Ac Enterprise

11/27/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 506
VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 625

AC Enterprises, Inc. vs. Frabelle Properties Corporation
*
G.R. No. 166744. November 2, 2006.
AC ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. FRABELLE

PROPERTIES CORPORATION, respondent.
Actions; Certiorari; The general rule is that an order denying

a motion to dismiss a complaint cannot be questioned via a special
civil action for certiorari until a final judgment on the merits of
the case is rendered—the remedy of the defendant is to go trial and
appeal from an adverse decision.—The Order of the RTC dated
September 15, 2003 denying the motion to dismiss of petitioner
(as defendant below) is interlocutory in nature. The general rule
is that an order denying a motion to dismiss a complaint cannot
be questioned via a special civil action for certiorari until a final
judgment on the merits of the case is rendered. A party must
exhaust all remedies available before resorting to certiorari. A
writ for certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial
interlocutory ruling. It is resorted only to correct a grave abuse of
discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. It is a remedy narrow in scope, limited only to
keeping an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to relieve
persons from arbitrary acts which courts have no power or
authority to perform. The remedy of petitioner was to go to trial
and appeal from an adverse decision.
Same; Jurisdictions; Pleadings and Practice; The nature of an
action and whether the tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over
such action are to be determined from the material allegations of
the complaint, the law in force at the time the complaint is filed,
and the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether
plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims averred.—It is
axiomatic that the nature of an action and whether the tribunal
has exclusive jurisdiction over such action are to be determined
from the material allegations of the complaint, the law in force at
the time the complaint is filed, and the character of the relief
sought irrespective of whether plaintiff is entitled to all or some of
the claims averred. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016752a49224c5aa1b0c003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/51
theories set up by defendant in an answer to the complaint or a

motion to dismiss the same. Otherwise,
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
626
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
jurisdiction would be dependent almost entirely upon the whims

of defendants.
Same; Same; Nuisance; Noise; An action for abatement of a
private nuisance, more specifically noise generated by the blowers
of an air-conditioning system, even if the plaintiff prays for
damages, is one incapable of pecuniary estimation because the
basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
money.—We agree with the ruling of the RTC, as affirmed by the
CA, that as gleaned from the material averments of the complaint
as well as the character of the relief prayed for by respondent in
its complaint before the RTC, the petition is one for the judicial
abatement of a private nuisance, more specifically the noise
generated by the blowers of the airconditioning system of the
Feliza Building owned by petitioner, with a plea for a writ of
preliminary and permanent injunction, plus damages. Such action
of respondent is incapable of pecuniary estimation because the
basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
money. Although respondent prayed for judgment for temperate
or moderate damages and exemplary damages, such claims are
merely incidental to or as a consequence of, the principal relief
sought by respondent. An action incapable of pecuniary
estimation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC as
provided in Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 129, as amended
by R.A. No. 7691. In Tatel v. Municipality of Virac, 207 SCRA 157
(1992), the Court ruled that a simple suit for abatement of a
nuisance is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance, now the RTC.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The term “nuisance”
is so comprehensive that it has been applied to almost all ways
which have interfered with the rights of the citizens, either in
person, property, the enjoyment of property, or his comfort; A
private nuisance is one which violates only private rights and
produces damage to but one or a few persons while a nuisance is

public when it interferes with the exercise of public right by
directly encroaching on public property or by causing a common
injury, an unreasonable interference with the right common to the
general public.—Article 694 of the New Civil Code defines a
nuisance as follows: Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else
which: (1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or (3) Shocks, defies or
disregards
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VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 627
decency or morality; or (4) Obstructs or interferes with the free

passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property. The term “nuisance” is
so comprehensive that it has been applied to almost all ways
which have interfered with the rights of the citizens, either in
person, property, the enjoyment of his property, or his comfort.
According to Article 695 of the Civil Code, a nuisance may be
either public or private: Art. 695. Nuisance is either public or
private. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or
any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the
annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal.
A private nuisance is one that is not included in the foregoing
definition. A private nuisance has been defined as one which
violates only private rights and produces damages to but one or a
few persons. A nuisance is public when it interferes with the
exercise of public right by directly encroaching on public property
or by causing a common injury. It is an unreasonable interference
with the right common to the general public.
Same; Same; Same; A private nuisance action is the remedy
for an invasion of a property right, while the action for the
abatement of a public nuisance should be commenced by the city or
municipality.— Under Article 705 of the New Civil Code, a party
aggrieved by a private nuisance has two alternative remedies: (1)
a civil action; or (2) abatement, without judicial proceedings. A
person injured by a private nuisance may abate it as provided in
Article 706: Art. 706. Any person injured by a private nuisance
may abate it by removing, or if necessary by destroying the thing
which constitutes the nuisance, without committing a breach of
the peace or doing unnecessary injury. However, it is
indispensable that the procedure for extrajudicial abatement of a
public nuisance by a private person be followed. A private

nuisance action is the remedy for an invasion of a property right.
On the other hand, the action for the abatement of a public
nuisance should be commenced by the city or municipality. A
private person may institute an action for the abatement of a
public nuisance in cases wherein he suffered a special injury of a
direct and substantial character other than that which the
general public shares. The district health officer shall determine
whether or not abatement, without judicial proceedings, is the
best remedy against a public nuisance.
628
Same; Same; Same; Municipal Corporations; Local

Government Units (LGUs); The local sanggunian is empowered to
enact ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other
forms of nuisance but cannot declare a particular thing as a
nuisance per se and order its condemnation—it does not have the
power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when
such thing is not a nuisance per se, a thing which must be
determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law.—We agree
with petitioner’s contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A.
No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the
Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered to enact ordinances
declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of
nuisance. It bears stressing, however, that the Sangguniang
Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and
order its condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a
fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a
nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial
condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its
nature, situation or use is not such. Those things must be
determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law. If a thing
be in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that
question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the
Sangguniang Bayan.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Devolution; Words and Phrases;
Devolution refers to the act by which the national government
confers powers and authority upon the various local government
units to perform specific functions and responsibilities; What were
devolved by the Department of Enrivonment and Natural
Resources (DENR) to the Local Government Units (LGUs) under
DENR Administrative Order No. 30 dated 30 June 1992, in
relation to R.A. No. 7160, were the regulatory functions/duties of
the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC) which were

absorbed and integrated by the Environmental Management
Bureau (EMB).—Section 17 of R.A. No. 7160 provides that local
government units shall discharge the functions and
responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them
pursuant to the law; and such other powers, functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate or incidental to
efficient and effective provisions of the basic services and facilities
in the Code. Devolution refers to the act by which the national
government confers powers and authority upon the various local
government units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities. What were devolved by the DENR to the LGUs
under DENR Administra-
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VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 629
tive Order No. 30 dated June 30, 1992, in relation to R.A. No.
7160, were the regulatory functions/duties of the National
Pollution Control Commission (NPCC) which were absorbed and
integrated by the EMB, as provided in Title No. XIV, Chapter 2,
Section 17 of the 1987 Administrative Code. However, the DENR
exercises administrative supervision and control over the LGUs.
Enumerated in Chapter IV, Article 1, Sections 74 to 79 of the
Rules and Regulations promulgated by the NPCC implementing
P.D. 984 are the regulations relative to noise control, specifically,
the noise quality standards.
Same; Same; Same; Whether or not noise emanating from a
blower of the air-conditioning units of a building is nuisance is to
be resolved only by the courts in due course of proceedings—noise
is not a nuisance per se; Noise becomes actionable only when it
passes the limits of reasonable adjustment to the conditions of the
locality and of the needs of the maker to the needs of the listener;
Injury to a particular person in a peculiar position or of especially
sensitive characteristics will not render the noise an actionable
nuisance—in the conditions of present living, noise seems
inseparable from the conduct of many necessary occupations.—
Whether or not noise emanating from a blower of the air-
conditioning units of the Feliza Building is nuisance is to be
resolved only by the court in due course of proceedings. The
plaintiff must prove that the noise is a nuisance and the
consequences thereof. Noise is not a nuisance per se. It may be of
such a character as to constitute a nuisance, even though it arises
from the operation of a lawful business, only if it affects
injuriously the health or comfort of ordinary people in the vicinity

to an unreasonable extent. Injury to a particular person in a
peculiar position or of especially sensitive characteristics will not
render the noise an actionable nuisance. In the conditions of
present living, noise seems inseparable from the conduct of many
necessary occupations. Its presence is a nuisance in the popular
sense in which that word is used, but in the absence of statute,
noise becomes actionable only when it passes the limits of
reasonable adjustment to the conditions of the locality and of the
needs of the maker to the needs of the listener. What those limits
are cannot be fixed by any definite measure of quantity or quality;
they depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. They
may be affected, but are not controlled, by zoning ordinances. The
delimitation of designated areas to use for manufacturing,
industry or general business is not a license to emit every noise
profitably attending the conduct of any one of them.
630
Same; Same; Same; Test to Determine Noise as Nuisance.—

The test is whether rights of property, of health or of comfort are
so injuriously affected by the noise in question that the sufferer is
subjected to a loss which goes beyond the reasonable limit
imposed upon him by the condition of living, or of holding
property, in a particular locality in fact devoted to uses which
involve the emission of noise although ordinary care is taken to
confine it within reasonable bounds; or in the vicinity of property
of another owner who, though creating a noise, is acting with
reasonable regard for the rights of those affected by it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The determining factor when noise
alone is the cause of complaint is not its intensity or volume—it is
that the noise is of such character as to produce actual physical
discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities,
rendering adjacent property less comfortable and valuable.—
Commercial and industrial activities which are lawful in
themselves may become nuisances if they are so offensive to the
senses that they render the enjoyment of life and property
uncomfortable. The fact that the cause of the complaint must be
substantial has often led to expressions in the opinions that to be
a nuisance the noise must be deafening or loud or excessive and
unreasonable. The determining factor when noise alone is the
cause of complaint is not its intensity or volume. It is that the noise
is of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and
annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities, rendering adjacent
property less comfortable and valuable. If the noise does that it can
well be said to be substantial and unreasonable in degree; and
reasonableness is a question of fact dependent upon all the
circumstances and conditions. There can be no fixed standard as
to what kind of noise constitutes a nuisance.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Persons who live or work in thickly
populated business districts must necessarily endure the usual
annoyances and of those trades and businesses which are properly
located and carried on in the neighborhood where they live or
work.— The courts have made it clear that in every case the
question is one of reasonableness. What is a reasonable use of
one’s property and whether a particular use is an unreasonable
invasion of another’s use and enjoyment of his property so as to
constitute a nuisance cannot be determined by exact rules, but
must necessarily depend upon the circumstances of each case,
such as locality and the charac-
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VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 631
ter of the surroundings, the nature, utility and social value of the
use, the extent and nature of the harm involved, the nature,
utility and social value of the use or enjoyment invaded, and the
like. Persons who live or work in thickly populated business
districts must necessarily endure the usual annoyances and of
those trades and businesses which are properly located and
carried on in the neighborhood where they live or work. But these
annoyances and discomforts must not be more than those
ordinarily to be expected in the community or district, and which
are incident to the lawful conduct of such trades and businesses.
If they exceed what might be reasonably expected and cause
unnecessary harm, then the court will grant relief.
Same; Same; Same; Causes of Action; Elements; Pleadings
and Practice; Words and Phrases; A cause of action is the act or
omission by which a party violates a right of another; The
fundamental test for failure to state a cause of action is whether,
admitting the veracity of what appears on the face and within the
four corners of the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to the relief
prayed for.—A cause of action is the act or omission by which a
party violates a right of another. A cause of action exists if the
following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff
by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on

the part of such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to plaintiff for
which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.
The fundamental test for failure to state a cause of action is
whether, admitting the veracity of what appears on the face and
within the four corners of the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to the
relief prayed for. Stated otherwise, may the court render a valid
judgment upon the facts alleged therein? Indeed, the inquiry is
into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations. If
the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which
it can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the
defenses that may be presented by defendants.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The general rule is
that the facts asserted in the complaint must be taken into account
without modification although with reasonable inferences
therefrom, and all the pleadings filed may be considered,
including annexes,
632
motions and the other evidence on record.—The general rule is

that the facts asserted in the complaint must be taken into
account without modification although with reasonable inferences
therefrom. However, all the pleadings filed may be considered,
including annexes, motions and the other evidence on record, to
wit: However, in so doing, the trial court does not rule on the
truth or falsity of such documents. It merely includes such
documents in the hypothetical admission. Any review of a finding
of lack of cause of action based on these documents would not
involve a calibration of the probative value of such pieces of
evidence but would only limit itself to the inquiry of whether the
law was properly applied given the facts and these supporting
documents. Therefore, what would inevitably arise from such a
review are pure questions of law, and not questions of fact.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Parties; Words and Phrases; A
person injured by a nuisance may bring an action in his own name
and in behalf of others similarly affected to abate the same;
“Interest” within the meaning of Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court means material interest, an interest in essence to be
affected by the judgment as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or a mere incidental interest, and by real
interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished

from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or
consequential interest.— Section 2, Rule 3, of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. SEC. 2. Parties
in interest.—A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by
law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended
in the name of the real party in interest. (2a) “Interest” within the
meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in
essence to be affected by the judgment as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By
real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent,
subordinate or consequential interest. A real party in interest-
plaintiff is one who has a legal right while a real party defendant
is one who has a correlative legal obligation whose act or omission
violate the legal right of the former. A person injured by a
nuisance may bring an action in his own name and in behalf of
others simi-
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VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 633
larly affected to abate the same. One who has an interest in the
property affected such as the owner thereof or fix interest therein
are proper parties as plaintiffs. Possession alone of real estate is
sufficient to sustain an action to recover damages from the
maintenance of a nuisance by the adjoining property in such
manner as to injure the enjoyment of the former.
Same; Same; Same; Liability for nuisance may be imposed
upon one who sets in motion the force which entirely caused the
tortuous act, one who sets in motion a force or a chain of events
resulting in the nuisance; It is sufficient to maintain an action for
abatement of a nuisance if his building is rendered valueless for
the purpose it was devoted.—Liability for nuisance may be
imposed upon one who sets in motion the force which entirely
caused the tortuous act; upon one who sets in motion a force or a
chain of events resulting in the nuisance. In an action for
damages resulting from a nuisance, responsibility arises not only
from the creator of the nuisance but from its continued
maintenance as well. One is entitled to damages on account of the
conduct by another of his business which unreasonably and
substantially interferes with the quiet enjoyment of his premises

by himself or of his tenants. It is sufficient to maintain an action
for abatement of a nuisance if his building is rendered valueless
for the purpose it was devoted.
Same; Same; Same; A negligent or intentional act may
constitute a nuisance.—A negligent act may constitute a nuisance.
An intentional act may also constitute a nuisance. A nuisance
may be formed from a continuous, known invasion, where, after
complaint, and notice of damage, the defendant continues to
offend and refuses to correct or discontinue the nuisance. In such
a case, the nuisance is deemed intentional. An unreasonable use,
perpetrated and unconnected even after complaint and notice of
damage is deemed intentional.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Sonya Margarita Benemerito-Castillo for petitioner.
Ernest S. Ang, Jr. for respondent.
634

CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the
1
Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals
2
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
82166, affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malabon City in Civil Case No. 3742-MH, which
denied the Motion to Dismiss of petitioner AC Enterprises,
Inc. (ACEI), as well as the Resolution of the CA denying
the motion for reconsideration thereof.
Petitioner, a corporation duly organized under domestic
laws doing business in the Philippines, owns the 10-storey
Feliza Building located along Herrera Street, Legaspi
Village, Makati City. The building was subdivided into
commercial/office units which were leased to private
persons and entities. There are 36 blowers from 18 air-
cooled type airconditioning units in the building, four
blowers on each floor, from the 2nd to the 10th floors. The
blowers are aesthetically covered by vertical concrete type
baffles.
Respondent Frabelle Properties Corporation 3 (FPC),
formerly FTL & Sons Development Corporation, is the
developer of Frabella I Condominium (Frabella I), a 29-
storey commercial/residential condominium located at 109

Rada Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City. It owned some
units in the condominium which it leased to its tenants.
The building is managed by the Frabella I Condominium
Corporation (FCC).
Rada and Herrera streets lie parallel to each other such
that Feliza Building is situated at the back of Frabella I.
Feliza Building is at the back of Frabella I and is separated
by Rodriguez Street, a two-lane road approximately 12
meters
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria (retired), with

Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Rosalinda Asuncion
Vicente, concurring; CA Rollo, pp. 189-202.
2 Penned by Judge Benjamin T. Antonio.
3 CA Rollo, p. 242.
635
VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 635

4
wide. The street is bounded by the Thailand Embassy on
the side of the street of Frabella I. The exhaust of the
blowers from the air-conditioning units at the Feliza
Building were directed towards the rear of Frabella I.
On April 11, 1995, respondent wrote petitioner
demanding that the latter abate the daily continuous,
intense and “unbearable noise” and the hot air blast
coming from the 36 blowers in the Feliza Building.
Petitioner rejected the demand in a letter dated May 15,
1995. Respondent reiterated its demand for ACEI to abate
the nuisance in a letter dated June 6, 1995.
On June 29, 1995, respondent requested that the 36
blowers of Felisa Building be tested by the NCR
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). On August 11, 1995, it received a report from the
EMB that the noise generated by the blowers of Feliza
Building is beyond the legal allowable level under Section
78(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 984, as amended.
FPC had the blowers tested anew by the EMB on December
8, 1995 and July 1, 1996 with the same results. Despite
repeated demands, petitioner refused to act on the matter.
On August 14, 2000, respondent again wrote petitioner,
demanding that it abate the nuisance. Petitioner ignored
the letter anew. Respondent then had the blowers tested

again by the EMB with same results as evidenced by its
report dated August 29, 2000 and November 4, 2000.
On March 11, 2001, Frabelle I Condominium
Corporation, through counsel, Ang & Associates, as
complainant, filed a complaint against petitioner with the
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) for the abatement of
noise and/or air pollution and damages with a plea for
injunctive relief. The complainant alleged therein that it
managed the Frabella I and that
_______________
4 Id., at p. 65.
636

its members’ own units in the condominium. It alleged,

inter alia, that:
“6. Feliza Building’s air-conditioning system is served

by some 36 blowers, installed 4 blowers to each
floor, all located on the same side directly facing
Frabella I.
7. Everytime the Feliza Building’s air-conditioning
system is turned on, all or a good number of the 36
blowers operate at the same time. As a direct result
of the operation of the blowers, unbearable hot air
is generated and blown towards Frabella I.
8. Apart from the hot air, the blowers also generate a
continuous, deafening, intolerable and irritating,
vibrating noise which makes normal conversation
across the street and at the Frabella I difficult if not
impossible.
9. As a consequence of such hot air, vibrating and
intolerable noise, the occupants of Frabella I have
been, and still are, prevented from enjoying
peaceful and comfortable use of their property
thereby forcing them to vacate and/or transfer
elsewhere.
10. Such intolerable noise, hot air, and vibration
constitute noise and/or air pollution violative of
P.D. 984, the Clean Air Act and other related
environmental laws.
11. In all good faith without any desire to cause any

unnecessary inconvenience or trouble, the
complainant, for the last several years, has written
and made numerous contacts with the respondent
complaining about this pollution, even soliciting the
help and intercession of the Makati Commercial
Estate Association, Inc. (MACEA) and the Metro
Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to try to
settle the matter amicably.
12. On the other hand, the DENR, over a span of
several years, has conducted several tests. As
shown by the results, the noise and vibration
generated by the Feliza Building blowers exceeds
the DENR and Local Government ambient noise
standards 5 hence, it undoubtedly constitutes
pollution.”
The complainant prayed that judgment be rendered in its

favor, thus:
_______________
5 CA Rollo, pp. 48-49.
637
VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 637

“WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after notice and

hearing, a Decision be rendered in favor of complainant and
against the respondent:
1. Declaring the intolerable noise, hot air and vibration

generated by the Feliza Building blowers as a noise and/or
air pollution and ordering the respondent to abate the
same and in case of failure to do so, that the
establishment be closed or ordered to cease operations.
2. After arbitration, ordering the respondent to indemnify
the complaint for actual damages at not less than
P5,000,000.00 and to reimburse it for attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation at not less than P400,000.00.
3. Condemning the respondent to pay the corresponding
fines and other administrative penalties for each day of
continuing pollution.
Complainant
6
prays for other relief just and equitable in the
premises.”
While the case was pending, respondent, through its

VicePresident, wrote Dr. Maria Leonor B. Soledad, City
Health Officer of Makati City, requesting her intervention
to order petitioner to abate the noise and hot air coming
from the blowers of the Feliza Building. On March 5, 2002,
Dr. Soledad replied that a panel must be formed to settle
the matter.
In a letter dated March 7, 2002, respondent requested
Makati City Mayor Jejomar C. Binay not to renew or to
cancel the Mayor’s License and Business Permits of Feliza7
Building and to compel petitioner to comply with the law.
Copies of the letter were forwarded to Engr. Nelson B.
Morales, the City Building Official, and Atty. Enrico
Lainez, City Attorney.
Engr. Morales acted on the letter and wrote the EMB on
April 30, 2002, requesting the investigation of the
complaint relative to the noise from the air-conditioning
units of the
_______________
6 Id., at pp. 57-58.

7 Id., at pp. 45-46.
638

8
Feliza Building. A panel from the EMB conducted tests on
the 36 blowers of Feliza Building from 10:30 a.m. to 12:50
p.m. on May 24, 2002. On June 28, 2002, the Panel
submitted its Investigation Report, stating that the passing
of vehicles along the street and the blowers of nearby
building contributed to the ambient noise quality in the
area. The report stated that since DENR Administrative
Order No. 30 devolved the functions of the DENR on the
abatement of noise nuisance to the Local Government Unit,
the case should be endorsed 9 to the City Government of
Makati for appropriate action.
Regional Director Sixto E. Tolentino, Jr. of the EMB 10
forwarded the report to Engr. Morales on July 2, 2002. In
a letter dated July 19, 2002, Engr. Morales informed
respondent that based on the result of investigation
conducted by the DENR Management Bureau on Sound
Pressure Levels (SPL) measured on the different sampling
stations, the excess in the noise quality standard within
the vicinity does not come from the air-conditioning system
with 36 blowers of Feliza Building alone; there were other

prevailing factors to consider, “which is beyond the control
of said building and since the final result has been rendered
and resolved by the concerned government agency, it is
properly advised that further inquiry or anything involving
a sound environmental process which is not sanctioned 11
by
this office, be addressed directly to the said agency.”
Copies of the letter were furnished to the City Mayor,
the City Attorney and petitioner. Respondent then wrote
Engr. Morales seeking clarification, wanting to find out
why the matter should be referred to the EMB when the
latter had already endorsed the matter to the City of
Makati. A conference was held between the executives of
respondent and
_______________
8 Rollo, p. 389.
9 Id., at p. 392.
10 Id., at p. 389.
11 Id., at p. 388.
639
VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 639

Engr. Morales. The latter insisted on the report of the EMB

and his July 19, 2002 letter and dared it to go to court if it
was not satisfied with the report and his resolution of the
matter.
Respondent then wrote another letter to the EMB
relative to the May 24, 2002 Report of the Panel. The EMB
conducted SPL measurements anew on February 4, 2003.
Per its Report submitted on November 24, 2003, the EMB
declared that, from the table, it is evident that the SPL
measurements were high when the doors were opened
compared to the readings when the doors were closed.
However, the EMB emphasized that the standards in
Section 78 (b) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of P.D. No. 984 could not be applied since the provisions
were for ambient noise. It pointed out that the SPL
measurements were taken inside the building. The EMB
opined that since the nature of complaint is regarding noise
nuisance generated from the firm’s blowers, the SPL
measurements were not the critical factor in the resolution
of the issue. It stated that the noise needs not to be high or
low to annoy or cause nuisance to the receptor, for as long
as the complainant is disturbed with the level of12 sound

coming from the firm, it was considered a nuisance.
On July 1, 2003, respondent filed a complaint for the
abatement of nuisance with damages with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary and permanent injunction
before the RTC of Malabon City against petitioner. The
complaint alleged the following:
“6. The Feliza Building’s air-conditioning units are served by

some 36 blowers, 4 blowers to each floor located outside the
windows of the building facing directly towards the Frabella I
Condominium. The 36 blowers were installed from the 2nd floor to
the 10th floor of the building and these blowers are aesthetically
covered by a vertical concrete sun baffles.
_______________
12 Records, pp. 46-47.
640

7. [Every time] the Feliza Building’s air-conditioning system is

turned on, all or a good number of the 36 blowers are made to
operate simultaneously. The operation of the Feliza’s blowers
generates a continuous deafening unbearable vibrating and
stressful noise affecting the tenants of the Frabella I
Condominium. Hot air is also blasted from the [Feliza] Building’s
blowers to the direction of the Frabella I Condominium.
8. The tenants occupying the 5th to the 16th floors of the
Frabella I Condominium facing Feliza Building are directly
subjected to a daily continuous intense noise and hot air blast
coming from the blowers of the [10-storey] Feliza Building. Some
are tenants of plaintiff, who have complained to plaintiff about
the matter. Tenants who could not bear the nuisance any longer
have vacated their units, and as a result, many units of plaintiff
have remained vacant, and unoccupied or uninhabitable, thereby
depriving plaintiff with rental income that it should have
otherwise be receiving.
9. In all good faith, without any desire to cause any
unnecessary inconvenience or trouble, plaintiff has written and
made numerous contacts with defendant to complain about this
nuisance, even soliciting the help and intercession of the
Barangay San Lorenzo, Makati Commercial Estate Association,
Inc. (MACEA), Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA),
Makati City Government, Makati Pollution Office and
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), to

try to settle the matter amicably. Several meetings have taken
place, as well as many correspondences made by plaintiff to
defendant. But reasonable and lawful demands by plaintiff to
abate the nuisance have been repeatedly ignored/refused by
defendant. The demand letters, and the response of defendant to
these letters, are herein attached and made integral part of this
Complaint as follows:
Date Remarks
Annex
11 April 1995 Demand letter to abate nuisance
“A”
15 May 1995 Response to demand letter
“B”
06 June 1995 Follow-up demand letter
641
VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 641

“C”
14 August 2000 Follow-up demand letter
“D”
10. There [are] more letters that were exchanged between

plaintiff and defendant and/or their lawyers, but they will not be
attached to this Complaint at this time to simplify the facts.
11. Even the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA)
and Makati Commercial Estate Association, Inc. (MACEA) wrote
defendant letters urging it to rectify and abate the nuisance.
Copies of the letters of the MMDA dated 29 April 1996 and the
MACEA dated 10 October 1996 are herein attached and marked
as Annexes—“E” and “F”[,] respectively.
12. On the other hand, the DENR, over a span of 7 years, has
conducted several noise sampling tests. As shown by the results,
the unbearable noise generated by the Feliza’s blowers is beyond
the legally allowable level under Sec. 78(b) of P.D. 984, as
indicated in their reports, hence[,] it undoubtedly constitutes
nuisance. Copies of the test results are herein attached and made
an integral part of this Complaint as follows:
Date Annex
Date Annex
29 June 1995 “G”
11 August 1995 “H”
08 December 1995 “I”
01 July 1996 “J”
04 November 1996 “K”
29 August 2000 “L”
13. Please note that the testing done on 08 December 1995 (Annex
- “I”) was even requested by defendant.
14. On 04 February 2003, another test by the DENR was
conducted, and a copy of the results are herein attached and
marked as Annex - “M.” Although the latest test would seem to
indicate that there was a reduction in the decibel readings as
compared with the previous tests, this is actually misleading. For
one, 28 blowers were operational at the time of the testing, as
opposed to the previous
642

testing done when all 36 blowers were functioning. This is rather

exceptional because ordinarily, all 36 blowers of the Feliza
Building are in operation. The fact that only 28 blowers were
operational at the time of the testing resulted in the lower decibel
reading.
15. Plaintiff will also demonstrate by expert testimony during
the course of the trial that there were lapses committed during
the latest testing that materially influenced the results. But be
that as it may, defendant did not perform any remedial or
rectification works to lower the noise being generated by the
blowers, hence [,] it was not responsible for any imagined or
actual reduction in the decibel readings.
16. As a consequence of such unbearable, hot air and stressful
noise, the occupants of the Frabella I, including the tenants of
plaintiff, have been and still are, prevented from enjoying
peaceful and comfortable use of their property thereby forcing
them to vacate and or to transfer elsewhere.
17. Notwithstanding the foregoing results, repeated
requests/demands from the plaintiff and recommendations of the
DENR, MACEA and MMDA to abate the pollution and nuisance,
the defendant has ignored and still 13
continues to ignore such
requests/demands/recommendation.”
Respondent prayed for injunction and the following other

reliefs, thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed

that upon the filing of this Complaint, after notice and hearing,
and after the payment of a bond in an amount to be fixed by the
Honorable Court, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction be issued
enjoining defendant from operating the air-conditioning system of
the Feliza Building and/or turning on the blowers subject matter
of this suit while the instant case remains pending.
After trial and hearing, judgment be rendered against the
defendant and for the plaintiff, ordering the former:
1. To abate the noise and air pollution being generated by all the
blowers of the air-conditioning system of Feliza
_______________
13 Records, pp. 2-5.
643
VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 643

Building, and/or to make the Writ of Preliminary Injunction

permanent;
2. To pay plaintiff the amount of P1,000,000.00 in temperate or
moderate damages[;]
3. To pay the plaintiff the amount of P1,000,000.00 as and by way of
exemplary damages;
4. To pay the plaintiff the amount of P500,000.00 as and by way of
attorney’s fees; and
14
5. [To pay] the cost of the suit.”
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the

following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter of the complaint; (2) the complaint does
not state a cause of action; and (3) the action is15barred by
res judicata, litis pendentia, and forum shopping.
Petitioner averred that it was the Makati City
Government that had jurisdiction over the complaint
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160. It also pointed
out that DENR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 30 issued
on June 30, 1992 devolved to the local government units
the power to determine matters pertaining to
environmental management such as: (a) enforcement of
pollution control and environmental protection laws, rules
and regulations; (b) abatement of noise and other forms of

nuisance; and (c) implementation of cease and desist orders
issued by the PAB. It maintained that respondent had filed
a similar action before the Makati City Government
concerning the same issues presented in the complaint and
that the City Building Official, Engr. Morales, had ruled in
his letter dated July 19, 2002 that the excess in the noise
quality standard within the vicinity was caused not only by
the air-conditioning system of Feliza Building but also by
other prevailing factors which were beyond its control.
Respondent had failed to appeal the resolution; hence, the
resolution of the City Building Official barred the
complaint.
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 9-10.

15 Id., at pp. 80-89.
644

Petitioner further averred that, aside from the action

brought before the City Government, the Frabella
Condominium Corporation (FCC) filed a case for
Abatement of Noise and/or Air Pollution and Damages with
Prayer for Interim Cease and Desist Order, docketed as
PAB Case No. 01-0009NCR. As gleaned from the material
averments of the two complaints, both involved the same
set of facts and issues. Consequently, the petition is barred
by litis pendentia, and respondent was guilty of violating
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court for failure to include
in its certification against forum shopping of the pendency
of the PAB case or the prior resolution by the City
Government of the complaint before the City Building
Official/City Engineer.
Petitioner further claimed that the complaint stated no
cause of action because it failed to allege any right of
respondent which it was obliged to respect, and any act or
omission of defendant in violation of such right. As gleaned
from the EMB’s report to the City Engineer on May 24,
2002, the passing of vehicles along the street and blowers
in the nearby building
16
contributed to the ambient noise
quality in the area.
In compliance with the order of the court, the parties
submitted their respective Position Papers. Respondent
averred that the provisions of R.A. No. 7160 cited by

petitioner apply not to 17abatements of nuisance but to
pollution control cases. The local government units
(LGUs) are only granted administrative and executive
powers, not judicial or quasi-judicial functions to abate a
nuisance. While admitting that DENR A.O. No. 30
devolved to the LGUs the function of abating noise and
other forms of nuisance as defined by law, plaintiff posited
that said A.O. is not a law and the DENR cannot deprive
the court of its jurisdiction over the abatement of nuisance.
_______________
16 CA Rollo, pp. 55-63.

17 Id., at pp. 86-99.
645
VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 645

Respondent alleged that in filing a motion to dismiss,

petitioner hypothetically admitted the factual allegations
in the complaint and, thus, only questions of law remained;
hence, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and the need for
exhaustion of administrative remedies do not apply.
Moreover, petitioner itself had even admitted that
respondent had tried to seek administrative relief before
the Makati City Government, but the City Building Official
denied the same. It insisted that to require the further
exhaust of administrative remedies beyond what it had
tried in the past years would be an injustice. It claimed
that the proper application of P.D. No. 984 was in issue,
specifically Section 78(b) of the Rules and Regulations of
the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC) which
were adopted and promulgated pursuant to Section 6 of
P.D. No. 984 and Title VIII of the Civil Code.
Respondent maintained that Engr. Morales’ letter to it
could not be considered as final as to constitute res judicata
between the parties. It was only a reply-letter. Besides, the
City Engineer/Building Official could not exercise quasi-
judicial functions. Due process was not also observed
because no proceedings were conducted. It insisted that it
wrote follow-up letters to know the basis of his findings and
to confirm the fact that the Makati City Government did
not issue a permit to operate its air-conditioning unit.
However, Engr. Morales refused to acknowledge the same
and did not reply thereto. Respondent asserted that it did
not engage in forum shopping as the complainant in the

PAB case was FCC, a corporation of unit owners of
Frabella I. It is a totally different corporate entity, the
stockholders and officers of which are not similar to FPC.
On petitioner’s claim that there was no cause of action for
the abatement of nuisance, it declared that the material
allegations of its complaint and the answer thereto show
otherwise. Petitioner had the obligation to abate the
nuisance caused by the blowers of Feliza Building.
Although under the DENR Report on May 24, 2002, the
DENR conducted noise sampling, and noted that the
passing vehicles along the street and blowers of nearby
building contributed to
646

the noise, the basis of its complaint was the noise

generated by the blowers of Feliza Building.
Before the RTC court could resolve the motion to dismiss18
of petitioner, the PAB resolved, on July 29, 2003 to
dismiss the complaint filed by Frabelle. The matter was
then endorsed to the LGU concerned in accordance with
Section IV, Rule III of PAB Resolution 1-C, Series of 1997,
as amended. It noted that based on the pleadings of the
parties, and the testimonial evidence, the case is more of a
nuisance, and “[e]xcept where such would constitute a
pollution case, local government units shall have the power
to abate nuisance within their respective areas pursuant to
the Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code of the Philippines),
Republic Act 7160 (the Local Government Code),
Presidential Decree 856 (the Code of Sanitation of the
Philippines), DENR Department Administrative Order No.
30, Series of 1992 and other pertinent laws, rules and
regulations” without prejudice to the institution of a
pollution case, upon proof that respondent had failed to
comply with DENR standards and the presentation of other
evidence that would warrant the PAB 19
to take cognizance of
and assert jurisdiction over the case.
Thereafter, the 20RTC denied petitioner’s motion to
dismiss in an Order dated September 15, 2003. It ruled
that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction simply calls for the
determination of administrative questions, which are
ordinarily questions of facts and not of law. Likewise, the
trial court is not divested of its jurisdiction simply because
of plaintiff’s failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Moreover, as gleaned from the

averments of the complaint, there was an urgency of
abating the noise and air pollution generated by the
blowers of petitioner’s airconditioning system such that
respondent prayed for injunctive relief. The RTC took note
of the allegations of respondent
_______________
18 Id., at p. 175.
19 Id., at p. 93.
20 Rollo, pp. 119-123.
647
VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 647

that it would suffer great and irreparable injury; hence, to

require it to exhaust further administrative remedies
would be, in effect, a nullification of its claim.
According to the RTC, the doctrine of res judicata
applies only to judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings and
not to the exercise of administrative powers. Thus, no
forum shopping was also committed. Since the findings of
the City Building Official appear to be a complete
disavowal of the previous results gathered from the
numerous tests conducted by the EMB, the court could not
be deprived of its inherent power to review the factual
findings of the administrative official in order to determine
the regularity of the procedure used.
On the merits of the complaint, the RTC declared that
the factual allegations were sufficient in themselves to
constitute a cause of action against respondent and, if
admitting the facts, the court can render valid judgment on
the basis thereof in accordance with the relief prayed for:
“Undeniably, the instant complaint is one for abatement of

nuisance. Plaintiff alleges that the operation of defendant’s
blowers generates a continuous, deafening, unbearable, vibrating
and stressful noise affecting its tenants. Some have already
vacated their units while others refused to pay rents and threaten
plaintiff to be sued because of the unabated nuisance. Plaintiff
has been deprived of rental income. It had written and made
numerous contacts with the defendant to complain about the
nuisance and further solicited intervention from government
agencies including the Government of Makati City. Defendant
allegedly failed or refused to abate the nuisance which is in total
disregard of the right of the plaintiff over its property. Contested

findings of the EMB and City Building Official of Makati City are,
likewise, put in issue. These are sufficient to constitute a cause of
action against the defendant and, if admitting the facts, this
Court can render valid judgment
21
upon the same in accordance
with the relief prayed for.”
_______________
21 Id., at p. 123.
648

The court 22denied the motion for reconsideration filed by

petitioner, and the latter sought relief from the CA via a
petition for certiorari. Petitioner averred that:
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT

JURISDICTION, OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
SO GRAVE AS TO LOSE JURISDICTION IN ASSUMING AND
EXERCISING ITS JURISDICTION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 03-
3745-MN, CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION

OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT.
JURISDICTION IS VESTED WITH THE MAKATI CITY
GOVERNMENT, THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT
CONCERNED.
B. THE COMPLAINT IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA.
THE MAKATI CITY GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY
DECIDED A COMPLAINT FILED BY FRABELLE.
FRABELLE DID NOT ELEVATE THE SAME ON
APPEAL, OR, IN ANY WAY, QUESTION SUCH
DECISION. THUS, THE DECISION BY THE MAKATI
CITY GOVERNMENT IS NOW FINAL AND
EXECUTORY.
C. AT THE TIME THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED, IT WAS
BARRED BY LITIS PENDENTIA. A SIMILAR ACTION
WAS PENDING WITH THE POLLUTION
ADJUDICATION BOARD (PAB) WHICH,
SUBSEQUENTLY, FOUND NO LIABILITY ON THE
PART OF AC. FRABELLE IS CLEARLY AND
UNDENIABLY GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING.
D. PLAINTIFF FRABELLE HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION
AND THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CAUSE OF
23
23
ACTION AGAINST AC ENTERPRISES.
Petitioner asserted that, by express provision of law, the

City of Makati has primary jurisdiction over the complaint
and is the competent authority to determine the existence
of any incidence of pollution, the special standards and
regula-
_______________
22 Id., at pp. 124-132.

23 CA Rollo, pp. 11-12.
649
VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 649

tions controlling the same and the resolution whether a

party has complied with the regulations. The complaint
does not fall under any of the exceptions to the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies. Respondent is
guilty of short-circuiting the whole process without
requisite justification. Contrary to the contention of
respondent, the proceedings before the City Government
are quasi-judicial in nature. It pointed out that the City
Government had already made its findings, which
respondent did not contest in the proper tribunal within
the reglementary period. It did not appeal the decision of
the City Building Official conformably with DENR
Administrative Order No. 37-45 (General Manual of
Operations for Devolved Functions from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to the Local
Government Units); hence, the resolution became final and
executory. It insisted that the complaint is but a desperate
attempt to revive what is otherwise a dead issue.
On September 21, 24
2004, the CA rendered judgment
denying the petition. The fallo of the decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED

for lack of merit. Accordingly, the dismissal of the petition
rendered the application for a temporary restraining order or writ
of preliminary injunction
25
moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.”
The CA ruled that the action of respondent was one for the
abatement of a nuisance within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the RTC. It agreed with respondents’ contention that,
under R.A. No. 7160, the LGUs are not divested of its
jurisdiction over an action for the abatement of a nuisance.
Section 17, sub-paragraphs (b)(3)(iii) in relation to (b)(4) of
the law pertain to the enforcement of pollution control law
and not to the abatement of nuisance. While DENR A.O.
No. 30 devolved to
_______________
24 Rollo, pp. 189-202.

25 Id., at p. 201.
650

the LGUs the abatement of noise and other forms of

nuisance as defined by law, this does not necessarily
deprive the courts to hear and decide actions pertaining
thereon. It was thus proper for respondent to bring the case
before the court since it had already sought the
intercession of Barangay San Lorenzo, Makati Commercial
Estate Corporation (MACEA), DENR, and the Makati City
Government to no avail.
Further, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies need not
be adhered to when the question between the parties is
purely legal. In this case, petitioner, in filing a motion to
dismiss, is deemed to have hypothetically admitted all the
factual averments of respondent. Hence, what is left for the
court to adjudicate is only the application of laws dealing
with nuisance. The CA also declared that the filing of the
case below was not barred by res judicata for the reason
that the decision adverted to by petitioner was only a letter
of the City Building Official to respondent; no adversarial
proceedings or submission of evidence and position papers
took place before said office. At best, the letter is only an
exercise of the City Government’s administrative powers,
not judicial or quasi-judicial functions which the City
Building Official does not possess. Respondent’s filing of
the complaint before the Malabon RTC is also not barred
by litis pendentia. FCC, as complainant, initiated the
action before the PAB, while the respondent filed the
pending case before the court; there is no identity of parties
since FCC has a personality separate and distinct from
that of respondent.
Finally, the CA held that all the requisites for the

existence of a cause of action were present in the case at
bar. Due to the unbearable noise and hot air allegedly
produced by the blowers installed at petitioner’s building,
tenants of respondent have been complaining, forcing them
to vacate their units while others refused to pay their rent
and threatened to take legal action. Respondent had the
right to abate such nuisance in order to avert future
business losses. Since petitioner refused to heed its
demands, respondent was well within its
651
VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 651

right to file a case protecting its property and proprietary

rights.
On January 18, 2005, the appellate court26 resolved to
deny petitioner’s
27
motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.
Petitioner forthwith filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari, praying for the reversal of the CA decision
and resolution on the following grounds:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT

THE LOWER COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE
INSTANT CASE, CONSIDERING THAT THE EXCLUSIVE
AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN
THE CASE A QUO LIES WITH THE CITY OF MAKATI.
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE

POWER TO ABATE NUISANCES AND CONTROL NOISE
POLLUTION HAS BEEN DEVOLVED TO THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNIT CONCERNED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
REPUBLIC ACT 7160 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING

THAT THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE INSTANT CASE
NECESSARILY INVOLVE A QUESTION OF FACT, AND,
THEREFORE, THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION
AND THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES ARE BOTH APPLICABLE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT

THE COMPLAINT IS NOT BARRED BY (1) LITIS PENDENTIA;
(2) RES JUDICATA; AND (3) FORUM SHOPPING.
_______________
26 Id., at pp. 205-221.

27 Id., at pp. 256-257.
652

IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT

RESPONDENT’S
28
COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF
ACTION.
Petitioner insists that, under Section 17(b)(4) in relation to

Section 17(b)(3)(III) of R.A. No. 7160, the City of Makati is
obliged to enforce the Pollution Control Law, and under
Section 458(4)(I) of the said law, the Sangguniang
Panglungsod is empowered to declare, prevent or abate any
nuisance. Thus, the City of Makati has exclusive
jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint for the abatement
of the noise from the blowers of the air conditioning unit of
the Feliza Building and of the hot air generated by the said
blowers. Petitioner avers that the issues before the trial
court were factual in nature. By its motion to dismiss the
complaint, it did not hypothetically admit the allegations of
respondent in its complaint that the noise and hot air
emitted by the blowers of the Feliza Building constitute a
nuisance or air pollution because the allegations are mere
conclusions of law and not mere statements of facts.
Respondent’s complaint before the trial court and its
several complaints against petitioner before quasijudicial
bodies is an implied admission of the availability of
administrative remedies under the law. Since respondent
failed to pursue and exhaust all administrative remedies
before filing its complaint below, its action was premature.
While there were exceptions to the requirement of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, nevertheless,
respondent failed to establish any of them. Moreover,

respondent’s action before the RTC was barred by the letter
of the City Engineer’s Office of Makati City on July 19,
2002 which ruled that there was no factual basis for
respondent’s complaint; hence, respondent’s complaint was
barred by res judicata. The complainant in PAB Case No.
01-0009-NCR involved the same set of issues and
circumstances, and the complainant therein and
respondent represented the same interests, alleged the
same rights
_______________
28 Id., at p. 21.
653
VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 653

and prayed for the same reliefs. Consequently, the RTC

erred in denying its motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of res judicata, litis pendentia and forum shopping.
Finally, respondent had no cause of action against
petitioner because, as shown by the tests conducted by the
EMB on May 24, 2002, based on noise sampling tests, the
noise and air pollution did not emanate from Feliza
Building but from passing cars.
In its comment on the petition, respondent maintained
that the assailed orders of the RTC and decision of the CA
are in accord with law and the rulings of this Court.
Respondent maintains that the only issue before the trial
court was how to apply P.D. No. 984 and Section 78(b) and
the Rules and Regulations of the NPCC and the provisions
of the New Civil Code governing the abatement of
nuisance. By filing a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that it stated no cause of action, the petitioner
thereby hypothetically admitted the factual allegations
therein. The court must hear the case to be able to finally
resolve the factual issues that may be raised in the Answer
of the petitioner after the denial of its motion to dismiss.
Respondent avers that it was not obliged to first exhaust
all administrative remedies. It pointed out that the
Building Official of Makati City ignored its right to due
process when he dismissed its complaint without
conducting an investigation based solely on the July 2,
2002 Report of the EMB Panel. The issues between the
parties are legal, that is, whether there is irreparable
injury. It likewise points out that to require exhaustion of

administrative remedies would be unreasonable as the rule
does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It
insists that it could not have appealed the letters of the
City Mayor and the Building Official of Makati because
there are no rules promulgated by the City governing
appeals from said letters. It points out that the City
Engineer and City Mayor did not grant its letter request-
654

ing for a clarification of petitioner’s letters denying its

lettercomplaint.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
The Order of the RTC dated September 15, 2003
denying the motion to dismiss of petitioner (as defendant
below) is interlocutory in nature. The general rule is that
an order denying a motion to dismiss a complaint cannot be
questioned via a special civil action for certiorari until a
final judgment on the merits of the case is rendered. A
party must exhaust all remedies available before resorting
to certiorari. A writ for certiorari is not intended to correct
every controversial interlocutory ruling. It is resorted only
to correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical
exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It is
a remedy narrow in scope, limited only to keeping an
inferior court within its jurisdiction and to relieve persons
from arbitrary acts29 which courts have no power or
authority to perform. The remedy of petitioner was to go
to trial and appeal from an adverse decision.
Moreover, the CA correctly ruled that the RTC did not
commit grave abuse of its discretion in denying the motion
to dismiss filed by respondent. Indeed, the assailed orders
of the RTC are in accord with the law and rulings of this
Court, taking into account the averments of the complaint
and the answer appended thereto and the other pleadings
of the parties.
The RTC Has Jurisdiction Over

the Action of the Respondent for
Abatement Of Nuisance
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and whether the
tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over such action are to
be determined from the material allegations of the
complaint, the law in force at the time the complaint is

filed, and the
_______________
29 Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher Education,

G.R. No. 139371, April 4, 2001, 356 SCRA 367, 384.
655
VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 655

character of the relief sought irrespective of whether

plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims averred.
Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set
up by defendant in an answer to the complaint or a motion
to dismiss the same. Otherwise, jurisdiction would be 30
dependent almost entirely upon the whims of defendants.
We agree with the ruling of the RTC, as affirmed by the
CA, that as gleaned from the material averments of the
complaint as well as the character of the relief prayed for
by respondent in its complaint before the RTC, the petition
is one for the judicial abatement of a private nuisance,
more specifically the noise generated by the blowers of the
airconditioning system of the Feliza Building owned by
petitioner, with a plea for a writ of preliminary and
permanent injunction, plus damages. Such action of
respondent is incapable of pecuniary estimation because
the basic issue is something other than the right to recover
a sum of money. Although respondent prayed for judgment
for temperate or moderate damages and exemplary
damages, such claims are merely incidental to or as a
consequence of, the principal relief sought by respondent.
An action incapable of pecuniary estimation is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC as provided in Batas
Pambansa
31
Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 129, as amended
32
by R.A. No.
7691. In Tatel v. Municipality of Virac, the Court ruled
that a simple suit for abatement of a nuisance is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, now
the RTC.
_______________
30 Arzaga v. Copias, 448 Phil. 171, 180; 400 SCRA 148, 154-155 (2003);
Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 400 Phil. 307,
326; 346 SCRA 485 (2000).
31 Radio Communications of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 435

Phil. 62, 66; 386 SCRA 67, 70 (2002); Raymundo v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 97805, September 2, 1992, 213 SCRA 457, 460461.
32 G.R. No. 40243, March 11, 1992, 207 SCRA 157.
656

Article 694 of the New Civil Code defines a nuisance as

follows:
“Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment,

business, condition of property, or anything else which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or

(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public
highway or street, or any body of water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.”
The term “nuisance” is so comprehensive that it has been

applied to almost all ways which have interfered with the
rights of the citizens, either in person, 33 property, the
enjoyment of his property, or his comfort. According to
Article 695 of the Civil Code, a nuisance may be either
public or private:
“Art. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance

affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number
of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or
damage upon individuals may be unequal. A private nuisance is
one that is not included in the foregoing definition.”
A private nuisance has been defined as one which violates

only private 34rights and produces damages to but one or a
few persons. A nuisance is public when it interferes with
the exercise of public right by directly encroaching
35
on
public property or by causing a common injury. It is an
unreason-
_______________
33 TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE

PHILIPPINES,PROPERTY,VOL. II, p. 372.
34 Id., at p. 377.
35 Connerty v. Metropolitan District Commission, 495 N.E.2d 840

(1986).
657
VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 657

able interference
36
with the right common to the general
public.
Under Article 705 of the New Civil Code, a party
aggrieved by a private nuisance has two alternative
remedies: (1) a civil action; or (2) abatement, without
judicial proceedings. A person injured by a private
nuisance may abate it as provided in Article 706:
“Art. 706. Any person injured by a private nuisance may abate it

by removing, or if necessary by destroying the thing which
constitutes the nuisance, without committing a breach of the
peace or doing unnecessary injury. However, it is indispensable
that the procedure for extrajudicial abatement of a public
nuisance by a private person be followed.”
A private nuisance action is the remedy for an invasion of a

property right. On the other hand, the action for the
abatement of a public nuisance
37
should be commenced by
the city or municipality. A private person may institute an
action for the abatement of a public nuisance in cases
wherein he suffered a special injury of a direct and
substantial character
38
other than that which the general
public shares. The district health officer shall determine
whether or not abatement, without judicial 39
proceedings, is
the best remedy against a public nuisance.
In the present case, respondent opted to file an action in
the RTC for abatement of the private nuisance complained
of and damages under Article 697 of the New Civil Code for
its past existence.
One has an action to recover personal damages arising
from a private nuisance. The gist of the action is the unrea-
_______________
36 Harvey v. Mason City & Ft. Dodge R. Co., 105 N.W. 958 (1906).
37 Art. 701, NEW CIVIL CODE.
38 Connerty v. Metropolitan District Commission, supra note 36.
658

sonable interference by the defendant with the use and

enjoyment of properties. Indeed, petitioner may be
compelled to adopt the necessary measures to reduce or
deaden the nuisance emanating from the blowers of the air-
conditioning system at the Feliza Building.
The PAB has no primary jurisdiction over the noise
complained of by the respondent. The resolution of the
issue before the RTC, which is whether the noise
complained of is actionable nuisance, does not require any
special technical knowledge, expertise and experience of
the PAB or even of Makati City requiring the
determination of technical and intricate matters of fact.
Indeed, the PAB dismissed the complaint of the Frabelle I
Condominium Corporation declaring that, based on the
pleadings before it and the evidence of the parties, the case
is more of an abatement of a nuisance under the New Civil
Code and DENR Order No. 30, Series of 1992. It declared
that it was not a pollution case. The Resolution reads:
“After considering the evidence adduced and the arguments of

both parties in their pleadings, the Board, likewise giving due
importance to the technical findings giving rise to the conclusion
that the nature of the case is more of a nuisance, hereby resolves
to DISMISS the pending complaint of pollution in accordance
with Rule III, Section IV of PAB Resolution 1-C, Series of 1997 as
amended, which categorically states that “Except where such
would constitute a pollution case, local government units shall
have the power to abate a nuisance within their respective areas
pursuant to the Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code of the
Philippines), Republic Act 7160 (the Local Government Code),
Presidential Decree 856 (the Code on Sanitation of the
Philippines), DENR Department Administrative Order No. 30,
Series of 1992 and other pertinent laws, rules and regulations.”
(italics supplied)
Accordingly, the issues raised by the complainant are hereby
endorsed to the Local Government Unit concerned for appropriate
action consistent with above cited laws, and without prejudice to
the institution of a pollution case upon definite findings that
herein respondent had failed to comply with the DENR
Standards, and
659
VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 659

presentation of other evidence that would warrant 40

the Board to
take cognizance of the matter as a pollution case.”
The power of the NPCC to resolve pollution cases under

Section 6, paragraphs (e), (f), (g), (j), (k) and (p) of P.D. No.
984 is vested in the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB)
under Title XIV, Chapter 2, Section 13 of the 1987
Administrative Code, which reads:
“SEC. 13. Pollution Adjudication Board.—The Pollution

Adjudication Board, under the Office of the Secretary, shall be
composed of the Secretary as Chairman, two Undersecretaries as
may be designated by the Secretary, the Director of
Environmental Management, and three others to be designated
by the Secretary as members. The Board shall assume the powers
and functions of the Commission Commissioners of the National
Pollution Control Commission with respect to the adjudication of
pollution cases under Republic Act 3931 and Presidential Decree
984, particularly with respect to Section 6 letters (e), (f), (g), (j), (k)
and (p) of P.D. 984. The Environment Management Bureau shall
serve as the Secretariat of the Board. These powers and functions
may be delegated to the regional officers of the Department in
accordance with the rules and regulations to be promulgated by
the Board.”
The cases referred to in Section 6 of P.D. No. 984 are as

follows:
(e) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with

the provisions of this Decree and its implementing
rules and regulations only after proper notice and
hearing.
(f) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the
discontinuance of pollution specifying the
conditions and the time within such discontinuance
must be accomplished.
(g) Issue, renew or deny permits, under such conditions
as it may determine to be reasonable, for the
prevention and abatement of pollution, for the
discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or for the
installation or operation of sewage works and
industrial disposal system or parts thereof:
Provided, however, That the Commission, by
_______________
40 CA Rollo, p. 93.
660

rules and regulations, may require subdivisions,

condominium, hospitals, public buildings and other
similar human settlements to put up appropriate
central sewerage system and sewage treatment
works, except that no permits shall be required of
any new sewage works or changes to or extensions
of existing works that discharge only domestic or
sanitary wastes from a single residential building
provided with septic tanks or their equivalent. The
Commission may impose reasonable fees and
charges for the issuance or renewal of all permits
herein required.
xxx
(j) Serve as arbitrator for the determination of
reparations, or restitution of the damages and
losses resulting from pollution.
(k) Deputize in writing or request assistance of
appropriate government agencies or
instrumentalities for the purpose of enforcing this
Decree and its implementing rules and regulations
and the orders and decision of the Commission.
xxx
(p) Exercise such powers and perform such other
functions as may be necessary to carry out its
duties and responsibilities under this Decree.
Section 2(a) of P.D. No. 984 defines pollution as:
(a) “Pollution” means any alteration of the physical, chemical and

biological properties of any water, air and/or land resources of the
Philippines, or any discharge thereto of any liquid, gaseous or
solid wastes as will or is likely to create or to render such water,
air and land resources harmful, detrimental or injuries to public
health, safety or welfare or which will adversely affect their
utilization for domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural,
recreational or other legitimate purposes.
We agree with petitioner’s contention that, under Section

447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is
empowered to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or
abating noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears
stressing, however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot

declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its
condemnation. It does
661
VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 661

not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing

is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor
can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and
destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature,
situation or use is not such. Those things must be
determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law. If a
thing be in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its
operation, that question cannot be determined
41
by a mere
resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Section 17 of R.A. No. 7160 provides that local
government units shall discharge the functions and
responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to
them pursuant to the law; and such other powers, functions
and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate or
incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic
services and facilities in the Code. Devolution refers to the
act by which the national government confers powers and
authority upon the various local government units to
perform specific functions and responsibilities.
What were devolved by the DENR to the LGUs under
DENR Administrative Order No. 30 dated June 30, 1992,
in relation to R.A. No. 7160, were the regulatory
functions/duties of the National Pollution Control
Commission (NPCC) which were absorbed and integrated
by the EMB, as provided in Title No. XIV, Chapter 2,
Section 17 of the 1987 Administrative Code. However, the
DENR exercises administrative supervision and control
over the LGUs. Enumerated in Chapter IV, Article 1,
Sections 74 to 79 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated
by the NPCC implementing P.D. 984 are the regulations
relative to noise control, specifically, the noise quality
standards.
Under Section 78 of said Rules, as amended by NPCC
Memorandum Circular No. 002, dated May 12, 1980, the
_______________
41 Estate of Francisco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91279, July 25,

1991, 199 SCRA 597, 601.
662

Environmental Quality Standards for Noise in General

Areas are:
Category of Daytime Morning & Nighttime

Area Evening
AA 50dB 45dB 40dB
A 55 ” 50 ” 45 ”
B 65 ” 60 ” 55 ”
C 70 ” 65 ” 60 ”
D 75 ” 70 ” 65 ”
Class “A” area refers to that section or contiguous area

which is primarily used for residential purposes, while
Class “B” refers to that section or contiguous area which is
primarily a commercial area. Frabelle I and Feliza
Buildings are located in Makati City, an area which is
classified as a commercial district.
The division of the 24-hour period shall be as follows:
Morning 5:00 A.M. to

......................................................................... 9:00
A.M.
Daytime 8:00 A.M. to
......................................................................... 10:00
P.M.
Evening 6:00 P.M. to
.......................................................................... 10:00
P.M.
Nighttime 10:00 P.M.to
....................................................................... 5:00
P.M.
The LGUs may conduct inspections, at all reasonable

times, without doing damage, after due notice to the
owners of buildings to ascertain compliance with the noise
standards under the law; and to order them to comply
therewith if they fail to do so; or suspend or cancel any
building permits or clearance certificates issued by it for
said units/buildings after due hearing as required by P.D.
No. 984.
However, the LGUs have no power to declare a

particular thing as a nuisance unless such as thing is a
nuisance per se; nor can they effect the extrajudicial
abatement of that as a
663
VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 663

nuisance which in its nature or use is not such. Those

things must be resolved by the courts in the ordinary
course of law.
Whether or not noise emanating from a blower of the
airconditioning units of the Feliza Building is nuisance is
to be resolved only by the court in due course of
proceedings. The plaintiff must prove that the noise is a
nuisance and the consequences thereof. Noise is not a
nuisance per se. It may be of such a character as to
constitute a nuisance, even though it arises from the
operation of a lawful business, only if it affects injuriously
the health or comfort of ordinary people in the vicinity to
an unreasonable extent. Injury to a particular person in a
peculiar position or of especially sensitive characteristics
will not render the noise an actionable nuisance. In the
conditions of present living, noise seems inseparable from
the conduct of many necessary occupations. Its presence is
a nuisance in the popular sense in which that word is used,
but in the absence of statute, noise becomes actionable only
when it passes the limits of reasonable adjustment to the
conditions of the locality and of the needs of the maker to
the needs of the listener. What those limits are cannot be
fixed by any definite measure of quantity or quality; they
depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. They
may be affected, but are not controlled, by zoning
ordinances. The delimitation of designated areas to use for
manufacturing, industry or general business is not a
license to emit every noise profitably attending the conduct
of any one of them.
The test is whether rights of property, of health or of
comfort are so injuriously affected by the noise in question
that the sufferer is subjected to a loss which goes beyond
the reasonable limit imposed upon him by the condition of
living, or of holding property, in a particular locality in fact
devoted to uses which involve the emission of noise
although ordinary care is taken to confine it within
reasonable bounds; or in the vicinity of property of another
owner who, though creating a
664

noise, is acting with 42

reasonable regard for the rights of
those affected by it.
Commercial and industrial activities which are lawful in
themselves may become nuisances if they are so offensive
to the senses that they render the enjoyment of life and
property uncomfortable. The fact that the cause of the
complaint must be substantial has often led to expressions
in the opinions that to be a nuisance the noise must be
deafening or loud or excessive and unreasonable. The
determining factor when noise alone is the cause of
complaint is not its intensity or volume. It is that the noise
is of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort
and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities,
rendering adjacent property less comfortable and valuable.
If the noise does that it can well be said to be substantial
and unreasonable in degree; and reasonableness is a
question of fact dependent upon all the circumstances and
conditions. There can be no fixed
43
standard as to what kind
of noise constitutes a nuisance.
The courts have made it clear that in every case the
question is one of reasonableness. What is a reasonable use
of one’s property and whether a particular use is an
unreasonable invasion of another’s use and enjoyment of
his property so as to constitute a nuisance cannot be
determined by exact rules, but must necessarily depend
upon the circumstances of each case, such as locality and
the character of the surroundings, the nature, utility and
social value of the use, the extent and nature of the harm
involved, the nature, utility and44social value of the use or
enjoyment invaded, and the like.
Persons who live or work in thickly populated business
districts must necessarily endure the usual annoyances
and of those trades and businesses which are properly
located and
_______________
42 Tortorella v. H. Traiser & Co., 90 ALR 1203 (1933).

43 Kentucky and West Virginia Power Company v. Anderson, 156
S.W.2d 857 (1941) (emphasis ours).
44 Clinic and Hospital v. McConnell, 23 ALR2d 1278 (1951).
665
VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 665

carried on in the neighborhood where they live or work.

But these annoyances and discomforts must not be more
than those ordinarily to be expected in the community or
district, and which are incident to the lawful conduct of
such trades and businesses. If they exceed what might be
reasonably expected and 45
cause unnecessary harm, then the
court will grant relief.
A finding by the LGU that the noise quality standards
under the law have not been complied with is not a
prerequisite nor constitutes indispensable evidence to
prove that the defendant is or is not liable for a nuisance
and for damages. Such finding is merely corroborative to
the testimonial and/or other evidence to be presented by
the parties. The exercise of due care by the owner of a
business in its operation does not constitute a defense
where, notwithstanding the same, the business as
conducted,
46
seriously affects the rights of those in its
vicinity.
We reject petitioner’s contention that respondent’s
complaint does not state a cause of action for abatement of
a private nuisance and for damages. Under Section l(g),
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, a complaint may be
dismissed upon motion if the complaint states no cause of
action, or that a condition47
precedent for filing the claim has
not been complied with.
A cause of action is the act 48
or omission by which a party
violates a right of another. A cause of action exists if the
following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such right;
and (3) an act
_______________
45 Sullivan v. Royer, 72 Cal. 248, 13 P 655 (1887); Five Oaks Corp. v.

Gathmann, 190 Md 348, 58 A2d 656 (1948).
46 Robinson v. Westman, 29 N.W.2d 1 (1947).
47 Section 1(j), Rule 16, Rules of Court.
48 Section 2, Rule 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
666

or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the

right of plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of
defendant to plaintiff for which49 the latter may maintain an
action for recovery of damages.
The fundamental test for failure to state a cause of
action is whether, admitting the veracity of what appears
on the face and within the four corners of the complaint,
plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for. Stated
otherwise, may the court 50
render a valid judgment upon the
facts alleged therein? Indeed, the inquiry is into 51the
sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations. If
the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on
which it can be maintained, it
_______________
49 Mondragon Leisure and Resorts Corporation v. United Coconut

Planters Bank, G.R. No. 154187, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 585, 592;
Barcelona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130087, September 24, 2003, 412
SCRA 41, 46; Nadela v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 149627, September 18,
2003, 411 SCRA 315, 323; Bank of America NT & SA v. Court of Appeals,
448 Phil. 181, 194; 400 SCRA 156, 167 (2003); Ceroferr Realty Corporation
v. Court of Appeals, 426 Phil. 522, 528; 376 SCRA 144, 148 (2002); Uy v.
Hon. Evangelista, 413 Phil. 403, 415; 361 SCRA 95, 107 (2001); Drilon v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106922, April 20, 2001, 357 SCRA 12, 21; and
Alberto v. Court of Appeals, 390 Phil. 253, 263; 334 SCRA 756, 766 (2000).
50 Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, G.R. No.
156109, November 18, 2004, 443 SCRA 56, 59; Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation Limited v. Catalan, G.R. No. 159590, October 18,
2004, 440 SCRA 498, 510; Mondragon Leisure and Resorts Corporation v.
United Coconut Planters Bank, supra, at p. 591; Equitable Philippine
Commercial International Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143556,
March 16, 2004, 425 SCRA 544, 552; Vda. de Daffon v. Court of Appeals,
436 Phil. 233, 239; 387 SCRA 427, 432 (2002); Heirs of Kionisala v. Heirs
of Dacut, 428 Phil. 249, 259; 378 SCRA 206, 213-214 (2002); Alberto v.
Court of Appeals, Id.; Heirs of Paez v. Hon. Torres, 381 Phil. 393, 400; 324
SCRA 403, 410 (2000); and Dabuco v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 939, 949;
322 SCRA 853, 862-863 (2000).
51 Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Limited v. Catalan,
Id.
667
VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 667

should not be dismissed regardless of52 the defenses that

may be presented by defendants. As the Court
emphasized:
“In determining whether allegations of a complaint are sufficient

to support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the
complaint does not have to establish or allege facts proving the
existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be
done at the trial on the merits of the case. To sustain a motion to
dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that
the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has
been defectively stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.
Equally important, a defendant moving to dismiss a complaint
on the ground of lack of cause of action is regarded 53
as having
hypothetically admitted all the averments thereof.”
The general rule is that the facts asserted in the complaint

must be taken into account without modification
54
although
with reasonable inferences therefrom. However, all the
pleadings filed may be considered, including annexes,
motions and the other evidence on record, to wit:
“However, in so doing, the trial court does not rule on the truth or
falsity of such documents. It merely includes such documents in
the hypothetical admission. Any review of a finding of lack of
cause of action based on these documents would not involve a
calibration of the probative value of such pieces of evidence but
would only limit itself to the inquiry of whether the law was
properly applied given the facts and these supporting documents.
Therefore, what would inevitably arise from such 55
a review are
pure questions of law, and not questions of fact.”
_______________
52 Id.; Mondragon Leisure and Resorts Corporation v. United Coconut

Planters Bank, supra, at pp. 591-592; and Vda. de Daffon v. Court of
Appeals, supra, at p. 239; p. 432.
53 Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 111538,
February 26, 1997, 268 SCRA 727.
54 Nadela v. City of Cebu, supra, at p. 323; Heirs of Kionisala v. Heirs of
Dacut, supra, at p. 259; pp. 213-214.
55 China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil.
590, 602; 348 SCRA 401, 412 (2000).
668

Section 2, Rule 3, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended
in the name of the real party-in-interest.
SEC. 2. Parties in interest.—A real party in interest is the party

who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted
or defended in the name of the real party in interest. (2a)
“Interest” within the meaning of the rule means material

interest, an interest in essence to be affected by the
judgment as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real
interest is meant a present substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy or a 56 future,
contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. A real
party in interest-plaintiff is one who has a legal right while
a real party defendant is one who has a correlative legal
obligation whose
57
act or omission violate the legal right of
the former.
A person injured by a nuisance may bring an action in
his own name and 58
in behalf of others similarly affected to
abate the same. One who has an interest in the property
affected such as the owner thereof 59
or fix interest therein
are proper parties as plaintiffs. Possession alone of real
estate is sufficient to sustain an action to recover damages
from the maintenance of a nuisance by the adjoining
property in such manner as to injure the enjoyment of the
former.
In the present case, respondent made the following
allegations in its complaint below:
_______________
56 Ortigas & Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 400 Phil. 615, 625; 346 SCRA
748, 757-758 (2000).
57 Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81123, February 28, 1989, 170
SCRA 800, 806.
58 Robinson v. Westman, supra note 47.
59 Connerty v. Metropolitan District Commission, supra note 36.
669
VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 669

[Every time] the Feliza Building’s air-conditioning system is

turned on, all or a good number of the 36 blowers are made to
operate simultaneously. The operation of the Feliza’s blowers
generates a continuous defeaning unbearable vibrating and
stressful noise affecting the tenants of Frabella I Condominium.
Hot air is also blasted from the [Feliza Building’s blowers to the
direction of the Frabella I Condominium.
xxxx
The tenants occupying the 5th to the 16th floors of the Frabella
I Condominium facing Feliza Building are directly subjected to a
daily continuous intense noise and hot air blast coming from the
blowers of the [10-storey] Feliza Building. Some are tenants of
plaintiff, who have complained to plaintiff about the matter.
Tenants who could not bear the nuisance any longer have vacated
their units, and as a result, many units of plaintiff have remained
vacant, and unoccupied or uninhabitable thereby depriving
plaintiff with rental income that it should have otherwise be
receiving.
xxxx
Defendant did not perform any remedial or rectification works
to lower the noise being generated by the blowers;
As a consequence of such unbearable, hot air and stressful
noise, the occupants of the Frabella I, including the tenants of
plaintiff, have been and still are, prevented from enjoying
peaceful and comfortable use of their property thereby forcing
them to vacate and or to transfer elsewhere.
Notwithstanding the foregoing results, repeated requests/
demands from the plaintiff and recommendation of the DENR,
MACEA and MMDA to abate nuisance, the defendant has ignored
and still continues to ignore such
requests/demands/recommendation.
Appended to respondent’s complaint are its letters of

demand to the petitioner for the latter to abate the
nuisance complained of, as well as the results of the tests
conducted by the DENR showing that the noise generated
by the blowers of the Feliza Building is beyond the legally
allowable level standards under Section 78 of P.D. No. 984.
670

By filing a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground

that the complaint does not state a sufficient cause of
action for abatement of nuisance and damages, petitioner
hypothetically admitted the material allegations of the

complaint. A plain reading of the material averments
therein and its appendages will readily show that
respondent had a cause of action for abatement of a private
nuisance and for damages.
Respondent is the real party-in-interest as party
plaintiff in the complaint below because it owned several
units in Frabelle I and, as a result of the defeaning and
unbearable noise from the blowers of the air-conditioning
units of the Feliza Building owned by petitioner, many
tenants of the respondent vacated their units. The units
remained unoccupied, thereby depriving respondent of
income. Some of the tenants even threatened to sue
respondent on account of the noise from the Feliza
Building. In fine, respondent is obliged to maintain its
tenants
60
in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the
units.
Under Article 697 of the New Civil Code, the aggrieved
party is entitled to damages 61
for the present and past
existence of a nuisance. 62
He is entitled to actual or
compensatory damages or indemnification for damages
inclusive of the value of the loss suffered and profits which
respondent failed to obtain.
Liability for nuisance may be imposed upon one who sets
in motion the force which entirely caused the tortuous act;
upon one who sets in motion a force or a chain of events
resulting in the nuisance. In an action for damages
resulting from a nuisance, responsibility arises not only
from the creator of the 63
nuisance but from its continued
maintenance as well. One is entitled to damages on
account of the conduct by another of his business which
unreasonably and substantially interferes
_______________
60 Art. 1654(3), NEW CIVIL CODE.

63 Hasapopoulos v. Murphy, 689 S.W.2d 118 (1985).
671
VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 671

with the quiet

64
enjoyment of his premises by himself or of
his tenants. It is sufficient to maintain an action for
abatement of a nuisance if his building is rendered

valueless for the purpose it was devoted.
A negligent act may constitute a nuisance. An
intentional act may also constitute a nuisance. A nuisance
may be formed from a continuous, known invasion, where,
after complaint, and notice of damage, the defendant
continues to offend and refuses to correct or discontinue the
nuisance. In 65
such a case, the nuisance is deemed
intentional. An unreasonable use, perpetrated and
unconnected even after
66
complaint and notice of damage is
deemed intentional.
In this case, as alleged in the complaint, the subject
nuisance had been existing continuously since 1995 and,
despite repeated demands by respondent, petitioner
intransigently refused to abate the same.
We reject petitioner’s contention that considering the
Report of the EMB Team dated July 2, 2002 that the noise
complained of by the respondent did not necessarily come
from the blowers but also from passing cars, it follows that
respondent has no cause of action against it for abatement
of nuisance. As gleaned from the Report, the panel of
investigators found that the passing of vehicles along the
street and blowers of nearby buildings were merely
contributory to the ambient noise quality in the
area. To what extent the passing of vehicles contributed to
the noise is not indicated in the Report, nor is it stated that
the noise coming from the blowers of the air-conditioning
unit of the Feliza Building were at par with or lower than
the Level Standards under the property Rules and
regulations of P.D. No. 984.
_______________
64 Pratt v. Hercules, Inc., 570 F. Supp.773 (1982).

65 Supra note 51.
66 Bower v. Hog Builders, Inc., 461 S.W.2d 784 (1970); Vaughn v.
Missouri Power and Light Co., 89 SW2d 699 (1935); Hawkins v.
Burlington Northern, Inc., 514 S.W.2d 593 (1974).
672

The July 2, 2002 Report of the EMB Panel should not be

considered in isolation of other Reports of the EMB since
1995 up to 2000, showing that the noise level from the
blowers of the Feliza Building exceeded the allowable level
under P.D. No. 984. The July 2, 2002 Report is not decisive
on the issue of whether petitioner had abated the nuisance
complained of by respondent or that the nuisance does not
exist at 67all. Indeed, in Velasco v. Manila Electric
Company, this Court cited the68ruling in Kentucky & West
Virginia Power Co. v. Anderson, thus:
x x x The determinating factor when noise alone is the

cause of complaint is not its intensity or volume. It is that
the noise is of such character as to produce actual physical
discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities,
rendering adjacent property less comfortable and valuable. If the
noise does that it can well be said to be substantial and
unreasonable in degree; and reasonableness is a question of fact
dependent upon all the circumstances and conditions. 20 R.C.L.
445, 453; Wheat Culvert Company v. Jenkins, supra. There can be
no fixed standard as to what kind of noise constitutes a nuisance.
xxx
Besides, even if it is assumed for the nonce that petitioner

had abated the nuisance in 2002, still the complaint of the
respondent states a cause of action for damages based upon
the past existence of the nuisance, from 1995. Where the
injury from the alleged nuisance is temporary in its nature;
or is of a continuing or recurring character, the damages
are ordinarily regarded as continuing and one recovery
against the wrongdoer is not a bar to sanction an action
69
for
damages thereafter accruing from the same wrong.
_______________
67 G.R. No. 18390, August 6, 1971, 40 SCRA 342, 348-349.

68 156 S.W.2d 857.
69 Harvey v. Mason City & Ft. Dodge R. Co, supra note 37.
673
VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 673

The Complaint of the Respondent Not Premature

Admittedly, respondent did not appeal the July 19, 2002
letter of Engr. Morales. However, the letter was not
appealable. It bears stressing that the letter-complaint of
the respondent to Mayor Jejomar Binay against petitioner
was referred to Engr. Morales for investigation of the
complaint; the latter was required to submit his Report
thereon to the City Mayor for final disposition. Engr.

Morales did secure the July 2, 2002 Report of the EMB but
failed to make a Report on his findings. Until after the City
Mayor shall have acted on the findings and
recommendation of Engr. Morales an appeal therefrom
would be premature.
Obviously, Engr. Morales gave respondent another
chance to have the EMB reverse or revise its July 2, 2002
Report. However, when the officials of respondent sought a
clarification of his Order, Engr. Morales was piqued and
even dared them to go to court if they were not satisfied
with the EMB Report. Respondent then sought another
test by the EMB. In its November 24, 2003, Report, the
EMB confirmed that the SPL was higher when the doors
were open; as it was, the SPL readings were taken from
inside the Frabelle I. The EMB added that the noise
quality standards in Section 78 of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of P.D. No. 984 could not be applied since
it is for ambient noise. It even emphasized that the SPL are
not the actual factors in the resolution of the issues.
Conformably with case law, the EMB opined, noise need
not be high or low to annoy or cause nuisance to the
receptor; as long as the complainant is disturbed with the
level of sound coming from the firm, the same is a
nuisance. Clearly, the EMB was of the view that the EMB
Reports are not decisive on the issue between petitioner
and respondent, and that said issue is one beyond the
competence of the LGUs, by implying that the issue is a
matter to be presented to and resolved by the ordinary
courts. By returning the records to Makati City, the EMB
expected the City to dismiss
674

the complaint and just allow respondent, as complainant,

to seek relief from the courts. Respondent then took its cue
from the EMB Report and filed its complaint in the RTC.
There is, thus, no basis for the contention of petitioner that
respondent failed to exhaust all administrative remedies
before filing its complaint with the RTC.
Also barren of merit are the petitioner’s contention that
the action of respondent was barred by the decision of the
PAB AM No. 01-0009-FLC. While it is true that the
Frabella I Condominium Corporation filed its complaint
against petitioner before the PAB for and in behalf of the
tenants/owners of units of Frabella I, including those

owned by respondent, however, the PAB dismissed the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and without
prejudice. The PAB ruled that respondent’s action was for
abatement of a nuisance which was already devolved to the
local government.
As gleaned from the Resolution, the dismissal was
without prejudice. Since the PAB had no jurisdiction over
the complaint and the dismissal was without prejudice,
respondent’s action before 70the RTC was not barred by res
judicata or litis pendentia. The decision71
of the PAB was
not a decision on the merits of the case. Consequently, the
contention of petitioner that respondent is guilty of forum
shopping has no factual basis.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago,

Austria-Martinez and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
_______________
70 Cayana v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125607, March 18, 2004, 426
SCRA 10, 19-21; Delgado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137881, December
21, 2004, 447 SCRA 402, 415.
71 Custodio v. Corrado, G.R. No. 146082, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 500,
508-509.
675
VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 675

Petition denied.
Notes.—In determining whether or not the complaint

states a cause of action, the annexes attached to the
complaint may be considered, they being parts of the
complaint. (Sea-Land Service, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 327
SCRA 135 [2000])
Annexes form an integral part of the pleading. (Rudolf
Lietz Holdings, Inc. vs. Registry of Deeds of Parañaque
City, 344 SCRA 680 [2000])
——o0o——
676
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11/27/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 506

VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 625

AC ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. FRABELLE

Actions; Certiorari; The general rule is that an order denying

theories set up by defendant in an answer to the complaint or a

626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

AC Enterprises, Inc. vs. Frabelle Properties Corporation

jurisdiction would be dependent almost entirely upon the whims

produces damage to but one or a few persons while a nuisance is

VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 627

AC Enterprises, Inc. vs. Frabelle Properties Corporation

decency or morality; or (4) Obstructs or interferes with the free

public nuisance by a private person be followed. A private

628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

AC Enterprises, Inc. vs. Frabelle Properties Corporation

Same; Same; Same; Municipal Corporations; Local

the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC) which were

VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 629

AC Enterprises, Inc. vs. Frabelle Properties Corporation

injuriously the health or comfort of ordinary people in the vicinity

630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

AC Enterprises, Inc. vs. Frabelle Properties Corporation

Same; Same; Same; Test to Determine Noise as Nuisance.—

VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 631

AC Enterprises, Inc. vs. Frabelle Properties Corporation

respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on

632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

AC Enterprises, Inc. vs. Frabelle Properties Corporation

motions and the other evidence on record.—The general rule is

interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished

VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 633

AC Enterprises, Inc. vs. Frabelle Properties Corporation

substantially interferes with the quiet enjoyment of his premises

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

storey commercial/residential condominium located at 109

1 Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria (retired), with

VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 635

the letter anew. Respondent then had the blowers tested

636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

its members’ own units in the condominium. It alleged,

“6. Feliza Building’s air-conditioning system is served

11. In all good faith without any desire to cause any

The complainant prayed that judgment be rendered in its

5 CA Rollo, pp. 48-49.

VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 637

“WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after notice and

1. Declaring the intolerable noise, hot air and vibration

While the case was pending, respondent, through its

6 Id., at pp. 57-58.

638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

with 36 blowers of Feliza Building alone; there were other

VOL. 506, NOVEMBER 2, 2006 639

Engr. Morales. The latter insisted on the report of the EMB

as the complainant is disturbed with the level of12 sound

“6. The Feliza Building’s air-conditioning units are served by

12 Records, pp. 46-47.

640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED