Burma - Rohingya

Country Policy and Information Note
Burma: Rohingya
Version 1.0
November 2017
Preface
This note provides country of origin information (COI) and policy guidance to Home
Office decision makers on handling particular types of protection and human rights
claims. This includes whether claims are likely to justify the granting of asylum,
humanitarian protection or discretionary leave and whether – in the event of a claim
being refused – it is likely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under s94 of the
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
Decision makers must consider claims on an individual basis, taking into account the
case specific facts and all relevant evidence, including: the policy guidance
contained with this note; the available COI; any applicable caselaw; and the Home
Office casework guidance in relation to relevant policies.
Country information
COI in this note has been researched in accordance with principles set out in the
Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin
Information (COI) and the European Asylum Support Office’s research guidelines,
Country of Origin Information report methodology, namely taking into account its
relevance, reliability, accuracy, objectivity, currency, transparency and traceability.
All information is carefully selected from generally reliable, publicly accessible
sources or is information that can be made publicly available. Full publication details
of supporting documentation are provided in footnotes. Multiple sourcing is normally
used to ensure that the information is accurate, balanced and corroborated, and that
a comprehensive and up-to-date picture at the time of publication is provided.
Information is compared and contrasted, whenever possible, to provide a range of
views and opinions. The inclusion of a source is not an endorsement of it or any
views expressed.
Feedback
Our goal is to continuously improve our material. Therefore, if you would like to
comment on this note, please email the Country Policy and Information Team.
Independent Advisory Group on Country Information
The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) was set up in
March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to make
recommendations to him about the content of the Home Office’s COI material. The
IAGCI welcomes feedback on the Home Office’s COI material. It is not the function
of the IAGCI to endorse any Home Office material, procedures or policy. IAGCI may
be contacted at:
Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration,
5th Floor, Globe House, 89 Eccleston Square, London, SW1V 1PN.
Email: [email protected]
Information about the IAGCI‘s work and a list of the COI documents which have
been reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector‘s
website at http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/country-information-reviews/
Page 2 of 50
Contents
Policy guidance ........................................................................................................ 5
1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Basis of claim ........................................................................................... 5
1.2 Points to note ........................................................................................... 5
2. Consideration of issues ................................................................................... 5
2.1 Credibility.................................................................................................. 5
2.2 Assessment of risk ................................................................................... 5
2.3 Protection ................................................................................................. 7
2.4 Internal relocation ..................................................................................... 7
2.5 Certification .............................................................................................. 8
3. Policy summary ............................................................................................... 8
Country information ................................................................................................. 9
4. Background ..................................................................................................... 9
4.1 Origin of the term “Rohingya” ................................................................... 9
4.2 Demography ........................................................................................... 10
4.3 Language/culture .................................................................................... 11
4.4 Burmese names ..................................................................................... 12
5. Legal rights .................................................................................................... 13
5.1 Citizenship .............................................................................................. 13
5.2 Identity documents ................................................................................. 14
5.3 Marriage and the ‘two-child policy’ ......................................................... 16
6. State treatment and attitudes – Rakhine state ............................................... 18
6.1 Sources .................................................................................................. 18
6.2 General socio-economic conditions ........................................................ 18
6.3 Pre-October 2016 human rights violations ............................................. 19
6.4 Clashes with security forces – October 2016 ......................................... 19
6.5 Response to October 2016 attacks ........................................................ 21
6.6 Arrest and detention following October 2016 attacks ............................. 24
6.7 Clashes – August 2017 .......................................................................... 25
6.8 Violence against women......................................................................... 27
6.9 Extortion and harassment....................................................................... 28
6.10 Accountability ......................................................................................... 29
6.11 Avenues of redress ................................................................................ 32
7. Societal treatment and attitudes .................................................................... 32
7.1 Sources .................................................................................................. 32
Page 3 of 50
7.2 Inter-communal violence ........................................................................ 32
7.3 Anti-Muslim rhetoric and Buddhist nationalism ....................................... 34
8. Humanitarian situation ................................................................................... 36
8.1 Internally displaced persons (IDPs) ........................................................ 36
8.2 Humanitarian aid .................................................................................... 38
9. Access to services ......................................................................................... 38
9.1 Restrictions............................................................................................. 38
9.2 Education ............................................................................................... 39
9.3 Healthcare .............................................................................................. 39
10. Freedom of movement ................................................................................... 40
10.1 Restrictions............................................................................................. 40
11. Rohingyas outside Rakhine State .................................................................. 43
12. Rohingyas in Bangladesh .............................................................................. 43
12.1 Demography ........................................................................................... 43
12.2 Cross-border travel and “push-backs” .................................................... 44
12.3 Refugee and unofficial camps ................................................................ 45
12.4 Documentation and legal rights .............................................................. 47
13. Rohingya in Malaysia and Thailand ............................................................... 48
14. Fraudulent documents ................................................................................... 49
Version control and contacts ................................................................................ 50
Page 4 of 50
Policy guidance
Updated 9 November 2017
1. Introduction
1.1 Basis of claim
1.1.1 Fear of persecution or serious harm by Burmese state actors because the
person identifies as a member of the Rohingya ethnic minority.
1.2 Points to note
1.2.1 This note predominantly deals with the situation of Rohingya in Burma. It
also provides limited country information on the situation of Rohingya in
other countries, namely Rohingyas in Bangladesh and Rohingya in Malaysia
and Thailand.
1.2.2 Most Rohingya from Burma are de facto stateless (see Citizenship). Where
a person does not qualify for asylum or humanitarian protection, it is open to
the person to apply for leave to remain as a stateless person. This cannot be
done at the same time as the asylum claim is being pursued (see the
Statelessness guidance).
1.2.3 The military regime in Burma changed the name of the country to Myanmar
in 1989, following the violent suppression of a popular democratic uprising in
1988. Since the UK Government did not recognise the legitimacy of the
Burmese military regime it did not acknowledge the military-led name-
change of the country from Burma to Myanmar, or of the main city of
Rangoon to Yangon. Internationally, both names are recognised and are
used interchangeably in the sources cited in the country information section.
Back to Contents
2. Consideration of issues
2.1 Credibility
2.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the Asylum Instruction on
Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.
2.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for
a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas
should be investigated prior to the asylum interview see the Asylum
Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants.
2.1.3 Decision makers should also consider the need to conduct language
analysis testing see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis. (See also
Language/culture).
Back to Contents
2.2 Assessment of risk
a. General points
2.2.1 The Rohingya, estimated to number about 2 million, are a self-identified
Muslim minority living predominantly in Burma’s northern Rakhine state. The
Page 5 of 50
majority are Sunni Muslim. The Rohingya are regarded as illegal immigrants
from Bangladesh and the Burmese authorities refer to them as ‘Bengali’,
implying they are non-indigenous or “illegal immigrants” (see Background).
2.2.2 The Rohingya are not recognised as Burmese citizens unless they can prove
residence in the country prior to 1948. As a result, their rights to study, work,
travel freely, marry, practise their religion and access health services are
severely restricted (see Legal rights, Access to services and Freedom of
movement).
b. Rakhine state
2.2.3 Rohingya in Rakhine State face widespread official discrimination. The vast
majority of Rohingya remain undocumented and, due to lack of citizenship
rights, are effectively stateless. An estimated 120,000 Rohingya live in poor
standard internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in Rakhine and have
limited access to employment, education and healthcare. They are also
subject to restrictions on practising their religion, marriage and the number of
children a married couple can have, as well as severe restrictions on
freedom of movement within Burma (see Legal rights, State treatment and
attitudes – Rakhine state and Freedom of movement).
2.2.4 Many Rohingya are reported to be subject to extortion and harassment by
the authorities including in IDP camps (see Extortion and harassment). Inter-
communal violence and societal discrimination against Rohingya in Rakhine
State is widespread. Anti-Muslim sentiment, compounded by an increase in
hate-speech by extreme Buddhist nationalists, has exacerbated religious
and ethnic tensions, particularly against those who identify as Rohingya (see
Societal treatment and attitudes).
2.2.5 In October 2016 there were violent attacks on a border guard post in
Rakhine state, which the Burmese authorities stated were carried out by the
Aqa Mul Mujahidin (Harakah al-Yaqin also known as Arakan Rohingya
Salvation Army) and intended to promote violent ideology among the
Rohingya population in the area (see Clashes with security forces – October
2016 attacks). During the subsequent security operations in Rakhine State
there were consistent reports of systematic human rights abuses against
Rohingya by state actors. Reports and eyewitness accounts indicate the
deliberate targeting of civilians with reports of human rights abuses including
torture, indiscriminate killings, burning of houses and rape (see Government
response to October 2016 attacks).
2.2.6 In August 2017, further fighting took place following an attack on police posts
and an army base in Rakhine by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army. The
ensuing clashes and counter-military offensive caused hundreds of civilian
deaths and forced hundreds of thousands of Rohingya to cross the border
into Bangladesh (see Clashes – August 2017 and Rohingyas in
Bangladesh).
2.2.7 To date there have been very limited efforts by the Burma authorities to
investigate reports of human rights violations (see Accountability).
Page 6 of 50
2.2.8 Discrimination on racial grounds will amount to persecution if a person’s
human dignity is affected to such an extent as to be incompatible with the
most elementary and inalienable human rights.
2.2.9 In general, the level and cumulative effect of the denial of rights and state
discrimination against the Rohingya population in Rakhine State is such that
it amounts to persecution.
c. Outside Rakhine state
2.2.10 Outside of Rakhine State Rohingya are reported to face less discrimination
provided they maintain a low profile. They are typically able to obtain identity
documentation as ‘Burmese Muslims’ which allows them to live and work
without facing the high levels of discrimination otherwise experienced by
Rohingya. Burmese Muslims hold national ID cards and residency
documents, which gives them a legal right to a passport. Muslims or people
of South Asian appearance in Burma are not subject to local orders as other
Rohingya are in northern Rakhine State (see Rohingyas outside Rakhine
State).
2.2.11 The level of discrimination faced by Rohingya is lower outside of Rakhine
State, provided people keep a low profile. However, it may, in individual
cases, amount to persecution. In line with HJ Iran, a person cannot be
expected to live discreetly on account of their ethnicity or religion. If a
material reason why the person will live discreetly is that they genuinely fear
that otherwise they will be persecuted, it will be necessary to consider
whether that fear is well founded.
2.2.12 Decision makers will need to consider each such case on its facts, with the
onus on the person to demonstrate that their personal circumstances are
such that they would face a level of discrimination that would amount to
persecution.
2.2.13 For further guidance on assessing risk, see the Asylum Instruction on
Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status
Back to Contents
2.3 Protection
2.3.1 If the person’s fear is of persecution or serious harm at the hands of the
state, they will not be able to obtain protection.
2.3.2 For further guidance on assessing the availability or not of state protection,
see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.
Back to Contents
2.4 Internal relocation
2.4.1 If the person’s fear is of persecution or serious harm at the hands of the
state, internal relocation is not a reasonable option. Furthermore, identity
documents and travel permits are required for internal movement and the
ability for a Rohingya to obtain such documents is severely restricted (see
Freedom of Movement).
2.4.2 For further guidance on internal relocation, see the Asylum Instruction on
Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.
Page 7 of 50
Back to Contents
2.5 Certification
2.5.1 Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’
under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
2.5.2 For further guidance on certification, see Certification of Protection and
Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and
Asylum Act 2002 (clearly unfounded claims).
Back to Contents
3. Policy summary
3.1.1 Official and societal discrimination against Rohingya in Burma is widespread.
Denial of citizenship severely restricts their rights to study, work, move
freely, marry, practise their religion and access health services. In security
operations, there have been consistent allegations of Rohingya been victims
of torture, indiscriminate killings, burning of houses and rape by the security
forces and other state actors.
3.1.2 In general, the level and cumulative effect of the denial of rights and state
discrimination against the Rohingya population in Rakhine State is such that
it amounts to persecution.
3.1.3 Rohingya who live outside of Rakhine State may also be able to
demonstrate a need for international protection depending on their personal
circumstances.
3.1.4 Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’.
Back to Contents
Page 8 of 50
Country information
Updated 21 September 2017
4. Background
4.1 Origin of the term “Rohingya”
4.1.1 The origin of the term Rohingya, and its usage in relation to being an ethnic
group, is complex and contested.
4.1.2 Leading Rakhine historian, Jacques P. Leider, noted in a paper dated
January 2014 that the word Rohingya, meaning “Rakhine” in the local
Muslim language, appeared for the first time as “Rooinga” in a report on the
languages of Burma by Francis Hamilton-Buchanan, published at the end of
the 18th century1. In an interview with The Irrawaddy, Leider spoke of an
emerging Muslim community in Burma in the 15th century, and a further
community of Muslims arriving from Bengal during the colonial era, who
settled in Rakhine2.
4.1.3 Both the Burmese government and Rakhine Buddhist representatives
explained to the Special Rapporteur during her January 2015 mission to
Burma that the term “Rohingya” has no historical or legal basis. In her report
to the Human Rights Council, the Special Rapporteur commented on ‘... the
right of Rohingya to self-identification according to international human rights
law. She believes the ongoing focus on the terminology used to describe this
group has paralysed progress on addressing important human rights issues
and achieving durable solutions.’3
4.1.4 The US Department of State’s Human Rights Report for 2015 stated:
‘The name Rohingya is used in reference to a group that self-identifies as
belonging to an ethnic group defined by religious, linguistic, and other ethnic
features. Rohingya do not dispute their ethnogeographic origins from
present-day Bangladesh but hold that they have resided in what is now
Rakhine State for decades, if not centuries. Authorities usually referred to
Rohingya as “Bengali,” claiming that the Muslim residents of northern
Rakhine State are irregular migrants from Bangladesh or descendants of
migrants transplanted by the British during colonial rule.’4
1 Leider, Jacques, P., ‘Rohingya: The name. The movement. The quest for identity’, (page 8), 28
January 2014, http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/Jacques-P-Leider-2014-01-28-Rohingya-
The_Name-The_movement-The_quest_for_identity-en.pdf. Accessed: 25 April 2017
2 The Irrawaddy, ‘History Behind Arakan State Conflict’, 9 July 2012, https://www.irrawaddy.com/in-
person/interview/history-behind-arakan-state-conflict.html. Accessed: 25 April 2017

3 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
Myanmar, Yanghee Lee’ [A/HRC/28/72], (paragraph 46), 23 March 2015 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1427812907_a-hrc-28-72-en.doc. Accessed: 25 April 2017
4 US Department of State, ‘Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2015 – Burma’, (Section
2d), 23 April 2016, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2015&

dlid=252751. Accessed: 13 December 2016.
Page 9 of 50
4.1.5 For more detailed historical background on the Rohingya in Burma, see the
International Crisis Group’s 2014 report ‘The Politics of Rakhine State’5 and
the 2012 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report ‘The Government Could Have
Stopped This’6.
Back to Contents
4.2 Demography
4.2.1 The Rohingya are an ethnic minority living predominantly in Burma’s north-
western Rakhine state (historically known as Arakan)7 and account for most
of the population in the 3 northernmost townships: Maungdaw; Buthidaung;
and Rathedaung8. The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(DFAT) noted in its January 2017 Country Information Report Myanmar that
credible sources informed them that those who identified as Rohingya made
up around 85-95 per cent of the population of the townships of Maungdaw
and Buthidaung. DFAT also noted ‘There are smaller communities of
Rohingya in many other townships in Rakhine State, including Sittwe,
Pauktaw and Myebon.’ The majority of Rohingya are Sunni Muslim9.
Rohingya speak a Bengali dialect10, reportedly similar to the southern dialect
of Chittagonian11. (See also Language/culture).
4.2.2 An estimated 1 million Rohingya account for around 30 per cent of Rakhine’s
population12, whilst their total numbers in Burma reportedly exceed 2
million13. However, official estimates of the size of the population were not
available as Rohingya are not recognised as citizens and were excluded
5 International Crisis Group, ‘The Politics of Rakhine State’, 22 October 2014, available at http://www.
ecoi.net/file_upload/1002_1414163665_261-myanmar-the-politics-of-rakhine-state.pdf. Accessed: 9
December 2016.
6 Human Rights Watch, ‘“The Government Could Have Stopped This” Sectarian Violence and
Ensuing Abuses in Burma’s Arakan State’, (page 46), August 2012, https://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/reports/burma0812webwcover_0.pdf. Accessed: 13 December 2016.
7 Balazo, P., ‘Truth & Rights: Statelessness, Human Rights, and the Rohingya’, The Undercurrent
Journal, Volume XI, (page 6), Winter 2015, http://undercurrentjournal.ca/wp-content/uploads/

2015/01/Undercurrent-Issue-Winter-2015.pdf. Accessed: 9 December 2016.
8 Fortify Rights, ‘Policies of Persecution: Ending Abusive State Policies Against Rohingya Muslims in
Myanmar’, (page 5), February 2014, http://www.fortifyrights.org/downloads/Policies_of_Persecution_

Feb_25_Fortify_Rights.pdf?bcsi_scan_14cf79d043f374a1=0&bcsi_scan_filename=Policies_of_
Persecution_Feb_25_Fortify_Rights.pdf. Accessed: 13 December 2016.
9 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘DFAT Country Information Report
Myanmar’, (paragraphs 3.8 and 3.9), 10 January 2017, http://dfat.gov.au/about-

us/publications/Documents/country-information-report-myanmar.pdf. Accessed: 2 February 2017
10 Al Jazeera, ‘Who are the Rohingya’, 28 October 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/
indepth/features/2015/10/rohingya-151024202611276.html. Accessed: 13 December 2016.

11 Ethnologue, ‘Languages of the World’, (Chittagonian), 2016, Nineteenth edition, online version:
https://www.ethnologue.com/language/ctg. Accessed: 13 December 2016.

12 Council on Foreign Relations, ‘The Rohingya Migrant Crisis’, 19 September 2016,
http://www.cfr.org/burmamyanmar/rohingya-migrant-crisis/p36651. Accessed: 9 December 2016.

Journal, Volume XI, (page 6), Winter 2015, http://undercurrentjournal.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/

Undercurrent-Issue-Winter-2015.pdf. Accessed: 9 December 2016.
Page 10 of 50
from the 2014 census14. (Burma’s population totals over 55 million – July
2016 estimate15).
4.2.3 The International Crisis Group reported in October 2014 that ‘The largest
group in the state are the Rakhine Buddhists, who make up about 60 per
cent of the 3.2 million total population. Muslim communities, including the
Rohingya, are about 30 per cent, and the remaining 10 per cent consist of
Chin (who are Buddhist, Christian or animist) and a number of other small
minorities, including the Kaman (also Muslim), Mro, Khami, Dainet and
Maramagyi.’16
4.2.4 In parts of Rakhine State, members of some communities were not counted
in the 2014 census because they were not allowed to self-identify as
Rohingya as this group was not recognised by the government.17 The
Council on Foreign Relations noted that ‘... after Buddhist nationalists
threatened to boycott the census, the government decided the Rohingya
could only register if they identified as Bengali...’18 implying they were
immigrants from Bangladesh19.
Back to Contents
4.3 Language/culture
4.3.1 Between 4 February and 17 February 2011, the Danish Immigration Service
conducted a fact-finding mission (FFM) to Dhaka and Cox’s Bazar in
Bangladesh and Bangkok in Thailand to investigate various issues related to
the situation of the Rohingya people. According to various sources consulted
by the FFM team the language of the Rohingya and the local Bangladeshi
population in the border area of Burma and Bangladesh was very similar and
that ‘distinguishing the Rohingya from the local population in the Chittagong
area is very difficult.’ The Danish FFM 2011 report noted:
‘According to UNHCR (Bangladesh), the Rohingya language is not a written
language and the Rohingya people are in general not very literate. Their
Rohingya language is very similar to the Chittagonian dialect of Bangla
spoken in the area. There are few words which may differ in the two
languages depending on how close to the Bangladesh border the Rohingya
14 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘DFAT Country Information
Report Myanmar’, (paragraph 3.8), 10 January 2017, http://dfat.gov.au/about-
15 CIA, ‘The World Factbook – Burma’, (People and society), updated 10 November 2016,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html. Accessed: 9 December

2016.
16 International Crisis Group, ‘The Politics of Rakhine State’, (page 1), 22 October 2014, available at
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1002_1414163665_261-myanmar-the-politics-of-rakhine-state.pdf.
Accessed: 9 December 2016.
17 International Crisis Group, ‘The Politics of Rakhine State’, (page 1, footnote 1), 22 October 2014,
available at http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1002_1414163665_261-myanmar-the-politics-of-rakhine-
state.pdf. Accessed: 9 December 2016.

19 IRIN, ‘Bribes and bureaucracy: Myanmar’s chaotic citizenship system’, 31 October 2016,
https://www.irinnews.org/feature/2016/10/31/bribes-and-bureaucracy-myanmar%E2%80%99s-
chaotic-citizenship-system. Accessed: 13 December 2016.
Page 11 of 50
were residing in. Given that many Rohingya have been residing in
Bangladesh for many years, it becomes difficult to distinguish a Rohingya
from a Bangladeshi at times. On occasion, a local person might be able to
distinguish the Rohingya language from the language spoken by local
Bangladeshis.’20
4.3.2 The Danish FFM 2011 report stated that, according to all sources consulted,
the cultural and religious practices performed by the Rohingya were similar
to local Bangla practices21.
See also Rohingyas in Bangladesh.
Back to Contents
4.4 Burmese names
4.4.1 A guide to culture and customs published in 2013 stated that ‘From the mid-
1960s to the present day, the trend has been for children to have only
Myanmar names, as anything of a foreign nature has been strongly
discouraged by the government.’22 Instances were found of Rohingya using
both a Burmese and Rohingyan alias. A few examples are listed below:
• U Jangir (alias) U Aung Myo Min (Burmese)23;
• ‘The other candidates for Maungdaw township are Aung Zaw Win, alias
Zahir Ahmed (Upper House), Htay Win, alias Zahidur Rahman (Lower
House), and Jahin Gir Alam, alias Aung Myo Myint (State Parliament)’24;
• U Kyaw Min alias Master Shamsul Anowarul Hoque25;
• Mohamed Sayed (alias Hla Maung Thein)26;
• Mohamed Salim alias Than Htun27.
20 Danish Immigration Service, ‘Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and Thailand’, (pages 10-11), May
2011, 1/2011, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4dd0d6f72.html. Accessed: 2 February
2017.
21 Danish Immigration Service, ‘Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and Thailand’, (page 12), May
2011, 1/2011, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4dd0d6f72.html. Accessed: 2 February

2017.
22 Saw Myat Yin, ‘Culture Shock! Myanmar: a Survival Guide to Customs and Etiquette’, (page 64), 31
December 2013, Accessed: 30 December 2016

23 The European Rohingya Council, ‘Burmese president meets Rohingya and Rakhine in Maungdaw’,
5 October 2013, http://www.theerc.net/2013/10/burmese-president-meets-rohingya-and-rakhine-in-

maungdaw/. Accessed: 20 December 2016
24 Kaladan Press Network, ‘Rohingyas and the forthcoming election’, 6 November 2010,
http://www.kaladanpress.org/v3/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2884:rohingyas-
and-the-forthcoming-election-&catid=106:kpn&Itemid=48. Accessed: 20 December 2016.
25 Asian Tribune, ‘U Kyaw Min: An Imprisoned: Rohingya MP without Citizenship’, 5 March 2009,
http://www.asiantribune.com/?q=node/15905. Accessed: 20 December 2016.

26 Rohingya Arakanese Refugee Committee, ‘Rakhine ministers try to build Buddhist community hall
on Rohingya’s resident’, 13 March 2012, http://arrcinfo.blogspot.co.uk/2012/03/rakhine-ministers-try-

to-build-buddhist.html. Accessed: 20 December 2016.
27 Kaladan Press Network, ‘129 prisoners released from northern Arakan, no prominent Rohingya
politician’, 20 October 2011, http://www.kaladanpress.org/v3/index.php?option=com_content&view=

article&id=3408:129-prisoners-released-no-prominent-rohingya-politician&catid=141:october-
2011&Itemid=2. Accessed: 20 December 2016.
Page 12 of 50
4.4.2 As a result, documentation processes in Burma commonly request the
provision of aliases in application forms. For example, to request birth
certificates applicants must provide a copy of their identity card, family
registration documents, and, amongst other details, all names and aliases28.
Burmese names do not have a family name / surname29.
Back to Contents
5. Legal rights
5.1 Citizenship
5.1.1 Though recognised as citizens under the 1947 Constitution and Union
Citizenship Act 194830, the 1974 Emergency Immigration Act stripped many
Rohingya of their Burmese nationality by replacing their national registration
certificates with foreign registration cards31. The 1982 Burma Citizenship
Law designates three categories of citizens: full citizens; associate citizens;
and naturalised citizens32.
5.1.2 Nick Cheesman, a research fellow at the Australian National University
discussed Burma’s 1982 Citizenship Law and its effect on those identifying
as Rohingya. Whilst the said law does not include specific sections to deny
the Rohingya citizenship, violation and selective application of the law
effectively rendered the Rohingya stateless. The law also made membership
of one of the country’s 8 “national races” the primary basis for citizenship,
declaring “Kachin, Karenni, Karen, Chin, Burman, Mon, Arakanese, Shan
and other national races and ethnic groups who resided in an area of the
state as their permanent home anterior to 1823AD are Burmese citizens”.33
Former British diplomat Derek Tonkin appeared to support Cheesman’s
position in his comment following an article in New Mandala on the
Rohingyas citizenship status34.
5.1.3 Most Rohingya were unable to prove to the state ‘conclusive evidence of
their lineage’, effectively making them stateless35. Al Jazeera reported that
28 US Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs, ‘Burma Reciprocity Schedule’, undated,

https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/fees/reciprocity-by-country/BM.html. Accessed: 20 December
2016.
29 Khine, C.M., ‘Myanmar’s Unique Naming System’, 20 July 2012, available at Global Voices
https://globalvoices.org/2012/07/20/myanmars-unique-naming-system/. Accessed: 4 September

2017.
30 Gibson, T., et al, ‘Rohingyas – Insecurity and Citizenship in Myanmar’, (pages 80-82), 2016,
http://www.iid.org/uploads/6/2/0/6/6206024/rohingya.pdf. Accessed: 20 July 2017

31 Pugh, C. L., ‘Is Citizenship the Answer? Constructions of belonging and exclusion for the stateless
Rohingya of Burma’, (page 14), October 2013, https://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/publications/wp-76-13.

Accessed 20 July 2017
32 Burma Citizenship Law, 15 October 1982, available at:
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4f71b.html. Accessed: 9 December 2016.

33 Cheesman, N., ‘Problems with facts about Rohingya statelessness’, E-International Relations, 8
December 2015, http://www.e-ir.info/2015/12/08/problems-with-facts-about-rohingya-statelessness/.

Accessed 21 April 2017
34 New Mandala, ‘Diplomatic protection for the stateless Rohingya’, (Responses – Derek Tonkin), 22
March 2017, http://www.newmandala.org/diplomatic-protection-stateless-rohingya/. Accessed: 26

April 2017
Page 13 of 50
‘To get citizenship, [the Rohingya] need to prove they have lived in Myanmar
for 60 years, but paperwork is often unavailable or denied to them. As a
result, their rights to study, work, travel, marry, practise their religion and
access health services are restricted.’36
Back to Contents
5.2 Identity documents
5.2.1 Due to their lack of citizenship status, the majority of Rohingya have no legal
documentation37. The International Crisis Group noted in its October 2014
report that:
‘After 1951, citizens over the age of twelve were issued with “national
registration cards” (NRCs); many Rakhine Muslims [Rohingya and non-
Rohingya], including those in northern Rakhine State, held these cards,
while others – as was the case in remote areas across the country – never
registered. In cases where NRCs were lost or defaced, citizens were issued
with “temporary registration certificates” (TRCs, also known as “white
cards”), intended to be temporary documents pending the issuance of a new
NRC.
‘In 1989, a citizenship inspection process was carried out, and those found
to meet the new requirements under the 1982 law had their NRCs replaced
with new “citizenship scrutiny cards” (CSCs). The majority of Rakhine
Muslims surrendered their NRCs, but were never issued with CSCs. This
was not in accordance with the law, due process was not followed, and it
appears to constitute an arbitrary deprivation of citizenship, rendering them
stateless.’’38
5.2.2 HRW reported in 2012 that CSCs are colour-coded according to citizenship
status: full citizens = pink; associate citizens = blue; and naturalised citizens
= green39.
5.2.3 In 1995 the government began to issue Temporary Registration Certificates
(TRCs) to Rohingyas in Northern Rakhine State40. A briefing by the Burmese
Rohingya Organisation UK reported that ‘Temporary Registration Certificates
(White Cards) are issued to residents in Burma (not resident foreigners)
under Article 13 of the Residents of Burma Registration Rules (1951).
Despite Rohingya now only having these temporary registration cards, they
Journal, Volume XI, (page 8), Winter 2015, http://undercurrentjournal.ca/wp-

content/uploads/2015/01/Undercurrent-Issue-Winter-2015.pdf. Accessed: 9 December 2016.
36 Al Jazeera, ‘Who are the Rohingya’, 28 October 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/
2015/10/rohingya-151024202611276.html. Accessed: 13 December 2016.


39 Human Rights Watch, ‘“The Government Could Have Stopped This” Sectarian Violence and
Ensuing Abuses in Burma’s Arakan State’, (page 46), August 2012, https://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/reports/burma0812webwcover_0.pdf. Accessed: 13 December 2016.
40 Gibson, T., et al, ‘Rohingyas – Insecurity and Citizenship in Myanmar’, (page 75), 2016,
http://www.iid.org/uploads/6/2/0/6/6206024/rohingya.pdf. Accessed: 20 July 2017
Page 14 of 50
were able to take part in the 2008 referendum on Burma’s Constitution, and
the 2010 elections.’ However, on 11 February 2015, the then President
Thein Sein, announced that TRCs would expire on 31 March 2015, and
should be returned to the authorities by the end of May 2015, thus
preventing the Rohingya from voting in the 2015 constitutional referendum or
the November 2015 elections41. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Burma Human Rights Priority Country report noted that ‘... the Rohingya
community was disenfranchised and prospective Muslim candidates were
disproportionately excluded’ from the 2015 general elections42. An estimated
1.5 million white card holders faced having no identity documents once their
white cards were rescinded43.
5.2.4 In June 2015, Rakhine State’s Immigration and Population Department
began issuing green cards44, or National Verification Certificates (NVCs)45.
However, despite being informed that the green cards would allow holders to
travel more freely, some Rohingya were resistant to accepting the new cards
– in exchange for their white cards – as they refused to identify as Bengali46.
The Irrawaddy reported in June 2016 that Rohingya residents of one village
told officials they ‘“wouldn’t agree [to accept the new cards] unless you first
put our race and religion [Rohingya Muslim] on the cards.” The officials
responded that “there are no Rohingya in Arakan [Rakhine] State” and soon
left the village.’47
5.2.5 In July 2016, the UN Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW) noted its concern that:
‘[T]he issuance of identification documents to members of the Rohingya
Muslim ethnic group, still uses the outdated Citizenship Law of 1982, which
is discriminatory since it results in the arbitrary deprivation of nationality. The
Committee … notes with concern that Rohingya women and girls in Rakhine
State are being deprived of their nationality and, therefore, rendered
41 Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK, ‘The Rohingya, the Citizenship Law, temporary registration,
and implementation of the Rakhine State Action Plan’, April 2015,
http://burmacampaign.org.uk/media/BROUK-White-Card-Briefing.pdf. Accessed: 9 December 2016.
42 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Human Rights and Democracy: The 2015 Foreign &
Commonwealth Office Report’, (page 37), April 2016,

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/518658/FCO755_Hum
an_Rights_Report_2015_-_WEB.pdf. Accessed: 15 August 2017.
43 The Irrawaddy, ‘Winners and Losers of the White Card’s Demise’, 9 March 2015,
http://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/winners-and-losers-of-the-white-cards-demise.html. Accessed:
13 December 2016.
44 Myanmar Times, ‘New ‘green cards’ meet resistance’, 18 June 2015, http://www.mmtimes.com/
index.php/national-news/15082-new-green-cards-meet-resistance.html. Accessed: 15 December

2016.
45 The Irrawaddy, ‘Rohingya Reject New Citizenship Verification Cards’, 10 June 2016,
http://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/rohingya-reject-new-citizenship-verification-cards.html.
46 Voice of America, ‘Few Rohingya Want New Myanmar ID Cards’, 13 July 2015,
http://www.voanews.com/a/few-rohingya-want-new-myanmar-idenitification-cards/2859878.html.
47 The Irrawaddy, ‘Rohingya Reject New Citizenship Verification Cards’, 10 June 2016,
http://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/rohingya-reject-new-citizenship-verification-cards.html.
Page 15 of 50
stateless, by the Citizenship Law of 1982. The Committee also notes with
concern that members of the Rohingya ethnic group, including women and
girls, who refused to identify as “Bengali” have been arbitrarily excluded from
the verification process, which was first piloted in June 2014.’48
5.2.6 DFAT understood that around 1,000 people were issued with an ‘identity
card for national verification’ (ICNV, also known as a “turquoise card”)’, and
that a small number of Rohingya were issued with the card, although they
had to identify as Bengali to receive one. According to DFAT, despite some
Rohingya holding an NVC, there was no change to their access to services
or freedom of movement49.
5.2.7 The Irrawaddy reported in April 2017 that, according to an immigration
official, 4,600 people had accepted the NVC since the project was launched
in 2014. The report also indicated that Rohingya Muslims who accepted
NVCs, cooperated with the authorities, or spoke to the media or diplomats
were sometimes threatened or targeted by ‘unknown groups’.50 Because of
the low uptake rates, the majority of Rohingya remain undocumented (apart
from their household registration lists) – or holding receipts for their TRCs –
and are effectively stateless, not being recognised as citizens of Myanmar51.
See also Fraudulent documents and Freedom of movement.
Back to Contents
5.3 Marriage and the ‘two-child policy’
5.3.1 The US Department of State noted in its Human Rights (USSD HR) report
for 2016 that:
‘In northern Rakhine State, local authorities required members of the
Rohingya minority to obtain a permit to marry officially, a step not required of
other ethnicities. Wait times for the permit could exceed one year, and bribes
usually were required. According to human rights organizations, on April 28
[2016], Border Guard Police in Buthidaung Township issued new instructions
to village administrators outlining additional requirements for members of the
Muslim community to obtain a permit to marry. The government referred to
the revised procedures as “matters related to marriage of Bengali race.” The
new required documents included: a letter from the district immigration
authorities that the couple were of legal age to marry; a letter from a station
commander showing the couple was free of criminal offenses; a letter from a
48 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), ‘Concluding

observations on the combined fourth and fifth periodic reports of Myanmar’, (paragraph 32), 25 July
2016, http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2fPPRiCAqhKb7
yhsgOTxO5cLIZ0CwAvhyns%2byKPrKA2t8J89bRNf6MAsfOCDXtpmeBlp6nw6lBoTpR5Q%2fhZzxKix
l0q4v09CV8dXhMWhiRipl6zvuqRky8JEwpz. Accessed: 19 December 2016.

50 The Irrawaddy, ‘Man Killed in Buthidaung After Talking to Journalists’, 2 April 2017,
https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/127736.html. Accessed: 20 April 2017


Page 16 of 50
health assistant assuring the couple was free of communicable diseases;
and a letter from village administrators confirming that the individuals were
single, unmarried, and that any previous marriage was dissolved at least
three years prior. Unauthorized marriages could result in prosecution of
Rohingya men under the penal code, which prohibits a man from “deceitfully”
marrying a woman, and could result in a prison sentence or fine. The law
prohibits the adoption of children by non-Buddhist families.’52
5.3.2 Fortify Rights, a non-profit human rights organisation investigating and
reporting human rights abuses, noted in a report dated October 2015 that
couples who marry under Islamic law, cohabiting couples, or even those in a
relationship but not living together, risk arrest. The report added:
‘To obtain marriage licenses, men and women must adhere to rules that
conflict with Rohingya religious beliefs. The rules require that men shave
their beards for their license photographs. Similarly, the rules prohibit women
from wearing religious head and face coverings. The NaSaKa [a security
force consisting of police, military, intelligence, customs officers, and riot
police] have reportedly touched Rohingya women to determine if they are
pregnant. Authorities have required Rohingya women to take pregnancy
tests before issuing marriage permits. The NaSaKa, at various points in the
marriage-license process, have also demanded bribes that can total more
than the equivalent of three months’ salary.’53
5.3.3 As regards the ‘two-child policy’, Fortify Rights reported:
‘Since at least 2005, the government has allowed some Rohingya couples to
obtain marriage licenses only if they agree to have no more than two
children. Women in legal marriages who have more than two children and
women who have children out of wedlock are subject to possible prison
sentences of up to ten years. State-level authorities in Rakhine State issued
a policy document in 2008 titled “Population Control Activities,” specifying
how law enforcement officials in Rakhine State should force people to “use
pills, injections and condoms for birth control at every [NaSaKa] regional
clinic, township hospitals, and their own regional hospitals”.’54
5.3.4 The USSD HR Report 2016 noted that the Burmese authorities ‘... limited the
registration of children to two per family, but local enforcement of the two-
child policy was inconsistent. For the most part, authorities registered
additional children beyond the two-child limit for Rohingya families, yet there
were cases of authorities not doing so.’55
1f), 3 March 2017, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=
2016&dlid=265324. Accessed: 6 March 2017
53 Fortify Rights, ‘Persecution of the Rohingya Muslims: Is Genocide Occurring in
Myanmar’s Rakhine State? A legal analysis’, (page 12), October 2015, http://www.fortifyrights.org/
downloads/Yale_Persecution_of_the_Rohingya_October_2015.pdf. Accessed: 15 December 2016.
54 Fortify Rights, ‘Persecution of the Rohingya Muslims: Is Genocide Occurring in
Myanmar’s Rakhine State? A legal analysis’, (page 12), October 2015, http://www.fortifyrights.org/
downloads/Yale_Persecution_of_the_Rohingya_October_2015.pdf. Accessed: 15 December 2016.
2d), 3 March 2017, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=
Page 17 of 50
5.3.5 A May 2015 report by the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of
Genocide noted that the ‘... two-child policy enforced in the northern Rakhine
townships of Maungdaw and Buthidaung ... only applies to Rohingya.
Although the policy is enacted at the local level, politicians at the national
and state level support the measure and describe the population control
method as necessary and even beneficial for Rohingya. Penalties for
disobeying the orders include fines or imprisonment.’56
5.3.6 The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW) expressed concern, in its Concluding observations, dated 25 July
2016, about the restrictive legislation and local orders in Rakhine state on
the maximum two-child limit and spacing between births of at least 36
months57.
Back to Contents
6. State treatment and attitudes – Rakhine state
6.1 Sources
6.1.1 Note that between 27 February and 24 March 2017 the UN Human Rights
Council convened to discuss amongst other things the human rights situation
in Myanmar/Burma. Relevant documents and reports submitted ahead and
after the meeting are available on the UN HRC website.
Back to Contents
6.2 General socio-economic conditions
6.2.1 Rakhine state was reported to be the poorest state in Burma and, as cited by
the UN Special Rapporteur following her visit to the country in June/July
2016, faced ‘long-standing social and economic underdevelopment,
including malnutrition, low incomes, poverty and weak infrastructure,
compounded by natural hazards.’58 The UN Secretary General reported in
August 2016 that ‘... little progress was made in improving the desperate
conditions faced by the Muslim population in Rakhine, including those who
continued to identify themselves as Rohingya. Many of them continued to
languish in camps for internally displaced persons and, along with those
outside the camps, have borne the brunt of institutionalized discrimination
from the majority community.’59

56 The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of
Genocide, ‘They want us all to go away‘, (page 6), May 2015, https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/
20150505-Burma-Report.pdf. Accessed: 2 February 2017.
observations on the combined fourth and fifth periodic reports of Myanmar’, (paragraph 44d), 25 July
2016, http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2fPPRiCAqhKb7
yhsgOTxO5cLIZ0CwAvhyns%2byKPrKA2t8J89bRNf6MAsfOCDXtpmeBlp6nw6lBoTpR5Q%2fhZzxKix
l0q4v09CV8dXhMWhiRipl6zvuqRky8JEwpz. Accessed: 19 December 2016.
58 UN General Assembly: Situation of human rights in Myanmar [A/71/361], (paragraph 58), 29 August
2016 (available at ecoi.net) http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1478087528_n1627260.pdf.

Accessed: 2 February 2017.
59 UN General Assembly, ‘Situation of human rights in Myanmar, Report of the Secretary General’,
(Summary), 5 August 2016, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/57d9421a4.html. Accessed: 14
Page 18 of 50
See also Internally displaced persons (IDPs).
Back to Contents
6.3 Pre-October 2016 human rights violations
6.3.1 The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights noted in its June
2016 report on the ‘Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other
minorities in Myanmar’ that ‘Patterns of human rights violations against the
Rohingya have been documented by successive Special Rapporteurs since
1992. Many result from national, State or local laws, policies and practices
targeting the Rohingya owing to their ethnicity, race or religion, either directly
or through selective, discriminatory implementation.’60
6.3.2 A 2015 report by the International State Crime Initiative, a cross-disciplinary
research centre institutionally supported by Queen Mary University of
London and partnered with Harvard University, the University of Hull and the
University of Ulster, noted that in 2012 in Rakhine state, ‘Organised
massacres [sparked by the murder and rape of a Buddhist woman] left over
200 Rohingya men, women and children dead. Up to 60 Rakhine were also
killed during the June violence. Hundreds of homes, the vast majority
belonging to Rohingya, were destroyed.’61 The Global Centre for the
Responsibility to Protect provided a chronological list of important responses
and actions from national and international actors following the eruption of
anti-Muslim violence in June 2012.
Back to Contents
6.4 Clashes with security forces – October 2016
6.4.1 For a timeline of events in Rakhine state between 9 October and 18
November 2016 see Time.com.
6.4.2 As reported by the International Crisis Group (ICG), on 9 October 2016, a
series of attacks on border-guard posts in Maungdaw and Rathedaung
townships in northern Rakhine state killed 9 police officers. The ICG noted
that according to government statements and local sources, at least 250
assailants – reportedly Rohingya Muslims – led the attacks, also fleeing with
guns and ammunition. Further clashes between the group and security
officials occurred in subsequent days. A major security operation was
launched following the attacks62.
6.4.3 Amnesty International stated in its December 2016 report that following the
border post attacks:
December 2016.
60 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Situation of human rights of Rohingya
Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar’, (paragraph 25), 29 June 2016,

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1484061108_g1613541.pdf. Accessed: 30 December 2016.
61 Green, P., Macmanus, T., de la Cour Venning, A., ‘Countdown to Annihilation: Genocide in
Myanmar, International State Crime Initiative, (pages 15 and 74), 2015,

http://statecrime.org/data/2015/10/ISCI-Rohingya-Report-PUBLISHED-VERSION.pdf. Accessed: 23
March 2017
62 International Crisis Group, ‘Myanmar Border Attacks Fuel Tensions with Rohingya Muslim Minority’,
12 October 2016, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/myanmar-border-

attacks-fuel-tensions-rohingya-muslim-minority. Accessed: 15 December 2016.
Page 19 of 50
‘The government immediately tightened security throughout northern
Rakhine State. Large numbers of soldiers were immediately deployed in the
region and began search operations to apprehend the attackers and recover
the weapons seized by them. A curfew in Maungdaw and Buthidaung
Townships in place since 2012 was extended, and people were ordered not
to leave their villages. The government sealed off the area, forcing the
suspension of humanitarian aid and precluding access by journalists and
rights monitors... In the past two months, the government has repeatedly
insisted that their security operations are aimed at apprehending “violent
attackers” and are being conducted “in accordance with the law”. However,
the evidence … suggests that security forces in their response to the 9
October attacks, have perpetrated widespread and systematic human rights
violations against the group including by deliberately targeting the civilian
populations with little, or no, regard for their connection to militants. While
some unknown number of Rohingya participated in the 9 October attacks
and subsequent clashes with security forces, the overwhelming majority did
not.’63 (See Government response to October 2016 attacks).
6.4.4 The ICG reported that the group claiming responsibility for the attacks
‘...refers to itself as Harakah al-Yaqin (HaY, “Faith Movement” in Arabic).
The government calls it Aqa Mul Mujahidin, a generic Arabic phrase
meaning “communities of fighters” ...’64 Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported that
according to the security forces, who interrogated 4 of the alleged
perpetrators, the attacks were intended to promote extremist violent ideology
among the majority Muslim population in the area. RFA added that ‘Aqa Mul
Mujahidin has links to the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), a small
militant group active in the 1980s and the 1990s until the Myanmar
government launched a counteroffensive to expel its insurgents from the
border area with Bangladesh. The group was believed to be defunct.’65 HaY
publicly refers to itself as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA)66
6.4.5 Further attacks against the security forces by HaY took place on 12
November 2016 and, according to the ICG, several hundred villagers
supported the attackers by taking up weapons (knives and farming
63 Amnesty International, ‘Myanmar: “We Are At Breaking Point” - Rohingya: Persecuted In Myanmar,
Neglected In Bangladesh’, (page 8), 19 December 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/download/
Documents/ASA1653622016ENGLISH.PDF. Accessed: 26 January 2017.
64 International Crisis Group, ‘Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State’, (Chapter V. A),
15 December 2016, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/283-myanmar-new-

muslim-insurgency-rakhine-state. Accessed: 26 January 2017.
65 Radio Free Asia, ‘Myanmar Says Islamic Terrorist Organization Behind Deadly Border Raids in
Rakhine State’, 14 October 2016, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/myanmar-says-islamic-

terrorist-organization-behind-deadly-border-raids-in-rakhine-state-10142016164041.html. Accessed:
15 March 2017
66 Radio Free Asia, ‘Who Are the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army?’, 1 September 2017,
http://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/arsa-commentary-09012017155658.html; International Crisis

Group, ‘Myanmar Tips into New Crisis after Rakhine State Attacks’,
https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/myanmar-tips-new-crisis-after-rakhine-
state-attacks. Accessed: 4 September 2017.
Page 20 of 50
implements). After a lieutenant colonel was shot dead, air support was called
in and armed helicopters reportedly fired indiscriminately at villagers 67.
6.4.6 Whilst condemning the attacks against border security posts, the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, added that ‘...
accounts we have received suggest that security forces may have imposed
collective punishment on an entire community, with reprisals against already
vulnerable Rohingya Muslims continuing more than two months after the
border post attacks, causing some 27,000 people to flee across the border
into Bangladesh.’68
See also Internally displaced persons (IDPs) and Rohingyas in Bangladesh.
6.4.7 On 15 February 2017, it was reported that the military’s clearance operation
in Rakhine state had ended. Reuters quoted a government official statement,
in which it was announced ‘The situation in northern Rakhine has now
stabilized. The clearance operations undertaken by the military have ceased,
the curfew has been eased and there remains only a police presence to
maintain the peace.’69
6.4.8 However, a military spokesman told The Irrawaddy a day after the
announcement ‘“We will not stop clearance operations. There will be regular
security operations. Ceasing military operations [in northern Arakan State] is
information I am not aware of.”’70.
See Freedom of movement.
Back to Contents
6.5 Response to October 2016 attacks
6.5.1 Reporting on events following the October 2016 attacks, the OCHA stated
that:
‘Numerous reports have emerged about serious human rights violations
including summary executions, torture and rape perpetrated by the security
forces against the Muslim population. It has been difficult for the UN to verify
these allegations due to the continued restrictions on access to communities
in northern Rakhine. Many people arriving in Bangladesh have testified to
human rights violations in Rakhine. The UN has expressed its deep concern
at the reports and a group of UN Human Rights experts urged the
67 International Crisis Group, ‘Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State’, (Chapter V. C),
15 December 2016, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/283-myanmar-new-
muslim-insurgency-rakhine-state. Accessed: 26 January 2017.
68 UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, ‘“Callous” approach to northern Rakhine may
have grave repercussions – Zeid’, 16 December 2016, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/

DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21042&LangID=E. Accessed: 19 December 2016.
69 Reuters, Myanmar says military operation in troubled Rakhine has ended’, 15 February 2017,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-army-idUSKBN15V0BI. Accessed: 3 March 2017

70 The Irrawaddy, ‘Have Burma Army Operations in Northern Arakan State Really Ended?’, 25
February 2017, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/have-burma-army-operations-in-northern-arakan-

state-really-ended.html. Accessed: 3 March 2017
Page 21 of 50
Government to address the growing reports of violations. The Government of
Myanmar has refuted most of the allegations.’71
6.5.2 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) reported ‘There were
widespread allegations of torture, ill treatment, extrajudicial killing, arson,
mass rape and other forms of sexual violence committed by security
forces.’72 In May 2017 the FCO responded to a petition to suspend the
Myanmar Ambassador for genocide (as defined by the 1948 UN Convention)
of the Rohingya in Burma. Whilst stating allegations of genocide were for the
courts to decide, the response said ‘The British Government remains deeply
concerned by the situation in Rakhine and the persecution of the Muslim
minority Rohingya community. It is clear that the Muslim Rohingya minority
are being persecuted and denied fundamental rights.’73
6.5.3 At the 34th session of the Human Rights Council the UK stated its concern
over ‘... the response of the security forces in Rakhine State to the 9 October
attacks, in particular widespread reports of conflict-related human rights
violations. The devastating impact on civilians, in particular the Rohingya,
has been well-documented by NGOs and the OHCHR.’74
6.5.4 HRW cited in its Annual Report 2017, covering 2016 events, that following
the border-post attack, ‘... the government initiated “clearance operations” to
locate the alleged attackers while locking down the area, denying access to
humanitarian aid groups, independent media, and rights monitors.
‘The security operations led to numerous reports of serious abuses by
government security forces against Rohingya villagers, including summary
killings, rape and other sexual violence, torture and ill-treatment, arbitrary
arrests, and arson. The military employed helicopter gunships during a
series of clashes beginning on November 11 [2016]. At time of writing, the
government said it had arrested over 300 alleged suspects. Local groups
reported the use of torture and a number of deaths in custody.’75 Evidence
collected by Amnesty International, including eyewitness accounts, also
indicated excessive use of force by the security forces76.
71 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Humanitarian Bulletin Myanmar’, (page 3),
Issue 4 2016, October 2016 - January 2017,
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Myanmar%20Humanitarian%20Bulletin-
%20October%202016-Jan%202017.pdf. Accessed: 2 February 2017.

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/630623/Human_Rights
_and_Democracy_Report_2016_accessible.pdf. Accessed: 15 August 2017.
73 UK Government and Parliament, Petitions: ‘Suspend the Myanmar Ambassador for Genocide of
Rohingya Muslims’, Government responded, 3 May 2017,

https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/170740. Accessed: 4 September 2017.
74 Human Rights Council 34: UK statement on the human rights situation in Burma, 13 March 2017,
available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/human-rights-council-34-uk-statement-on-the-

human-rights-situation-in-burma. Accessed 15 August 2017
75 Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report 2017’ Burma – events of 2016, 12 January 2017,
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/burma. Accessed: 26 January 2017.

Neglected In Bangladesh’, (pages 18-21), 19 December 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/download/
Page 22 of 50
See Arrest and detention following October 2016 attacks.
6.5.5 HRW reported that ‘Satellite imagery in November [2016] revealed
widespread fire-related destruction in Rohingya villages, with a total of 430
destroyed buildings in three villages of Maungdaw district.’77 Eyewitnesses
interviewed by Amnesty International stated that their villages were
destroyed by the military78.
6.5.6 The UN Special Rapporteur stated in her End of Mission Statement, dated
20 January 2017, that Government officials informed her it was the villagers
who had burnt down their own houses as a way of getting international
actors to build them better houses, or to put the security forces in a bad light.
No evidence was offered to support this and the Special Rapporteur did not
find these arguments credible79.
6.5.7 From 8 to 23 January 2017, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) undertook a mission to Bangladesh to interview
Rohingyas who had entered Bangladesh from northern Rakhine State (nRS)
in the aftermath of the 9 October 2016 attacks. According to testimonies
gathered from 204 persons interviewed the following types of violations were
reported and experienced frequently in the so-called ‘lockdown zone’ or the
‘area clearance operation zone’, located in northern Rakhine State, halfway
between Taungpyoletwea and Maungdaw:
‘Extrajudicial executions or other killings, including by random shooting;
enforced disappearance and arbitrary detention; rape, including gang rape,
and other forms of sexual violence; physical assault including beatings;
torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; looting and
occupation of property; destruction of property; and ethnic and religious
discrimination and persecution...
‘All of the eyewitness testimonies the team gathered referred to violations
allegedly perpetrated by either the Myanmar security forces (Tatmadaw,
Border Guard Police and/or the regular police force, operating both
separately and through joint operations) or by Rakhine villagers (either
acting jointly with security forces or at least with their acceptance)... the team
gathered several testimonies indicating that Rakhine villagers from the area
have recently been given both weapons and uniforms, which bodes ill for the
future relation and trust between the two communities.’80

77 Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report 2017’ Burma – events of 2016, 12 January 2017,
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/burma. Accessed: 26 January 2017.


79 OHCHR, ‘End of Mission Statement by Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
Myanmar’, 20 January 2017, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?

NewsID=21107&LangID=E. Accessed: 26 January 2017.
80 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), ‘Report of OHCHR mission to
Bangladesh: Interviews with Rohingyas fleeing from Myanmar since 9 October 2016’, (pages 40-41),
3 February 2017, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/5899cc374.html. Accessed: 14 February
2017
Page 23 of 50
See also Inter-communal violence.
6.5.8 The OHCHR report further noted:
‘The testimonies gathered by the team – the killing of babies, toddlers,
children, women and elderly; opening fire at people fleeing; burning of entire
villages; massive detention; massive and systematic rape and sexual
violence; deliberate destruction of food and sources of food – speak volumes
of the apparent disregard by Tatmadaw and BGP officers that operate in the
lockdown zone for international human rights law, in particular the total
disdain for the right to life of Rohingyas.’81
6.5.9 Reuters reported on 8 February 2017 that UN officials estimated that more
than 1,000 Rohingya may have been killed in the crackdown. However, the
same source noted that ‘Myanmar's presidential spokesman, Zaw Htay, said
the latest reports from military commanders were that fewer than 100 people
have been killed in a counterinsurgency operation against Rohingya militants
who attacked police border posts in October.’82
6.5.10 As reported by The Independent, the Burmese government ‘... has
repeatedly denied persecuting the minority Rohingya Muslim group,
dismissing evidence of killings as “propaganda”.’83 Win Htein, a close aide of
Aung San Suu Kyi, claimed that UN accounts of abuses against the
Rohingya were “biased” and “unfair”, whilst Chief of the General Staff
General Mya Tun Oo described the allegations as “lop-sided”, adding that 76
“Bengalis” had been killed and not the hundreds claimed by the UN84.
See also Accountability.
Back to Contents
6.6 Arrest and detention following October 2016 attacks
6.6.1 Amnesty International reported on 12 January 2017 that, according to a
governmental Investigation Commission, the Burmese authorities had:
‘[A]rrested and “taken legal action” against 485 people since 9 October 2016.
Among them are village leaders, business owners, religious leaders and
Arabic teachers as well as ordinary villagers. In some instances, men failed
to return after being summoned to security force headquarters, while others
were arrested by state security forces during village sweeps to find
Bangladesh: Interviews with Rohingyas fleeing from Myanmar since 9 October 2016’, (page 41), 3
February 2017, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/5899cc374.html. Accessed: 14 February
2017
82 Reuters, Exclusive: More than 1,000 feared killed in Myanmar army crackdown on Rohingya - U.N.
officials, 8 February 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-idUSKBN15N1TJ.

Accessed: 3 March 2017
83 The Independent, ‘Burma says UN claims of crimes against humanity against Rohingya Muslims
are “exaggerated”’, 10 March 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/burma-un-

rohingya-muslims-crimes-against-humanity-united-nations-exaggerated-claims-aung-san-suu-kyi-
a7622331.html. Accessed: 15 March 2017
84 Agence France Presse, ‘Myanmar govt swats away ‘biased’ UN abuse claims’, 2 March 2017,
available at http://www.mizzima.com/news-domestic/myanmar-govt-swats-away-%E2%80%98
biased%E2%80%99-un-abuse-claims. Accessed: 3 March 2017
Page 24 of 50
suspected assailants and stolen weapons. Relatives have told Amnesty
International they do not know where their loved ones are being detained,
what they have been charged with or whether they have access to any
lawyer.’85
6.6.2 In her End of Mission Statement, dated 20 January 2017, the UN Special
Rapporteur stated that, during her recent 12-day visit to Burma, she had met
with some of those arrested and detained for their alleged involvement with
the border post attacks. She noted that they did not seem informed of any
charges brought against them. Some had no communication with their
families and neither were the families informed of their arrest or place of
detention86.
6.6.3 According to testimonies collected by Amnesty International:
‘[S]ome arrests have been accompanied or followed by torture and other ill-
treatment. In October [2016], two young Rohingya men from northern
Maungdaw Township were beaten by state security forces for 30 minutes
before being taken away. In November, soldiers and police officers beat a
man from Kyet Yoe Pyin village with rods to get him to disclose the location
of suspected militants. A video posted online in December also showed
police beat a Rohingya boy during a security sweep. According to state
media six people have died in custody since 9 October, including Kalim
Ullah, a 58-year-old former UN worker, who died three days after being
arrested in Ridar village on 14 October.’87
Back to Contents
6.7 Clashes – August 2017
6.7.1 As reported by the International Crisis Group, on 25 August 2017:
‘[T]he Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) – mounted coordinated
attacks on 30 police posts and an army base in the north of Myanmar’s
Rakhine state, in the townships of Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung.
The government reports that the attackers, equipped with hand-held
explosive devices, machetes and a few small arms, killed ten police officers,
a soldier and an immigration official. Reportedly, 77 insurgents also were
killed and one captured. In response, the military is conducting “clearance
operations” across the area and police in rural outposts have moved to more
secure locations in case of further attacks.’88
85 Amnesty International, ‘Urgent Action: Torture fears for hundreds Rohingya detained’, 12 January
2017, available at http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1484293172_asa1654632017english.pdf.
Accessed: 26 January 2017
86 OHCHR, ‘End of Mission Statement by Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
Myanmar’, 20 January 2017, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?

NewsID=21107&LangID=E. Accessed: 26 January 2017
87 Amnesty International, ‘Urgent Action: Torture fears for hundreds Rohingya detained’, 12 January

Accessed: 26 January 2017
88 International Crisis Group, ‘Myanmar Tips into New Crisis after Rakhine State Attacks’, 27 August
2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/myanmar-tips-new-crisis-after-
rakhine-state-attacks. Accessed: 4 September 2017.
Page 25 of 50
6.7.2 According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), at the end of August 2017,
satellite data showed widespread fires burning in at least 10 areas in
Rakhine state89. Al Jazeera reported on 30 August 2017 that residents and
activists blamed soldiers for shooting indiscriminately at unarmed Rohingya
men, women and children, as well as arson attacks90. On 4 September 2017
Reuters reported that at least 400 people had been killed in the clashes and
counter-military offensive91.
6.7.3 On 19 September 2017, HRW reported that satellite imagery from Burma’s
Rakhine State showed the near total destruction of 214 villages in
Maungdaw and Rathedaung Townships. Security forces blamed the ARSA
and Rohingya villagers of burning down their own homes, whilst Rohingyas
described arson, killing, and looting by the Burmese military, police, and
ethnic Rakhine mobs92.
6.7.4 The UN Special Rapporteur for Burma expressed concern at the
deteriorating situation in Rakhine state93. A UN official at the human rights
council in Geneva cited the Rohingya situation as a ‘textbook example of
ethnic cleansing’.94 As reported by the UN News Service on 19 September
2017, an estimated 415,000 people had crossed the border into Bangladesh
since late August95. BBC News reported that a number of people had
drowned as they attempted to escape the violence by boat96. There were
also reports of landmines being laid across a section of the Burma-
Bangladesh border, posing a threat to those fleeing the country97 (see also
Rohingyas in Bangladesh).
89 Human Rights Watch, ‘Burma: Satellite Data Indicate Burnings in Rakhine State’, 29 August 2017,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/29/burma-satellite-data-indicate-burnings-rakhine-state.
DAccessed: 4 September 2017.
90 Al Jazeera, ‘HRW: Satellite data show fires burning in Rakhine state’, 30 August 2017,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/hrw-satellite-data-show-fires-burning-rakhine-state-
170829065457014.html. Accessed: 4 September 2017.
91 Reuters, ‘Explosions rock Myanmar area near Bangladesh border amid Rohingya exodus’, 4
September 2017, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-myanmar-rohingya/explosions-rock-myanmar-area-

near-bangladesh-border-amid-rohingya-exodus-idUKKCN1BF0F7. Accessed: 4 September 2017.
92 Human Rights Watch, ‘Burma: Satellite Imagery Shows Mass Destruction’, 19 September 2017,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/19/burma-satellite-imagery-shows-mass-destruction. Accessed: 21
September 2017
93 OHCHR, ‘Myanmar: Worsening cycle of violence in Rakhine must be broken urgently, UN expert
warns’, 31 August 2017,

http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22018&LangID=E.
Accessed: 4 September 2017.
94 The Guardian, ‘Myanmar treatment of Rohingya looks like 'textbook ethnic cleansing', says UN’, 11
September 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/11/un-myanmars-treatment-of-

rohingya-textbook-example-of-ethnic-cleansing. Accessed: 21 September 2017
95 UN News Service, UN scaling up assistance as number of Rohingya refugees grows to over
400,000, 19 September 2017, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/59c297434.html. Accessed:

21 September 2017
96 BBC News, ‘Myanmar Rakhine: Rohingya refugees drown as exodus mounts’, 31 August 2017,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-41105292. Accessed: 4 September 2017.

97 Reuters UK, ‘Exclusive - Myanmar laying landmines near Bangladesh border: government sources
in Dhaka’, 6 September 2017, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-myanmar-rohingya-bangladesh-

landmines/exclusive-myanmar-laying-landmines-near-bangladesh-border-government-sources-in-
dhaka-idUKKCN1BH04B; Amnesty International, ‘Myanmar Army landmines along border with
Page 26 of 50
Back to Contents
6.8 Violence against women
6.8.1 DFAT reported
‘Women that identify as Rohingya in Rakhine state face multiple levels of
discrimination. In addition to the official and societal discrimination faced by
Rohingya people in general..., Rohingya society is generally conservative
and women often face familial or community-based restrictions on their
movements and activities. Rohingya girls over the age of 13 are often
prevented from leaving their homes until they are married; women in
northern Rakhine State typically wear full facial coverings and gloves when
in public. Violence against women is reportedly highly prevalent, particularly
intimate partner violence.’98
6.8.2 Following the attacks in October 2016 (see Clashes with security forces –
October 2016 attacks) OHCHR cited testimonies, by women and girls, of
rape, gang rape, and sexual assault by members of the security forces, as
well as by Rakhine villagers 99. HRW and Amnesty International also cited
incidences of sexual violence against Rohingya women and girls100 101. HRW
stated ‘Survivors and witnesses, who identified army and border police units
by their uniforms, kerchiefs, armbands, and patches, described security
forces carrying out attacks in groups, some holding women down or
threatening them at gunpoint while others raped them. Many survivors
reported being insulted and threatened on an ethnic or religious basis during
the assaults…’102
6.8.3 On 19 September 2017, the UN News Service reported:
‘... the Secretary-General's Special Representative on Sexual Violence in
Conflict, Pramila Patten, said her office has been closely monitoring reports
of sexual violence committed during the insurgency operations. She is
particularly concerned about the security of women and girls who constitute
the majority of those crossing the border. “More than half of the Rohingya
Bangladesh pose deadly threat to fleeing Rohingya’, 9 September 2017,

https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/09/myanmar-army-landmines-along-border-with-
bangladesh-pose-deadly-threat-to-fleeing-rohingya/. Accessed: 21 September 2017

Bangladesh: Interviews with Rohingyas fleeing from Myanmar since 9 October 2016’, (pages 20-25),
3 February 2017, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/5899cc374.html. Accessed: 14 February
2017
100 Human Rights Watch, ‘Burma: Security Forces Raped Rohingya Women, Girls - New Eyewitness
Accounts Show Systematic Attacks Based on Ethnicity, Religion’, 6 February 2017, available at
ecoi.net http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/335674/465121_en.html. Accessed: 14 February 2017

102 Human Rights Watch, ‘Burma: Security Forces Raped Rohingya Women, Girls - New Eyewitness
Accounts Show Systematic Attacks Based on Ethnicity, Religion’, 6 February 2017, available at
ecoi.net http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/335674/465121_en.html. Accessed: 14 February 2017
Page 27 of 50
women interviewed in early 2017 in a refugee camp in Bangladesh reported
experiencing rape or other forms of sexual violence, but due to the acute
social stigma, such cases are significantly under-reported,” said a statement
issued by the Special Representative.
‘Interviews with victims and witnesses indicate “disturbing patterns” of rape,
gang rape and other forms of sexual violence, such as invasive body
searches. “Survivors have described sexual violence being used as a
calculated tool of terror to force targeted populations to flee. They describe
the perpetrators as mainly members of the military, with the police and
Rakhine villagers also identified, in some cases,” added the statement.’ 103
Back to Contents
6.9 Extortion and harassment
6.9.1 As well as extracting bribes to allow travel in Rakhine state (see also
Freedom of movement), DFAT reported in its Country Information Report,
January 2017, that:
‘There are reports of BGP [Border Guard Police] officials carrying out night-
time raids on Rohingya households, under the pretext of searching for
weapons or other contraband. These raids are used to further extract
payment from the Rohingya population.
‘There are also accusations of BGP officials planting Bangladeshi mobile
phone SIM cards on the persons of Rohingya; while it is not illegal to
possess a Bangladeshi SIM card under Myanmar law, there are local orders
in northern Rakhine State against holding these cards. Credible sources
confirmed to DFAT reports of a woman being strip-searched and sexually
harassed after being accused of hiding a Bangladeshi SIM card in her
undergarments.’104
6.9.2 DFAT also noted that:
‘People in [IDP] camps also face a risk of extortion or other forms of
corruption from members of their camp management committee (CMC).
CMCs are typically managed by camp members chosen by local authorities.
This results in representatives who are generally not reflective of the broader
camp community, which is often made up of people from different villages
across Rakhine State. There have been credible allegations of corruption,
with CMC members seeking payment or sexual favours in return for
allocations of resources such as food and accommodation.’105
See Internally displaced persons (IDPs).
21 September 2017


Page 28 of 50
Back to Contents
6.10 Accountability
6.10.1 A joint letter, from several NGOs, to Members and Observer States of the
United Nations Human Rights Council, dated 3 March 2017, cited the official
commissions that were set up to investigate the situation in Rakhine State.
The letter noted ‘Regrettably, all of them lack the independence, impartiality,
human rights and technical expertise, and mandate necessary to conduct a
credible and effective investigation’:
• ‘On 1 December 2016, Myanmar’s President Htin Kyaw established a
13-member investigation commission led by Vice-President Myint
Swe, a former army general, to probe “the truth” in relation to violent
attacks that occurred on 9 October and 12-13 November 2016 in
Maungdaw Township. Its members include the current Chief of Police
and a number of former government officials. The commission’s
preliminary findings, published on 3 January 2017, dismissed claims
of misconduct by Myanmar security forces, having found insufficient
evidence to take legal action in response to alleged violations,
religious persecution, and allegations of genocide. As the UN Special
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide Adama Dieng noted on 6
February, this commission “is not a credible option” to investigate
abuses against Rohingya.’106
6.10.2 The national commissions final report was released on 6 August 2017; it
dismissed allegations of human rights abuses107.
• ‘Two commissions, formed by the army and the Ministry of Home
Affairs (also controlled by the military) on 9 February and 11 February
2017 respectively, have been tasked with investigating human rights
violations committed by military and police personnel during the
‘clearance operations’. These commissions, made up of military and
police officers, lack the independence and impartiality necessary to
investigate violations committed by security forces.’108
6.10.3 The Commission formed by the army released its final report on 23 May
2017 and concluded that no abuses had occurred. Subsequently HRW said
that ‘The Burmese army’s denials of well-documented abuses shows
unvarnished contempt for truth, accountability, and respect for human
rights.’109
106 Human Rights Watch, ‘Joint Letter to UNHRC Members Re: Human Rights Violations in Rakhine
State’, 2 March 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/02/joint-letter-unhrc-members-re-human-
rights-violations-rakhine-state. Accessed: 3 March 2017
107 Reuters, ‘Myanmar rejects allegations of human rights abuses against Rohingya’, 6 August 2017,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya/myanmar-rejects-allegations-of-human-rights-
abuses-against-rohingya-idUSKBN1AM0DU. Accessed 4 September 2017.

109 Human Rights Watch, ‘Burma: Army Investigation Denies Atrocities’, 24 May 2017,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/24/burma-army-investigation-denies-atrocities. Accessed: 4
Page 29 of 50
• ‘An 11-member commission appointed by the Rakhine State
Parliament on 24 October 2016, composed predominantly of ethnic
Rakhine members from the Arakan National Party (ANP), was tasked
with investigating the 9 October attacks on the three police border
post[s] but excluded any probe into human rights violations against
the Rohingya population. The commission’s chairman, ANP MP Aung
Win, claimed in an interview with the BBC that rape of Rohingya
women could not have occurred because they are “very dirty” and
“they are not attractive so neither the local Buddhist men or the
soldiers are interested in them”.’110
6.10.4 The Advisory Commission on Rakhine State was established in August 2016
by State Counsellor, Aung San Suu Kyi, as a “neutral and impartial body”
with aims to “propose concrete measures for improving the welfare of all
people in Rakhine state”. It consisted of six local and three international
experts, chaired by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan111. However,
as confirmed by Annan at a press conference on 8 September 2016 the
commission’s purpose was not to investigate reports of human rights
violations112.
6.10.5 The final report of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State was submitted
to the Burmese authorities on 23 August 2017. The reported highlighted the
risk of further violence and radicalisation, and made several
recommendations on citizenship verification, rights and equality before the
law, documentation, the situation of the internally displaced and freedom of
movement113.
6.10.6 According to the USSD HR Report for 2016 that:
‘In Rakhine State police failed to investigate crimes motivated by
intercommunal tension and in some instances discouraged family of the
victims from pursuing legal action. On August 18, soldiers in Sittwe, Rakhine
State, found an unconscious Rohingya woman named Raysuana outside
their compound. They called village leaders to take the woman to a clinic,
where she died. Clinic attendants reportedly noted injuries suggesting rape,
but police refused to investigate and instead ordered villagers to bury
Raysuana without a post mortem examination.’114
September 2017.

111 Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, http://www.rakhinecommission.org/. Accessed: 3 March
2017
112 The Irrawaddy, ‘Kofi Annan: Commission Will Not Do ‘Human Rights Investigation’ in Arakan
State’, 8 September 2016, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/kofi-annan-commission-will-not-

do-human-rights-investigation-in-arakan-state.html. Accessed: 3 March 2017
113 Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, ‘Towards a peaceful, fair and prosperous
future for the people of Rakhine: Final Report of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State’, August
2017, http://www.rakhinecommission.org/app/uploads/2017/08/FinalReport_Eng.pdf. Accessed: 4
September 2017.
1d), 3 March 2017, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=
Page 30 of 50
6.10.7 Reuters reported on 28 October 2016 that, according to the office of
President Htin Kyaw, an investigation was underway following the death in
custody of a 60-year-old Rohingya known as Khawrimular. According to a
report in the state-run Global New Light of Myanmar newspaper, whilst being
transferred to a police station “...the suspect grabbed a firearm from a
soldier. Responsible personnel managed to subdue Khawrimular, but he lost
consciousness as a result”. The report added that Khawrimular died on his
way to hospital115.
6.10.8 On 2 January 2017, it was reported that several police officers were arrested
over a video that appeared to show officers beating members of the
Rohingya community during security operations in Rakhine state in
November 2016116.
6.10.9 The Independent reported on 22 February 2017 that, according to a police
report seen by Reuters and interviews with 2 senior security officials,
Burma’s Home Affairs Ministry was investigating the deaths in custody of 2
Rohingyas in Rakhine state. The investigation, denied by the Ministry, was
compiled by Border Guard Police (BGP) in northern Rakhine and concerned
the arrest and detention of 2 men on 18 October 2016, held on suspicion of
aiding insurgents, and whose deaths were apparently concealed by BGP
officers. Initial reports indicated the men, a father and son, died from asthma.
Phil Robertson, deputy director of HRW's Asia division, said cover-ups of
abuses by security forces were common in Burma117.
6.10.10 On 4 April 2017 UN News Service reported:
‘The UN's main human rights body is assembling a team to probe alleged
atrocities against Myanmar's Rohingya, even as the government appears set
to deny investigators access to areas where crimes against humanity may
have occurred. While the resolution sponsored on 24 March [2017] by the
European Union at the UN Human Rights Council called for “ensuring full
accountability for the perpetrators and justice for victims”, Myanmar has no
obligation to cooperate with the fact-finding mission and has strongly
signaled that it won't... In the meantime, letters to the Myanmar government
are being prepared and a team of specialists – including experts in forensics
and gender-based violence – will be assembled in Geneva to support the
mission in establishing the facts and circumstances of alleged human rights
violations by security forces in Rakhine State. The resolution says the scope
of the probe will include, but not be limited to, “arbitrary detention, torture
and inhuman treatment, rape and other forms of sexual violence,

115 Reuters, ‘Myanmar probes Rohingya Muslim's death in custody during military operation’, 28
October 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-idUSKCN12S10X. Accessed: 15

March 2017
116 BBC News, ‘Myanmar detains police officers over Rohingya beating video’, 2 January 2017,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-38487067. Accessed: 6 March 2017

117 The Independent, ‘Burma probing police 'cover up' of deaths of two Rohingya Muslims’, 22
February 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/burma-rohingya-muslims-police-cover-

up-death-two-mass-rape-genocide-minority-group-un-amnesty-a7592841.html. Accessed: 15 March
2017
Page 31 of 50
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary killings, enforced disappearance, forced
displacement and unlawful destruction of property”.’118
See also Government response to October 2016 attacks.
Back to Contents
6.11 Avenues of redress
6.11.1 DFAT assessed that the police could not be relied upon to protect the
Rohingya from communal violence. The report noted:
‘Police complaint processes require official identity documents to lodge
complaints. As non-citizens, those that identify as Rohingya are often unable
to make police complaints (see Citizenship). Local administrators and police
in Rakhine State are almost exclusively drawn from the Rakhine Buddhist
community. Credible sources suggest that the police in Rakhine State carry
societal prejudices against Rohingya people. Reports of police standing by
when faced with anti-Muslim communal violence are widespread and
credible (see Inter-communal violence).
‘Access to legal representation and to the court system in Rakhine State is
limited. Civil disputes are typically managed by (Rakhine Buddhist) local
administrators. Criminal matters must be supported by local police if they are
to proceed.’119
Back to Contents
7. Societal treatment and attitudes
7.1 Sources
7.1.1 Note that between 27 February 2017 to 24 March 2017 the UN Human
Rights Council convened to discuss amongst other things the human rights
situation in Myanmar/Burma. Relevant documents and reports submitted
ahead and after the meeting are available on the UN HRC website.
Back to Contents
7.2 Inter-communal violence
7.2.1 The International Crisis Group reported in October 2014 that ‘Muslim
communities in Rakhine State have over the years been progressively
marginalised from social and political life. Apart from the Kaman, the rest
have been denied full citizenship, with significant consequences for their
livelihoods and well-being.’120
118 UN News Service, ‘UN convenes Rohingya abuse investigation, but Myanmar says it won't
cooperate’, 4 April 2017, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/58e744564.html. Accessed: 7
April 2017
Report Myanmar’, (paragraphs 5.19-5.20), 10 January 2017, http://dfat.gov.au/about-

Accessed: 9 December 2016
Page 32 of 50
See also Citizenship.
7.2.2 In November 2014, IRIN reported that ‘Two bouts of communal violence
between Buddhist ethnic Rakhines and Muslim Rohingyas in June and
October 2012 killed 176 and destroyed more than 10,000 homes and
buildings.’121 HRW reported that the violence was sparked by the rape and
murder of a Rakhine Buddhist woman by 3 Muslim men on 28 May 2012.
Killings and arson were committed by both Muslims and Buddhists and led to
thousands fleeing their homes. The report noted ‘While the state security
forces initially did nothing to halt the violence, they soon joined in with
Arakanese [Rakhine] mobs to attack and burn Muslim [Rohingya and
Kaman] neighborhoods and villages.’122
7.2.3 According to HRW, the violence that occurred in October 2012 was more
organised and planned. The report stated:
‘For months, local Arakanese political party officials and senior Buddhist
monks publicly vilified the Rohingya population and described them as a
threat to Arakan State. On October 23, thousands of Arakanese men armed
with machetes, swords, homemade guns, Molotov cocktails, and other
weapons descended upon and attacked Muslim villages in nine townships
throughout the state. State security forces either failed to intervene or
participated directly in the violence. In some cases attacks occurred
simultaneously in townships separated by considerable distance.’123
7.2.4 The UN reported they had credible information that further communal
clashes in early January 2014 led to the deaths of at least 48 Rohingya men,
women and children124. The government rejected the claims and only
acknowledged the death of a Rakhine police officer, reportedly killed by
Rohingya villagers125.
7.2.5 The report of the UN Secretary General noted that during the reporting
period, from 8 August 2015 to 1 August 2016, ‘No major outbreak of
communal violence was reported in Rakhine State or elsewhere...
Government-led and grass-roots and civil society efforts at promoting social
121 IRIN, ‘No easy solution for Myanmar's Rakhine crisis’, 4 November 2014, http://www.irinnews.org/
report/100793/no-easy-solution-myanmars-rakhine-crisis. Accessed: 13 December 2016
122 Human Rights Watch, ‘“All You Can Do is Pray” Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing of
Rohingya Muslims in Burma’s Arakan State,’ 22 April 2013, https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/04/22/all-

you-can-do-pray/crimes-against-humanity-and-ethnic-cleansing-rohingya-muslims. Accessed: 15
December 2016
123 Human Rights Watch, ‘“All You Can Do is Pray” Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing of
Rohingya Muslims in Burma’s Arakan State,’, 22 April 2013, https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/04/22/

all-you-can-do-pray/crimes-against-humanity-and-ethnic-cleansing-rohingya-muslims. Accessed: 15
December 2016
124 UN News Centre, ‘Top UN officials call for probe into latest violence in Myanmar’s Rakhine state’,
23 January 2014, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=46987#.WFK9RPm8PMo.

125 BBC News, ‘Burma violence: UN calls for Rohingya deaths inquiry’, 24 January 2014,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-25866350. Accessed: 15 December 2016
Page 33 of 50
cohesion and intercommunal harmony have also been promoted, with
successful results.’126
7.2.6 The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) noted in its
January 2017 report that, although there were reduced opportunities for
societal violence due to the limitations on freedom of movement for the
Rohingya, it assessed that high levels of religious and ethnic tensions
remained between Muslims and Buddhists127.
Back to Contents
7.3 Anti-Muslim rhetoric and Buddhist nationalism
7.3.1 According to a May 2015 report by the Simon-Skjodt Center for the
Prevention of Genocide, staff of whom visited Rakhine state in March 2015:
‘The Buddhist extremist nationalist movement, led by monks and supported
by various government officials, has spearheaded anti-Muslim campaigns in
Burma. The extremists have led sermons and public speeches against
Rohingya and other Muslims, orchestrated efforts to boycott Muslim shops,
and distributed anti-Muslim stickers that people could post on their homes
and businesses. Hate speech is disseminated through public rallies as well
as online through social media platforms.’128
7.3.2 In November 2015, a publisher and four others were charged and fined
under the Printing and Publishing Law for printing a calendar which
represented Rohingyas as a legitimate ethnic minority of Myanmar129.
According to recently published research linking Ma Ba Tha’s inflammatory
speeches and publications with outbreaks of violence, after intervention by
Ma Ba Tha monks in the calendar case, the four men were rearrested and
charged under the Criminal Code130.
7.3.3 Ma Ba Tha (in English – the Committee for the Protection of Nationality and
Religion) is a Buddhist nationalist movement that, as cited in the Myanmar
Times, ‘rose to prominence in the wake of the 2012 communal violence
between Rakhine State Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims...’131 Whilst they
(paragraph 23), 5 August 2016, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/57d9421a4.html.

128 The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of
Genocide, ‘They want us all to go away‘, (page 9), May 2015, https://www.ushmm.org/m/
pdfs/20150505-Burma-Report.pdf. Accessed: 2 February 2017
129 The Myanmar Times, ‘Publisher, four others jailed over calendar’, 25 November 2015,
http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/17814-publisher-four-others-jailed-over-
calendar.html; The Irrawaddy, ‘Five men detained, charged over “Rohingya calendar”’, 25 November
2015, http://www.irrawaddy.com/burma/five-men-detained-charged-over-rohingya-calendar.html.
130 C4ADS Innovation for Peace, ‘Sticks and Stones: hate speech narratives and facilitators in
Myanmar’, (page 27), 5 February 2016, http://static1.squarespace.com/static/566ef8b4d8af

107232d5358a/t/56b41f1ff8baf3b237782313/1454645026098/Sticks+and+Stones.pdf. Accessed: 7
March 2017
131 Myanmar Times, ‘Ma Ba Tha a ‘divisive’ minority, other monks say’, 21 July 2016,
Page 34 of 50
initially gained sympathy from the Buddhist majority for their views against
Burma’s Muslim minority, the government has made efforts to distance itself
from the group132 133.
7.3.4 The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights reported in June
2016 that ‘Since 2012, incidents of religious intolerance and incitement to
hatred by extremist and ultra-nationalist Buddhist groups have increased
across the country. The Rohingya and other Muslims are often portrayed as
a “threat to race and religion”.’134 The UN Special Rapporteur noted in her
August 2016 report that ‘Ultranationalist groups and religious movements
have spread misinformation and further fuelled tensions between
communities. As one example, fears about population increases in Aung
Mingalar, a Muslim enclave in Sittwe, resulted in a headcount, conducted in
May 2016. The count ultimately showed no appreciable change in population
numbers.’135
7.3.5 The DFAT report dated January 2017 stated that ‘Anti-Muslim sentiment in
Myanmar is widespread and entrenched, especially outside of major cities...
laws allowing for greater freedom of speech have led to an increase in hate-
speech, which has incited violence, particularly against those that identify as
Rohingya and other minority groups.’136
7.3.6 A Malaysian ship carrying aid for Rohingyas was greeted by Buddhist
protesters as it docked in Rangoon (Yangon) on 9 February 2017. According
to Al Jazeera, dozens of Buddhist monks and demonstrators waited outside
the docking area waving national flags and signs reading ‘No Rohingya’.137
Aid organisers, who were denied access to dock in Rakhine’s capital, Sittwe,
said they trusted the Burmese government to deliver the 2.5 tonnes of
supplies138.
http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/yangon/21494-ma-ba-tha-a-divisive-minority-other-
monks-say.html. Accessed: 26 April 2017
132 Radio Free Asia, ‘Myanmar’s Ministry of Religious Affairs Backs Journalist Facing Defamation,
Religious Insult Lawsuits’, 5 April 2017, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/ministry-

04052017134854.html. Accessed: 26 April 2017
133 Frontier Myanmar, ‘Can the government manage the challenge posed by Ma Ba Tha?’, 2 April
2017, http://frontiermyanmar.net/en/can-the-government-manage-the-challenge-posed-by-ma-ba-tha.
Accessed: 26 April 2017
Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar’, (paragraph 9), 29 June 2016,

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1484061108_g1613541.pdf. Accessed: 30 December 2016
135 UN General Assembly: Situation of human rights in Myanmar [A/71/361], (paragraph 64), 29
August 2016 (available at ecoi.net) http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1478087528_n1627260.pdf.

Accessed: 2 February 2017.
Report Myanmar’, (paragraphs 3.36 and 3.49), 10 January 2017, http://dfat.gov.au/about-

137 Al Jazeera, ‘Malaysian ship with aid for Rohingya docks in Myanmar’, 9 February 2017,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/02/malaysian-ship-aid-rohingya-docks-myanmar-
170209090106480.html. Accessed: 7 March 2017
138 Voice of America, ‘Malaysian Aid for Myanmar's Rohingya Arrives at Yangon Dock’, 9 February
2017, http://www.voanews.com/a/malaysian-aid-myanmar-rohingya-arrives-yangon-
dock/3717308.html. Accessed: 7 March 2017
Page 35 of 50
Back to Contents
8. Humanitarian situation
8.1 Internally displaced persons (IDPs)
8.1.1 The report of the UN Secretary General, August 2016, noted as regard IDPs
in Rakhine state, that:
‘An estimated 120,000 people in Rakhine State remain internally displaced in
39 camps or camp-like settings following the intercommunal violence that
erupted in 2012. Successive rainy seasons and floods, as well as Cyclone
Komen in 2015, have taken a serious toll on shelter in the camps, which
were originally built to last a maximum of three years. Work has begun to
repair some structures, but significant needs remain. While more than
20,000 internally displaced persons were returned or resettled from camps in
Rakhine in 2015, a durable solution for the other 120,000 remains out of
reach. In addition, more than 330,000 other vulnerable people in Rakhine
remain in need of humanitarian assistance.’139
8.1.2 The US Department of State’s Human Rights Report for 2015 (USSD HR
Report) noted that the displacement following the 2012 violence affected
Rohingya and Kaman Muslims, ethnic Rakhine, and Maramagyi
Buddhists140. The USSD HR Report for 2016 added:
‘Nearly 90,000 Rohingya IDPs lived in Sittwe’s rural camps, where they
relied on assistance from aid agencies. Humanitarian agencies provided
access to clean water, food, shelter, and sanitation in most IDP camps. The
government limited health and education services and livelihood
opportunities through systematic restrictions on movement. Rakhine State
authorities and security officials imposed severe and disproportionate
restrictions on movements of Rohingya IDPs. Conditions in Aung Mingalar,
the sole remaining Muslim quarter in Sittwe, remained poor, with Rohingya
allowed to leave the fenced and guarded compound to shop for necessities
at nearby markets or to visit outside health clinics if they paid a fee to
security services. There were reports that some Rohingya were able to
engage in limited commercial activities outside Aung Mingalar. While
restrictions on movement remained in place, local residents reported some
easing of restrictions on their movements.’141
See also Freedom of movement and Access to services.
8.1.3 DFAT noted in its January 2017 report that levels of healthcare provided in
IDP camps was very basic. Giving an example, the report noted that:
(paragraph 30), 5 August 2016, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/57d9421a4.html.
1f), 23 April 2016, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2015&dlid

=252751. Accessed: 13 December 2016
2d), 3 March 2017, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2016&dlid

=265324. Accessed: 6 March 2017
Page 36 of 50
‘[I]n a camp visited by DFAT, a mobile clinic provides services four days per
week for three hours per day, with limited facilities. Sittwe hospital does not
allow Rohingya access to the general medical services provided to the rest
of the population. Access to the hospital for Rohingya is limited to
emergency cases, and this group are treated in a separate ward at the
hospital, which has a limited number of beds and lower-standard facilities
compared to the rest of the hospital. People in IDP camps are often reluctant
to go to hospital (a process which requires a police escort and transportation
costs), meaning treatment is often delayed, leading to higher death rates.
This in turn makes people even more reluctant to seek hospital care. Those
Rohingya who have sufficient funds will occasionally travel to Bangladesh or,
less often, Yangon to seek medical treatment.’142
See also Healthcare.
8.1.4 As noted in the UN Special Rapporteur’s report of August 2016, following her
visit between 20 June to 1 July 2016:
‘The conditions in the camps for internally displaced persons visited by the
Special Rapporteur have not significantly improved since her previous visits,
with a number of continuing problems, including overcrowding, the
deterioration of temporary shelters and housing and the lack of proper
sanitation facilities. She remains concerned about the dire housing
conditions of the majority of internally displaced persons, including those in
camps around Sittwe.’143
8.1.5 In its Humanitarian Bulletin, covering the period October 2016 to January
2017, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
reported that ‘[M]ore than 23,000 (over 12,300 women/girls and over 11,100
men/boys) are estimated by the UN to remain displaced inside Maungdaw
north. The majority of those displaced are Muslims who identify themselves
as Rohingya, however members of other communities were also
displaced.’144
8.1.6 In April 2017, the Advisory Committee established by Aung San Suu Kyi
(see Accountability) recommended the closure of IDP camps in Rakhine
state to allow the inhabitants – Kaman Muslims, ethnic Rakhine people, and
Rohingya Muslims – to return to their homes. The IDPs have lived in the
camps since 2012 when they were displaced by communal violence145.

Accessed: 2 February 2017
Issue 4 2016, October 2016 - January 2017, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/

Myanmar%20Humanitarian%20Bulletin-%20October%202016-Jan%202017.pdf. Accessed: 2
February 2017
145 Radio Free Asia, ‘Myanmar’s Rakhine State to Close Three Camps For Refugees From 2012
Violence’, 5 April 2017, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/myanmars-rakhine-state-to-close-

three-camps-for-refugees-from-2012-violence-04052017155618.html. Accessed: 26 April 2017
Page 37 of 50
Back to Contents
8.2 Humanitarian aid
8.2.1 Amnesty International reported on 25 January 2017 that following the
October 2016 border post attacks (see Clashes with security forces –
October 2016 attacks), ‘[t]he Myanmar authorities suspended all
humanitarian operations in northern Rakhine State, affecting 150,000 people
who were previously reliant on the aid. The majority of those affected were
from the ethnic Rohingya minority, including thousands of newly displaced
people.’146
8.2.2 The OCHA reported in its Humanitarian Bulletin for Burma, covering October
2016 – January 2017, that:
‘After a three month interruption to most of the services being provided by
UN agencies and humanitarian organizations in northern Rakhine, the
Government has been permitting an incremental resumption of some
activities, but with national staff only. International staff still face severe
movement restrictions. While they have been permitted to observe some
Government-led food distributions and while some high level visits are being
permitted, most international staff based in northern Rakhine remain
confined to the township capitals (Maungdaw and Buthidaung towns).’147
Back to Contents
9. Access to services
9.1 Restrictions
9.1.1 Discussing the position in Rakhine state, the Committee on the Elimination
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) expressed concern, in its
Concluding observations, dated 25 July 2016, ‘That local requirements that
women and girls receive permits before travelling place undue restrictions on
their movement, which poses significant obstacles for women and girls in
gaining access to education, health care and emergency medical care and
other basic services...’148
Back to Contents
146 Amnesty International, ‘Urgent Action: Aid services slowly resume in North Rakhine’, 25 January
Issue 4 2016, October 2016 - January 2017, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/

Myanmar%20Humanitarian%20Bulletin-%20October%202016-Jan%202017.pdf. Accessed: 2
February 2017
observations on the combined fourth and fifth periodic reports of Myanmar’, (paragraph 44b), 25 July
2016, http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2fPPRiCAqhKb7yhsg
OTxO5cLIZ0CwAvhyns%2byKPrKA2t8J89bRNf6MAsfOCDXtpmeBlp6nw6lBoTpR5Q%2fhZzxKixl0q4
v09CV8dXhMWhiRipl6zvuqRky8JEwpz. Accessed: 19 December 2016
Page 38 of 50
9.2 Education
9.2.1 The UN Special Rapporteur noted in her August 2016 report that education
in displaced communities was a challenge. The report noted:
‘In Rakhine State, members of the Rakhine community around Sittwe
highlighted the long distances that had to be travelled to reach a secondary
school. In camps for Muslim communities around Sittwe, there is only one
secondary school, leaving many without access to formal education. The
Special Rapporteur notes that small numbers of Muslim students are now
able to attend Sittwe University, but underlines the need to dramatically
expand access to education at all levels, irrespective of religion or
ethnicity.’149
Back to Contents
9.3 Healthcare
9.3.1 In June 2016, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
reported that the ‘availability, accessibility, affordability and quality of health
facilities, goods and services are extremely poor across Rakhine State’,
adding:
‘In townships surrounding Sittwe, including Pauktaw and Myebon, Muslims
have no free access to township hospitals; emergency cases must be
referred to Sittwe General Hospital through an onerous and time-consuming
referral process, which entails boat travel and police escorts. Muslim patients
are confined to a segregated ward, where allegations and rumours of
discriminatory treatment persist. The situation leads to a general reluctance
to seek care at the facility. In northern Rakhine State, patients have access
to township hospitals but are required to obtain costly and time-consuming
travel authorizations, pass through checkpoints and face additional
limitations imposed by the curfew, which in some cases may lead to serious
and life-threatening delays in an emergency situation. Delays in seeking or
receiving emergency obstetric treatment can have particularly devastating
consequences and are a major cause of death of babies and for women
experiencing complications during pregnancy and childbirth.’150
9.3.2 The UN Special Rapporteur noted in her August 2016 report that there was
‘… a need to improve access to health care, particularly in rural and conflict-
affected areas. This is especially true in Rakhine State, where Muslim
communities in several townships can seek emergency medical treatment
only at Sittwe hospital. This requires an onerous referral process, several
hours’ travel in many cases and, often, a police escort. Delays in accessing
emergency treatment have resulted in preventable deaths...’151
Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar’, (paragraphs 38-39), 29 June 2016,

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1484061108_g1613541.pdf. Accessed: 30 December 2016
Page 39 of 50
9.3.3 DFAT reported in January 2017 that:
‘Access to healthcare is severely impacted by imposed restrictions on
movement for Rohingya. This includes those living in IDP camps as well as
those in northern Rakhine State. Poor access to healthcare is partly driven
by the generally poor healthcare services in Rakhine State and
underdeveloped transport infrastructure, and exacerbated by the movement
restrictions for Rohingya and discrimination in the delivery of services. For
example, Rohingya living in IDP camps near Myebon are not permitted to
attend the local hospital in the Myebon town centre, a short drive away.
Instead, these people must travel by boat to Sittwe, a journey that takes
between five and seven hours.’152
See also Internally displaced persons (IDPs).
Back to Contents
10. Freedom of movement
10.1 Restrictions
10.1.1 The US Department of State noted in its Human Rights report for 2016,
Burma, that:
‘Restrictions on in-country movement of Muslims in Rakhine State were
extensive. Authorities required the Rohingya, a stateless population, to carry
special documents and travel permits for internal movement in five areas in
Rakhine State where the Rohingya ethnic minority primarily resides:
Buthidaung, Maungdaw, Rathedaung, Kyauktaw, and Sittwe. Township
officers in Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships continued to require
Rohingya to submit a “form for informing absence from habitual residence”
for permission to stay overnight in another village and to register on the
guest list with the village administrator. Obtaining these forms and permits
often involved extortion and bribes.
‘Restrictions governing the travel of foreigners, Rohingya, and others
between townships in northern Rakhine State varied, depending on
township, and usually required submission of a document known as “Form
4.” A traveler could obtain this form only from the Township Immigration and
National Registration Department (INRD) and only if that person provided an
original copy of a family list, temporary registration card, and two guarantors.
Travel authorized under Form 4 is valid for 14 days. The cost to obtain the
form varied from township to township, with payments required to village
administrators or to the township INRD office in amounts ranging from
50,000 to 100,000 kyats ($38 to $76). Change of residency from one village
or township to another in northern Rakhine State required permission from
the INRD or the township, district, and state officials. While Rohingya could


Page 40 of 50
change residency, the government would not register them on a new
household registration list in that new location. This practice effectively
prevented persons from changing residency.’153
See Identity documents.
10.1.2 On 18 March 2016, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar
expressed her concern about:
‘... highly discriminatory policies and practices against the Rohingya and
other Muslim communities in Rakhine. In practice, these policies deny the
affected population some of their most fundamental rights. Of particular
importance is the need to restore freedom of movement for all, which in turn
could facilitate the process of return and reintegration of communities.
Ongoing discriminatory restrictions to freedom of movement are largely used
to control the Rohingya population; as a consequence, movement is
restricted within and between townships, and people must obtain specific
authorization to travel outside Rakhine State. These restrictions severely
affect all aspects of their life, including access to livelihood, and hamper
interactions between the Rakhine and Muslim communities.’154
10.1.3 DFAT also reported that ‘Rohingya are required to obtain travel approval to
move even short distances; credible sources told DFAT that obtaining travel
approval documents and then using these documents to pass through
checkpoints requires them to pay ‘informal fees’ at every stage. The size of
these informal payments can vary and can be linked to the perception of an
individual’s capacity to pay.’ The same source added ‘It is estimated that
there are nearly 200 checkpoints in northern Rakhine State alone. Credible
sources told DFAT that Rohingya faced systematic levels of extortion in
central and northern Rakhine State.’155
See Extortion and harassment.
10.1.4 The International Crisis Group, reporting on an attack against border police
in northern Rakhine state on 9 October 2016 (see Clashes with security
forces – October 2016 attacks) stated:
‘Security fears are part of the reason for the continued imposition of a curfew
in Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships under section 144 of the Myanmar
Code of Criminal Procedure. The 11pm to 4am curfew order was most
recently renewed on 8 August 2016 for two months and includes restrictions
on gatherings of five or more people in public areas or at mosques. As a
result of the latest incident, the curfew has been extended, and now runs
from 7pm to 6am. This impacts people’s livelihoods and means that in
2d), 3 March 2017, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2016&dlid=
265324. Accessed: 6 March 2017
154 UN Human Rights Council ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
Myanmar’, Yanghee Lee [A/HRC/31/71], (paragraph 39), 18 March 2016, available at ecoi.net:
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1465384791_g1605513.pdf. Accessed: 21 April 2017
Report Myanmar’, (paragraphs 3.16 and 3.21), 10 January 2017, http://dfat.gov.au/about-

Page 41 of 50
practice attending Friday prayers is prohibited – a much-resented religious
and social restriction.’156
10.1.5 DFAT noted that the restrictions on freedom of movement, that followed the
inter-communal violence of 2012, disproportionately affected the Rohingya
and remained in place at the time of publication of its report in January 2017.
DFAT further noted that in northern Rakhine state the Border Guard Police
(BGP) maintained checkpoints that restricted movement, sometimes even
within village tracts within a township. A sealed security zone was
established in northern Rakhine following the October 2016 border post
attacks, making movement in and out of the zone extremely limited.157
10.1.6 The Irrawaddy reported on 25 February 2017 that, following an
announcement that clearance operations had ceased:
‘Abdu Raman of Maungdaw said Muslim residents of the town are now
enjoying the freedom of movement and there is no more security checks in
nearby villages – a situation that was quite unlikely until last month.
“We can freely travel in Maungdaw Township, both in northern and southern
parts,” he said, adding that trip to the Bangladesh border town of Teknaf is
now possible with official documents from Maungdaw authorities.
‘Aung Soe Moe, a villager of Aung Thaya village in northern Maungdaw
Township in the heart of the rampant Burma Army manhunt, said there was
now no security restrictions in the area.
10.1.7 “You can now travel through Muslim villages there – the situation is stable,”
he told The Irrawaddy on Friday. Despite the National Security Advisor’s
statement that military operations had ceased in northern Arakan State, this
was not accepted by the military command so easily…
‘In fact, Gen. Aung Ye Win – the spokesperson of the military – painted a
very different picture of the situation when he spoke to The Irrawaddy the
day after the security advisor meeting. “We will not stop clearance
operations. There will be regular security operations. Ceasing military
operations [in northern Arakan State] is information I am not aware of,” he
said.’158
See also Clashes with security forces – October 2016 attacks.
Back to Contents
156 International Crisis Group, ‘Myanmar Border Attacks Fuel Tensions with Rohingya Muslim
Minority’, 12 October 2016, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/myanmar-
border-attacks-fuel-tensions-rohingya-muslim-minority. Accessed: 15 December 2016

158 The Irrawaddy, ‘Have Burma Army Operations in Northern Arakan State Really Ended?’ 25
February 2017, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/have-burma-army-operations-in-northern-arakan-

state-really-ended.html. Accessed: 3 March 2017
Page 42 of 50
11. Rohingyas outside Rakhine State
11.1.1 DFAT assessed that Rohingya living outside Rakhine State experienced
moderate levels of societal discrimination on a day-to-day basis. The DFAT
report of January 2017 noted:
‘There are a number of Rohingya people living outside of Rakhine State,
particularly in Yangon. The size of the Rohingya population in Myanmar
outside Rakhine State is unclear, as these people generally do not publicise
their ethnicity. Rohingya outside Rakhine State typically have higher
incomes and better access to resources than those in Rakhine State, and
are typically able to obtain identity documentation that allows them to live
and work without facing the high levels of discrimination otherwise
experienced by Rohingya in their day-to-day life. Typically, Rohingya in
Yangon are registered as ‘Burmese Muslims’. Burmese Muslims hold
national ID cards and residency documents, which gives them a legal right to
a passport. Rohingya who maintain a low profile outside of Rakhine State
face a similar level of discrimination to that faced by other Muslims or people
of South Asian appearance in Myanmar, although they are not subject to
local orders as other Rohingya in northern Rakhine State.’159
Back to Contents
12. Rohingyas in Bangladesh
12.1 Demography
12.1.1 According to the DFAT Country Information Report on Bangladesh, dated
July 2016:
‘... up to 500,000 Rohingyas [from Burma] now live in Cox’s Bazar. Adjacent
to the Bangladesh – Myanmar border, Cox’s Bazar is one of the poorest
regions in Bangladesh. Many Rohingyas have familial connections in
Myanmar along with the majority Bengali population in Bangladesh.
Increasing numbers of Rohingyas live in Dhaka and, to a lesser extent, other
areas of Bangladesh. Rohingyas are not easily distinguishable from the
majority Bengali population in physical appearance. Many speak fluent
Bengali and have otherwise assimilated into the local community, including
through marriage.’160
See also Language.
12.1.2 According to the English-language daily newspaper, New Age, a June 2016
census on undocumented Rohingya indicated the Rohingya resided in
almost all of Bangladesh’s 64 districts161.
Report Bangladesh’, (paragraph 3.11), 5 July 2016, http://dfat.gov.au/about-

us/publications/Documents/country-information-report-bangladesh.pdf. Accessed: 30 December 2016
161 New Age, ‘Rohingya refugee census: Refugees spread across Bangladesh’, 13 December 2016,
http://www.newagebd.net/article/4749/rohingya-refugee-census-refugees-spread-across-bangladesh.
Page 43 of 50
12.1.3 The FCO Human Rights and democracy report stated ‘The ongoing dispute
over citizens rights and desperate living conditions led to an increase in the
number of Rohingya leaving Burma.’162
12.1.4 Over 400,000 Rohingya crossed the border into Bangladesh following
clearance operations in Rakhine in August 2017163 (see Clashes – August
2017).
Back to Contents
12.2 Cross-border travel and “push-backs”
12.2.1 The DFAT Country Information Report on Burma, dated January 2017, noted
that:
‘While travel within Rakhine State – and Myanmar in general – is severely
restricted for Rohingya, several credible sources told DFAT that this group in
northern Rakhine State are more easily able to travel to and from
Bangladesh, despite neither country recognising the Rohingya as citizens.
Prior to the security operations following the October 2016 attacks against
BGP outposts, people from northern Rakhine State were able to take these
trips for trading purposes or to access healthcare services. Myanmar
immigration and customs officials issue an official document – known as a
‘blue book’ – that allowed regularised movements of people, including
Rohingya, between Myanmar and Bangladesh. Information on the card
includes the holder’s name and address and a record of their trips. The
cards allowed for multiple entries across a certain period of time. Since the
commencement of security operations, one way, irregular people movement
from Myanmar to Bangladesh has dramatically increased, but regular
movement between the two countries has been restricted.’164
12.2.2 The USSD HR 2016 report for Bangladesh noted that: ‘Between January
and September [2016], according to UNHCR, Bangladeshi authorities
forcibly turned back an estimated 3,487 Rohingya to Burma.’165
12.2.3 In December 2016, Amnesty International reported that the Border Guard
Bangladesh (BGB) had pushed back thousands of Rohingya attempting to
cross the border following the October 2016 attacks in Burma (see Clashes
with security forces – October 2016 attacks). The report added that the


https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/518658/FCO755_Hum
an_Rights_Report_2015_-_WEB.pdf. Accessed: 15 August 2017.

21 September 2017

165 US Department of State, ‘Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2016, Bangladesh’,
(section 2d), 3 March 2017,

http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2016&dlid=265532. Accessed: 7
April 2017
Page 44 of 50
Bangladesh authorities had attempted to keep its border with Burma sealed,
forcing many Rohingya to flee via dangerous and irregular routes166.
12.2.4 However, at the end of November 2016 it was reported that Bangladeshi
authorities were allowing some vulnerable refugees, particularly women and
children, into the country on a humanitarian basis. This was confirmed by a
government official167.
Back to Contents
12.3 Refugee and unofficial camps
12.3.1 According to the US Department of State’s Bangladesh Country Report on
Human Rights Practices for 2016 (USSD HR Report):
‘As of August [2016], the government [of Bangladesh] and UNHCR provided
temporary protection and basic assistance to 32,967 registered Rohingya
refugees from Burma living in two official camps (Kutupalong and Nayapara).
The government and UNHCR estimated that an additional 200,000 to
500,000 undocumented Rohingya lived in various villages and towns outside
the two official refugee camps. Most of these undocumented Rohingya lived
at unofficial sites among the local population in Teknaf and Ukhyia
subdistricts of Cox’s Bazar District. These sites included approximately
35,000 at the Kutupalong Makeshift site adjacent to the official Kutupalong
refugee camp, 15,000 at a site called Leda, and 10,000 at the Shamlapur
site. Starting in October [2016], a new wave of more than 34,000 migrants
entered Bangladesh, seeking refuge from violence in Rakhine state...
‘According to a June IOM report, 53.5 percent of those surveyed in Rohingya
populations living in makeshift settlements also experienced violence. Of
those, 50.5 percent said they experienced physical violence, 6.5 percent
said they experienced sexual violence, 3.8 percent said they experienced
mental abuse, and 2.8 percent said they experienced food deprivation.
These reports continued at year’s end.
‘The government did not fully cooperate with the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) or other humanitarian organizations in providing
protection and assistance to refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons,
and other persons of concern. For example, the government did not allow
UNHCR access to all individuals whom UNHCR deemed persons of
concern, particularly the undocumented Rohingya population living in the
towns and villages outside of the two official refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar
district. UNHCR was also not allowed unrestricted access to a new influx of
Rohingya migrants during the last three months of the year although the
166 Amnesty International, ‘Myanmar: "We Are At Breaking Point" - Rohingya: Persecuted In
Myanmar, Neglected In Bangladesh’, (page 41), 19 December 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/
download/Documents/ASA1653622016ENGLISH.PDF. Accessed: 17 February 2017
167 Amnesty International, ‘Myanmar: "We Are At Breaking Point" - Rohingya: Persecuted In
Myanmar, Neglected In Bangladesh’, (page 42), 19 December 2016,

https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA1653622016ENGLISH.PDF. Accessed: 17
February 2017
Page 45 of 50
International Organization for Migration (IOM) was allowed to provide
services.’168
12.3.2 DFAT reported that:
‘Rohingyas in official refugee camps receive basic health, nutrition,
educational and vocational services with the support of international
humanitarian organisations. According to the International Organisation for
Migration (IOM), Rohingyas living in unofficial refugee camps or within the
broader community have a growing need for humanitarian services,
including health, water, sanitation, hygiene and nutrition. Rohingyas are
generally able to move freely in and out of refugee camps.’169
12.3.3 However, the USSD HR Report 2016, for Bangladesh, noted that freedom of
movement beyond the camps was restricted, stating that ‘By law, refugees
are not permitted to move outside of the two [official] camps [Kutupalong and
Nayapara]. Police can punish with detention any movement without valid
documentation, including illegal entry and departure from the country.’ The
report added that despite constraints on movement, ‘[S]ome refugees
worked illegally as manual laborers or rickshaw pullers in the informal
economy. Undocumented Rohingya also worked illegally, mostly in day-labor
jobs.’170
12.3.4 U Aye Lwin, a Rakhine State Advisory Commission delegate, who
participated in a 3-day visit to Bangladesh at the end of January 2017,
described living conditions for Rohingyas arriving in Bangladesh as
inhumane and ’inappropriate even for animals’.171
12.3.5 The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported:
‘As of 20 February [2017], an estimated 73,000 people have crossed from
Rakhine State (Myanmar) into Bangladesh since October 2016. They are
residing in registered camps and makeshift settlements in Cox’s Bazar, and
in Teknaf and Ukhiya host villages. Over the last few weeks, there has been
a decrease in the number of the new arrivals, although some cross border
movements continue to be observed. New families have been reported in
Balukhali, Teknaf and Ukhiya host villages.’172
(Section 2d), 3 March 2017,
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2015&dlid=252959. Accessed: 6
March 2017

(Section 2d), 3 March 2017, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=

171 The Irrawaddy, ‘Arakan State Advisory Commission Member Describes Inhumane Conditions for
Refugees in Bangladesh’, 3 February 2017, http://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/arakan-state-

advisory-commission-member-describes-inhumane-conditions-for-refugees-in-bangladesh.html.
172 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Asia and the Pacific: Weekly Regional
Humanitarian Snapshot (14 - 20 February 2017)’, 20 February 2017, http://reliefweb.int/report
Page 46 of 50
12.3.6 The Dhaka Tribune reported in February 2017 on the Bangladesh
government plans to move Rohingya refugees to the remote and volatile
island of Thengar Char173. Reuters reported ‘The island is two hours by boat
from the nearest settlement. There are no buildings, mobile phone reception
or people. During the monsoon it often floods and, when the seas are calm,
pirates roam nearby waters hunting for fishermen to kidnap for ransom.’
Critics said the island was uninhabitable174.
12.3.7 Following the influx of Rohingya into Bangladesh during August/September
2017, aid agencies stated that the lack of food and medical aid were leading
to a ‘humanitarian catastrophe’175.
Back to Contents
12.4 Documentation and legal rights
12.4.1 DFAT reported in its Country Information Report Bangladesh, dated July
2016, that ‘Many documented Rohingyas possess UNHCR Identity Cards,
birth certificates and World Food Program Food Cards (which list primary
and secondary household recipients – women and men respectively where
possible). The Government also reportedly maintains a ‘Rohingya Family
Book’, which contains the details of all documented Rohingyas in
Bangladesh.’176 In 2011, sources indicated to the Danish FFM team that
Rohingya refugee documents have been traded with, or falsified by, local
Bangladeshis177.
12.4.2 The USSD HR report for 2016 on Bangladesh noted that:
‘The Rohingya in Bangladesh are legally stateless. Government and UNHCR
estimates indicate that between 200,000 and 500,000 undocumented
Rohingya are present in Bangladesh. They cannot derive citizenship from
birth in the country, marriage with local citizens, or any other means… The
government did not authorize Rohingya refugees living in the country to work
locally… Government authorities did not allow registered or unregistered
Rohingya formal and regular access to public health care.’178
/philippines/asia-and-pacific-weekly-regional-humanitarian-snapshot-14-20-february-2017. Accessed:
3 March 2017
173 Dhaka Tribune, ‘Thengar Char for Rohingya rehabilitation’, 9 February 2017,
http://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/law-rights/2017/02/09/thengar-char-rohingya-rehabilitation/.
Accessed: 26 April 2017
174 Reuters, ‘Pirates, cyclones and mud: Bangladesh's island solution to Rohingya crisis’, 3 February
2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-bangladesh-idUSKBN15I0QG. Accessed:

26 April 2017
175 Inter Press Service - News Agency: Rohingya: A Trail of Misfortune, 18 September 2017,
http://www.ipsnews.net/2017/09/rohingya-trail-
misfortune/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=rohingya-trail-misfortune. Accessed:
21 September 2017

177 Danish Immigration Service, ‘Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and Thailand’, (page 41), May
2011, 1/2011, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4dd0d6f72.html. Accessed: 2 February 2017

(Section 2d), 3 March 2017, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=
Page 47 of 50
12.4.3 DFAT noted that:
‘Rohingyas are not eligible for Bangladeshi citizenship, including through
marriage. They are also not legally entitled to work. However, credible
sources have told DFAT that many Rohingyas work informally using
fraudulent identity documents such as National Identity Cards [see
Fraudulent documents]. These sources have also indicated that law
enforcement agencies do not actively seek to enforce legal provisions
restricting Rohingyas’ access to employment, although many Rohingyas
have been forced to accept lower wages and poorer conditions.’179
12.4.4 DFAT reported that in June 2016, the Bangladesh Government conducted a
census of undocumented Rohingyas as part of its ‘“National Strategy on
Myanmar Refugees and Undocumented Nationals in Bangladesh – the
Rohingya”. Those who choose to register will receive identity cards that will
facilitate access to health and education services, and allow them to move
freely throughout Bangladesh. It is unclear whether the Government will
grant citizenship or residence status to these individuals or seek to settle
them in another country.’180 The census, which was voluntary, took place in
6 districts – Cox’s Bazar, Chittagong, Patuakhali, Khagrachari, Bandarban
and Rangamati.’181
12.4.5 DFAT further noted that:
‘Undocumented Rohingyas who choose to participate in the forthcoming
census ... will receive a “Myanmar National in Bangladesh Information Card.”
These cards will have a photo of the holder, 10-digit barcode, 17-digit
identification code and dual IOM and Government of Bangladesh logos, and
may contain a microchip. They will also display the holder’s name, their
father’s name, their addresses in Bangladesh and Myanmar, and the issue
date, and state that “The holder of this document has participated in the
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics Census of 2016”.’182
Back to Contents
13. Rohingya in Malaysia and Thailand
13.1.1 For information on the position of Rohingya in Malaysia and Thailand see:
Refugees International Field Report – ‘Still Adrift: Failure to Protect Rohingya
in Malaysia and Thailand’, November 2016; Fortify Rights and Burma
Rohingya Organisation UK – ‘ “Everywhere is Trouble” A Briefing on the



181 Dhaka Tribune, ‘Final Rohingya census report by Nov’, 20 June 2016, http://archive.dhakatribune.
com/bangladesh/2016/jun/20/final-rohingya-census-report-nov. Accessed: 17 February 2017


Page 48 of 50
Situation of Rohingya Refugees from Myanmar in Thailand, Malaysia, and
Indonesia’, March 2016.
Back to Contents
14. Fraudulent documents
14.1.1 In 2011, sources in Bangladesh indicated to the Danish FFM delegates that
the falsifying and fraudulent use of Rohingya refugee, and other Burmese
documents, was known to occur within the refugee community and with
Bangladeshis183.
14.1.2 The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, reporting on the availability
of fraudulent documents in Bangladesh between 2011 and 2015, stated
‘Sources report that several individuals of Rohingya origin ... were arrested
while attempting to use fake Bangladeshi passports to travel abroad in
2012... and 2013...’184
14.1.3 According to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)
Country Information Report on Bangladesh, dated July 2016, ‘Credible
sources have told DFAT that Rohingyas have obtained fraudulent NICs
[Bangladeshi national identity cards] in order to secure informal work in
Bangladesh. While it is an offence to forge an NIC, DFAT assesses that
people are able to obtain fraudulent NICs with relative ease.’185
Back to Contents
183 Danish Immigration Service, Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and Thailand, (page 42), May
2011, 1/2011, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4dd0d6f72.html. Accessed: 20 December
2016
184 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Bangladesh: Reports of fraudulent documents (2011-
2015), 20 August 2015, BGD105263.E, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/560b92654.html.


us/publications/Documents/country-information-report-bangladesh.pdf. Accessed: 30 December
2016.
Page 49 of 50
Version control and contacts
Contacts
If you have any questions about this note and your line manager, senior caseworker
or technical specialist cannot help you, or you think that this note has factual errors
then email the Country Policy and Information Team.
If you notice any formatting errors in this note (broken links, spelling mistakes and so
on) or have any comments about the layout or navigability, you can email the
Guidance, Rules and Forms Team.
Clearance
Below is information on when this note was cleared:
• version 1.0
• valid from 20 June 2017
Changes from last version of this note

First version of guidance and country information
Back to Contents
Page 50 of 50

Burma - Rohingya

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Burma - Rohingya

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Burma - Rohingya

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Country Policy and Information Note

person/interview/history-behind-arakan-state-conflict.html. Accessed: 25 April 2017

2d), 23 April 2016, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2015&

Journal, Volume XI, (page 6), Winter 2015, http://undercurrentjournal.ca/wp-content/uploads/

Myanmar’, (page 5), February 2014, http://www.fortifyrights.org/downloads/Policies_of_Persecution_

Myanmar’, (paragraphs 3.8 and 3.9), 10 January 2017, http://dfat.gov.au/about-

indepth/features/2015/10/rohingya-151024202611276.html. Accessed: 13 December 2016.

https://www.ethnologue.com/language/ctg. Accessed: 13 December 2016.

http://www.cfr.org/burmamyanmar/rohingya-migrant-crisis/p36651. Accessed: 9 December 2016.

Journal, Volume XI, (page 6), Winter 2015, http://undercurrentjournal.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html. Accessed: 9 December

http://www.cfr.org/burmamyanmar/rohingya-migrant-crisis/p36651. Accessed: 9 December 2016.

2011, 1/2011, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4dd0d6f72.html. Accessed: 2 February

December 2013, Accessed: 30 December 2016

5 October 2013, http://www.theerc.net/2013/10/burmese-president-meets-rohingya-and-rakhine-in-

http://www.asiantribune.com/?q=node/15905. Accessed: 20 December 2016.

on Rohingya’s resident’, 13 March 2012, http://arrcinfo.blogspot.co.uk/2012/03/rakhine-ministers-try-

politician’, 20 October 2011, http://www.kaladanpress.org/v3/index.php?option=com_content&view=

28 US Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs, ‘Burma Reciprocity Schedule’, undated,

https://globalvoices.org/2012/07/20/myanmars-unique-naming-system/. Accessed: 4 September

http://www.iid.org/uploads/6/2/0/6/6206024/rohingya.pdf. Accessed: 20 July 2017

Rohingya of Burma’, (page 14), October 2013, https://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/publications/wp-76-13.

http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4f71b.html. Accessed: 9 December 2016.

December 2015, http://www.e-ir.info/2015/12/08/problems-with-facts-about-rohingya-statelessness/.

March 2017, http://www.newmandala.org/diplomatic-protection-stateless-rohingya/. Accessed: 26

Journal, Volume XI, (page 8), Winter 2015, http://undercurrentjournal.ca/wp-

2015/10/rohingya-151024202611276.html. Accessed: 13 December 2016.

http://www.cfr.org/burmamyanmar/rohingya-migrant-crisis/p36651. Accessed: 9 December 2016.

http://www.iid.org/uploads/6/2/0/6/6206024/rohingya.pdf. Accessed: 20 July 2017

Commonwealth Office Report’, (page 37), April 2016,

index.php/national-news/15082-new-green-cards-meet-resistance.html. Accessed: 15 December

48 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), ‘Concluding

Report Myanmar’, (paragraph 3.13), 10 January 2017, http://dfat.gov.au/about-

https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/127736.html. Accessed: 20 April 2017

Report Myanmar’, (paragraph 3.15), 10 January 2017, http://dfat.gov.au/about-

2d), 3 March 2017, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=

2016&dlid=265324. Accessed: 6 March 2017

2016 (available at ecoi.net) http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1478087528_n1627260.pdf.

(Summary), 5 August 2016, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/57d9421a4.html. Accessed: 14

Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar’, (paragraph 25), 29 June 2016,

Myanmar, International State Crime Initiative, (pages 15 and 74), 2015,

12 October 2016, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/myanmar-border-

15 December 2016, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/283-myanmar-new-

Rakhine State’, 14 October 2016, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/myanmar-says-islamic-

http://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/arsa-commentary-09012017155658.html; International Crisis

have grave repercussions – Zeid’, 16 December 2016, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-army-idUSKBN15V0BI. Accessed: 3 March 2017

February 2017, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/have-burma-army-operations-in-northern-arakan-

Commonwealth Office Report’, (page 34), April 2016,

Rohingya Muslims’, Government responded, 3 May 2017,

available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/human-rights-council-34-uk-statement-on-the-

https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/burma. Accessed: 26 January 2017.

Neglected In Bangladesh’, (pages 18-21), 19 December 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/download/

Documents/ASA1653622016ENGLISH.PDF. Accessed: 26 January 2017.

https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/burma. Accessed: 26 January 2017.

Neglected In Bangladesh’, (page 9), 19 December 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/download/

Myanmar’, 20 January 2017, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?

officials, 8 February 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-idUSKBN15N1TJ.

are “exaggerated”’, 10 March 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/burma-un-