary interest in the subject property. Private respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for an order against petitioners to pay damages to private respondents by way of counterclaim, as well as reconveyance of the subject land to private respondent. Issue: Whether or not the RTC palpably erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that it does not allege under oath that earnest efforts toward a compromise were made prior to filing as required by Art. 151 of FC. Held: No. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. Moreover, as petitioners contend, Art. 151 of the Family Code does not apply in this case since the suit is not exclusively among family members. Petitioners claim that whenever a stranger is a party in a case involving family members, the requisite showing of earnest efforts to compromise is no longer mandatory. They argue that since private respondent Ayson is admittedly a stranger to the Hontiveros family, the case is not covered by the requirements of Art. 151 of the Family Code. We agree with petitioners. The inclusion of private respondent Ayson as defendant and petitioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family Code. Under this provision, the phrase members of the same family refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood. In Gayon v. Gayon, the enumeration of brothers and sisters as members of the same family does not comprehend sisters-in-law. In that case, then Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized that sistersin-law (hence, also brothers-in-law) are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of the same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the same enumeration of members of the family, we find no reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the mater. Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private respondent Hernando, was required to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise before filing the present suit. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction. Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is described in the complaint as the spouse of
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respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes of Art. 151. Petitioners finally question the constitutionality of Art. 151 of the Family Code on the ground that it in effect amends the Rules of Court. This, according to them, cannot be done since the Constitution reserves in favor of the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules of pleadings and procedure. Considering the conclusion we have reached in this case, however, it is unnecessary for present purposes to pass upon this question. Courts do not pass upon constitutional questions unless they are the very lis mota of the case. 111) Guerrero vs. RTC Ilocos Norte, Judge Luis Bello & Pedro Hernando G.R. No. 109068 January 10, 1994 Facts: Filed by petitioner as an accion publicana against private respondent, this case assumed another dimension when it was dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that the parties being brotherin-law the complaint should have alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted towards a compromise. Admittedly, the complaint does not allege that the parties exerted earnest efforts towards a compromise and that the same failed. However, private respondent Pedro G. Hernando apparently overlooked this alleged defect since he did not file any motion to dismiss nor attack the complaint on this ground in his answer. It was only at the pre-trial conference, that the relationship of petitioner Gaudencio Guerrero and Hernando was noted by respondent Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr. Guerrero claims that since brothers by affinity are not members of the same family, he was not required to exert efforts towards a compromise. Issue: Whether brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family contemplated in Art. 217, par. (4), and Art. 222 of the New Civil Code, as well as under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court requiring earnest efforts towards a compromise before a suit between them may be instituted and maintained. Held: No. The reason for the requirement that earnest efforts at compromise be first exerted before a complaint is given due course is because it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers. A litigation in a family is to be lamented far more than a lawsuit between strangers . In Gayon v. Gayon, the enumeration of brothers and sisters as members of the same family does not comprehend sisters-in-law. The attempt to compromise as well as inability to succeed is a condition precedent to the the filing of a suit between members of the same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the same enumeration of "members of the family", we find no reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the matter. Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private respondent Hernando, was required to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise before filing the present suit. Also, Guerreros wife has no actual interest and participation in the land subject of the suit, which the petitioner bought, before he married his wife. 112) Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. vs. Hon. Edmundo Acua, RTC Judge Caloocan City and Alberto Moreno G.R. no. 154132 August 31, 2006 Facts: Alberto Moreno filed with the RTC of Caloocan City a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage. Respondent Moreno contends that he did not secure any loan from petitioner, nor did he sign or execute any contract of mortgage in its favor; that his wife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses Owe, who were the ones that benefited from the loan, made it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage; that he could not have executed the said contract because he was working abroad. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss because private respondent failed to comply with Article 151 of the
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Family wherein it is provided that no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. Petitioner contends that since the complaint does not contain any fact or averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made prior to its institution, then the complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action. RTC denied the motion to dismiss, it held that earnest efforts towards a compromise is not required before the filing of the instant case considering that the above-entitled case involves parties who are strangers to the family. Issue: Whether or not lack of earnest efforts toward a compromise is not a ground for a motion to dismiss in suits between husband and wife when other parties who are strangers to the family are involved in the suit. Held: Yes. The Code Commission that drafted Article 222 of the Civil Code from which Article 151 of the Family Code was taken explains: it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers. In Magbaleta vs. Gonong, the case involved brothers and a stranger to the family, the alleged owner of the subject property. The Court, taking into consideration the explanation made by the Code Commission in its report, ruled that: These consideration s do not however weigh enough to make it imperative that such efforts to compromise should be a jurisdictional pre-requisite for the maintenance of an action whenever a stranger to the family is a party thereto, whether as a necessary or indispensable one. It is not always that one who is alien to the family would be willing to suffer the inconvenience of; much less, relish the delay and the complications that wrangling between or among relatives more often than not entail. Besides, it is neither practical nor fair that the determination of the rights of a stranger to the family who just happened to have innocently acquired some kind of interest in any right or property disputed among its members should be made to depend on the way the latter would settle their differences among themselves. 22 x x x. Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before the action can prosper. Petition is Dismissed. FAMILY HOME 113) Modequillo vs. Breva G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990 Facts: In 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals in "Francisco Salinas, et al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al. finding the defendants-appellees Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs-appellants as compensation for the death of Audie Salinas for hospitalization expenses of Renato Culan- Culan. The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the RTC Davao City to satisfy the said judgment on the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay at Malalag, Davao del Sur. The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 600 square meters with a market value of P34,550.00 and assessed value of P7,570.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87008-01359, registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur; and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 3 hectares with a market value of P24,130.00 and assessed value of P9,650.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87-08-01848 registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur. A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging that the residential land located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code. As to the agricultural land although it is
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declared in the name of defendant it is alleged to be still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority was not approved by the proper government agency. An opposition thereto was filed by the plaintiffs. Issue: Whether or not a final judgment of the Court of Appeals in an action for damages may be satisfied by way of execution of a family home constituted under the Family Code. Held: Yes. Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home. Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For non-payment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building. The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year). The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well- taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect. Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment aforecited? No. The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code. As to the agricultural land subject of the execution, the trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made by the sheriff shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land. 114) Manacop vs. CA and F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC., G.R. No. 104875 November 13, 1992 Facts: Owing to the failure to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed between petitioner's corporation and private respondent herein, the latter filed on July 3, 1989, a complaint for a sum of money, with a prayer for preliminary attachment, against the former. As a consequence of the order on July 28, 1989, the corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was issued on August 11, 1989 which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by Manacop Construction President Florante F. Manacop, herein petitioner. The petitioner insists that the attached property is a family home, having been occupied by him and his family since 1972, and is therefore exempt from attachment.
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RTC held that the subject property is not exempt from attachment. Issue: Whether or not the property of Florante Manacop is exempt from attachment. Held: No. The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code. The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect. 115) Manacop vs. CA and E & L MERCANTILE INC. 227 SCRA 57 Facts: On March 10, 1972, Petitioner Florante F. Manacop and his wife Eulaceli purchased a 446-square-meter residential lot with a bungalow, in consideration of P75,000.00. The property is located at Commonwealth Village, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City. Private Respondent E & L Mercantile, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc. before the RTC Pasig to collect an indebtedness of P3,359,218.45. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and his company entered into a compromise agreement with private respondent. On July 15, 1986, E & L Mercantile filed a motion for execution which the lower court. However, execution of the judgment was delayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on several vehicles and other personal properties of petitioner. In partial satisfaction of the judgment debt, these chattels were sold at public auction for which certificates of sale were correspondingly issued by the sheriff. Petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writs of execution and to stop the sheriff from continuing to enforce them on the ground that the judgment was not yet executory. Private respondent opposed the motion alleging that the property covered by TCT No. 174180 could not be considered a family home on the grounds that petitioner was already living abroad and that the property, having been acquired in 1972, should have been judicially constituted as a family home to exempt it from execution. RTC ruled in favor of private respondent. It held that petitioners residence was not exempt from execution as it was not duly constituted as a family home, pursuant to the Civil Code. CA affirmed. Issue: May a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment issued before the effectivity of the Family Code be executed on a house and lot constituted as a family home under the provision of said Code? HELD Yes. [The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error. On the contrary, its Decision and Resolution are supported by law and applicable jurisprudence.] Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in holding that his residence was not exempt from execution in view of his failure to show that the property involved has been duly constituted as a family home in accordance with law. He asserts that the Family Code and Modequillo require simply the occupancy of the property by the petitioner, without need for its judicial or extrajudicial constitution as a family home. Petitioner is only partly correct. True, under the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became his family home under the simplified process embodied in Article 153 of
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said Code. However, Modequillo explicitly ruled that said provision of the Family Code does not have retroactive effect. In other words, prior to August 3, 1988, the procedure mandated by the Civil Code had to be followed for a family home to be constituted as such. There being absolutely no proof that the subject property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home, it follows that the laws protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioner. Since the debt involved herein was incurred and the assailed orders of the trial court issued prior to August 3, 1988, the petitioner cannot be shielded by the benevolent provisions of the Family Code. Petitioner contends that he should be deemed residing in the family home because his stay in the United States is merely temporary. He asserts that the person staying in the house is his overseer and that whenever his wife visited this country, she stayed in the family home. This contention lacks merit. The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by any of its beneficiaries must be actual. That which is actual is something real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or constructive. Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the beneficiaries enumerated by Article 154 of the Family Code. 116) Versola vs. Ong G.R. No. 164740 July 31, 2006 Facts: Private respondent Dr. Victoria T. Ong Oh granted a loan to a certain Dolores Ledesma in the amount of P1M. As a security for said loan, Ledesma issued to private respondent a check for the same amount dated 10 February 1993 and promised to execute a deed of real estate mortgage over her house and lot located at Tandang Sora, Quezon City which did not materialize. Subsequently, Ledesma sold the said house and lot to petitioners for P2.5M. Petitioners paid Ledesma P1M as downpayment, with the remaining balance of P1.5M to be paid in monthly installments of P75,000. Petitioners, however, were only able to pay the amount of P50,000.00 to Ledesma. To raise the full amount that Ledesma demanded, petitioners applied for a loan with Asiatrust Bank, Inc. (Asiatrust) in the amount of P2M. In the course of the application for said loan, petitioners, private respondent, and Ledesma convened with Asiatrust to arrive at a scheme to settle the obligation of Ledesma to private respondent and the obligation of petitioners to Ledesma. In keeping with the foregoing agreement, private respondent granted Ledesma an additional loan of P450,000.00. Ledesma, in turn, executed a Deed of Sale transferring the title of the subject property to petitioners. Private respondent then delivered the title of the said property to Asiatrust. The Deed of Sale was registered and the title in the name of Ledesma was cancelled and a new one was issued in the names of petitioners. Thereafter, Asiatrust approved the loan application of petitioners. However, when Asiatrust tried to register the Real Estate Mortgage covering the subject property executed in its favor by petitioners, it discovered a notice of levy on execution was annotated on the title in connection with Ledesma's obligation to a certain Miladay's Jewels, Inc., in the amount of P214,284.00. Because of this annotated encumbrance, Asiatrust did not register said Real Estate Mortgage and refused to release the P2M loan of petitioners. When private respondent presented Ledesma's check for payment, the same was dishonored for the reason that the account was already closed. Subsequently, when private respondent presented for payment the check issued by petitioners, the said check was likewise dishonored because there was a stop payment order. With the dishonor of the checks and with Asiatrust's refusal to release the P2M loan of petitioners, private respondent came away emptyhanded as she did not receive payment for the P1.5M loan she granted to Ledesma that was assumed by petitioners. As a result, private respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against Ledesma, petitioners, and Asiatrust. RTC ruled in favor of Dr. Victoria T. Ong Oh. CA affirmed withmodification. Private respondent filed a Motion for Execution with the RTC. The property in the name of Spouses Versola were subsequently levied upon. On 5 August 2002, private respondent filed with the trial court an Ex-parte Motion for Issuance of Confirmation of Judicial Sale of Real Property of Sps. Eduardo and Elsa Versola. Petitioners opposed the said motion on the following grounds: (1) the property sold at the public auction is the family home of petitioners which is exempt from execution pursuant to Article 155 of the Family Code; and (2)
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no application was made by private respondent for the determination of the value of their family home to be subjected to execution, as required under Article 160 of the Family Code. Petitioners maintain that said objection to the sale was based on the fact that there was no order or clearance from the trial court for the sheriff to proceed with the auction sale, in clear violation of Article 160 of the Family Code, which requires an application by the creditor and a determination of the actual value of the family home by the court ordering the sale of property under execution. Issue: Whether or not petitioners timely raised and proved that their property is exempt from execution. Held: No. Article 153 of the Family Code provides: The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as the family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as its beneficiaries resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. Under the cited provision, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence; there is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially. The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exception. In the instant case, it was only after almost two years from the time of the execution sale and after the "Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale" was issued did petitioners rigorously claim in their Opposition to private respondent's Ex-parte Motion for Issuance of Confirmation of Judicial Sale of Real Property of Sps. Eduardo and Elsa Versola that the property in question is exempt from execution. Even then, there was no showing that petitioners adduced evidence to prove that it is indeed a family home. 117) Patricio vs. Marcelino G. Dario III and CA G.R. No. 170829 November 20, 2006 Facts: On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building. On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario. Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition. The RTC ordered the partition and the sale of the property by public auction. The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint for partition filed by petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It held that the family home should continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not partition the property unless the court found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held that the minor son of private respondent, who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino V. Dario and Perla G. Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of the family home. Issue: Whether Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor son of private respondent, can be considered as a beneficiary under Article 154 of the Family Code. Held: No. Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support. To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
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As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The term descendants contemplates all descendants of the person or persons who constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Thus, private respondents minor son, who is also the grandchild of deceased Marcelino V. Dario satisfies the first requisite. As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home to avail of the benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of private respondent and grandson of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the family home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite. However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IVs parents, especially his father, herein private respondent who is the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his grandmother, but from his father. Thus, despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must now establish his own family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age.
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XIV. PATERNITY AND FILIATION 118) Andal vs. Macaraig G.R. No. L-2474 May 30, 1951 FACTS: Emiliano Andal was the owner of the parcel of land in question having acquired it from his mother Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter nuptias executed by the latter in favor of the former on the occasion of his marriage to Maria Dueas. Emiliano Andal had been in possession of the land from 1938 up to 1942, when Eduvigis Macaraig, taking advantage of the abnormal situation then prevailing, entered the land in question. Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis in January 1941. Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to live in his house to help him work his farm. His sickness became worse that on or about September 10, 1942, he became so weak that he could hardly move and get up from his bed. On September 10, 1942, Maria Duenas, his wife, eloped with Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria's father, until the middle of 1943. Since May, 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other as husband and wife. On January 1, 1943, Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who did not even attend his funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria Dueas gave birth to a boy, who was given the name of Mariano Andal. If the son born to the couple is deemed legitimate, then he is entitled to inherit the land in question. If otherwise, then the land should revert back to Eduvigis Macaraig as the next of kin entitled to succeed him under the law. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. ISSUE: Whether or not the child born by Maria is considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano. HELD: Yes. Article 108 of the Civil Code provides that children born after the one hundred and eighty days next following that of the celebration of marriage or within the three hundred days next following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. This presumption may be rebutted only by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred next preceding the birth of the child. Impossibility of access by husband to wife would include (1) absence during the initial period of conception, (2) impotence which is patent, continuing and incurable, and (3) imprisonment, unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulations. Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on January 1, 1943, that boy is presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife, he having been born within three hundred (300) days following the dissolution of the marriage. There was no evidence presented that Emiliano Andal was absent during the initial period of conception, especially during the period comprised between August 21, 1942 and September 10, 1942, which is included in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child Mariano Andal. On the contrary, there is enough evidence to show that during that initial period, Emiliano Andal and his wife were still living under the marital roof, or at least had access one to the other. Even if Felix, the brother, was living in the same house, and he and the wife were indulging in illicit intercourse since May, 1942, that does not preclude cohabitation between Emiliano and his wife. Also, even though Emiliano was already suffering from tuberculosis and his condition then was so serious that he could hardly move and get up from bed does not show that this does not prevent carnal intercourse. He was not impotent. The fact that Maria Dueas has committed adultery can not also overcome this presumption. Therefore, presumption of legitimacy under the Civil Code in favor of the child has not been overcome. Renren Geremia 119) Teofista Babiera vs. Presentacion B. Catotal G.R. No. 138493 June 15, 2000 FACTS: Presentacion B. Catotal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Node, Branch II, Iligan City, a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera in the Civil Registry of Iligan City. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3046. From the petition filed, Presentacion asserted that she is the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa, who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990 respectively. On September 20, 1996 a baby girl was delivered by "hilot" in the house of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera and without the knowledge of said spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and a housemaid of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, caused the registration/recording of the facts of birth of her child, by simulating that she was the child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena, then 54
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years old, and made Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging her signature. Petitioner, then 15 years old, saw with her own eyes and personally witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto, in their house, assisted by "hilot". The birth certificate of Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth, signature of informant forged, and it contained false entries, to wit: a) The child is made to appear as the legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa, when she is not; b) The signature of Hermogena Cariosa, the mother, is falsified/forged. She was not the informant; c) The family name Babiera is false and unlawful and her correct family name is Guinto, her mother being single; d) Her real mother was Flora Guinto and her status, an illegitimate child. The natural father, the carpenter, did not sign it. Also, the respondent Teofista Barbiera's birth certificate is void ab initio, and it is patently a simulation of birth, since it is clinically and medically impossible for the supposed parents to bear a child in 1956 because: a) Hermogena Cariosa Babiera, was already 54 years old; b) Hermogena's last child birth was in the year 1941, the year petitioner was born; c) Eugenio was already 65 years old, that the void and simulated birth certificate of Teofista Guinto would affect the hereditary rights of petitioner who inherited the estate. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner therein. Teofista averred "that she was always known as Teofista Babiera and not Teofista Guinto and that plaintiff is not the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena C. Babiera, for the truth of the matter is that they are sisters of the full-blood. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence adduced during trial proved that petitioner was not the biological child of Hermogena Babiera. It also ruled that no evidence was presented to show that Hermogena became pregnant in 1959. It further observed that she was already 54 years old at the time, and that her last pregnancy had occurred way back in 1941. The CA noted that the supposed birth took place at home, notwithstanding the advanced age of Hermogena and its concomitant medical complications. Moreover, petitioner's Birth Certificate was not signed by the local civil registrar, and the signature therein, which was purported to be that of Hermogena, was different from her other signatures. ISSUE: Whether or not Teofista is the legitimate child of spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa. HELD: No. Article 171 of the Family Code states that, the child's filiation can be impugned only by the father or, in special circumstances, his heirs. Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate the present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. The interest of respondent in the civil status of petitioner stems from an action for partition which the latter filed against the former. The case concerned the properties inherited by respondent from her parents. Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of this provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present action does not impugn petitioner's filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place. Also, the prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. Verily, the action to nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescribe, because it was allegedly void ab initio. A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate proof that it is fictitious. Thus, void is a certificate which shows that the mother was already fifty-four years old at the time of the child's birth and which was signed neither by the civil registrar nor by the supposed mother. Because her inheritance rights are adversely affected, the legitimate child of such mother is a proper party in the proceedings for the cancellation of the said certificate. Renren Geremia 120) Marissa Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994 FACTS: The facts show that the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties especially in Laguna. Isabel died on April 25, 1982. Vicente followed her in the grave on November 13, 1989. He died intestate.The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued. On September 24, 1990, private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and
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Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente's sister and nephew, respectively) instituted Sp. Proc. No. 797 (90) before the RTC of San Pablo City, 4th Judicial Region, Br. 30. They prayed for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente's estate in favor of private respondent Aguilar. They alleged, that the decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives either any ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted. Also, despite claims or representation to the contrary, petitioners can well and truly establish, given the chance to do so, that said decedent and his spouse Isabel Chipongian who pre-deceased him, and whose estate had earlier been settled extra-judicial, were without issue and/or without descendants whatsoever, and that one Marissa Benitez-Badua who was raised and cared by them since childhood is, in fact, not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir. Petitioner opposed the petition and alleged that she is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of administering his estate. The parties further exchanged reply and rejoinder to buttress their legal postures. Petitioner tried to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. She submitted documentary evidence, among others: (1) her Certificate of Live Birth; (2) Baptismal Certificate; (3) Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his daughter; and (4) School Records. She also testified that the said spouses reared and continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other hand, private respondents tried to prove, mostly thru testimonial evidence, that the said spouses failed to beget a child during their marriage and that the late Isabel, then thirty six (36) years of age, was even referred to Dr. Constantino Manahan, a noted obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment. The trial court decided in favor of the petitioner. However, the Court of Appeals, reversed the said decision of the trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is the legitimate child and thus the surviving heir of the spouses Benitez. HELD: No. A careful reading of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench for it is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Factual finding of the appellate court that petitioner was not the biological child or child of nature of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian is meritorious. There was strong and convincing evidence that Isabel Chipongian never became pregnant and, therefore, never delivered a child. Renren Geremia 121) Jao vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-49162 July 28, 1987 FACTS: Petitioner, assisted by her mother, filed a case for recognition and support against Perico Jao. The latter denied paternity thus the parties agreed to a blood grouping test conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation. The result indicated that the petitioner could not have been the offspring of the latter and her mother, Arlene. The lower court found the test conclusive however, upon a second motion for reconsideration the trial resulted on the declaration of the petitioner being the child of Perico and is entitled to support. The latter questioned said decision to the Court of Appeals where it reversed said decision of the lower court. ISSUE: Whether or not the results of the blood grouping test are admissible and conclusive to prove non-paternity. HELD:
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Yes. The use of blood typing in cases of disputed percentage has already become an important legal procedure. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive to paternity. This is because the fact that the blood type of a child is a possible product of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents. On the other hand, if the blood type of the child is not a possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged father are cross-matched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father. Renren Geremia 122) Artemio G. Ilano vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 104376 February 23, 1994 FACTS: Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano while she was working as secretary to Atty. Mariano C. Virata. Petitioner was one of the clients of Atty. Virata. On several occasions, she and petitioner took lunch together. Sometime in 1957, Leoncia, then managing a business of her own as Namarco distributor, met petitioner again who was engaged in the same business and they renewed acquaintances. Since then, he would give her his unsold allocation of goods. Later, he courted her more than four years. Their relationship became intimate and with his promise of marriage, they eloped to Guagua, Pampanga in April, 1962. They stayed at La Mesa Apartment, located behind the Filipinas Telephone Company branch office, of which he is the president and general manager. He came home to her three or four times a week. The apartment was procured by Melencio Reyes, Officerin-Charge of the Filipinas Telephone Company branch office. He also took care of the marketing and paid rentals, lights and water bills. Unable to speak the local dialect, Leoncia was provided also by Melencio with a maid by the name of Nena. Petitioner used to give her P700.00 a month for their expenses at home. In June, 1962, Leoncia, who was conceiving at that time, was fetched by petitioner and they transferred to San Juan St., Pasay City. In October, 1962, she delivered a still-born female child at the Manila Sanitarium. The death certificate was signed by petitioner. Thereafter, while they were living at Highway 54, Makati, private respondent Merceditas S. Ilano was born on December 30, 1963 also at the Manila Sanitarium. Her birth was recorded as Merceditas de los Santos Ilano, child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio Geluz Ilano. Leoncia submitted receipts issued by the Manila Sanitarium to show that she was confined there from December 30, 1963 until January 2, 1964 under the name of Mrs. Leoncia Ilano. The support by petitioner for Leoncia and Merceditas was sometimes in the form of cash personally delivered by him, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (niece of Leoncia) or thru Merceditas herself. Sometimes in the form of a check like Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532, the signature appearing thereon having been identified by Leoncia as that of petitioner because he often gives her checks which he issues at home and saw him sign the checks. During the time that petitioner and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, he showed concern as the father of Merceditas. When Merceditas was in Grade I at the St. Joseph Parochial School, he signed her Report Card for the fourth and fifth grading periods as her parent. Those signatures were both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas because he signed them in their residence in their presence and of Elynia. Since Merceditas started to have discernment, he was already the one whom she recognized as her Daddy. He treated her as a father would to his child. He would bring home candies, toys, and anything a child enjoys. He would take her for a drive, eat at restaurants, and even cuddle her to sleep. In May, 1963, Ruth Elynia Mabanglo, niece of Leoncia, lived with Leoncia and petitioner. She accompanied her aunt when she started having labor pains in the morning of December 30, 1963. Petitioner arrived after five o'clock in the afternoon. When the nurse came to inquire about the child, Leoncia was still unconscious so it was from petitioner that the nurse sought the information. Inasmuch as it was already past seven o'clock in the evening, the nurse promised to return the following morning for his signature. However, he left an instruction to give birth certificate to Leoncia for her signature, as he was leaving early the following morning. Prior to the birth of Merceditas, Elynia used to accompany her aunt and sometimes with petitioner in his car to the Manila Sanitarium for prenatal check-up. At times, she used to go to his office at 615 Sales St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, upon his instructions to get money as support and sometimes he would send notes of explanation if he cannot come which she in turn gave to her aunt. They stayed at 112 Arellano St., then Sta. Cruz, Manila in 1966 before they finally transferred to Gagalangin in 1967. Petitioner lived with them up to June, 1971 when he stopped coming home. ISSUE:
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Whether or not Merceditas is the child of Artemio and is entitled to support. HELD: Yes. Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children or those who are conceived and born out of wedlock were generally classified into two groups: (1) Natural, whether actual or by fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other and (2) Spurious, whether incestuous, were disqualified to marry each other on account of certain legal impediments. Since petitioner had a subsisting marriage to another at the time Merceditas was conceived, she is a spurious child. In this regard, Article 287 of the Civil Code provides that illegitimate children other than natural in accordance with Article 269 and other than natural children by legal fiction are entitled to support and such successional rights as are granted in the Civil Code. The Civil Code has given these rights to them because the transgressions of social conventions committed by the parents should not be visited upon them. They were born with a social handicap and the law should help them to surmount the disadvantages facing them through the misdeeds of their parents. However, before Article 287 can be availed of, there must first be a recognition of paternity either voluntarily or by court action. The Court finds that there is sufficient evidence of recognition on the part of petitioner. The evidences submitted like the signature in the report cards, testimonies, and other pieces of evidence shows that petitioner indeed recognized Merceditas as his child and thus entitles her to support. Renren Geremia 123) Corito Ocampo Tayag vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 95229 June 9, 1992 FACTS: Private respondent is the mother and legal guardian of her minor son, Chad Cuyugan, by the father of the petitioner, the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. Petitioner is the known administratrix of the real and personal properties left by her deceased father, said Atty. Ocampo, who died intestate in Angeles City on September 28, 1983. Private respondent has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for several years now and during which time, she and Atty. Ricardo Ocampo had illicit amorous relationship with each other that, as a consequence thereof, they begot a child who was christened Chad Cuyugan in accordance with the ardent desire and behest of said Atty. Ocampo. Chad, the son of private respondent by the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who was born in Angeles City on October 5, 1980 had been sired, showered with exceptional affection, fervent love and care by his putative father for being his only son as can be gleaned from indubitable letters and documents of the late Atty. Ocampo to herein private respondent. The minor, Chad D. Cuyugan, although illegitimate is nevertheless entitled to a share in the intestate estate left by his deceased father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo as one of the surviving heirs. The deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, at the time of his death was the owner of real and personal property, located in Baguio City, Angeles City and in the Province of Pampanga with approximate value of several millions of pesos. The estate of the late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been inventoried by the petitioner and the inheritance of the surviving heirs including that of said Chad has not likewise been ascertained. The only known surviving heirs of the deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo are his children, namely: Corito O. Tayag, Rivina O. Tayag, Evita O. Florendo, Felina Ocampo, and said minor Chad, for and in whose behalf this instant complaint is filed. Private respondent has no means of livelihood and she only depends on the charity of friends and relatives for the sustenance of her son, Chad, such that it is urgent, necessary and imperative that said child be extended financial support from the estate of his putative father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. Several demands, verbal and written, have been made for petitioner to grant Chad's lawful inheritance, but despite said demands, the latter failed and refused and still fails and refuses to satisfy the claim for inheritance against the estate of the late Atty. Ocampo. ISSUE: Whether or not Chad is entitled to inherit from Atty. Ocampos estate as his illegitimate child. HELD: Yes. Although petitioner contends that the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be considered as one to compel recognition. Further that the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence. Also, the action has not yet
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prescribed. The applicable law is Article 285 of the Civil Code which states that the action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority. The Court holds that the right of action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. where we held that the fact of filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law. Renren Geremia 124) John Paul E. Fernandez, et al., vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 108366 February 16, 1994 FACTS: Violeta P. Esguerra, single, is the mother and guardian ad litem of the two petitioners, Claro Antonio Fernandez and John Paul Fernandez, met sometime in 1983, at the Meralco Compound tennis courts. A Meralco employee and a tennis enthusiast, Carlito used to spend his week-ends regularly at said courts, where Violeta's father served as tennis instructor. Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her two sons. She claimed that they started their illicit sexual relationship six (6) months after their first meeting. The tryst resulted in the birth of petitioner Claro Antonio on March 1, 1984, and of petitioner John Paul on not know that Carlito was married until the birth of her two children. She averred they were married in civil rites in October, 1983. In March, 1985, however, she discovered that the marriage license which they used was spurious. Petitioners presented the following documentary evidence: their certificates of live birth, identifying respondent Carlito as their father; the baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro which also states that his father is respondent Carlito; photographs of Carlito taken during the baptism of petitioner Claro; and pictures of respondent Carlito and Claro taken at the home of Violeta Esguerra. In defense, respondent Carlito denied Violeta's allegations that he sired the two petitioners. He averred he only served as one of the sponsors in the baptism of petitioner Claro. This claim was corroborated by the testimony of Rodante Pagtakhan, an officemate of respondent Carlito who also stood as a sponsor of petitioner Claro during his baptism. ISSUE: Whether or not Claro Antonio and John Paul are children of Carlito and are entitled for support. HELD: No. The rule is well-settled that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals may be reviewed by this court only under exceptional circumstances. One such situation is when the findings of the appellate court clash with those of the trial court as in the case at bench. It behooves us therefore to exercise our extraordinary power, and settle the issue of whether the ruling of the appellate court that private respondent is not the father of the petitioners is substantiated by the evidence on record. The evidence offered by the petitioners is insufficient to prove their filiation. Petitioners cannot rely on the photographs showing the presence of the private respondent in the baptism of petitioner Claro. These photographs are far from proofs that private respondent is the father of petitioner Claro. As explained by the private respondent, he was in the baptism as one of the sponsors of petitioner Claro. The pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing private respondent showering affection to Claro fall short of the evidence required to prove paternity. The baptismal certificates of petitioner Claro naming private respondent as his father has scant evidentiary value. There is no showing that private respondent participated in its preparation. The certificates of live birth of the petitioners identifying private respondent as their father are not also competent evidence on the issue of their paternity. Again, the records do no show that private respondent had a hand in the preparation of said certificates. Also, there is no proof that Father Fernandez is a close friend of Violeta Esguerra and the private respondent which should render unquestionable his identification of the private respondent during petitioner Claro's baptism. In the absence of this proof, we are not prepared to concede that Father Fernandez who officiates numerous baptismal ceremonies day in and day out can remember the parents of the children he has baptized. Renren Geremia 125) Camelo Cabatania vs. Court of Appeals
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G.R. No. 124814 October 21, 2004 FACTS: Florencias version was that she was the mother of private respondent who was born on September 9, 1982 and that she was the one supporting the child. She recounted that after her husband left her in the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for work and was eventually hired as petitioners household help. It was while working there as a maid that, on January 2, 1982, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in at the Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got pregnant. Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioners child 27 days after their sexual encounter. The sexual intercourse was repeated in March 1982 in San Carlos City. Later, on suspicion that Florencia was pregnant, petitioners wife sent her home. But petitioner instead brought her to Singcang, Bacolod City where he rented a house for her. On September 9, 1982, assisted by a hilot in her aunts house in Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she gave birth to her child, private respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner Camelo Cabatanias version was that he was a sugar planter and a businessman. Sometime in December, 1981, he hired Florencia as a servant at home. During the course of her employment, she would often go home to her husband in the afternoon and return to work the following morning. This displeased petitioners wife, hence she was told to look for another job. In the meantime, Florencia asked permission from petitioner to go home and spend New Years Eve in Cadiz City. Petitioner met her on board the Ceres bus bound for San Carlos City and invited her to dinner. While they were eating, she confided that she was hard up and petitioner offered to lend her save money. Later, they spent the night in San Carlos City and had sexual intercourse. While doing it, he felt something jerking and when he asked her about it, she told him she was pregnant with the child of her husband. They went home the following day. In March 1982, Florencia, then already working in another household, went to petitioners house hoping to be re-employed as a servant there. Since petitioners wife was in need of one, she was re-hired. However petitioners wife noticed that her stomach was bulging and inquired about the father of the unborn child. She told petitioners wife that the baby was by her husband. Because of her condition, she was again told to go home and they did not see each other anymore. Petitioner was therefore surprised when summons was served on him by Florencias counsel. She was demanding support for private respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner refused, denying the alleged paternity. He insisted she was already pregnant when they had sex. He denied going to Bacolod City with her and checking in at the Visayan Motel. He vehemently denied having sex with her on January 2, 1982 and renting a house for her in Singcang, Bacolod City. The trial court gave probative weight to the testimony of Florencia despite its discovery that she misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality, her husband was alive. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not Camelo should be entitled to support as Camelo Cabatanias child. HELD: No. Clearly, this petition calls for a review of the factual findings of the two lower courts. As a general rule, factual issues are not within the province of this Court. Factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, become final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. However, the Court is convinced that this case falls within one of the exceptions. Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code which states that: the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws; Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Private respondents copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the preparation of which was without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
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competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person. Also, while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the childs paternity. Thus, certificates issued by the local civil registrar and baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same. Private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntary recognition. On the other hand, the fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law. Renren Geremia 126) SAYSON VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. Nos. 89224-25, January 23, 1992 Cruz, J.: FACTS: Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died in 1952 and Rafaela in 1976. One of their children, Teodoro married to Isabel died on 1972. The wife of Teodoro, Isabel then after died in 1981. The properties of the couple Teodoro and Isabel were left with private respondents Delia, Edmundo and Doribel, who were their children. On April 25, 1983, Maurico, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Juana (mother of Isabel) filed for partition of the estate of Teodoro and Isabel, which was opposed by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel, who claimed successional rights to the estate. Likewise, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint for the partition of Eleno and Rafaelas estate through representation. Both cases were decided in favor of the private respondents. Judge Rafael declared that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption. Doribel was their legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate. Consequently, the three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation. On the other case, Judge Saez held that being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel as established by the aforementioned evidence, the same excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate. The Court of Appeals modified the decision in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but affirmed all other respects. Hence, this petition for review by certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to inherit from their parents and their grandparents. HELD: A challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally in an action for partition but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the issue. On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, the findings of the trial courts as affirmed by the respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar. Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple, conformably to the following Article 979 of the Civil Code:
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Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages. An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate child. The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his children and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their continued care even after he is gone from this earth. There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other children. But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party. 127) LIYAO vs. TANHOTI-LIYAO 378 SCRA 563 FACTS: This is a petition for compulsory recognition of William Liyao Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late Willima Liyao against Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao (children and wife of William). According to Corazon G. Garcia, William Liyao Jr.s mother and representative, she was married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten (10) years and cohabited with late William Liyao from 1965 to the time of Williams untimely demise on December 2, 1975. They lived together with the knowledge of William Liyaos legitimate children, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga, who were both employed at the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. of which Corazon and William were the vice president and president, respectively. On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao Jr. (Billy). Since then, he had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child of William Liyao by the latters direct and overt acts which among others, the payment of medical and hospital expenses, food and clothing and bringing him to vacations and various social gatherings as evidenced by the pictures taken on the said occasions. On the other hand, according to Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga, her parents, William Liyao and Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married. She grew up and lived with her parents at San Lorenzo Village , Makati until she got married. Her parents were not separated legally or in fact and that there was no reason why any of her parents would institute legal separation proceedings in court. Her father came home regularly even during out of town to change cloths until he suffered from two strokes before the fatal attack which led to his death on December 2, 1975. She further testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo and was not legally separated from her husband and the records from Local Civil Registrar do not indicate that the couple obtained any annulment of their marriage. Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testimony was similar to Ms. Linda that their parents were legally married and had never been separated. They resided at San Lorenzo Village until the time of their fathers death. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the William, Jr. and Corazon. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court and ruled in favor of Juanita, Pearl and Linda. Issue: Whether or not William, Jr. is entitled to inherit. Held: The Court sustained the decision of the Court of Appeals stating that the fact that Corazon had been living separately from Ramon at the time petitioner was conceived and born has no bearing to the legitimacy of the child. While the physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds in impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the
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legitimacy of the child mentioned in Art. 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Art. 262 of the Civil Code. It is therefore clear that the present petition initiated by petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao Jr., as the illegitimate son of late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The Court cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mothers alleged paramour. 128) DE JESUS vs. ESTATE OF DIZON 366 SCRA 499 Vitug, J.: FACTS: Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born. In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint for "Partition with Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. The trial court denied, due to lack of merit. However. the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court and ordered the case to be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. The Trial Court decreed that the declaration of heirship could only be made in a special proceeding inasmuch as petitioners were seeking the establishment of a status or right. In the instant petition for review on certiorari, the petitioners maintain that their recognition as being illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to establish their status as such and does not require a separate action for judicial approval. ISSUE: Whether an action for partition is proper to ascertain the question of paternity & filiation or whether it should be taken in an independent suit. HELD: The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing the civil register or a final judgement; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuos possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court or record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicted on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court or record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statue of limitations is essential in order to establish the child's acknowledgement. Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of
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legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected. The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress. 129) LABAGALA vs. SANTIAGO G.R. No. 132305; December 4, 2001 Quisumbing, J.: FACTS: Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila . Alleging that Jose had fraudulently registered it in his name alone, his sisters Nicolasa and Amanda (now respondents herein) sued Jose for recovery of 2/3 share of the property. The trial court in that case decided in favor of the sisters, recognizing their right of ownership over portions of the property. The Register of Deeds of Manila was required to include the names of Nicolasa and Amanda in the certificate of title to said property. Jose died intestate. The respondents filed a complaint for recovery of title, ownership, and possession against herein petitioner, Ida C. Labagala, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, to recover from her the 1/3 portion of said property pertaining to Jose but which came into petitioner's sole possession upon Jose's death. Respondents alleged that Jose's share in the property belongs to them by operation of law, because they are the only legal heirs of their brother, who died intestate and without issue. They claimed that the purported sale of the property made by their brother to petitioner sometime in March 1979 was executed through petitioner's machinations and with malicious intent, to enable her to secure the corresponding transfer certificate of title (TCT No. 172334) in petitioner's name alone. Respondents insisted that the deed of sale was a forgery .The deed showed that Jose affixed his thumbmark thereon but respondents averred that, having been able to graduate from college, Jose never put his thumb mark on documents he executed but always signed his name in full. On the other hand, petitioner claimed that her true name is not Ida C. Labagala as claimed by respondent but Ida C. Santiago. She claimed not to know any person by the name of Ida C. Labagala. She claimed to be the daughter of Jose and thus entitled to his share in the subject property. She maintained that she had always stayed on the property, ever since she was a child. She argued that the purported sale of the property was in fact a donation to her, and that nothing could have precluded Jose from putting his thumbmark on the deed of sale instead of his signature. She pointed out that during his lifetime, Jose never acknowledged respondents' claim over the property such that respondents had to sue to claim portions thereof. She lamented that respondents had to disclaim her in their desire to obtain ownership of the whole property. Trial court ruled in favor of petitioner which was reversed by the Court of Appeals. ISSUES: (1) whether or not respondents may impugn petitioner's filiation in this action for recovery of title and possession; and (2) whether or not petitioner is entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the property he co-owned with respondents, through succession, sale, or donation. HELD: Petitioner's reliance on Article 263 of the Civil Code is misplaced. This article should be read in conjunction with the other articles in the same chapter on paternity and filiation in the Civil Code. A careful reading of said chapter would reveal that it contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a man's child by his wife, and the husband (or, in proper cases, his heirs) denies the child's filiation. It does not refer to situations where a child is alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple.
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Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person is not a man's child by his wife. However, the present case is not one impugning petitioner's legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all. Moreover, the present action is one for recovery of title and possession, and thus outside the scope of Article 263 on prescriptive periods. Petitioner's reliance on Sayson is likewise improper. The factual milieu present in Sayson does not obtain in the instant case. What was being challenged by petitioners in Sayson was (1) the validity of the adoption of Delia and Edmundo by the deceased Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and (2) the legitimate status of Doribel Sayson. While asserting that Delia and Edmundo could not have been validly adopted since Doribel had already been born to the Sayson couple at the time, petitioners at the same time made the conflicting claim that Doribel was not the child of the couple. The Court ruled in that case that it was too late to question the decree of adoption that became final years before. Besides, such a challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally but in a direct proceeding. Petitioner, who claims to be Ida Santiago, has the same birthdate as Ida Labagala. The similarity is too uncanny to be a mere coincidence. During her testimony before the trial court, petitioner denied knowing Cornelia Cabrigas, who was listed as the mother in the birth certificate of Ida Labagala. In her petition before this Court, however, she stated that Cornelia is the sister of her mother, Esperanza. It appears that petitioner made conflicting statements that affect her credibility and could cast along shadow of doubt on her claims of filiation. Thus, we are constrained to agree with the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is in reality the child of Leon Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas, and contrary to her averment, not of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Not being a child of Jose, it follows that petitioner can not inherit from him through intestate succession. It now remains to be seen whether the property in dispute was validly transferred to petitioner through sale or donation. Jose did not have the right to transfer ownership of the entire property to petitioner since 2/3 thereof belonged to his sisters. Petitioner could not have given her consent to the contract, being a minor at the time. Consent of the contracting parties is among the essential requisites of a contract, including one of sale, absent which there can be no valid contract. Moreover, petitioner admittedly did not pay any centavo for the property, which makes the sale void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 1471. If the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been in reality a donation, or some other act or contract. Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid deed of donation. 130) ESTATE OF LOCSIN vs. JUAN C. LOCSIN G.R. No. 146737, December 10, 2001 Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.: FACTS: Eleven months after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr. died intestate on December 11, 1990, respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City , a "Petition for Letters of Administration" praying that he be appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. He alleged that he is an acknowledged natural child. The trial court issued an order setting the petition for hearing which order was duly published, thereby giving notice to all persons who may have opposition to the said petition. Before the scheduled hearing, the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition. They averred that respondent is not a child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name. On January 5, 1993, another opposition to the petition was filed by Lucy Salinop (sole heir of the late Maria Locsin Vda. De Araneta, sister of the deceased), Manuel Locsin and the successors of the late Lourdes C. Locsin alleging that respondent's claim as a natural child is barred by prescription or the statute of limitations. The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr. (brother of the deceased) also entered its appearance in the estate proceedings, joining the earlier oppositors. This was followed by an appearance and opposition of Ester Locsin Jarantilla (another sister of Juan C. Locsin), likewise stating that there is no filial relationship between herein respondent and the deceased. To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased, respondent submitted a machine copy of his Certificate of Live Birth found in the bound volume of birth records in the Office of the Local Clerk Registrar of Iloilo City which contains the information
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that respondent's father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was the informant of the facts stated therein, as evidenced by his signatures. To prove the existence and authenticity of Certificate of Live Birth, respondent presented the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Respondent also offered in evidence a photograph showing him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead body. The photograph, respondent claims, shows that he and his mother have been recognized as family members of the deceased. Petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth is spurious. They submitted a certified true copy of Certificate of Live Birth found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro Manila indicating that the birth of respondent was reported by his mother, Amparo Escamilla, and that the same does not contain the signature of the late Juan C. Locsin. They observed as anomalous the fact that while respondent was born on October 22, 1956 and his birth was recorded on January 30, 1957, however, his Certificate of Live Birth was recorded on a December 1, 1958 revised form. The trial court found that the Certificate of Live Birth and the photograph are sufficient proofs of respondent's illegitimate filiation. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the order of the trial court. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, while respondent filed a motion for execution pending appeal. Both motions were denied by the Appellate Court. ISSUE: Which of the two documents Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "8") is genuine. HELD: Exhibit 8 for the petitioners. With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by interested parties is obviously easier. Thus, in proving the authenticity of Exhibit "D," more convincing evidence than those considered by the trial court should have been presented by respondent. The event about which she testified on March 7, 1994 was the record of respondent's birth which took place on October 22, 1956, on 37 or 38 years ago. The Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City at that time was Emilio G. Tomesa. Necessarily, Vencer's knowledge of respondent's birth record allegedly made and entered in the Local Civil Registry in January, 1957 was based merely on her general impressions of the existing records in that Office. When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in the Local Civil Registry vary from those appearing in the copy transmitted to the Civil Registry General, pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, the variance has to be clarified in more persuasive and rational manner. In this regard, we find Vencer's explanation not convincing. Respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") was recorded in a December 1, 1958 revised form. Asked how a 1958 form could be used in 1957 when respondent's birth was recorded, Vencer answered that "x x x during that time, maybe the forms in 1956 were already exhausted so the former Civil Registrar had requested for a new form and they sent us the 1958 Revised Form." The answer is a "maybe", a mere supposition of an event. It does not satisfactorily explain how a Revised Form dated December 1, 1958 could have been used on January 30, 1957 or almost (2) years earlier. Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" of the petitioners found in the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila is on Municipal Form No 102, revised in July, 1956. We find no irregularity here. Indeed, it is logical to assume that the 1956 forms would continue to be used several years thereafter. But for a 1958 form to be used in 1957 is unlikely. There are other indications of irregularity relative to Exhibit "D." The back cover of the 1957 bound volume in the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo is torn. Exhibit "D" is merely pasted with the bound volume, not sewn like the other entries. The documents bound into one volume are original copies. Exhibit "D" is a carbon copy of the alleged original and sticks out like a sore thumb because the entries therein are typewritten, while the records of all other certificates are handwritten. Unlike the contents of those other certificates, Exhibit "D" does not indicate important particulars, such as the alleged father's religion, race, occupation, address and business. The space which calls for an entry of the legitimacy of the child is blank. On the back page of Exhibit "D", there is a purported signature of the alleged father, but the blanks calling for the date and other details of his Residence Certificate were not filled up.
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When asked to explain the torn back cover of the bound volume, Vencer had no answer except to state, "I am not aware of this because I am not a bookbinder." The records of the instant case adequately support a finding that Exhibit "8" for the petitioners, not respondent's Exhibit "D", should have been given more faith and credence by the courts below. In this connection, we echo this Court's pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar that: "Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines . . . explicitly prohibit, not only the naming of the father of the child born out of wedlock, when the birth certificate, or the recognition, is not filed or made by him , but also, the statement of any information or circumstances by which he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make or record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of said child." The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate filiation is further elucidated in Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals where this Court said that "a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father (who had no hand in its preparation) is not competent evidence of paternity." A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and filiation. However, birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 entered in the records of the Local Civil Registry (from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has all the badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on file in that office was removed and substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live Birth. 131) EDGARDO TIJING & BIENVENIDA TIJING vs. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 125901; March 8, 2001) Quisumbing, J.: FACTS: Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila . Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of Tondo, Manila . According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the child while Bienvenida was doing laundry. Upon her return, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelita's house in Tondo, Manila , but did not find them there. Angelita's maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to come back later. She returned to Angelita's house after three days, only to discover that Angelita had moved to another place. Bienvenida then complained to her barangay chairman and also to the police who seemed unmoved by her pleas for assistance. Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida lost no time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after four years. She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez. She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite her demand to do so. Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order to recover their son. Petitioners presented two witnesses. The 1st, witness is Vasquez who testified that she assisted in the delivery of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her clinic. The 2nd, Benjamin Lopez who declared that his brother admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son and that he and Angelita were not blessed with children. For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. She asserts that at age 42, she gave birth to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife Zosima Panganiban in Singalong, Manila . She added, though, that she
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has two other children with her real husband, Angel Sanchez. She said the birth of John Thomas was registered by her common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar of Manila on August 4, 1989. On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband could not have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. The trial court also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity. Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person who is the natural child of petitioners. The sheriff implemented the order of the trial court by taking custody of the minor. In his report, the sheriff stated that Angelita peacefully surrendered the minor and he turned over the custody of said child to petitioner Edgardo Tijing. The Court of Appeals reversed and expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus. In its view, the evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not sufficient to establish that she was the mother of the minor. It ruled that the lower court erred in declaring that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy? (2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person and is the son of petitioners? HELD: The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will. It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child. It must be stressed too that in habeas corpusproceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to the usual presumptions including those as to identity of the person. A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr. First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. From her very lips, she admitted that after the birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of marriage in 1974. Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son. Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of the accident and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son. Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no children after almost fifteen years together. Though Tomas Lopez had lived with private respondent for fourteen years, they also bore no offspring. Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife. Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child. Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage. Needless to stress, the trial court's conclusion should be given high respect, it having had the opportunity to observe the physical appearances of the minor and petitioner concerned. Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her clinic. Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records consisting of a log book, discharge order and the signatures of petitioners. All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son of petitioners. The writ of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of said child. 132) AGUSTIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND PROLLAMANTE G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005 Corona, J.: FACTS: Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City . In their complaint,
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respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10, 1999. Despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in Quezon City . The babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child. Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly ended in 1998, long before Martins conception. He claimed that Fe had at least one other secret lover. Arnel admitted that their relationship started in 1993 but "he never really fell in love with (Fe) not only because (she) had at least one secret lover, a certain Jun, but also because she proved to be scheming and overly demanding and possessive. Unable to bear the prospect of losing his wife and children, Arnel terminated the affair although he still treated her as a friend such as by referring potential customers to the car aircon repair shop" where she worked. Later on, Arnel found out that Fe had another erstwhile secret lover. In May 2000, Arnel and his entire family went to the United States for a vacation. Upon their return in June 2000, Arnel learned that Fe was telling people that he had impregnated her. Arnel refused to acknowledge the child as his because their "last intimacy was sometime in 1998." Exasperated, Fe started calling Arnels wife and family. On January 19, 2001, Fe followed Arnel to the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot to demand that he acknowledge Martin as his child. According to Arnel, he could not get through Fe and the discussion became so heated that he had no "alternative but to move on but without bumping or hitting any part of her body." Finally, Arnel claimed that the signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the acknowledgment of Martins birth certificate were falsified. The CTC erroneously reflected his marital status as single when he was actually married and that his birth year was 1965 when it should have been 1964. Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against selfincrimination. He also moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action, considering that his signature on the birth certificate was a forgery and that, under the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recognized by the putative father. He attached the certification of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory that his signature in the birth certificate was forged. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. ISSUES: (1) whether a complaint for support can be converted to a petition for recognition and (2) whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating petitioners constitutional right to privacy and right against selfincrimination. HELD: The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support into one for recognition but merely allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action against petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of the documentary evidence of acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution and order effectively integrated an action to compel recognition with an action for support, such was valid and in accordance with jurisprudence. In Tayag v. Court of Appeals,20 we allowed the integration of an action to compel recognition with an action to claim ones inheritance: In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from the putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation to the latter. We also said that it is necessary to allege in the complaint that the putative father had acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child because such acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to inherit. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for failure of the petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of the action. Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an
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illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be considered as one to compel recognition. Further, that the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence. Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as in Tayag, the basis or rationale for integrating them remains the same. Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled to support depends completely on the determination of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits, given how intimately related the main issues in both cases are. To paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate to these proceedings. On the second issue, petitioner posits that DNA is not recognized by this Court as a conclusive means of proving paternity. He also contends that compulsory testing violates his right to privacy and right against self-incrimination as guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution. These contentions have no merit. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence. Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of object evidence taken from the person of the accused from the realm of selfincrimination. These include photographs,28 hair,29 and other bodily substances.30We have also declared as constitutional several procedures performed on the accused such as pregnancy tests for women accused of adultery,31 expulsion of morphine from ones mouth32 and the tracing of ones foot to determine its identity with bloody footprints.33 In Jimenez v. Caizares,34 we even authorized the examination of a womans genitalia, in an action for annulment filed by her husband, to verify his claim that she was impotent, her orifice being too small for his penis. Some of these procedures were, to be sure, rather invasive and involuntary, but all of them were constitutionally sound. DNA testing and its results, per our ruling in Yatar,35 are now similarly acceptable. In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good. 133) In re: Petition for Change of Name of Julian Lim G.R. No. 159966 March 30, 2005 Facts: On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition for change of name and/or cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time because they will let him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore. Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a persons name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current registered name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are brother and sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapores Mandarin language since they do not have the letter R but if there is, they pronounce it as L. It is for these reasons that the name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang. The RTC rendered a decision denying the petition. The trial court found that the reason given for the change of name sought in the petitionthat is, that petitioner Julian may be discriminated against when studies in Singapore because of his middle name did not fall within the grounds recognized by law. The trial court ruled that the change sought is merely for the convenience of the child. Since the State has an interest in the name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why
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this right should now be taken from petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor. The trial court added that when petitioner Julian reaches the age of majority, he could then decide whether he will change his name by dropping his middle name. Issue: Whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to Article 174 of the Family Code Held: The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable cause for which the change is sought. To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name. In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws. 134) Briones vs. Miguel G.R. No. 156343 October 18, 2004 Facts: Petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda. Later, petitioner filed an Amended Petition to include Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of the minor, as one of the respondents. The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. The petitioner further alleges that he caused the minor child to be brought to the Philippines so that he could take care of him and send him to school. That respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel came to the house of the petitioner in Caloocan City on the pretext that they were visiting the minor child and requested that they be allowed to bring the said child for recreation at the SM Department store. They promised him that they will bring him back in the afternoon, to which the petitioner agreed. However, the respondents did not bring him back as promised by them. The petitioner went several times to respondent Maricel P. Miguel at Tanza, Tuguegarao City but he was informed that the child is with the latters mother at Batal Heights, Santiago City. When he went there, respondent Francisca P. Miguel told him that Michael Kevin Pineda is with her daughter at Tuguegarao City. He sought the assistance of the police and the Department of Social Welfare to locate his son and to bring him back to him, but all his efforts were futile. Hence, he was constrained to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus. The petitioner prays that the custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his biological father and as he has demonstrated his capability to support and educate him. The respondents filed their Comment, in their Comment, the respondent Loreta P. Miguel denies the allegation of the petitioner that he was the one who brought their child to the Philippines and stated that she was the one who brought him here pursuant to their agreement. She likewise denies petitioners allegation that respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel were the ones who took the child from the petitioner or the latters parents. She averred that she was the one who took Michael Kevin Pineda from the petitioner when she returned to the Philippines and that the latter readily agreed and consented. Respondent Loreta P. Miguel alleges that the
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petitioner was deported from Japan under the assumed name of Renato Juanzon when he was found to have violated or committed an infraction of the laws of Japan. She further stated that since the time the petitioner arrived in the Philippines, he has not been gainfully employed. The custody of the child was entrusted to petitioners parents while they were both working in Japan. She added that even before the custody of the child was given to the petitioners parents, she has already been living separately from the petitioner in Japan because the latter was allegedly maintaining an illicit affair with another woman until his deportation. Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the custody of her minor child be given to her and invokes Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article 363 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Issue: Who Should Have Custody of the Child? Held: Under the Family Code there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. Obviously, Michael is a natural ("illegitimate," under the Family Code) child, as there is nothing in the records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal impediment to marry at the time of his birth. Both acknowledge that Michael is their son. As earlier explained and pursuant to Article 176, parental authority over him resides in his mother, Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his fathers recognition of him. There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of and having sole parental authority over the minor, is entitled to have custody of him. She has the right to keep him in her company. She cannot be deprived of that right, and she may not even renounce or transfer it "except in the cases authorized by law. Article 213 of the Family Code that, generally, no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, except when the court finds cause to order otherwise. Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mothers unfitness to exercise sole parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to someone else. In the past, the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental authority: neglect or abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable disease. 135) de Santos vs. Hon. Angeles and Conchita Talag de Santos G.R. No. 105619 December 12, 1995 Facts: On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was blessed with a daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time, their relationship became strained to the breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow doctor, Conchita Talag, private respondent herein. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first marriage by obtaining a divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949. Aware that said decree was a worthless scrap of paper in our jurisdiction which then, as now, did not recognize divorces, Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry private respondent, with whom he had been cohabiting since his de facto separation from Sofia. This union produced eleven children. On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less than a month later, on April 23, 1967, Antonio and private respondent contracted a marriage in Tagaytay City celebrated under Philippine laws. On March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate leaving properties with an estimated value of P15,000,000.00. On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court asking for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of her late husband's estate. She alleged, among other things, that the decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely, herself, their ten surviving children, and petitioner. There being no opposition, her petition was granted. After six years of protracted intestate proceedings, however, petitioner decided to intervene. Thus, in a motion she filed she argued that private respondent's children were illegitimate. This was challenged by private respondent although the latter admitted during the hearing that all her children were born prior to Sofia's death in 1967. After approval of private respondent's account of her administration, the court a quo passed upon petitioner's motion. The court declared private respondent's ten children legitimated and instituted and declared them, along with petitioner and private respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos.
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Petitioner sought a reconsideration of said order but this was denied. Hence, she filed the instant petition for certiorari on June 16, 1992, contending that since only natural children can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated her half brothers and sisters. Issue: Can natural children by legal fiction be legitimized? Held: Article 269 of the Civil Code expressly states: Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural. In other words, a child's parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the time of conception for him to qualify as a "natural child." In the case at bench, there is no question that all the children born to private respondent and deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived and born when the latter's valid marriage to petitioner's mother was still subsisting. That private respondent and the decedent were married abroad after the latter obtained in Nevada, U.S.A. a decree of divorce from his legitimate wife does not change this fact, for a divorce granted abroad was not recognized in this jurisdiction at the time. Evidently, the decedent was aware of this fact, which is why he had to have the marriage solemnized in Tokyo, outside of the Philippines. It may be added here that he was likewise aware of the nullity of the Tokyo marriage for after his legitimate, though estranged wife died, he hastily contracted another marriage with private respondent, this time here in Tagaytay.
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XV. ADOPTION 136) Republic vs CA and Zenaida Bobiles G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992 Facts: On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six (6) years old and who had been living with her family since he was four (4) months old, before the Regional Trial Court. The trial court rendered the minor child, JASON CONDAT, be freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and be, to all intents and purposes, the child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and the surname of the child be changed to "Bobiles" which is the surname of the petitioner. The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2, 1988, when the law applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them. However, after the trial court rendered its decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. On the foregoing consideration, petitioner contends that the petition for adoption should be dismissed outright for it was filed solely by private respondent without joining her husband, in violation of Article 185 of the Family Code which requires joint adoption by the spouses. It argues that the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of her petition for adoption. Issue: Can the Family Code be applied retroactively to the petition for adoption filed by Zenaida Bobiles and granting that the Family Code should not apply retroactively, should the CA have modified the trial courts decision by granting the adoption in favor of private respondent only, her husband not being a petitioner? Held: Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions thereof, subject to the qualification that such retrospective application will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested. Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right to file a petition for adoption by herself, without joining her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law. When private respondent filed her petition in Special Proceeding, the trial court acquired jurisdiction there over in accordance with the governing law. Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the petition for adoption filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent attached to the petition and expressly made an integral part thereof, shows that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child. Those declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court, are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Under the circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of his foreign residence, he must have yielded to the legal advice that an affidavit of consent on his part sufficed to make him a party to the petition. This is evident from the text of his affidavit. Punctiliousness in language and pedantry in the formal requirements should yield to and be eschewed in the higher considerations of substantial justice. The future of an innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the form of pleadings.
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137) Cang vs. CA G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998 Facts: Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973, begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981. During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple's relationship was undisturbed. However, Anna Marie learned of her husband's alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos. Upon learning of her husband's alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court which rendered a decision approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that they agreed to live separately and apart or from bed and board. Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places to petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and never remarried. While in the United States, petitioner worked in Tablante Medical Clinic earning P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 a month a portion of which was remitted to the Philippines for his children's expenses and another, deposited in the bank in the name of his children. Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sisterin-law of Anna Marie, filed Special Proceedings for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before the Regional Trial Court. The petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had "evaded his legal obligation to support his children; that her brothers and sisters including Ronald V. Clavano, had been helping her in taking care of the children; that because she would be going to the United States to attend to a family business, leaving the children would be a problem and would naturally hamper her job-seeking venture abroad; and that her husband had long forfeited his parental rights over the children. Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were financially capable of supporting the children while his finances were "too meager" compared to theirs, he could not "in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved children." Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire custody over his children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby leaving custody of their children to private respondents. The Regional Trial Court issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect, relinquished custody over the children and, therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father. The court then directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to petitioner. Issue: Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them? Held: It is evident that notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. The written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is insane or hopelessly intemperate. The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even without the written consent of the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith. However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for determination.The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon failure of the oppositor natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his child may the petition for adoption be considered on its merits. In its ordinary sense, the word abandon
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means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly. In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child. It means neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children. In the instant case, records disclose that petitioners conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims. Wherefore, the questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. 138) In the matter of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus of a minor Angelie Anne Cervantes, Nelson Cervantes and Zenaida Cervantes vs. Gina Carreon Fajardo and Conrado Fajardo G.R. No. 79955 January 27, 1989 Facts: This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus filed with this Court over the person of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. The minor was born on 14 February 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife. Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister and brother-in-law, the herein petitioners Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took care and custody of the child when she was barely two (2) weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child by herein petitioners, was also executed by respondent Gina Carreon The appropriate petition for adoption was filed by petitioners over the child before the Regional Trial Court and rendered a decision granting the petition. The child was then known as Angelie Anne Fajardo. The court ordered that the child be freed from parental authority of her natural parents as well as from legal obligation and maintenance to them and that from now on shall be, for all legal intents and purposes, known as Angelie Anne Cervantes, a child of petitioners and capable of inheriting their estate . Thereafter, adoptive parents, Nelson and Zenaida Cervantes, received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused to accede to the demand. As a result, while petitioners were out at work, the respondent Gina Carreon took the child from her yaya at the petitioners' residence on the pretext that she was instructed to do so by her mother. Respondent Gina Carreon brought the child to her house. Petitioners thereupon demanded the return of the child, but Gina Carreon refused, saying that she had no desire to give up her child for adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she had executed was not fully explained to her. She sent word to the petitioners that she will, however, return the child to the petitioners if she were paid the amount of P150,000.00. Issue: Who has the right to the custody of Angelie Ann Cervantes? Held: In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court deviated from this criterion. It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman other than respondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship with the latter is a common-law husband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon
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will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person. Besides, respondent Gina Carreon had previously given birth to another child by another married man with whom she lived for almost three years but who eventually left her and vanished. For a minor (like Angelie Anne C. Cervantes) to grow up with a sister whose father is not her true father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of said minor. Upon the other hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her. Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses. The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him. The custody and care of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes are hereby granted to petitioners to whom they properly belong, and respondents are ordered (if they still have not) to deliver said minor to the petitioners immediately upon notice hereof. 139) Macario Tamargo, Celso Tamargo and Aurelia Tamargo vs. CA and Hon. Rubio and Victor Bunduc and Clara Bunduc G.R. No.85044 June 3, 1992 Facts: On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings before the then Court of First Instance. This petition for adoption was grunted on, 18 November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed. Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption. The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action. Petitioners, then went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial court's Decision. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal. Issue: Whether or not Adelbertos natural parents are indispensable parties to the action? Held: This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence, where a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents their parental authority which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child. The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with them, may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living
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with its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control. Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. The parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the presumption can be overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. The basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be giver to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed. 140) LAHOM vs. SIBULO G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003 Facts: Spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom filed in 1971 a petition to adopt Melvin Sibulo, Isabelita Lahom`s nephew. The petition was granted in 1972. Hence, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin Lahom." However, in 1999, the petitioner filed a petition to rescind the adoption on the ground of the continuous refusal of the respondent to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom and for his indifference towards the petitioner by failing to visit her in Naga. In 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect which deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption. Issue: Whether or not the adoption of respondent may still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter. Held: The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption. It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued. Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a person has no vested right in statutory privileges. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right," the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by
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statute. It is a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate. WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs. 141) IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA G.R. No. 148311 March 31, 2005 Facts: Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia alleging that Stephanie has been using her mother's middle name and surname and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie's middle name Astorga be changed to 'Garcia, her mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname . The trial court granted the adoption and ruled that the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG. The petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name but was denied by the trial court ruling that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name. Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father. Held: We find merit in the petition. Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name. The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law. Law Is Silent As To The Use Of Middle Name ' As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as ' An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father, is silent as to what middle name a child may use. The middle name or the mother's surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mother's surname shall be added. Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use . Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that ' an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter . Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus: "(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters
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and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters; The Underlying Intent of Adoption Is In Favor of the Adopted Child ' One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 Article V of RA 8552. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie's continued use of her mother's surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future. Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them 'Mama and Papa. Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mother's surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy. Liberal Construction of Adoption Statutes In Favor Of Adoption It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that: In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother's surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother's surname 'GARCIA as her middle name.
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XVI. PARENTAL AUTHORITY 142) DAVID vs. CA G.R. No. 111180 November 16, 1995 Facts: Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine and Cathy Mae. The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J. to Villar's house in Angeles City and introduced him to Villar's legal wife. After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually accepted by his legal family. In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year. Hence, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner ruling that the custody of the child shall be given to the mother and directing respondent to give a temporary support of P 3,000.00 a month. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC`s judgment holding that habeas corpus case was not the proper remedy in that the latter contemplate a situation where the parents are married to each other but are separated. Moreover, it ruled that in an adulterous relationship, the question of custody shall be brought in a case singularly filed for the purpose and that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the other minor children. It ruled that it is for the best interest of Christopher J. That he should temporarily remain under the custody of respondent until the issue on custody and support shall have been determined in a proper case. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the custody of the child shall be given to the child. Held: Rule 102, 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that the determination of the right to the custody of minor children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated from each other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other situation. In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of her children, especially considering that she has been able to rear and support them on her own since they were born. Petitioner is a market vendor earning from P2,000 to P3,000 per month in 1993 when the RTC decision was rendered. She augments her income by working as secretary at the Computer System Specialist, Inc. earning a monthly income of P4,500.00. She has an arrangement with her employer so that she can personally attend to her children. She works up to 8:00 o'clock in the evening to make up for time lost during the day. That she receives help from her parents and sister for the support of the three children is not a point against her. Cooperation, compassion, love and concern for every member of the family are characteristics of the close family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it what it is. Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of support in
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this case is justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed willingness to support the minor child. The order for payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the grant to him of custody of the child. In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his child, he should not condition the grant of support for him on the award of his custody to him (private respondent). WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and private respondent is ORDERED to deliver the minor Christopher J. T. David to the custody of his mother, the herein petitioner, and to give him temporary support in the amount of P3,000.00, pending the fixing of the amount of support in an appropriate action. 143) Libi vs IAC G.R. No. 70890 September 18, 1992 Facts: Respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who was an 18-yearold first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi who was then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his parents. Julie Anne Goting and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until after two years when Julie Ann broke up with Wendell after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. During the first and second weeks of their break up, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands of reconciliation but the latter persited with her refusal prompting the former to resort to threats against her. Hence, Julie Anne stayed at the house of her bestfriend to avoid Wendell. Julie Ann and Wendell died each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the sme firearm, a revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi which was recovered from the scene of the crime inside the residence of private respondents. Private respondent submitted that Wendell caused their daughter`s death by shooting her with the firearm and then turning the gun on himself to commit suicide. Petitioner`s, however contended that an unknown third person, whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as narcotics informer must have caused their death. Julie Ann`s parents filed a case to recover civil damages arising from the vicarious liability of Wendell`s parents under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable vicarious liability. for
Held: In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners, respondent court cites Fuella cs Callado, et al. Which supposedly holds that the subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligation arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses, followed by an extended quotation ostensibly from teh same case explaining why under Article 2180 of the Civil Code and Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code parents should assume subsidiary liability for the damage cause by their minor children. Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding the parents liable, but the categorization of their liability being subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a hard second look considering previous decisions of this court on the matter which warrant comparative analysis. Our concern stems from our readings that if the liability of the parents for crimes or quasidelict of their minors is subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damages. On the other hand, if such liability imputed to the parents is considered direct and primary, that diligence could constitute a valid and substantial defense. We believe that the civil liability of the parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or omission , in this case the minor and the father , in
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cas of his death or incapacity, the mother, are solidary liable. Under the foregoing rule, we hereby rule that the parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by theri minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent such damages. In the case at bar, whether the death of hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a felony or a quasi-delict committed by Wendel Libi, respondent court did not err in holding petitioner liable for damages arising therefrom. Subject to the preceding modifications of the premises relied upon by it therefor and on the bases of the legal imperatives herein explained, we conjoin with its findings that said petitioners failed to duly exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such damages. 144) Espiritu vs.CA G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995 Facts: Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met sometime in 1976 in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. In 1977, Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. She was able to acquire immigrant status sometime later. In 1984, Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. Subsequently, Rosalind Therese was born. While they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the U.S.A., Reginald Vince was born. The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate sometime in 1990. Teresita blamed Reynaldo for the break-up, stating he was always nagging her about money matters. Reynaldo, on the other hand, contended that Teresita was a spendthrift, buying expensive jewelry and antique furniture instead of attending to household expenses. Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. She claims, however, that she spent a lot of money on long distance telephone calls to keep in constant touch with her children. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, co-petitioner Guillerma Layug and her family. Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children because Reynaldo filed a criminal case for bigamy against her and she was afraid of being arrested. Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children. The RTC dismissed the petition for habeas corpus suspendeding Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the custody of the two children. Held: In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances. In the present case, both Rosalind and Reginald are now over seven years of age. Rosalind celebrated her seventh birthday on August 16, 1993 while Reginald reached the same age on January 12, 1995. Both are studying in reputable schools and appear to be fairly intelligent children, quite capable of thoughtfully determining the parent with whom they would want to live. Once the choice has been made, the burden returns to the court to investigate if the parent thus chosen is unfit to assume parental authority and custodial responsibility. We are inclined to sustain the findings and conclusions of the regional trial court because it
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gave greater attention to the choice of Rosalind and considered in detail all the relevant factors bearing on the issue of custody. When she was a little over 5 years old, Rosalind was referred to a child psychologist, Rita Flores Macabulos, to determine the effects of uprooting her from the Assumption College where she was studying. Four different tests were administered. The results of the tests are quite revealing. The responses of Rosalind about her mother were very negative causing the psychologist to delve deeper into the child's anxiety. Among the things revealed by Rosalind was an incident where she saw her mother hugging and kissing a "bad" man who lived in their house and worked for her father. Rosalind refused to talk to her mother even on the telephone. She tended to be emotionally emblazed because of constant fears that she may have to leave school and her aunt's family to go back to the United States to live with her mother. At about the same time, a social welfare case study was conducted for the purpose of securing the travel clearance required before minors may go abroad. Social Welfare Officer Emma D. Estrada Lopez, stated that the child Rosalind refused to go back to the United States and be reunited with her mother. She felt unloved and uncared for. Rosalind was more attached to her Yaya who did everything for her and Reginald. The child was found suffering from emotional shock caused by her mother's infidelity. Respondent Teresita, for her part, argues that the 7year age reference in the law applies to the date when the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is filed, not to the date when a decision is rendered. This argument is flawed. Considerations involving the choice made by a child must be ascertained at the time that either parent is given custody over the child. The matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable. Then too, it must be noted that both Rosalind and Reginald are now over 7 years of age. They understand the difference between right and wrong, ethical behavior and deviant immorality. Their best interests would be better served in an environment characterized by emotional stability and a certain degree of material sufficiency. There is nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is an "unfit" person under Article 213 of the Family Code. Teresita does not deny that she was legally married to Roberto Lustado on December 17, 1984 in California. Less than a year later, she had already driven across the continental United States to commence living with another man, petitioner Reynaldo, in Pittsburgh. The two were married on October 7, 1987. Of course, to dilute this disadvantage on her part, this matter of her having contracted a bigamous marriage later with Reynaldo, Teresita tried to picture Reynaldo as a rapist, alleging further that she told Reynaldo about her marriage to Lustado on the occasion when she was raped by Reynaldo. Expectedly, Judge Harriet Demetriou of the Pasig RTC lent no weight to such tale. And even if this story were given credence, it adds to and not subtracts from the conviction of this Court about Teresita's values. Rape is an insidious crime against privacy. The argument that moral laxity or the habit of flirting from one man to another does not fall under "compelling reasons" is neither meritorious nor applicable in this case. Not only are the children over seven years old and their clear choice is the father, but the illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values, at least in Rosalind. This is not to mention her conviction for the crime of bigamy, which from the records appears to have become final. The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two requirements found in the first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption under the second paragraph of said article no longer applies as the children are over seven years. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside, and the decision of Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Quezon City and presided over by the Honorable Lucas P. Bersamin in its Civil Case No. Q-92-14206 awarding custody of the minors Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu to their father, Reynaldo Espiritu, is reinstated. No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
145) SANTOS vs. CA G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995 Facts:
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Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the temporary custody of the latter's parents, the respondent spouses Bedia. The latter alleged that they paid for all the hospital bills, as well as the subsequent support of the boy because petitioner could not afford to do so. Julia Bedia-Santos left for the U.S.A. in 1988 to work. Petitioner alleged that he is not aware of her whereabouts and his efforts to locate her in the United States proved futile. PR`s claim that although abroad, their daughter Julia had been sending financial support to them for her son. PR`s contended that petitioner abducted the boy when petitioner along with his two brothers visited the Bedia household, where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr., before the RTC which was granted on the same day and was affirmed by the CA. Issue: Whether or not the custody of minor Leouel Santos, Jr. shall be awarded to the petitioner. Held: The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are dutybound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company.The child's welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody. The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent. The situation obtaining in the case at bench is one where the mother of the minor Santos, Jr., is working in the United States while the father, petitioner Santos, Sr., is present. Not only are they physically apart but are also emotionally separated. There has been no decree of legal separation and petitioner's attempt to obtain an annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of his wife has failed. Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award custody of his minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art. 214 of the Family Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper only when both parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not been successfully shown by private respondents. We find the aforementioned considerations insufficient to defeat petitioner's parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly since he has not been shown to be an unsuitable and unfit parent. Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents. The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide financial support for his minor son from birth up to over three years when he took the boy from his in-laws without permission, should not be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to the child's custody. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the severest criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond between parent and son. It would also give the father a chance to prove his love for his son and for the son to experience the warmth and support which a father can give. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 30, 1992 as well as its Resolution dated November 13, 1992 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Custody over the minor Leouel Santos Jr. is awarded to his legitimate father, herein petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr. 146) NERISSA Z. PEREZ vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth Division) and RAY C. PEREZ 255 SCRA 661 ROMERO, J.
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FACTS: Private respondent Ray Perez is a doctor of medicine practicing in Cebu while petitioner Nerissa, his wife is a registered nurse. They were married on December 6, 1986. After six miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, petitioner finally gave birth to Ray II in New York on July 20, 1992. Petitioner who began work in the US in October 1988, used part of her earnings to build a model house in Mandaue City, Cebu. She also sought medical attention for her successive miscarriages in New York. In February 1992, petitioner became a resident alien. Private respondent stayed with her in the US twice and took care of her when she became pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a tourist visa and was not employed. In January 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to the US. When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray IIs first birthday, the couple was no longer on good terms. Petitioner did not want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on her husbands meager income of P 5,000.00. She longed to be with her only child but her husband was keeping him away from her. On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here , where he could raise his son even as he practiced his profession. Petitioner was forced to move to her parents home in Mandaue. Nerissa filed a petition for Habeas Corpus asking respondent to surrender the custody of their son to her. The court a quo issued an Order awarding custody of the one year old child to his mother, citing paragraph 2, of Art. 213 of the Family Code which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the Court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. On appeal, the CA reversed the trial courts order and awarded custody of the boy to his father. Holding that granting custody to the boys father would be for the childs best interest and welfare. ISSUE: As between father and mother, who should have rightful custody of a child who bears in his person both their genes? HELD: When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family Code is the applicable law. Since the Code does not qualify the word separation to mean legal separation decreed by a court, couples who are separated in fact, such petitioner and private respondent, are covered within its terms. The Revised Rules of Court also contains a similar provision . Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors). The provisions of law mandate that a child under 7 years of age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word shall in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character. The general rule that a child under 7 years of age shall not be separated from his mother finds its raison d' etre in the basic need of a child for his mothers loving care. Only the most compelling reasons shall justify the courts awarding the custody of such a child to someone other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable disease. It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best interest of the child. (Gutierrez, Alvin F.)
147) VANCIL vs. HELEN G. BELMES G.R. No. 132223 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. FACTS: Bonifacia Vancil is the mom of Reeder C. Vancil, a US Navy serviceman who died in US in 1986. Reeder had a common-law wife, Helen Belmes, with whom he had two kids, Valerie & Vincent. Bonifacia instituted guardianship proceedings over person & properties of Valerie (6 yrs old) & Vincent (2 yrs old). Estate consists of proceeds from their dads pension benefits worth P100k. RTC Cebu appointed Bonifacia as legal & judicial guardian. Natural mother Helen opposed claiming she already filed a similar petition for guardianship. She later on filed a motion for Removal of Guardian &Appointment of New One claiming that shes the natural mom in actual custody of & exercising parental authority over children. She further asserted that Bonifacia was a resident of Colorado, USA & that shes a naturalized US citizen. Regional Trial Court rejected & denied motion.
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The Court of Appeals reversed. FC 225: parents, father or in his absence, mother are considered as natural guardian of minor children. Revised ROC Rule 93 Sec. 7 confirms designation of parents as ipso facto guardian of their minor kids w/o need of court appointment & such can only be transferred to another person for a good reason. CA found no reason why biological mom should be deprived of her legal right. Affirming RTC would abdicate & violate the very basic fundamental tenets in civil law & the constitution on family solidarity. Bonifacia claims that she should be appointed as the guardian based on the undisputed proof that Helens livein partner has raped Valerie seven times while under Helens custody. ISSUE: Whether or not Bonifacia should be appointed as the guardian HELD: No. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The case is moot. Valerie since already turned 18 on Sept. 2, 1998. Only thing in dispute is guardianship of Vincent. Art. 211 (FC): Father & mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over their common children. Fathers decision shall prevail in cases of disagreement unless theres a judicial order to the contrary. Thus, Helen, being the natural mom of Vincent has the natural & legal right to his custody. Such right is inherent & not created by state/decision of courts but derives from nature of parental relationship (Sagala-Eslao vs. CA). Art. 214 (FC) allows substitute parental authority of surviving grandparent only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of parents. Helen is very much alive & has continuously exercised parental authority over Vincent. Helens unfitness was only asserted Valerie & since shes already of major age, such cannot be appreciated anymore. Even if Helen were unfit, Bonifacia still wont qualify considering that shes a US citizen & resident. She wont be able to perform the responsibilities &obligations required of a guardian. Most probably shell just delegate those duties to another person who might not be qualified. Shes been out of the country since 1987 and considering that shes old & was previously convicted of libel, its not likely that shell come back here to fulfill her duties. Besides, only2 yrs are left for her to exercise guardianship over child. True that law does not require courts to only appoint residents as guardians but court should not appoint guardians who are not within our courts jurisdiction for it will be difficult to protect the wards in such instances. VITUG, CONCURRING: Law & jurisprudence recognizes deep ties that bind parent & child. Parents are placed 1st in rank in matters of parental authority. Childs legitimacy doesnt affect the order of priority in exercise of parental authority. FC176 states that illegitimate child shall be under parental authority of mom who should be entitled for the childs custody. (Gutierrez, Alvin F.)
148) ST. MARYS ACADEMY vs. CARPITANOS G.R. No. 143363 PARDO, J.
WILLIAM
FACTS: In February 1995, defendant-appellant St Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the SY 1995-96.Part of the campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. A student of that school and part of the campaign, Sherwin Carpitanos along w/other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same school. En route to Larayan Elem School, it was alleged that minor James drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. The Regional Trial Court held St Marys liable for indemnification for loss of Sherwins life, actual damages for burial and so-related expenses, attorneys fees and moral damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed decision but absolved from any liability the driver-minor James and jeeps owner Vivencio Villanueva. St. Marys appealed. The Court of Appeals reduced actual damages to PhP25K but affirmed the rest of its previous decision. School filed Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this appeal. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding St. Marys liable for said death 2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of moral damages against the school HELD:1. Yes.CA held school liable under Arts 218 & 219 FC, pointing out that petitioner was negligent in allowing a minor to drive in the campaign to visit public schools to solicit enrollment. School was also liable in not having a teacher accompany the minor
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students in the jeep. However, for petitioner to be liable, it must be shown that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence, must have a causal connection to the accident. But respondent-spouses Daniel and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of the school or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. This was confirmed by the testimony of the traffic investigator who instituted a report of the accident. Hence, reliance on Art 219 FC that those given the authority and responsibility under Art 218 shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by acts oromissions of the unemancipated minor was unfounded. Liability, whether caused by the negligence of the minor-driver or mechanical detachment of the jeeps steering wheel guide, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of St Marys was only a remote cause of the accident, an event that the school had no control over. 2. Yes. Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle was respondent Villanueva for he even admitted this fact. The Court has held that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets. It is not the schools but the registered owned of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. Judgment reversed. Case remanded to TC for determination of liability of defendants excluding St Marys. (Gutierrez, Alvin F.) 149) LACSON vs. LACSON G.R. No. 150644 GARCIA, J.: FACTS: The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters of petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born on December 4, 1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children to seek, apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month, they stayed with Leas mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her (Leas) mother and then with her brother Noel Daban. After some time, they rented an apartment only to return later to the house of Leas mother. As the trial court aptly observed, the sisters and their mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling place to another not their own. It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband Edward for support, relying initially on his commitment memorialized in a note dated December 10, 1975 to give support to his daughters. As things turned out, however, Edward reneged on his promise of support, despite Leas efforts towards having him fulfill the same. Lea would admit, though, that Edward occasionally gave their children meager amounts for school expenses. Through the years and up to the middle part of 1992, Edwards mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave small amounts to help in the schooling of Maowee and Maonaa, both of whom eventually took up nursing at St. Pauls College in Iloilo City. In the early part of 1995 when Lea, in behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint against Edward for support before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33, Maowee was about to graduate. In that complaint dated January 30, 1995, as amended, docketed as Civil Case No. 22185, Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother, averred that their father Edward, despite being gainfully employed and owning several pieces of valuable lands, has not provided them support since 1976. They also alleged that, owing to years of Edwards failure and neglect, their mother had, from time to time, borrowed money from her brother Noel Daban. As she would later testify, Lea had received from Noel, by way of a loan, as much as P400,000.00 to P600,000.00. As applied for and after due hearing, the trial court granted the sisters Maowee and Maonaa support pendente lite at P12,000.00 per month, subject to the schedule of payment and other conditions set forth in the courts corresponding order of May 13, 1996. Following trial, the RTC rendered on June 26, 1997 judgment finding for the plaintiff sisters, as represented by their mother. In that judgment, the trial court, following an elaborate formula set forth therein, ordered their defendant father Edward to pay them a specific sum which represented 216 months, or 18 years, of support in arrears. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in the grant of support in arrears from 1976 to 1994
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HELD: The Court finds no adequate reason to disturb the factual determination of the CA confirmatory of that of the trial court respecting the demand Lea made on the petitioner to secure support for the respondents. As a matter of long and sound appellate practice, factual findings of the CA are accorded respect, if not finality, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons. Not one of the wellrecognized exceptions to this rule on conclusiveness of factual findings appear to obtain in this case. Accordingly, the Court cannot grant the petitioners plea for a review of the CAs findings bearing on the actuality that, as basis for an award of support in arrears, an extrajudicial demand for support had been made on the petitioner as evidenced by the December 10, 1975 note adverted to. Lest it be overlooked, the jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review, as here, is generally limited to correction of errors of law. Complementing that postulate is the rule that the Court is not bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below, except when, as earlier indicated, compelling reasons demand a review of the factual conclusions drawn from such evidence. (Gutierrez, Alvin F.)
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CASES IN PROERTY 150) LEUNG YEE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FRANK L. STRONG MACHINERY COMPANY and J. G. WILLIAMSON, defendants-appellees G.R. No. L-11658 CARSON, J. FACTS: The "Compaia Agricola Filipina" bought ricecleaning machinery from the machinery company, and executed a chattel mortgage thereon to secure payment of the purchase price. It included in the mortgage deed the building of strong materials in which the machinery was installed, without any reference to the land on which it stood. The indebtedness secured by this instrument not having been paid when it fell due, the mortgaged property was sold by the sheriff, in pursuance of the terms of the mortgage instrument, and was bought in by the machinery company. The mortgage was registered in the chattel mortgage registry, and the sale of the property to the machinery company in satisfaction of the mortgage was annotated in the same registry on 29 December 1913. On 14 January 1914, the "Compaia Agricola Filipina" executed a deed of sale of the land upon which the building stood to the machinery company, but this deed of sale, although executed in a public document, was not registered and made no reference to the building erected on the land and would appear to have been executed for the purpose of curing any defects which might be found to exist in the machinery company's title to the building under the sheriff's certificate of sale. The machinery company went into possession of the building at or about the time when this sale took place, that is to say, the month of December 1913, and it has continued in possession ever since. At or about the time when the chattel mortgage was executed in favor of the machinery company, the "Compaia Agricola Filipina" executed another mortgage to Leung Yee upon the building, separate and apart from the land on which it stood, to secure payment of the balance of its indebtedness to Leung Yee under a contract for the construction of the building. Upon the failure of the mortgagor to pay the amount of the indebtedness secured by the mortgage, Leung Yee secured judgment for that amount, levied execution upon the building, bought it in at the sheriff's sale on or about the 18 December 1914, and had the sheriff's certificate of sale duly registered in the land registry of the Province of Cavite. At the time when the execution was levied upon the building, the machinery company, which was in possession, filed with the sheriff a sworn statement setting up its claim of title and demanding the release of the property from the levy. The Court gave judgment in favor of the machinery company, relying upon Article 1473 and the fact that the company had its title to the building registered prior to the date of the registry of plaintiffs certificate. Hence, the appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff to recover possession of the building from the machinery company HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment with costs against the appellant. Building separate from land does not affect character as real property; Registry of chattel mortgage does not affect character of the building and the machineries installed therein . The Chattel Mortgage Law contemplates and makes provision for mortgages of personal property; and the sole purpose and object of the chattel mortgage registry is to provide for the registry of "Chattel mortgages," mortgages of personal property executed in the manner and form prescribed in the statute. The building of strong materials in which the machinery was installed was real property, and the mere fact that the parties seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood in no wise changed its character as real property. It follows that neither the original registry in the chattel mortgage registry of the instrument purporting to be a chattel mortgage of the building and the machinery installed therein, nor the annotation in that registry of the sale of the mortgaged property, had any effect whatever so far as the building was concerned. Possession before sheriffs sale, not Article 1473 (on good faith), controlling as to ownership of property. The ruling cannot be sustained on the ground of Article 1473, second paragraph, but on the ground that the agreed statement of facts discloses that neither the purchase of the building by plaintiff nor his inscription of the sheriff's certificate of sale in his favor was made in good faith, and that the machinery company must be held to be the owner of the property under the third paragraph of the above cited article of the code, it appearing that the company first took possession of the property; and further, that the building and the land were sold to the machinery company long prior to the date of the sheriff's sale to the plaintiff. (Gutierrez, Alvin F.)
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151) DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MYLO O. QUINTO and JESUSA CHRISTINE S. CHUPUICO, respondent. G.R. No. 109946 BELLOSILLO, J. FACTS: Development Bank of the Philippines filed this petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals holding that the mortgages in favor of the bank were void and ineffectual because when constituted the mortgagors, who were merely applicants for free patent of the property mortgaged, were not the owners thereof in fee simple and therefore could not validly encumber the same. Petitioner granted a loan of P94,000.00 to the spouses Santiago Olidiana and Oliva Olidiana. To secure the loan the Olidiana spouses executed a real estate mortgage on several properties. At the time of the mortgage the property was still the subject of a Free Patent application filed by the Olidianas with the Bureau of Lands but registered under their name in the Office of the Municipal Assessor of Molave for taxation purposes.The Olidiana spouses filed with the Bureau of Lands a Request for Amendment of their Free Patent applications over several parcels of land including Lot No. 2029 (PIs-61). In this request they renounced, relinquished and waived all their rights and interests over Lot No. 2029 (Pls-61) in favor of Jesusa Christine Chupuico and Mylo O. Quinto, respondents herein. This second mortgage also included Lot No. 2029 (Pls-61) as security for the Olidiana spouses financial obligation with petitioner. Thereafter, for failure of Santiago and Oliva Olidiana to comply with the terms and conditions of their promissory notes and mortgage contracts, petitioner extrajudicially foreclosed all their mortgaged properties. However, when petitioner tried to register the sale and the affidavit of consolidation and to have the tax declaration transferred in its name it was discovered that Lot No. 2029 had already been divided and covered in the name of Jesusa Christine Chupuico, while the other half known as Lot 2029-B was covered by the same in the name of Mylo 0. Quinto. Since there was no showing that the sales application was approved before the property was mortgaged, the trial court concluded that the Olidiana spouses were not yet its owners in fee simple when they mortgaged the property. The lower court also said that with the subsequent issuance of the Free Patent by the Bureau of Lands for the respondents. Therefore petitioner could not have acquired a valid title over the subject property by virtue of the foreclosure and subsequent sale at public auction. Resultantly, the trial court declared the following as null and void. Petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals which likewise ruled in favor of respondents, hence the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether the land in dispute could have been validly mortgaged while still the subject of a Free Patent Application with the government
HELD: Petitioner bank did not acquire valid title over the land in dispute because it was public land when mortgaged to the bank. The Court cannot accept petitioners contention that the lot in dispute was no longer public land when mortgaged to it since the Olidiana spouses had been in open, continuous, adverse and public possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years. Meanwhile the government still remained the owner thereof, as in fact the application could still be canceled and the land awarded to another applicant should it be shown that the legal requirements had not been complied with. What divests the government of title to the land is the issuance of the sales patent and its subsequent registration with the Register of Deeds. It is the registration and issuance of the certificate of title that segregate public lands from the mass of public domain and convert it into private property. Since the disputed lot in the case before us was still the subject of a Free Patent Application when mortgaged to petitioner and no patent was granted to the Olidiana spouses. Thus, since the disputed property was not owned by the Olidiana spouses when they mortgaged it to petitioner, the contracts of mortgage and all their subsequent legal consequences as regards the subject lot are null and void. It is essential requisite for the validity of a mortgage that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of a property mortgaged, and it appearing that the mortgage was constituted before the issuance of the patent to the mortgagor, the mortgage in question must of necessity be void and ineffective. For the law explicitly requires an imperative for the validity of a mortgage that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of what is mortgaged. (Gutierrez, Alvin F.)
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152) ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and LIWAN CONSI, respondents. G.R. No. 88883 PARAS, J. FACTS: Fredia Mineral claim of about nine (9) hectares situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet, was located sometime between December 25, 1930 and December 31, 1930, a period of six (6) days, by A.I. Reynolds in accordance with the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, better known as the Philippine Bill of 1902, in a so-called Declaration of Location. The said Declaration of Location of mineral claim was duly recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder sometime on January 2, 1931. Fredia mineral claim, together with other mineral claims, was sold by A.I. Reynolds to Big Wedge Mining Company, the earlier corporate name of Atok Big Wedge Mining Company, Inc. in a Deed of Sale executed on November 2, 1931. Since then petitioner Atok has been in continuous and exclusive ownership and possession of said claim up to the present. Atok has paid the realty taxes and occupation fees for the Fredia mineral claim. The Fredia mineral claim together with other mineral claims owned by Atok has been declared under Tax Declaration No. 9535 and that in view of Presidential Decree No. 1214 an application for lease was filed by Atok covering the Fredia mineral claim. On the other hand, private respondent Liwan Consi has a lot below the land of a certain Mr. Acay at Tuding Slide, Itogon, Benguet. He constructed a house thereon sometime in 1964. The lot is covered by Tax Declaration No. 9462. When he first constructed his house below the lot of Mr. Acay he was told that it was not necessary for him to obtain a building permit as it was only a nipa hut. And no one prohibited him from entering the land so he was constructing a house thereon. It was only in January 1984 when private respondent Consi repaired the said house that people came to take pictures and told him that the lot belongs to Atok. Private respondent Consi has been paying taxes on said land which his father before him had occupied. On January 1984, the security guards of Atok informed Feliciano Reyes, Security Officer of Atok, that a construction was being undertaken at the area of the Fredia mineral claim by private respondent Liwan Consi. Feliciano Reyes instructed the cashier to go and take pictures of the construction. Feliciano Reyes himself and other security guards went to the place of the construction to verify and then to the police to report the matter. On March 1, 1984, Atok filed a complaint for forcible entry and detainer against Liwan Consi. On January 29, 1987, after due hearing, the Municipal Trial Court of Itogon. This case against Liwan Consi is hereby ordered dismissed. Petitioner ATOK appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio and Benguet. the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner ATOK. Hence, the petition. ISSUE: Whether or not an individual's long term occupation of land of the public domain vests him with such rights over the same as to defeat the rights of the owner of that claim HELD: It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as held in the Gold Creek Mining Corporation case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the owner is not required to secure a patent as long as he complies with the provisions of the mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by patent. In the case at bar, the evidence on record pointed that the petitioner Atok has faithfully complied with all the requirements of the law regarding the maintenance of the said Fredia Mineral Claim. The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the land had become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok. With this ruling enunciated by the Court, it can further be declared and held that petitioner Atok has the exclusive right to the property in question. (Gutierrez, Alvin F.) 153) Republic vs. De Guzman, et.al. 326 SCRA 574 FACTS: Conflicting applications for confirmation of imperfect title was filed by Norma Almanzor against respondents over lands located in Silang, Cavite. It is undisputed that the lands were released as agricultural land on 1965 and that the Petition for
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Confirmation of Imperfect Title was filed by the respondents on 1991. The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. The CA affirmed such ruling. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents have overthrown the presumption that the lands are part of the public domain? HELD: The petition for confirmation of imperfect title was filed four (4) years short of the required thirty (30) year period possession requirement under PD 29 and RA 6940. The respondents period of occupancy over the subject land 26 years at the time of the filing of the petition, four (4) years short of the required 30-year period possession requirement under the law. Prior to its declaration as alienable land in 1965, any occupation or possession thereon cannot be considered in the counting of the 30-year possession requirement. The rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. 154) Isaguirre vs. De Lara 332 SCRA 803 FACTS: Alejandro De Lara was the original applicant-claimant for Miscellaneous Sales Application on 1942. He was succeeded by his wife, respondent Felicitas De Lara upon his death. On said land stood a 2-story commercial and residential apartment in the name of private respondents sons. Sometime on 1960, a Deed of Sale and Special Cessation of Rights and Interests was executed in favor of the petitioner, Cornelio. Subsequently, an OCT was executed in his name. Meanwhile, an OCT was issued to the respondent anent the sales application. The CA reversed the same. It ruled that the transaction that was entered into was an equitable mortgage and not a sale thus, the petitioners OCT is void. Respondents motion for execution was granted by the trial court and was affirmed by the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to retain possession of the property until payment of the loan and the value of the necessary and useful improvements made upon such property. HELD: As the sole owner, the respondent has the right to enjoy her property without any other limitations than those established by law. As a general rule, the mortgagor retains possession of the mortgaged property. A mortgage is merely a lien. Possession is an essential attribute of ownership. It would be redundant for the respondent to go back to court to establish her right to possess the property. 155) Geminiano et. al. vs. CA 259 SCRA 344 FACTS: The subject lot was originally owned by petitioners mother Paulina. An unfinished bungalow was constructed on the lot by the petitioners. The said bungalow was sold by petitioners to respondent in 1978. Meanwhile, a contract of lease over the lot was earlier entered into by the petitioners mother in favor of the respondents for a period of 7 years. Petitioners, after having the lot registered in their names, filed a case for unlawful detainer and damages against the respondents. The lower court ruled in favor of the respondents. On appeal, the RTC reversed the same and ordered the Petitioner then filed an action for Quieting of Title and Damages against herein respondent.
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petitioners to reimburse the respondents for the value of the house and the improvements. The CA affirmed the RTC. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents were builders in good faith or mere lessees. HELD: Being mere lessees, the respondents knew that their occupation of the premises would continue only for the life of the lease. Thus, they cannot be considered as possessors or builders in good faith. Article 448 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 546 of the Civil Code applies only to possessors in good faith. It does not apply where ones only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to improve his landlord out of his property. 156) Tecnogas vs. CA G.R. No. 108894, February 10, 1997 FACTS: Plaintiff is a domestic corporation and a registered owner of the subject land located in San Dionisio, Paranaque. It purchased the subject land from Pariz Industries, Inc. in 1970 with the buildings, improvements and the wall existing thereon. Dedendant Eduardo Uy was the registered owner of the land adjoining petitioners land. Tecnogas offered to buy from Uy the portion of the latters land occupied by the portion of its buildings and wall. Uy refused. ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff is considered a builder in bad faith because he is presumed to know the metes and bounds of his property as described in the Certificate of Title. HELD: The plaintiff purchased the land with the structures already in existence. Article 527, Civil Code presumes good faith since no proof exists to show that the encroachment over a narrow, needle-shaped portion of the respondents land was done in bad faith by the builder of the encroaching structures. It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in which it was acquired, until the contrary is proved. Thus, plaintiff is deemed to have stepped into the shoes of the seller in regard to all rights of ownership over the land sold, including the right to compel the defendant to exercise either of the options under Art. 448, Civil Code. Plaintiff must also pay rent for the property occupied by its building but only up to the date the respondent serves notice of its option upon plaintiff and the trial court if such option is for the respondent to appropriate the encroaching structure. 157) Pleasantville Dvt. Corp. vs. CA 253 SCRA 10 FACTS: Robillo purchased from petitioner Lot 9 in Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. In 1975, respondent Jardinico bought the rights from Robillo. At that time, Lot 9 was vacant. Meanwhile, on 1974, respondent Wilson Kee bought on installment Lot 8 of said subdivision from CTTEI (exclusive real agent of petitioner). Said agent, through one of its employees, accompanied Kees wife to inspect lot 8. Unfortunately, the parcel of land pointed to was Lot 9. Kee then constructed improvements on said property. Jardinico then filed an ejectment case against Kee. ISSUE: Whether or not a lot buyer who constructs improvements on the wrong property erroneously delivered by the owners agent, a builder in good faith? HELD: Kee was in good faith. At the time he built improvements of Lot 9, Kee believed that said lot was what he bought from petitioner. The rights of Kee and Jardinico vis--vis each other, as builder in good faith and owner in good faith respectively are regulated by law (448, 546, 548, Civil Code).
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158) Benitez vs. CA 266 SCRA 242 FACTS: Sometime on 1986, petitioners purchased a lot from Cavite Development Bank. Subsequently, the respondents bought the same. Respondents then bought another property adjacent to that of petitioners land. Thereafter, the former then filed a case against the latter for ejectment upon discovery of the former that the latters house encroached on the formers land. MeTC ruled in favor of the respondents. The RTC and CA affirmed the same. ISSUE: Whether or not possession of a lot encroached upon by a part of anothers house be recovered in an action for ejectment. HELD: Yes, within 1 year from last demand. That petitioners occupied the land prior to respondents purchase thereof does not negate the latters case for ejectment. Prior physical possession is not required. Possession can be acquired by material occupation, by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of ones will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. 159) Evadel Realty vs. Soriano April 20, 2001 FACTS: Respondent-spouses as sellers, entered into a Contract to Sell with petitioner as buyer over a parcel of land which is part of a huge tract of land known as the Imus Estate. Upon payment of the first installment, the petitioners introduced improvements thereon and fenced off the property with concrete walls. Thereafter, the respondents discovered that the area fenced off by the petitioners exceeded the area subject of the contract by 2,450 square meters. 160) NAZARENO et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS 257 SCRA 589 FACTS: A parcel of land is situated in Telegrapo, Puntod, Cagayan de Oro City. It was formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan river by Sun Valley Lumber Co. Private respondents Jose Salasanan and Reo Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their houses stood from Petitioner Antonio Nazareno. For refusal to pay rentals, respondents were ejected. Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the survey plan to perfect his title over the accretion area being claimed by him. However, it was protested by private respondents. The petitioners claim that the subject land is private land being an accretion to his titled property, applying Article 457 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether or not Article 457 of The Civil Code applies. HELD: No. The following requites should all concur in order for accretion to apply as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code: (1) that Moreover petitioner, as a real estate developer is presumed to be experienced in business and ought to have sufficient technical expertise to correctly determine the metes and bounds of the land it acquires. A complaint for accion reinvindicatoria was filed by respondents against petitioner. The trial court, by way of a summary judgment, ruled in favor of respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not the issue regarding petitioners good faith or bad faith as a builder should have been peremptorily disposed of by the trial court. HELD: The petitioner admitted in its Amended Answer that the lot in dispute is covered by the TCT of respondents. With this admission, petitioner can no longer claim that it was a builder in good faith.
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the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast). Petitioners admit that the accretion was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River bounding their land. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the accumulation of such boulders, soil and other filling materials was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the current of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River. Absence of the first and second requisites, they cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner. Article 457 excludes all deposits caused by human intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. When a land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the water current of the river bordering said land but as a consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of man, it manmade accretion and, as such, part of the public domain. 161) NAVARRO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL G.R. No. 68166. February 12, 1997 FACTS: Petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. The Director of Fisheries, gave due course to his application but only to the extent of seven (7) hectares of the property as may be certified by the Bureau of Forestry as suitable for fishpond purposes. Sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application to register and confirm his title to a parcel of land, situated in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his property, situated in Barrio Puerto Rivas, Balanga, Bataan. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the riparian owner. Emiliano Navarro filed an opposition to Pascual's application. Navarro claimed that the land sought to be registered has always been part of the public domain, it being a part of the foreshore of Manila Bay. He was a lessee and in possession of a part of the subject property by virtue of a fishpond permit issued by the Bureau of Fisheries and confirmed by the Office of the President and also that he had already converted the area covered by the lease into a fishpond. ISSUE: Is land be considered as foreshore land? HELD: Yes. The third requisite of accretion is absent in the case at bar. It states that alluvium must be deposited on the portion of claimant's land which is adjacent to the river bank. Here private respondents' own land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers; in front of their land on the northern side lies the disputed land where before 1948, there lay the Manila Bay. If the accretion were to be attributed to the action of either or both of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should have been deposited on either or both of the eastern and western boundaries of private respondents' own tract of land, not on the northern portion thereof which is adjacent to the Manila Bay. The disputed land is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined private respondents own tract of land on the northern side. Hence, the land which is adjacent to the property belonging to Pascual cannot be considered an accretion caused by the action of the two rivers. 162) ROBLES et al vs. CA 328 SCRA 97 FACTS: Leon Robles primitively owned a land which he occupied the same openly and adversely as early as 1916 and paid its taxes. When Leon died his son Silvino Robles inherited land, took possession and paid taxes. Upon Silvinos death, his widow Maria de la Cruz and his children inherited the property, took adverse possession and paid taxes. However, the task of cultivating the land was assigned to Lucio Robles. Plaintiffs entrusted the payment of the land taxes to their co-heir and half-brother, Hilario Robles. In 1962, the tax declaration in Silvinos name was canceled and transferred Hilario Robles and his wife. In 1966, Andrea Robles secured a loan from the
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Cardona Rural Bank, Inc., using the tax declaration as security. When the mortgage debt was unpaid, it was auctioned for sale and Rural Bank was the highest bidder. Consequently the spouses Robles failed to redeem property. Thus, title was transferred in the name of Rural Bank. Then Rural Bank sold the same to the Spouses Vergel Santos and Ruth Santos. In 1987, plaintiff discovered the mortgage and attempted to redeem the property, but was unsuccessful. The spouses Santos also took possession of the property and secured a free patent in their names. Hence a petition for quieting of title to the land was filed. ISSUE: Will the petition prosper? HELD: Yes. Hilario mortgaged the disputed property to the Rural Bank of Cardona in his capacity as a mere coowner thereof. The said transaction did not divest the plaintiff of title to the property at the time of the institution of the complaint for quieting of title. An action to quiet title is a remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property. It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on plaintiffs title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Also, there is an irregularity when the tax declaration of Silvino was cancelled since there was no instrument or deed of conveyance evidencing its transfer to Hilario Robles. 163) De Aviles vs. CA 264 SCRA 473 FACTS: Eduardo Aviles was in actual possession of the afore-described property since 1957. In fact he mortgaged the same with the Rural Bank and Philippine National Bank. When the property was inspected by a bank representative, Eduardo Aviles, in the presence of the boundary owners, namely, defendant Camilo Aviles, Anastacio Aviles and Juana and Apolonio Joaquin, pointed to the inspector the existing earthen dikes as the boundary limits of the property and nobody objected. When the real estate mortgage was foreclosed, the property was sold at public auction but this was redeemed by plaintiffs' mother and the land was subsequently transferred and declared in her name. On March 23, 1983, defendant Camilo Aviles asserted a color of title over the northern portion of the property with an area of approximately 1,200 square meters by constructing a bamboo fence (thereon) and moving the earthen dikes, thereby molesting and disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over said portion. ISSUE: Will the remedy of quieting of title apply for settling a boundary dispute? HELD: No. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property. To avail of the remedy of quieting of title, a plaintiff must show that there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owner's title to or interest in real property. However, the Agreement of Partition executed by private respondent and his brothers (including the petitioners' father and predecessor-in-interest), in which their respective shares in the inherited property were agreed upon, and the Deed of Sale evidencing the redemption by petitioner Anastacia Vda. de Aviles of the subject property in a foreclosure sale are in no way documents that constitute a cloud or cast a doubt upon the title of petitioners. In fact, the uncertainty arises from the parties' failure to situate and fix the boundary between their respective properties. The construction of the bamboo fence enclosing the disputed property and the moving of earthen dikes are not the "clouds" or "doubts" which can be removed in an action for quieting of title. An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought for the purpose of settling a boundary dispute.
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164) DEL CAMPO vs. CA 351 SCRA 1 FACTS: Salome, Consorcia, Alfredo, Maria, Rosalia, Jose, Quirico and Julita, all surnamed Bornales, were the original co-owners of 27, 170 sq. m. lot known as Lot 162 under OCT No. 18047. The lot was divided in aliquot shares among the eight co-owners. Salome sold part of her 4/16 share in Lot 162 to Soledad Daynolo. Thereafter, Soledad Daynolo immediately took possession of the land and built a house thereon. A few years later, Soledad and her husband, Simplicio Distajo, mortgaged the subject portion of Lot 162 as security for a debt to Jose Regalado, Sr. Then three of the eight co-owners of Lot 162, specifically, Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo, sold 24,993 square meters of said lot to Jose Regalado, Sr. Simplicio Distajo, heir of Soledad Daynolo who had since died, paid the mortgage debt and redeemed the mortgaged portion of Lot 162 from Jose Regalado, Sr. The latter, in turn, executed a Deed of Discharge of Mortgage in favor of Soledad's heirs, namely: Simplicio Distajo, Rafael Distajo and Teresita Distajo-Regalado. On same date, the said heirs sold the redeemed portion of Lot 162 for P1,500.00 to herein petitioners, the spouses Manuel Del Campo and Salvacion Quiachon. ISSUE: Is the sale by a co-owner of a physical portion of an undivided property held in common be valid? HELD: Yes. Salome's right to sell part of her undivided interest in the co-owned property is absolute in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a coowner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person in its enjoyment. Since Salome's clear intention was to sell merely part of her aliquot share in Lot 162, in our view no valid objection can be made against it and the sale can be given effect to the full extent. Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner will only transfer the rights of said coowner to the buyer, thereby making the buyer a coowner of the property. In this case, Regalado merely became a new coowner of Lot 162 to the extent of the shares which Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could validly convey. Soledad retained her rights as co-owner and could validly transfer her share to petitioners in 1951. The logical effect of the second disposition is to substitute petitioners in the rights of Soledad as coowner of the land. Needless to say, these rights are preserved notwithstanding the issuance of TCT No. 14566 in Regalado's name in 1977. 165) Rodil Enterprises vs. CA G.R. No. 129609; November 29, 2001 FACTS: Petitioner Rodil Enterprises Inc. is the lessee of the Ides O'Racca Building since 1959. It was a "former alien property" over which the Republic of the Philippines acquired ownership by virtue of RA 477. In 1972, the lease contract between RODIL and the REPUBLIC was renewed for another 15 years. In 1980, RODIL entered into a sublease contract with respondents Carmen Bondoc, et al. members of the Ides O'Racca Building Tenants Association Inc. (ASSOCIATION). In 1982, authorization of the sale of "former alien properties" classified as commercial and industrial, and the O'RACCA building was classified as commercial property. In 1987,RODIL offered to purchase the subject property. In 1997, ASSOCIATION also offered to lease the same building. In May 18, 1992, RODIL signed a renewal contract which would extend the lease for 10 years from 1 September 1987. A supplement to the renewal contract was subsequently entered into on May 25, 1992 where rentals on the previous lease contract were increased. In September 1992: spouses Saturnino Alvarez and Epifania Alvarez, sublessees of RODIL, filed with the Office of the President a letter-appeal assailing the authority of Factoran to enter into the renewal contract of May 18, 1992 with RODIL, and claiming the right to purchase the subject property. ASSOCIATION instituted another Civil Case praying for the setting aside of the renewal contract of 18 May 1992 as well as the supplementary contract of May 25, 1992. Finally in 1993, RODIL filed an action for unlawful detainer against Divisoria Footwear (private respondents) and a similar action against Chua Huay Soon (also private respondents).
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The lower court dismissed the action filed by the ASSOCIATION. The Office of the President then denied the letter-appeal of the spouses Alvarez but nullified the renewal contract of 18 May 1992 and the supplementary contract of 25 May 1992. Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila upheld RODIL's right to eject respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua Huay Soon. The RTC affirmed MTC decision. However the appellate court declared the renewal contract between RODIL and the REPUBLIC null and void. ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic being the owner has freedom to dispose of a thing. HELD: Yes. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. Every owner has the freedom of disposition over his property. It is an attribute of ownership, and this rule has no exception. The REPUBLIC being the owner of the disputed property enjoys the prerogative to enter into a lease contract with RODIL in the exercise of its jus disponendi. Hence, as lessor, the REPUBLIC has the right to eject usurpers of the leased property where the factual elements required for relief in an action for unlawful detainer are present. The contracts of 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992 are valid. CA invalidated the contracts because they were supposedly executed in violation of a temporary restraining order issued by the RTC. CA however failed to note that the order restrains the REPUBLIC from awarding the lease contract only as regards respondent ASSOCIATION but not petitioner RODIL. In an action for unlawful detainer the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession. Respondents have admitted that they have not entered into any lease contract with the REPUBLIC and that their continued occupation of the subject property was merely by virtue of acquiescence. The records clearly show this to be the case. The REPUBLIC merely issued a "temporary occupancy permit" which was not even in the name of the respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear or Chua but of respondent ASSOCIATION. Since the occupation of respondents was merely tolerated by the REPUBLIC, the right of possession of the latter remained uninterrupted . It could therefore alienate the same to anyone it chose. Unfortunately for respondents, the REPUBLIC chose to alienate the subject premises to RODIL by virtue of a contract of lease entered into on 18 May 1992. Resultantly, petitioner had the right to file the action for unlawful detainer against respondents as one from whom possession of property has been unlawfully withheld. 166) Heirs of Roman Soriano V. CA G.R. No. 128177; August 15, 2001 FACTS: The land in question was originally owned by Adriano Soriano, upon his death, it passed on to his heirs who leased the same to the spouse De Vera for a period of 15 years. Roman Soriano as one of the children of Adriano Soriano, acts as the caretaker. The property was subdivided into two lots, lot 1 was sold to respondent spouses Abalos. As a co-owner of lot 2, Roman ownes , the of which was also sold to the spouses Abalos. He was ousted as caretaker of the land. Roman Soriano filed a case for reinstatement and reliquidation. The agrarian court authorized the ejectment, but on appeal the CA reversed. Subsequently the parties entered into an agreement allowing Roman to sublease the property. The spouses Abalos filed an application for registration of the title of lot 1 and the of lot 2, which was granted. The petitioner filed with DARAB for Security of Tenure with prayer for preliminary injunction. The lower court ruled that the spouses Abalos are the real owner of the land. They filed an application for the writ of execution of the decision, and to oust Roman Soriano and the sub-lessee. However there was a pending case with DARAB. ISSUE: Whether or not the winning party in the land registration case can effectively oust the possessor whose security of tenure rights are still pending with DARAB. HELD: No. The prevailing party in land registration case cannot be placed in possession of the area while it is occupied by the one claiming to be an agricultural tenant, pending declaration that the latters occupation was lawful. Judgement of ownership
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does not include possession as a necessary incident. Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. There is ownership when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the right of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, among which are the rights to enjoy the thing owned and the right to exclude other person from possession. While possession is the holding of the thing or enjoyment of a right. A person may be declared owner but may not be entitled to possession. It may be in the hand if another as a lessee or a tenant. 167) SERASPI vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. 135602 April 28, 2000 FACTS: The lots in question were originally owned by Marcelino Recasa and are both situated in Barangay Lapnag, Banga, Aklan. When Marcelino died in 1943, and in 1948 his intestate estate was partitioned into three parts to his corresponding heirs in his Three (3) marriages during his lifetime. In the same year, Patronicio Recasa (the representing the heirs first marriage) sold their share to Dominador Recasa (representing heirs in the second marriage). In 1950, Dominador sold their share to Quirico and Purificacion Seraspi. In 1958, the Seraspis acquired a loan from Kalibo Rural Bank, Inc. (KRBI) the subject land being the security, however, they failed to pay the loan and the property was foreclosed and sold to the highest bidder KRBI, and subsequently sold the same to Manuel Rata (brother-in-law of Quirico Seraspi) who allowed Quirico to administer the same. In 1974, private respondent Simeon Recasa (Marcelinos heir by his third marriage) took advantage of the fact that Quirico was paralyzed due to a stroke, forcibly entered the lands in question and took possession thereof. In 1983 the Seraspis were able to purchase the lands from Manuel Rata and thereafter filed a case against Simeon Recasa for recovery of possession of the lands. RTC ruled in favor of Seraspi, but CA reversed on appeal. ISSUE: Whether the there was prescription in favor of Simeon Recasa? acquisitive HELD: No, there was no acquisitive prescription Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. In the case at bar, respondent claim ordinary prescription through adverse possession of the property for more than Ten (10) years under Art. 1134 of the Civil Code. However, for purposes of prescription, respondent was not able to prove his just title or good faith required by acquisitive prescription, as he did not acquire possession of the property through the modes recognized by the Civil Code for acquisition of ownership or other real rights, namely: 1. Occupation 2. Intellectual creation 3. Law 4. Donation 5. Succession 6. Tradition in consequence of certain contracts 7. Prescription Also, under Article 714, the ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation, nor can respondent claim that he acquired his right through succession because he was an heir to the original owner, remember that the property was validly partitioned and the subject lots are not part of those which he inherited, and lastly, he cannot be considered in good faith as he entered the property without the knowledge and permission of the original owner, thus making him a mere usurper. When the property belonging to another is unlawfully taken by another, the former has the right of action against the latter fir the recovery of the property and such right may be transferred by the sale or assignment of the property and the transferee can maintain such action against the wrongdoer. *1974-1983 in only 9 years. 168) CATAPUSAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. 109262 November 21, 1996 FACTS: Bonifacio Catapusan was first married to Narcissa Tanjuatco, the only surviving heir of Dominga Piguing, their (4) children are the private respondent in the case at bar. Narcissa died in 1910, Bonifacio got married for the second time, and the children in the second marriage are the petitioners in this case. Bonifacio died in 1940. Thereafter in 1974, petitioners filed an action for partition of the lot in
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question located in Wawa, Tanay, Rizal. Petitioners claim that the Wawa Lot is the property of their father (Bonifacio) therefore it is co-owned by the heirs of the first and the second marriage. As proof of their claim, they have presented tax declarations of the four (4) adjacent land owners stating in such document that the owner of the subject lot is Bonifacio Catapusan. Witnesses were also presented and testified that they saw Bonifacio working on the lot. Respondent on the other hand, argues that the Wawa lot was originally owned by Dominga Piguing and inherited by Narcissa Tanjuatco as her paraphernal property; hence petitioners have no right over the lot. As evidence, theyve presented tax declarations in their names and also alleged that they have been in open, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the said lot for more than 50 years. The RTC ruled in favor of respondents declaring them as owner of the property, and such decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals except for Attorneys fees. ISSUE: Whether Bonifacio is the owner of the lot? HELD: No, He is not an owner. The tax declarations of neighbors stating that Bonifacio is the owner of the lot is not conclusive, so as the testimonies of the neighbors that they saw him working on the lot. As oppose to the tax declarations of the respondents showing they own the land. Possession be mere tolerance cannot ripen into ownership even if such possession have been for a long period of time. Also, the declaration of ownership made by the RTC in favor of respondents is proper because ownership must be decided first before partition may be granted. 169) VERDAD vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. 109972 April 29, 1996 FACTS: Macaria Atega was married twice during her lifetime, first with Angel Burdeos, and second with Canuto Rosales. She owned a land in Butuan City about 248 sq. m., Macaria died in 1956. The petitioner is the Zosima Verdad, who purchased the lot in question for P23,000.00 from heirs of Macarias son (Ramon Burdeos) in 1982. When Socorro (wife of the deceased David Rosales who died some time after his mother Macaria died) found out in March 30, 1987 that the lot was sold to Verdad, she sought intervention of the Lupong Tagapamayapa for redemption, her tender of P23,000.00 was refused because the current value of the property is higher. October 16, 1987, no settlement was reached, thus a case was filed by Socorro (private respondent) for Legal Redemption with Preliminary Injunction, which the RTC denied stating that redemption period already lapse. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, it reversed the RTC and declared that Socorro has the right to redeem the property. ISSUE: Whether Socorro Cordero Vda. De Rosales is capacitated to redeem the property even if she is only related by affinity to Macaria Atega and not an heir? HELD: Yes, Socorro is capacitated to make the redemption. Even if she is not an heir to Macaria, she is an heir to David Rosales who inherited a share of his mothers estate. Article 995 of the Civil Code, in the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate and their descendants, whether legitimate of illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit, without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under article 1001. The right to redeem spawned from the nondisclosure of the sale to all co-owners when the sale is in favor of a third person. In fact, written notice is required under Article 1623, and the redemption period is 30 days from receipt of such notice. In the case at bar, no notice was given, hence, the 30 day period stared from the time of discovery of the sale on March 30, 1987, and stayed by the proceedings in the Punong Tagapamayapa. There was clear intent to redeem at that time but the offer was rejected by Verdad. 170) TABUSO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. 108558 June 21, 2001 FACTS: The lot in question is an unregistered parcel of land in Antipolo, Naval, Leyte with an area of 3,267 square meters, which latter turned out to be in fact 11,927 square meters.
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A case was initiated to declare ownership of the land in question. Herein petitioners claim ownership of the land through succession from Ignacio Montes and presented tax declarations from 1944 1947 in the name of Ignacio Montes, but were only paid in 1981. Plaintiff Andrea Tabuso claim to be a successor in interest of Andrea Elaba (daughter of Maria Montes [Maria is the Sister of Ignacio Montes]). Also, there is a house built on the lot by Marcelo Tabuso (father of Andrea Tabuso). Private respondent however, alleged that the land was originally owned by Maria Montes, but she donated it to Isabel Elaba as supported by a document executed on September 24, 1923, thereafter Isabel sold the lot to Esteban Abad in 1948. Various tax declarations were also presented by respondent showing that from 1948 1982 tax has been paid on the lot by respondents predecessors in interest mainly by Esteban Abad. Also, part of the lot is being rented by one Valentin Poblete from Menesio Abad (heir of Esteban) as evidenced by a lease contract. During trial, petitioners also presented as witness the counsel of defendant, Atty. Jose Gonzales, who testified that he owns a lot adjacent to the land in question and that he have personal knowledge that the land in question had been in the possession of the heirs of Esteban Abad. RTC ruled that owner of the property is the respondents, which was upheld by the CA on appeal. ISSUE: Whether the CA was correct in declaring respondents as owner of the land in question? HELD: Yes, Court of Appeals was correct. The totality of evidence presented leans heavily in favor of herein private respondents. They have been able to adduce evidence which support their claim that they have been in open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession for more than 60 years. Also, in view of the size of the land which is 11,927 square meters, it is unbelievable for an alleged owner such as Tabuso to build only a barong-barong (small house) in the lot, which was latter shown to be allowed by mere tolerance by a letter addressed to plaintiff asking them to vacate the property within 3 months time. Also, petitioners are bound by the testimony of Atty. Gonzales even if he is counsel for the private respondent because he was presented by the plaintiff themselves as hostile witness. Petitioners possesses the land as mere holders, distinguished from possession in the concept of an owner, being a mere holder acknowledges another superior right over the property he possess. *Petitioners also raised an issue regarding the adjudication of 11,927 square meters to private respondent when the tax declarations only state 3,267 square meters. This is untenable, because what defines a piece of land is not the numerical data indicated as its area, but the boundaries or metes and bounds specified in its description as enclosing the land indicating its limits. 171) DIZON vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. 116854 November 19, 1996 FACTS: Aida Dizon mortgaged the subject lot to Monte de Piedad Bank on October 23, 1980 and failed to pay the loan obligation, hence the house and lot mortgage was thereafter foreclosed. The bank told Dizon that she can repurchase the property, having no means to pay the amount at the moment, she asked Elizabeth Santiago to repurchase the property in the amount of P550,000.00 on May 28, 1987. The TCT of Dizon was cancelled and a new one was issued in favor of Santiago in view of the Deed of Absolute Sale signed by Dizon in Favor of Santiago, also, an Option to Buy Back was signed by the same parties giving Dizon the option to buy back the said property from Santiago within a period of Three (3) months, with the stipulation that if Dizon failed to used the option within the agreed period, Dizon shall vacate the property in favor of Santiago. The period lapse without Dizon exercising her option to buy, thereafter, Santiago asked Dizon to vacate the premises. Dizon refused, which prompted Santiago to file an Ejectment case before the MTC. After trial, MTC ordered Dizon to vacate the property. RTC reversed and ordered the cancellation of the TCT in favor of Dizon. CA affirmed on appeal, but reversed itself upon MR of Santiago. ISSUE: Whether Dizon is entitled to possession of the subject property? HELD: No, Dizon is not entitled to possession. The title of the property held by the private respondent is enough proof to hold them as the
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rightful possessor upon default of Dizon to exercise her right to redeem the property. Also, the stipulation that Dizon, upon failure to buy back the property within the specified period, shall vacate the property is a binding agreement, thus, Santiago is already entitled to possession after the lapse of the said period. This is ofcourse without prejudice to Dizons right to file another action to determine the ownership of the property, which she interposed as a defense alleging that the sale was an equitable mortgage. The RTC made an error in ordering the cancellation of the TCT because Ejectment cases only dwell on the rightful possession and does not determine ownership with finality. 172) CEQUENA vs. BOLANTE G.R. 137944 April 6, 2000 FACTS: The land subject of the dispute has an area of 1,728 square meters and situated in barangay Bangad, Binangonan, Province of Rizal. Respondent Honorata Mendoza Bolante is the only daughter of Sinforoso Mendoza, while petitioner Cequena is the daughter of Margarito Mendoza. Sinforoso and Margarito are brothers. The subject lot was declared for tax purposes by Sinforoso since 1926. When he died in 1930, his wife and daughter continuously possessed the land, and when respondent was of age in 1948, she paid the taxes for the lot from 1932-1948. Margarito acquired joint possession from 1952, and by a virtue of an affidavit signed allegedly by respondents mother, transferred tax declaration in the name of Margarito Mendoza starting 1954, who thereafter cultivated part of the land with his heirs from 19531985 until they were ousted by respondents. The dispute over who has a better right of possession was raised in the trial court, which decided in favor of the petitioners. The Court of Appeals reversed the said decision and declared the respondents as lawful owner and possessor. ISSUE: Whether respondents are the lawful owner and possessor of the land in question? HELD: Yes, respondent is the lawful owner and possessor of the land. By acquisitive prescription of the property under Article 1134 of the New Civil Code, ownership and other real rights over immovable property may be acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of Ten (10) years. In the case at bar, respondent acquired their rights over the property through tax declaration of Sinforoso, when he died in 1930 respondents continued to possess the property and paid taxes from 1932-1948 in the concept of an owner. Such possession was not disturbed until 1952 when Margarito took joint possession of the land, however, the possession of respondent which is public, peaceful, and uninterrupted already ripened to ownership. *The affidavit that allowed the transfer of tax declaration from Sinforoso to Margarito was doubtful to say the lease, because one of the alleged signatories is the respondent mother of Honorata who testified that she was illiterate and could not have signed the document. *Possession of petitioners cannot ripen into ownership because such possession was not exclusive as they possess the property at the same time respondent are also living therein from 19521985. 1985 respondent ousted petitioner from the property. 173) DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. 129471 April 28, 2000 THE
FACTS: The land in dispute has an area of 19.4 hectares located in San Miguel, Province of Bohol whose original ownership rest with Ulpiano Mumar as evidenced by Tax Declaration since 1917. In 1950, Mumar sold the subject property Carlos Cajes (herein private respondent) who was issued tax declaration in the same year. He occupied and cultivated the land, planting cassava and camote in certain portions of the land. In 1969, unknown to private respondent, Jose Alvarez was able to register a parcel of land with an area of 1,512,468 square meters and OCT #546 was issued in the same year in his name. In 1972 Alvarez sold the property to spouses Beduya to whom TCT #10101 was issued, the former and the latter never occupied the said lot the property included in it the 19.4 hectares owned by Cajes. In the same year, 1972, spouse Beduya acquired a loan from DBP and mortgage the the land under TCT #10101 for P526,000.00, and in 1978 it was again mortgage for another loan in the amount of P1,430,000.00 in favor of the petitioner (DBP), no ocular inspection of the land was made.
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In 1978 private respondent applied for loan from DBP mortgaging the 19.4 hectares giving as evidence of ownership tax declarations and a certification of the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Bohol that no civil, land registration or cadastral case has been filed or instituted before the court affecting the validity of the Tax Declaration on the 19.4 hectare land. Private respondent approved the loan, however after releasing the money petitioner found out that the land mortgaged by private respondent was included in the land covered by TCT #10101, hence, petitioner immediately cancelled the loan and demanded immediate payment. Private respondent repaid the loan. Spouses Beduya failed to pay their loan and the land in TCT #10101 was forclosed. In 1985 during the foreclosure sale, DBP was the highest bidder, and as spouses Beduya failed to redeem the property, petitioner consolidated its ownership. In 1986, petitioner found out that Cajes is occupying a part of the land in TCT #10101, DBP demanded that Cajes vacate the property but private respondent refused, hence, DBP filed a case for Recovery of Possession against him. RTC ruled in favor of DBP, but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision declaring Cajes the lawful owner of the 19.4 hectares included in TCT #10101. ISSUE: Whether the CA was correct in adjudicating that the 19.4 hectares included in TCT #10101 is owned by private respondent Carlos Cajes? HELD: Yes, Court of Appeals is correct. Acquisitive prescription already vested in Carlos Cajes ownership of the 19.4 hectares of land he was paying tax on since he has been in open public, peaceful, uninterrupted, and adverse possession of the said property in the concept of an owner since 1950. Ordinary prescription requires only such possession for Ten (10) years. Thus, in 1969, when the spouses Beduya were able to register their land under TCT #10101, the private respondent Cajes already acquired ownership over the 19.4 hectares he acquired from Mumar who have been in possession as an owner since 1917. Surely, private respondents possession together with Mumars possession and occupation of the 19.4 hectares is more than Thirty (30) years required under Act no. 496. Although the initial case is recovery of possession of real property, and collateral attack is not allowed in to defeat the indefeasibility of a Torrens Title, the counter claim of the private respondent when he raised the counterclaim of ownership plus damages, was in fact a direct attack on the title. DBP cannot be considered a mortgagor in good faith because being a bank, it is required to exercise due diligence in its dealings as such are impress with public concern. It appears from the facts that it did not conduct inspection of the property of spouses Beduya when they applied for loan. Also, even when it has knowledge since 1978 that the private respondent has a claim in the land covered by TCT #10101, it still bought the land in question in the foreclosure sale in 1985 ignoring the fact that would normally raise suspicion because private respondent is occupying a part of the said lot. 174) VILLANUEVA VS CA G.R. No. 108921 April 12, 2000 FACTS: Petitioners are the legitimate children of Leon Villanueva, Concepcion Macahilas vda. de Villanueva is his widow. Leon was one of eight (8) children of Felipe Villanueva, predecessor-in-interest of the parties in the present case.Private respondents are related by blood to the petitioners as descendants of Felipe. . The remaining undivided portion of the land was held in trust by Leon for his co-heirs. During Leon's lifetime, his co-heirs made several seasonable and lawful demands upon him to subdivide and partition the property, but for one reason or another, no subdivision took place. After the death of Leon in August 1972, private respondents discovered that the shares of four of the heirs of Felipe, namely, Simplicio, Nicolasa, Fausta and Maria Baltazar, spouse of Benito, was purchased by Leon as evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed on August 25, 1946 but registered only in 1971. Leon sometime in July 1970, executed a sale and partition of the property in favor of his own children, herein petitioners. By virtue of such Deed of Partition, private respondents had succeeded in obtaining Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. C256. On April 25, 1975, petitioners managed to secure separate and independent titles over their pro-indiviso shares in their respective names. Private respondents then filed a case for partition with annulment of documents and reconveyance with the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Private respondents contended that the sale in favor of Leon was fraudulently obtained through m the
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Regional Trial Court of Kalibo rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 2389, declaring "the defendants the legal owners of the property in question through machinations and false pretenses. On appeal The CA Reversed the Trial courts ruling. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court erred in failing to declare action by the private respondents to recover the property in question barred by laches, estoppel, prescription. RULING: Laches is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. Its essential elements are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; (2) delay in asserting complainant's right after he had knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after he has an opportunity to sue; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant. At the time of signing of the Deed of Sale of August 26, 1948, private respondents , Ramon and Rosa were minors. They could not be faulted for their failure to file a case to recover their inheritance from their uncle Leon, since up to the age of majority, they believed and considered Leon their co-heir and administrator. It was only in 1975, not in 1948, that they became aware of the actionable betrayal by their uncle. Upon learning of their uncle's actions, they filed an action for recovery. They did not sleep on their rights, contrary to petitioners' assertion. Under the circumstances of the instant case, we do not think that respondent appellate court erred in considering private respondents' action. The action was not too late. Furthermore, when Felipe Villanueva died, an implied trust was created by operation of law between Felipe's children and Leon, their uncle, as far as the 1/6 share of Felipe. Leon's fraudulent titling of Felipe's 1/6 share was a betrayal of that implied trust Neither is the action barred by prescription, we held that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title of the property. Here the questioned Deed of Sale was registered only in 1971. Private respondents filed their complaint in 1975, hence well within the prescriptive period. We held that a land registration case is an action in rem binding upon the whole world, and considering that the private respondents failed to object to the registration of the realty in question, then res judicata had set in. True, but notwithstanding the binding effect of the land registration case upon the private respondents, the latter are not deprived of a remedy. While a review of the decree of registration is no longer available after the expiration of the oneyear period from entry thereof, an equitable remedy is still available. Those wrongfully deprived of their property may initiate an action for reconveyance of the properly. 175) Eduardo Fontanilla vs Court of Appeals G.R. No. 119341, November 29, 1999 FACTS: Spouses Crisanto and Feliciana Duaman were awarded a homestead patent over a parcel of land. Upon their death, private respondent Luis Duaman, one of their children, inherited a four-hectare portion of the homestead. On 21 July 1976, in order to expedite the loan application of his two (2) sons, Ernesto and Elpidio Duaman, with the Development Bank of the Philippines, private respondent transferred to them the ownership of his share in the homestead. On 8 August 1985, in view of the imminence of foreclosure of the said lot by the bank, Ernesto and Elpidio sold the two-hectare portion thereof to Eduardo Fontanilla, Sr. for P30,000.00. The vendee named in the deed of sale was Ellen M.T. Fontanilla. . Sometime later, private respondent informed Eduardo Fontanilla of his desire to repurchase the subject lot. Private respondent filed a case with the RTC of Cauayan Isabela against petitioners for the "Repurchase of the Homestead. Upon motion filed by petitioners, the lower court dismissed private respondent's complaint for failure to state a cause of action On appeal, the CA reversed the order of the trial court.The CA held that private respondent could still exercise the right to repurchase under Section 119 of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141,
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as amended) despite the fact that it was not him but his sons who conveyed the subject lot to petitioners. ISSUE: Whether private respondent, not being the vendor in the sale of the subject lot to petitioners, could no longer exercise his right to repurchase under Section 119 of the Public Land Act against petitioners. RULING: Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of conveyance. (Commonwealth Act 141) these homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots of the " State to landdestitute citizens for their home and cultivation." 2 Further, the plain intent of Section 119 is "to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the State had gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it. Petitioners argue that private respondent could no longer avail himself of the right to repurchase under Section 119 because he was not the vendor of the subject lot. Only the vendor allegedly has the right to repurchase. Petitioners claim is without merit, Our pronouncement in Madarcos that only the vendor has the right to repurchase was taken out of context by petitioners. Said pronouncement may not be sweepingly applied in this case because of a significant factual difference between the two cases. In Madarcos, we ruled that Cantain (petition herein) cannot repurchase the share of Francisca, his coheir, because the homestead had already been partitioned and distributed among them as heirs. In other words, in that case, we held that Catain could not avail himself of the right granted under Section 119 because he was not entitled to repurchase the share of his co-heir in the homestead. Upon the other hand, in this case, private respondent is precisely seeking to repurchase from petitioners his own share in the homestead that he inherited from his parents. There is nothing in Section 119 which provides that the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs" must be the conveyor of the homestead before any of them can exercise the right to repurchase. Rather, what said law plainly provides is that the "applicant, his widow, or legal heirs" shall be entitled to repurchase the homestead within (5) years from the date of conveyance. In this case, there is no dispute that private respondent is the legal heir of spouses Crisanto and Feliciana Duaman, the homesteaders. Since the transfer of the subject lot by private respondent to his sons does not fall within the purview of Section 119, it necessarily follows that the five-year period to repurchase cannot be reckoned from the date of said conveyance. Rather, the date of conveyance for the purpose of counting the fiveyear period to repurchase under Section 119 is that alienation made to a third party outside of the family circle which in this case was the conveyance of the subject lot to petitioners on 8 August 1985. Accordingly, private respondent's complaint for the repurchase of the subject lot, which was filed on 20 June 1989, was not time-barred as not more than five (5) years had lapsed since the date of its conveyance to petitioners. 176) Quimen Vs. CA and Yolanda Oliveros G.R. No. 112331, May 29, 1996 Facts: Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and sister Rufina inherited a piece of property situated in Pandi, Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the property equally among themselves, as they did, with the shares of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and Rufina abutting the municipal road. In February 1982 Yolanda purchased a part of the lot from her uncle Antonio through her aunt Anastacia who was then acting as his administratrix. According to Yolanda, when petitioner offered her the property for sale she was hesitant to buy as it had no access to a public road. But Anastacia prevailed upon her to buy the lot with the assurance that she would give her a right of way on her adjoining property for P200.00 per square meter. Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her passageway to the public highway a portion of Anastacia's property. But when Yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the pathway Anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she was thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through her property. In February 1986 Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen, located directly behind the property of her parents who provided her a pathway Although the pathway leads to the municipal road it is not adequate for ingress and egress. The municipal road cannot be reached with facility because the store itself obstructs the path so that one has to pass through the back entrance and the facade of the store to
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reach the road. On 29 December 1987 Yolanda filed an action with the trial court praying for a right of way through Anastacia's property. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. On appeal by respondent Yolanda, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and held that she was entitled to a right of way on petitioner's property ISSUE: Whether Yolanda is entitled to a right of way on her property RULING: YES, she is entitled. Yolanda sufficiently established the presence of the ff: 1. her estate (dominant estate) is surrounded by other immovable without an adequate outlet to public highway; 2. she is willing to pay the proper indemnity; 3. the isolation was not due to the acts of Yolanda; and 4. the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. The criterion of least prejudicial to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance. Where the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, if these 2 circumstances do not concur, the way which will cause the least damage should be used even if it will not be the shortest. In this case, Anastacias property is least prejudicial since it will not entail the demolition of a sari-sari store which is made of strong materials. As between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of way which although longer will require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should be preferred. 177) Valley Land Resources vs Valley Golf Club G.R. No. 126584. November 15, 2001 Facts: Victoria Valley Blvd is composed of road lots which connects Ortigas Avenue and Sumulong Highway. Half of the Boulevard is made up of road lots owned by defendant-appellant Valley Golf. The other half is supposed to be owned by Hacienda Benito with whom Valley Golf entered into an agreement, whereby it was agreed that Hacienda Benito and Valley Golf will own jointly Victoria Valley Blvd, one of the provisions provide that the right of way shall be owned and maintained jointly by Hacienda Benito and Valley Golf. Thereafter, Hacienda Benito transferred ownership and all its rights and interests over the road lots covering half of the Victoria Valley Blvd. to herein plaintiff-appellee Valley Land by virtue of a Mutual Agreement Valley Golf treated and recognized Valley Land as its alleged new co-owner over Victoria Valley Blvd., sharing half of all the proceeds of the grant of right of way over the boulevard. However, in a subsequent review of the agreement between Valley Golf and Hacienda Benito, Valley Golf discovered that there is actually no existing coownership between them over Victoria Valley Blvd. Valley Golf retained exclusive ownership over the road lots forming part of Victoria Valley Blvd. notwithstanding their agreement, and that the other half of the boulevard is no longer under the name of either Hacienda Benito or Valley Land as the same has been disposed of already and is registered in favor of the Active Realty & Dev't. Corp. Based on said discovery, Valley Golf sought to recover the sum of money which it allegedly remitted by mistake to Valley Land which represents the supposed share of the latter in the grant of right of way. Valley Land in turn sought the cancellation of Valley Golf s titles over the road lots forming half of Victoria Valley Blvd. The cases were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo and consolidated therein. In due time, the assailed decision was rendered and brought to this Court on appeal by Valley Golf ISSUE: Whether Valley Golf is the sole owner of the subject road lots, or Valley Land is a co-owner thereof RULING: Valley Golf is the sole owner of the road lots. The TCTs which are the subject of the road right of way and all the rest of the other certificates of title covering the road lots are solely in the name of Valley Golf. Consequently, there can be no question that Valley Golf is the owner of the road lots. As such owner, Valley Golf has the right to enjoy and
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dispose of the same without any limitations other than those established by law. However, Valley Golf made the mistake of sharing the proceeds of the right of way with Valley Land. Considering that when the said amount was given to Valley Land, it did not have the right to receive the amount as Valley Golf delivered it under the mistaken belief that Valley Land was a co-owner of the lands, thus Valley Land was under obligation to return the amount of P1,585,962.96. 178) Cabatingan vs heirs of Corazon Cabatingan G.R. No. 131953. June 5, 2002 FACTS: On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of Donation Inter Vivos for House and Lot" covering () portion of the former's house and lot located at Liloan, Cebu. Four (4) other deeds of donation were subsequently executed by Conchita Cabatingan on January 14, 1995, bestowing upon: (a) petitioner Estela C. Maglasang, two (2) parcels of land - one located in Cogon, Cebu and the other, a portion of a parcel of land in Masbate. (b) petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a portion of a parcel of land located in Masbate (and (c) petitioner Merly S. Cabatingan, a portion of the Masbate property These deeds of donation contain similar provisions: "That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, x x x the DONOR transfers, conveys, by way of donation, unto the DONEE the above property, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR xxx Upon learning of the existence of these donations, respondents filed with the RTC an action for Annulment And Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Donations and Accounting. Respondents allege that petitioners, through their sinister machinations and strategies and taking advantage of Conchita Cabatingan's fragile condition, caused the execution of the deeds of donation, and, that the documents are void for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments, considering that these are donations mortis causa. Respondents prayed that they be declared as co-owners of the properties in equal shares, together with Nicolas Cabatingan. RTC rendered a partial judgment in favor of respondents by declaring the 4 Deeds of Donation as null and void for being a Donation Mortis Causa and for failure to comply with formal and solemn requisite under Art. 806 of the New Civil Code; declaring respondents as co-owners of the properties of Conchita ISSUE: Whether or not the donations are mortis causa or inter vivos RULING: The Donations in this case are Mortis Causa. In a Donation Mortis Causa, "the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive." In determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken into account: (1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; transferor retains ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive; (2) Before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; (3) The transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingan's death. It establishes the donor's intention to transfer the ownership and possession of the donated property to the donee only after the former's death. The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to petitioners during her lifetime. Petitioners themselves expressly confirmed the donations as mortis causa in the following Acceptance and Attestation clauses, uniformly found in the subject deeds of donation, "That the DONEE does hereby accept the foregoing donation mortis causa. 179) GONZALES vs. CA G.R. No. 110335. June 18, 2001 FACTS: The deceased spouses Ignacio Gonzales and Marina Gonzales were the registered owners of two parcels of agricultural Land situated at Barrio Fortaleza, Cabanatuan City, Herein petitioners are the successors-in-interest or the children and grandchildren of said Gonzales spouses. On the
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other hand, private respondents are the farmers and tenants of said spouses who have been cultivating the parcels of land even before World War II either personally or through their predecessors-in-interest. On May 7, 1969, Marina Gonzales died intestate and appointed as administratrix of her estate was petitioner Lilia Gonzales. Prior to the partition of said estate, Ignacio Gonzales executed a Deed of Donation on July 12, 1972 conveying his share of the property. When Presidential Decree No. 27 (P.D. No. 27) took effect on October 21, 1972, the landholdings of the spouses Gonzales were placed under Operation Land Transfer by virtue of said decree, and private respondents were accordingly issued the corresponding Certificates of Land Transfer and Emancipation Patents. On March 5, 1974, the administratrix Lilia Gonzales filed an application for retention with the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform, requesting that their property be excluded from the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) resolution dated February 23, 1983 recommending that the land subject of the deed of donation, or Lot No. 551-C, be exempt from Operation Land Transfer. ISSUE:Whether the property subject of the deed of donation which was not registered when P.D. No. 27 took effect, should be excluded from the Operation Land Transfer. RULING: No. Article 749 of the Civil Code provides that "in order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy." Article 709 of the same Code explicitly states that "the titles of ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of property shall not prejudice third persons. From the foregoing provisions, it may be inferred that as between the parties to a donation of an immovable property, all that is required is for said donation to be contained in a public document. Registration is not necessary for it to be considered valid and effective. However, in order to bind third persons, the donation must be registered in the Registry of Property (now Registry of Land Titles and Deeds). Although the nonregistration of a deed of donation shall not affect its validity, the necessity of registration comes into play when the rights of third persons are affected, as in the case at bar. It is undisputed in this case that the donation executed by Ignacio Gonzales in favor of his grandchildren, although in writing and duly notarized, has not been registered in accordance with law. For this reason, it shall not be binding upon private respondents who did not participate in said deed or had no actual knowledge thereof. Hence, while the deed of donation is valid between the donor and the donees, such deed, however, did not bind the tenants-farmers who were not parties to the donation. From the foregoing, the ineluctable conclusion drawn is that the unregistered deed of donation cannot operate to exclude the subject land from the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer of P.D. No. 27, which took effect on October 21, 1972. To rule otherwise would render ineffectual the rights and interests that the tenants-farmers immediately acquired upon the promulgation of P.D. No. 27. 180) Republic vs. Leon Silim G.R. No. 140487. April 2, 2001 FACTS: On 17 December 1971, respondents, the Spouses Leon Silim and Ildefonsa Mangubat, donated a 5,600 square meter parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools, Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur (BPS). In the Deed of Donation, respondents imposed the condition that the said property should "be used exclusively and forever for school purposes only."1 This donation was accepted by Gregorio Buendia, the District Supervisor of BPS, through an Affidavit of Acceptance and Confirmation of Donation. Through a fund raising campaign spearheaded by the Parent-Teachers Association of Barangay Kauswagan, a school building was constructed on the donated land. However, the Bagong Lipunan school building that was supposed to be allocated for the donated parcel of land in Barangay Kauswagan could not be released since the government required that it be built upon a one (1) hectare parcel of land. To remedy this predicament, Assistant School Division Superintendent of the Province of Zamboanga del Sur, Sabdani Hadjirol, authorized District Supervisor Buendia to officially transact for the exchange of the one-half (1/2) hectare old school site of Kauswagan Elementary School to a new and suitable location which would fit the specifications of the government. Pursuant to this, District Supervisor Buendia and Teresita Palma entered into a Deed of Exchange whereby the donated lot was exchanged with the bigger lot owned by the latter..
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When respondent Leon Silim saw, to his surprise, that Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated land, he asked the latter why he was building a house on the property he donated to BPS. Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma replied that he is already the owner of the said property. Respondent Leon Silim endeavored to stop the construction of the house on the donated property but Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma advised him to just file a case in court. On February 10, 1982, respondents filed a Complaint for Revocation and Cancellation of Conditional Donation, Annulment of Deed of Exchange and Recovery of Possession and Ownership of Real Property with damages against Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma before the RTC of Pagadian City which dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, respondents appealed in which the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the donation null and void on the grounds that the donation was not properly accepted and the condition imposed on the donation was violated. ISSUE: Whether or not the donation is valid. HELD: Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be categorized as: (1) pure or simple; (2) remuneratory or compensatory; (3) conditional or modal; and (4) onerous. An onerous donation is that which imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation or, to be more precise, this is the kind of donation made for a valuable consideration, the cost of which is equal to or more than the thing donated. Unlike the other forms of donation, the validity of and the rights and obligations of the parties involved in an onerous donation are completely governed not by the law on donations but by the law on contracts (Article 733 Civil Code). The donation involved in the present controversy is one which is onerous since there is a burden imposed upon the donee to build a school on the donated property. In accordance to Art. 745 & 749, there was a valid acceptance of the donation in this case. The written acceptance of the donation having been considered by the trial court in arriving at its decision, there is the presumption that this exhibit was properly offered and admitted by the court. Also, a school building was immediately constructed after the donation was executed. Silim had knowledge of the existence of the school building put up on the lot. The condition for the donation in this case was not violated when the lot donated was exchanged with another one. The purpose for the donation remains the same - for the establishment of a school. The exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for the release of funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan School Bldg which could not be accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot. 181) QUILALA V. ALCANTARA G.R. No. 13268, December 3, 2001 FACTS: On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" in favor of Violeta Quilala over a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila. The "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" consists of two pages. The first page contains the deed of donation itself, and is signed on the bottom portion by Catalina Quilala as donor, Violeta Quilala as donee, and two instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the Acknowledgment, which states merely that Catalina Quilala personally appeared before the notary public and acknowledged that the donation was her free and voluntary act and deed. There appear on the lefthand margin of the second page the signatures of Catalina Quilala and one of the witnesses, and on the right-hand margin the signatures of Violeta Quilala and the other witness. On November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala died. Violeta Quilala likewise died on May 22, 1984. Petitioner Ricky Quilala alleges that he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala.. Meanwhile, respondents Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes, claiming to be Catalina's only surviving relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity, executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate, dividing and adjudicating unto themselves the subject property. The trial court found that the deed of donation, although signed by both Catalina and Violeta, was acknowledged before a notary public only by the donor, Catalina. Consequently, there was no acceptance by Violeta of the donation in a public instrument, thus rendering the donation null and void. Furthermore, the trial court held that nowhere in Catalina's SSS records does it appear that Violeta was Catalina's daughter. Rather, Violeta was referred to therein as an adopted child, but there
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was no positive evidence that the adoption was legal. On the other hand, the trial court found that respondents were first cousins of Catalina Quilala. However, since it appeared that Catalina died leaving a will, the trial court ruled that respondents' deed of extrajudicial settlement cannot be registered. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming with modification the decision of the trial court by dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action without prejudice to the filing of probate proceedings of Catalina's alleged last will and testament. ISSUE: validity of the donation executed by Catalina in favor of Violeta HELD: Article 749 of the Civil Code, the donation of an immovable must be made in a public instrument in order to be valid, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee,and is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee, provided the donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law from accepting the donation. Once the donation is accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable, and the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property. The acceptance, to be valid, must be made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee.It may be made in the same deed or in a separate public document, and the donor must know the acceptance by the donee. In the case at bar, the deed of donation contained the number of the certificate of title as well as the technical description of the real property donated. It stipulated that the donation was made for and in consideration of the "love and affection which the DONEE inspires in the DONOR, and as an act of liberality and generosity." Below the terms and stipulations of the donation, the donor, donee and their witnesses affixed their signature. However, the Acknowledgment appearing on the second page mentioned only the donor, Catalina Quilala. The second page of the deed of donation, on which the Acknowledgment appears, was signed by the donor and one witness on the left-hand margin, and by the donee and the other witness on the right hand margin. Surely, the requirement that the contracting parties and their witnesses should sign on the lefthand margin of the instrument is not absolute. The intendment of the law merely is to ensure that each and every page of the instrument is authenticated by the parties. The requirement is designed to avoid the falsification of the contract after the same has already been duly executed by the parties. Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is merely directory. The fact that one of the parties signs on the wrong side of the page does not invalidate the document. The purpose of authenticating the page is served, and the requirement in the above-quoted provision is deemed substantially complied with. In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public does not also render the donation null and void. The instrument should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be considered a private document in part and a public document in another part. The fact that it was acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of donation in its entirety a public instrument. The fact that the donee was not mentioned by the notary public in the acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is the conveyance that should be acknowledged as a free and voluntary act. In any event, the donee signed on the second page, which contains the Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on the first page of the notarized deed of donation, was made in a public instrument. 182) SPOUSES STA. MARIA COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 127549, January 28, 1998 V.
FACTS: Spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo are the registered owners of a piece of land, Lot No. 124, located at Paco, Obando, Bulacan. They acquired said lot under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 6, 1992 executed by the vendors Pedro M. Sanchez, et al. Plaintiff's aforesaid Lot 124 is surrounded by a fishpond on the northeast portion thereof; by Lot 126, owned by Florentino Cruz, on the southeast portion; by Lot 6-a and a portion of Lot 6-b, owned respectively by Spouses Cesar and Raquel Sta. Maria and Florcerfida Sta. Maria, on the southwest; and by Lot 122, owned by the Jacinto family, on the northwest. On February 17, 1992, Respondent spouses Fajardo filed a complaint against petitioner Cesar and Raquel Sta. Maria or Florcerfida Sta. Maria for the establishment of an easement of right of way. Respondents alleged that their lot, Lot 124, is surrounded by properties belonging to other persons, including those of the petitioners; that since
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respondents have no adequate outlet to the provincial road, an easement of a right of way passing through either of the alternative petitioners properties which are directly abutting the provincial road would be respondents only convenient, direct and shortest access to and from the provincial road; that respondents predecessors-in-interest have been passing through the properties of petitioners going to and from their lot; that petitioners' mother even promised respondents' predecessors-in-interest to grant the latter an easement of right of way as she acknowledged the absence of an access from their property to the road; and that alternative petitioners, despite respondents request for a right of way and referral of the dispute to the barangay officials, refused to grant them an easement. Thus, respondents prayed that an easement of right of way on the lots of defendants be established in their favor. Defendants, instead of filing an answer, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the lower court has no jurisdiction to hear the case since plaintiffs failed to refer the matter to the barangay lupon. The lower court, however, in its Order dated May 18, 1992, denied said motion on the premise that there was substantial compliance with the law. The trial court found that based on the Ocular Inspection Report there was no other way through which the private respondents could establish a right of way in order to reach the provincial road except by traversing directly the property of the petitioners. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the private respondents had sufficiently established the existence of the four requisites for compulsory easement of right of way on petitioners' property, to wit: (1) private respondents' property was, as revealed by the Ocular inspection Report, surrounded by other immovables owned by different individuals and was without an adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) the isolation of private respondents' property was not due to their own acts, as it was already surrounded by other immovables when they purchased it; (3) petitioners' property would provide the shortest way from private respondents' property to the provincial road, and this way would cause the least prejudice because no significant structure would be injured thereby; and (4) the private respondents were willing to pay the corresponding damages provided for by law if the right of way would be granted. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT A COMPULSORY RIGHT OF WAY CAN BE GRANTED TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HELD: In the instant case, the Court of Appeals have correctly found the existence of the requisites. Private respondents' property is landlocked by neighboring estates belonging to different owners. The petitioners try to convince the Court that there are two other existing passage ways over the property of Cruz and over that of Jacinto, as well as a "daang tao," for private respondents' use. But the examination of the records yields otherwise. Said lots of Cruz and Jacinto do not have existing passage ways for the private respondents to use. Moreover, the Ocular Inspection Report reveals that the suggested alternative ways through Cruz's or Jacinto's properties are longer and "circuitous" than that through petitioners' property. This is also clear from the Sketch Plan submitted by the private respondents wherein it is readily seen that the lots of Cruz and Jacinto are only adjacent to that of private respondents unlike that of petitioners which is directly in front of private respondents' property in relation to the public highway. Under Article 650 of the Civil Code, the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. Where there are several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, and the easement may be established on any of them, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen.The conditions of "least damage" and "shortest distance" are both established in one tenement petitioners' property. As to the "daang tao" at the back of private respondents' property, it must be stressed that under Article 651 the width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time. Therefore, the needs of the dominant estate determine the width of the easement.The needs of private respondents' property could hardly be served by this "daang tao" located at the back and which is bordered by a fishpond.
183) CRISTOBAL V. COURT OF APPEALS 291 SCRA 122
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FACTS: Petitioners own a house and lot situated at Visayas Avenue Extension, Quezon City, where they have been residing from 1961 to the present. Respondent Cesar Ledesma, Inc., on the other hand, is the owner of a subdivision at Barrio Culiat along Visayas Avenue which once included the disputed residential lots, Lot 1 and Lot 2, located adjacent to petitioners' property. Lots 1 and 2 were originally part of a private road known as Road Lot 2 owned exclusively by Cesar Ledesma, Inc. Petitioners were using Road Lot 2 in going to and from the nearest public road. When Visayas Avenue became operational as a national road in 1979, Cesar Ledesma, Inc., filed a petition before the RTC of Quezon City to be allowed to convert Road Lot 2 into residential lots. The petition was granted, hence, Road Lot 2 was converted into residential lots designated as lot 1 and lot 2. Subsequently, Cesar Ledesma , Inc., sold both lots to Macario Pacione. In turn, Macario Pacione conveyed the lots to his son and dauhter-in-law, respondent spouses Jesus and Lerma Pacione. When the Pacione spouses, who intended to build a house on Lot 1, Visited the property in 1987, they found out that the lot was occupied by a squatter named Juanita Geronimo and a portion was being used a passageway by petitioners to and from Visayas Avenue. Accordingly, the spouses complained about the intrusion into their property to the Barangay Office. When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, the spouses started enclosing Lot 1 with a concrete fence. Petitioners prostested the enclosure alleging that their property was bounded on all sides by residential houses belonging to different owners and had no adequate outlet and inlet to Visayas Avenue except through the property of the Paciones. As their protests went unheeded, petitioners instituted an action for easement of right of way. At the instance of the parties, the trial court ordered an ocular inspection of the property. The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that one essential requisite of a legal easement of right of way was not proved, i.e., the absence of an alternative adequate way or outlet to a public highway, in this case, Visayas Avenue. On 16 January 1996 the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed decision affirming the findings of the trial court. ISSUE: whether or not petitioners are entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way HELD: To be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way, the preconditions provided under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be established. These are: (1) that the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) that proper indemnity has been paid; (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) that the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.The burden of proving the existence of these prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate. In the present case, the first element is clearly absent. As found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, an outlet already exist, which is a path walk located at the left side of petitioners' property and which is connected to a private road about five hundred (500) meters long. The private road, in turn, leads to Ma. Elena Street which is about 2.5 meters wide and, finally, to Visayas Avenue. This outlet was determined by the court a quo to be sufficient for the needs of the dominants estate, hence petitioners have no cause to complain that they have no adequate outlet to Visayas Avenue. Further, no evidence was adduced by petitioners to prove that the easement they seek to impose on private respondents' property is to be established at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. For emphasis, Lot 1 is only 164 square meters and an improvident imposition of the easement on the lot may unjustly deprive private respondents of the optimum use and enjoyment of their property, considering that its already small area will be reduced further by the easement. Worse, it may even render the property useless for the purpose for which private respondents purchased the same. It must also be stressed that, by its very nature, and when considered with reference to the obligations imposed on the servient estate, an easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property rights of the servient owner and is regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient estate. Thus, it is incumbent upon the owner of the dominant estate to establish by clear and convincing evidence the presence of all the preconditions before his claim for easement of right of way be granted. Petitioners miserably failed in this regard. On the question of adequacy of the existing outlet, petitioners allege that the path walk is much longer, circuitous and inconvenient, as from Visayas Avenue one has to pass by Ma. Elena St., turn right to a private road, then enter, then vacant lot, and turn right again to exit from the vacant lot until one reaches petitioners' property.
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We find petitioners' concept of what is "adequate outlet" a complete disregard of the well-entrenched doctrine that in order to justify the imposition of an easement of right of way there must be a real, not ficititious or artificial, necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed Admittedly, the proposed right of way over private respondents' property is the most convenient, being the shorter and the more direct route to Visayas Avenue. However, it is not enough that the easement be where the way is shortest. It is more improtant that it be where it will cause the least prejudice to the servient estate. As discussed elsewhere, petitioners failed to sufficiently demonstrate that the proposed right of way shall be at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. 184) CAMARINES NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (CANORECO) V. COURT OF APPEALS 345 SCRA 85 FACTS: On May 18, 1989, Conrad L. Leviste filed with the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte, a complaint for collection of a sum of money and foreclosure of mortgage against Philippine Smelter Corporation (PSC). For failure to file an answer to the complaint, the trial court declared PSC in default and allowed plaintiff Leviste to present evidence ex-parte. On November 23, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff. When the decision became final and executory, the trial court issued a writ of execution and respondent sheriff Eduardo R. Moreno levied upon two (2) parcels of land issued by the Registrar of Deeds in the name of PSC. On April 24, 1990, the parcels of land were sold at public auction in favor of Vines Realty Corporation. On April 25, 1990, the Clerk of Court, as ex-officio Provincial Sheriff, issued a Certificate of Sale which Judge Luis D. Dictado, in his capacity as executive judge, approved. On June 23, 1992, Vines Realty moved for the issuance of a writ of possession over said property. On June 25, 1992, the trial court granted the motion. On August 7, 1992, copy of the writ of possession was served on petitioner as owner of the power lines standing on certain portions of the subject property. Later, on August 12, 1992, Vines Realty filed an amended motion for an order of demolition and removal of improvements on the subject land. Among the improvements for removal were the power lines and electric posts belonging to petitioner. Petitioner opposed the motion on the ground that petitioner was not a party to the case and therefore not bound by the judgment of the trial court and that it had subsisting right-of-way agreements over said property. The trial court proceeded with the hearing despite the fact that petitioner had no counsel present. Thus, only Vines Realty presented its evidence. On the same date, November 27, 1992, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of demolition. On December 7, 1992, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition with restraining order and preliminary injunction and the same was granted. On December 11, 1992, the trial court issued another order directing the National Power Corporation sub-unit in Camarines Norte to shut off the power lines . On the same day, December 11, 1992, respondent Vines Realty cut down petitioners electric posts professedly using a chainsaw and resulting in a loud blast affecting the area. Even the members of the Sangguniang Bayan at San Jose appealed to respondent Sheriff to desist from proceeding with the demolition due to a restraining order but to no avail. On January 26, 1993, the trial court issued an alias writ of demolition The sheriff, at the request of Vines Realty demolished the remaining electric posts resulting in the cutting off of power supply to various business establishments and barangays. Meantime, on January 19, 1993, the Court of Appeals, promulgated a decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. Meanwhile, in response to the publics urgent basic need, petitioner re-constructed its power lines along the provincial road leading to the Port of Osmea upon authority of DPWH. On April 23, 1993, however, petitioner received a letter dated April 10, 1993, stating that Vines Realty was the owner of the roadside and that petitioner could not construct power lines therein without its permission. Petitioner promptly replied that the power lines were constructed within the right of way of the provincial road leading to the port of Osmea as granted by the District Engineer of DPWH. Hence this petition.
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ISSUE: whether petitioner is entitled to retain possession of the power lines located in the land sold at public auction as a result of extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage HELD: The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard. A court denies a party due process if it renders its orders without giving such party an opportunity to present its evidence. This Court finds that petitioner was denied due process. Petitioner could have negated private respondents claims by showing the absence of legal or factual basis therefor if only the trial court in the exercise of justice and equity reset the hearing instead of proceeding with the trial and issuing an order of demolition on the same day. The trial court failed to appreciate the nature of electric cooperatives as public utilities. The acquisition of an easement of a right-ofway falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. Such conclusion finds support in easements of right-of-way where the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use. However, a simple right-of-way easement transmits no rights, except the easement. Vines Realty retains full ownership and it is not totally deprived of the use of the land. It can continue doing what it wants to do with the land, except those that would result in contact with the wires. The acquisition of this easement, nevertheless, is not gratis. Considering the nature and effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use. For these reasons, Vines Realty is entitled to payment of just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the money equivalent of the property. Just compensation has been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss, which the owner of the res expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. The value of the land and its character at the time it was taken by the Government are the criteria for determining just compensation. No matter how commendable petitioners purpose is, it is just and equitable that Vines Realty be compensated the fair and full equivalent for the taking of its property, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity. 185) VILLANUEVA V. VELASCO 346 SCRA 99 FACTS: Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the parcel of land in Quezon City. He bought it from Pacific Banking Corporation, the mortgagee of said property. The bank had acquired it from the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel at a public auction on March 19, 1983. When petitioner bought the parcel of land there was a small house on its southeastern portion. It occupied one meter of the two-meter wide easement of right of way the Gabriel spouses granted to the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, in a Contract of Easement of Right of Way. Unknown to petitioner, even before he bought the land, the Gabriels had constructed the aforementioned small house that encroached upon the two-meter easement. Petitioner was also unaware that private respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, had filed on May 8, 1991 for easement, damages and with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order against the spouses Gabriel. As successors-ininterest, Sebastian and Lorilla wanted to enforce the contract of easement. On May 15, 1991, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order. On August 13, 1991, it issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the Gabriels to provide the right of way and to demolish the small house encroaching on the easement. On August 15, 1991, the Gabriels filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied. Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and upheld the RTCs issuances. The decision became final and executory on July 31, 1992. On January 5, 1995, Judge Tirso Velasco of the RTC in Quezon City issued an Alias Writ of Demolition. On June 20, 1995, the sheriff tried to demolish the small house pursuant to the writ. Petitioner, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals asserting that the existence of the easement of right of way was not annotated in his title and that he was not a party to the Civil Case. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit and denied the reconsideration. ISSUE: whether the easement on the property binds petitioner HELD: The subject easement (right of way) originally was voluntarily constituted by agreement between the Gabriels and the Espinolas. But as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the easement in the instant petition is both (1) an easement by grant or a voluntary easement, and (2)
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an easement by necessity or a legal easement. A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public use or for private interest, and becomes a continuing property right. As a compulsory easement, it is inseparable from the estate to which it belongs, as provided for in said Article 617 of the Civil Code. The essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. The trial court and the Court of Appeals have declared the existence of said easement (right of way). This finding of fact of both courts below is conclusive on this Court, hence there is no need to further review, but only to re-affirm, this finding. The small house occupying one meter of the two-meter wide easement obstructs the entry of private respondents cement mixer and motor vehicle. One meter is insufficient for the needs of private respondents. It is well-settled that the needs of the dominant estate determine the width of the easement. Conformably then, petitioner ought to demolish whatever edifice obstructs the easement in view of the needs of private respondents estate. Petitioners second proposition, that he is not bound by the contract of easement because the same was not annotated in the title and that a notice of lis pendens of the complaint to enforce the easement was not recorded with the Register of Deeds, is obviously unmeritorious. As already explained, it is in the nature of legal easement that the servient estate (of petitioner) is legally bound to provide the dominant estate (of private respondents in this case) ingress from and egress to the public highway. Petitioners last argument that he was not a party to Civil Case and that he had not been given his day in court, is also without merit under Rule 39, Sec. 47, of the Revised Rules of Court. Simply stated, a decision in a case is conclusive and binding upon the parties to said case and those who are their successor in interest by title after said case has been commenced or filed in court. In this case, private respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, initiated Civil Case on May 8, 1991, against the original owners, the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel. Title in the name of petitioner was entered in the Register of Deeds on March 24, 1995, after he bought the property from the bank which had acquired it from the Gabriels. Hence, the decision in Civil Case binds petitioner. For, although not a party to the suit, he is a successor-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action in court. 186) COSTABELLA CORPORATION V. CA 193 SCRA 332 FACTS: petitioner owns the real estate properties situated at Sitio Buyong, Maribago, Lapu-Lapu City, on which it had constructed a resort and hotel. The private respondents, on the other hand, are the owners of adjoining properties. Before the petitioner began the construction of its beach hotel, the private respondents, in going to and from their respective properties and the provincial road, passed through a passageway which traversed the petitioner's property. In 1981, the petitioner closed the aforementioned passageway when it began the construction of its hotel, but nonetheless opened another route across its property through which the private respondents, as in the past, were allowed to pass. Sometime in August, 1982, when it undertook the construction of the second phase of its beach hotel, the petitioner fenced its property thus closing even the alternative passageway and preventing the private respondents from traversing any part of it. As a direct consequence of these closures, an action for injunction with damages was filed against the petitioner by the private respondents on September 2, 1982. In their complaint, the private respondents assailed the petitioner's closure of the original passageway which they (private respondents) claimed to be an "ancient road right of way" that had been existing before World War II and since then had been used by them, the community, and the general public, either as pedestrians or by means of vehicles, in going to and coming from Lapu-Lapu City and other parts of the country. The private respondents averred that by closing the alleged road right of way in question, the petitioner had deprived them access to their properties and caused them damages. In the same complainant, the private respondents likewise alleged that the petitioner had constructed a dike on the beach fronting the latter's property without the necessary permit, obstructing the passage of the residents and local fishermen, and trapping debris and flotsam on the beach. They also claimed that the debris and flotsam that had accumulated prevented them from using their properties for the purpose for which they had
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acquired them. The complaint this prayed for the trial court to order the re-opening of the original passageway across the petitioner's property as well as the destruction of the dike. In its answer, the petitioner denied the existence of an ancient road through its property and counteraverred, among others, that it and its predecessorsin-interest had permitted the temporary, intermittent, and gratuitous use of, or passage through, its property by the private respondents and others by mere tolerance and purely as an act of neighborliness. At any rate, the petitioner alleged, the private respondents were not entirely dependent on the subject passageway as they (private respondents) had another existing and adequate access to the public road through other properties. With respect to the dike it allegedly constructed, the petitioner stated that what it built was a breakwater on the foreshore land fronting its property and not a dike as claimed by the private respondents. Moreover, contrary to the private respondents' accusation, the said construction had benefitted the community especially the fishermen who used the same as mooring for their boats during low tide. The quantity of flotsam and debris which had formed on the private respondents' beach front on the other hand were but the natural and unavoidable accumulations on beaches by the action of the tides and movement of the waves of the sea. After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision on March 15, 1984 finding that the private respondents had acquired a vested right over the passageway in controversy based on its long existence and its continued use and enjoyment not only by the private respondents, but also by the community at large. The petitioner in so closing the said passageway, had accordingly violated the private respondents' vested right. The respondent Appellate Court held as without basis the trial court's finding that the private respondents had acquired a vested right over the passageway in question by virtue of prescription. The appellate court pointed out that an easement of right of way is a discontinuous one which, under Article 622 of the New Civil Code, may only be acquired by virtue of a title and not by prescription. ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of respondent appellate court is grossly erroneous not in accord with the provisions of Articles 649 650 of the Civil Code on easements and prevailing jurisprudence on the matter the and and the right of way, as is involved here, is discontinuous and as such can not be acquired by prescription. Insofar therefore as the appellate court adhered to the foregoing precepts, it stood correct. Unfortunately, after making the correct pronouncement, the respondent Appellate Court did not order the reversal of the trial court's decision and the dismissal of the complaint after holding that no easement had been validly constituted over the petitioner's property. Instead, the Appellate Court went on to commit a reversible error by considering the passageway in issue as a compulsory easement which the private respondents, as owners of the "dominant" estate, may demand from the petitioner the latter being the owner of the "servient" estate. Based on Article 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, Based on the foregoing, the owner of the dominant estate may validly claim a compulsory right of way only after he has established the existence of four requisites, to wit: (1) the (dominant) estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) after payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. Additionally, the burden of proving the existence of the foregoing pre-requisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate. Here, there is absent any showing that the private respondents had established the existence of the four requisites mandated by law. For one, they failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet from their respective properties to a public highway. On the contrary, as alleged by the petitioner in its answer to the complaint, and confirmed by the appellate court, "there is another outlet for the plaintiffs (private respondents) to the main road." Thus, the respondent Court of Appeals likewise admitted that "legally the old road could be closed." Yet, it ordered the re- opening of the old passageway on the ground that "the existing outlet (the other outlet) is inconvenient to the plaintiff." On this score, it is apparent that the Court of Appeals lost sight of the fact that the convenience of the dominant estate has never been the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. To be sure, the true standard for the grant of the legal right is "adequacy." Hence, when there is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, even if the said outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified. For to justify the imposition of an easement or right of way, "there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial necessity for it." Further, the private respondents failed to indicate in
HELD: The petition is meritorious. It is already well-established that an easement of
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their complaint or even to manifest during the trial of the case that they were willing to indemnify fully the petitioner for the right of way to be established over its property. Neither have the private respondents been able to show that the isolation of their property was not due to their personal or their predecessorsin-interest's own acts. Finally, the private respondents failed to allege, much more introduce any evidence, that the passageway they seek to be re-opened is at a point least prejudicial to the petitioner. Considering that the petitioner operates a hotel and beach resort in its property, it must undeniably maintain a strict standard of security within its premises. Otherwise, the convenience, privacy, and safety of its clients and patrons would be compromised. That indubitably will doom the petitioner's business. It is therefore of great importance that the claimed light of way over the petitioner's property be located at a point least prejudicial to its business. As also earlier indicated, there must be a real necessity therefor, and not mere convenience for the dominant estate. Hence, if there is an existing outlet, otherwise adequate, to the highway, the "dominant" estate can not demand a right of way, although the same may not be convenient. Of course, the question of when a particular passage may be said to be "adequate" depends on the circumstances of each case. The isolation of the dominant estate is also dependent on the particular need of the dominant owner, and the estate itself need not be totally landlocked. What is important to consider is whether or not a right of way is necessary to fill a reasonable need therefor by the owner But while a right of way is legally demandable, the owner of the dominant estate is not at liberty to impose one based on arbitrary choice. Under Article 650 of the Code, it shall be established upon two criteria: (1) at the point least prejudicial to the servient state; and (2) where the distance to a public highway may be the shortest. "The court," says Tolentino, "is not bound to establish what is the shortest; a longer way may be established to avoid injury to the servient tenement, such as when there are constuctions or walls which can be avoided by a roundabout way, or to secure the interest of the dominant owner, such as when the shortest distance would place the way on a dangerous decline." FACTS: Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion and private respondent Heirs of the late Aniceta Magsino Viuda de Sagun are the owners of two adjacent estates situated in Buco, Talisay, Batangas. Petitioner owns the dominant estate. Private respondents co-own the 405-square-meter servient estate which is bounded on the North by the National Highway, on the South by Tomas Encarnacion, on the East by Mamerto Magsino and on the West by Felipe de Sagun. In other words, the servient estate stands between the dominant estate and the national road. Prior to 1960, when the servient estate was not yet enclosed with a concrete fence, persons going to the national highway just crossed the servient estate at no particular point. However, in 1960 when private respondents constructed a fence around the servient estate to provide access to the highway. One-half meter width of the path was taken from the servient estate and the other one-half meter portion was taken from another lot owned by Mamerto Magsino. No compensation was asked and non was given for the portions constituting the pathway. It was also about that time that petitioner started his plant nursery business on his land where he also had his abode. He would use said pathway as passage to the highway for his family and for his customers. Petitioner's plant nursery business through sheer hard work flourished and with that, it became more and more difficult for petitioner to haul the plants and garden soil to and from the nursery and the highway with the use of pushcarts. In January, 1984, petitioner was able to buy an owner-type jeep which he could use for transporting his plants. However, that jeep could not pass through the roadpath and so he approached the servient estate owners and requested that they sell to him one and one-half (1 1/2) meters of their property to be added to the existing pathway so as to allow passage for his jeepney. To his utter consternation, his request was turned down by the two widows and further attempts at negotiation proved futile. Petitioner then instituted an action seeking the issuance of a writ of easement of a right of way over an additional width of at least two (2) meters over the De Saguns' 405-square-meter parcel of land. During the trial, the attention of the lower court was called to the existence of another exit to the highway, only eighty (80) meters away from the dominant estate. On December 2, 1985, the lower court rendered judgment dismissing petitioner's complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court on January 28, 1987 and rejected petitioner's claim for an additional
187) ENCARNACION V. CA 195 SCRA 74
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easement. The Appellate Court took into consideration the presence of a dried river bed only eighty (80) meters away from the dominant estate and conjectured that petitioner might have actually driven his jeep through the river bed in order to get to the highway, and that the only reason why he wanted a wider easement through the De Sagun's estate was that it was more convenient for his business and family needs ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has sufficiently established his claim for an additional easement of right of way HELD: While there is a dried river bed less than 100 meters from the dominant tenement, that access is grossly inadequate. Generally, the right of way may be demanded: (1) when there is absolutely no access to a public highway, and (2) when, even if there is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient. In the present case, the river bed route is traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and there is no ingress nor egress from the highway. For the jeep to reach the level of the highway, it must literally jump four (4) to five (5) meters up. Moreover, during the rainy season, the river bed is impassable due to the floods. Thus, it can only be used at certain times of the year. With the inherent disadvantages of the river bed which make passage difficult, if not impossible, it is if there were no outlet at all. Where a private property has no access to a public road, it has the right of easement over adjacent servient estates as a matter of law. Article 651 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)he width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time." This is taken to mean that under the law, it is the needs of the dominant property which ultimately determine the width of the passage. And these needs may vary from time to time. When petitioner started out as a plant nursery operator, he and his family could easily make do with a few pushcarts to tow the plants to the national highway. But the business grew and with it the need for the use of modern means of conveyance or transport. Manual hauling of plants and garden soil and use of pushcarts have become extremely cumbersome and physically taxing. To force petitioner to leave his jeepney in the highway, exposed to the elements and to the risk of theft simply because it could not pass through the improvised pathway, is sheer pigheadedness on the part of the servient estate and can only be counter-productive for all the people concerned. Petitioner should not be denied a passageway wide enough to accomodate his jeepney since that is a reasonable and necessary aspect of the plant nursery business. The Court is aware that an additional one and onehalf (1 1/2) meters in the width of the pathway will reduce the servient estate . But petitioner has expressed willingness to exchange an equivalent portion of his land to compensate private respondents for their loss. Perhaps, it would be well for respondents to take the offer of petitioner seriously. But unless and until that option is considered, the law decrees that petitioner must indemnify the owners of the servient estate including Mamerto Magsino from whose adjoining lot 1/2 meter was taken to constitute the original path several years ago. 188) DIONISIO V. ORTIZ 204 SCRA 745 FACTS: The petitioners are co-owners of lots contiguous to each other situated in the Sitio of Kangkong, District of Balintawak, Quezon City. The private respondents are also co-owners of lots which are adjacent to the lots owned by the petitioners. Lot 272-B was later subdivided into two lots where Lot 272-A was assigned to Chua Lee and Chua Bun Tong pursuant to a memorandum agreement executed by and between them. They are also owners of another lot at the upper portion of Lot 272-B . By virtue of an agreement entered intobetween the owners of the contiguous lots and the members of the Quezon City Industrial Estates Association (QCIEA), a right of way was granted over Howmart Road which is a private road traversing the contiguous lots owned by the petitioners, among others, in favor of the QCIEA members. In return for its use, QCIEA paid compensation to the petitioners for this right of way. The private respondents are bona fide members of the QCIEA. In order to have access to Howmart Road, there is a gate in private respondents' 914 sq. m. lot fronting Howmart Road and another gate in Lot 272-A. As a result of the subdivision of Lot 272, the private respondents opened a new gate in Lot 272-B also fronting Howmart Road which is now the gate in question. On October 5, 1989, under the instructions of Maxima Dionisio, certain persons commenced the digging of holes in a parallel line and afterwards put up steel posts in front of the newly constructed gate of private respondents amidst the latter's
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protestations.The petitioners claim that the surreptitiously constructed gate opened directly into the house of Maxima Dionisio, exposing them to air and noise pollution arising from the respondents' delivery trucks and service vehicles. On November 7, 1989, the private respondents instituted a civil action for damages against the petitioners. The complaint sought the immediate issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the petitioner to remove the barricade erected by them in front of the iron gate. The same was granted. Fifteen days later, the petitioners removed the barricade in front of the gate of the private respondents. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that the issue has already become moot and academic since the petitioners have already complied with the Order of the lower court. ISSUE: whether or not the private respondents have an easement of right of way over Howmart Road HELD: The private respondents' claim that they have every right to use Howmart Road as passageway to EDSA by reason of the fact that public respondents are bonafide members of the QCIEA which has a standing oral contract of easement of right of way with the petitioners. The contract is still subsisting even after its alleged expiration in December, 1988 as evidenced by the two (2) letters signed by Maxima Dionisio and Atty. In such a case, it is alleged that the petitioners did not have the right to put the barricade in question in front of the private respondents' gate and stop them from using said gate as passageway to Howmart Road. There is no question that a right of way was granted in favor of the private respondents over Howmart Road but the records disclose that such right of way expired in December, 1988. The continued use of the easement enjoyed by QCIEAincluding the private respondents is by the mere tolerance of the owners pending the renegotiation of the terms and conditions of said right of way. This is precisely shown by the two letters to the QCIEA requesting for an increase in compensation for the use of Howmart Road. Absent an agreement of the parties as to the consideration, among others, no contract of easement of right of way has been validly entered into by the petitioners and QCIEA. Thus, the private respondents' claim of an easement of right of way over Howmart Road has no legal or factual basis. Not having any right, the private respondents are not entitled to the injunctive relief granted by the lower court. The Court has held in several cases that in order to be entitled to an injunctive writ, one must show an unquestionable right over the premises and that such right has been violated. In the case at bar, the private respondents have not shown that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injuction. The records show that there are two (2) gates through which the private respondents may pass to have direct access to EDSA: (1) the northern gate which opens directly to EDSA; and (2) the southern gate along Howmart Road. The records also disclose that the petitioners and the other lot owners previously prohibited and prevented members of QCIEA from opening new gates. The claim that they were forced to open a new gate by reason of the subdivision of Lot 272 where a wall was constructed between these 2 lots is untenable. The private respondents can not assert a right of way when by their own or voluntary act, they themselves have caused the isolation of their property from the access road. The fact that the barricade constructed by the petitioners was already removed upon the issuance of the questioned preliminary injunction does not make the petition moot and academic as ruled by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals has the power to recallor lift the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction so issued if it finds that the party is not so entitled. But as earlier found, the private respondents are not entitled to the injunctive relief considering that they have no clear right over Howmart Road. 189) ROMAN CATHOLIC vs. CA 198 SCRA 300 FACTS: Private respondents as plaintiffs, filed a complaint for nullification of deed of donation, rescission of contract and reconveyance of real property with damages against petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, Cavite, together with the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, before the Regional Trial Court. Private respondents alleged that on August 23, 1930, spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta, now both deceased, executed a deed of donation in favor of therein defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a certain parcel of land, Lot No. 626located at Kawit, Cavite. Said lot consists of an area of 964 square meters. The deed of donation
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allegedly provides that the donee shall not dispose or sell the property within a period of one hundred years from the execution of the deed of donation, otherwise such would render ipso facto null and void the deed of donation and the property would revert back to the estate of the donors. It is further alleged that on or about June 30, 1980, and while still within the prohibitive period to dispose of the property, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, executed a deed of absolute sale of the property n in favor of petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao for P114,000. 00. A Transfer Certificate of Title was issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite on November 15, 1980 in the name of said petitioner spouses. ISSUE: Whether or not the cause of action had already prescribed. HELD: No. Article 764 of the Civil Code provides that "The donation shall be revoked at the instance of the donor, when the donee fails to comply with any of the conditions which the former imposed upon the latter," and that "this action shall prescribe after four years from the non-compliance with the condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and may be exercised against the donee's heirs. Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action for the revocation of a donation must be brought within four years from the noncompliance of the conditions of the donation, the same is not applicable in the case at bar. The deed of donation involved herein expressly provides for automatic reversion of the property donated in case of violation of the condition therein, hence a judicial declaration revoking the same is not necessary. When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the property donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, we are of the opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing for automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of the rescission sought. Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act. 190) REPUBLIC v. DAVID REY GUZMAN 326 SCRA 90 FACTS: David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of Simeon Guzman, a naturalized American citizen, and Helen Meyers Guzman, an American citizen. In 1968 Simeon died. He left to his sole heirs Helen and David an estate consisting of several parcels of land located in Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Thereafter, Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman dividing and adjudicating to themselves all the property. The document of extrajudicial settlement was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds. The the parcels of land were accordingly registered in the name of Helen Meyers Guzman and David Rey Guzman in undivided equal shares. Later, Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed assigning, transferring and conveying to David her undivided 1/2 interest. Since the document appeared not to have been registered, Helen executed another document, a Deed of Quitclaim, confirming the earlier deed of quitclaim as well as modifying the document to encompass all her other property in the Philippines. A signed letter was sent to the Office of the Solicitor General together with documents showing that David's ownership of the 1/2 of the estate of Simeon Guzman was defective. On the basis thereof, the Government filed a Petition for Escheat praying that 1/2 of David's interest in the subject parcels of land be forfeited in its favor. David prayed that said petition be dismissed. The trial court dismissed the petition holding that the two deeds of quitclaim executed by Helen had no legal force and effect and that the ownership of the properties remained with her. The Government appealed. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. ISSUE : Whether or not David, being an American citizen could validly acquire 1/2 interest in each of the subject parcels of land by way of the two deeds of quitclaim as they are in reality donations inter vivos. RULING: Yes. There are three (3) essential elements of a donation: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of
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the donor; (b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi. When applied to a donation of an immovable property, the law further requires that the donation be made in a public document and that there should be an acceptance thereof made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document. In cases where the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, it is mandated that the donor should be notified thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in both instruments. Not all the elements of a donation of an immovable property are present in the instant case. The transfer of the property by virtue of the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Helen resulted in the reduction of her patrimony as donor and the consequent increase in the patrimony of David as donee. However, Helen's intention to perform an act of liberality in favor of David was not sufficiently established. However, the inexistence of a donation does not render the repudiation made by Helen in favor of David valid. There is no valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already accepted her share of the inheritance when she and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement. By virtue of such extrajudicial settlement the parcels of land were registered in their name in undivided equal share and for eleven (11) years they possessed the lands in the concept of owner. Nevertheless, the nullity of the repudiation does not ipso facto operate to convert the parcels of land into res nullius to be escheated in favor of the Government. The repudiation being of no effect whatsoever the parcels of land should revert to their private owner, Helen, who, although being an American citizen, is qualified by hereditary succession to own the property subject of the litigation. 191) GESTOPA VS. COURT OF APPEALS 342 SCRA 105 Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the owners of six parcels of unregistered land. They executed three deeds of donation mortis causa, in favor of the Private Respondent Mercedes. All deeds contained the reservation of the rights of the donors (1) to amend, cancel or revoke the donation during their lifetime, and (2) to sell, mortgage, or encumber the properties donated during the donors' lifetime, if deemed necessary. Later, Diego Danlag, with the consent of his wife, executed a deed of donation inter vivos covering the aforementioned parcels of land plus two other parcels, again in favor of private respondent. This deed of donation contained two conditions, first, that the Danlag spouses shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the land during their lifetime, and second, that the donee can not sell or dispose of the land during the lifetime of the spouses, without their prior consent and approval. Mercedes caused the transfer of the parcels' tax declaration to her name and paid the taxes thereon. However, spouses Danlag later sold parcels 3 and 4 to herein petitioners, spouses Gestopa. They also executed a deed of revocation recovering the 6 parcels of land subject of the deed of donation inter vivos. Consequently, private respondent filed with the RTC a petition for quieting of title over the above parcels of land against the Gestopas and the Danlags. She alleged that she was an illegitimate daughter of Diego Danlag; that she lived and rendered incalculable beneficial services to Diego and his mother, Maura Danlag, when the latter was still alive. In recognition of the services she rendered, Diego executed a Deed of Donation conveying to her the six parcels of land. She accepted the donation in the same instrument, openly and publicly exercised rights of ownership over the donated properties, and caused the transfer of the tax declarations to her name. However, through machination, intimidation and undue influence, Diego persuaded the husband of Mercedes, Eulalio Pilapil, to buy two of the six parcels covered by the deed of donation. Said donation inter vivos was coupled with conditions and, according to Mercedes, since its perfection, she had complied with all of them; that she had not been guilty of any act of ingratitude; and that respondent Diego had no legal basis in revoking the subject donation and then in selling the two parcels of land to the Gestopas. However, petitioners averred that the deed of donation dated January 16, 1973 was null and void because it was obtained by the private respondent through machination and undue influence. RTC ruled that the both the donations mortis causa and inter vivos as revoked, and therefore have no legal effect. The trial court also declared the spouses Danlag as the absolute owners of the disputed lands. However, CA reversed the decision of the RTC upon appeal. ISSUES: Whether or not the donation in this case is inter vivos or mortis causa to determine whether the donor intended to transfer the ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed. Whether or not the revocation is valid HELD:
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On the first issue, the court held that the donation was inter vivos and that the donor intended to transfer the ownership of the properties. First, Diego Danlag donated the properties in consideration of love and affection for the donee.. Second, the reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor intended to transfer the naked ownership over the properties. As correctly posed by the Court of Appeals, what was the need for such reservation if the donor and his spouse remained the owners of the properties? Third, the donor reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in accordance with his standing in society, indicating that the donor intended to part with the six parcels of land. Lastly, the donee accepted the donation. A limitation on the right to sell during the donors life implied that ownership had passed to the donees and donation was already effective during the donors lifetime. No. A valid donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable, except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the charges imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. The donor-spouses did not invoke any of these reasons in the deed of revocation. 192) NOCEDA vs. COURT OF APPEALS 313 SCRA 504 FACTS: On June 1, 1981, plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo, the daughter, grandson, and widow, respectively, of the late Celestino Arbizo, extrajudicially settled a parcel of land, Lot 1121, located at Bitaog, San Isidro, Cabangan, Zambales, which was said to have an area of 66,530 square meters. Directos share was 11,426 square meters, Noceda got 13,294 square meters, and the remaining 41,810 square meters went to Maria Arbizo. On the same date, Directo donated 625 square meters of her share to Noceda, who is also her nephew. However, on August 17, 1981, another extrajudicial settlement-partition of Lot 1121 was executed by plaintiff Directo, Noceda, and Maria Arbizo. Three fifths of the said land went to Maria Arbizo while Directo and Noceda got only onefifth each. In said extrajudicial settlement-partition as well as in the Tax Declaration 16-0032 over Lot 1121 in the name of the late Celestino Arbizo, the said parcel of land was said to have an area of only 29,845 square meters. Noceda later constructed his house on the land donated to him by Directo. Directo, on the other hand, fenced the portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement, excluding the donated portion, and constructed thereon three huts. However said fence was later removed by Noceda, occupied the three huts and fenced the entire land of Directo without her consent. Directo demanded that Noceda vacate her land, but the latter refused. Thus, Directo filed the a complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership and rescission/annulment of donation. During the trial, the lower court ordered that a relocation survey of Lot 1121 be conducted. The engineer found that the area of Lot 1121 stated in the extrajudicial settlement-partition was smaller than the actual area of said lot which is 127,298 square meters. He further subdivided Lot 1121, excluding the portions occupied by third persons, known as Lot 8, the salvage zone and the road lot, on the basis of the actual occupancy of Lot 1121 by the heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo and the extrajudicial settlement-partition. The portion denominated as Lot A, with an area of 12,957 square meters was the share of defendant Noceda; Lot C, with the same area as that of Lot A, was the share of plaintiff Directo, a portion of which was donated to defendant Noceda; and Lot B, with an area of 38,872 square meters, went to Maria Arbizo. The trial court declared valid the extrajudicial partition and further held that the deed of donation revoked. It further ordered the defendant to vacate and reconvey that donated portion to the plaintiff, and to remove the house built inside the donated portion at the his expense or pay a monthly rental of P300.00. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. ISSUES: Whether or not said lot should be partitioned in accordance with the extra-judicial settlement Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in revoking the deed of donation HELD: The Supreme Court sees no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the respondent Court as follows: The discrepancies between the extrajudicial settlements executed by plaintiff Directo, defendant Noceda and Maria Arbizo on June 1, 1981 and August 17, 1981 only meant that the latter was intended to supersede the former. The signature of defendant Noceda in the extrajudicial settlement of August 17, 1981 would show his conformity to the new apportionment of Lot 1121 among the heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo. The fact that defendant Noceda occupied the portion allotted to him in the extrajudicial settlement, as well as the donated
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portion of the share of plaintiff Directo, presupposes his knowledge of the extent of boundaries of the portion of Lot 1121 allotted to him. Moreover, the statement in the extrajudicial settlement of August 17, 1981 with respect to the area of Lot 1121, which was 29,845 square meters, is not conclusive because it was found out, after the relocation survey was conducted on Lot 1121, that the parties therein occupied an area larger than what they were supposed to possess per the extrajudicial settlement- partition of August 17, 1981. Although in the extrajudicial settlement dated August 17, 1981 the heirs of Celestino Arbizo partitioned only a 29,845 square meter lot to conform with the area declared under tax declaration 16-0032 yet the heirs were each actually occupying a bigger portion the total area of which exceeded 29,845 square meters. This was confirmed by Geodetic Engineer Quejada in his report. The survey conducted on Lot 1121 was only a confirmation of the actual areas being occupied by the heirs taking into account the percentage proportion adjudicated to each heir on the basis of their August 17, 1981 extrajudicial settlement. As to the second issue, the court holds proper the judgment of respondent CA. Article 769 of the New Civil Code states that: The action granted to the donor by reason of ingratitude cannot be renounced in advance. This action prescribes within one year to be counted from the time the donor had knowledge of the fact and it was possible for him to bring the action. As expressly stated, the donor must file the action to revoke his donation within one year from the time he had knowledge of the ingratitude of the donee. Also, it must be shown that it was possible for the donor to institute the said action within the same period. The concurrence of these two requisites must be shown by defendant Noceda in order to bar the present action. Defendant Noceda failed to do so. He reckoned the one year prescriptive period from the occurrence of the usurpation of the property of plaintiff Directo in the first week of September, 1985, and not from the time the latter had the knowledge of the usurpation. Moreover, defendant Noceda failed to prove that at the time plaintiff Directo acquired knowledge of his usurpation, it was possible for plaintiff Directo to institute an action for revocation of her donation.The action to revoke by reason of ingratitude prescribes within one (1) year to be counted from the time (a) the donor had knowledge of the fact; (b) provided that it was possible for him to bring the action. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show proof of the concurrence of these two conditions in order that the one (1) year period for bringing the action be considered to have already prescribed. No competent proof was adduced by petitioner to prove his allegation. In Civil Cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance of evidence. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, supported by substantial evidence on record are final and conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial court; for it is not the function of this Court to re-examine all over again the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties unless the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are not supported by the evidence on record or the judgment is based on the misapprehension of facts. The jurisdiction of this court is thus limited to reviewing errors of law unless there is a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion. We find no such showing in this case. 193) ELOY IMPERIAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS 316 SCRA 393 FACTS: Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a parcel of land also known as Lot 45 of the Cadastral Survey of Albay, which he later sold for P1.00 to his acknowledged natural son, petitioner herein, who then acquired title over the land and proceeded to subdivide it into several lots. Petitioner and private respondents admit that despite the contracts designation as one of Absolute Sale, it was in fact a donation. Two years after the donation, Leoncio filed a complaint for annulment of the said deed, on the ground that he was deceived by petitioner into signing the said document. The dispute, however, was resolved through a compromise agreement, which provides that: (1) Leoncio recognized the legality and validity of the rights of petitioner to the land donated; and (2) petitioner agreed to sell a designated 1,000-square meter portion of the donated land, and to deposit the proceeds thereof in a bank, for the convenient disposal of Leoncio. In case of Leoncios death, it was also agreed that the balance of the deposit will be withdrawn by petitioner to defray burial costs. In the meantime, Leoncio died, leaving only two heirs, herein petitioner, and an adopted son, Victor Imperial. Victor substituted for Leoncio in the case, and moved for execution of judgment, which
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was granted by the court. Fifteen years thereafter, Victor died single and without issue, survived only by his natural father, Ricardo Villalon, who was a lessee of a portion of the disputed land. Four years hence, Ricardo died, leaving as his only heirs his two children, Cesar and Teresa Villalon. Five years thereafter, Cesar and Teresa filed a complaint for annulment of the donation. Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, by virtue of the compromise judgment, which was granted by the trial court. The Court of Appeals however, reversed the trial courts order and remanded the case for further proceedings. Consequently, Cesar and Teresa filed an amended complaint in the same case, for Annulment of Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession, seeking the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale affecting the above property, on grounds of fraud, deceit and inofficiousness. In the amended complaint, it was alleged that petitioner caused Leoncio to execute the donation by taking undue advantage of the latters physical weakness and mental unfitness, and that the conveyance of said property in favor of petitioner impaired the legitime of Victor Imperial, their natural brother and predecessor-in-interest. RTC held that it is a donation, and is hereby reduced proportionately insofar as it affected the legitime of the late Victor Imperial, which share is inherited by the plaintiffs herein, to the extent that plaintiffs are ordered to be given by defendant a portion of 10,940 square meters thereof. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. ISSUES: Whether or not the private respondents had a right to question the donation and; Whether or not the donation was inofficious and should be reduced. HELD: The court held yes. Article 772 of the Civil Code provides that: Only those who at the time of the donors death have a right to the legitime and their heirs and successors in interest may ask for the reduction of inofficious donations. As argued by petitioner, when Leoncio died, it was only Victor who was entitled to question the donation. However, instead of filing an action to contest the donation, Victor asked to be substituted as plaintiff and even moved for execution of the compromise judgment therein. No renunciation of legitime may be presumed from the foregoing acts. It must be remembered that at the time of the substitution, the judgment approving the compromise agreement has already been rendered. Victor merely participated in the execution of the compromise judgment. He was not a party to the compromise agreement. More importantly, our law on succession does not countenance tacit repudiation of inheritance. Rather, it requires an express act on the part of the heir. Thus, under Article 1051 of Civil Code: The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or authentic instrument, or by petition presented to the court having jurisdiction over the testamentary or intestate proceedings. Thus, when Victor substituted Leoncio upon the latters death, his act of moving for execution of the compromise judgment cannot be considered an act of renunciation of his legitime. He was, therefore, not precluded or estopped from subsequently seeking the reduction of the donation, under Article 772. Nor are Victors heirs, upon his death, precluded from doing so, as their right to do so is expressly recognized under Article 772, and also in Article 1053: If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the inheritance, his right shall be transmitted to his heirs. As to the second issue, the court also rules in the affirmative. The donation is inofficious because Leoncio had no other property at the time of his death, the RTC computed the legitime of Victor based on the area of the donated property. Hence, in its dispositive portion, it awarded a portion of the property to private respondents as Victors legitime. This was upheld by the Court of Appeals. Our rules of succession require that before any conclusion as to the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the following steps must be taken: (1) the net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all the payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; (2) the value of all donations subject to collation would be added to it. Having ascertained this action as one for reduction of an inofficious donation, we cannot sustain the holding of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the applicable prescriptive period is thirty years, under Article 1141 of the Civil Code. The sense of both courts that this case is a real action over an immovable allots undue credence to private respondents description of their complaint, as one for Annulment of Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession of Property, which suggests the action to be, in part, a real action enforced by those with claim of title over the disputed land. Unfortunately for private respondents, a claim for legitime does not amount to a claim of title. The rationale for this is that the donation is a real alienation which conveys
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ownership upon its acceptance, hence, any increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee. What, then, is the prescriptive period for an action for reduction of an inofficious donation? The Civil Code specifies the following instances of reduction or revocation of donations: (1) four years, in cases of subsequent birth, appearance, recognition or adoption of a child; (2) four years, for noncompliance with conditions of the donation; and (3) at any time during the lifetime of the donor and his relatives entitled to support, for failure of the donor to reserve property for his or their support. Interestingly, donations as in the instant case, the reduction of which hinges upon the allegation of impairment of legitime, are not controlled by a particular prescriptive period, for which reason we must resort to the ordinary rules of prescription. Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by law must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs. From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? The case of Mateo vs. Lagua, 29 SCRA 864, which involved the reduction for inofficiousness of a donation propter nuptias, recognized that the cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of the donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it is only then that the net estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes may be determined. It took private respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio to initiate this case. The action, therefore, has long prescribed. 194) EDUARTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS 253 SCRA 391 FACTS: Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in San Cristobal, San Pablo City, with an area of 12,199 square meters. He later executed a deed of donation inter vivos, ceding onehalf portion thereof to his niece Helen S. Doria. Later, another deed identically entitled was purportedly executed by Calapine ceding unto Helen S. Doria the whole of the parcel of land. Doria then donated a portion of the parcel of land to the Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc., on the basis of which said transfer certificate of title was cancelled and TCT No. T-24444 was issued in its name covering 157 square meters and TCT No. T24445, in the name of Helen S. Doria covering the remaining portion of 12,042 square meters. Doria then sold, transferred and conveyed unto the spouses Romulo and Sally Eduarte the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-24445, save the portion of 700 square meters on which her house was erected. Claiming that his signature to the deed of donation was a forgery and that, she was unworthy of his liberality, Calapine brought suit against Doria, the Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc. and the spouses Eduarte and asked to revoke the donation made in favor of Doria to declare null and to void the deeds of donation and sale that she had executed in favor of the Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc. and the spouses. The trial court granted held in favor of Calapine. Spouses Eduarte appealed, which as dismissed. ISSUE: Whether or not the deeds of donation should be revoked. HELD: Anent the revocation of the first deed of donation, petitioners submit that paragraph (1) of Article 765 of the Civil Code does not apply in this case because the acts of ingratitude referred to therein pertain to offenses committed by the donee against the person or property of the donor. Petitioners argue that as the offense imputed to herein donee Helen Doria - falsification of a public document - is neither a crime against the person nor property of the donor but is a crime against public interest under the Revised Penal Code, the same is not a ground for revocation. In support of this contention, petitioners cite the following portions found in Tolentinos Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code: Offense against Donor - x x x. The crimes against the person of the donor would include not only homicide and physical injuries, but also illegal detention, threats and coercion; and those against honor include offenses against chastity and those against the property, include robbery, theft, usurpation, swindling, arson, damages, etc. (5 Manresa 175-176). This assertion, however, deserves scant consideration. The full text of the very same commentary cited by petitioners belies their claim that falsification of the deed of donation is not an act of ingratitude, to wit: Offense Against Donor. All crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for revocation. There is no doubt, therefore, that the
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donee who commits adultery with the wife of the donor, gives cause for revocation by reason of ingratitude. The crimes against the person of the donor would include not only homicide and physical injuries, but also illegal detention, threats, and coercion; those against honor include offenses against chastity; and those against the property, include robbery, theft, usurpation, swindling, arson, damages, etc. [Manresa 175-176]. (Italics supplied). Obviously, the first sentence was deleted by petitioners because it totally controverts their contention. As noted in the aforecited opinion all crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for revocation. Petitioners attempt to categorize the offenses according to their classification under the Revised Penal Code is therefore unwarranted considering that illegal detention, threats and coercion are considered as crimes against the person of the donor despite the fact that they are classified as crimes against personal liberty and security under the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners also impute grave error to respondent Court of Appeals in finding that the second deed of donation dated July 26, 1984 was falsified. Petitioners deplore the fact that more credence was given to the testimony of the NBI handwriting expert who found Pedro Calapines signature in the second deed of donation to be a forgery despite the existence of controverting testimony by PC-INP Crime Laboratory (PCCL) Chief Document Examiner which petitioners adduced as evidence on their part. We are not persuaded. Respondent Court of Appeals and the trial court cannot be faulted for giving more weight and credence to the testimony of the NBI handwriting expert considering that the examination of the said witness proved to be complete, thorough and scientific. 195) CITY OF ANGELES vs. CA G.R. No. 97882. August 28, 1996 FACTS: In an Amended Deed of Donation, private respondent donated to the City of Angeles 51 parcels of land. Said deed provides that the properties donated shall be devoted and utilized solely for the site of the Angeles City Sports Center. Petitioners then started the construction of a drug rehabilitation center on a portion of the donated land. Upon learning thereof, private respondent protested such action for being violative of the terms and conditions of the amended deed and prejudicial to its interest and to those of its clients and residents. Private respondent also offered another site for the rehabilitation center. However, petitioners ignored the protest, maintaining that the construction was not violative of the terms of the donation. The alternative site was rejected because, according to petitioners, the site was too isolated and had no electric and water facilities. Consequently, private respondent filed a complaint, alleging breach of the conditions imposed in the amended deed of donation and seeking the revocation of the same. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin the petitioners from further proceeding with the construction of the center. The RTC further ordered that the defendants perpetually cease and desist from constructing a Drug Rehabilitation Center or any other building or improvement on the Donated Land. It also declared the amended Deed of Donation revoked and rescinded and ordered defendants to peacefully vacate and return the Donated Land to plaintiff. Petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal. However, while the appeal was pending, petitioners inaugurated the Drug Rehabilitation Center. The respondent Court rendered the assailed Decision affirming the ruling of the trial court. Subsequently, the petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied for lack of merit. ISSUE: Whether a donor of open spaces in a residential subdivision can validly impose conditions on the said donation; whether the city government as donee can build and operate a drug rehabilitation center on the donated land intended for open space; and whether the said donation may be validly rescinded by the donor. HELD: The general law on donations does not prohibit the imposition of conditions on a donation so long as the conditions are not illegal or impossible. In regard to donations of open spaces, P.D. 1216 itself requires among other things that the recreational areas to be donated be based, as aforementioned, on a percentage (3.5%, 7%, or 9%) of the total area of the subdivision depending on whether the subdivision is low-, medium-, or highdensity. It further declares that such open space devoted to parks, playgrounds and recreational areas are non-alienable public land and nonbuildable. However, there is no prohibition in either P.D. 957 or P.D. 1216 against imposing conditions on such donation. We hold that any condition may be imposed in the donation, so long as the same is
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not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. The contention of petitioners that the donation should be unconditional because it is mandatory has no basis in law. P.D. 1216 does not provide that the donation of the open space for parks and playgrounds should be unconditional. To rule that it should be so is tantamount to unlawfully expanding the provisions of the decree. Private respondents contention that the construction of said drug rehabilitation center is violative of the Amended Deed of Donation. Therefore, under Article 764 of the New Civil Code and stipulation no. 8 of the amended deed, private respondent is empowered to revoke the donation when the donee has failed to comply with any of the conditions imposed in the deed. We disagree. Article 1412 of the Civil Code which provides that: If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed: (1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the others undertaking; comes into play here. Both petitioners and private respondents are in violation of P.D. 957 as amended, for donating and accepting a donation of open space less than that required by law, and for agreeing to build and operate a sports complex on the non-buildable open space so donated; and petitioners, for constructing a drug rehabilitation center on the same non-buildable area. Inasmuch as the construction and operation of the drug rehabilitation center has been established to be contrary to law, the said center should be removed or demolished. After due consideration of the circumstances, we believe that the fairest and most equitable solution is to have the City of Angeles, donee of the subject open space and, ostensibly, the main beneficiary of the construction and operation of the proposed drug rehabilitation center, undertake the demolition and removal of said center, and if feasible, recover the cost thereof from the city officials concerned. Property:Action for Cancellation of Title 196) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LAND, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF IRENE BULLUNGAN, represented by her husband DOMINGO PAGGAO and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ISABELA, respondents. G.R. No. 104296, March 29, 1996 MENDOZA, J.: Note: This is a petition for review of the decision of the CA reversing the decision of the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela declaring Free Patent No. V79740 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-8817 in the name of Irene Bullungan null and void so far as the portion of Lot No. 1, Psu-150801 involved in this case is concerned. FACTS: Irene Bullungan (now deceased) applied for a FREE PATENT covering lots situated in Angadanan, Isabela. The lots included a portion of lot (Lot No. 1, Psu-150801 between Lot No. 763 and Lot No. 764 ) which Vicente Carabbacan claimed. (Vicente Carabbacan in this case is the present possessor and cultivator of the land in dispute). BASIS FOR HER APPLICATION OF FEE PATENT (w/c is false): In her application however, Irene Bullungan stated that the land applied for by her was not claimed or occupied by any other person and that it was public land which had been continuously occupied and cultivated by her since 1925. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS DECISION: Upon certification of Assistant Public Land that Irene Bullungan had been in actual, continuous open, notorious, exclusive and adverse possession of the land since 1925, the Director of Lands approved Bullungan's application for free patent and an OCT was issued in her name. STEPS TAKEN BY THE OPPOSITOR THE PROTEST: Alleging that a portion of Lot No. 1, Psu-150801 (lot in dispute) covered by the free patent issued to Irene Bullungan overlapped the lot between Lot No. 763 and Lot No. 764, which he was occupying, Vicente Carrabacan, (the actual possessor of the land) filed a protest to the Director of Lands on 1961. The latter only ordered an investigation on 1982. ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE (1st) & CANCELLATION OF FEE PATENT: Vicente Carabbacan also brought an action for the reconveyance of the portion of the lot in dispute and the cancellation of free patent against Irene Bullungan before the CFI on 1961. DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION BY THE COURT: but this was dismissed by the court without prejudice.
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The heirs of Irene Bullungan in turn sought to RECOVER POSSESSION OF THE LAND in an action filed in CFI on 1972. 2nd ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE: On the other hand, refusing to give up his claim, Vicente Carabbacan filed again a case for reconveyance on 1972. The cases were thereafter tried jointly. CFIs DECISION: The court rendered a decision, DISMISSING the complaint of Vicente Carabbacan and ordering him to vacate the land and upheld the ownership of Irene Bullungan. Carabbacan, who had been in possession of the land in question, was finally ousted on December 10, 1981. RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION: Meanwhile, in the investigation conducted by the Director of lands, it was found out that Vicente Carabbacan had been in actual cultivation of the land since 1947, having acquired the same from Tomas Tarayao. The land investigator stated that due to a big flood which occurred in December 1947, the Cagayan River changed its course by moving north-east, resulting in the emergence of a piece of land, which is the subject of this dispute. Carrabacan took possession of the land and cultivated it. He was in the continuous, peaceful, open and adverse occupation and cultivation of the land from December 1947 until 1981 when he was ejected by virtue of the decision in Civil Case. THE PETITIONER: In view of the investigation, the Republic, as represented by the Solicitor General, filed a COMPLAINT FOR THE CANCELLATION OF FREE PATENT issued in favor of Irene Bullungan on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation. RTC: Complaint for Cancellation of Free Patent was GRANTED, thus the court ruled in favor of petitioner, Republic and justified the reversion of the land in question as an assertion of a governmental right. It declared that the Free Patent was null and void insofar as the portion of Lot subject to dispute. BASIS: The lower court found that Irene Bullungan made misrepresentations by claiming in her application for a free patent that she was in possession of the disputed portion of Lot No. 1, Psu150801, when in fact Vicente Carabbacan was occupying and cultivating the land. CA: GRANTED the appeal of private respondent, thus REVERSING the lower courts decision. BASIS: on the ground that, after the lapse of one year from the date of issuance of the patent, the State could no longer bring an action for reversion. The appellate court held that the certificate of title issued in the name of Irene Bullungan became incontrovertible and indefeasible upon the lapse of one year from the issuance of the free patent. PETITIONER-REPUBLIC ARGUMENT: The Republic controverts the ruling of the Court of Appeals. It contends that the doctrine of indefeasibility of Torrens Titles does not bar the filing of an action for cancellation of title and reversion of land even if more than one year has elapsed from the issuance of the free patent in case of fraud in obtaining patents. ISSUE: Whether or not doctrine of indefeasibility of Torrens Title bars the filing of an action for cancellation of title, on the ground of fraud, if more than one year has elapsed from the issuance of the free patent. HELD: NO. The SC agreed as to the argument of petitioner-Republic. To begin with, there is no question that Free Patent No. 79740 and Original Certificate of Title P8817 were obtained through fraud. The trial court found that Irene Bullungan falsely stated in her application for a free patent that Lot No. 1, Psu150801 was not claimed or occupied by any other person. The trial court found that a portion of the lot in question had been in the possession and cultivation of Vicente Carabbacan since December 1947. Indeed private respondents admit that before Irene Bullungan filed her application for a free patent, she had filed a complaint for forcible entry against Vicente Carrabacan. The complaint, which was filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of Angadanan, Isabela, was dismissed precisely because the court found that Carabbacan had been in possession of the land long before it was sold to Irene Bullungan by Leonida Tarayao. The Court of Appeals did not disturb the trial court's finding in this case that Irene Bullungan committed fraud and misrepresentation. Its decision rests solely on the ground that after the lapse of one year from the date of issuance of a free patent an action for the cancellation of patent and title on ground of fraud and misrepresentation can no longer be maintained. GENERAL RULE: It is settled that once a patent is registered under Act No. 496 (now P.D. No. 1529) and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and
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becomes private property over which the Director of Lands will no longer have either control or jurisdiction. The Torrens Title issued on the basis of a free patent or homestead patent becomes as indefeasible as one which was judicially secured upon the expiration of one year from date of issuance of patent as provided in P.D. No. 1529. EXCEPTION: However, as held in Director of Lands v. De Luna, even after the lapse of one year, the State may still bring an action for the reversion to the public domain of lands which have been fraudulently granted to private individuals. This has been the consistent ruling of this Court. FRAUD & MISREPRESENTATION: In the case at bar, the failure of Irene Bullungan to disclose that Vicente Carrabacan was in possession of the portion of land in dispute constitutes fraud and misrepresentation and is a ground for annulling her title. Where public land is acquired by an applicant through fraud and misrepresentation the State may institute reversion proceedings even after the lapse of the one-year period. Public policy demands that one who obtains title to a public land through fraud should not be allowed to benefit therefrom. Vicente Carabbacan had been in possession of the land even. before Irene Bullungan bought the possessory rights to the land. It was therefore a misrepresentation for her to state in her application for a free patent that she had been in possession of the lot in question when the fact is that Carabbacan had been there ahead of her. Pataueg, Nick Jr. y Alversado
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CASES IN SUCCESSION 197) MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee, vs.MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO NEBREDA, DOMINADOR NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO NEBREDA, Jr., defendantsappellants. G.R. No. L-4963, January 29, 1953 BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: Note: This is an ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF THE OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION of five (5) parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four children named Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and Faustino, surnamed Nebreda, who are all of minor age, before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. FACTS: Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff-lawful wife claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment. DEED OF SEPARATION: Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property that may be left by her husband upon his death. (waiver of future inheritance) RTC: Trial court rendered decision ruling in favor of the lawful wife and ordering the defendants (common-law-wife & kids) to restore to the plaintiff the ownership and possession of the lands in dispute. DEFENDANTs ARGUMENT: In its appeal to the SC, defendant claimed that plaintiff has already relinquished her rights when she expressly renounced any future property she was to inherit from her husband. It was also claimed that the provisions of the New Civil Code, giving status and rights to natural children, should be given a retroactive effect so that the illegitimate children of Del Rosario will be entitled to the inheritance. ISSUE 1: May Maria Unson validly renounce her future inheritance? HELD 1: NO. There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was merely a common-law wife of the late Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate children, her now codefendants. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson. Applying Article 657 of the old Civil Code , Court ruled that the property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. The right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into on February 21, 1931 cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced. The decision appealed from is affirmed. ISSUE 2: Whether or not the illegitimate children of del Rosario are entitled to the inheritance. HELD 2: NO. Defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights, however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950, they are given the status and rights of
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natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code). There is no merit in this claim PRINCIPLE OF NON-IMPAIRMENT OF VESTED RIGHT AS AN EXCEPTION: Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, BUT this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin." As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute. VOID DONATION: As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in state, in a gesture of pity or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in question to the minor children for the reason that they were acquired while the deceased was living with their mother and Maria Uson wanted to assuage somewhat the wrong she has done to them, this much can be said; apart from the fact that this claim is disputed, we are of the opinion that said assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a DONATION OF REAL PROPERTY, inasmuch as it involves no material consideration, and in order that it may be valid it shall be made in a public document and must be accepted either in the same document or in a separate one (Article 633, old Civil Code). Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been followed, it results that the alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect. Pataueg, Nick Jr. y Alversado Succession Ownership as a Mode of Transferring
198) ROMULO A. CORONEL, ALARICO A. CORONEL, ANNETTE A. CORONEL, ANNABELLE C. GONZALES (for herself and on behalf of Florida C. Tupper, as attorney-in-fact), CIELITO A. CORONEL, FLORAIDA A. ALMONTE, and CATALINA BALAIS MABANAG, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, CONCEPCION D. ALCARAZ, and RAMONA PATRICIA ALCARAZ, assisted by GLORIA F. NOEL as attorney-in-fact, respondents. G.R. No. 103577. October 7, 1996 MELO, J.: Note: The petition before us has its roots in a COMPLAINT FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE to compel herein petitioners (except the last named, Catalina Balais Mabanag) to consummate the sale of a parcel of land with its improvements located along Roosevelt Avenue in Quezon City entered into by the parties sometime in January 1985 for the price of P1,240,000.00. FACTS: 1st CONTRACT OF ABSOLUTE SALE: Peitioner, Romulo Coronel, et. al. being the sons and daughters of the decedent Constancio P. Coronel (hereinafter referred to as Coronels) executed a document entitled Receipt of Down Payment in favor of plaintiff Ramona Patricia Alcaraz. The document provided that for the total amount of P1,240,000.00, wherein a downpayment of P50,000.00 was initially paid, the Coronels bind themselves to effect the transfer in their names the certificate of title of the house and lot they inherited from their father. They also promised that upon the transfer of the TCT in their names, they will immediately execute the deed of absolute sale of the property, and the other party Ramona will pay the balance of P1,190,000.00. (Note: The agreement could not have been a contract to sell because the sellers herein made no express reservation of ownership or title to the subject parcel of land. Furthermore, the circumstance which prevented the parties from entering into an absolute contract of sale pertained to the sellers themselves (the certificate of title was
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not in their names) and not the full payment of the purchase price. Under the established facts and circumstances of the case, the Court may safely presume that, had the certificate of title been in the names of petitioners-sellers at that time, there would have been no reason why an absolute contract of sale could not have been executed and consummated right there and then). 2nd CONTRACT OF ABSOLUTE SALE/DOUBLE SALE: The Coronels however, upon having the property registered in their name, sold it to Catalina Mabanag for a higher price (P1,580,000.00), and cancelled and rescinded the contract with Ramona by depositing the amount of down payment to a bank, in trust for Ramona. THE COMPLAINT FILED: A complaint for specific performance was filed by the Concepcions against the Coronels. RTC: The RTC ruled in favor of respondents Conceptions. Judgment for specific performance is hereby rendered ordering defendant-Coronels to execute in favor of plaintiffs a deed of absolute sale covering that parcel of land CA: Affirmed the same. The petitioners claim that there could been no perfected contract on January 19, 1985 because they were then not yet the absolute owners of the inherited property. ISSUE 1: Whether or not petitioners were already the owners of the inherited property when they executed the contract with respondents. HELD 1: Yes. Article 774 of the Civil Code defines Succession as a mode of transferring ownership as follows: Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law. Petitioners-sellers in the case at bar being the sons and daughters of the decedent Constancio P. Coronel are compulsory heirs who were called to succession by operation of law. Thus, at the point their father drew his last breath, petitioners stepped into his shoes insofar as the subject property is concerned, such that any rights or obligations pertaining thereto became binding and enforceable upon them. It is expressly provided that rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. MOOTNESS OF THE ISSUE: Be it also noted that petitioners claim that succession may not be declared unless the creditors have been paid is rendered moot by the fact that they were able to effect the transfer of the title to the property from the decedents name to their names. ESTOPPEL: Aside from this, petitioners are precluded from raising their supposed lack of capacity to enter into an agreement at that time and they cannot be allowed to now take a posture contrary to that which they took when they entered into the agreement with private respondent Ramona P. Alcaraz. The Civil Code expressly states that: Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. Having represented themselves as the true owners of the subject property at the time of sale, petitioners CANNOT claim now that they were not yet the absolute owners thereof at that time. The sale of the subject parcel of land between petitioners and Ramona P. Alcaraz, is deemed perfected. PEITIONERs ARGUMENT: Petitioners also contend that although there was in fact a perfected contract of sale between them and Ramona P. Alcaraz, the latter breached her reciprocal obligation when she rendered impossible the consummation thereof by going to the United States of America, without leaving her address, telephone number, and Special Power of Attorney for which reason, so petitioners conclude, they were correct in unilaterally rescinding the contract of sale. ISSUE 2: Whether or not peitioner-seller is correct in unilaterraly rescinding the contract of sale between the latter and Ramona Alcaraz, the buyer. HELD 2: We do not agree with petitioners that there was a valid rescission of the contract of sale in the instant case. We note that these supposed grounds for petitioners' rescission, are mere allegations found only in their responsive pleadings, which by express provision of the rules, are deemed controverted even if no reply is filed by the plaintiffs (Sec. 11, Rule 6, Revised Rules of Court). The records are absolutely bereft of any supporting evidence to substantiate
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petitioners' allegations. We have stressed time and again that allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence (Ng Cho Cio vs. Ng Diong, 110 Phil. 882 [1961]; Recaro vs. Embisan, 2 SCRA 598 [1961]. Mere allegation is not an evidence (Lagasca vs. De Vera, 79 Phil. 376 [1947]). Even assuming arguendo that Ramona P. Alcaraz was in the United States of America on February 6, 1985, we cannot justify petitioner-sellers' act of unilaterally and extradicially rescinding the contract of sale, there being no express stipulation authorizing the sellers to extarjudicially rescind the contract of sale. (cf. Dignos vs. CA, 158 SCRA 375 [1988]; Taguba vs. Vda. de Leon, 132 SCRA 722 [1984]) Moreover, petitioners are estopped from raising the alleged absence of Ramona P. Alcaraz because although the evidence on record shows that the sale was in the name of Ramona P. Alcaraz as the buyer, the sellers had been dealing with Concepcion D. Alcaraz, Ramona's mother, who had acted for and in behalf of her daughter, if not also in her own behalf. Indeed, the down payment was made by Concepcion D. Alcaraz with her own personal check for and in behalf of Ramona P. Alcaraz. There is no evidence showing that petitioners ever questioned Concepcion's authority to represent Ramona P. Alcaraz when they accepted her personal check. Neither did they raise any objection as regards payment being effected by a third person. Accordingly, as far as petitioners are concerned, the physical absence of Ramona P. Alcaraz is not a ground to rescind the contract of sale. ISSUE 3: Between the Alcaraz and Catalina Mabanag, who between them is the owner of the property subject to dispute? HELD 3: It belongs to Alcaraz. Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property. Should if be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in Registry of Property. Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith. The record of the case shows that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 25, 1985 as proof of the second contract of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City giving rise to the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of Catalina B. Mabanag on June 5, 1985. Thus, the second paragraph of Article 1544 shall apply. The above-cited provision on double sale presumes title or ownership to pass to the first buyer, the exceptions being: (a) when the second buyer, in good faith, registers the sale ahead of the first buyer, and (b) should there be no inscription by either of the two buyers, when the second buyer, in good faith, acquires possession of the property ahead of the first buyer. Unless, the second buyer satisfies these requirements, title or ownership will not transfer to him to the prejudice of the first buyer. In his commentaries on the Civil Code, an accepted authority on the subject, now a distinguished member of the Court, Justice Jose C. Vitug, explains: The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer's rights except when the second buyer first registers in good faith the second sale (Olivares vs. Gonzales, 159 SCRA 33). Conversely, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register, since knowledge taints his registration with bad faith (see also Astorga vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 58530, 26 December 1984). In Cruz vs. Cabana (G.R. No. 56232, 22 June 1984, 129 SCRA 656), it has held that it is essential, to merit the protection of Art. 1544, second paragraph, that the second realty buyer must act in good faith in registering his deed of sale (citing Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 99, Crisostomo vs. CA, G.R. No. 95843, 02 September 1992). (J. Vitug Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 Edition, p. 604). In a case of double sale, what finds relevance and materiality is not whether or not the second buyer was a buyer in good faith but whether or not said second buyer registers such second sale in good faith, that is, without knowledge of any defect in the title of the property sold. As clearly borne out by the evidence in this
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case, petitioner Mabanag could not have in good faith, registered the sale entered into on February 18, 1985 because as early as February 22, 1985, a notice of lis pendens had been annotated on the transfer certificate of title in the names of petitioners, whereas petitioner Mabanag registered the said sale sometime in April, 1985. At the time of registration, therefore, petitioner Mabanag knew that the same property had already been previously sold to private respondents, or, at least, she was charged with knowledge that a previous buyer is claiming title to the same property. Petitioner Mabanag cannot close her eyes to the defect in petitioners' title to the property at the time of the registration of the property. If a vendee in a double sale registers that sale after he has acquired knowledge that there was a previous sale of the same property to a third party or that another person claims said property in a pervious sale, the registration will constitute a registration in bad faith and will not confer upon him any right. (Salvoro vs. Tanega, 87 SCRA 349 [1978]; citing Palarca vs. Director of Land, 43 Phil. 146; Cagaoan vs. Cagaoan, 43 Phil. 554; Fernandez vs. Mercader, 43 Phil. 581.) Thus, the sale of the subject parcel of land between petitioners and Ramona P. Alcaraz, perfected on February 6, 1985, prior to that between petitioners and Catalina B. Mabanag on February 18, 1985, was correctly upheld by both the courts below. Pataueg, Nick Jr. y Alversado 199) ISIDORO M. MERCADO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEON C. VIARDO and PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NUEVA ECIJA, defendants-appellants. G.R. No. L-14127, August 21, 1962 FACTS: The spouses Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte were defendants in a case where a writ of execution was issued and levied upon rights and interests the spouses have over a disputed land. By virtue of the writ of execution as above mentioned, the sheriff sold at public acution of the lots subject of controversy. This was was bought by Leon Viardo being the highest bidder.. The spouses failed to redeem the property within the statutory period of one year from the date of sale. A final bill of sale was issued to buyer Viardo, and a co-owner's copy of the certificate of title was likewise issued to him. On 28 December 1945 the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Land Registration Case acting upon a verified petition of Leon C. Viardo, ordered the Registrar of Deeds in and for Nueva Ecija, to cancel Original Certificate of Title and to issue another in lieu thereof in the name of and in the proportion as follows: LEONOR BELMONTE share; FELISA BELMONTE, share; PILAR BELMONTE, /8 share; LEON C. VIARDO, /8 share; and INES DE GUZMAN, share Spouses Driz and Belmonte filed an action in the CFI against the buyer-Viardo for reconveyance of the said land. CFI (now RTC): The court dismissed, including the counterclaim of Viardo. Defendant is the legal owner of the land in question and the right of redemption of the plaintiff of said land had already elapsed. Not satisfied with the judgment dismissing his counter-claim, the defendant Leon C. Viardo appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA: Pending appeal with the Court of Appeals, Bartolome Driz died. His children of age substituted him in the appeal. The judgment of the CA, granting the prayer of Viardo, eventually became final and executory. The CFI issued a writ of execution. Prior to the CA ruling, Belmonte sold her interest in the land to Isidoro Mercado. Mercado then filed a third-party complaint against Belmonte. Viardo then sued Belmonte. CFI ruled that the heirs of Bartolome could not be held liable personally for judgment rendered against them. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of Bartolome Driz can be held personally liable for the judgment rendered against their father? HELD: NO. The only ground of appellant for this contention is that the present owners of these lots are the children of the spouses Pilar Belmonte and Bartolome Driz, the plaintiffs in civil case No. 161, and that, upon the death of Bartolome Driz during the pendency of the appeal in civil case No. 161, these children were substituted as parties. This assignment of error is without merit.
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The substitution of parties was made obviously because the children of Bartolome Driz are his legal heirs and therefore could properly represent and protect whatever interest he had in the case on appeal. But such a substitution did not and cannot have the effect of making these substituted parties personally liable for whatever judgment might be rendered on the appeal against their deceased father. Article 774 of the Civil Code provides: Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law. Moreover, it appears from the evidence that Bartolome Driz was only a formal party to civil case No. 161, the real party in interest being his wife Pilar Belmonte. The subject matter in litigation was Pilar Belmonte's interest in the parcel of land described in original certificate of title No. 3484, which appears to be paraphernal property. The trial court, therefore, correctly ruled that the remedy of Leon C. Viardo, the creditor was to proceed against the estate of Bartolome Driz. Judgment MODIFIED. Pataueg, Nick Jr. y Alversado 200) Intestate of the late AGUSTIN MONTILLA, SR.; PEDRO LITONJUA, a movant-appellant, vs. AGUSTIN B. MONTILLA, JR., administratorappellee; CLAUDIO MONTILLA, oppositor-appellee. G.R. No. L-4170, January 31, 1952 PARAS, C.J.: FACTS: In a Civil Case rendered by the CFI of Negros Occidental, Pedro L. Litonjua obtained a judgment against Claudio Montilla for the payment of the sum of P4,000 with legal interest, plus costs amounting to P39.00 In due time, a writ of execution was issued, but no property of Claudio Montilla was found which could be levied upon. In order to satisfy the said judgment Pedro L. Litonjua filed in special Proceeding of the CFI of Negros Occidental, Intestate Estate of Agustin Montilla, Sr., deceased, a motion praying that the interest, property and participation of Claudio Montilla, one of the heirs of Agustin Montilla, Sr., in the latter's intestate estate be sold and out of the proceed the judgment debt of Claudio Montilla in favor of Pedro L. Litonjua be paid. This motion was opposed by Claudio Montilla and by Agustin Montilla, Jr., administrator of the intestate estate CFI : issued an order denying the motion. Hence, this appeal to the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not Litonjua, as a creditor, may go after the interest of Montilla Jr. in the intestate Estate of Agustin Montilla Sr. HELD: NO. The creditors of the heirs of a deceased person is entitled to collect his claim out of the property which pertains by inheritance to said heirs, ONLY AFTER all debts of the testate or intestate succession have been paid and when the net assets that are divisible among the heirs known. The debts of the deceased must first be paid before his heirs can inherit. A person who is not a creditor of a deceased, testate or intestate, has NO RIGHT to intervene either in the proceedings brought in connection with the estate or in the settlement of the succession. An execution cannot legally be levied upon the property of an intestate succession to pay the debts of the widow and heirs of the deceased, until the credits held against the latter at the time of his death shall have been paid can the remaining property that pertains to the said debtors heirs can be attached. Pataueg, Nick Jr. y Alversado 201) SOCORRO LEDESMA and ANA QUITCO LEDESMA, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. CONCHITA MCLACHLIN, ET AL., defendantsappellants. G.R. No. L-44837, November 23, 1938 VILLA-REAL, J.: Note: This case is an appeal taken by the defendants Conchita McLachlin, Lorenzo Quitco, Jr., Sabina Quitco, Rafael Quitco and Marcela Quitco, from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros, making the heirs of their deceased father solidary liable as to the
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indebtedness incurred by their deceased father instituted by the plaintiff-creditor in the Intestate Estate of Eusebio, their grandfather and not in the Intestate Estate of Quitco, their father. FACTS: Defendants in this case are the heirs of their deceased debtor-father Lorenzo M. Quitco. COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP: In the year 1916, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma lived maritally with Lorenzo M. Quitco, while the latter was still single, of which relation, lasting until the year 1921, was born a daughter who is the other plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma. In 1921, it seems hat the relation between Socorro Ledesma and Lorenzo M. Quitco came to an end. Lorenzo M. Quitco executed a deed acknowledging the plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma as his natural daughter. THE DEBT: On January 21, 1922, Lorenzo issued in favor of the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma a promissory note for or on behalf of his indebtedness amounting to 2,000 w/c is to be paid on installment. THE MARRIAGE TO ANOTHER: Subsequently, Lorenzo married Conchita McLachlin. They had four (4) children, who are the other defendants. DEATH: On March 9, 1930, Lorenzo M. Quitco died predeceasing his father, but, still later, that is, on December 15, 1932, his father Eusebio Quitco also died, and as the latter left real and personal properties upon his death. Administration proceedings of said properties were instituted in this court, the said case being known as the "Intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco," civil case No. 6153 of this court. In order to satisfy the remaining value of the PN, Socorro went after the Intestate Estate of Eusebio Quitco, to claim the indebtedness of his debtordeceased son Lorenzo. ISSUE 1: Whether or not the action for the recovery of the sum of P1,500, representing the last installment of the promisorry note has already prescribed. HELD 1: YES. According to the promissory note executed by the deceased Lorenzo M. Quitco, on January 21, 1922, the last installment of P1,500 should be paid two years from the date of the execution of said promissory note, that is, on January 21, 1924. The complaint in the present case was filed on June 26, 1934, that is, more than ten years after the expiration of the said period. The fact that the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma filed her claim, on August 26, 1933, with the committee on claims and appraisal appointed in the intestate of Eusebio Quitco, does not suspend the running of the prescriptive period of the judicial action for the recovery of said debt, because the claim for the unpaid balance of the amount of the promissory note should not have been presented in the intestate of Eusebio Quitco, the said deceased not being the one who executed the same, but in the intestate of Lorenzo M. Quitco, which should have been instituted by the said Socorro Ledesma as provided in section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure, authorizing a creditor to institute said case through the appointment of an administrator for the purpose of collecting his credit. More than ten years having thus elapsed from the expiration of the period for the payment of said debt of P1,500, the action for its recovery has prescribed under section 43, No. 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure. ISSUE 2: Whether or not the properties inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by representation are subject to the payment of debts and obligations of their deceased father, who died without leaving any property HELD 2: NO. The claim for the unpaid balance of the amount of the PN should have been presented in the intestate of Lorenzo and not in the intestate of Eusebio, the formers father. RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION: While it is true that under the provisions of articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a children presents his father or mother who died before him in the properties of his grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation does not make the said child answerable for the obligations contracted by his deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is received with the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the properties received from their predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in
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representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their said father from whom they did NOT inherit anything. The appealed judgment is reversed, and the DEFENDANTS ARE ABSOLVED from the complaint, with the costs to the appellees Pataueg, Nick Jr. y Alversado 202) DKC HOLDINGS CORPORATION,petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VICTOR U. BARTOLOME and REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR METRO MANILA, DISTRICT III, respondents. G.R. No. 118248, April 5, 2000 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. Note: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal Decision of the CA entitled "DKC Holdings Corporation vs. Victor U. Bartolome, et al.", affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC of Valenzuela, which dismissed Civil Case No. 3337-V90 and ordered petitioner to pay P30,000.00 as attorney's fees. FACTS: THE LOT IN DISPUTE: The subject of the controversy is a 14,021 square meter parcel of land located in Malinta, Valenzuela, Metro Manila which was originally owned by private respondent Victor U. Bartolome's deceased mother, Encarnacion Bartolome, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. B37615 of the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District III. This lot was in front of one of the textile plants of petitioner and, as such, was seen by the latter as a potential warehouse site. THE CONTRACT: DKC entered into a CONTRACT OF LEASE W/ OPTION TO BUY with Encarnacion Bartolome (plaintiff deceased mother). DKC was given the option to a.) lease or b.) lease with purchase the subject land w/c must be exercised within a period of two (2) years counted from the signing of the contract. 1st REFUSAL TO ACCEPT PAYMENT: DKC regularly paid its dues to Encarnacion until her death. DKC coursed its payment to Victor Bartolome, the sole heir of Encarnacion. Victor refused to accept these payments. THE TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP OVER THE LOT: Meanwhile, Victor executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication over all the properties of Encarnacion, including the subject lot. Accordingly, respondent Register of Deeds cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-37615 and issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-14249 in the name of Victor Bartolome. 2nd REFUSAL TO ACCEPT PAYMENT: On March 14, 1990, petitioner served upon Victor, via registered mail, notice that it was exercising its option to lease the property, tendering the amount of P15,000.00 as rent for the month of March. Again, Victor refused to accept the tendered rental fee and to surrender possession of the property to petitioner. DKC deposited its payments at China Bank. DKC filed a COMPLAINT FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND DAMAGES against Victor, praying among others the surrender and delivery of possession of the subject land in accordance with the Contract terms. RTC: dismissed the complaint filed by DKC, thus ruling in favor of Victor Bartolome. CA: affirmed in toto. BASIS OF RTC & CA: Victor is not a party thereto to the contract entered into between his deceased mother and plaintiff. ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy entered into by the late Encarnacion Bartolome with petitioner was terminated upon her death or whether it binds her sole heir, Victor, even after her demise. Stated differently, whether or not Contract of Lease with Option to Buy entered into by the late Encarnacion Bartolome with petitioner is transmissible to his sole heir. HELD 1: YES. General Rule: Heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-ininterest except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of law. (Art 1311 CC) In the present case, there is neither contractual stipulation nor legal provision making the rights and obligations under the Contract intransmissible. More importantly, the nature of the rights and obligations therein are, by their nature, transmissible. The nature of intransmissible rights as explained by Arturo Tolentino, an eminent civilist, is as follows:
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Among contracts which are intransmissible are those which are purely personal, either by provision of law, such as in cases of partnerships and agency, or by the very nature of the obligations arising therefrom, such as those requiring special personal qualifications of the obligor. It may also be stated that contracts for the payment of money debts are not transmitted to the heirs of a party, but constitute a charge against his estate. Thus, where the client in a contract for professional services of a lawyer died, leaving minor heirs, and the lawyer, instead of presenting his claim for professional services under the contract to the probate court, substituted the minors as parties for his client, it was held that the contract could not be enforced against the minors; the lawyer was limited to a recovery on the basis of quantum meruit. In American jurisprudence, "(W)here acts stipulated in a contract require the exercise of special knowledge, genius, skill, taste, ability, experience, judgment, discretion, integrity, or other personal qualification of one or both parties, the agreement is of a personal nature, and terminates on the death of the party who is required to render such service." TEST:It has also been held that a good measure for determining whether a contract terminates upon the death of one of the parties is whether it is of such a character that it may be performed by the promissor's personal representative. Contracts to perform personal acts which cannot be as well performed by others are discharged by the death of the promissor. Conversely, where the service or act is of such a character that it may as well be performed by another, or where the contract, by its terms, shows that performance by others was contemplated, death does not terminate the contract or excuse nonperformance. NO PERSONAL ACT: In the case at bar, there is no personal act required from the late Encarnacion Bartolome. Rather, the obligation of Encarnacion in the contract to deliver possession of the subject property to petitioner upon the exercise by the latter of its option to lease the same may very well be performed by her heir Victor. ISSUE 2: Whether or not Victor Bartolome as sole heir is not a party to the contract executed by his deceased mother. The property subject of the contract was inherited by Victor. HELD 2: Victor cannot insist that he is not a party to the Contract because of the clear provision of Art 1311. Being an heir of Encarnacion, there is PRIVITY OF INTEREST between him and his deceases mother. He only succeeds to what rights his mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as against him. The subject matter of the Contract is lease, which is a property right. Hence, the death of a party DOES NOT excuse non-performance of a contract which involves a property right, and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the deceased. Non-performance is NOT excused by the death of the party when the other party has a property interest in the subject matter of the contract. Pataueg, Nick Jr. y Alversado 203) ARUEGO VS CA 254 SCRA 711 FACTS: Jose Aruego Sr. had an amorous relationship with Luz Fabian, out of which was born Antonia and Evelyn Aruego. A Complaint for Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of Successional Rights was filed by the two children, represented by their mother, Fabian. Said complaint prayed for the following: a. That Antonia and Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children of the deceased Jose; b. That petitioners be compelled to recognize and acknowledge them as the compulsory heirs of the deceased Jose; c. That their share and participation in the estate of Jose be determined and ordered delivered to them. The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged open and continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children. RTC declared Antonia as illegitimate daughter of Jose but not as to Evelyn. It ordered petitioners to recognize Antonia and to deliver to the latter her share in the estate of Jose. Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration alleging loss of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court by virtue of the advent of the Family Code. Said motion was denied. CA affirmed. ISSUE:
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WON the application of the Family Code will prejudice or impair any vested right of Antonia such that it should not be given retroactive effect. HELD: YES. The action brought by Antonia for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was filed before the advent of the Family Code must be governed by Art 285 of the Civil Code and NOT by Art 175, par.2 of the Family Code. The Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect as its application will prejudice the vested right of Antonia. The right was vested to her by the fact that she filed her action under the Civil Code. The action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative father was already deceased, since Antonia was then still a minor when it was filed an exception to the general rule under Art 285 of the Civil Code. 204) LORENZO VS POSADAS 64 PHIL 353 Doctrine: A transmission by inheritance is taxable at the time of the predecessor's death, notwithstanding the postponement of the actual possession or enjoyment of the estate by the beneficiary, and the tax measured by the value of the property transmitted at that time regardless of its appreciation or depreciation. Facts: It appears that on May 27, 1922, one Thomas Hanley died in Zamboanga, Zamboanga, leaving a will and considerable amount of real and personal properties. On june 14, 1922, proceedings for the probate of his will and the settlement and distribution of his estate were begun in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. The will was admitted to probate. The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga considered it proper for the best interests of the estate to appoint a trustee to administer the real properties which, under the will, were to pass to Matthew Hanley ten years after the two executors named in the will, was, on March 8, 1924, appointed trustee. Moore took his oath of office and gave bond on March 10, 1924. He acted as trustee until February 29, 1932, when he resigned and the plaintiff herein was appointed in his stead. During the incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee, Defendant Collector of Internal Revenue assessed against the estate of Hanley an inheritance tax together with the penalties for delinquency in payment. Lorenzo paid the amount under protest. CIR overruled the said protest and refused to refund the same. CFI held that the real property of Thomas Hanley, passed to his instituted heir, Matthew Hanley, from the moment of death of the former, and that from that time, the latter became the owner thereof. Issue: Whether an heir succeeds immediately to all of the property of his or her deceased ancestor? Held: It is well-settled that inheritance taxation is governed by the statute in force at the time of the death of the decedent. The taxpayer can not foresee and ought not to be required to guess the outcome of pending measures. The SC hold that a transmission by inheritance is taxable at the time of the predecessor's death, notwithstanding the postponement of the actual possession or enjoyment of the estate by the beneficiary, and the tax measured by the value of the property transmitted at that time regardless of its appreciation or depreciation. The mere fact that the estate of the deceased was placed in trust did not remove it from the operation of our inheritance tax laws or exempt it from the payment of the inheritance tax. The corresponding inheritance tax should have been paid to escape the penalties of the laws. This is so for the reason already stated that the delivery of the estate to the trustee was in esse delivery of the same estate to the cestui que trust, the beneficiary in this case. A trustee is but an instrument or agent for the cestui que trust. When Moore accepted the trust and took possesson of the trust estate he thereby admitted that the estate belonged not to him but to his cestui que trust.
205) CASTAEDA vs. ALEMANY 3 PHIL 426 Issue: Whether or not the will of Doa Juana Moreno was duly signed by herself in the presence of three witnesses, who signed it as witnesses in the presence of the testratrix and of each other. It was therefore executed in conformity with law. Held: There is nothing in the language of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure which supports the claim of the appellants that the will must be written by the testator himself or by someone else in his presence and under his express direction. That section requires (1) that the will be in writing and (2)
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either that the testator sign it himself or, if he does sign it, that it be signed by some one in his presence and by his express direction. Who does the mechanical work of writing the will is a matter of indifference. The fact, therefore, that in this case the will was typewritten in the office of the lawyer for the testratrix is of no consequence. The English text of section 618 is very plain. The mistakes in translation found in the first Spanish edition of the code have been corrected in the second. (2) To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one valid. It could not in this case make any decision upon the question whether the testratrix had the power to appoint by will a guardian for the property of her children by her first husband, or whether the person so appointed was or was not a suitable person to discharge such trust. All such questions must be decided in some other proceeding. The grounds on which a will may be disallowed are stated the section 634. Unless one of those grounds appears the will must be allowed. They all have to do with the personal condition of the testator at the time of its execution and the formalities connected therewith. It follows that neither this court nor the court below has any jurisdiction in his proceedings to pass upon the questions raised by the appellants by the assignment of error relating to the appointment of a guardian for the children of the deceased. It is claimed by the appellants that there was no testimony in the court below to show that the will executed by the deceased was the same will presented to the court and concerning which this hearing was had. It is true that the evidence does not show that the document in court was presented to the witnesses and identified by them, as should have been done. But we think that we are justified in saying that it was assumed by all the parties during the trial in the court below that the will about which the witnesses were testifying was the document then in court. No suggestion of any kind was then made by the counsel for the appellants that it was not the same instrument. In the last question put to the witness Gonzales the phrase "this will" is used by the counsel for the appellants. In their argument in that court, found on page 15 of the record, they treat the testimony of the witnesses as referring to the will probate they were then opposing. The judgment of the court below is affirmed, eliminating therefrom, however, the clause "el cual debera ejecutarse fiel y exactamente en todas sus partes." The costs of this instance will be charged against the appellants. 206) IN RE WILL OF RIOSA 39 PHIL 23 FACTS: Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917. He left a will made in the month of January, 1908, in which he disposed of an estate valued at more than P35,000. The will was duly executed in accordance with the law then in force, namely, section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will was not executed in accordance with Act No. 2645, amendatory of said section 618, prescribing certain additional formalities for the signing and attestation of wills, in force on and after July 1, 1916. In other words, the will was in writing, signed by the testator, and attested and subscribed by three credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other; but was not signed by the testator and the witnesses on the left margin of each and every page, nor did the attestation state these facts. The new law, therefore, went into effect after the making of the will and before the death of the testator, without the testator having left a will that conforms to the new requirements. Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The attestation shall state the fact that the testator signed the will, or caused it to be signed by some other person, at his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and that they attested and subscribed it in his presence and in the presence of each other. But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided.
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Act No. 2645 has amended section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to make said section read as follows: SEC. 618. Requisites of will. No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect known by the testator and signed by him, or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each, and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet. The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other. The Court of First Instance for the province of Albay rendered its decision on December 29, 1917 disallowing the will of Jose Riosa. ISSUE: The issue which this appeal presents is whether in the Philippine Islands the law existing on the date of the execution of a will, or the law existing at the death of the testator, controls. RULING: The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that the validity of the execution of a will must be tested by the statutes in force at the time of its execution and that statutes subsequently enacted have no retrospective effect. This doctrine is believed to be supported by the weight of authority. It was the old English view; in Downs (or Downing) vs. Townsend (Ambler, 280), Lord Hardwicke is reported to have said that "the general rule as to testaments is, that the time of the testament, and not the testator's death, is regarded." It is also the modern view, including among other decisions one of the Supreme Court of Vermont from which State many of the sections of the Code if Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands relating to wills are taken. (Giddings vs. Turgeon [1886], 58 Vt., 103.) Of the numerous decisions of divergent tendencies, the opinion by the learned Justice Sharswood (Taylor vs. Mitchell [1868], 57 Pa. St., 209) is regarded to be the best considered. In this opinion is found the following: Retrospective laws generally if not universally work injustice, and ought to be so construed only when the mandate of the legislature is imperative. When a testator makes a will, formally executed according to the requirements of the law existing at the time of its execution, it would unjustly disappoint his lawful right of disposition to apply to it a rule subsequently enacted, though before his death. It is, of course, a general rule of statutory construction, as this court has said, that "all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the restrospective effect." (Montilla vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos [1913], 24 Phil., 220. See also Chew Heong vs. U.S. [1884], 112 U.S., 536; U.S. vs American Sugar Ref. Co. [1906], 202 U.S., 563.) Statute law, as found in the Civil Code, is corroborative; article 3 thereof provides that "laws shall not have a retroactive effect, unless therein otherwise prescribed." The language of Act No. 2645 gives no indication of retrospective effect. Such, likewise, has been the uniform tendency of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands on cases having special application to testamentary succession. (Abello vs. Kock de Monaterio [1904], 3 Phil., 558; Timbol vs. Manalo [1906], 6 Phil., 254; Bona vs. Briones, supra; In the Matter of the Probation of the Will of Bibiana Diquia [1918], R. G. No. 13176, 1 concerning the language of the Will. See also section 617, Code of Civil Procedure.) The strongest argument against our accepting the first two rules comes out of section 634 of the Code of Civil Procedure which, in negative terms, provides that a will shall be disallowed in either of five cases, the first being "if not executed and attested as in this Act provided." Act No. 2645 has, of course, become part and parcel of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will in question is admittedly not executed and attested as provided by the Code of Civil Procedure as amended. Nevertheless, it is proper to observe that the general principle in the law of wills inserts itself even within the provisions of said section 634. Our statute announces a positive rule for the transference of property which must be complied with as completed act at the time of the execution, so far as the act of the testator is
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concerned, as to all testaments made subsequent to the enactment of Act No. 2645, but is not effective as to testaments made antecedent to that date. To answer the question with which we began this decision, we adopt as our own the second rule, particularly as established by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The will of Jose Riosa is valid. The order of the Court of First Instance for the Province of Albay of December 29, 1917, disallowing the will of Jose Riosa, is reversed, and the record shall be returned to the lower court with direction to admit the said will to probate, without special findings as to costs. So ordered. 207) ENRIQUEZ VS ABADIA 95 SCRA 627 FACTS: On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament. He died on January 14, 1943 and left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees, filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews, who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition. During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out in longhand the subject document in Spanish which the testator spoke and understood; that he (testator) signed on the left hand margin of the front page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his writing at the last page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his last will and that the said three witnesses signed their names on the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The oppositors did not submit any evidence. The learned trial court found and declared the subject document to be a holographic will; that it was in the handwriting of the testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect in form, said trial court admitted to probate the subject document, as the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of the Civil Code allowing holographic wills should be applied. HELD: No. The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides that a person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated and signed by the testator himself and need not be witnessed. It is a fact, however, that at the time the subject document was executed in 1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted, and the law at the time imposed certain requirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each page (not folio or sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses, requirements which were not complied with in the subject document because the back pages of the first two folios of the will were not signed by any one, not even by the testator and were not numbered, and as to the three front pages, they were signed only by the testator. But Article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or statement of the weight of authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the instrument was executed. One reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. From the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under the
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due process clause of the constitution against a subsequent change in the statute adding new legal requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning, when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he should be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is that the Legislature cannot validate void wills. In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and the subject document is denied probate. 208) Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator vs. ANDRE BRIMO 50 PHIL 867 FACTS: The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it. The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code. But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed. lawphil.net As to the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which says: that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this request. The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. ISSUE: Whether or not the condition imposed by the decedent in his will is void being contrary to law. HELD: The Supreme Court held that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the Civil Code provides that Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Moreover, the said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions. Therefore, the condition, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor. The second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law. Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees.
209) BELLIS vs BELLIS 20 SCRA 358
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FACTS: Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward, George, (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry, Alexander and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin, Walter and Dorothy and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis. Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives in equal shares. 1wph1.t Subsequently, died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, and pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages. Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased. The lower court, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes. Issue: WON the national law of Amos Bellis should apply in the said partition. Held: YES. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code. Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. It is evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto. 210) Bugnao v. Ubag 14 PHIL 163 FACTS: The last will and testament of Domingo Ubag was admitted for probate. It was signed by him in the presence of three subscribing and attesting witnesses and appears upon its face to have been duly executed in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on the making of wills.
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The instrument was propounded by his widow Catalina Bugnao who is the sole beneficiary. The order admitting the will was appealed by the appellants who are brothers and sisters of the deceased and would be entitled to share in the distribution of his estate, if probate were denied, as it appears that the deceased left no heirs in the direct ascending or descending line. They contend that Ubag was not of sound mind and memory, and was physically and mentally incapable of making a will. The appellants pointed out that one of the attesting witnesses stated that the decease sat up in bed and signed his name to the will, and that after its execution food was given him by his wife; while the other testified that he was assisted into a sitting position, and was given something to eat before he signed his name. Appellants also contended that the decedent was physically incapacitated to make the will because he was then suffering from an advanced stage of tuberculosis, such that he was too weak to stand or even sit up unaided, and that he could not speak when he had asthma attacks. Of the four witnesses appellant presented who tried to prove that the attesting witnesses were not present during the signing of the will by the decedent, two of the witnesses stand to inherit from the decedent if the will were denied probate. These two witnesses, on direct cross-examination, later admitted that they were not even in the house of the decedent at the time of the execution of the will. The attesting witnesses, on the other hand, testified on the due execution and testamentary capacity of the decedent. Appellants, who are siblings of the decedent, also claimed that the will was obtained by fraud considering that they were excluded therefrom. ISSUE: Whether the evidence of the appellants is sufficient to prove that the testator lacked testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will or that he was induced by fraud in making the same HELD: That the testator was mentally capable of making the will is in our opinion fully established by the testimony of the subscribing witnesses who swore positively that, at the time of its execution, he was of sound mind and memory. It is true that their testimony discloses the fact that he was at that time extremely ill, in an advanced stage of tuberculosis complicated with severe intermittent attacks of asthma; that he was too sick to rise unaided from his bed; that he needed assistance even to rise himself to a sitting position; and that during the paroxysms of asthma to which he was subject he could not speak; but all this evidence of physical weakness in no wise establishes his mental incapacity or a lack of testamentary capacity, and indeed the evidence of the subscribing witnesses as to the aid furnished them by the testator in preparing the will, and his clear recollection of the boundaries and physical description of the various parcels of land set out therein, taken together with the fact that he was able to give to the person who wrote the will clear and explicit instructions as to his desires touching the disposition of his property, is strong evidence of his testamentary capacity. Counsel for appellant suggests that the fact that the alleged will leaves all the property of the testator to his widow, and wholly fails to make any provision for his brothers or sisters, indicates a lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence; and because of the inherent improbability that a man would make so unnatural and unreasonable a will, they contend that this fact indirectly corroborates their contention that the deceased never did in fact execute the will. But when it is considered that the deceased at the time of his death had no heirs in the ascending or descending line; that a bitter family quarrel had long separated him from his brothers and sisters, who declined to have any relations with the testator because he and his wife were adherents of the Aglipayano Church; and that this quarrel was so bitter that none of his brothers or sisters, although some of them lived in the vicinity, were present at the time of his death or attended his funeral; we think the fact that the deceased desired to leave and did leave all of his property to his widow and made no provision for his brothers and sisters, who themselves were grown men and women, by no means tends to disclose either an unsound mind or the presence of undue influence on the part of his wife, or in any wise corroborates contestants' allegation that the will never was executed. For the purposes of this decision it is not necessary for us to attempt to lay down a definition of testamentary capacity which will cover all possible cases which may present themselves, because, as will be seen from what has already been said, the testator was, at the time of making the instrument under consideration, endowed with all the elements of mental capacity set out in the following definition of testamentary capacity which has been frequently announced in courts of last resort in England and the United States; and while is some cases testamentary capacity has been held to exist in the absence of proof of some of these elements, there can be no question that, in the absence of proof of
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very exceptional circumstances, proof of the existence of all these elements in sufficient to establish the existence of testamentary capacity. Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the person who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty. The order probating the will affirmed. was opposed by Isidro Paguio, son of the deceased and several grandchildren by a former marriage, the latter being the children of a deceased daughter. Their opposition is based on the ground that the will was not executed according to the formalities and requirements of the law, and further that the testator was not in the full of enjoyment and use of his mental faculties to execute a valid will. CFI Bulacan admits the will to probate. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: DID THE TESTATOR POSSESS THE REQUIRED MENTAL SOUNDNESS TO VALIDLY EXECUTE A WILL? HELD: CFI AFFIRMED Upon this point considerable evidence was adduced at the trial. One of the attesting witnesses testified that at the time of the execution of the will the testator was in his right mind, and that although he was seriously ill, he indicated by movements of his head what his wishes were. Another of the attesting witnesses stated that he was not able to say whether decedent had the full use of his mental faculties or not, because he had been ill for some years, and that he (the witnesses) was not a physician. The other subscribing witness, Pedro Paguio, testified in the lower court as a witness for the opponents. He was unable to state whether or not the will was the wish of the testator. The only reasons he gave for his statement were the infirmity and advanced age of the testator and the fact that he was unable to speak. The witness stated that the testator signed the will, and he verified his own signature as a subscribing witness. Florentino Ramos, although not an attesting witness, stated that he was present when the will was executed and his testimony was cumulative in corroboration of the manner in which the will was executed and as to the fact that the testator signed the will. This witness also stated that he had frequently transacted matters of business for the decedent and had written letters and made inventories of his property at his request, and that immediately before and after the execution of the will he had performed offices of his character. He stated that the decedent was able to communicate his thoughts by writing. The testimony of this witness clearly indicates the presence of mental capacity on the part of the testator. Among other witnesses for the opponents were two physician, Doctor Basa and Doctor Viado. Doctor Basa testified that he had attended the testator some four or five years prior to his death and that the latter had suffered from a cerebral congestion from which the paralysis
211) JULIANA BAGTAS, plaintiffs-appellee, vs. ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL., defendants-appellants. 22 PHIL 227 FACTS: The testator,Pioquinto Paguio, for some 14 or 15 years prior to the time of his death suffered from a paralysis of the left side of his body; that a few years prior to his death his hearing became impaired and that he lost the power of speech. Owing to the paralysis of certain muscles his head fell to one side, and saliva ran from his mouth. He retained the use of his right hand, however, and was able to write fairly well. Through the medium of signs he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to other members of his family. At the time of the execution of his will, four testamentary witnesses were present: Agustin Paguio, Anacleto Paguio, and Pedro Paguio, and attorney, Seor Marco, and one Florentino Ramos.The testator, wrote out on pieces of paper notes and items relating to the disposition of his property, and these notes were in turn delivered to Seor Marco, who transcribed them and put them in form. The witnesses testify that the pieces of paper upon which the notes were written are delivered to attorney by the testator; that the attorney read them to the testator asking if they were his testamentary dispositions; that the testator assented each time with an affirmative movement of his head; that after the will as a whole had been thus written by the attorney, it was read in a loud voice in the presence of the testator and the witnesses; that Seor Marco gave the document to the testator; that the latter, after looking over it, signed it in the presence of the four subscribing witnesses; and that they in turn signed it in the presence of the testator and each other. The executrix and widow of the decedent, Juliana Bagtas, filed a petition to probate the will of Paguio.It
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resulted. The following question was propounded to Doctor Basa: Q. Referring to mental condition in which you found him the last time you attended him, do you think he was in his right mind? A. I can not say exactly whether he was in his right mind, but I noted some mental disorder, because when I spoke to him he did not answer me. Doctor Basa testified at more length, but the substance of his testimony is that the testator had suffered a paralysis and that he had noticed some mental disorder. He does not say that the testator was not in his right mind at the time of the execution of the will, nor does he give it at his opinion that he was without the necessary mental capacity to make a valid will. He did not state in what way this mental disorder had manifested itself other than that he had noticed that the testator did not reply to him on one occasion when he visited him. Doctor Viado, the other physician, have never seen the testator, but his answer was in reply to a hypothetical question as to what be the mental condition of a person who was 79 years old and who had suffered from a malady such as the testator was supposed to have had according to the testimony of Doctor Basa, whose testimony Doctor Viado had heard. He replied and discussed at some length the symptoms and consequences of the decease from which the testator had suffered; he read in support of his statements from a work by a German Physician, Dr. Herman Eichost. In answer, however, to a direct question, he stated that he would be unable to certify to the mental condition of a person who was suffering from such a disease. We do not think that the testimony of these two physicians in any way strengthens the contention of the appellants. Their testimony only confirms the fact that the testator had been for a number of years prior to his death afflicted with paralysis, in consequence of which his physician and mental strength was greatly impaired. Neither of them attempted to state what was the mental condition of the testator at the time he executed the will in question. There can be no doubt that the testator's infirmities were of a very serious character, and it is quite evident that his mind was not as active as it had been in the earlier years of his life. However, we cannot include from this that he wanting in the necessary mental capacity to dispose of his property by will. The courts have been called upon frequently to nullify wills executed under such circumstances, but the weight of the authority is in support if the principle that it is only when those seeking to overthrow the will have clearly established the charge of mental incapacity that the courts will intervene to set aside a testamentary document of this character.In this jurisdiction the presumption of law is in favor of the mental capacity of the testator and the burden is upon the contestants of the will to prove the lack of testamentary capacity. The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well established, and the testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged insane by a court of competent jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent upon the opponents to overcome this legal presumption by proper evidence. This we think they have failed to do. There are many cases and authorities which we might cite to show that the courts have repeatedly held that mere weakness of mind and body, induced by age and disease do not render a person incapable of making a will. The law does not require that a person shall continue in the full enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental powers in order to execute a valid will In the above case the will was sustained. In the case at bar we might draw the same contrast as was pictured by the court in the case just quoted. The striking change in the physical and mental vigor of the testator during the last years of his life may have led some of those who knew him in his earlier days to entertain doubts as to his mental capacity to make a will, yet we think that the statements of the witnesses to the execution of the will and statements of the conduct of the testator at that time all indicate that he unquestionably had mental capacity and that he exercised it on this occasion. At the time of the execution of the will it does not appear that his conduct was irrational in any particular. He seems to have comprehended clearly what the nature of the business was in which he was engaged. The evidence show that the writing and execution of the will occupied a period several hours and that the testator was present during all this time, taking an active part in all the proceedings. Again, the will in the case at bar is perfectly reasonable and its dispositions are those of a rational person.
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212) TRINIDAD NEYRA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ENCARNACION NEYRA, defendant-appellee 76 PHIL 333 FACTS: Severo Nayra died leaving certain properties and two children, by his first marriage, named Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, and other children by his second marriage; That after the death of Severo Neyra, the two sisters, Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, had serious misunderstandings, in connection with the properties left by their deceased father.Trinidad Neyra filed a complaint against her sister, Encarnacion Neyra, in CFI Manila, for the recovery of of a property left by their deceased father, and demanding at the same time of the rents collected on the said property by the defendant Encarnacion Neyra. CFI decided in favour of Trinidad but at the same time ordered her to pay Encarnacion the sum of P727.77, plus interests, by virtue of said counterclaims.Trinidad Neyra appealed from the said decision, to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, dismissed the appeal on a decision dated November 10, 1942, by virtue of said agreement or compromise, Atty. Lucio Javillonar, claiming to represent Encarnacion Neyra, who had died since November 4, 1942, and other relatives of hers, The heirs of the deceased filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that the alleged compromise or agreement, dated November 3, 1942, could not have been understood by Encarnacion Neyra, as she was already then at the threshold of death, and that as a matter of fact she died the following day; and that if it had been signed at all by said Encarnacion Neyra, her thumbmark appearing on said document must have been affixed thereto by Trinidad Neyra's attorney, against Encarnacion's will. Pending the appeal before CA, Encarnacion became seriously ill and was advised by her religious adviser, Fr. Garcia to reconcile with her sister. Trinidad was invited to her sisters home and they reconciled while Encarnacion was lying in bed. In the course of their conversation which they also talked about the properties left by their father and their litigations which had reached the Court of Appeals, and they agreed to have the latter dismissed, on the condition that the property involved therein should be given exclusively to Trinidad Neyra, that the latter should waive her share in the rents of said property collected by Encarnacion, and the Trinidad had no more indebtedness to Encarnacion. Attorney Panis prepared said document of compromise as well as the new will and testament, naming Trinidad Neyra and Eustaquio Mendoza beneficiaries therein, pursuant to Encarnacion's express instructions, and the two documents were prepared, in duplicate, and were ready for signature, since the morning of November 3, 1942; that in the afternoon of that day, of compromise and last will and testament to Encarnacion Neyra, slowly and in a loud voice, in the presence of Father Teodoro Garcia, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio Aldecoa, Trinidad Neyra, and others, after which he asked her if their terms were in accordance with her wishes, or if she wanted any change made in said documents; that Encarnacion Neyra did not suggest any change, and asked for the pad and the two documents, and, with the help of a son of Trinidad, placed her thumbmark at the foot of each one of the two documents, in duplicate, on her bed in the sala, in the presence of attesting witnesses, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio R. Aldecoa and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, after which said witnesses signed at the foot of the will, in the presence of Encarnacion Neyra, and of each other. The agreement was also signed by Trinidad Neyra, as party, and by Dr. M. B. Abad and Eustaquio Mendoza, a protege, as witnesses. Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz argue, that when the thumbmark of Encarnacion Neyra was affixed to the agreement in question, dated November 3, 1942, she was sleeping on her bed in the sala; and that the attesting witnesses were not present, as they were in the caida. ISSUES: 1. WHETHER ENCARNACION WAS OF SOUND MIND WHEN SHE SIGNED HER WILL AND THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT 2. WHETHER THE WITNESSES WERE PRESENT IN THE SIGNING OF THE WILL HELD: PETITION DENIED, CA AFFIRMED 1.It has been conclusively shown that Encarnacion Neyra died on November 4, 1942, due to a heart attack, at the age of 48, after an illness of about two (2) years. Presentacion Blanco, in the course of her cross-examination, frankly admitted that, in the morning and also at about 6 o'clock in he afternoon of November 3, 1942, Encarnacion Neyra talked to her that they understood each other clearly, thus showing that the testatrix was really of sound mind, at the time of signing and execution of the agreement and will in question. It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the mental faculties of persons suffering from Addison's disease, like the testatrix in this case, remain unimpaired, partly due to the fact that, on account of the sleep they enjoy, they necessarily receive the
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benefit of physical and mental rest. And that like patients suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia or diabetes, they preserve their mental faculties until the moments of their death. Judging by the authorities above cited, the logical conclusion is that Encarnacion Neyra was of sound mind and possessed the necessary testamentary and mental capacity, at the time of the execution of the agreement and will, dated November 3, 1942. 2.The contention that the attesting witnesses were not present, at the time Encarnacion Neyra thumbmarked the agreement and will in question, on her bed, in the sala of the house, as they were allegedly in the caida, is untenable. It has been fully shown that said witnesses were present, at the time of the signing and execution of the agreement and will in question, in the sala, where the testatrix was lying on her bed. The true test is not whether they actually saw each other at the time of the signing of the documents, but whether they might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so; and the attesting witnesses actually saw it all in this case. And the thumbmark placed by the testatrix on the agreement and will in question is equivalent to her signature. established by this court in Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476), to the effect that the testator is presumed to know the dialect of the locality where he resides, unless there is proof to the contrary, even he invoked in support of the probate of said document as a will, because, in the instant case, not only is it not proven that English is the language of the City of Baguio where the deceased Piraso lived and where the will was drawn, but that the record contains positive proof that said Piraso knew no other language than the Igorrote dialect, with a smattering of Ilocano; that is, he did not know the English language in which then will is written. So that even if such a presumption could have been raised in this case it would have been wholly contradicted and destroyed. Such a result based upon solidly established facts would be the same whether or not it be technically held that said will, in order to be valid, must be written in the Ilocano dialect; whether or not the Igorrote or Inibaloi dialect is a cultivated language and used as a means of communication in writing, and whether or not the testator Piraso knew the Ilocano dialect well enough to understand a will written in said dialect. The fact is, we repeat, that it is quite certain that the instrument Exhibit A was written in English which the supposed testator Piraso did not know, and this is sufficient to invalidate said will according to the clear and positive provisions of the law, and inevitably prevents its probate. 214) GERMAN JABONETA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. RICARDO GUSTILO, ET AL., defendantsappellees. 5 PHIL 541 FACTS: Macario Jaboneta executed under the following circumstances the document in question, which has been presented for probate as his will: Being in the house of Arcadio Jarandilla, in Jaro, in this province, he ordered that the document in question be written, and calling Julio Javellana, Aniceto Jalbuena, and Isabelo Jena as witnesses, executed the said document as his will. They were all together, and were in the room where Jaboneta was, and were present when he signed the document, Isabelo Jena signing afterwards as a witness, at his request, and in his presence and in the presence of the other two witnesses. Aniceto Jalbuena then signed as a witness in the presence of the testator, and in the presence of the other two persons who signed as witnesses. At that moment Isabelo Jena, being in a hurry to leave, took his hat
213) In re estate of Piraso, deceased. SIXTO ACOP, petitioner-appellant, vs. SALMING PIRASO, ET AL., opponentsappellees. 52 PHIL 660 FACTS: The proponent Acop appeals the judgment of the CFI Benguet, denying the probate of last will and testament of the deceased Piraso. The will was written in English; that Piraso knew how to speak the Ilocano dialect, although imperfectly, and could make himself understood in that dialect, and the court is of the opinion that his will should have been written in that dialect. ISSUE: WAS THE WILL VALIDLY EXECUTED? HELD: CFI AFFIRMED Section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure, strictly provides that: "No will, except as provides in the preceding section" (as to wills executed by a Spaniard or a resident of the Philippine Islands, before the present Code of Civil Procedure went into effect), "shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect known by the testator," Nor can the presumption in favor of the will
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and left the room. As he was leaving the house Julio Javellana took the pen in his hand and put himself in position to sign the will as a witness, but did not sign in the presence of Isabelo Jena; but nevertheless, after Jena had left the room the said Julio Javellana signed as a witness in the presence of the testator and of the witness Aniceto Jalbuena. The last will and testament of Macario Jaboneta, deceased, was denied probate because the lower court was of the opinion from the evidence adduced at the hearing that Julio Javellana, one of the witnesses, did not attach his signature thereto in the presence of Isabelo Jena, another of the witnesses, as required by the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.. ISSUE: EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL WITH RESPECT TO THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF WITNESSES SIGNING THE WILL IN THE PRESENCE OF EACH OTHER HELD: TRIAL COURT REVERSED We can not agree with so much of the above finding of facts as holds that the signature of Javellana was not signed in the presence of Jena, in compliance with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The fact that Jena was still in the room when he saw Javellana moving his hand and pen in the act of affixing his signature to the will, taken together with the testimony of the remaining witnesses which shows that Javellana did in fact there and then sign his name to the will, convinces us that the signature was affixed in the presence of Jena. The fact that he was in the act of leaving, and that his back was turned while a portion of the name of the witness was being written, is of no importance. He, with the other witnesses and the testator, had assembled for the purpose of executing the testament, and were together in the same room for that purpose, and at the moment when the witness Javellana signed the document he was actually and physically present and in such position with relation to Javellana that he could see everything which took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction, and without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so, therefore we are of opinion that the document was in fact signed before he finally left the room. The purpose of a statutory requirement that the witness sign in the presence of the testator is said to be that the testator may have ocular evidence of the identity of the instrument subscribed by the witness and himself, and the generally accepted tests of presence are vision and mental apprehension. (See Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, vol. 30, p. 599, and cases there cited.) In the matter of Bedell (2 Connoly (N.Y.), 328) it was held that it is sufficient if the witnesses are together for the purpose of witnessing the execution of the will, and in a position to actually see the testator write, if they choose to do so; and there are many cases which lay down the rule that the true test of vision is not whether the testator actually saw the witness sign, but whether he might have seen him sign, considering his mental and physical condition and position at the time of the subscription. (Spoonemore vs. Cables, 66 Mo., 579.) 215) EUTIQUIA AVERA, petitioner-appellee, vs. MARINO GARCIA, and JUAN RODRIGUEZ, as guardian of the minors Cesar Garcia and Jose Garcia,objectors-appellants 42 PHIL 45 FACTS: Eutiquia Avera instituted the probate of the will of one Esteban Garcia; contest was made by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, the latter in the capacity of guardian for the minors Jose Garcia and Cesar Garcia. The proponent of the will introduced one of the three attesting witnesses who testified that the will was executed with all necessary external formalities, and that the testator was at the time in full possession of disposing faculties. Upon the latter point the witness was corroborated by the person who wrote the will at the request of the testator. Two of the attesting witnesses were not introduced, nor was their absence accounted for by the proponent of the will. The attorney for the opposition introduced a single witness whose testimony tended to show in a vague and indecisive manner that at the time the will was made the testator was so debilitated as to be unable to comprehend what he was about. The trial judge found that the testator at the time of the making of the will was of sound mind and disposing memory and that the will had been properly executed. He accordingly admitted the will to probate.Hence this appeal ISSUES: 1. whether a will can be admitted to probate, where opposition is made, upon the proof of a single attesting witness, without producing or accounting for the absence of the other two; 2. whether the will in question is rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the signature of the testator and of the three attesting witnesses are written on the right margin of each page of the will instead of the left margin.
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HELD: lower court affirmed 1. While it is undoubtedly true that an uncontested will bay be proved by the testimony of only one of the three attesting witnesses, nevertheless in Cabang vs. Delfinado (34 Phil., 291), this court declared after an elaborate examination of the American and English authorities that when a contest is instituted, all of the attesting witnesses must be examined, if alive and within reach of the process of the court. In the present case no explanation was made at the trial as to why all three of the attesting witnesses were not produced, but the probable reason is found in the fact that, although the petition for the probate of this will had been pending from December 21, 1917, until the date set for the hearing, which was April 5, 1919, no formal contest was entered until the very day set for the hearing; and it is probable that the attorney for the proponent, believing in good faith the probate would not be contested, repaired to the court with only one of the three attesting witnesses at hand, and upon finding that the will was contested, incautiously permitted the case to go to proof without asking for a postponement of the trial in order that he might produce all the attesting witnesses.Although this circumstance may explain why the three witnesses were not produced, it does not in itself supply any basis for changing the rule expounded in the case above referred to; and were it not for a fact now to be mentioned, this court would probably be compelled to reverse this case on the ground that the execution of the will had not been proved by a sufficient number of attesting witnesses. 2. We are of the opinion that the will in question is valid. It is true that the statute says that the testator and the instrumental witnesses shall sign their names on the left margin of each and every page; and it is undeniable that the general doctrine is to the effect that all statutory requirements as to the execution of wills must be fully complied with. So far as concerns the authentication of the will, and of every part thereof, it can make no possible difference whether the names appear on the left or no the right margin, provided they are on one or the other. The controlling considerations on the point now before us were well stated In Re will of Abangan (40 Phil., 476, 479), where the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Avancea, in a case where the signatures were placed at the bottom of the page and not in the margin, said: The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution o will and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded. In the case before us, where ingenuity could not suggest any possible prejudice to any person, as attendant upon the actual deviation from the letter of the law, such deviation must be considered too trivial to invalidate the instrument. 216) IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA VILLACORTE. CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee, vs. NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositors-appellants. 11 SCRA 423 FACTS: A special proceeding was commenced on October 2, 1958 for the allowance and admission to probate of the original will of Josefa Villacorte, deceased, and for the appointment of petitioner Celso Icasiano as executor thereof. Natividad Icasiano, a daughter of the testatrix, filed her opposition. Enrique Icasiano, a son of the testatrix, also filed a manifestation adopting as his own Natividad's opposition to the probate of the alleged will. Proponent subsequently filed a motion for the admission of an amended and supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent left a will executed in duplicate with all the legal requirements, and that he was, on that date, submitting the signed duplicate , which he allegedly found only on or about May 26, 1959. oppositors Natividad Icasiano de Gomez and Enrique Icasiano filed their joint opposition to the admission of the amended and supplemental petition, but by order, the court admitted said petition. The evidence presented for the petitioner is to the effect that Josefa Villacorte died in the City of Manila on September 12, 1958; that on June 2, 1956, the late Josefa Villacorte executed a last will and testament in duplicate at the house of her daughter Mrs. Felisa Icasiano at Pedro Guevara Street, Manila, published before and attested by three instrumental witnesses, namely: attorneys Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Jose V. Natividad, and Mr. Vinicio B.
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Diy; that the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and by the said three instrumental witnesses on the same date before attorney Jose Oyengco Ong, Notary Public in and for the City of Manila; and that the will was actually prepared by attorney Fermin Samson, who was also present during the execution and signing of the decedent's last will and testament, together with former Governor Emilio Rustia of Bulacan, Judge Ramon Icasiano and a little girl. Of the said three instrumental witnesses to the execution of the decedent's last will and testament, attorneys Torres and Natividad were in the Philippines at the time of the hearing, and both testified as to the due execution and authenticity of the said will. So did the Notary Public before whom the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and attesting witnesses, and also attorneys Fermin Samson, who actually prepared the document. The latter also testified upon cross examination that he prepared one original and two copies of Josefa Villacorte last will and testament at his house in Baliuag, Bulacan, but he brought only one original and one signed copy to Manila, retaining one unsigned copy in Bulacan. Witness Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page three (3) of the original, admits that he may have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page three (3) was signed in his presence. The court issued the order admitting the will and its duplicate to probate. From this order, the oppositors appealed directly to this Court ISSUE: WHETHER THE WILL IS VALID IN THE ABSENCE OF A WITNESS SIGNATURE IN ONE PAGE HELD: CFI AFFIRMED On the question of law, we hold that the inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de Gil. vs. Murciano, 49 Off. Gaz. 1459, at 1479 (decision on reconsideration) "witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it or the attestation clause". That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is shown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of signatures in every page. The text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise evidence that no one was aware of the defect at the time. This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory requirements, where the purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal tenor of the law, this Court has held that a testament, with the only page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses, but not in the left margin, could nevertheless be probated (Abangan vs. Abangan, 41 Phil. 476); and that despite the requirement for the correlative lettering of the pages of a will, the failure to make the first page either by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429). These precedents exemplify the Court's policy to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud and bid faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of the testamentary privilege. 217) Testate estate of the late VICENTE CAGRO. JESUSA CAGRO, petitioner-appellee, vs. PELAGIO CAGRO, ET AL., oppositorsappellants. 92 PHIL 1033 FACTS: This is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Samar, admitting to probate the will allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro who died in Laoangan, Pambujan, Samar, on February 14, 1949. The main objection insisted upon by the appellant in that the will is fatally defective, because its attestation clause is not signed by the attesting witnesses. The signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin. The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin conform substantially to the law and may be deemed
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as their signatures to the attestation clause. ISSUE: WHETHER THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WHEN THE WITNESSES SIGNATURES APPEAR ON THE LEFT MARGINS BUT NOT IN THE ATTESTATION CLAUSE HELD: CFI REVERSED We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is correct. The attestation clause is 'a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will' required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their participation. The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause. This is untenable, because said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses 218) BEATRIZ NERA, ET AL., plaintiffsappellees, vs. NARCISA RIMANDO, defendantappellant.. 18 PHIL 450 FACTS: The lower court admitted the instrument propounded therein as the last will and testament of the deceased, Pedro Rimando.The defendant appeals the decision, contending that it one of the witnesses was not present during the signing of the will by the testator and of the other subscribing witnesses. one of the witnesses was the outside some 8 or 10 feet away, in a small room connected by a doorway from where the will was signed ,across which was hung a curtain which made it impossible for one in the outside room to see the testator and the other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their signatures to the instrument. ISSUE: WHETHER THE WILL WAS VALIDLY EXECUTED EVEN IF ONE OF THE WITNESSES WAS IN ANOTHER ROOM DURING THE SIGNING OF THE WILL HELD: LOWER COURT AFFIRMED In the case just cited, on which the trial court relied, we held that: The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they might have been seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical condition and position with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each signature. But it is especially to be noted that the position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment of the subscription of each signature , must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so. This, of course, does not mean that the testator and the subscribing witnesses may be held to have executed the instrument in the presence of each other if it appears that they would not have been able to see each other sign at that moment, without changing their relative positions or existing conditions. The trial courts decision merely laid down the doctrine that the question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the instrument in the presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment existing conditions and their position with relation to each other were such that by merely casting the eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign. To extend the doctrine further would open the door to the possibility of all manner of fraud, substitution, and the like, and would defeat the purpose for which this particular condition is prescribed in the code as one of the requisites in the execution of a will. 219) CANEDA VS CA 222 SCRA 781 FACTS: Testator Mateo Caballero is a widower without any children. He executed a will in the presence of three witnesses. He was assisted by his lawyer and a notary public in the preparation of his will. Under the said will, the testator disposed of his properties to persons without blood relation to the testator. The testator himself submitted the will to the probate court but the testator passed away even before his petition could be heard. The petitioners, who claimed to be the nephews and nieces of the testator, filed for the settlement of the
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intestate estate of Mateo. The probate proceedings and special proceedings filed were consolidated. Petitioners opposed the allowance of the will of Mateo on the ground that on the date stated in the will, the testator was already of poor health and could not have executed the will. They likewise questioned the genuineness of the signature of the testator in the said will. The probate court allowed the will. On appeal, the petitioners contended that the Attestation Clause was fatally defective for failing to state that the testator signed in the presence of the witnesses and the witnesses signed in the presence of the testator and of one another. Court of Appeals, nevertheless affirmed the probate courts decision and held that there was substantial compliance with Art. 805. ISSUE: Whether or not the attestation clause contained in the last will complies with the requirements of Art. 805 and 809? HELD: In the case of ordinary or notarial wills, the attestation clause need not be written in a language or dialect known to the testator since it does not form part of the disposition. The language used in the attestation clause likewise need not even be known to the attesting witnesses. The last paragraph of Art. 805 merely requires that, in such a case, the Attestation Clause shall be interpreted to said witnesses. An Attestation Clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses certify that the instrument has been executed before them and to the manner of the execution of the same. It is a separate memorandum of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution of the same. Paragraph 3 of Art. 805 requires three things to be stated in the Attestation Clause, the lack of which would result in the invalidity of the will: a) The number of pages b) That the testator signed or expressly caused another to sign, the will and every page thereof in the presence of the attesting witnesses and c) That the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all of its pages, and that said witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against any interpolation or omission of some of its pages, whereas the subscription of the signatures of the testator and the attesting witnesses is made for the purpose of authentication and identification, and thus indicates that the will is the very instrument executed by the testator and attested to by the witnesses. By attesting and subscribing to the will. The witnesses thereby declare that due execution of the will as embodied in the Attestation Clause. The Attestation Clause provides strong legal guaranties for the due execution of a will and to ensure the authenticity thereof. It needs to be signed only by the witnesses and not the testator, absence of the signature of the former invalidates the will. In the case at bar, the will was comprised of three pages, all numbered correlatively, with the left margin of each page bearing the respective signatures of the testator and the three attesting witnesses. The testamentary dispositions were expresses in Cebuano- Visayan dialect and were signed at the foot by the testator. The Attestation Clause was recite in English and is likewise signed at the end of three attesting witnesses. What is fairly apparent upon a careful reading of the Attestation Clause herein is the fact that while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of three attesting witnesses and stated as well the number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. What is clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. The absence of that statement is a fatal defect which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will. As to the substantial compliance rule under Art. 809, while it may be true that the Attestation Clause is indeed subscribed at the end thereof and at the left margin of each page by the three attesting witnesses, it certainly cannot be conclusively inferred therefrom that the said witnesses affixed their respective signatures in the presence of the testator and of each other, since the presence of such signatures only establishes the fact that it was indeed signed, but it does not prove that the attesting witnesses did subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of one another.
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The execution of a will is supposed to be one act so that where the testator and the witnesses sign on various days or occasions and in various combinations, the will cannot be stamped with the imprimatur of effectivity. In a situation like in the case at bar, the defects is not only in the form or language of the Attestation Clause but the total absence of a specific element requires by Art. 805. In order that Art. 809 can apply, the defects must be remedied by intrinsic evidenced supplied by the will itself. In the case at bar, proof of the acts requires to have been performed by the attesting witnesses san be supplied only by extrinsic evidence thereof. Reversal of the judgment rendered by the CA. 220) AZNAR VS GARCIA 7 SCRA95 FACTS: Aznar (executor) filed a petition to probate the will of the deceased Edward Christensen giving to Helen Christensen 3, 600 pesos while Lucy all the remainder of his property which was opposed by Helen because it deprives her legitime as an acknowledged natural children hence she is entitled to of the estate but CFI opposes the final accounting of the executor. ISSUE:WON Helen is entitled estate? to share of the ISSUE: Whether or not the will was executed in accordance with Art. 805 and 806? HELD:The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge before means to avow or to own as genuine, to assent and before means in front or preceding in space or ahead of. Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of himself. The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements. That function would be defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. For them he would be interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves himself and the validity of his own act. It would place him in an inconsistent position and the very purpose of the acknowledgement, which is to minimize fraud would be thwarted. To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one of the attesting and acknowledging witnesses, would have the effect of having only two attesting witnesses to the will which would be in contravention of the provisions of Art. 805 requiring at least three credible witnesses to act as such and of Art 806 which requires that the testator and the required number of witnesses must appear before the notary public to acknowledge the will. The result woukd be, as has been said, that only 2 witnesses appeared before the notary public for that purpose. 222) KALAW VS RELOVA 132 SCRA 237 FACTS: The private respondent, who claims to be the sole heir of his sister who is Natividad Kalaw, filed for a petition to admit to probate the holographic will of his sister. In such will, private respondent Gregorio was named as the sole heir of all the properties left behind by the testatrix and was also named as the executor of the will. The petition was opposed by Rosa, the sister of the testatrix, who claims to have been originally instituted as the sole heir. She alleged that the holographic will contained alterations, corrections and insertions without the proper authentication by
HELD: Remand the case to Philippine court for partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides. The citizenship of the deceases was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, hence the meaning of national law in Art 16 is the conflict of law rules in California. However, ART 946 of California Civil Code authorizes the return of the question to the law of the testators domicile, The Philippines. Therefore, the Philippine court should not refer back it to California. Court of domicile is bound to apply its own law as directed in conflict of law rule of decedent state. 221) CRUZ VS VILLASOR 54 SCRA 31 FACTS: Respondent Manuel Lugay filed a petition for probate of the will of Valente Cruz with the CFI which was opposed by the petitioner, Agapita Cruz on the ground that the one of the three witnesses is at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged.
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the full signature of the testatrix as requires by Art 814 of the Civil Code. The court denied the petition. Rosa filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. ISSUE: whether or not the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions were voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full signature of the testatrix, should be probated or not, with her as sole heir. Held: No. ordinarily, when a number of erasures, correction made by the testator on a holographic will not be noted under his signature, hence the will is not invalidated as a whole but as most only as respects the particular words erased or corrected. However in this case, the holographic will in dispute had only one substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain valid. To state that the will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature- the intention of the testator could not be ascertained. However, there is clear showing of the testators intention to revoke the institution of Rosa as her sole heir. Thus, the petition is hereby dismissed and the decision of the respondent judge is affirmed. 223) AJERO VS CA 236 SCRA 488 FACTS: Late Anne Sand left a will and named as devisees the petitioner, Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand. Fe Sand, Lisa Sand and Dr. Jose Ajero Sr and their children. Petitioner filed for the allowance of decedent holographic will contending that the latter was of sound mind and not acting under duress. Private Respondent opposed it that the testament body and signature was not decedents handwriting and such properties, the decedent is not the sole owner. RTC admitted the will while CA reversed it that the will fails to meet the requirements for its validity under Art 813 and 814 because the dispositions were either unsigned and undated or signed but not dated and erasure had not been authenticated by decedent. ISSUE: WON the will is valid? HELD: Yes. Art 839, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is the decedents will (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with formalities prescribed by law (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed and (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were voluntary acts of the decedent Art. 813 of the new Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void. In the case at bar, unless, the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testators signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes. In addition to, courts in probate are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will. However, exception, Courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will that Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late father John Sand which Dr Ajero question her conveyance. 224) LABRADOR VS CA 184 SCRA 170 FACTS: Testator Melencio died and left a parcel of land and his children as heirs. He allegedly executed a holographic will. The holographic will was submitted for probate by petitioner Sagrado, the devisee of the parcel of the land.
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Jesus and Gaudencio opposed the probate of the will on the ground that the will has been extinguished or revoked by implications of law, when the testator, before his death, sold the parcel of land to the oppositors. The said transaction was evidenced by the new TCT issued in the name of the oppositors and the Deed of Sale executed by the testator. Meanwhile, Jesus sold the parcel of land to a 3 rd person, Sagrado sought to have the Deed of Sale annulled on the ground that it was fictitious. LC allowed the probate of the will and declared null and void the Deed of Sale. CA reversed the judgment and disallowed the probate of the will on the ground that it was undated. ISSUE: WON the alleged holographic will is dated? HELD: The Holographic is dated. It appears that the date when the testator made the will was stated in the body of the complaint, on the 2nd page of the will and this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning the respective assignment of the said fish pond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year 1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed, and the one who made this writing is no other that MELECIO LABRADOR, their father. The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These requirements are present in the subject will. 225) PEREZ VS TOLETE 232 SCRA 722 FACTS: Dr. Jose Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn PerezCunanan are husband and wife, who became American citizens and residents of New York, U.S.A, with their children, Jocelynm18; Jacqueline,16; and Josephine,14. Each executed a will also in New York, containing provisions on presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known which one of the spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his wife). To wit: If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that I predeceased her, and my estate shall be administered and distributed, in all respects, in accordance with such presumption. Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will and testament containing the same provisions as that of the will of her husband. To wit: If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that he predeceased me, and my estate shall be administered and distributed in all respects, in accordance with such presumption. Later, the entire family perished in a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in Joses will, filed for separate probate proceedings of the wills. Later, Evelyns mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir according to New York law. He contended that since the wills were executed in New York, New York law should govern. He further argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers and sisters were Joses heirs and as such entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to give. For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were in accordance with New York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the law of New York, the reprobate court already issued an order, disallowing the wills. ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed HELD: The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines: Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes. Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.
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The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills. Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence. The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them. This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact - petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party. The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required. The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . " WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.
226) TESTATE ESTATE OF BOHANAN 106 PHIL. 997 FACTS: C.O. Bohanan was born in Nebraska and therefore a citizen of that state. Notwithstanding his long residence in the Philippines, he continued and remained to be a citizen of the United States and of the state of his pertinent residence to spend the rest of his days in that state. His permanent residence or domicile in the United States depended upon his personal intent or desire, and he selected Nevada as his homicide and therefore at the time of his death, he was a citizen of that state. The oppositors, Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children, question the validity of the executor/testator C.O. Bohanans last will and testament, claiming that they have been deprived of the legitimate that the laws of the form concede to them. Another, is the claim of the testator's children, Edward and Mary Lydia Bohanan, who had received legacies in the amount of PHP 6, 000 each only, and, therefore, have not been given their shares in the estate which, in accordance with the laws, should be two- thirds of the estate left by the testator. ISSUE: WON the testamentary dispositions of the testator is valid: as to Magdalena Bohanan and second to his children? HELD: The first issue refers to the share that the wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, should be entitled to receive. The will has not given her any share in the estate left by the testator. It is argued that it was error for the trial court to have recognized the Reno divorce secured by the testator from his Filipino wife Magdalena C. Bohanan, and that said divorce should be declared a nullity in this jurisdiction. The court refused to recognize the claim of the widow on the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his former (or divorced) wife. No right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada, thus the oppositor can no longer claim portion of the estate left by the testator.
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With regards the second issue, the old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944, expressly provides that successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, thus the two-third rule is not enforceable. Wherefore, the court finds that the testator, C.O Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen of the United States and declares that his will and testament is fully in accordance with the laws of the State of Nevada and admits the same to probate. The validity of Testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the testator and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that the national law of the testator is that State of Nevada, which allows the testator to dipose his properties according to his will, like in the case at bar. Thus the order of the court approving the project partition made in accordance to testamentary provisions must be affirmed. 227) Testate Estate of Maloto 158 SCRA 451 FACTS: Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the petitioners believing that no last wiil and testament was left they iniateda an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunt's estate. While the case was still in progress, the parties executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adriana's estate. The agreement provided for the division of the estate into four equal parts among the parties. They then presented the extrajudicial settlement agreement to the trial court for approval. Three years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma discovered a document entitled "KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento)," dated January 3,1940, and purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana. It Significantly, the appellate court while finding as inconclusive the matter on whether or not the document or papers allegedly burned by the househelp of Adriana, Guadalupe Maloto Vda. de Coral, upon instructions of the testatrix, was indeed the will, contradicted itself and found that the will had been revoked. The respondent court stated that the presence of animus revocandi in the destruction of the will had, nevertheless, been sufficiently proven. The appellate court based its finding on the facts that the document was not in the two safes in Adriana's residence, by the testatrix going to the residence of Atty. Hervas to retrieve a copy of the will left in the latter's possession, and, her seeking the services of Atty. Palma in order to have a new will drawn up. ISSUE: Whether or not the will was revoked by Adriana. HELD: It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person but under the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself. In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice. "Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction. There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the document or papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating that they were the only ones present at the place where the stove (presumably in the kitchen) was located in which the papers proffered as a will were burned. Nowhere in the records before us does it appear that the two witnesses, Guadalupe Vda. de Corral and Eladio Itchon, both illiterates, were unequivocably positive that the document burned was indeed Adriana's will. Guadalupe, we think, believed that the papers she destroyed was the will only because, according to her, Adriana told her so. Eladio, on the other hand, obtained his information that the burned document was the will because Guadalupe told him so, thus, his testimony on this point is double hearsay. 228) Molo vs. Molo 90 PHIL 37
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FACTS: The deceased died leaving no forced heir in the descending or ascending line, however he was survived by his weife and and his nieces and nephews who were the legitimate children of his deceased brother, during his lifetime he executed two wills, one executed at 1918 and the subsequent one in 1939. The latter will contains a clause which revokes the will in 1918. The said will containing the clause revoking the previous will, however, was disallowed. ISSUE: Whether the previous will was annulled even if the subsequent will, with revoking clause, was disallowed. HELD: A subsequent will containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was not executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void Execution of Wills 229) Tolentino v Francisco 57 PHIL 749 FACTS: Gregorio Tolentino had been married to Benita Francisco, but she predeceased him years ago. The pair had no children with a number of his wifes kin as survivors. However, strained relations, resulting from grave disagreements, developed between Tolentino and the Francisco relations and he determined to make a new will in which, apart from certain legacies in favor of a few individuals, the bulk of his estate, worth probably about P150,000, should be given to Adelaida Tolentino de Concepcion, as his universal heir. To this end, Tolentino went to the office of Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, an attorney and informed him that he wanted to make a new will and desired Repide to draft it for him. After the necessary preliminary inquiries had been made, the attorney suggested to him to bring a copy of the will previously made which was reduced to itsproper form. As the instrument was taking shape Tolentino stated that he wanted the will to be signed in Repide's office, with the latter as one of the attesting witnesses. For the other two witnesses Tolentino requested that two attorneys attached to the office, namely, Leoncio B. Monzon and Ramon L. Sunico, should serve. When the instrument had been reduced to proper form, changes were made by Tolentino with regards to the attesting witnesses. Pursuant to these instructions Repide made the desired changes in the will and just before twelve o'clock noon of the next day Tolentino returned to Repide's office and received from him the criminal document with a carbon copy thereof. Repide advised the testator that the copy should be executed with the same formality as the original in order that the intention of the testator should not be frustrated by the possible loss or destruction of the original.lawphil.netIt is a custom in the office of Repide not to number the consecutive pages of a will, on the typewriting machine, the duty of numbering the pages being left to the testator himself. Tolentino thereupon drew two documents from his pocket saving that it was his last will and testament, done in duplicate, and he proceeded to read the original to the witnesses. After this had been completed, Legarda himself took the will in hand and read it himself. He then returned it to Tolentino, who thereupon proceeded, with pen and ink, to number the pages of the will thus, "Pagina Primera", "Pagina Segunda", etc. He then paged the duplicate copy of the will in the same way. He next proceeded to sign the original will and each of its pages by writing his name "G. Tolentino" in the proper places. Following this, each of the three witnesses signed their own respective names at the end of the will, at the end of the attesting clause, and in the left margin of each page of the instrument. During this ceremony all of the persons concerned in the act of attestation were present together, and all fully advertent to the solemnity that engaged their attention. After preliminary explanations had been made, Tolentino requested Repide to keep the will overnight in his safe, In this connection the testator stated that he did not wish to take the will to his home, as he knew that his relatives were watching him and would take advantage of any carelessness on his part to pry into his papers. On the morning of November 9, 1930, Gregorio Tolentino was found dead in his bed, having perished by the hands of an assassin. ISSUE: Whether the will was executed and attested in the manner required by law HELD: The peculiarity of this case is that, upon the trial of this proceeding for the probate of the will of the
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decedent, two of the attesting witnesses, Jose Syyap and Vergel de Dios, repudiated their participation in the execution of the will at the time and place stated; and while admitting the genuineness of their signatures to the will, pretended that they had severally signed the instrument, at the request of the testator, at different places. Thus Syyap, testifying as a witness, claimed that the testator brought the will to Syyap's house on the afternoon of October 21 a time, be it remembered, when the will had not yet left the hands of the draftsman and upon learning that Syyap could not be present at the time and place then being arranged for the execution of the will, he requested Syyap, as a mere matter of complaisance, to sign the will then, which Syyap did. Vergel de Dios has another story to tell of isolated action, claiming that he signed the will in the evening of October 22 at the Hospital of San Juan de Dios in Intramuros. We are unable to give any credence to the testimony of these two witnesses on this point, the same being an evident fabrication designed for the purpose of defeating the will. In the first place, the affirmative proof showing that the will was properly executed is adequate, consistent, and convincing, consisting of the testimony of the third attesting witness, Vicente Legarda, corroborated by Miguel Legarda and Urbana Rivera, two disinterested individuals, employees of La Previsora Filipina, who were present in Legarda's office when the will was executed and who lent a discerning attention to what was being done. In the second place, each of the seven signatures affixed to his will by Syyap appear to the natural eye to have been made by using the same pen and ink that was used by Legarda in signing the will. The same is also probably true of the seven signatures made by Vergel de Dios. This could hardly have happened if the signatures of Syyap and Vergel de Dios had been affixed, as they now pretend, at different times and places. In the third place, Both Syyap and Vergel de Dios are impeached by proof of contradictory statements made by them on different occasions prior to their appearance as witnesses in this case. In this connection we note that, after the murder of Gregorio Tolentino, and while the police authorities were investigating his death, Nemesio Alferez, a detective, sent for Syyap and questioned him concerning his relations with the deceased. Upon this occasion Syyap stated that Gregorio Tolentino had lately made a will, that it had been executed at the office of La Previsora Filipina under the circumstances already stated, and that he himself had served as one of the attesting witnesses. These circumstances and other incidents revealed in the proof leave no room for doubt in our mind that Syyap and Vergel de Dios have entered into a conspiracy between themselves, and in concert with the opponents, to defeat the will of Gregorio Tolentino although they are well aware that said will was in all respects properly executed; and the trial court, in our opinion, committed no error in admitting the will to probate. When a will is contested it is the duty of the proponent to call all of the attesting witnesses, if available but the validity of the will in no wise depends upon the united support of the will by all of those witnesses. A will may be admitted to probate notwithstanding the fact that one or more of the subscribing witnesses do not unite with the other, or others, in proving all the facts upon which the validity of the will rests. (Fernandez vs. Tantoco, 49 Phil., 380.) It is sufficient if the court is satisfied from all the proof that the will was executed and attested in the manner required by law. In this case we feel well assured that the contested will was properly executed and the order admitting to it probate was entirely proper. SUCCESSION Probate of Wills 230) Mercado vs. Santos 57 Phil. 749 FACTS: Petitioner Mercado applied for the probate of the will of his deceased wife. There was no opposition to it. The court then admitted the will to probate. After more than a year, the relatives of his wife filed a complaint against Mercado on the ground of falsifaction or forgery of the will probated. A motion to quash was filed by Mercado stating that the will has already been admitted to probate. It is therefore conclusively presumed to be genuine. RTC: For respondent. Motion denied. CA: Affirms RTC. ISSUE: Whether the will is can be presumed to be genuine? HELD: Yes, it is. A criminal action for falsification of will, will not lie after its admission to probate. This is the effect of the probate of a will. The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem. The provision of notice by publication as a prerequisite to the allowance of a will is constructive notice to the whole world, and
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when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State. The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction thereof is considered as conclusive as to its due execution and validity, and is also conclusive that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he executed the will, and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, and that the will is genuine and not a forgery. The will in question having been probated by a competent court, the law will not admit any proof to overthrow the legal presumption that it is not a forgery. A criminal action will not lie against a forger of a will which had been duly admitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction in view of the provisions of sections 306, 333, and 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 231) Testate Estate of Biascan vs. Biascan 347 SCRA 621 FACTS: In 1975, respondent Rosalina Biascon filed a petition for her appointment as the administratrix of the intestate estate of Florencio Biascan and Timotea Zulueta. The court issued an order appointing her as the regular administrator. Maria Biascon was the legal wife of Florencio and filed an opposition to the appointment. On April 2, 1981, the court issued an order resolving that Maria as legal wife, and Rosalina and her brother as the natural children of Florencio, are the legal heirs of the deceased and upheld the appointment of Rosalina as the administratrix. On June 6, 1981 or 58 days after the receipt of the Order, Maria filed her MFR. On November 15, 1981, the fourth floor of the City Hall of Manila was completely gutted by fire. The records of the settlement proceedings were among those lost in the fire. Thus, on January 2, 1985, private respondent filed a Petition for Reconstitution of the said records. Due to the delay caused by the fire and the reconstitution of the records, it was only on April 30, 1985 that the RTC issued an Order denying Marias June 6, 1981 MFR. Sometime thereafter, Maria died and her lawyer Atty. Lopez was appointed as interim special administrator. Notice of this April 30, 1985 Order allegedly came to the attention of Marias lawyer only on August 21, 1996. Her lawyers thereafter filed a Notice of Appeal and Record of Appeal on September 20, 1996. The TC issued an order denying the appeal on the ground that it was filed out of time. A petition for certiorari was filed with the CA which was likewise denied. ISSUE: Whether the appeal was filed on time? HELD: No, it was not. Section 1. Rule 109 of the RROC enumerates the orders and judgments in special proceedings which may be the subject of an appeal. An appeal is allowed in these cases as these orders, decrees or judgments issued by a court in a special proceeding constitute a final determination of the rights of the parties so appealing. The ruling of the TC that Maria, Rosalina and her brother were entitled to participate in the settlement proceedings falls squarely under paragraph b of section 1, Rule 109 as the proper subject of appeal. By so ruling, the TC has effectively determined that the three persons are the lawful heirs of the deceased. As such, the same may be the proper subject of an appeal. Similarly, the ruling of the TC denying Marias motion to set aside the order appointing Rosalina as the regular administratrix of the estate of Florencio Biascan is likewise a proper subject of appeal. The order of the TC appointing a regular administrator of a deceased persons estate is a final determination of the rights of the parties thereunder and is thus appealable. This is in contrast with an order appointing a special administrator which is appointed only for a limited time and for a specific purpose. Because of the temporary character and special character of this appointment, the Rules deem it not advisable for any party to appeal from said temporary appointment. It is thus clear that the Order dated April 2, 1981 may be the proper subject of an appeal in a special proceeding. In special proceedings, the period of appeal from any decision or final order rendered therein is thirty days. The appeal period may only be interrupted by the filing of a motion for a new trial or reconsideration. Once the appeal period expires without an appeal or a MFR or new trial being perfected, the decision or order becomes final. Considering that this was only on June 6, 1981 or a full 58 days after the receipt of the order that the MFR was filed, it is clear that the same was filed out of time. There was no more appeal period to interrupt as the Order had already become final. It is well settled that judgments or orders become final and executory by operation of law and not by judicial declaration. Thus, finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or MFR or
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new trial is filed. The TC need not even pronounce the finality of the order as the same becomes final by operation of law. Being final and executory, the TC can no longer alter, modify or reverse the questioned order. The subsequent filing of the MFR cannot disturb the finality of the judgment order. The Order of the trial court denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the April 2, 1981 Order was issued on April 30, 1985. Allegedly, petitioner was only made aware of this April 30, 1985 Order on August 21, 1996 when it inquired from the trial court about the status of the case. Giving petitioner the benefit of the doubt that it had indeed received notice of the order denying its motion for reconsideration on August 21, 1996, it follows that petitioner only had until the following day or on August 22, 1996 within which to perfect the appeal. At this point, we note with disapproval petitioners attempt to pass off its Notice of Appeal as having been filed on August 22, 1996. In all its pleadings before this Court and the Court of Appeals, petitioner insists that its Notice of Appeal was filed the day after it secured the August 21, 1996 Certification from the trial court. While the Notice of Appeal was ostensibly dated August 22, 1996, it is clear from the stamp of the trial court that the same was received only on September 20, 1996. Moreover, in the Order dated October 22, 1996 of the trial court denying petitioners appeal, the court clearly stated that the Notice of Appeal with accompanying Record on Appeal was filed on September 20, 1996. Considering that it is clear from the records that petitioners notice of appeal was filed on September 20, 1996, the same was clearly filed out of time as it only had until August 22, 1996 within which to file the said pleading. 232) Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 FACTS: Rosario Nuguid died and was survived by her parents, brothers and sisters. Petitioner Remedios, her sister, filed for the probate of her holographic will a year after her death. Remedios was instituted as the universal heir in the said will. The parents opposed this, claiming that they were preterited by the institution of Remedios as the sole heir thereby invalidating the will. The trial court declared the will to be a complete nullity and therefore creating an intestacy of the estate of Rosario. ISSUE: Whether the parents were preterited creating intestacy of Rosarios estate? HELD: Yes, they were. In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the courts area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will; the due execution thereof; the testatrixs testamentary capacity; and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. In the case at bar however, a peculiar situation exists. The parties shunned aside the question of whether or not the will should be allowed probate. They questioned the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. But if the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. In the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, the probability exists that the case will come up once again before the court on the same issue of the instrinsic validity of or nullity of the will. The result would be a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These practical considerations induce the SC to meet head-on the issue of the nullity of the provisions of the will in question, there being a justiciable controversy. The deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line, her parents. Her will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition. There is no other provision in the will except the institution of Remedios as the universal heir. Such institution by itself is null and void and, intestate succession ensues. The disputed order declares the will in question a complete nullity. Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies the institution of the heir. The will however, provides for the institution of the petitioner as the universal heir and nothing more. The result is the same. The entire will is null. Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance in turn is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. The effects flowing from preterition are totally different form those of disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 shall annul the institution of an heir. This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition,
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testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918, such disinheritance shall also annul the institution of the heirs but only insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited, which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. In disinheritance, the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. 233) Caniza vs. CA 268 SCRA 641 FACTS: Caniza was 94 years old and was declared incompetent because of her advanced years. She was represented in this case by Evangelista, her guardian. Caniza previously allowed the spouses and their relatives to occupy the house without paying any rent out of the goodness of her heart. However, she needed money for her support, maintenance and medical treatment. A demand by Evangelista was made on the Estradas to vacate the house but refused contending that they would inherit the house as stated in Canizas holographic will. Evangelista then moved to eject the spouses from the premises. The MetTC ruled in favor of Caniza which was reversed by the RTC on the ground that the "action by which the issue of defendants' possession should be resolved is accion publiciana, the obtaining factual and legal situation ** demanding adjudication by such plenary action for recovery of possession cognizable in the first instance by the Regional Trial Court." This was affirmed by the CA. Caniza died during the pendency of the appeal. ISSUE: Whether the Estradas may rightfully claim the property through the holographic will? HELD: No, they cannot. It is settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, it suffices to allege that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, and a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. The only issue that could legitimately be raised under the circumstances was that involving the Estradas possession by tolerance, i.e., possession de facto, not de jure. It is therefore incorrect to postulate that the proper remedy for Caiza is not ejectment but accion publiciana, a plenary action in the RTC or an action that is one for recovery of the right to possession de jure. The Estradas possession of the house stemmed from the owners express permission. That permission was subsequently withdrawn by the owner, as was her right; and it is immaterial that the withdrawal was made through her judicial guardian, the latter being indisputably clothed with authority to do so. Nor is it of any consequence that Caniza executed a will bequeathing the disputed property to the Estradas, that circumstance did not give them the right to stay on the premises after demand to vacate on the theory that they might in the future become owners thereof. The Estradas right of ownership being at best inchoate, no transfer of ownership being possible unless and until the will is duly probated. Prior to the probate of the will, any assertion of possession by them would be premature and inefficacious. A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court." An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case there was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age. While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward, the rule affords no advantage to the Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as niece of Carmen Caiza, is one of the latter's only two (2) surviving heirs, the other being Caiza's nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion and by Resolution of this Court of June 20, 1994, they were in fact substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased, in accordance with Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Caiza's demise did not extinguish the desahucio suit instituted by her
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through her guardian. That action, not being a purely personal one, survived her death; her heirs have taken her place and now represent her interests in the appeal at bar. 234) PECSON VS. AGUSTIN CORONEL G.R. No. L-20374, 11 October 1923 FACTS: Decedent Dolores Coronel died testate and without issue. She appointed as sole heir her nephew, Lorenzo Pecson, wife of her niece Angela Coronel, for the services he rendered for the decedent. He was also appointed as executor thereof, and in his absence, decedents grandson Vincent Pecson. As she cannot read and write, he asked Vicente Francisco to write the will and sign it in her behalf. In the attestation clause, it stated that the will was signed by each of (them) us signed these presents in the presence of others and of the testatrix... Decedents relatives opposed the probate of the will, contending that the will could not be valid because first, it is not natural in our culture to exclude a persons blood relatives from her vast estate and hence at most, the decedent merely intended to appoint Lorenzo as executor; and second, that the attestation clause failed to comply with the provisions of Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the relatives exclusion in the will amounts to preterition? 2. Whether or not the defect in the attestation clause invalidates the will? RULINGS: First issue: Relatives Exclusion from the Will Their exclusion in the will does not amount to preterition. The liberty to dispose of ones estate by will when there are no forced heirs is rendered sacred by the Civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1889 which provides: Any person who has no forced heirs may dispose by will all of his property or any part of it in favour of any person qualified to acquire it. The preference given to Lorenzo is not purely arbitrary, nor a caprice or whim of the moment as there was sufficient proof that Lorenzo indeed rendered services for the decedent even prior to 1914, and was the decedents administrator and manager of her affairs in the last years of her life. Second issue: Defect in the Attestation Clause Section 618 of the Civil Code of Procedure provides that: The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, uponwhich the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will in each and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other. However, the attestation clause of the decedents will stated that it was signed in the presence of others. In resolving the same, the Court relied on in its decision in In Re Will of Abangan whereby it ruled that the object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. Hence, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. However, one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisite entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testators will, must be disregarded. The phrase is then construed to mean as of the other and is a mere grammatical error. Grammatical or clerical errors are not usually considered of vital importance when the intention is manifest in the will. 235) ACAIN VS. IAC G.R. No. 72706, 27 October 1987 FACTS: Nemesio Acain died testate, leaving the following as heirs: his wife Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain, his legally adopted daughter Virginia Fernandez, and his nephews and nieces from his brother Segundo Acain. In his will, he bequeathed all of his property to Segundo, and in case the latter predecease him, all his property will pass on to Segundos children. As Segundo predeceased Nemesio, the formers children moved for the probate of the will. Nemesios widow and daughter filed a motion to dismiss, contending that they were preterited. The trial court denied their motion. On appeal, the IAC reversed and ordered the trial court to dismiss the probate of the will. ISSUE: Whether or not Rosa and Virginia had been preterited?
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RULING: Yes. Article 854 of the Civil Code provides that: The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of the heir; but the devisese and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. If the omitted compulsory heir should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation. Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein , or even though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance, except those legacies and devices, unless it impairs the legitime of the heirs. In the case of Rosa, preterition shall not apply as she does not ascend nor descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. There is no preterition because she is not in the direct line. However, in the case of Virginia, preterition applies because as a legal adoptee, she is vested with the same rights and duties as that of a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adoptee the legal heir of the adopter. The universal institution of the petitioner and his siblings to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirswithout any other testamentary disposition in the willamounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. 236) NERI VS. AKUTIN G.R. No. L-47799, 13 June 1941 FACTS: Agripino Neri died on 12 December 1931 leaving 6 children from his first wife, and 5 children from his second wife Ignacia Akutin. In his will, he stated that his children by the first marriage shall have no longer any participation in his estate as they had already received their corresponding shares during his lifetime. However, during the hearing for declaration of heirs, the court found that contrary to what Agripino declared in his will, that all his children by the first and second marriages are intestate heirs of the deceased without prejudice to one-half of the improvements introduced in the properties during the existence of the last conjugal partnership which should belong to Ignacia Akutin. The Court of Appeals modified the decision and ruled that the will was valid with respect to the two-thirds part which the testator can freely dispose of. ISSUE: Whether or not the omission of the children by the first wife annuls the institution of the children by the second wife as sole heirs of the testator? RULING: Yes. Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. In this case, while the children of the first marriage were mentioned in the will, they were not accorded any share in the hereditary property, without expressly being disinherited. The omission of a forced heir or anyone of them, whether voluntary or involuntary, is a preterition if the purpose to disinherit is not expressly made or is not at least manifest. Except as to legacies and devises which shall remain valid insofar as they are not officious, preterition avoids the institution of heirs and gives rise to intestate succession. The will in this case, there being no legacies or devises, is void. 237) VIADO NON VS. CA G.R. No. 137287, 15 February 2000 FACTS: Spouses Julian and Virginia Viado owned, among others, a house and lot pertained to as the Isarog property. Virginia died on 20 October 1982, followed by Julian 3 years later. Left as heirs were their children namely: Rebecca Viado Non, Delia Viado, Nilo Viado, and Leah Viado Jacobs. Both Nilo and Leah died on 22 April 1987. Nilo left as heirs his wife Alicia and their 2 children. The children of spouses Viado lived in the Isarog property together with Nilos widow and children. However, a dispute arose when Rebecca Viado Non asked that the property be divided equally between the 2 families to make room for their growing children. Nilos wife and children claimed absolute ownership over the property evidence by a deed of donation executed by Julian in favour of Nilo, covering his conjugal share, and a deed of extrajudicial partition settlement in which Julian, Leah, and Rebecca waived in favour of Nilo all their interests and rights over their share of the
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property inherited from Virginia. Both documents were registered 5 years after its execution, and a new TCT is issued by the Register of Deeds in Nilos favor. Petitioner Rebecca contends that Delia Viado, their retardate sister, was not part of the extrajudicial settlement, and hence amounts to preterition which should invalidate the settlement. Both the trial court and CA ruled in favor of Nilos wife and children. Hence this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not Delias exclusion from the extrajudicial settlement amounts to preterition? RULING: Yes. However, in the absence of bad faith and fraud, Article 1104 of the Civil Code must apply which, in essence, provides that where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her. 238) PEREZ VS. GARCHITORENA G.R. No. L-31703, 13 February 1930 FACTS: Ana Maria Alcantara died testate. The pertinent provisions of her will are as follows: NINTH. Being single and without forced heir, to show my gratitude to my niece-in-law, Carmen Garchitorena, of age, married to my nephew, Joaquin Perez Alcantara xxx as my sole and universal heiress to the remainder of my estate xxx TENTH. Should my heiress Carmen Garchitorena dies, I order that my whole estate shall passu unimpaired to her surviving children; and should any of these die, his share shall serve to increase the portions of his surviving brothers (and sisters) by accretion, xxx the estate shall never pass out of the hands of my heiress or her children insofar as it is legally permissible. Among Ana Marias properties is a deposit amounting to Php 21,428.23 with La Urbana. Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for Php 7, 872.23 against Joaquin, Carmens husband. He attached the La Urbana deposit to satisfy his claims. Carmen secured an injunction restraining the execution. Garchitorena contends that the same can be levied because Carmen is a universal heiress. Carmen contends that the deposit belongs to Carmens children as fideicommissary heirs of Ana Maria. ISSUE: Whether or not the instant case is a fideicommissary substitution? RULING: Yes. Manresa provides 3 requisites for fideicommissary: 1. First heir called primarily to the enjoyment of the estate; 2. An obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve and transmit to a 3rd person the whole or a part of the estate; 3. Second heir. Applying the foregoing to the case, Carmen was called to the enjoyment of the estate according to the 9th clause of the will. Clause 10th which provides that the whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her (Carmens) surviving children, thus, instead of leaving Carmen at liberty to dispose of the estate by will, or by living the law to take its course in case she dies intestate, the said clause not only disposes of the estate in favour of the disposition thereof in case she should die after the testatrix. The children of Carmen are referred to as second heirs. Hence, the deposit does not belong to Carmen as her absolute property, but also to her children, from the moment of death of Ana Maria. It cannot be attached by Mariano. 239) RABADILLA VS. CA G.R. No. 113725, 29 June 2000 FACTS: Alejandra Belleza executed a Codicil making Jorge Rabadilla as her heir. The Codicil provides that she is bequeathing No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre and that should Dr. Rabadilla predecease her, the lot will go to his wife and children. She also stated that it shall be Dr. Rabadillas obligation to deliver in favour of Marlina Coscolluela 75 piculs of Export sugar and 35 piculs of domestic sugar, until Marlinas death. In case of Dr. Rabadillas death, his heir shall fulfil such obligation. In the event that Dr. Rabadilla or his heirs shall later sell, lease, mortgage the Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall also have the obligation to respect and deliver to Marlina yearly 100 piculs of sugar ever December. Dr. Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife and children. His son Johnny is herein petitioner. Marlina then filed a complaint against the heirs of Dr. Rabadilla for the enforcement of the Codicil. The parties came up with a Memorandum of Agreement whch was, however, not complied with by the heirs. The RTC dismissed the complaint.
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ISSUE: Whehter or not Dr. Rabadillas institution in the Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution? RULING: Yes. Article 882 of the New Civil Code provides that the statement of the object of the institution or the application of the property left by the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be considered as a condition unless it appears that such was his intention. That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the instituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the testator and for the return of anything he or they may receive, together with its fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard this obligation. Article 883 provides that when without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the preceding article cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it shall be complied with in a manner most analogous to and in conformity with his wishes. The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in article 882 is known as an institucion sub modo or modal substitution. In a modal substitution, the testator states: 1. The object of the institution; 2. Purpose or application o the property left by the testator; 3. Charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A mode imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficscy of his rights to the succession. In a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend. In this case, Alejandra intended Dr. Rabadilla to inherit the property. She likewise imposed an obligation on him and to his heirs to deliver 100 piculs of sugar to Marlina. However, Alejandra did not make Dr. Rabadillas inheritance and effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. Should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to Alejandras near descendants. The institution of Dr. Rabadilla is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution. Since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heirs should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal institution. 240) MORENTE VS. DE LA SANTA G.R. No. L-3891, 19 December 1907 FACTS: Consuelo Morente died testate. In her will, her husbnd Gumersindo de la Santa was made sole heir, subject to the condition that he shall not remarry, remain to live with her brothers, and that should he have children with anyone, the 2/3 of the estate shall remain for her brother Vicente, or the latters children, and the remaining 1/3 is subject to Gumersindos disposal. Gumersindo married again 4 months after his wifes death. Consuelos sister asked for the annulment of the legacy in the will on the ground of remarriage. She contends that the mere act off remarriage of Gumersindo strips him off of his rights acquired from the will. ISSUE: Whether or not Consulelos intention that Gumersindos remarriage would forfeit the legacy? RULING: No. Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions may be made confidential and Article 798 provides that a prohibition against another marriage may in certain cases be validly imposed upon the widow or widower. In this case, there was nothing in the will which would mean that it was Consuelos intention that Gumersindos remarriage would strip him of his rights from the legacy. There is no express condition attached to that legacy in references to the 2 nd marriage, as the will simply said he will not marry again. No condition was attached in case of noncompliance. 241) ROSALES VS. ROSALES No L-40789, 27 February 1987 FACTS: Petra Rosales died intestate, leaving as heirs her husband Fortunato and their 2 children. Carterio Rosales, also a child of Spouses Rosales, predeceased her, and left as heirs his son Macikequerox and widow Irenea. The estimated
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gross value of Petras estate was about Php 30, 000.00. Magna Rosales Acebes, her daughter, filed for intestate proceedings and was later on appointed as administratrix. The court then declared the following as Petras legal heirs, and their respective shares: 1. Fortunato Rosales (husband) ; 2. Magna Rosales Acebes (daughter) ; 3. Macikequerox Rosales (grandson) ; 4. Antonio Rosales (son) . Irena appealed, contending that as the surviving spouse of Carterio, she is compulsory heir of Petra together with her son. The court denied her plea. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? RULING: No. Intestate heirs/ legal heirs are divided into two: those who inherit in their own right (as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil Code), and those who inherit by right of representation as provided in Article 981 of the Civil Code. There is nothing in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The provisions of the Code which relates to intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. Article 887, from which Irenea bases her claim refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of the parent-inlaw. The surviving spouse is considered as a 3 rd person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law. The estate in this case is that of Petra Rosales, the mother-in-law of Irenea. It is from Petras estate that Macikequerox draws a share of the inheritance by right of representation as provided in Article 981. Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox is called to succession by law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father Carterio who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have succeeded. Irenea cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law. 242) FRANCISCO vs. FRANCISCO-ALFONSO G.R. No. 138774. March 8, 2001 FACTS: Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso (hereafter Aida) is the only daughter of spouses Gregorio Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, who are now both deceased. Petitioners, on the other hand, are daughters of the late Gregorio Francisco with his common law wife Julia Mendoza, with whom he begot seven (7) children. Gregorio Francisco (hereafter Gregorio) owned two parcels of residential land, situated in Barangay Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan, covered by TCT Nos. T-32740 and T-117160. When Gregorio was confined in a hospital in 1990, he confided to his daughter Aida that the certificates of title of his property were in the possession of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. After Gregorio died on July 20, 1990, Aida inquired about the certificates of title from her half sisters. They informed her that Gregorio had sold the land to them on August 15, 1983. After verification, Aida learned that there was indeed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. Thus, on August 15, 1983, Gregorio executed a Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan, whereby for P25,000.00, he sold the two parcels of land to Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. By virtue of the sale, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued TCT No. T-59.585 to Regina Francisco and TCT T-59.586 to Zenaida Pascual. On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan a complaint against petitioners for annulment of sale with damages. She alleged that the signature of her late father, Gregorio Francisco, on the Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15, 1983, was a forgery. In their joint answer to the complaint, petitioners denied the alleged forgery or simulation of the deed of sale. After due proceedings, on July 21, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. The Court of Appeals Reversed the decision of the RTC. ISSUE: May a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her deceased father by a simulated contract transferring the property of her father to his illegitimate children? HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the kasulatan was simulated. There was no consideration for the contract of sale. Felicitas de la Cruz, a family friend of the Franciscos, testified that Zenaida Pascual and
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Regina Francisco did not have any source of income in 1983, when they bought the property, until the time when Felicitas testified in 1991. As proof of income, however, Zenaida Pascual testified that she was engaged in operating a canteen, working as cashier in Mayon Night Club as well as buying and selling RTW (Ready to Wear) items in August of 1983 and prior thereto. Zenaida alleged that she paid her father the amount of P10,000.00. She did not withdraw money from her bank account at the Rural Bank of Meycauayan, Bulacan, to pay for the property. She had personal savings other than those deposited in the bank. Her gross earnings from the RTW for three years was P9,000.00, and she earned P50.00 a night at the club. Regina Francisco, on the other hand, was a market vendor, selling nilugaw, earning a net income of P300.00 a day in 1983. She bought the property from the deceased for P15,000.00. She had no other source of income.The testimonies of petitioners were incredible considering their inconsistent statements as to whether there was consideration for the sale and also as to whether the property was bought below or above its supposed market value. They could not even present a single witness to the kasulatan that would prove receipt of the purchase price. Since there was no cause or consideration for the sale, the same was a simulation and hence, null and void. Even if the kasulatan was not simulated, it still violated the Civil Code provisions insofar as the transaction affected respondents legitime. The sale was executed in 1983, when the applicable law was the Civil Code, not the Family Code. Obviously, the sale was Gregorios way to transfer the property to his illegitimate daughters at the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was executed to prevent respondent Alfonso from claiming her legitime and rightful share in said property. Before his death, Gregorio had a change of heart and informed his daughter about the titles to the property. According to Article 888, Civil Code: The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother. The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided. Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of land involved were the only property left by their father, the sale in fact would deprive respondent of her share in her fathers estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of her father as his only legitimate child. The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco must be determined in proper testate or intestate proceedings for settlement of the estate. His compulsory heir can not be deprived of her share in the estate save by disinheritance as prescribed by law.
243) NIEVA vs. ALCALA G.R. No. L-13386 October 27, 1920 FACTS: Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva, married Francisco Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo Deocampo was born. Juliana Nieva died intestate on April 19, 1889, and her said son, Alfeo Deocampo, inherited from her, ab intestate, the parcels of land described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint. Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and without issue on July 7, 1890. Thereupon the two parcels of land above-mentioned passed to his father, Francisco Deocampo, by intestate succession. Thereafter Francisco Deocampo married the herein defendant Manuela Alcala, of which marriage was born Jose Deocampo, the other defendant herein. Francisco Deocampo died on August 15, 1914, whereupon his widow and son, the defendants herein, took possession of the parcels of land in question, under the claim that the said son, the defendant Jose Deocampo (a minor) had inherited the same, ab intestate, from his deceased father. On September 30, 1915, the plaintiff herein, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of the said Juliana Nieva, instituted the present action for purposes of recovering from the defendants the parcels of land in question, particularly described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint, invoking the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff is an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased Juliana Nieva and if an illegitimate relative within the third degree is entitled to the reserva troncal provided for by article 811 of the Civil Code. HELD: The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the plaintiff was an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva, she was not entitled to the property here in question because, in its opinion, an illegitimate relative has no right to the reserva troncal under the provisions of article 811 of
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the Civil Code and which reads as follows: Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came. SC held that the object is to protect the patrimony of the legitimate family, following the precedents of the foral law. And it could not be otherwise. Article 943 denies to legitimate parents the right to succeed the natural child and viceversa, from which it must be deduced that natural parents neither have the right to inhering from legitimate ones; the law in the article cited established a barrier between the two families; properties of the legitimate family shall never pass by operation of law to the natural family. ( Ibid. pp. 251-252.) Article 943, above referred to provides as follows: A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child. To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural brother, Alfeo Deocampo, by operation of law, would be a fragrant violate of the express provision of the foregoing article (943). For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, without any finding as to costs. So ordered. 244) SOLIVIO vs. CA G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990 FACTS: This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr. He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban, Jr. was born. Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife (p. 325, Record), but no conjugal property was acquired during her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr. On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr. During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on February 26,1977 without having set up the foundation. Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased. Celedonia was appointed as the administratix of the estate and later on the court adjudicated her as the sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javallana Jr. and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 13207, in favor of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva. ISSUE: Whether or not the property of the deceased was subject to reserve troncal. HELD: The Court finds no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased was subject to reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal provision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads as follows: ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
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property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came. The persons involved in reserva troncal are: 1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)the ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from his descendants. 2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees (reservatarios)relatives within the third degree counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which the property came. 3. The propositusthe descendant who received by gratuitous title and died without issue, making his other ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.) Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891. Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code which provide: ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate. The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood. However, It is true that by the agreement, she did not waive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation, and therefore, Concordia is obligated to honor her commitment as Celedonia has honored hers. The petition for review was granted. The decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals were SET ASIDE. Concordia J. Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his estate. However, comformably with the agreement between her and her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of the deceased should be conveyed to the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javallana Foundation," of which both the petitioner and the private respondent shall be trustees, and each shall be entitled to nominate an equal number of trustees to constitute the Board of Trustees of the Foundation which shall administer the same for the purposes set forth in its charter. 245) SUMAYA vs. IAC G.R. No. 68843-44 September 2, 1991 FACTS: Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different ascendants the two (2) sets of properties subject of this case: 1) A one-third (1/3) interest, pro-indiviso in a parcel of land situated in Dita, Lilio (Liliw) Laguna from his father Jose, Sr., who died on January 28, 1945; and 2) A one-seventh (1/7) interest proindiviso in ten (10) parcels of registered lands from his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista, who died on November 3, 1950. On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and leaving only his mother, Consuelo Joaquin Vda. de Balantakbo, as his sole surviving heir to the real properties abovementioned. On November 3, 1952, Consuelo adjudicated unto herself the above described properties in an Affidavit entitled "Caudal Herederario del finado Raul Balantakbo." Consuelo then sold some properties to Mariquita H. Sumaya and Villa Honorio Development Corporation which the latter in turn transferred and assigned all its rights to the properties in favor of Laguna AgroIndustrial Coconut Cooperative. On June 3, 1968, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo died. On March 4, 1970, Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, and Erasto, all surnamed Balantakbo, brothers in full blood of Raul Balantakbo and Luisa, Jose and Dolores, also all surnamed Balantakbo, surviving children of deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr., another brother of the first named Balantakbos, filed the above mentioned civil cases to recover the properties described in the respective complaints which they claimed were subject to a reserva troncal in their favor. ISSUE: Whether or not the properties sold were
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subject to a reserva troncal and if it is necessary to reserve and annotate the same. HELD: The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the Balantakbos and the Coust of Appeals affirmed said decision. The SC Held that consistent with the rule in reserva viudal where the person obliged to reserve (the widowed spouse) had the obligation to annotate in the Registry of Property the reservable character of the property, in reserva troncal, the reservor (the ascendant who inherited from a descendant property which the latter inherited from another descendant) has the duty to reserve and therefore, the duty to annotate also. The jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Registry of Property of the right reserved in real property subject of reserva viudal insofar as it is applied to reserva troncal stays despite the abolition of reserva viudal in the New Civil Code. This rule is consistent with the rule provided in the second paragraph of Section 51 of P.D. 1529, which provides that: "The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned . . ." (emphasis supplied) The properties involved in this case are already covered by a Torrens title and unless the registration of the limitation is effected (either actual or constructive), no third persons shall be prejudiced thereby. The respondent appellate court did not err in finding that the cause of action of the private respondents did not prescribe yet. The cause of action of the reservees did not commence upon the death of the propositus Raul Balantakbo on June 13, 1952 but upon the death of the reservor Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo on June 3, 1968. Relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right (or property) is reserved have no title of ownership or of fee simple over the reserved property during the lifetime of the reservor. Only when the reservor should die before the reservees will the latter acquire the reserved property, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives within the third degree (See Velayo Bernardo v. Siojo, G.R. No. 36078, March 11, 1933, 58 Phil. 89). The reserva is extinguished upon the death of the reservor, as it then becomes a right of full ownership on the part of the reservatarios, who can bring a reivindicatory suit therefor. Nonetheless, this right if not exercised within the time for recovery may prescribe in ten (10) years under the old Code of Civil Procedure ( see Carillo v. De Paz, G.R. No. L-22601, October 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 467, 473) or in thirty years under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code. The actions for recovery of the reserved property was brought by herein private respondents on March 4, 1970 or less than two (2) years from the death of the reservor. Therefore, private respondents' cause of action has not prescribed yet. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is AFFIRMED, except for the modification on the necessity to annotate the reversable character of a property subject of reserva troncal. 246) RIOSA vs. ROCHA G.R. No. L-23770, February 18, 1926 FACTS: Maria Corral was united in marriage with the deceased Mariano Riosa, it being her first and only marriage and during which time she bore him three children named Santiago, Jose and Severina. The latter died during infancy and the other two survived their father, Mariano Riosa. Santiago Riosa, now deceased, married Francisca Villanueva, who bore him two children named Magin and Consolacion Riosa. Jose Riosa, also deceased, married Marcelina Casas and they had one child who died before the father, the latter therefore leaving no issue. Mariano Riosa left a will dividing his property between his two children, Santiago and Jose Riosa, giving the latter the eleven parcels of land described in the complaint. Upon the death of Jose Riosa he left a will in which he named his wife, Marcelina Casas, as his only heir. On May 16, 1917, the will of Jose Riosa was filed for probate. Notwithstanding the fact that Marcelina Casas was the only heir named in the will, on account of the preterition of Maria Corral who, being the mother of Jose Riosa, was his legitimate heir, I Marcelina Casas and Maria Corral, on the same date of the filing of the will for probate, entered into a contract by which they divided between themselves the property left by Jose Riosa, the eleven parcels of land described in the complaint being assigned to Maria Corral. Maria Coral then sold some parcels of land to Marcelina Casas and the latter to Pablo Rocha. However some of the parcels of land were returned by Pablo to Marcelina alleging that the said parcels of land were erroneously transferred by Maria to Marcelina. An action was brought by Magin Riosa, for whom the property should have been reserved,
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against Maria Corral, whose duty it was to reserve it, and against Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha as purchasers of parcels 10 and 11. The complaint prays that the property therein described be declared reservable property and that the plaintiffs Jose and Consolacion Riosa be declared reservees; that this reservation be noted in the registry of deeds; that the sale of parcels 10 and 11 to Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha be declared valid only in so far as it saves the right of reservation in favor of the plaintiff Magin Riosa and of the defendant Consolacion Riosa, and that this right of reservation be also noted on the deeds of sale executed in favor of Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha; ISSUE: Whether or not the parcels of land subject to reserva troncal necessitates the recording of which in the registry of deeds. HELD: The Supreme Court held that Marcelina Casas, as well as Pablo Rocha, Knew of the reservable character of the property when they bought it. They had knowledge of the provisions of the last will and testament of Mariano Riosa by virtue of which these parcels were transferred to Jose Riosa. Pablo Rocha was one of the legatees in the will. Marcelina Casas was the one who entered into the contract of partition with Maria Corral, whereby these parcels were adjudicated to the latter, as a legitimate heir of Jose Riosa. Pablo Rocha was the very person who drafted the contracts of sale of these parcels of land by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas and by the latter to himself. These facts, together with the relationship existing between Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha, the former a daughter-in-law and the latter a nephew of Maria Corral, amply support the conclusion that both of them knew that these parcels of land had been inherited by Maria Corral, as her legitime from her son Jose Riosa who had inherited them, by will, from his father Mariano Riosa, and were reservable property. Wherefore, the duty of Maria Corral of recording the reservable character of lots 10 and 11 has been transferred to Pablo Rocha and the reservees have an action against him to compel him to comply with this obligation. The judgment appealed from is modified and Pablo Rocha is ordered to record in the registry of deeds the reservable character of parcels 10 11, the subject of this complaint. 247) DE PAPA vs. CAMACHO G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986 FACTS: Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt and granduncles and having a common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of defendant. Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her said two children in equal pro-indiviso shares. Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of land now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 16545 and 16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, were adjudicated as the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the said three (3) parcels of land devolved upon her two legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in equal Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received the said property subject to a reserva troncal which was subsequently annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title. Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights and interests in the parcels of land abovementioned were inherited by her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject to the usufructuary right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo Tongko. Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived his only legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. TongkoCamacho. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned as her inheritance from her mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the other half of the said seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned by virtue of the reserva troncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon and under the laws on intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal advice, oppose her said claim because they claim three-
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fourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which interest was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their being also third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon. ISSUE: Whether or not all relatives of the praepositus within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista, or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of said relatives are subject to, and should be determined by, the rules on intestate succession. HELD: The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Padura vs. Baldovino,, declared the principles of intestacy to be controlling, Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession, the plaintiffsappellees must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the praepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the defendantappellant, although they are related to him within the same degree as the latter. The court, therefore, held, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed. Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is no doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees would have been excluded by the defendant-appellant under the rules of intestate succession. There is no reason why a different result should obtain simply because "the transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva;" 6 i.e., the property took a "detour" through an ascendant-thereby giving rise to the reservation before its transmission to the reservatario. Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defendant-appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees. WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and set aside and the complaint is dismissed. 248) LLorente vs. Rodriguez, et. Al. G.R. NO. L-3339, MARCH 26, 1908 FACTS: Martina Avalle, widow of Llorente, had during her marriage four legitimate children named Jacinta, Julio, Martin, and Francisco, all with the surname of Llorente y Avalle. In the will executed by her on the 31st of December, 1900, she instituted as her sole and general heirs her three first-named children, Jacinta, Julio, and Martin, and the children of the late Francisco, named Soledad and Adela Llorente. Jacinta died prior to the testatrix, on the 11th of August, 1901, leaving several legitimate children with the surname of Rodriguez y Llorente, and besides them, a natural daughter named Rosa Llorente. The said Rosa Llorente, the natural daughter of Jacinta Llorente, wanted to become a party in the proceedings for the probate of the will of Martina Avalle, but the legitimate children of the said Jacinta Llorente objected thereto on the ground that they were the sole and exclusive heirs of their mother, the late Jacinta Llorente, and that the plaintiff, Rosa Llorente, absolutely cannot be a party thereto. The Court of First Instance of Cebu, where the will was admitted for probate, held that Rosa Llorente had no right whatever to the inheritance of the late Martina Avalle, and denied her all right to intervene in the proceedings regarding the estate of the said deceased. ISSUE: Whether or not the hereditary portion which Martina Avalle left in her will to her legitimate daughter Jacinta Llorente, and which the latter had not been able to possess because of her death before that of the testatrix, should also pass to her natural daughter, Rosa Llorente, the same as to her legitimate children. HELD: No. From the fact that a natural son has the right to inherit from the father or mother who acknowledged him, conjointly with the other legitimate children of either of them, it does not follow that he has the right to represent either of them in the succession to their legitimate ascendants; his right is direct and immediate in relation to the father or mother who acknowledged him, but it cannot be indirect by representing them in the succession to their ascendants to whom he is not related in any manner, because he does not
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appear among the legitimate family of which said ascendants are the head. If Jacinta Llorente had survived her mother, Martina Avalle, she would have inherited from her, and in what she inherited from her mother, her natural daughter, Rosa Llorente would have participated, in conjunction with her legitimate children, from the day in which the succession became operative, because she would then appear by virtue of her own right to inherit from her mother the legal quota that pertained to her; but, not because she has said right, would she also be entitled to that of representation, inasmuch as there is no legal provision establishing such a doctrine; that Rosa Llorente might and should inherit from her natural mother is one thing, and that she should have the right to inherit from her who would be called her natural grandmother, representing her natural mother, is quite another thing. The latter right is not recognized by the law in force. Therefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed. because she failed to show him due respect and on a certain occasion raised her hand against him. On his will, Florencio Pecson state that he disinherited Rosario Mediavillo "because she was grossly disrespectful to me and because on one occasion, when it was I do not remember, she raised her hand against me. Therefore it is my will that she, the said Rosario Mediavillo, shall have no share in my property." ISSUES: Whether or not the court may inquire into the cause of the disinheritance and decide whether there is a ground for such disinheritance. Whether or not Basiliso Mediavillo, the father of Joaquin Mediavillo, is the latters heir by representation. HELD: Yes, the Civil Code (art. 848) provides that disinheritance shall only take place for one of the causes expressly fixed by law. In accordance with the provisions of that article (848) we find that articles 756 and 853 provide the cases or causes for disinheritance; or, in other words, the cases or causes in which the ancestors may by will disinherit their heirs. Article 849 of the Civil Code provides that the disinheritance can only be effected by the testament, in which shall be mentioned the legal grounds or causes for such disinheritance. If it is true that heirs can be disinherited only by will, and for causes mentioned in the Civil Code, it would seen to follow that the courts might properly inquire whether the disinheritance has been made properly and for the causes provided for by law. The right of the courts to inquire into the causes and whether there was sufficient cause for the disinheritance or not, seems to be supported by express provisions of the Civil Code. Article 850 provides that "the proof of the truthfulness of the reason for disinheritance shall be established by the heirs of the testator, should the disinherited person deny it." It would appear then that if the person disinherited should deny the truthfulness of the cause of disinheritance, he might be permitted to support his allegation by proof. The right of the court to inquire whether or not the disinheritance was made for just cause is also sustained by the provisions of article 851, which in part provides that:Disinheritance made without statement of the
249) FILOMENA PECSON, as administratix of the last will and testament of Florencio Pecson, et al. vs. ROSARIO MEDIAVILLO 28 PHIL. 81 FACTS: Some time prior to the 17th day of September, 1910, the last will and testament of Florencio Pecson was presented to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay for probate. Mr. Tomas Lorayes, an attorney at law, opposed the legislation of the will on the ground that it had not been authorized nor signed by the deceased. However, after hearing the respective parties, the court found that the will had been signed and executed in accordance with the provisions of law. On the 18th day of September, 1910, the said Tomas Lorayes, representing Basiliso Mediavillo and Rosario Mediavillo, presented a motion alleging that Rosario Mediavillo is and Joaquin Mediavillo was a legitimate child of the deceased Teresa Pecson. Teresa was a daughter of the testator; that the said granddaughter, Rosario Mediavillo y Pecson, was disinherited by her grandfather, the testator Florencio Pecson, according to clause 3 of the will,
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reason, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, should not be proven . . . shall annul the designation of heirship, in so far as it prejudices the person disinherited. With reference to the second assignment of error, The Supreme Court held that the right of representation shall always take place in the direct descending line, but never in the ascending. In collateral lines, it shall take place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the whole or half blood. It will be remembered that the whole argument of the appellants with reference to the first assignment of error was that Rosario Mediavillo had been disinherited and the court evidently believed that there were no "legitimate children, descendants of the deceased, surviving," and that therefore the father or mother of said legitimate children would inherit as ascendants. Inasmuch, however, as there was a descendant in the direct line, surviving, the inheritance could not ascend, and for the reason the lower court committed an error in declaring that Basiliso Mediavillo was entitled to inherit that share of the estate that would have belonged to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been living. Therefore, and for all the foregoing, that part of the judgment of the lower court nullifying and setting aside paragraph 3 of the will is hereby affirmed, and that art of said judgment which decrees to Basiliso Mediavillo one-half of the estate of Florencio Pecson, belonging to Teresa Pecson and which would have been given to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been surviving, is hereby revoked. And without any findings as to costs, it is hereby ordered that the cause be remanded to the lower court. last will and testament. In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandros will to probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void. The trial court granted the motion and issued an order, declaring Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and declaring the oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda Dorotheo Quintana as the only heirs of the late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes, whose respective estates shall be liquidated and distributed according to the laws on intestacy upon payment of estate and other taxes due to the government. Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they were not married to each other. Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed for failure to file appellants brief within the extended period granted. This dismissal became final and executory on February 3, 1989 and a corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals on May 16, 1989. Petitioner assails the Order of the Court of Appeals upholding the validity of the January 30, 1986 Order which declared the intrinsic invalidity of Alejandros will that was earlier admitted to probate. Issue: May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that has become final and executory still be given effect? Held: The petition is without merit. It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated, particularly on three aspects: whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedents last will and testament; compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills; the testamentary capacity of the testator; and the due execution of the last will and testament. Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of sound
250) DOROTHEO vs CA 320 SCRA 12 FACTS: Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after Alejandros death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latters
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and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is genuine and not a forgery, that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will. The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, i[13] the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and executory decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that character of finality is binding on this Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory decision of which the party had the opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals must stand and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was aggrieved by a decision or court action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is satisfied with the decision or order Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the will, as she precisely appealed from an unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and executory Order of January 30, 1986 wherein private respondents were declared as the only heirs do not bind those who are not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son of the testator, the same constitutes res judicata with respect to those who were parties to the probate proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise those matters anew for relitigation otherwise that would amount to forum-shopping. It is clear from the executory order that the estates of Alejandro and his spouse should be distributed according to the laws of intestate succession. No intestate distribution of the estate can be done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity that is whether the provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of succession. In this case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial court. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. 251) URIARTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BENEDICTO ESTRADA 284 SCRA 511 FACTS: Agatonica Arreza is the offspring of Pedro Arreza and Ursula Tubil. The Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is the son of Agatonica. Upon the death of Pedro Arreza, Ursula married Juan Arnaldo by whom she had another daughter, the decedent Justa. Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is thus the nephew of Justa by her half sister Agatonica. Domingo Arnaldo is the brother of Juan Arnaldo. Domingo and his wife Catalina Azarcon had a daughter, Primitiva Arnaldo. Primitiva then married Conrado Uriarte who had children, one of whom was Pascasio Uriarte. The widow and daughters of Pascasio are the petitioners in his case. Petitioners are thus grandchildren, the relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity, of Justa by her cousin Primitiva Arnaldo Uriarte. The other petitioners are the children of Primitiva and those of her brother Gregorio. The children of Primitiva by Conrado Uriarte, aside from Pascasio, are Josefina, Gaudencio, Simplicio, Domingo and Virgilio, all surnamed Uriarte. The children of Gregorio Arnaldo, Primitiva's brother, by Julieta Ilogon, are Jorencio, Enecia, Nicolas, Lupecino and Felisa. These other petitioners are thus grandchildren and relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity of Justa by her cousins Gregorio Arnaldo and Primitiva Arnaldo. Private respondent Benedicto Estrada brought this case in the Regional Trial Court for the partition of the land left by Justa Arnaldo-Sering. The land, consisting of 2.7 hectares, had been acquired by Justa as follows: 0.5 hectare by inheritance from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, and 2.2 hectares by purchase. Private respondent claimed to be the sole surviving heir of Justa, on the ground that the latter died without issue. He complained that Pascasio Uriarte who, he claimed, worked the land as Justa's tenant, refused to give him (private respondent) his share of the harvest. He contended
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that Pascasio had no right to the entire land of Justa but could claim only one-half of the 0.5 hectare land which Justa had inherited from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil. Pascasio died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by his heirs. In their answer, the heirs denied they were mere tenants of Justa but the latter's heirs entitled to her entire land. They claimed that the entire land, subject of the case, was originally owned by Ambrocio Arnaldo, their great granduncle. It was allegedly bequeathed to Domingo and Juan Arnaldo, Ambrocio's nephews, in a holographic will executed by Ambrocio in 1908. Domingo was to receive two-thirds of the land and Juan, one-third. The heirs claimed that the land had always been in their possession and that in her lifetime Justa never asserted exclusive right over the property but only received her share of the harvest from it. They alleged that private respondent did not have any right to the property because he was not an heir of Ambrocio Arnaldo, the original owner of the property. ISSUE: Whether a nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant or spouse survive the decedent HELD: YES. Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and private respondent. As already stated, private respondent is the son of Justa's half-sister Agatonica. He is therefore Justa's nephew. A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the decedent. That private respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify him from being his aunt's heir. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, "The determination of whether the relationship is of the full or half blood is important only to determine the extent of the share of the survivors. 252) SAYSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS 205 SCRA 321 FACTS: Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on 1952, and Rafaela on 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on 1972. His wife died nine years later, on, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children. 253) Bagunu vs. Piedad G.R. No. L-66574 June 17, 1987 Doctrine: The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply. By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by operation of law, "raised to the same place and degree" of relationship as that of a closer blood On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedent's lawful descendants. Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children. The complainants asserted the defense, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation. ISSUE: Whether the adopted children of Teodoro (Delia and Edmundo) are entitled to inherit Teodoros share by right of representation? HELD:NO! There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other children. But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.
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relative of the same decedent. In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts. The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, fourth decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction. Facts: On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in Special Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad," pending before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 117, of Pasay City. Asserting entitlement to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad, petitioner assailed the finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad contending that the proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities, including an incomplete publications of the notice of hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the estate. Issue: WON petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, can inherit alongside respondent, a collateral relative of the third civil degree? Elsewise stated does the rule of proximity in intestate succession find application among collateral relatives? Held:No. Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or ascendants. Respondent is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a third-degree relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or a fifthdegree relative of the decedent. The right of representation does not apply to "others collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, fourth decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction. Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding an intestato to the estate of the decedent. 254) DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, petitioners, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al., vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, respondents 182 SCRA 427 FACTS: ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, FACTS: Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the CFI of Cavite in a special proceeding "In The Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero," praying among other things, that the corresponding letters of Administration be issued in her favor and that she be appointed as special Administratrix of the properties of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion. Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy. Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero. Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
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Pascual Santero died in 1970, while Pablo Santero died in 1973 and Simona Santero died in 1976. Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa. In 1976, the court declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit: Petition for the Letters of Administration of the intestate Estate of Pablo Santero; Petition for the Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of Pascual Santero; Petition for Guardianship over the properties of an incompetent Person, Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; and Petition for Settlement of the Intestate Estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene was allowed to intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and Pascual Santero by Order of the Court in 1977. Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, filed her "Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estate of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero. Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children. In 1980, the court issued an order excluding Felisa Jardin "from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and declared her to be, not an heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero." Felisa Jardin filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and it was denied by the trial court. On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the decision of the trial court and declaring the Felisa Jardin as the sole heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and ordering oppositors-appellees not to interfere in the proceeding for the declaration of heirship in the estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. ISSUE: Whether petitioners as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda, de Santero. HELD: NO. Since the hereditary conflict refers solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which reads as follows: ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (943a) Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the oppositors (petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992, Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of the letter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier provided for under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code. It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. The record shows that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor
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natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. will be excluded by the illegitimate son, Francisco Udan, as sole intestate heir, by operation of law. The death of Francisco two years after his mother's demise does not improve the situation of appellants. The rights acquired by the former are only transmitted by his death to his own heirs at law not to the appellants, who are legitimate brothers of his mother, for the reason that, as correctly decided by the court below, the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child. This is clear from Article 992 of the Civil Code. The legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child. This is clear from Article 992 of the Civil Code. David T. Tolentino 256) ISABEL DE LA PUERTA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CARMELITA DE LA PUERTA, respondents. G.R. No. 77867 February 6, 1990 CRUZ, J.: FACTS: The testator, Dominga Revuelta died on July 3, 1966, at the age of 92, leaving her properties to her three surviving children, Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel. Isabel was given the free portion in addition to her legitime and was appointed executrix of the will. Vicente and Alfredo opposed the petition for the probate of the will filed by Isabel. The two claimed that their mother was already senile at the time of the execution of the will and did not fully comprehend its meaning, that the properties listed in the inventory of her estate belonged to them exclusively. Alfredo subsequently died, leaving Vicente the lone oppositor. Vicente de la Puerta filed with the CFI of Quezon, a petition to adopt Carmelita de la Puerta, which was thereafter granted. Isabel appealed the said decision to the CA. Vicente died during the pendency of the appeal, prompting her to move for the dismissal of the case. Carmelita filed a motion for the payment to her of a monthly allowance as the acknowledged natural child of Vicente de la Puerta. The said motion was granted by the probate court granted the motion, declaring that Carmelita was a natural child of Vicente de la Puerta and was entitled to the amounts claimed for her support. CA affirmed this order of the lower court. Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner's main argument is that Carmelita was not the natural child of Vicente de la Puerta, who was married to Genoveva de la Puerta in 1938 and remained his wife until his death in
255) WENCESLA CACHO, petitioner-appellee, vs. JOHN G. UDAN, and RUSTICO G. UDAN, oppositors-appellants. G.R. No. L-19996 April 30, 1965 REYES, J.B.L., J. FACTS: John, Rustico and Silvina are siblings. Silvina G. Udan died leaving a purported will naming her illegitimate son, Francisco G. Udan, and one Wencesla Cacho, as her sole heirs, share and share alike. During the probate of the will, opposition was made by her two brothers on the ground that the will was not attested and executed as required by law, that the testatrix was incapacitated to execute it; and that it was procured by fraud or undue influence. Francisco died pending the probate. The RTC denied the oppositions filed by the two brothers. Hence, this appeal ISSUE: WON oppositor brothers, John and Rustico Udan, may claim to be heirs intestate of their legitimate sister, the late Silvina Udan. HELD: The Court ruled that the court below correctly held that they were not, for at the time of her death Silvina's illegitimate son, Francisco Udan, was her heir intestate, to the exclusion of her brothers under Articles 988 and 1003 of the governing Civil Code of the Philippines in force at the time of the death of the testatrix It decreed that collateral relatives of one who died intestate inherit only in the absence of descendants, ascendants, and illegitimate children. Albeit the brothers and sisters can concur with the widow or widower under Article 1101, they do, not concur, but are excluded by the surviving children, legitimate or illegitimate (Art. 1003). The trial court committed no error in holding that John and Rustico Udan had no standing to oppose the probate of the will. For if the will is ultimately probated John and Rustico are excluded by its terms from participation in the estate; and if probate be denied, both oppositors-appellants
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1978. Carmelita's real parents are Juanito Austrial and Gloria Jordan. ISSUE: WON respondent Carmelita de la Puerta, can claim successional rights to the estate of her alleged grandmother. HELD: The Court held that Vicente de la Puerta did not predecease his mother and Carmelita is a spurious child. It is settled that in testamentary succession, the right of representation can take place only in the following cases: first, when the person represented dies before the testator; second, when the person represented is incapable of succeeding the testator; and third, when the person represented is disinherited by the testator. In all of these cases, since there is a vacancy in the inheritance, the law calls the children or descendants of thefiliation of private respondent Carmelita de la Puerta, who claims successional rights to the estate of her alleged grandmother. person represented to succeed by right of representation. The law is clear that there is representation only when relatives of a deceased person try to succeed him in his rights which he would have had if still living. Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta, her son Vicente had the right to inherit from her directly or in his own right. No right of representation was involved, nor could it be invoked by Carmelita upon her father's death, which came after his own mother's death. It would have been different if Vicente was already dead when Dominga Revuelta died. Carmelita could then have inherited from her in representation of her father Vicente, assuming the private respondent was a lawful heir. As a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita is barred from inheriting from Dominga because of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which lays down the barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families. This article provides quite clearly: Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. Even as an adopted child, Carmelita would still be barred from inheriting from Dominga Revuelta for there would be no natural kindred ties between them and consequently, no legal ties to bind them either. Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of Vicente de la Puerta, has successional rights to the intestate estate of her father but not to the estate of Dominga Revuelta. Her claims for support and inheritance should therefore be filed in the proceedings for the settlement of her own father's estate and cannot be considered in the probate of Dominga Revuelta's will. David T. Tolentino 257) BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA MANUEL, MADRONA MANUEL, ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL, BASILISA MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and NUMERIANA MANUEL, petitioners, vs. HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Lingayen, Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL, respondents. G.R. No. 117246 August 21, 1995 VITUG, J.: FACTS: The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is the inheritance left by an illegitimate child who died intestate without any surviving descendant or ascendant. Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling, filed this suit. During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with Ursula Bautista. From this relationship, a child named Juan Manuel was born. Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land, with an area of 2,700 sqm was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel. Two other parcels of land, were later bought by Juan and registered in his name. The couple were not blessed with a child that is why they took private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own "daughter." On June 3, 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land. Juan Manuel died intestate on February 21, 1990. Two years later, Esperanza Gamba also passed away. A month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an Affidavit of SelfAdjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land. Following the registration of the document of adjudication with the Office of the Register of Deeds, the three titles in the name of Juan Manuel were canceled and new titles, were issued in the name of Modesta Manuel-Baltazar. Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa Manuel a
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Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. The petitioners filed a complaint filed before the RTC Lingayen, Pangasinan, seeking the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments. The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that petitioners, not being heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate brother Juan Manuel, were not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit. The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the trial court. Hence, this Petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: WON the petitioners are entitled to inherit in the intestate estate of their illegitimate brother, Juan Manuel. RULING: The Court ruled that the petitioners are not entitled to inherit from the intestate estate of their illegitimate brother, Juan Manuel under ARTICLE 992, an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relative inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. The principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family wherein such doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions. A barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family from members of the legitimate family wherein the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the illegitimate child. Admittedly in her answer, Modesta is not an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. A ward, without the benefit of formal/judicial adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. Nevertheless, the complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three TCT's issued to her favor, as well as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly dismissed by the trial court. David T. Tolentino 258) OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners, vs. ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUALBAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUALMARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents. G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992 PARAS, J.: Facts: Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual. Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children. Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a Special Proceeding for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband. On October 16, 1985, all the heirs entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual The Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their uncle. On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights. Both the RTC and CA dismissed the submitted Motions as well as Motions for reconsideration reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Issue: WON Article 992 excludes recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased. Ruling: The Court dismissed the instant petition for lack of merit and affirmed the assailed decision of the
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respondent Court of Appeals. It cited the previous decided case of Diaz v. IAC, where such Court ruled that Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children. Applying the doctrine, respondent IAC did not err in holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father. David T. Tolentino 259) MANUEL SARITA, ET AL., plaintiffsappellants, vs. ANDRES CANDIA, defendantappellee. G.R. No. L-7768 November 14, 1912 ARELLANO, C.J.: FACTS: Spouses Apolinario Cedenio and Roberta Montesa are allegedly the owners of a parcel of land apparently of an area of 2 cavanes of corn upon which they had planted fruit trees. Respondent Candia claims ownership over the land having purchased the same from Villarosa, the vendee of Apolinario. Petitioners claim on the other hand, that as nieces and nephews,they are the collateral heirs of Apolinario, through the latters brothers and sisters. Sarita, however, is the grandnephew of Apolinario. The RTC absolved the defendant from the complainant, on the grounds that, with regard to the animals and real property sued for, there was no proof whatever that they were in possession of the spouses at the time of their death, and, with respect to the land: (1) That the defendant was the possessor in good faith continuously and was presumed to hold under just title so long as the contrary should not be proved; and (2) that neither the plaintiffs nor their alleged predecessors in interest made demand for it during the period of twenty-six years, since the ownership thereof was conveyed by Isidario or Apolinario Cedeo to Juan Basa Villarosa, on the 24th of June, 1881, it being that during this very long period of time they did not obtain possession of the property. Hence, the judgment having been appealed through a bill exceptions. ISSUE: WON grandnephews have a right of representation over the estate of the deceased. HELD: The Court ruled that the right of representation is limited to nephews and nieces who are children of brothers and sisters of decedent. The plaintiff Sarita who joins as the representative of his grandfather in a complaint with others, who are brothers and nephews of the predecessor in interest, lacks such right of representation, for it belongs in the collateral line only to the nephews and not to the grandnephews. Hence, sister and nephews of the deceased having appeared to claim the inheritance, they, as the nearest of kin, exclude a remote relative like a grandnephew. David T. Tolentino 260) CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA DOMINGO, respondents. G.R. No. 121027 July 31, 1997 REGALADO, J.: FACTS: This case involves an action for reconveyance filed by herein petitioners against herein private respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as the aforesaid Civil Case No. Q-88-1054, over a parcel of land with a house and apartment thereon located at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and which was originally owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. Petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and nephew, respectively, of the deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero who is the sister of
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petitioner's father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation. Records revealed that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse, Martin, executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66886, as a consequence of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 358074 was issued in the name of Martin Guerrero. Martin Guerrero then sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 was issued in the latter's name. After Martin Guerreros death, Petitioners filed an action for reconveyance claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation. Both the RTC and CA granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the complaint for reconveyance and declared that the documentary evidence presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: WON petitioners failed to meet the quantum of proof required by Article 172 of the Family Code to establish legitimacy and filiation HELD: The Court ruled for the petitioners and reversed and set aside the questioned judgment of respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioners and Private Respondent were declared co-owners of the subject property with an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share therein, respectively. The Court considered two points: First is the issue on petitioner's legitimacy. The documentary evidence adduced by petitioners, taken separately and independently of each other, are not per se sufficient proof of legitimacy nor even of pedigree. It seems that the lower courts have regrettably overlooked the universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally. The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate children of Hermogenes Dezoller cannot be properly controverted in the present action for reconveyance. This is aside, of course, from the further consideration that private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. The presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of petitioners unless and until it is rebutted. Indubitably, when private respondent opted not to present countervailing evidence to overcome the presumption, by merely filing a demurrer to evidence instead, she in effect impliedly admitted the truth of such fact. Indeed, she overlooked or disregarded the evidential rule that presumptions like judicial notice and admissions, relieve the proponent from presenting evidence on the facts he alleged and such facts are thereby considered as duly proved. Second is the question regarding their filiation with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. The Court is sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance where the general requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of the declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. More importantly, there is in the present case an absolute failure by all and sundry to refute that declaration made by the decedent. From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the sole basis of the decedent's declaration and without need for further proof thereof, that petitioners are the niece and nephew of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. Applying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless produce the same result. For while the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on their admissibility, we are however of the considered opinion that the same may be admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence. David T. Tolentino 261) ZOSIMA VERDAD vs. CA G.R. No. 109972 April 29, 1996
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VITUG, J.: FACTS: Petitioner Zosima Verdad is the purchaser of a 248square meter residential lot at Magallanes Street, now Marcos M. Calo St., Butuan City. Private respondent Socorro Cordero Vda. de Rosales, seeks to exercise a right of legal redemption over the subject property and traces her title to the late Macaria Atega, her mother-in-law, who died intestate on 08 March 1956. During her lifetime, Macaria contracted two marriages: the first with Angel Burdeos and the second, following the latter's death, with Canuto Rosales. At the time of her own death, Macaria was survived by her son Ramon A. Burdeos and her grandchild (by her daughter Felicidad A. Burdeos) Estela Lozada of the first marriage and her children of the second marriage, namely, David Rosales, Justo Rosales, Romulo Rosales, and Aurora Rosales (notice that other respondents in this case are the children from the 2 nd marriage). Socorro is the wife of David Rosales who sometime after the death of Macaria, died intestate without issue. It was discovered that the heirs of Ramon Buderos sold the lot in question to petitioner in an instrument dated 14, June 1982 (for P55,460) and another instrument on 14 Nov 1982 (this time a duly notarized deed of sale for P23,000), which sale was later discovered by respondent Socorro on 30 Mar 1987. Settlement was attempted at the Failure of settlement at the Lupong Tagapamayapa prompted the Respondent to initiated a case for the "Legal Redemption with Preliminary Injunction" before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City. RTC decided that the private respondents' right to redeem the property had already lapsed. On appeal by respondents, Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts decision declaring plaintiff-appellant, Socorro C. Rosales, entitled to redeem the inheritance rights (Art. 1088, NCC) or pro indiviso share (Art. 1620, NCC) of the Heirs of Ramon Burdeos, Sr. in Lot 529, Ts-65 of the Butuan Cadastre, within the remaining ELEVEN (11) DAYS from finality hereon, unless written notice of the sale and its terms are received in the interim, under the same terms and conditions appearing under Exhibit "J" and after returning the purchase price of P23,000.00 within the foregoing period. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON respondents may initiate redemption proceedings over the lot, her not being a legal coheir, as well as the timeliness of that the said case was instituted. HELD: The Court denied the petition. On the contention of petitioner as to the capacity of Socorro to initiate the redemption proceedings, the Court ruled that Respondent possess the capacity to ask for a redemption. It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law (or, for that matter, a mere relative by affinity), is not an intestate heir of her parents-in-law; however, Socorro's right to the property is not because she rightfully can claim heirship in Macaria's estate but that she is a legal heir of her husband, David Rosales, part of whose estate is a share in his mother's inheritance. David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his mother's death. When Macaria died on 08 March 1956 her estate passed on to her surviving children, among them David Rosales, who thereupon became co-owners of the property. When David Rosales himself later died, his own estate, which included his undivided interest over the property inherited from Macaria, passed on to his widow Socorro and her co-heirs pursuant to the law on succession(Art 995 and 1001). Socorro and herein private respondents, along with the co-heirs of David Rosales, thereupon became co-owners of the property that originally descended from Macaria. As to the timeliness of the filing of the petition, the Court ruled that such was exercised on time. Concededly, no written notice of the sale was given by the Burdeos heirs (vendors) to the coowners required under Article 1623 of the Civil Code. Hence, the thirty-day period of redemption had yet to commence when private respondent Rosales sought to exercise the right of redemption on 31 March 1987, a day after she discovered the sale from the Office of the City Treasurer of Butuan City, or when the case was initiated, on 16 October 1987, before the trial court. The written notice of sale is mandatory. This Court has long established the rule that notwithstanding actual knowledge of a coowner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and status. David T. Tolentino
262) FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant, vs.GAUDENCIA
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FERRARIS DE BORROMEO, CATALINA FERARIS DE VILLEGAS, JUANITO FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS, oppositors-appellees. G.R. No. L-19382 August 31, 1965 FACTS: Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided in Manilacontinuously until 1944. More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and distributing her estate among her heirs. Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City. The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent). The trial court ruled that the appellees, as children of the only predeceased brother of the decedent, are nearer in degree than the appellant since nieces and nephews succeed by right of representation. ISSUE: Who amongst the claimants are entitled to the inheritance? HELD: We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and then descending to the heir. Appellant is likewise right in her contention that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (i.e., per stripes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased. Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. Under Article 1009, the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. Brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the latter vis-a-vis the other collaterals. Therefore, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed. 263) BICOMONG vs. ALMANZA G.R. No. L-37365 Nov. 29, 1977 Facts: Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas having three children: Perpetua, Igmedia and Ignacio. When Sisenda died, Simeon married Silvestra producing two children: Felipa and Maura. The subject matter of the complaint concerns the one-half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the 5 parcels of land which she inherited from her deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso. Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint, namely: (a) the Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos, children of Igmedia Bagsic; and (c) Francisco Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City against the defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio Menese for the recovery of their lawful shares in the properties left by Maura Bagsic. After the death of Maura Bagsic, properties passed on to Cristela Almanza who took charge of the administration of the same. Thereupon, the plaintiffs approached her and requested for the partition of their aunt's properties. However, they were prevailed upon by Cristeta Almanza not to divide the properties yet as the expenses for the last illness and burial of Maura Bagsic had not yet been paid. Having agreed to defer the partition of the same, the plaintiffs brought out the subject again sometime in 1959 only. This time Cristeta Almanza acceded to the request as the debts, accordingly, had already been paid. Unfortunately, she died without the division of the properties having been effected, thereby leaving the possession and administration of the same to the defendants. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. The respondents have the right to inherit from Maura by right of representation. The appellate court certified the case to the Supreme Court.
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Issue: Whether the nephews and nieces from the brothers and sisters whether full or half blood has the right to inherit Held: Yes. The nephews and nieces from the brothers and sisters whether full or half blood has the right to inherit. In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, Art. 1003 of the NCC provides that collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. It appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (10) children of her brother and two (2) sisters of half blood in accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the NCC. Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to whether the nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and without preference as to whether their relationship to the deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole niece of whole blood of the deceased does not exclude the ten nephews and n of half blood. The only difference in their right of succession is provided in Art. 1008, NCC in relation to Art. 1006 of the NCC, which provisions, in effect, entitle the sole niece of full blood to a share double that of the nephews and nieces of half blood. 264) CITY OF MANILA VS. ARCHBISHOP G.R. No. L-10033 / August 30, 1917 FACTS: In 1668, Ana Sarmiento resided with her husband in the City of Manila. She owned properties consisted of five parcels of land in Malate and Paco. She made a will and later on added a codicil to said will. The will contained provisions for the establishment of a "Capellania de Misas"; that the first chaplain of said capellania should be her nephew Pedro del Castillo; that said will contained a provision for the administration of said property in relation with the said "Capellania de Misas" succeeding administration should continue perpetually. In 1672, Ana Sarmiento died. For more than two hundred years, respondent Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, through his various agencies, has administered said property. Petitioner city of Manila filed an action before the CFI to have declared escheated to the city of Manila the mentioned property. The theory of the petitioner is that one Ana Sarmiento was the owner of said property and died in the year 1668 without leaving "her or person entitled to the same." However, the respondent opposed alleging that it has rightfully and legally succeeded to the possession and administration of the property in accordance with the terms and provisions of the will of Ana Sarmiento. The trial court denied the petition. ISSUE: Whether the property can be escheated in favor of City of Manila. HELD: No Section 750 of Act No. 190 provides when property may be declared escheated. It provides, "when a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal property . . . leaving no heir or person by law entitled to the same," that then and in that case such property under the procedure provided for by sections 751 and 752, may de declared escheated. The proof shows that Ana Sarmiento did not die intestate. She left a will. The will provides for the administration of said property by her nephew as well as for the subsequent administration of the same. She did not die without an heir nor without persons entitled to administer her estate. It further shows that she did not die without leaving a person by law entitled to inherit her property. Therefore, the property in question cannot be declared escheated. The will clearly, definitely and unequivocally defines and designates what disposition shall be made of the property in question. The heir mentioned in said will evidently accepted its terms and permitted the property to be administered in accordance therewith. And, so far as the record shows, it is still being administered in accordance with the terms of said will for the benefit of the real beneficiary as was intended by the original owner. 265) TORRES vs. LOPEZ G.R. No. L-25966 November 1, 1926 FACTS: Tomas Rodriguez, had been judicially declared incapable of taking care of himself and had been placed under the care of his cousin Vicente F. Lopez, as guardian. The will instituted as universal heirs of all his property his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno and cousin Lopez. Lopez died 4 days from the time the will was made and the testator died about a month thereafter. The time the will was made Lopez had not presented his final accounts as
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guardian, and no such accounts had been presented by him at the time of his death. Margarita Lopez was a cousin and nearest relative of the decedent, filed a case claiming half of the estate of Tomas by intestate succession as next of kin and nearest heir. Luz, on the other hand, claims the same by accretion and in the character of universal heir under the will of Tomas. Appellant contends that there has supervened a partial intestacy with respect to the half of the estate which was intended for Vicente F. Lopez and that this half has descended to the appellant. The trial court ruled in favor of Luz. ISSUE: Whether or not one-half of the estate of Tomas Rodriquez should go to Margarita Lopez being the next of kin and nearest heir of Vicente Lopez or to his daughter by accretion? HELD: Article 753 of the Civil Code which in effect declares that, with certain exceptions in favor of near relatives, no testamentary provision shall be valid when made by a ward in favor of his guardian before the final accounts of the latter have been approved. This provision is of undoubted application to the situation before the court and the provision made in the will of Tomas Rodriguez in favor of Vicente F. Lopez was not any general incapacity on his part, but a special incapacity due to the accidental relation of guardian and ward existing between the parties. Accretion takes place in a testamentary success when two or more persons are called to the same inheritance or the same portion thereof without special designation of shares and secondly, when one of the persons so called dies before the testator or renounces the inheritance or is disqualified to receive it. In the case before us we have a will calling Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter, Luz Lopez de Bueno, to the same inheritance without special designation of shares. In addition to this, one of the persons named as heir has predeceased the testator, this person being also disqualified to receive the estate even if he had been alive at the time of the testator's death by reason of his being then the legal guardian of the testator with accounts unsettled, does not make a case for intestate succession as to his part of the estate. This article (982) is the exact application to the case and its effect is to give to the survivor, Luz Lopez de Bueno, not only the undivided half which she would have received in conjunction with her father if he had been alive and qualified to take, but also the half which pertained to him. There was no error whatever, therefore in the order of the trial court declaring Luz Lopez de Bueno entitled to the whole estate. 266) NEPOMUCENO vs. IAC 139 SCRA 206 FACTS: On July 16, 1974, Martin Jugo died and left a will. In the said will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. The estate was devised to his legal heirs, except the free portion which was devised to petitioner. Petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the will but was denied by the court on the opposition of the legal heirs on the ground that petitioner admitted her living in concubinage with the testator, thus, she is wanting in integrity and letters testamentary should not be issued to her. The Court of Appeals declared the will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void, Petitioner contends that the lower court has no jurisdiction in passing upon the question of the intrinsic validity of the will. ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court may pass upon the provisions of the will. HELD: NO. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the courts area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will. The fact that the probate court declared a devise made in a will null and void will be sustained where no useful purpose will be served by requiring the filing of a separate civil action and restricting the court only to the issue of extrinsic validity of the will. There is no useful purpose that would be served if we remand
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the nullified provision to the proper court in a separate action for that purpose simply because, in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions. The prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage. 267) PASTOR vs. CA 122 SCRA 885 FACTS: Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.), a Spanish subject, died in Cebu City on June 5, 1966, survived by his Spanish wife Sofia Bossio (who also died), their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (PASTOR, JR.) and Sofia Pastor de Midgely (SOFIA), and an illegitimate child, not natural, by the name of Lewellyn Barlito Quemada (QUEMADA). QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of PASTOR, SR., which contained a legacy in favor of Quenada consisting of 30% of Pastor Sr.s 42% share in the operation of Atlas Mining. PASTOR, JR. and his wife claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights, and not by inheritance Thus, Quemada appointed as special administrator filed for reconveyance of said claims of alleged properties including the subject of legacy. ISSUE: Whether the probate order resolved with finality the questions of ownership. Whether the probate ordere resolved the intrinsic validity of the will. HELD: In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will, As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. Probate court erred in assuming in its implementing order that the probate order adjudged the issues of ownership. In case of death of one of the spouses, their respective rights must be liquidated and the debts paid in the succession proceedings for the deceased spouse. Certiorari is proper where probate court issued erroneous implementing orders of its probate order. Legacy made in a will cannot be distributed without a prior liquidation of the decedents estate and payment of debts and taxes. A legacy is not a debt of the estate for which a writ of execution may issue. An order of execution that varies the terms of a final order can be questioned in a certiorari proceeding. 268) SANCHEZ vs. CA G.R. No. 108947 September 29, 1997 FACTS: Private respondent Rosalia S. Lugod is the only child of spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca while Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto S. Lugod are the legitimate children of Rosalia. Petitioners Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez, are the illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez. Rosalia filed a petition for letters of administration over the estate of her mother following her death and the estate of her father, Juan, who was at the time in a state of senility. But before the administration proceedings could formally be terminated and closed, Juan died. Such that petitioners as heirs of Juan, filed a petition for letters of administration over the intestate estate of Juan, which petition was opposed by Rosalia. Thereafter, Rosalia and petitioners executed a Compromise Agreement wherein they agreed to divide the properties enumerated therein of the late Juan Sanchez. Petitioners filed a Motion to require administratrix, Rosalia, to deliver deficiency of 24 hectares and/or to set aside compromise agreement. Private respondent Rosalia and petitioners entered into and executed a memorandum of agreement which modified the compromise agreement. Nine years later, petitioners filed a motion to require Rosalia to submit a new inventory and to render an accounting over properties not included in the compromise agreement. They likewise filed a motion to defer the approval of the compromise agreement, in which
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they prayed for the annulment of the compromise agreement on the ground of fraud. The trial court declared the compromise agreement void and unenforceable, the same not having been approved by the intestate court and that the same having been seasonably repudiated by petitioners on the ground of fraud. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and declared the modified compromise agreement valid and binding. Petitioners contend that, because the compromise agreement was executed during the pendency of the probate proceedings, judicial approval is necessary to shroud it with validity. Issue: Whether or not the compromise agreement entered by the parties during the pendency of probate proceedings is valid and binding. Held: Yes. Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise agreement as "a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced." Being a consensual contract, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties. Judicial approval is not required for its perfection. Petitioners' argument that the compromise was not valid for lack of judicial approval is not novel; the same was raised in Mayuga vs. Court of Appeals, where the Court ruled: It is alleged that the lack of judicial approval is fatal to the compromise. A compromise is a consensual contract. As such, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties to the contract. And from that moment not only does it become binding upon the parties, it also has upon them the effect and authority of res judicata (Civil Code, Art. 2037), even if not judicially approved . In the case before us, it is ineludible that the parties knowingly and freely entered into a valid compromise agreement. Adequately assisted by their respective counsels, they each negotiated its terms and provisions for four months; in fact, said agreement was executed only after the fourth draft. As noted by the trial court itself, the first and second drafts were prepared successively in July, 1969; the third draft on September 25, 1969; and the fourth draft, which was finally signed by the parties on October 30, 1969, followed. Since this compromise agreement was the result of a long drawn out process, with all the parties ably striving to protect their respective interests and to come out with the best they could, there can be no doubt that the parties entered into it freely and voluntarily. Accordingly, they should be bound thereby. To be valid, it is merely required under the law to be based on real claims and actually agreed upon in good faith by the parties thereto. Indeed, compromise is a form of amicable settlement that is not only allowed but also encouraged in civil cases. Article 2029 of the Civil Code mandates that a "court shall endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree upon some fair compromise."In opposing the validity and enforcement of the compromise agreement, petitioners harp on the minority of Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myna. Citing Article 2032 of the Civil Code, they contend that the court's approval is necessary in compromises entered into by guardians and parents in behalf of their wards or children. However, we observe that although denominated a compromise agreement, the document in this case is essentially a deed of partition, pursuant to Article 1082 of the Civil Code which provides that "[e]very act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction."For a partition to be valid, Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, requires the concurrence of the following conditions: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3) the heirs and liquidators are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represented by their judicial guardian or legal representatives; and (4) the partition was made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds. We find that all the foregoing requisites are present in this case. We therefore affirm the validity of the parties' compromise agreement/partition in this case. 269) NAZARENO VS. CA 343 SCRA 637 FACTS Maximinoo Nazareno Sr. and Aurea Poblete were husband and wife. Aurea died on April 15, 1970 , while Maximo Sr. died on December 18, 1980 . They were survived by their children, Natividad, Romeo, Jose, Pacifico and Maximinoo Jr. Maximinoo Jr. and Natividad are petitioners in this case, while Romeo and his wife are respondents. Deceased spouses Nazareno acquired properties in Quezon City and in Cavite . It is the ownership of some of these properties that is in question in this case. It appears that after the death of Maximino Sr. Romeo filed an intestate case in the CFI of Cavite. Romeo was appointed administrator of his fathers
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estate. In the course of the proceedings, Romeo discovered that his parents executed several deeds of sale conveying a number of real properties in favor of his sister, Natividad. This involved 6 lots in QC one of which is a lot occupied by Romeo and his wife. This lot was later sold by Natividad to Maximino Jr. Romeo filed on behalf of the estate of Maximino Sr., a case for annulment of sale with damages against Natividad and Maximino Jr. on the ground that both sales were void for lack of consideration. Trial Court rendered judgement declaring the nullity of the deed of sale. CA modified RTC, ordered lots cancelled and restored to the estate of Maximino Sr. ISSUE: Whether upon death of the deceased spouses their estate alone can seek the annulment of said sale? Whether the sale is valid? HELD The petition is without merit. The fact that other properties had allegedly been sold by the spouses Maximino Sr. and Aurea does not necessarily show that the deed of sale made in favor of Natividad is valid. The trial court and CA found that the Nazareno spouses transferred their properties to their children by fictitious sales in order to avoid payment of inheritance taxes. It was also found out that Natividad had no means to pay for the six lots subject of the deed of sale. The estate of Maximino alone cannot contest the validity of the deed of sale because the estate of Aurea has not been settled. CA decision affirmed. 270) ZARAGOZA VS. CA 341 SCRA 309 FACTS Flavio Zaragoza Cano was a registered owner of certain parcels of land situated at the municipalities of Cabatuan, New Lucena and Sta. Barbara, Iloilo . He had four children, Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentina and Alberta . On Decemeber 1964 he died without a will. Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan filed a complaint against Florentino for delivery of her inheritance share, consisting of lots 943 and 871 and for payment of damages. She claims that, his father in his lifetime partitioned the said properties among his children. The shares of her brothers and sisters were given to them in advance by way of deed of sale, but without valid consideration. Her share, lots 943 and 871 were not conveyed then. She averred that because of her marriage, she became an American citizen and was prohibited to acquire lands in the Philippines except by hereditary succession. Petitioners denied that there was partition of the estate of their father during his lifetime. The trial court ruled and ordered adjudication lot 871 to the plaintiff Alberta , the claim for lot 943 is dismissed. Ca reversed RTC in so far as lot 943 is concerned, ordered Alberta as owner of lot 943. ISSUE: 1. Whether the partition inter vivos by Flavio Zaragoza of his properties which includes lot 871 and 943 valid? 2. Whether the validity of the sale and consequently, the TCT over lot 943 registered in the name of Petitioners Florentina be a valid subject matter of the entire proceeding for the delivery of the inheritance share. HELD This court affirms the decision of CA, lots 871 and 943 were inheritance shares of respondent, based on documentary evidence and testimonial evidence. Partition during the lifetime of Flavio zaragoza is valid. It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Article 1080 of the Civil Code is clear, the petition, must be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding were all the indispensable parties are present for the rightful determination of their respective legitime. Second Issue. Petition is a collateral attack. It is not allowed by Sec 48 of PD 1529. The certificate, in absence of fraud, is eveidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of the owner. The title once registered. Should not be thereafter impugned, altered or changed except in direct proceeding permitted by law. 271) MENDOZA VS CA 199 SCRA 778 FACTS Petitioner Mendoza I et al instituted before CFI of Bulacan an action for reconveyance of real property against private respondents spouses Samonte.
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Petitioners are legitimate children of deceased Mendoza , Trinidad , their mother sold a parcel of land to respondents spouses Samonte. Petitioners aver that they are entitled to legal redemption. According to the plaintiff, the sale of the disputed property in favor of the defendants was null and void on the ground that, as a mere co-owner of an undivided estate, Trinidad Mendoza had no right to divide the estate into parts and then convey a part thereof by metes and bounds to a third person, since there had never been any partition, judicial or extra judicial, of the estate among the heirs of their late father, Arcadio. The trial court dismissed the the petitioners complaint. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. ISSUE: Whether the deed of sale is void? Whether petitioners can still exercise the right of legal redemption? HELD: Petitioner Trinidad is not entitled to one-half (1/2) of said lot but only to the share of one legitimate child or 1 and 1/3 rights and interest, citing article 996 of the Civil Code. The deed of sale is void insofar as it affects the rights and interests of other petitioners because petitioner Trinidad can only sell her 1 1/3 rights and interest over the said lot and no more than that. Corollary, the remaining petitioners can still exercise the right of legal redemption, conformably with Article 1620 of the civil code. 272) AZNAR BROTHERS REALT CO. VS CA 327 SCRA 359 FACTS Lot no. 4399 containing an area of 34,325 square meters located at Brgy. Mactan, Lapu Lapu City was acquired By Aznar from the heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on by virtue of an extrajudicial Partition of real estate with deed of absolute sale. Private respondents were allegedly allowed to occupy portions of lot 4399 provided that they leave the land in the event that the company would use the property for its purpose. Later, Aznar entered into a joint venture with Sta. Lucia Realty for development of the subject lot into a multi-million peso housing subdivision and beach resort. When demands to vacate failed, Aznar filed with MTCC a case for unlawful detainer and damages. Private Respondents alleged that they are the successors and descendants of the eight children of the late Crisanta and that they had been residing in the concept of owner since the time of their parents and grandparents. They claim that the deed of absolute sale was simulated and fraudulent. Thus files with RTC a complaint seeking to declare the subject document null and void. MTCC favored Aznar. RTC ordered demolition. CA reversed and set aside RTC and declared Private Respondents as the rightful possessors. ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale is valid. HELD: Private respondents claim that not all the known heirs participated in the extrajudicial partition, and that two persons who participated and were made parties thereto were not the heirs of Crisanta. This claim even if true would not warrant rescission of the deed. Article 1104 of the Civil Code as to parties who were allegedly not heirs, article 1105 is in point. Extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale is a notarized document. As such, it has in its favor the presumption of regularity and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. It is admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. Decision of RTC reinstated. 273) RALLA VS. UNTALAN L-63253-54 APRIL 27 1989 FACTS Rosendo Ralla, a widower, filed a petition for the probate of his will in the RTC of Albay. In his will he left his entire estate to his son, Pablo (herein petitioner substituted by heirs), leaving nothing to his other son, Pedro. At the same time, Pedro filed an action for the partition of the estate of their mother, Paz. With this case, the brothers agreed to amicably compromise via project partition, whereby sixty-three parcels of land, apparently forming the estate of their deceased mother was divided between them.
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In the course of the proceeding for the probate of Rosendo, Pablo filed a motion to dismiss the petition for probate on the ground that he was no longer interested in the allowance of the will of his late father for its probate would no longer be beneficial to him. This motion was denied, it was also denied at the CA. In its decision the CA said, indeed the petitioner stood to gain if the testate proceedings were to be dismissed because then he would not be compelled to submit for inclusion in the inventory of the estate of Rosendo comprising 149 parcels of land from which he alone had been collecting rentals and receiving income, to the exclusion and prejudiced of hi s brother who was being deprived of his successional rights. Consequently, the court declared Pedro and Pablo the only heirs of Rosendo who should share equally upon the division of the latters estate and thereupon converted the testate proceedings into one of intestacy. After eleven years, one Joaquin Chancoco brother in law of Pablo filed a petition for the probate of the same will of Rosendo on the ground that the decedent owed him P5000. The petition for probate was granted. Teodorico Almine, son-in-law of Pablo was appointed special administrator, over and above the objections of the heirs of Pedro. In taking possession, Teoderico also took possession of the 63 parcels of land subject of the partition earlier. Judge Untalan orderd that the 63 parcels of land should be included in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Rosendo and thereafter proceed as probate proceedings. After 2 years, Judge Untalan reconsidered his order and held that the project partition is respected and upheld. Petitioners filed an MR but was denied hence the instant case. ISSUE: Whether the partition should be regarded or respected in view with the probate proccedings of the estate of Rosendo HELD: Verily, the rule that there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the will has been probated. This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced in the will. Thus this rule invoked, is inapplicable in the instant case where there are two separate cases each involving the estate of two different person comprising dissimilar properties. The project partition is valid and binding upon the brothers as well as upon their heirs especially as this was accompanied by delivery of possession to them of their respective shares. They are duty bound to respect the division agreed upon by them and embodied in the document of partition. Thus the petitioner could no longer question the exclusion of the lands subject of the partition from the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Rosendo. Petition dismissed. 274) FELIX BALANAY, Jr. vs. Martinez L-39247 June 27, 1975 FACTS Leodegaria Julian died in Davao City , she was survived by her husband Felix Balanay Sr. and by their 6 children, Felix Jr., Avelina, Beatriz, Carolina Delia and Emilia. Felix Jr. filed in the lower court a petition for the probate of his mothers notarial will. In the said will, it was declared that, 1.) She was the owner of the southern half of the nine conjugal lots, 2.) That it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her husbands lifetime. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husbands one half share of the conjugal assets. Feliz Sr. and Avelina opposed the probate on the ground of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence preterition of the husband and alleged improper partitioned of the conjugal estate. They claim that Felix Jr. should collate certain properties which he had received from the testatrix. Felix Jr. in his reply attatched an affidavit signed by Feliz Sr waiving and renouncing hereditary rigts in the estate of his wife in favor of their children. Avelina contended that the affidavit was void. Lower court denied and gave effect to the affidavit and conformity of Felix Sr. In the meantime, A lawyer Montana appeared claiming to be a lawyer of Felix Jr, he filed a motion to withdraw the probate and to proceed by intestae estae proceeding. The lower court adopted the view of Atty , Montana that the will was void. So, it dismissed the petition for probate and converted the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding.
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ISSUE: Whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and declaring it void. HELD We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate. The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the wills intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. But the probate court erred in declaring the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that in its order it gave effect to the surviving husbands conformity to the will and to his renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably included in one-half share of the conjugal estate. The rule is that the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made. (Art.792 CC) Where some valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries. The provision of the will of the testatrix should not be divided among her heirs during her husbands lifetime but should be kept intact and that the legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code. Felix Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of the conjugal partnership (Art. 179 and Art 1041 CC) but insofar as said renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal estate (1061 CC) it should be subject to the limitations prescribed in Articles 750 and 752 of the CC. A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance or at least his legitime should be respected. In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to partition the conjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is true that she could dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal estate but since the husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to her testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such partition has become valid assuming that the will may be probated. In the instant case, the preterited heir was the husband, the surviving spouse. His preteritiion did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wifes will and renounced his hereditary rights. Hearing for the petition for probate affirmed. 275) Amorante Plan vs. IAC L-65656 February 28,1985 FACTS In the intestate proceeding for the settlement of Regino Bautistas estate, his widow filed a motion dated December 9, 1964 for authority to sell to Plan the two lots and theater for not less than P140,000. The purpose was to pay the debts amounting to P117,220. The motion was set for hearing. It was indicated that the children were notified through one child Milagros Bautista. Judge Jimenez of the probate court granted the authority to sell to Plan the entire estate of the deceased for not less than P140,000 so as to pay the obligations of the estate, appearing that all heirs have conformed thereto. On that day, Florencia and Plan executed a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage obligations for the two lots. A motion to approve the sale was filed. Judge signed the original deed of sale under the word approved to indicate that the sale was okayed by probate court. Sixteen days after the sale an opposition to the agreement of absolute sale was filed by Federico Bautista child of the deceased. Federicos counsel did not file any objection to the project of partition as per order by the Judge. The reason is not hard to surmise. The estate sought to be partitioned had already been sold to Plan. Federico contended that because there was no compliance with Section 7 Rule 89 of the Rules of Court the sale was void. Instead of asking the court to act on his petition for relief from the orders authorizing and approving the sale, Federico filed a separate action against Plan to nullify the sale. Judge dismissed the action. He ruled that the nullity of the sael as to Federicos 1/16 share should be
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resolved in the intestae proceeding. He filed three times same action, all have been dismissed. Ca ruled in favor of Federico, it declared void the agreement to sell based on article 1088 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether Federico could nullify in a separate action, instead of an intestate proceeding his fathers estate, the sale of two conjugal lots made by his mother, with authorization and approval of the probate court. HELD We hold that the appellate court erred in ordering Plan to reconvey the disputed property to Federico. Said judgment is bereft of factual and legal basis. Federico did not pray for reconveyance he prayed for receivership for nullification of the agreement to sell and the sale itself. Article 1088 of the Civil Code does not justify legal redemption in this case because it refers to the sale of hereditary rights, and not to specific properties, for the payment of the debts of the decedents estate as to which there is no legal redemption. In the instant case we agree with the decision of the Judges that Federicos remedy is in the intestate proceeding where his petition for relief has been pending for nearly twenty years. 276) Maria Bicarme vs. CA and Cristina Bicarme L-51914 June 6, 1990 FACTS Maria Bicarme and Cristina Bicarme are the only surviving co-heirs and co-owners and entitled in equal shares over the parcel of lands (cornland and Riceland) in litigation. Spouses Bicarme died intestate and were survived by children, Maria and Victoria (mother of Cristina). Cristina instituted this action for partition, because her aunt, Maria refused to share with her the yearly fruits of the disputed parcels of lan. Maria howeve, maintains that she acquired these two parcels of land from deceased spouses Bidaya and since then until the present, had been in open, public, peaceful and contionous, adverse possession and enjoyment in the concept of absolute owner. Maria further claims that Cristina never shared or contributed to the payment of taxes of said two parcels of land. The trial court stated that the provision in the deed of sale (Maria subscribed that the property is inherited from her father) was in the nature of trust provision in favor of Cristina as co-owner and co-heir. ISSUE: Who has ownership rights over the litigated parcels of land HELD: We agree with the trial court. By admitting that the cornland is inherited property, Maria in effect recognized Critinas rights thereto as a co-owner coheir. Having established that Critinas co-ownership rights, maria nonetheless insists that Cristinas rights are barred by prescription under secs 40 and 42 of act 190 / art 1116 of the Civil Code where the longest period of both acquisitive and extinctive prescription is ten years. In the present case, Cristina, it is alleged, asserted her claims 34 yers after her right of action accrued. On Marias claims of acquisitive prescription, the trial court held that Maria was a trustee with respect to Cristinas share. As such, prescription, as a mode of acquiring title, could not apply. An action for partition implies that the thing is still owned in common. If a co-owner holds the property in exclusive adverse possession as owner, asserting the property in exclusive dominion for a required period, he can acquire sole title to it as against coheirs or co-owners. The imprescriptibly of an action for partition cannot thus be invoked when one of the co-owners has possessed the property as exclusive owner, and for a period sufficient to acquire it by prescription. From the moment one of the co0owners claims that he is absolute owner and denies other any question involve is no longer of partition but of ownership. Acquisitive prescription cannot apply in this case. A mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents fruits or profit from the property cannot serve as proof of exclusive ownership, it is not borne out of clear and complete evidence that he exercise acts of possession which unequivocally constitute an ouster of the other co-owners. Cristinas rights to partition will therefore prosper.
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan

CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW I

Prof. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan

SUBMITTED BY: IV - LLB-4402

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21) RCPI VS CA G.R No. L-44748, August 29, 1986

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