A/HRC/39/CRP.

2
17 September 2018

English only

Human Rights Council

Thirty-ninth session
10–28 September 2018
Agenda item 4
Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention

Report of the detailed findings of the Independent

International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar*

Summary
The Human Rights Council established the Independent International Fact-Finding
Mission on Myanmar in its resolution 34/22. In accordance with its mandate, the Mission
focused on the situation in Kachin, Rakhine and Shan States since 2011. It also examined
the infringement of fundamental freedoms, including the rights to freedom of expression,
assembly and peaceful association, and the question of hate speech.
The Mission established consistent patterns of serious human rights violations and
abuses in Kachin, Rakhine and Shan States, in addition to serious violations of international
humanitarian law. These are principally committed by the Myanmar security forces,
particularly the military. Their operations are based on policies, tactics and conduct that
consistently fail to respect international law, including by deliberately targeting civilians.
Many violations amount to the gravest crimes under international law. In the light of the
pervasive culture of impunity at the domestic level, the mission finds that the impetus for
accountability must come from the international community. It makes concrete
recommendations to that end, including that named senior generals of the Myanmar
military should be investigated and prosecuted in an international criminal tribunal for
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.
The present document contains the detailed findings of the Mission. Its principal
findings and recommendations are provided in document A/HRC/39/64.

* The information contained in this document should be read in conjunction with the report of the
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (A/HRC/39/64).

GE.18-15350(E)

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Contents
Page
I. Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 6
II. Mandate and methodology and legal framework ............................................................................. 6
A. Mandate ................................................................................................................................... 6
B. Methodology ............................................................................................................................ 7
C. Legal framework ...................................................................................................................... 11
III. Context….. ....................................................................................................................................... 22
A. Military domination in politics ................................................................................................ 22
B. Ethnic and religious diversity .................................................................................................. 25
C. History of human rights violations .......................................................................................... 27
IV. Emblematic situation 1: Kachin and Shan States ............................................................................. 30
A. Patterns of violations committed by Myanmar military and security forces ........................... 32
1. Conduct of hostilities in flagrant disregard of civilian life and property ......................... 32
2. Unlawful killings ............................................................................................................. 38
3. Torture and other ill treatment ......................................................................................... 43
4. Sexual and gender-based violence................................................................................... 51
5. Arbitrary deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance .......................................... 57
6. Forced labour and forced recruitment of adults and children .......................................... 65
7. Forced displacement, confiscation and destruction of property, and denial of
humanitarian assistance ................................................................................................... 71
8. Emblematic incidents ...................................................................................................... 79
B. Patterns of violations and abuses committed by non-State armed actors................................. 83
1. Legal framework ............................................................................................................. 84
2. Findings ........................................................................................................................... 84
C. Impact of conflict, violations and abuses on civilians ............................................................. 92
1. Fear, trauma, displacement and humanitarian impact ..................................................... 92
2. Landmines ....................................................................................................................... 95
3. Lack of recourse .............................................................................................................. 96
V. Emblematic situation 2: Rakhine State............................................................................................. 100
A. Human rights violations against the ethnic Rakhine ................................................................ 102
1. Forced or compulsory labour .......................................................................................... 102
2. Forced evictions .............................................................................................................. 105
3. Confiscation of food and livestock .................................................................................. 107
4. Sexual and gender-based violence................................................................................... 108
5. Emblematic incident: shooting in Mrauk-U on 16 January 2018 .................................... 109
6. Conclusion....................................................................................................................... 111
B. Systemic oppression and persecution of the Rohingya ............................................................ 111
1. Denial of legal status and identity ................................................................................... 112
2. Denial of the right to freedom of movement ................................................................... 121

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3. Restrictions on access to food, livelihoods, health care and education ........................... 129
4. Restrictions on humanitarian access ................................................................................ 138
5. Restrictions affecting private life .................................................................................... 139
6. Oppression through arbitrary arrest and detention .......................................................... 145
7. Other forms of oppression ............................................................................................... 146
8. Conclusion....................................................................................................................... 149
C. Violence in 2012 ...................................................................................................................... 149
1. Emblematic incidents ...................................................................................................... 149
2. Kaman Muslims of Rakhine State ................................................................................... 158
3. Torture and ill-treatment at Buthidaung prison ............................................................... 159
4. Government response to the 2012 violence ..................................................................... 162
5. Spreading hate ................................................................................................................. 168
6. Overall analysis ............................................................................................................... 174
7. Conclusion....................................................................................................................... 179
D. 25 August 2017 and the “clearance operations” ..................................................................... 179
1. A human rights catastrophe ............................................................................................. 180
2. A foreseeable and planned catastrophe ........................................................................... 256
3. An enduring catastrophe .................................................................................................. 279
4. Perpetrators ..................................................................................................................... 309
5. Violations of international law ........................................................................................ 314
VI. Emblematic situation 3: Democratic space and the exercise of fundamental freedoms ................... 316
A. Silencing of critical voices ....................................................................................................... 317
1. Legal toolbox for restricting fundamental freedoms ....................................................... 317
2. Intimidation and reprisal for engagement with the United Nations ................................. 320
3. Curtailment of peaceful protests ...................................................................................... 321
B. The issue of “hate speech” ....................................................................................................... 321
1. Legal framework ............................................................................................................. 322
2. Findings ........................................................................................................................... 323
C. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 346
VII. Hallmarks of Tatmadaw operations ................................................................................................. 346
A. Targeting civilians ................................................................................................................... 346
B. Sexual violence ........................................................................................................................ 348
C. Exclusionary and discriminatory rhetoric ................................................................................ 350
D. Command climate and impunity .............................................................................................. 351
VIII. Crimes under international law ........................................................................................................ 352
A. Genocide .................................................................................................................................. 353
B. Crimes against humanity ......................................................................................................... 366
C. War crimes ............................................................................................................................... 382
IX. Responsibility ................................................................................................................................... 384
A. Tatmadaw and other security forces ........................................................................................ 385

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B. Civilian authorities................................................................................................................... 390

C. Non-State armed groups and individuals ................................................................................. 392
D. Non-exhaustive list of alleged perpetrators ............................................................................ 392
E. International community .......................................................................................................... 393
X. Impunity and accountability ............................................................................................................. 395
A. Legal framework and international standards on accountability ............................................. 396
B. History and climate of impunity in Myanmar .......................................................................... 399
C. Way forward ............................................................................................................................ 412
XI. Conclusions and recommendations .................................................................................................. 421
A. Conclusions ............................................................................................................................. 421
B. Recommendations.................................................................................................................... 422
Annexes
I. Map of Myanmar .............................................................................................................................. 433
II. Letters from the Mission to the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar ................ 434

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Acronyms
AA Arakan Army
ARSA Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CAT Convention against Torture
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CESCR Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
CPED International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child
CRPD Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
EAO Ethnic Armed Organization
FPNCC Federal Political Negotiation and Consultation Committee
GAD General Administration Department
ICC International Criminal Court
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICERD International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination
ICESC International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IHL International Humanitarian Law
ILO International Labour Organization
KIA Kachin Independence Army
LIB Light Infantry Battalion
LID Light Infantry Division
MNDAA Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army
NLD National League for Democracy
OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
SGBV Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SLORC State Law and Order Restoration Council
SPDC State Peace and Development Council
SSA-N Shan State Army North
SSA-S Shan State Army South
TNLA Ta’ang National Liberation Army
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITAR United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNOSAT UNITAR’s Operational Satellite Applications Programme
USDP Union Solidarity and Development Party
UWSA United Wa State Army
WFP World Food Programme
MaBaTha Association for the Protection of Race and Religion
MaHaNa Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee
NaSaKa Border Area Immigration Control Headquarters
NaTaLa Ministry for Development of Border Areas and National Races “model villages”
SaYaPa Myanmar Intelligence Office

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I. Introduction
1. The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (hereinafter “the
Mission”) was established by Human Rights Council resolution 34/22, adopted on
24 March 2017. The President of the Council appointed Marzuki Darusman (Indonesia) as
chairperson and Radhika Coomaraswamy (Sri Lanka) and Christopher Sidoti (Australia) as
members. A secretariat was recruited by the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The core team was composed of a
coordinator, fact-finding team leader and five human rights officers, legal adviser/reporting
officer, military adviser, sexual and gender-based violence adviser, security officer, two
language assistants and administrative support.
2. The Mission presented an oral update at the Human Rights Council’s thirty-sixth
session (19 September 2017) and an oral interim report at the thirty-seventh session
(12 March 2018), and delivered a video statement at the twenty-seventh special session of
the Council (5 December 2017). In its decision 36/115, the Council requested the Mission
to submit its final report at its thirty-ninth session. The main findings and recommendations
of the Mission are contained in document A/HRC/39/64. A/HRC/39/CRP.2 contains the
full factual and legal analysis, with supporting information, underpinning document
A/HRC/39/64. It also includes recommendations directed more broadly than the
accountability recommendations in that document.
3. The Mission deeply regrets the lack of cooperation from the Government of
Myanmar, despite repeated appeals from the Human Rights Council and the Mission. The
Mission requested in-country access through letters of 4 September 2017, 17 November
2017 and 29 January 2018. It sent a detailed list of questions on 27 March 2018. Each time
its members travelled to Geneva, the Mission requested a meeting with the Permanent
Mission of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar to the United Nations and Other
International Organizations in Geneva, Switzerland. The Mission had some limited
informal contact with Government representatives but received no official response to its
letters requesting formal meetings, in-country access or information. The Mission’s draft
main findings and recommendations were shared with the Government prior to their
submission and public release, providing an opportunity to comment or make factual
corrections. No response was received. The Mission’s letters to the Government are in
annex 2.

II. Mandate, methodology and legal framework

A. Mandate

4. Resolution 34/22 mandated the Mission “to establish the facts and circumstances of
the alleged recent human rights violations by military and security forces, and abuses, in
Myanmar, in particular in Rakhine State, including but not limited to arbitrary detention,
torture and inhuman treatment, rape and other forms of sexual violence, extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary killings, enforced disappearances, forced displacement and unlawful
destruction of property, with a view to ensuring full accountability for perpetrators and
justice for victims”.
5. In the interpretation of this mandate, the Mission considered the resumption of
hostilities in Kachin State and escalation in Shan State in 2011 and the outbreak of major
violence in Rakhine State in 2012 as key recent turning points that generated renewed
violence and further allegations of serious human rights violations and abuses. The Mission
therefore determined that focusing on the situation in Kachin, Rakhine and Shan States
since 2011 would allow it to fulfil its mandate in a contextualised manner. The Mission
selected several significant incidents for in-depth fact-finding, aiming to make findings on
specific allegations of human rights violations and abuses while revealing broader patterns
of conduct.

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6. The Mission considered that the types of violations and abuses listed in the Council
resolution were illustrative, and that it was mandated to consider the full range of violations
of international law as appropriate. In line with the Council’s request to examine alleged
human rights violations and abuses, the Mission decided to examine allegations against
both State and non-State actors. Finally, considering the objective of the mandate (“with a
view to ensuring full accountability for perpetrators and justice for victims”), the Mission
endeavoured to identify perpetrators, as well as to make findings about responsibility and
recommendations on accountability.
7. The Mission notes with concern that allegations of human rights violations and
abuses occurring in other parts of Myanmar also merit in-depth fact-finding. Time and
resource constraints led the Mission to limit itself to Rakhine, Kachin and Shan States,
particularly in light of the events that unfolded since August 2017 that required significant
attention. The Mission is comfortable, however, that its geographic, temporal and subject
matter focus allowed for solid overall findings and recommendations.

B. Methodology

8. The Mission was acutely aware of the complexity and sensitivity of the situation it
was mandated to examine, as well as of allegations from all sides that the spread of false
information about events has been commonplace. This awareness reinforced its
commitment to meticulously follow established methodologies and best practices for
human rights fact-finding, as developed by the United Nations. In doing so, the Mission
strictly adhered to the principles of “do no harm”, independence, impartiality, objectivity,
transparency and integrity.
9. In particular, the Mission followed the best practices established for commissions of
inquiry and fact-finding missions, outlined in the 2015 OHCHR publication, International
Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-Finding Missions on International Human Rights Law
and International Humanitarian Law – Guidance and Practice.1

1. Standard of proof
10. Consistent with the practice of United Nations fact-finding bodies, the Mission
employed the “reasonable grounds” standard in making factual determinations on
individual cases, incidents and patterns of conduct. The standard was considered met when
a sufficient and reliable body of primary information, consistent with other information,
would allow an ordinarily prudent person to reasonably conclude that a case, incident or
pattern of conduct occurred. This standard of proof is lower than that required in criminal
proceedings.
11. Individual cases or incidents contained in the report are based on at least one
credible source of first-hand information, which was independently corroborated by at least
one other credible source of information. Specific major incidents, such as those set out in
chapter V on Rakhine State, are based on multiple accounts from eyewitnesses and victims,
allowing for in-depth fact-finding and detailed event reconstruction. Where the report
describes patterns of conduct, these are based on multiple credible sources of first-hand
information, which are consistent with and corroborated by the overall body of credible
information collected. In the few instances where this standard was not met, but the
Mission still considered it appropriate to include the information, this is stated explicitly.
12. In cases of torture or sexual and gender-based violence, where a second independent
source of information was often unavailable, the Mission considered the case or incident
corroborated when it obtained one first-hand account which it assessed as credible and was
consistent with what was known about the incident or the established patterns of similar
incidents in the area, and in line with the interviewer’s own observations (for example,
scars or signs of trauma).

1 Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/CoI_Guidance_and_Practice.pdf

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13. The Mission considered the following to be sources of first-hand information:

• confidential interviews conducted by the Mission or its staff with victims, witnesses,
victim’s close family members, perpetrators or former Myanmar officials with direct
knowledge of the issues brought before the Mission, where it was assessed that the
source was credible and reliable;
• satellite imagery from reliable sources, authenticated video and photo material as
well as documents containing first-hand information from a reliable source;
• publicly available admissions of relevant facts by Myanmar officials;
• laws, policies and directives of Myanmar as well as internal Myanmar documents,
provided that they were received from a credible and reliable source and their
authenticity could be confirmed; and
• statistics, surveys and other quantitative information generated by Myanmar or the
United Nations, to the extent that the data was based on an apparently sound
methodology and the inputs underlying the data were considered originating from a
credible and reliable source.
14. The Mission relied on the following types of information to corroborate first-hand
information and providing overall context to violations:
• confidential interviews conducted by the Mission or its staff with witnesses who
received the information directly from a person known to them (and not as a
rumour), provided that the Mission assessed the source to be credible and reliable;
• summaries of witness accounts contained in publications or in submissions from the
United Nations, research institutes and human rights organizations, where the
Mission assessed the source to be credible and reliable;
• summary descriptions of patterns of conduct contained in expert interviews, public
reports, submissions, academic research publications, documentaries and similar
materials, where the Mission assessed the source to be credible and reliable.
15. In its assessment of second-hand sources, the Mission endeavoured to interview the
researcher or author of the publication, submission or text to assess its credibility and the
methodology used.
16. The reliability and credibility of each source was carefully assessed. The Mission
considered whether the source was trustworthy, consistently probing the veracity of their
statements. Such assessment took into account, among other considerations:
• the witness’ political and personal interests, potential biases and past record of
reliability, where known;
• the witness’ apparent capacity to recall events correctly, considering his or her age,
trauma, how far back the events occurred, and so on;
• the position of the witness in relation to the subject of the information;
• where and how the witness obtained the information;
• the reasons for which the witness provided the information.
17. The Mission also considered the information’s relevance to the fact-finding work, its
internal consistency and coherence, and its consistency with and corroboration by other
information, among other factors. Assessment of the validity of the information was
separate from the assessment of its reliability and credibility. The Mission did not assume
that a credible and reliable source would necessarily provide accurate and valid
information.
18. Where this report refers to an account of a witness, the Mission has accepted the
statement as assessed and described to be truthful and relevant, unless stated otherwise.
Direct references to specific witness statements in the report should not be taken as an
indication that it was the sole basis of judgment in relation to the issues under analysis.
These direct references and citations were included to provide an example or illustration.

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2. Collection of information
19. The Mission obtained a vast quantity of primary and secondary information. It
conducted 875 in-depth interviews with victims and eyewitnesses. The Mission took care to
diversify its sources of information. It interviewed individuals from different ethnic and
religious backgrounds (including Bamar, ethnic Rakhine, Rohingya 2, Kaman Muslims,
Hindus and individuals from Kachin and Shan ethnic groups). It also interviewed a number
of members of non-State armed groups, as well as some former officials of Myanmar State
institutions. Due to the lack of cooperation from the Government of Myanmar, it was
unable to interview any serving government officials or members of its military forces. 3
20. The Mission used various methodological approaches to select persons for
interviews. This included random selection, for example by visiting different areas of a
refugee camp or different refugee centres without pre-arrangement. Specifically in relation
to the situation in Rakhine State, each visit to southern Bangladesh also prioritised
interviews with persons who had most recently arrived from Myanmar to ensure the receipt
of “fresh” information. Additionally, the Mission targeted interviewees to corroborate
specific incidents or patterns. The Mission ensured that it did not rely on any single
organization or individual to assist. To the extent possible, the Mission also strove to only
speak with persons who had not previously spoken with any other organization or media
outlet, and confirmed this ahead of the interview.
21. Nearly 40 per cent of interviewees were female. While the majority of interviews
predominantly pertained to the situation in Rakhine State, more than 200 interviews were
related to the situation in Kachin and Shan States, with further interviews relating to both
situations, or to the country as a whole. Interviews were mostly conducted in person, in a
safe and private setting and in the presence of a trusted, professional interpreter where
required. Some interviews were conducted remotely, through secure channels of
communication and taking additional precautions to ensure reliability (for example, a visual
link or a known and trusted intermediary).
22. The Mission obtained a large body of satellite imagery and analysis with the support
of UNOSAT4, and received a vast amount of documents, photographs and videos – some
clandestinely recorded or obtained by the source. It only used those materials that it was
able to authenticate. All information was checked against secondary information assessed
as credible and reliable, including organizations’ raw data or notes, expert interviews,
submissions and open source material. The Mission’s internal expertise included human
rights and law, sexual and gender-based violence, psychology and child psychology,
military affairs and forensics, and specialist advice was sought in digital verification.
23. To collect information, the Mission members travelled to Bangladesh, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Thailand, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Requests to visit China and India did not receive a response. Mission members visited the
refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar (Bangladesh) at the start of the mandate, shortly after the
arrival of vast numbers of Rohingya refugees, and once again near the end of the mandate
in July 2018 to take stock of the situation prior to the finalization of their report to the
Human Rights Council. The Mission secretariat undertook numerous additional field-
missions between September 2017 and July 2018, of several weeks at a time, primarily to
interview victims and witnesses. Specifically in relation to the unfolding events after
25 August 2017 in Rakhine State, a team was deployed immediately to conduct interviews
with persons who had just fled Myanmar. The Mission also held over 250 consultations
with other stakeholders, including intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations,
researchers, and diplomats – in person and remotely. It received written submissions,

2 The Mission is conscious of the sensitivity concerning the term “Rohingya” in Myanmar, where the
group is generally referred to as “Bengali”. The Mission uses the term in line with the concerned
group’s right to self-identify.
3 The Mission did, however, undertake an extensive analysis of public statements made by government
and military officials.
4 UNOSAT is the Operational Satellite Applications Programme of the United Nations Institute for
Training and Research (UNITAR).

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including through a public call. The Mission further engaged with a number of United
Nations entities and other humanitarian actors. It is particularly grateful to the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and to other United Nations officials
and entities that provided relevant information and support. It regrets that a number of
United Nations entities did not provide similar support.
24. The Mission further regrets that it was not able to visit Myanmar and undertake in-
country fact-finding. The Mission was nevertheless able to gather the information necessary
to establish facts and draw conclusions in accordance with its mandate. As is apparent from
the preceding paragraphs, the Mission accessed a large volume and wide variety of sources,
mostly outside but also inside the country. Importantly, it had access to victims and
eyewitnesses who left Myanmar throughout the period under review, including very
recently. Moreover, considering the severe risk of intimidation and reprisals against
individuals who engage with independent human rights bodies (see below) and the
restrictions imposed on other international actors operating inside Myanmar, the Mission is
convinced that access to the country would not necessarily have generated more reliable or
valid information. The Mission is confident that it spoke with victims and witnesses in a
safe environment, where they could speak freely and without fear of reprisals.
25. The Mission expresses its deep gratitude for the invaluable support it received from
a number of non-governmental organizations and all the persons who agreed to be
interviewed. Their dedication to the betterment of the human rights situation in Myanmar is
truly admirable.

3. Protection of victims and witnesses

26. The Mission paid specific attention to the protection of victims and witnesses. Its
initial protection assessment indicated that persons who speak out about the human rights
situation in the country and who engage with United Nations mechanisms have been
subject to reprisals. The Mission was therefore extremely cautious in all interactions with
victims and witnesses, making constant assessments of the need to establish contact with
persons who may be placed at risk as a result. The Mission established strict security
protocols to guide these interactions and to ensure that they were conducted through means
to mitigate the risks. Contacts were not pursued if the Mission could not ensure the safety
of the cooperating person, if the risk of harm was assessed to be too high, or if the Mission
did not have sufficient information to make an informed determination on the level of risk.
In line with this policy, the Mission has not pursued multiple leads.
27. The most significant challenge for the Mission therefore arose from the fear of
reprisals. For the Myanmar population, this fear is well founded. The Mission received
information and verified incidents of reprisals against persons who have interacted with
international actors. Numerous potential witnesses were afraid to speak with the Mission,
even on a confidential basis, because they feared for the repercussions on themselves or
family members. The Mission did not pressure anyone to speak with it.
28. Many international actors operating in Myanmar, including aid workers, journalists,
diplomats and other foreign visitors to Myanmar, were also unwilling to share knowledge
and information with the Mission from fear that this would negatively affect their access if
it became known to the Myanmar authorities that they had cooperated with the Mission.
29. The Mission is gravely concerned at the intimidation and threats faced by Myanmar
nationals cooperating with Human Rights Council mechanisms mandated to examine the
situation in Myanmar. It urges Myanmar to guarantee the protection of victims and
witnesses, and everybody who engages with the Mission and with other international
human rights mechanisms, and to undertake that no one shall suffer harassment, threats,
intimidation, ill-treatment, arrest or other forms of reprisal because of such contact.

4. Storage of information
30. A secure, confidential electronic database was created to enable the Mission to
securely record and store information. It contains the summary records of all interviews and
meetings conducted as well as electronic copies of relevant materials collected. As a fully

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searchable tool, the database facilitated the organization and retrieval of information for
analysis and report writing.
31. The Mission systematically sought the informed and specific consent of all
interviewees to use and/or share the information given, ensuring confidentiality as
appropriate. The consent of every person interviewed and any conditions attached to it were
recorded in the database, as were any potential protection risks.
32. The database will be kept as part of the Mission’s archives, along with all its
physical records and in line with United Nations requirements regarding the archiving of
materials. The OHCHR will be the custodian of these archives. It is authorised to provide
access to competent authorities carrying out credible investigations to ensure accountability
for human rights violations and abuses in Myanmar in line with international norms and
standards. Access will be be granted to information only in accordance with the terms of
the sources’ informed consent and only after any protection concerns are duly addressed.

C. Legal Framework

33. Facts were assessed in light of international human rights law, international
humanitarian law and international criminal law, as applicable in Myanmar. The Mission
also considered the human rights guarantees under the domestic law of Myanmar.

1. International human rights law

34. Myanmar is bound by the United Nations Charter and the pledge to take action for
the achievement of “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”. 5
Regardless of the extent to which States have ratified specific human rights treaties, they
must respect internationally recognised human rights. Human rights are not limited to
citizens of the State, but must be guaranteed to all individuals within the territory or
jurisdiction of the State, irrespective of their nationality or lack thereof. 6 The content and
scope of Myanmar’s international human rights obligations are articulated in treaties
ratified by Myanmar, in customary international law and in various instruments of soft law.

(a) Treaty Law

35. As of August 2018, Myanmar has ratified four of the core United Nations human
rights treaties: the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Optional Protocol
thereto on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography (CRC-OP-SC); the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW);
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESC). 7 In doing so, Myanmar
consented to be bound by the obligations articulated in these treaties and accepted that
domestic laws and practice cannot be invoked to justify a failure to comply. 8 It agreed to
engage with the United Nations treaty bodies established to monitor the implementation of

5 United Nations Charter, arts. 55(c) and 56.

6 Only a limited number of rights can be limited to citizens, under strict conditions (see para. 68
below). B. Ramcharan, “The Law-Making Process: From Declaration to Treaty to Custom to
Prevention”, in The Oxford Handbook on International Human Rights Law, D. Shelton ed. (Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 511; D. Weissbrodt, The Human Rights of Non-Citizens (Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2008). See also A/HRC/19/43, para. 2.
7 Dates of accession or ratification by Myanmar are: CRC (15 July 1991), CEDAW (22 July 1997),
CRPD (7 December 2011), CRC-OP-SC (16 January 2012), ICESC (6 October 2017). Myanmar
signed the ICESC on 16 July 2015, meaning that it had to refrain from actions contrary to the object
or purpose of the Covenant from that date.
8 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27.

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the treaties and to duly consider their findings and recommendations. Myanmar has also
indicated that it is actively considering acceding to other core human rights treaties. 9
36. Under the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Myanmar is obligated to
guarantee children, meaning all persons under the age of 18 years, the rights to life,
survival, development and preservation of identity; to be registered at birth and to acquire a
nationality; to protection from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury and abuse,
including sexual abuse; to the highest attainable standard of health; to education; and not to
be tortured, sentenced to the death penalty nor suffer other cruel or degrading treatment or
punishment.10 Children also enjoy the rights to freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful
assembly and association, and freedom of religion.11 Children belonging to ethnic, religious
or linguistic minorities have the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise
their own religion, and to use their own language.12 Under the CRC, governments must do
everything they can to protect and care for children affected by armed conflicts. 13
Importantly, the CRC puts States parties under an explicit obligation to respect and ensure
these rights to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind,
irrespective of the child’s or their parents’ or legal guardian’s race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability,
birth or other status.14
37. As a party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, Myanmar is committed to undertake measures to end discrimination
against women in all forms, including by abolishing discriminatory laws and ensuring the
elimination of all acts of discrimination against women by persons, organizations or
enterprises. Violence against women and girls, including sexual and gender-based violence,
is a form of discrimination prohibited by the Convention and is a violation of human
rights.15 The obligations of States parties do not cease in periods of armed conflict or in
states of emergency resulting from political events or natural disasters, and they apply
without discrimination to both citizens and non-citizens, including stateless persons. 16
States parties have a due diligence obligation to prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish
acts of sexual and gender-based violence.17
38. Under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, States parties
undertake to ensure and promote the full realization of all human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all persons with disabilities without discrimination of any kind on the basis of

9 A/HRC/31/13/Add.1, para. 7. Myanmar has not yet ratified the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and its Second Optional Protocol aiming to the abolition of the death penalty; the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and its
Optional Protocol; the Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance;
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of
Their Families. It has signed, but not yet ratified, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (28 September 2015). Myanmar
has also not accepted any of the individual complaints procedures under these conventions.
10 CRC, arts. 1, 4, 6, 7, 19, 24, 28, 34, 37.
11 CRC, arts. 13-15.
12 CRC, art. 30.
13 CRC, art. 38(4).
14 CRC, art. 2.
15 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, “General
recommendation No. 28 on the core obligations of States parties under article 2 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women” (CEDAW/C/GC/28), para. 9;
“General recommendation No. 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict and post-conflict
situations” (CEDAW/C/GC/30), para. 34; “General recommendation No. 35 on gender-based
violence against women, updating general recommendation No. 19” (CEDAW/C/GC/35), para. 21.
16 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General
Recommendation No. 28, para. 11-12.
17 E.g. United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General
Recommendation No. 30, para. 15, 23.

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disability.18 Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental,
intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder
their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others. 19
39. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights requires State
parties to undertake steps, to the maximum of their available resources, with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the Covenant. These
include the right to work, the right to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of
work, the right to form trade unions, the right to social security, the right to adequate
standard of living including adequate food, clothing and housing, the right to the enjoyment
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, the right to education, and
the right to take part in cultural life. These rights apply to everyone including non-nationals,
such as stateless persons, regardless of legal status and documentation. 20 Complaints of
violations should be promptly, impartially, and independently investigated and adjudicated,
providing the complainant access to an effective remedy where appropriate. 21 The United
Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights further considers that the
Covenant requires States parties to adopt an active approach to eliminating systemic
discrimination and segregation in practice:
Tackling such discrimination will usually require a comprehensive approach with a
range of laws, policies and programmes, including temporary special measures.
States parties should consider using incentives to encourage public and private
actors to change their attitudes and behaviour in relation to individuals and groups
of individuals facing systemic discrimination, or penalize them in case of non-
compliance. Public leadership and programmes to raise awareness about systemic
discrimination and the adoption of strict measures against incitement to
discrimination are often necessary. Eliminating systemic discrimination will
frequently require devoting greater resources to traditionally neglected groups.
Given the persistent hostility towards some groups, particular attention will need to
be given to ensuring that laws and policies are implemented by officials and others
in practice.22
40. In addition to these four core United Nations human rights treaties, Myanmar is also
a party to a number of other international conventions that are relevant to the protection of
human rights. They include the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (obliging Myanmar to prevent and punish the crime of genocide) and the
International Labour Organization Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) and Worst
Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182) (obliging Myanmar to suppress the use
of forced or compulsory labour in all its forms within the shortest possible period, and to
take immediate and effective measures to secure the prohibition and elimination of the
worst forms of child labour as a matter of urgency). 23

(b) Customary international human rights law

41. On 10 December 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), with Myanmar voting in favour. Although the
UDHR was not intended at the time to be a legally binding document, it is generally
considered as an authoritative interpretation of the human rights provisions in the (binding)
United Nations Charter. The UDHR is considered a “common standard of achievement for
all peoples and all nations”24 and it sets out the fundamental human rights that are to be

18 CRPD, art. 4.
19 CRPD, art. 1.
20 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, “General Comment No. 20:
Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights” (E/C.12/GC/20), para. 30.
21 Ibid. para. 40.
22 Ibid. para. 39.
23 Dates of accession or ratification by Myanmar are: Genocide Convention (14 March 1956), Forced
Labour Convention (4 March 1955), Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (18 December 2013).
24 UDHR, Preamble.

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A/HRC/39/CRP.2

universally protected. It is accepted that many of its provisions – if not the entire document
– are reflective of customary international law. 25 This means that States are bound by the
norms captured in these provisions, regardless of whether they are codified in a binding
treaty and ratified by the State concerned.
42. Specific relevant examples of these norms are the right to life26 and the right to
equality and the prohibition of discrimination. 27 The principle of non-discrimination is set
out in article 55(c) of the United Nations Charter and further detailed in article 2 of the
UDHR. The latter provision states that “everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms
set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status”. Article 7 of the UDHR further stipulates that “[a]ll are equal before the law
and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law”. At its first
session, the General Assembly declared that it was in the higher interests of humanity to put
an immediate end to religious and racial persecution and discrimination, suggesting these
were contrary to the letter and spirit of the Charter. 28 Non-discrimination and equality are
also fundamental, crosscutting norms in all major international and regional human rights
treaties and texts. The principles of equality and non-discrimination underpin the entire
human rights system.
43. Some human rights provisions have not only attained the status of customary
international law but are also considered peremptory norms of international law, or jus
cogens. This means that these norms are accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation or limitation is
permitted.29 While there is no exhaustive list of recognised peremptory norms, it is
commonly accepted that these include the prohibitions of the arbitrary deprivation of life,
torture, enforced disappearance, slavery and forced labour, prolonged arbitrary detention,
systematic racial discrimination and apartheid, genocide, crimes against humanity and war
crimes (including hostilities directed at a civilian population).30

(c) Other instruments

44. In addition to the human rights norms articulated in treaties, a range of other
instruments assist in understanding and delineating human rights obligations of States, even
if these texts are not binding as such. These include, for example, the Declaration on the

25 See H. Hannum, “The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and
International Law”, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 25 (1995/6) 287-
397; O. De Schutter, International Human Rights Law, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2014), p. 63 (and references listed there).
26 N. Rodley, “Integrity of the Person”, in International Human Rights Law (2nd ed.), D. Moeckli, S.
Shah and S. Sivakumaran, eds. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 185.
27 At minimum on the grounds of race, religion and sex. See D. Moeckli, “Equality and Non-
Discrimination”, International Human Rights Law (2nd ed.), D. Moeckli, S. Shah and S. Sivakumaran,
eds. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 160-161. The International Court of Justice has
described the prohibition on racial and ethnic discrimination as an obligation erga omnes: ICJ,
Barcelona Traction (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment of 5 February 1970, ICJ Reports 1970.
28 A/RES/103(I).
29 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53.
30 See N. Rodley, “Integrity of the Person”, in International Human Rights Law (2nd ed.), D. Moeckli,
S. Shah and S. Sivakumaran, eds. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 185; ICJ, Questions
Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), Judgment of 20 July 2012,
ICJ Reports 2012, para. 99; J. Sarkin, “Why the Prohibition of Enforced Disappearance Has Attained
Jus Cogens Status in International Law”, Nordic Journal of International Law, Vol. 81(4), 2012, pp.
537-584; International Law Commission, “Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of
International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law”
A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), para. 374; E. De Wet, “Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes”, in
The Oxford Handbook on International Human Rights Law, Dinah Shelton ed. (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2013), pp. 543-547; M.C. Bassiouni, “International Crimes: Jus cogens and
obligatio erga omnes”, Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 59(4), 1996, p. 68.

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Protection of Persons from Enforced Disappearances 31, the Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement32, the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 33, the Body of
Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment34, the Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human
Rights through Action to Combat Impunity 35, and the Basic Principles and Guidelines on
the Right to Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law. 36 In
November 2012, the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
including Myanmar, unanimously adopted the ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights.
Despite the controversy surrounding its drafting process and the narrow formulation of
some of its provisions in comparison with international norms and standards 37, it remains a
useful instrument to further delineate the human rights obligations that ASEAN member
States themselves accept as binding on them.
45. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities is one of the main reference documents for
minority rights.38 It recognises that persons belonging to minorities have the right to the
protection by states of their existence and their national or ethnic, cultural, religious and
linguistic identity (art. 1), the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their
own religion, and to use their own language in private and in public (art. 2.1), the right to
participate effectively in cultural, religious, social, economic and public life (art. 2.2), the
right to participate effectively in decisions which affect them on the national and regional
levels (art. 2.3), the right to establish and maintain their own associations (art. 2.4), and the
freedom to exercise their rights, individually as well as in community with other members
of their group, without discrimination (art. 3). States are also to protect and promote the
rights of persons belonging to minorities by taking measures to ensure that they may
exercise fully and effectively all their human rights and fundamental freedoms without any
discrimination and in full equality before the law (art. 4.1). In its 2005 Commentary, the
United Nations Working Group on Minorities observed that “minority protection is based
on four requirements: protection of the existence, non-exclusion, non-discrimination and
non-assimilation of the groups concerned”.39
46. The 1979 United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the
1990 Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms for Law Enforcement Officials
provide guidance to States on the use of force and firearms by any law enforcement
official.40 The Code of Conduct stipulates in article 3 that law enforcement officials may
use force only when strictly necessary and to the extent required for the performance of

31 Declaration on the Protection of Persons from Enforced Disappearances, adopted by General

Assembly resolution 47/133, 18 December 1992.
32 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2).
33 The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners were initially adopted
by the United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in 1955,
and approved by the United Nations Economic and Social Council in 1957. On 17 December 2015, a
revised version was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly (A/RES/70/175).
34 Adopted by General Assembly resolution 43/173 of 9 December 1988.
35 Recognised in a consensus resolution of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in 2005
(E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1).
36 Adopted by General Assembly resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005.
37 See e.g. M. Davies, “An Agreement to Disagree: The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the
Absence of Regional Identity in Southeast Asia”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, vol.
33(3), 2014, 107-129; A. Bloed and N. Girard, “ASEAN – Background and Human Rights
Mechanisms”, in The United Nations Declaration on Minorities – an Academic Account on the
Occasion of its 20th Anniversary (1992-2012), U. Caruso and R. Hofmann, eds. (Leiden, Brill/Nijhoff,
2015), pp. 311-313.
38 Adopted by General Assembly resolution 47/135 (18 December 1992).
39 E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2005/2, para. 23.
40 The Code of Conduct was adopted by the General Assembly in 1979, and the Basic Principles were
adopted at the 8th United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders in 1990. On 18 December 1990, the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution
45/166 welcoming the Principles and inviting States to respect them.

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their duty. The Basic Principles set out the core parameters to determine the lawfulness of
use of force by law enforcement personnel and establish standards for accountability and
review. Any use of force by law enforcement officials should be in accordance with the
principles of legality, necessity, proportionality, non-discrimination, precaution, and
accountability. These instruments, and in particular the provisions regarding the use of
force in relation to the right to life and physical integrity, are generally considered
authoritative.41 States must investigate the use of lethal force by their agents. 42

(d) Responsibility
47. States are the primary duty holders of international human rights obligations,
whether assumed through ratification of human rights treaties or acquired by virtue of
applicable international customary law. States can be held responsible for human rights
violations committed by their organs (for example, legislative or executive branch) or by
their agents (for example, civil servants, the police, the army).43 States have the duty to
respect, protect and fulfil human rights. The duty to respect means that States themselves
must refrain from interfering with or curtailing the enjoyment of human rights, including
through their servants or agents. Under the duty to protect, States must actively ensure that
persons within their jurisdiction do not suffer from human rights abuse committed by
others. The obligation to fulfil means that States must take action to facilitate and enhance
the enjoyment of human rights. This has been understood to include not only the adoption
of appropriate laws, but also “judicial, administrative and educative and other appropriate
measures”.44
48. Inherent in these duties is a State’s obligation to ensure that individuals have
accessible and effective remedies.45 States have a duty to investigate and prosecute gross
violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international
humanitarian law, in particular those that amount to crimes under international law (in
particular war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide), and to provide an effective
remedy. States’ investigations into allegations must be carried out by independent and
impartial bodies and be prompt, thorough and effective. 46
49. The Mission concurs with the view that, in addition to the State, some non-State
actors have human rights obligations under customary international law, in particular when
they exercise effective control over territory and carry out government-like functions. They
are obliged to respect human rights norms when their conduct affects the human rights of
the individuals under their control.47 This is particularly so for peremptory norms of
international law.

41 See OHCHR and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Resource book on the use of force and
firearms in law enforcement” (New York, United Nations, 2017), p. 7 and references there.
42 See e.g. the United Nations Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal,
Arbitrary and Summary Executions, adopted on 24 May 1989 by the Economic and Social Council
Resolution 1989/65, paras. 9, 10, 17.
43 See chapter IX, Responsibility.
44 For an overview of these concepts, see F. Mégret, “Nature of Obligations”, in International Human
Rights Law (2nd ed.), D. Moeckli, S. Shah and S. Sivakumaran, eds. (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2014), p. 102-103.
45 B. Ramcharan, “The Law-Making Process: From Declaration to Treaty to Custom to Prevention”, in
The Oxford Handbook on International Human Rights Law, D. Shelton ed. (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2013), p. 512.
46 See chapter X, Impunity and accountability.
47 E.g. A/HRC/8/17, para. 9; A/HRC/10/22, para. 22; A/HRC/12/48, para. 305. See also e.g. United
Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, “General recommendation
No. 28 on the core obligations of States parties under article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women” (CEDAW/C/GC/28), para. 11: “Under international
human rights law, although non-State actors cannot become parties to the Convention, the
Committee notes that, under certain circumstances, in particular where an armed group with an
identifiable political structure exercises significant control over territory and population, non -State
actors are obliged to respect international human rights.”

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2. International humanitarian law

50. International humanitarian law is the body of law that regulates the conduct of
parties to an armed conflict. In situations of armed conflict, it applies concurrently with
international human rights law. Several non-international armed conflicts existed in
Myanmar during the period under review.
51. A non-international armed conflict exists “whenever there is protracted armed
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such
groups within a State”.48 This definition is widely accepted and is understood to encompass
two cumulative criteria, which distinguish a non-international armed conflict from internal
tensions or disturbances: the intensity of the armed violence and the level of organization of
the armed group(s) involved. Assessing whether these criteria are met in a particular
situation is a factual matter to be decided on a case-by-case basis. In their jurisprudence, the
United Nations ad hoc international tribunals have, for each of the two criteria, articulated a
number of indicators.49

(a) Kachin and Shan States

52. The Mission is satisfied that these two criteria are fulfilled for the conflicts between
the Government forces, on the one hand, and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the
Shan State Army – South (SSA-S),50 the Shan State Army – North (SSA-N),51 the Ta’ang
National Liberation Army (TNLA), 52 the Arakan Army (AA), and the Myanmar National
Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), on the other hand. This was the case for the period
under review in this report.
53. These non-State armed groups, in Myanmar referred to as “ethnic armed
organizations”,53 are long-established and, although they each have their own
characteristics, they all have a clear leadership and command structure; headquarters;
regular recruitment efforts and training; uniforms; a demonstrated ability to procure arms;
an ability to plan, coordinate and carry out military operations (jointly 54 or separately); and
an ability to exercise some level of territorial control in their respective operational areas.
These elements all confirm a level of organization sufficient to consider them party to an
armed conflict. The hostilities between each of these groups and the Government forces

48 ICTY, Prosecutor v Tadic, IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal
on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 70.
49 Indicators relevant to an assessment of the intensity of violence include, for example, the number of
incidents and the level, length and duration of the violence; the deaths, injuries, and damage caused
by the violence; the geographical spread of the violence; the mobilization of individuals and the
distribution of weapons to them; the weapons used by the parties; the conclusion of ceasefire and
peace agreements; and the involvement of third parties, whether the UN Security Council or other
outside entities. indicators that may assist in assessing the requisite level of organization of the armed
group have been grouped into those that indicate a command structure; that suggest that the group can
carry out organized military operations; that indicate logistical ability; that relate to the
implementation of obligations of international humanitarian law; and that demonstrate the ability to
speak with a unified voice.49 Specific indicators include the existence of an official command
structure; headquarters; uniforms; discrete roles and responsibilities of differing entities; the modes of
communication used; whether military training is afforded to members of the group; external relations
such as negotiations with third parties; the ability to operate within designated zones; control of
territory; procure, transport and distribute arms; recruit new members; ability to co-ordinate actions;
and the existence of internal regulations and disciplinary procedures. See S. Sivukumaran, “The Law
of Non-International Armed Conflict” (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 167-172.
50 Armed wing of the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS).
51 Armed wing of the Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP).
52 Armed wing of the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF).
53 This report uses the term “ethnic armed organization” when referring to non-State armed groups
operating in northern Myanmar (Kachin and Shan States) in opposition to the Government. The term
“non-State armed group” ordinarily refers to such organizations, as well as other armed actors
operating in these and other states (e.g. militia groups, or ARSA in Rakhine State).
54 E.g. the KIA, AA, TNLA and MNDAA have formed the “Northern Alliance”, which has engaged in
joint operations against the Myanmar military.

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have also reached the required level of intensity: clashes have occurred at regular intervals
over a long period of time; have involved the use of heavy weaponry and landmines, as
well as military aircraft, attack helicopters and heavy artillery; are often marked by
extensive destruction of property and displacement, resulting in casualties; and lead to
shifting frontlines and control over territory.
54. The Mission is also satisfied that the violence between the SSA-S/RCSS and the
TNLA amounts to a separate non-international armed conflict, since at least November
2015.

(b) Rakhine State

55. A more difficult question was whether the violence in Rakhine State, involving the
Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) 55 and the Myanmar government forces,
amounted to a non-international armed conflict at any point in time. ARSA is commonly
regarded as a poorly armed and poorly trained group, with a small number of partly trained
members but principally relying on untrained villagers to conduct attacks with sticks and
knives. In comparison with the long-standing and well-armed non-State armed groups
active in northern Myanmar, ARSA’s level of organization and military capacity appears
more limited.
56. However, the situation must be assessed on the facts, based on the information that
emerged during the Mission’s fact-finding work.56 The Mission considered the following
elements as pointing at a certain level of organization within ARSA: a command structure
allowing instructions to pass from decision makers to members and supporters at ground
level, who complied with them; an ability to coordinate between an operational group in
Rakhine State and groups based abroad; an ability to stage coordinated or simultaneous
attacks across different locations in a tightly-controlled environment; an ability to mobilise
widely among the Rohingya community at the time of attacks; the organization of village
cells according to different roles and responsibilities; an ability to provide at least a core
group of members with some military training and others with basic defence training, albeit
limited; an ability to obtain some firearms and produce some improvised explosive devices
and other hand-made weapons; an ability to articulate and communicate its positions and
demands in a seemingly unified manner; and at least a stated willingness to abide by
international law. On the other hand, the Mission also found elements that point towards the
opposite view, chiefly ARSA’s apparent inability to raise significant funds and to procure
and distribute firearms or other weaponry, and an overwhelming majority of those who
participated in the attacks not having had any meaningful military training.
57. On balance, considering that international jurisprudence and legal scholarship
emphasize that “some degree of organization will suffice” and that the requisite level of
organization “should not be exaggerated”,57 the Mission considered that ARSA meets the
requisite threshold of organization. The main factor that swayed the Mission was ARSA’s
ability to stage up to 30 coordinated attacks on Government security posts in August 2017
(although some of these attacks were very limited in scale) in a tightly controlled
environment and despite the earlier “clearance operations” of the Myanmar security
operations following the October 2016 ARSA attacks.
58. The second criterion, the intensity of the violence, cannot be in doubt, especially
since August 2017. The number of incidents, the geographic spread of the violence, the
military equipment and weaponry brought in and used during the operations, the duration of
the security operations, the number of casualties and injuries, and the extent of the
destruction caused, are of a nature and scale that cannot be regarded as a mere internal
disturbance. The question of whether the use of such tactics by the Myanmar security forces

55 The name “ARSA” came into existence only later, but is used for ease of reference.
56 See chapter V, section D.1.c. Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, for a full overview of ARSA based
on the information obtained by the Mission.
57 See S. Sivukumaran, “The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict” (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2012), p. 170 and the references listed there. E.g. ICTY, Prosecutor v Limaj et al., IT-03-66-T,
Judgment, 30 November 2005, para. 89.

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was warranted, appropriate and commensurate with the threat faced is valid, and will be
discussed in this report, but has no bearing on the factual determination of the intensity of
the violence itself. In this regard, the Mission also notes that ARSA was involved in
multiple attacks on Myanmar security posts, as well as in the killing of informants and the
burning of at least one village. 58
59. The Mission therefore has reasonable grounds to consider that the conflict between
the Myanmar government forces and ARSA amounts to a non-international armed conflict
at least since 25 August 2017.59 The Mission consequently examined the use of force in the
context of the August 2017 attacks and the resulting allegations of human rights violations
and abuses in light not only of the relevant rules of international human rights law but also
of international humanitarian law.

(c) Applicable rules of international humanitarian law

60. Myanmar is a party to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. 60 It is also a
party to the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons 61, the 1993
Convention prohibiting Chemical Weapons62, as well as to the Hague Convention and
Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property. 63 Additionally, all parties to non-
international armed conflicts in Myanmar are bound by the relevant rules of customary
international law applicable in such conflicts.
61. Of particular relevance is common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. This article
contains protections for civilians and other persons not taking direct part in hostilities. It
obliges all parties to respect, as a minimum, that persons taking no active part in hostilities
shall be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction. It prohibits violence to life and
person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture, taking of
hostages, outrages upon personal dignity as well as the passing of sentences and the
carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly
constituted court, respecting the generally recognized principles of fair trial and due
process. Furthermore, parties to armed conflicts must, at all times, abide by the principles
of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack. 64 This means that parties must
distinguish between civilian persons and objects, on the one hand, and lawful military
targets, on the other.65 Attacks are prohibited where they are expected to cause incidental
loss of life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 66
Parties must also take all feasible precautionary measures to avoid, and in any event to
minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. 67
62. Myanmar is responsible for all violations of international humanitarian law
committed by its armed forces or those acting under its direction or control.68

58 See chapter V, section D.1.c. Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army.

59 The Mission notes that this conclusion is in line with public statements made by the International
Committee of the Red Cross. See e.g. “Rakhine: Returns must be safe, dignified and voluntary -
Speech by the ICRC President at the Shangri-La Dialogue”, Singapore, 2 June 2018.
60 Since 25 August 1992. Myanmar has not ratified the Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva
Conventions.
61 Since 1 December 2014.
62 Since 8 July 2015.
63 Since 10 February 1956.
64 See J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, “Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume I:
Rules” (Cambridge, ICRC/Cambridge University Press, 2005), rules 1-24. (hereafter
ICRC/Customary IHL”).
65 Ibid. rule 7.
66 Ibid. rule 14.
67 Ibid. rules 15-24.
68 Ibid. rule. 149; International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility (General Assembly
resolution 56/83), art. 8.

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3. International criminal law

63. In its efforts to appropriately characterize the human rights violations and abuses it
established, the Mission has had regard to international criminal law. This body of law
governs the situations in which individuals can be held individually criminally responsible
for gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international
humanitarian law that amount to crimes under international law. The principal crimes
considered by the Mission were genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. In
doing so, the Mission referred to the definitions of these crimes in the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court and customary international law, as well as the interpretation of these
definitions in the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals. 69
64. As mentioned above, the prohibitions of genocide, crimes against humanity and war
crimes amount to peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens), meaning that no
derogation from the rule is allowed. The recognition of a crime under international law as
jus cogens gives rise to a duty of the State to prosecute and punish perpetrators, the non-
applicability of statutes of limitation for such crimes, and the universality of jurisdiction
over such crimes regardless of where they were committed, by whom, or against whom. 70
Moreover, under various sources of international law and under United Nations policy,
amnesties are impermissible if they prevent prosecution of individuals who may be
criminally responsible for war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity or other gross
violations of human rights. 71

4. Domestic law
65. Where relevant, the Mission also considered human rights guarantees under
Myanmar’s domestic law, in particular the 2008 Constitution and the Penal Code, and the
extent to which these are in line with international human rights norms and standards.

(a) Constitutions of the Union of the Republic of Myanmar of 2008

66. The 2008 Constitution of Myanmar, in its Chapter VIII (“Citizen, Fundamental
Rights and Duties of the Citizens”), guarantees a number of human rights, including the
right to equality and non-discrimination, the right to life, freedom of expression, freedom of
peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of movement, the right to privacy, the
right to education, the right to health care, and the prohibition of slavery and forced labour.
These constitutional human rights provisions are problematic for at least two reasons: most
are reserved for “citizens” only, and several are accompanied by broad and often
impermissible qualifications or limitations. In addition some fundamental human rights are
absent from the list (for example, the prohibition of torture).
67. Section 21 of the Constitution provides that “every citizen” shall enjoy the rights to
equality, liberty and justice. Section 348 further elaborates that the Union “shall not
discriminate any citizen of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar based on race, birth,
religion, official position, status, culture, sex and wealth”. Other examples of rights limited
to “citizens” are the rights to freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of
peaceful assembly and association, freedom of movement, privacy, education and health
care.72 In light of the arbitrary deprivation of nationality of a large segment of the
population (in particular the Rohingya), resulting in their de facto statelessness,73 these

69 See chapter VIII. Crimes under international law.

70 E.g. M.C. Bassiouni, “International Crimes: Jus cogens and obligatio erga omnes”, Law and
Contemporary Problems, vol. 59(4), 1996, p. 66.
71 See e.g. OHCHR, Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Amnesties (New York and Geneva,
United Nations, 2009), p. 11.
72 Constitution of Myanmar, sections 34, 354, 355, 357, 366 and 367.
73 See chapter V, section B.1. Denial of legal status and identity.

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constitutional provisions exclude large segments of the population from basic human rights
protection.74
68. The Mission recalls that every person, by virtue of their humanity, is entitled to
enjoy all human rights. Under international human rights law, the State is – as a matter of
principle – under an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of all persons
within its territory or under its jurisdiction, without discrimination. Distinctions between
citizens and non-citizens can only be made if they serve a legitimate State objective and are
proportional to the achievement of that objective.75 States may, for example, narrowly draw
a distinction with respect to political rights (such as the right to vote or stand for election)
and freedom of movement (limited to those who are “lawfully within the territory of a
State”).76 Any other distinction between citizens and non-citizens is in violation of
international human rights law.77 Importantly, any limitation to the enjoyment of human
rights to nationals must meet stringent conditions to comply with the principle of non-
discrimination.78 The denial of human rights cannot be based on an arbitrary deprivation of
nationality.
69. Second, the Constitution of Myanmar includes significant limitations on several
fundamental rights, often on vague or impermissible grounds. Section 34, for example,
provides for the freedom of religion for every “citizen” (freedom of conscience and the
right to freely profess and practise religion), but subjects this to “public order, morality or
health and to the other provisions of this Constitution”. Section 360(b) then expressly states
that the freedom of religious practice shall not prevent the State from “enacting law for the
purpose of public welfare and reform”. Similarly, the freedoms of expression, peaceful
assembly and association are guaranteed for every “citizen” but only if “not contrary to the
laws, enacted for Union security, prevalence of law and order, community peace and
tranquillity or public order and morality”79 and artistic expression is guaranteed if “not
detrimental to national solidarity”. 80 Whereas international human rights law permits
limitations on certain human rights, they must be determined by law, be necessary in a
democratic society and meet the strict tests of necessity and proportionality. Broad and
vague terms such as “public welfare and reform”, “tranquillity” and “solidarity” open the
door for abuse.

(b) Penal Code

70. Myanmar’s Penal Code criminalizes certain acts that could constitute violations or
abuses of human rights. Such provisions include those concerning homicide and murder
(section 299 and following), torture (section 330-331), rape (section 375 and following),
kidnapping, abduction, slavery, and forced labour (section 359 and following), and the
defiling of places of worship (section 299 and following). However, the Penal Code dates
from 1891 and has seen minimal amendments since then. Several of its provisions are too
narrow and inconsistent with international norms and standards81, and others are too broad
and used oppressively.

74 Note, however, section 347 of the Constitution, which provides that the Union “shall guarantee any
person to enjoy equal rights before the law and shall equally provide legal protection”, which appears
in contradiction with the provisions limiting certain rights to citizens (emphasis added).
75 D. Weissbrodt, The Human Rights of Non-Citizens (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 45
(and references there); OHCHR, The Rights of Non-Citizens (New York and Geneva, United Nations,
2006), p. 7.
76 See ICCPR, arts. 12(1) and 25.
77 See also A/HRC/19/43 and E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23
78 See A/HRC/19/43, para. 4; United Nations Human Rights Committee, “CCPR General Comment No.
15: The Position of Aliens Under the Covenant”, paras. 2 and 7.
79 Constitution of Myanmar, Section 354.
80 Constitution of Myanmar, Section 365.
81 E.g. on rape/sexual violence and on torture and ill-treatment. See Chapter X. Impunity and
accountability.

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III. Context

A. Military domination in politics

1. History of military rule

71. Myanmar’s political history has been heavily dominated by an all-powerful military,
known as the Myanmar “Tatmadaw”, which has ruled the country for most of its existence.
Myanmar (then still Burma) was already under heavy military influence during the 1950s
but it was a parliamentary democracy until the military coup of General Ne Win in 1962.
General Ne Win argued that a military take-over was necessary to protect the territorial
integrity of the country. Insurgencies from “ethnic armed organizations” 82 had flared soon
after independence and were “in protest against the centralising and Burmanising
tendencies of the Union government, the heavy-handedness of the army, and Prime
Minister U Nu’s persistent promotion of Buddhism as the state religion”. 83 The Tatmadaw
has used the alleged “ethnic” threat to national sovereignty and territorial integrity as the
excuse for its control of the country ever since.
72. When the “Union Revolutionary Council”, chaired by Ne Win, took power, it was
solely comprised of members of the armed forces and sought to transform Myanmar into a
self-sustaining socialist state. It suspended the 1947 Constitution. The regime placed
significant restrictions on political and union activities, suppressing demonstrations through
military force and arresting political opponents. It also used military force to attempt to
suppress “ethnic” insurgencies.
73. By 1988, there was increasing resentment towards Ne Win’s regime, exacerbated by
widespread human rights violations, high levels of corruption and economic
mismanagement. Widespread anti-regime protests took place between March and
September 1988, predominantly led by students calling for an end to one-party rule.
Military force was used to suppress the demonstrations throughout Myanmar, resulting in
thousands of deaths. Ultimately, these protests led Ne Win to resign as leader of the Burma
Socialist Programme Party, the Tatmadaw’s vehicle for governing, on 23 July 1988. The
sitting President, San Yu, also resigned. A general strike across much of Burma, beginning
on 8 August 1988, was accompanied by further significant protests attended by hundreds of
thousands of people. This became known as the 8888 Uprising. Riot police fired upon
protestors, killing and wounding thousands. On 18 September 1988, the military, under the
command of General Saw Maung, replaced the old military regime with a new one. It
established the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and seized control of
government operations.84
74. With a view to establishing a multi-party system, the SLORC briefly allowed the
registration of political parties. Parties registering included the National League for
Democracy (NLD), headed by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of Major General
Aung San, the Burmese independence leader and founder of the Tatmadaw, who was
assassinated in 1947, shortly before independence. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi had come to
prominence during the 8888 Uprising. However, in 1989, the authorities placed her under
house arrest. In the general election of 27 May 1990, the NLD won 60 per cent of the
popular vote and, under the electoral system in place, 80 per cent of parliamentary seats. 85

82 “Ethnic armed organizations” is a term used in Myanmar to refer to non-State armed groups operating
predominantly in northern and eastern Myanmar that maintain political opposition to the State. For
example, the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement of 2015 is “between the Government of the Republic
of the Union of Myanmar and the ethnic armed organizations”. This report will use the term as such.
83 D.C. Williams, “A second Panglong Agreement: Burmese Federalism for the Twenty–first Century”
in Constitutionalism and Legal Change in Myanmar, A. Harding, K.K. Oo, eds. (Oxford and
Portland, Hart Publishing, 2017), p. 61
84 D. Steinberg, Myanmar: The Anomalies Of Politics And Economics, The Asia Foundation Working
Paper Series - Working Paper #5 (1997).
85 J. Badgley and I. Holliday, “Democracy” in Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Myanmar, A.
Simpson, N. Farrelly, I. Holliday eds. (London and New York, Routledge, 2018), p. 38.

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The SLORC refused to recognise the result and maintained governmental control, refusing
to allow the legislature to assemble. Those who had been elected to parliament either were
arrested and imprisoned or fled. The 1990s remained a period of tight military control
where political dissent was stifled. Throughout the 1990s, Western nations imposed
increasingly strong sanctions against Myanmar. In 1997, the military junta changed its
name from SLORC to State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).
75. Following a sharp rise in the cost of basic commodities, at the end of 2006, and the
removal of oil and gas subsidies in August 2007, widespread protests occurred in urban
areas throughout Myanmar.86 Buddhist monks played a prominent role, leading to
international media referring to the protests as the “Saffron Revolution”. The SPDC used
lethal force to disperse the largely peaceful protests, garnering international
condemnation.87
76. In February 2008, the Government published a proposed new Constitution and
announced that it would be subject to a referendum on 10 May 2008. The process had
begun in 2004 after a national convention was convened to work on a draft under Prime
Minister General Khin Nyunt’s “Roadmap to Democracy”. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
remained under house arrest and the NLD refused to participate in the national convention.
Days before the referendum on the draft, on 2 May 2008, Cyclone Nargis made landfall in
Myanmar, causing significant destruction in the Ayeyarwady Region and killing an
estimated 138,000 people. The SPDC went ahead with the referendum nonetheless and
claimed that more than 90 per cent of the voters had approved the draft constitution. 88 A
key point of contention concerning the draft was the continued role of the military in the
political process. The draft also provided that the President of Myanmar could not be the
spouse or parent of a foreign national, a provision designed to exclude Daw Aung Sang Suu
Kyi. The NLD alleged that State authorities had frustrated their efforts to campaign against
the draft constitution. It rejected the alleged results, noting significant voting
irregularities.89
77. The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won the 2010
general election, which was boycotted by the NLD and other pro-democracy parties,
objecting to what were perceived as unfair electoral laws. Retired General Thein Sein, the
leader of the USDP, became President, taking over from Than Shwe who had led the junta
since 1992.
78. At the national level, the Thein Sein Government implemented a number of
important reforms, including freeing most political prisoners, relaxing censorship and
restrictions on the media, and permitting greater political and labour union activity,
including in relation to freedom of assembly and of association. NLD leader Aung San Suu
Kyi was released from house arrest shortly after the 2010 elections. After negotiations
between President Thein Sein and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the NLD contested
parliamentary by-elections and won parliamentary seats in April 2012. Daw Aung San Suu
Kyi entered parliament as leader of the new NLD group. As a result of the liberalisation,
2011 and 2012 also saw the relaxation of sanctions by Western States and increased foreign
investment. In 2014, efforts to amend the constitution to allow Daw Suu to become
President and to reduce the role of the military in governing the country were unsuccessful.
79. The significant increase in foreign investment, which more than tripled from USD
901 million in 2010 to USD 3.2 billion in 201690, and the significant levels of foreign aid
allocated to Myanmar, with some USD 13.7 billion committed to new projects between
2011 and 2015 (not including Chinese assistance), demonstrate the high level of

86 J. Head, “The hardship that sparked Burma’s unrest” (BBC News, 2 October 2007).
87 A/HRC/6/14, paras. 27-28, 30, 38.
88 A/HRC/8/12, para. 15.
89 A/HRC/8/12, para. 24.
90 World Bank, World Development Indicators database, Myanmar
(http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/reportwidget.aspx?Report_Name=CountryProfile&
Id=b450fd57&tbar=y&dd=y&inf=n&zm=n&country=MMR)

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international goodwill toward Myanmar following its initial steps toward democratization. 91
This contributed to Myanmar’s economic growth rates of approximately 7 per cent per
annum since 2015.

2. The role of the military in government after the 2015 elections

80. In the November 2015 general election, the NLD won a sweeping victory, claiming
86 per cent of the non-military seats in the Assembly of the Union (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw),
which is effectively about 60 per cent of the total number of seats. On 10 March 2016, U
Htin Kyaw and U Henry Van Thio, the chosen candidates of the NLD, became President
and Second Vice-President respectively. The military’s candidate, Myint Swe, became First
Vice-President. In March 2018, U Htin Kyaw resigned from the position of President. He
was replaced by U Win Myint on 30 March 2018. Constitutionally barred from the position
of President, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was appointed to the position of State Counsellor,
created for her, on 6 April 2016, and acts as the de facto head of the country. The powers of
the State Counsellor are not clearly delineated in the law establishing the position. 92 The
State Counsellor herself told a news conference just prior to the 2015 elections that, “if we
win and the NLD forms a government, I will be above the president. It’s a very simple
message.”93 She has enjoyed overwhelming popular support and moral authority and an
absolute majority in both houses of parliament.
81. Despite the elections and the NLD being in power, the Government remains a quasi-
civilian one at best. The 2008 Constitution was designed by the military to retain its
dominant role in politics and governance. It instituted a system of government with military
and civilian components. Under the Constitution, 25 per cent of the seats in each house of
parliament and in the state and regional assemblies belong to unelected members of the
military, who are appointed by the Tatmadaw. 94 This is significant because the Constitution
requires 75 per cent of votes in both houses of parliament for a constitutional amendment to
be adopted, giving the Tatmadaw, through its appointed members of parliament, effective
veto power. Furthermore, Parliament elects the President from among three proposed
candidates, one nominated by each legislative body and the third by the military appointed
members of parliament. This effectively guarantees the Tatmadaw at least one vice-
presidential position. Additionally, the Tatmadaw selects candidates for (and effectively
controls) three key ministerial posts: Defence, Border Affairs and Home Affairs. This is
sufficient to control the National Defence and Security Council and the entire security
apparatus.
82. The Commander-in-Chief of the Tatmadaw, Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing, is
the Supreme Commander of all armed forces in Myanmar. 95 This deviates from the practice
in most constitutional systems, where the head of state is usually the Supreme Commander
to whom the highest-ranking military officers and institutions are subordinated. The
Constitution also stipulates that the Tatmadaw has the “right to independently administer
and adjudicate all affairs of the armed forces”, 96 effectively removing it from any civilian
oversight or control.
83. Current or former military officers occupy positions of authority across all branches
of government, within the civil service and the judiciary, and in many State-owned
enterprises.97 This is notably so in the powerful General Administration Department

91 The Asia Foundation, The contested areas of Myanmar – Subnational Conflict, Aid, and Development
(2017).
92 The Republic of the Union of Myanmar – President Office, “President signs State Counsellor Bill into
law” (6 April 2016). Copy of the State Counsellor Bill on file with the Mission.
93 A. Marshall, T. Mclaughlin, “Myanmar’s Suu Kyi says will be above president in new government”
(Reuters, 5 November 2015).
94 Constitution of Myanmar, s. 109(b), 141(b) and 161(d).
95 Constitution of Myanmar, s. 20(c).
96 Constitution of Myanmar, s. 20(b).
97 The major productive sectors are dominated by over 30 State-Owned Enterprises, which are headed
by senior members of the military or people closely affiliated with them. They operate in many
sectors, from transport to textiles and banking to natural resources. Also, Myanmar holds significant

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(GAD), which runs the civil service for state and regional governments and is often the
first, sometimes only, contact people have with government officials or agencies. 98 The
GAD is responsible for many basic administrative tasks, including registration of births,
deaths and marriage, land and property ownership issues and other registration issues, such
as livestock. Significantly, it is also responsible for the collection of taxes. The GAD falls
under the Ministry of Home Affairs, one of the three ministries controlled by the
Tatmadaw.

B. Ethnic and religious diversity

1. Ethnic diversity and insurgencies

84. The territory of present-day Myanmar is inhabited by a large number of groups with
various ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious backgrounds. The largest group are the
Bamar, who are believed to comprise 60 to 70 per cent of the total population. 99 They are
predominantly Buddhist and most live in the central lowlands of the country. Many other
ethnic groups, with their distinct cultures, languages, traditions and sometimes religions,
live mainly in the peripheral areas, near the borders with Bangladesh, China, India and
Thailand. Before Burma gained independence, General Aung San and a number of ethnic
leaders agreed, at the Panglong Conference in 1947, on a constitutional framework that
recognised the distinctive identities of minorities and granted them a high degree of
autonomy. The Panglong Agreement has never been implemented.
85. Several of these groups hold deep-rooted grievances, struggling for greater
autonomy and an equitable sharing of natural resources. Since independence, the incessant
ethnically based armed conflicts have been used by the Tatmadaw to justify its power,
presenting itself as the guarantor of national unity. While successive Governments have
made overtures towards negotiated peace agreements, hostilities have continued, in recent
years predominantly in Kachin and Shan States. These conflicts indicate that the nation-
building efforts of the military have failed: 100 there is no unifying “Myanmar” national
identity, resentment against Bamar-Buddhist domination has grown, and the Tatmadaw has
failed to end the insurgencies by military or negotiated means. Notably, under military rule,
the concept of “national races” has gradually become the key criterion for membership in
the country’s political community, 101 creating a common “other”. The military regime has
constructed eight major ethnic groups (Kachin, Kayah, Karen, Chin, Bamar, Mon, Rakhine
and Shan), broken down further into 135 “national races”. There is no scientific basis for
this division, which contains both gaps and overlaps. The arbitrary list defines those who
“belong” in Myanmar; all others, regardless of how many generations they have lived in

amounts of natural resources. It is, for example, the world’s single largest source of jade. It has been
alleged that since the 1990s, the then small-scale industry has been transformed by the military’s
moves to grant the right to operate jade mines to government-approved companies who are allegedly
owned and operated by the military itself, by individuals that hold senior positions in the military, by
armed groups with whom ceasefires have been concluded, or by other officially licensed enterprises.
See: National Resource Governance Institute, State-Owned Economic Enterprise Reform in
Myanmar: the Case of Natural Resource Enterprises (2018); Global Witness, Jade: Myanmar’s Big
State Secret (2015).
98 See Kyi Pyar Chit Saw, M. Arnold, Administering the State in Myanmar – An overview of the
General Administration Department (Myanmar Development Resource Institute's Centre for
Economic and Social Development & The Asia Foundation, 2014).
99 See 2014 Population and Housing Census of Myanmar (available at
http://myanmar.unfpa.org/en/publications/2014-population-and-housing-census-myanmar-data-sheet).
100 M. Walton, “Nation-Building” in Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Myanmar, A. Simpson, N.
Farrelly, I. Holliday eds. (London and New York, Routledge, 2018), pp. 393-403.
101 N. Cheesman, “How in Myanmar ‘National Races’ Came to Surpass Citizenship and Exclude
Rohingya”, Journal of Contemporary Asia (2017), 47:3, pp. 461-483.

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Myanmar, are considered outsiders or immigrants. This includes the Rohingya. According
to the Tatmadaw, “Despite living among peacocks, crows cannot become peacocks”.102
86. Since 2016, the NLD-Government has led a peace process, the “Union Peace
Conference-21st Century Panglong”; sessions have been held in August 2016, May 2017
and July 2018. In the run up to the third session in July 2018, the United Nations Special
Rapporteur on Myanmar expressed concern that “the peace process appears to be losing its
momentum”, with “ethnic armed organizations” pointing to a failure by the Government
and the Tatmadaw to take steps to earn the trust of stakeholders,103 and through their
blocking of internal consultations by parties to the Conference. 104 Nevertheless, all
members of the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee, who had
previously not been invited, were invited to and attended the third session of the
Conference. This has been identified as a positive development. 105

2. Place of Buddhism in society

87. According to the 2014 census, 87.9 per cent of the population of Myanmar is
Buddhist, 6.2 per cent Christian and 4.3 per cent Muslim. 106 While the Bamar are
predominantly Buddhist, many other ethnic groups contain large numbers of non-
Buddhists. The 2008 Constitution recognizes the “special position” of Buddhism in
Myanmar, while acknowledging other religions. 107
88. Buddhism and the Buddhist monkhood have and retain a central place in Myanmar
society and are a driving force within the politics of Myanmar. The monkhood has acted as
a counterpoint where the State is perceived to act against the interests of its people. This is
exemplified in the role of the Sangha108 in opposing colonial rule and, more recently,
military rule.
89. Since reforms began in 2011, a vocal component of the monkhood has perceived
threats to Buddhist culture and responded through increased nationalist and anti-Muslim
rhetoric. Myanmar has witnessed episodes of violence between Buddhists and Muslims
across the country, although mainly in Rakhine State. The 969 Movement, led by vocal
Buddhist monks, was especially forthright in establishing a narrative in which Muslims
sought to “take over” Myanmar through the marriage and conversion of Buddhist women.
Perceptions around illegal immigration from Bangladesh and the dominance of local capital
by Muslims have also been identified as concerns, notwithstanding that the Muslim
population in Myanmar as whole is estimated only at around 4 per cent, and has not
drastically increased in recent decades.109

102 Tatmadaw, Directorate of the Public Relations and Psychological Warfare, “Myanmar Politics and the
Tatmadaw” (2018), p. 115. Hard copy on file with the Mission.
103 A/HRC/37/70, para. 40.
104 Ibid.
105 L. Weng, “All Members of Northern Alliance Invited to Attend Panglong Peace Conference” (The
Irrawaddy, 4 July 2018). Previously, only those groups with ceasefire agreements in place had been
invited to participate.
106 According to the 2014 Population and Housing Census, the first census undertaken in Myanmar in
three decades, the total population of Myanmar is approximately 51.5 million. The census was
controversial as it only allowed participants to identify as belonging to one of 135 officially
recognised ethnic groups (under eight major ethnic races: Kachin, Kayah, Karen, Chin, Bamar, Mon,
Rakhine and Shan) or as “other”. It did not include “Rohingya” and participants were not allowed to
self-identify as such. This led to a significant part of the population in Rakhine State not participating
in the count. Widespread fears that the release of data on the ethnic and religious composition of the
population would lead to violence, initially led the Government to release the outcome of the census
without data on ethnicity and religion. See International Crisis Group, Update Briefing: Counting the
Costs: Myanmar’s Problematic Census (2014).
107 Constitution of Myanmar, s. 361-362.
108 Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee (MaHaNa) is the Government-appointed body that regulates the
Myanmar Buddhist clergy.
109 In 2016, the Government released the census data related to religion. It showed that Buddhism
remained the main religion in the country, with 87.9 per cent of the participants identifying as

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90. In 2013, the Sangha prohibited the 969 Movement based on its unauthorised use of
Buddhist symbolism. While the authority of the 969 group subsequently waned, its
ideology was carried forward, notably through a successor group, the Association for the
Protection of Race and Religion (known also as “MaBaTha”), established in June 2013 and
rising to prominence in January 2014. One of its most prominent and radical leaders is
controversial monk Ashin Wirathu.
91. While international attention focused on the group’s anti-Muslim rhetoric, MaBaTha
developed widespread grassroots support for its activities, promotion of cultural values and
the provision of essential services, including social care, disaster relief, education, legal aid
and dispute resolution at a local level. 110 MaBaTha has thus been perceived to be responsive
to local community needs and concerns.111 Further, the leadership of the MaBaTha is
comprised of popular members of the monkhood.
92. On 23 May 2017, the Sangha issued a statement declaring that MaBaTha was not
formed in accordance with the Sangha Organization Law and the Sangha Organizational
Procedures, that neither the group nor individuals associated with it can use the full
Myanmar language name it was using and that all of the organization’s signboards across
the country had to be taken down.112 On 20 July 2018, the Sangha reportedly banned the
Dhamma Wunthanu Rakkhita Association, the successor of MaBaTha, as well. 113
Regardless of their formal status, the narratives spread by these groups have become
accepted in many circles across Myanmar.

C. History of human rights violations

93. Today, the Tatmadaw enjoys considerable popularity among the Bamar-Buddhist
majority. The violence, particularly the “Rohingya crisis” in Rakhine State, has been used
by the military to reaffirm itself as the protector of a nation under threat and to cement its
political role further. This is remarkable considering its appalling human rights record and
the long struggle of the democracy movement against its rule.
94. During the military dictatorship (1962-2011), Myanmar was considered one of the
most repressive countries in Asia. The main concern of the rulers was to maintain power
and to attain and preserve “national unity in the face of ethnic diversity”. Human rights
were “subordinate to these imperatives”. 114 In 1997, the then United Nations Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar observed that “the absence of
respect for the rights pertaining to democratic governance is at the root of all the major
violations of human rights in Myanmar in so far as this absence implies a structure of
power which is autocratic and accountable only to itself, thus inherently resting on the
denial and repression of fundamental rights”.115 Reports of serious human rights violations
were pervasive, affecting the entire spectrum of civil, political, economic, social and
cultural rights.
95. During Ne Win’s rule (1962-1988), reports of serious human rights issues arose
largely in two contexts: the suppression of critics and the security forces’ operations against
insurgencies in ethnic areas. Types of human rights violations frequently reported included

Buddhist in 2014, compared to 89.4 per cent in 1983. 2.3 per cent of the enumerated population
identified as Muslim, a drop from 3.9 per cent in 1983. However, the census report noted that,
assuming that the entirety of the more than 1 million estimated non-enumerated residents of Rakhine
State were Muslim, the percentage of Muslims would increase to 4.3 per cent. The number of
Christians rose slightly, from 4.9 per cent in 1983 to 6.2 per cent in 2014.
110 International Crisis Group, Buddhism and State Power in Myanmar (2017).
111 M. Walton, “Misunderstanding Myanmar’s Ma Ba Tha” (Asia Times, 9 July 2017).
112 Ibid.
113 The Irrawaddy, “Nationalists Rally in Yangon to Denounce New Ban on Ma Ba Tha” (13 August
2018).
114 C. Renshaw, “Human rights under the new regime”, in Constitutionalism and Legal Change in
Myanmar, A. Harding, K.K. Oo, eds. (Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2017), pp. 215 and 218.
115 E/CN.4/1997/64, para. 102.

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the arbitrary deprivation of life (including through excessive use of force), arbitrary
detention and torture, sexual violence, forced labour, violations of land and housing rights
(including through mass expulsions), and violations of the rights to freedom of expression
and peaceful assembly.
96. Following the violent repression of anti-Government protests in 1988 and the 1990
elections, Myanmar became a country of concern at the United Nations. The General
Assembly adopted its first resolution on the situation in Myanmar in 1991, noting with
concern the “substantive available information indicating a grave human rights situation in
Myanmar”.116 Similar resolutions were adopted most years thereafter. The Commission on
Human Rights created the mandate of Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in
Myanmar in 1992.117 The United Nations Secretary-General appointed a Special Envoy to
Myanmar in 1997. In 2005, the Security Council decided to hold a first, closed-door
briefing on the situation in Myanmar.
97. The four Special Rapporteurs serving between 1992 and 2011 all concluded that the
patterns of human rights violations they had identified were widespread and systematic and
linked to State and military policy. Special Rapporteur Rajsmoor Lallah, in 1998, stated
that human rights violations “have been so numerous and consistent over the past years as
to suggest that they are not simply isolated or the acts of individual misbehavior by middle-
and lower-rank officers but are rather the result of policy at the highest level, entailing
political and legal responsibility”. 118 Special Rapporteur Tomas Ojea Quintana, in 2010,
similarly concluded that, “[g]iven the gross and systematic nature of human rights
violations in Myanmar over a period of many years, and the lack of accountability, there is
an indication that those human rights violations are the result of a State policy that involves
authorities in the executive, military and judiciary at all levels”. He added that “the
possibility exists that some of these human rights violations may entail categories of crimes
against humanity or war crimes”.119 All four Special Rapporteurs also noted serious abuses
committed by non-State armed groups.120
98. The Special Rapporteurs identified the following contexts in which these patterns of
abuse mainly occurred: suppression of calls for democracy and voices critical of the
regime; imposition of oppressive measures towards minority groups; security forces’
responses to (ethnic) insurgencies, often directly targeting and impacting on the civilian
population; the military’s continued presence in ceasefire areas; and the Government and
military’s role in large-scale development projects. Specific types of human rights
violations frequently reported included the arbitrary deprivation of life, torture and inhuman
treatment, forced labour, sexual and gender-based violence, arbitrary arrest and detention,
forced displacement, restrictions on the freedoms of expression and association, and various
oppressive measures directed in particular at ethnic and religious minorities. The impact of
the regime’s policies on the realization of economic and social rights was also frequently
highlighted.
99. The Special Rapporteurs have often highlighted large-scale internal displacement
and significant refugee movements into neighbouring countries, mainly Bangladesh and
Thailand, as a consequence of armed conflict, human rights abuses and lack of protection.
Special Rapporteurs noted that between 1996 and 2010 up to 1 million people had been
displaced, half of them in the eastern part of the country, 121 and – for example – that in
November 2006 the total number of internally displaced persons who had been forced to
leave their homes and had not been able to return or resettle and reintegrate into society was
estimated to be at least 500,000.122 The various Special Rapporteurs identified several main
causes of this displacement: counterinsurgency operations, the practice of forced labour and

116 A/RES/46/132
117 E/CN.4/RES/1992/58
118 A/53/364, para. 59.
119 Ibid., para. 121.
120 E.g. A/65/368, para. 64.
121 See A/HRC/13/48, paras. 61-63; for similar figures, A/HRC/4/14, para. 54.
122 A/HRC/4/14, para. 54.

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portering, restrictions placed on farmers, and land confiscation policies. 123 They
emphasized that the role and conduct of the army was paramount to understanding the
issue.124 In 2010, Special Rapporteur Quintana stated that humanitarian and human rights
groups had documented the destruction and forced relocation of over 3,500 villages and
sites in eastern Myanmar since 1996.125
100. All United Nations Special Rapporteurs who have held the mandate, as well as other
human rights mechanisms, have expressed grave concern at the situation of the Rohingya in
Rakhine State. On 16 October 1992, then Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or
Belief informed the Government that he had received information that “since late 1989, the
Rohingya citizens of Myanmar … have been subjected to persecution based on their
religious beliefs involving extrajudicial executions, torture, arbitrary detention, forced
disappearances, intimidation, gang-rape, forced labour, robbery, setting of fire to homes,
eviction, land confiscation and population resettlement as well as the systematic destruction
of towns and mosques”.126 He noted that approximately 300,000 Rohingya had reportedly
fled to Bangladesh by April 1992, and that a similar campaign in 1978 had also led to a
reported 200,000 Muslims fleeing to Bangladesh. He added that these violations were
alleged to be primarily committed by the armed forces, mentioning also that he had
received numerous reports of security officers confiscating or tearing National Registration
Cards of Muslims. He further stated that, according to his sources, there appeared to be a
government policy of moving non-Muslim Burmese into northern Rakhine State in an
effort to displace the people the Government called “foreigners”, and that Muslims were
said to have been virtually prisoners of their provinces since 1964, not being allowed to
travel even between villages within a single township. 127
101. In 1993, Special Rapporteur Yozo Yokota also reported that his information strongly
indicated that the “Rakhine Muslims” had been singled out for human rights violations,
which had resulted in approximately 250,000 persons being forced to flee into
Bangladesh.128 In nearly all subsequent reports of the United Nations Special Rapporteurs,
the issue was raised as a continuing source of grave concern. In this context, all Special
Rapporteurs assessed that the 1982 Citizenship Law was discriminatory, in violation of
Myanmar’s obligations under international law, and created conditions that promoted
statelessness, in particular for the Muslim population of Rakhine State.129
102. In 2007, Special Rapporteur Sergio Pinheiro, together with five other special
procedures of the Human Rights Council, publicly called on the Government of Myanmar
to take urgent measures “to eliminate discriminatory practices against the returnees in
northern Rakhine State”.130 In 2008, the Special Rapporteur concluded that the Rohingya
were “subject to systematic discrimination and abuse …, especially with regard to the
restriction of movement, arbitrary taxation, forced labour, confiscation, forced eviction and

123 E.g. E/CN.4/1997/64; E/CN.4/1999/35.

124 E/CN.4/1997/64; E/CN.4/1999/35; A/HRC/13/48, para. 61-63.
125 A/HRC/65/368, para. 49; for similar figures, A/61/369, para. 44 and A/HRC/4/14, para. 54.
126 E/CN.4/1993/62.
127 The Government of Myanmar responded that there was no discrimination based on religion, that the
allegations were “fabricated by some big countries and certain foreign news agencies”, that “among
those who fled were mostly poor people who were lured by stories that relief food and goods were
being distributed on the other side” and that “some left because they were threatened by terrorist
insurgents to burn down their houses”, that the issue was one of “illegal immigration” which had also
been the cause of the “outflow of people of Bengali stock back in 1978”, that the “Rohingya do not
exist in Myanmar either historically, politically or legally”, that the Tatmadaw was a “methodically
and systematically organized institution made up of highly trained and disciplined personnel”, and
that the “grotesque allegations made against the Tatmadaw were totally false.” See E/CN.4/1993/62.
128 E/CN.4/1993/3, para. 235.
129 Ibid, para. 226; A/62/223, para. 57. Early on, one of the Special Rapporteurs pointed out that these
discriminatory laws would in the short term produce serious violations of the rights of both minorities
and other persons living in the country as well as a sense of not belonging to Myanmar. In the long
term, he forecast, the situation was likely to encourage and exacerbate secessionist movements likely
to be destructive of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious nation (A/52/484, para. 151).
130 A/62/223, para. 55.

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arbitrary arrest (including harassment and violence by police forces, death in custody and
sexual violence). In addition, people are often harassed (house searches, confiscation of
assets) or beaten by police forces, mainly during controls or at checkpoints. Cases of rape
of young women and children, perpetrated by different police forces, have been
reported.”131 Special Rapporteur Quintana, in 2010, similarly stated that, based on his
assessment of the situation during a mission to northern Rakhine State, he was “deeply
concerned about the systematic and endemic discrimination faced by the … Rohingya” 132,
also specifically noting that the Myanmar authorities had refused to issue birth certificates
to many Muslim children since 1994 which had led to further discrimination. 133 He
identified the “problem of statelessness” as the “root of chronic scourges endured by [this]
population”.134
103. Importantly, for nearly three decades all Special Rapporteurs have stressed that
systemic impunity for human rights violations and abuses was a critical obstacle to the
realization of human rights in Myanmar and had contributed to or compounded recurrent
patterns of violations.135
104. Allegations of serious human rights violations and abuses have continued in the
period since 2011. These are the focus of this report.

IV. Emblematic situation 1: Kachin and Shan States

105. The Mission focused its fact-finding work on three emblematic situations: the
hostilities and other military conduct in Kachin and Shan States and their human rights
impact; the crisis in Rakhine State in all its facets; and infringements on the exercise of
fundamental freedoms. In the context of the latter issue, it also examined the prevalence of
“hate speech”.
106. Since 2011, the decades old conflicts in Kachin and Shan States have escalated, with
episodes of intense fighting between the Tatmadaw and “ethnic armed organizations”
(EAOs), as well as incidents of non-State armed groups fighting each other. In June 2011, a
17-year ceasefire between the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Tatmadaw broke
down. In Shan State, the conflicts have been characterised by a complex patchwork of
armed actors and shifting territorial control. The Mission has amassed information
regarding the conduct of hostilities in the context of several of these conflicts and their
human rights and humanitarian impact on the civilian population. It verified a number of
incidents in the context of these armed conflicts and confirmed consistent patterns of
violations of international law.
107. Despite attempts to sign peace agreements with some of the EAOs since 1961,
several groups have been ostracized from the peace process, and hostilities have continued
even with some parties to the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). The NCA was signed
on 12 October 2015 with eight EAOs. Groups that have not signed include the Kachin
Independence Army (KIA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA),
the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) 136 and the Arakan Army (AA). Among the
groups currently involved in hostilities in Kachin and Shan States, only the Shan State
Army-South (SSA-S)137 signed the NCA but clashes continue between it and the
Tatmadaw, parallel to the peace process. The Shan State Army-North (SSA-N)138 has not
yet signed the NCA. The NLD-Government has led a peace process, the “Union Peace
Conference-21st Century Panglong”; sessions have been held in August 2016, May 2017

131 A/HRC/7/18, para. 78.

132 A/HRC/13/48, para. 86.
133 Ibid., para. 88.
134 A/64/318, para. 72.
135 E,g. reports of Special Rapporteur Sergio Pinheiro, including A/61/369 (para. 27-33), in which he
discussed several manifestations of impunity. Also E/CN.4/1999/35, para. 78; A/62/233, para. 30.
136 Armed wing of the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF).
137 Armed wing of the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS).
138 Armed wing of the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP).

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and July 2018. The Federal Political Negotiation and Consultation Committee (FPNCC) is
currently the most powerful umbrella coalition of EAOs,139 attempting to unite these groups
in their negotiations with the central Government. Progress has been slow.
108. All EAOs operating in Kachin and Shan States share a common opponent, the
Tatmadaw. Most EAOs have forged cooperative links with each other. The AA, the
MNDAA, the KIA and the TNLA collaborate as the Northern Alliance (and are all member
of the FPNCC). The Tatmadaw is fighting with the KIA, TNLA, SSA-S, SSA-N and
MNDAA and with the Northern Alliance. Since November 2015, the SSA-S and the TNLA
have also been fighting each other with the level of intensity rising to a non-international
armed conflict. Various militia groups are also involved in the conflicts, mostly alongside
the Tatmadaw.
109. The populations of Kachin and Shan States comprise various ethnic and religious
minorities.140 Many of these minorities have struggled for decades for greater autonomy and
against what they perceive to be a central government that has favoured Bamar-Buddhists
politically and economically. These grievances have been aggravated by the Tatmadaw’s
historic use of counterinsurgency tactics that directly affected the civilian population. The
Tatmadaw intentionally, frequently and systematically targeted the civilian population
because the Tatmadaw identified all civilians of an ethnic group as members of the EAO of
that particular group or in retaliation for attacks by the EAO against the Tatmadaw.
Villages were cleared and land was burned.
110. The conflicts in Kachin and Shan States are also fuelled by the exploitation of
natural resources; land use and major infrastructure projects; and narcotics trading. Indeed,
many interviewees informed the Mission that the drug trade had “taken over” the region
and that ordinary people were left with few economic opportunities: “either they trade
drugs or engage in war by joining armed groups”.141 Most parties to the conflicts are
involved in illicit economic activity, contributing to insecurity and affecting the human
rights situation, including by the appropriation of civilian land to conduct such activities. 142
111. Many reported violations have been committed within the context of the exploitation
of natural resources or development projects by some parties to the armed conflicts,
predominantly the Tatmadaw. 143 For example, an expert witness mentioned that the
locations of fighting in Kachin State follow the development of a national highway. 144
Other interviewees asserted that the Tatmadaw targeted them because they had witnessed
illegal timber exploitation145 or that they were tortured because the Tatmadaw wanted
information on access to KIA-controlled amber exploitation zones. 146 Victims and
witnesses of hostilities in Tanai Township, Kachin State, in 2017 and 2018 said that the
overall objective of the Tatmadaw operations was to “destroy the KIA’s economy by
appropriating amber and mining resources under their control”. 147
112. Violations against ethnic and religious minorities in northern Myanmar are
committed in a context of severe discrimination on ethnic and religious grounds, often with
persecutory intent. This manifests, for example, in the destruction or ransacking of churches

139 The FPNCC is comprised of seven member-organizations including the six armed groups active in
Shan and Kachin States: AA (United League of Arakan), KIA, MNDAA, TNLA, SSA-N, and the
United Wa State Army (UWSA).
140 The peoples of Shan State include the Shan, Pa-O, Intha, Lahu, Lisu, Taungyo, Danu, Ta’ang, Ahka
and Jinghpaw (Kachin), Shan-Chinese (Han), Shan-Ni and Kokang. The peoples of Kachin State
include the Jinghpaw, Shan, Ruwang, Lisu, Zaiwa, Lawngwaw, Lachyit, Rakhine and Bamar. Many
of the ethnic minority groups have substantial numbers of Christians among their members. Some
groups are predominantly Christian.
141 PI-031, QM-014.
142 PI-022, QI-089, SI-003.
143 PI-013, PI-022, PI-026, PI-032, PI-039, PI-048, PI-054, PI-061, PI-077, PI-103, QI-080.
144 QM-018.
145 PI-039, PI-048.
146 PI-054; see this chapter, section A.8. Emblematic incidents (Tanai).
147 PI-043, PI-049, PI-054; see this chapter, section A.8. Emblematic incidents (Tanai).

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and religious objects during military operations (and sometimes subsequent erecting of
Buddhist pagodas)148 but also in the use of ethnic or religious slurs during the commission
of gross human rights violations149 and in treatment of people as inferior or even “sub-
human”.150 For example, a victim reported, “The Tatmadaw soldiers don’t treat us like
humans, they treat us like animals. They look at us as if we should not even exist. Even
though the name is Kachin State, they don’t think Kachin should be there and exist.” 151
Another victim reported that the Tatmadaw said, “You Kachin people are like our penis”. 152
Several interviewees also reported that they experienced discrimination in the educational
system. They claimed that in government-controlled areas education was provided in
Myanmar language and that they “did not understand much” 153 or that they could hardly
identify or fully participate in the educational curriculum because the teachers did not speak
their language.154 The systemic discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or religion that
underlies the human rights violations identified by the Mission warrants further
investigation.
113. While the Mission focused its work on the situation in Kachin and Shan States, it
also received information on other areas, such as Kayah or Kayin States. For example, the
Mission was able to verify that, on 20 December 2017, Tatmadaw soldiers killed three
Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP)/Karenni Army members and one civilian at a
KNPP checkpoint in Kayah State.155 The Tatmadaw soldiers held the men at the checkpoint
and executed them on the spot. One KNPP member managed to escape and is now in
hiding. The Mission has reasonable grounds to conclude that the victims were unlawfully
killed because they observed the Tatmadaw transporting illegally logged timber. The
human rights situation in Kayah and Kayin States and in other areas, as a consequence of
the presence of Tatmadaw troops and the militarisation of areas, warrants specific
investigation.
114. The continuation of conflict and prevailing insecurity in Kachin and Shan States
provide strong reasons to conclude that the kind of violations and abuses outlined in this
chapter are still occurring, warranting further monitoring and investigation.

A. Patterns of violations committed by Myanmar military and security

forces

1. Conduct of hostilities in flagrant disregard of civilian life and property

115. Since 2011, numerous reports have drawn attention to policies, tactics and conduct
of the Tatmadaw and associated security forces that have resulted in serious violations of
international law committed in the context of their operations in Kachin and Shan States.
These reports invariably point at the devastating impact of military operations on the
civilian population. The Mission is able to confirm patterns of attacks directed by the
Myanmar military against civilians and civilian or other protected objects, as well as
indiscriminate attacks. These have often been carried out in civilian populated residential
areas and in the absence of an apparent military objective justifying the use of these tactics,
in flagrant disregard of life, property and the well-being of the civilian population. Attacks
resulted in the deaths and injuries of civilians. Widespread looting, as well as the
destruction and burning of homes and property, have often accompanied military
operations. The picture that emerges is one of a military that systematically fails to apply
the fundamental international humanitarian law principles of distinction and precaution, and
shows sheer contempt for basic human rights. This conduct was observed in most conflict-

148 PI-032, PI-049, PI-104, SI-003.

149 DI-063, DI-064, DI-066, PI-003, PI-007, PI-004, PI-026, PI-069, QI-090, QI-096.
150 PI-087, QI-094, PI-031, DI-061.
151 QI-094.
152 PI-028.
153 DI-040, PI-040.
154 DI-040, PI-024.
155 K-135, PI-039, PI-048.

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affected areas, especially in or around territory under the control of ethnic armed
organizations, and throughout the period under review.
116. Due to the non-cooperation of the Myanmar authorities, the Mission was unable to
conduct site visits or to hear the Tatmadaw’s version of events. While it would have been
preferable to collect in situ information about some of the military operations and their
broader context, the body of information collected is sufficiently comprehensive, consistent
and credible to enable the Mission to make solid findings.

(a) Legal framework

117. During armed conflict, international humanitarian law applies alongside
international human rights law. The key purpose of international humanitarian law is to
protect the victims of armed conflicts and to regulate hostilities, in an effort to limit the
humanitarian consequences of armed conflicts. 156 It restricts the means and methods of
warfare that parties to a conflict may employ and endeavours to ensure the protection and
humane treatment of persons who are not, or no longer, taking a direct part in the hostilities.
The cornerstone of international humanitarian law is the principle of distinction: the parties
to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants (fighters) and
between civilian objects and military objectives.157 Attacks may therefore only be directed
against combatants (fighters) and never against civilians. A corollary of the principle of
distinction is the duty of parties to the conflict to avoid or, in any event, minimize the
infliction of incidental death, injury and destruction on persons or objects protected against
direct attack. This is the principle of precaution: in the conduct of hostilities “constant care
shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects”.158 This
requirement applies to the attacking party and the party that is attacked. 159 A third cardinal
principle of international humanitarian law is the principle of proportionality. This means
that it is prohibited to launch an attack that may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 160
118. It flows from the above that direct attacks against civilians are absolutely prohibited
and so are acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror
among the civilian population. 161 Indiscriminate attacks are also prohibited. These are
attacks of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without
distinction because: (1) they are not directed at a specific military objective, (2) they
employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military
objective, or (3) they employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be
limited as required by international humanitarian law. 162
119. Violations of these cardinal rules of international humanitarian law may amount to
war crimes. For instance, it is a war crime to make the civilian population or individual
civilians, not taking part in hostilities, the object of an attack. Other war crimes include:
making civilian objects the object of attack; launching an indiscriminate attack resulting in
death or injury of civilians or an attack in the knowledge that it will cause excessive
incidental civilian loss, injury or damage; seizing property of the adverse party not required
by military necessity, and pillage.163

156 N. Melzer, International Humanitarian Law – A Comprehensive Introduction (ICRC, Geneva, 2016),
p. 17.
157 ICRC/Customary IHL, rules 1 and 7.
158 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 15.
159 ICRC/Customary IHL, rules 15 and 22.
160 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 14.
161 ICRC/Customary IHL, rules 1 and 2.
162 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 12.
163 See ICC Statute, art. 8.

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(b) Findings
120. Based on the body of information and material amassed, the Mission concludes that
there is a pattern of Tatmadaw military operations, connected to the armed conflicts in
Kachin and Shan States, that are in violation of the core principles of international
humanitarian law. The following key factual patterns were established.

Attacks directed at the civilian population or civilians, and indiscriminate attacks

121. The Tatmadaw intentionally, frequently and systematically directed attacks against
the civilian population or individual civilians. The Tatmadaw has also systematically
engaged in attacks that were indiscriminate, either because they were not directed against a
specific military objective or because they employed a method or means of combat that
cannot be directed at a specific military objective.
122. A regular and systematic occurrence, for example, is the attacking of villages in
Kachin and Shan States for the apparent sole reason that the residents belong to the same
ethnic group as a particular enemy “ethnic armed organization” and so are considered
members or supporters of that organization simply because of their ethnicity. Villages are
also attacked in retaliation for attacks by such groups against the Tatmadaw. 164 This pattern
is noted across villages and towns in conflict-affected areas. The Mission received
consistent accounts of Tatmadaw soldiers entering villages, going to civilians’ homes, or
gathering men (often including the village administrator) at the centre of the village to
question them on their affiliation with armed groups or the whereabouts of such fighters, or
any other information regarding these groups.165 If villagers did not answer, they were
beaten and/or tied-up, and otherwise ill-treated or tortured.166 For example, a witness gave
the following account of an instance in 2012 when Tatmadaw soldiers entered her village,
Nung Ong, in Mongkaung Township, Shan State:
The Tatmadaw always wanted to gather information on the Shan armed groups. If
villagers did not have any information, the soldiers would tie people up and threaten
them. When they came to our houses, Tatmadaw soldiers would ask “Do you know
anything about the Shan army? If you do not answer, we will kill you!” I saw this
happen with my neighbours. Soldiers used a rope to hit my neighbours and they tied
up their hands while pointing their guns at them.167
123. Multiple accounts received indicate that the Tatmadaw does not specifically or
necessarily target locations where non-State armed groups are based or active, but rather
launches attacks on villages because residents are of the same ethnic background as the
fighters, or because the villages are in the nearest location to a recent operation from the
armed group.168 One example is of a Tatmadaw operation in Man Lan village in Namhsan
Township in northern Shan State on or around 24 June 2017.169 The TNLA and the
Tatmadaw had been fighting in the area, but not close to the village. Tatmadaw soldiers
bound, beat, and threatened civilians with death, accusing them of supporting the TNLA.
Soldiers arrested about 20 villagers and it was reported that they deprived those who were
captured of food, water, and access to toilet facilities. It was also reported that the
Tatmadaw soldiers confiscated the civilians’ mobile phones. 170 Residents of Man Lan
village later found the body of one of the men who had been taken by the soldiers.171 All of
those taken by Tatmadaw soldiers were Ta’ang.
124. In another example, a victim reported that the Tatmadaw used firearms and mortar
directly at a group of 13 women escaping from the fighting between TNLA and the

164 PI-026, PI-043, PI-045, PI-046, PI-087, PI-101, SI-002.

165 DI-068, PI-065, PI-074, PI-087, PI-101.
166 DI-066, DI-068, PI-074; see this chapter, section A.3: Torture and other ill-treatment.
167 DI-068.
168 K-136, DI-057, DI-065, DI-067, PI-065, PI-074, PI-087, PI-101.
169 K-137, PI-074, V-093.
170 V-093.
171 K-137, PI-074, V-093.

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Tatmadaw in a village of Namkhan Township, in Shan State on 2 May 2017. The victim’s
mother, her sister and another child were hit by bullets and fragments from mortar
explosions. She said, “Even though we were all women fleeing, the Tatmadaw considered
us as TNLA and shot at us.”172
125. Another type of intentional attacks on civilians is the practice of Tatmadaw soldiers,
in the course of their military operations, deliberately shooting at or otherwise targeting the
civilian population or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities. In many
instances, the Tatmadaw has shot directly at civilians fleeing or seeking shelter, or launched
mortar shelling on a group of civilians. 173 In Shan State, for instance, a witness reported that
the Tatmadaw twice attacked the village of Manwing in Namhkan Township, the first time
on or around 5 January 2016 and a second time around 25 February 2016. The witness said:
The Burmese soldiers entered the village, and they were shooting at the villagers
who were trying to run. They were not shooting at KIA armed men but at civilians.
There were no KIA men in the village, as their post was two hours away by foot.174
126. On many occasions, the Tatmadaw launched attacks on villages under the apparent
assumption that fighters of EAOs were present at such locations but without seemingly
making any efforts to establish this ahead of initiating the attack or further assessing it in
the course of the attack. This is in violation of the rule that parties to the conflict must do
everything feasible to verify that targets are military objectives.175 During subsequent
operations in villages and towns, the Tatmadaw did also not attempt to distinguish civilians
from military objectives. Such indiscriminate attacks resulted in civilian men, women and
children being injured or killed, with large numbers of civilians being driven away from
their homes and villages.176
127. In many attacks reported, the Tatmadaw did not have a specific military objective
when targeting the villages. Sources informed the Mission that, in many cases, the EAOs’
posts or bases were located far outside the villages under attack. 177 For example, a witness
stated that the Tatmadaw had fired mortar shells at Gar Yar Yang village in Mansi
Township, Kachin State, in February 2013. He stated that there was no KIA base near the
village, that there was no fighting with the KIA or efforts on the part of the Tatmadaw to
target members of the KIA: they merely shot at the villagers. 178 As a further example, Nam
Ha village in Muse Township, Shan State, was reported to have been attacked on or around
14 December 2016, both by mortar shelling and airstrikes by four jet fighter planes. The
village was composed of nearly a hundred households and had a population of over 500
villagers, with no members of EAOs present during the attacks and with no other military
assets in the village: “There were no rebels in my village. But the army just came and
attacked the people.”179
128. Information therefore strongly indicates that airstrikes and shelling were used
indiscriminately as a more general tactic in the context of “clearance operations”, in
essence attacking the civilian population as a whole as opposed to being used against
specifically identified military targets.180

Failure to take requisite precaution in attacks

129. Even in cases where information indicates that the Tatmadaw attack was in pursuit
of a specific military objective, for example, the capture or weakening of an EAO’s base,

172 PI-073.
173 DI-057, DI-069, PI-043, PI-044, PI-047, PI-073, PI-087, QI-094; see this chapter, section A.8:
Emblematic incidents.
174 PI-087.
175 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 16.
176 DI-057, DI-066, PI-043, PI-044, PI-049, PI-050, PI-053, PI-065, PI-074, PI-087, PI-101.
177 DI-057, PI-026, PI-073, PI-101
178 PI-026.
179 DI-057.
180 See this chapter, section A.8: Emblematic incidents (Tanai).

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the attack often still failed to respect the principles of precaution.181 This is especially the
case when the attack occurred in densely populated civilian areas. Attacks were launched
which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage
to civilian objects, or a combination of the three, which would be excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
130. For example, on the morning of 14 January 2013, two artillery rounds landed near
the centre of the city of Laiza in Kachin State, killing three civilians, all of whom were
men.182 While the KIA headquarters are located in Laiza, a city densely populated by
civilians, there was no apparent specific military objective near where the shells impacted.
The Tatmadaw fired artillery from Hkang Hkai Bum military base, with the first round
landing in front of a civilian home, killing two civilians and injuring others. The second
round of artillery landed in front of another house close to the first, killing a child. In
addition to the three persons killed, at least four civilians were injured in the incident,
including two women and two children. A witness mentioned that the shrapnel hit one of
the children, a young girl, and that she was paralysed as a consequence. 183 Credible
information received indicates that the round impacted near a busy street, deflecting most
of the blast towards the house, and away from the many people walking on the sidewalks
nearby.184
131. This incident, as well as most other incidents involving the use of explosive
weapons in or around civilian areas examined by the Mission, did not show a pattern that
would indicate a legitimate attempt to target a specific military objective. 185 For example, to
be used with accuracy against a specific military target, artillery needs to have its fire
planned and directed. Initial rounds fired by artillery are often not on target, so adjustments
need to be made in order to “fire for effect” on the identified military target. However, this
pattern was not discernible in the cases examined. Apart from the fact that explosive
weapons ordinarily have wide-area effect and are therefore likely to have indiscriminate
effects in densely populated areas, their use in such areas also commonly causes a
widespread and predictable pattern of harm. In Kachin and Shan States, the Tatmadaw’s
airstrikes and shelling into populated residential areas have repeatedly caused the death and
injury of civilians and significant damage to civilian buildings. 186 Opting to use bombs or
shelling in such areas, in particular where specific military objectives are unclear and
civilian areas are densely populated, will therefore often be indiscriminate and in violation
of the principle of precaution in attacks.
132. Similarly, on 5 August 2017, in Maw Saung village in Kutkai Township in Shan
State, the Tatmadaw launched explosives from the air that landed on a tree next to a
woman’s house. Shrapnel hit the woman in her stomach and she died on her way to the
hospital.187 According to the witness, the Tatmadaw had attacked the village because on the
previous day the TNLA had come to the area in the context of a drug elimination
programme. The TNLA left the village and clashed with the Tatmadaw on the outskirts.
Subsequently, the Tatmadaw shelled the village. 188
133. Furthermore, information collected by the Mission also indicates that the Tatmadaw
has systematically engaged in hostilities with EAOs without providing adequate warnings
to civilians to allow them to evacuate the area targeted for military operations, or to take
feasible precautions during the course of the attacks.189 For example, in June 2017, the
Tatmadaw dropped leaflets warning civilians to evacuate prior to airstrikes on Nganga

181 DI-066, PI-024, PI-026, PI-050, PI-054, PI-065, PI-072.

182 K-136, SI-002, V-096.
183 SI-002.
184 K-136, SI-002, V-096.
185 DI-061, DI-062, PI-042, PI-043, PI-045, PI-072, PI-101, SI-002.
186 DI-057, DI-061, DI-066, PI-043, PI-045, PI-046, PI-049, PI-054, PI-072, PI-073.
187 PI-072.
188 K-137, PI-072.
189 PI-042, PI-049, PI-103.

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village, Tanai Township, Kachin State, but Tatmadaw soldiers then partly prevented
civilians from leaving the area, shutting down most routes. 190

Destruction, appropriation or looting of civilian property and other protected objects

134. The Mission collected multiple accounts and other information regarding the
Tatmadaw’s widespread practice of attacking, destroying and looting of civilian property or
other protected objects as part of its military operations. 191 Witnesses consistently reported
that the Tatmadaw systematically pillaged villagers’ belongings, including livestock, food
supplies and money.192 In addition, the Tatmadaw destroyed and ransacked civilian homes,
and sometimes schools, health clinics and churches, 193 including by setting them on fire. In
many cases, the attacks were seen as targeted against particular individuals or entire
villages based on their perceived affiliation and allegiance to armed groups, seemingly
merely because they share the same ethnicity. 194
135. For example, a witness reported that Garayang village, Waingmaw Township,
Kachin State was entirely burnt by the Tatmadaw during an offensive attack against the
KIA on 16 June 2011. She fled to an IDP camp because of the fighting and, when she
returned to her village in 2012 to gather some belongings, she found:
Nothing was left in our village. There were parts of my village that were entirely
burned down. The school was destroyed and so were most of the houses. I was not
able to recuperate any of our belongings from our village.195
136. Similarly illustrative, although falling outside the reporting period, a victim reported
that her village, Hoktai in Mongkaung Township, Shan State, was completely destroyed in
2009 by the Tatmadaw who had made a foray in the area in search of members of the Shan
ethnic armed groups. As they could not find any armed men, they burned all huts in the
village, starting with the village administrator’s home. 196 She said:
For the houses that could not burn easily, Tatmadaw soldiers poured gasoline all
around the house and then set it on fire. They used a stick with dry grass on the top,
poured gasoline onto it, set it on fire, and then threw the burning stick onto the
houses. There were 50 to 60 homes in my village, and these were all set on fire. It
took the soldiers only two to three hours to burn the entire village. Some villagers
died in the fire.197
137. Another victim reported that the Tatmadaw attacked his village near Waingmaw,
Kachin State in June 2011, and more specifically that:
The Tatmadaw attacked and destroyed the village - no one has lived there since. I
heard from other villagers that the inside of the houses are a mess after the soldiers
ransacked them. I also heard that our village was burned down and there were
many bullet holes in the houses. Some houses were burned, and there are landmines
in the village. Villagers had to leave everything when they fled, including the
livestock. These were probably eaten by the military. We had only taken a few items
when we left, as we thought that we would leave only for a short while. But now all
our possessions are gone or destroyed.198

190 PI-049, PI-103, V-062; see this chapter, forced displacement, confiscation and destruction of
property, and denial of humanitarian assistance section; see this chapter, section A.8: Emblematic
incidents (Tanai).
191 D-066, DI-068, DI-069, PI-024, PI-026, PI-042, PI-043, PI-045, PI-046, PI-047, PI-049, PI-050,
PI-054, PI-065, PI-073, PI-087.
192 PI-073, PI-074.
193 K-134, PI-024, PI-043, V-116.
194 DI-062, DI-066, DI-068, DI-069, PI-024, PI-026, PI-042, PI-043, PI-045, PI-046, PI-047, PI-049,
PI-050, PI-054, PI-065, PI-073, PI-087.
195 PI-024.
196 DI-069.
197 DI-069.
198 QI-094.

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138. The Mission received credible accounts that over 200 churches have been attacked,
ransacked or destroyed since June 2011 in Kachin and Shan States. While some of these
churches may have been used by EAOs, thereby losing their protected status, it was not
possible to verify whether this applies to all 200 churches. The subsequent erecting of
pagodas on compounds of some churches suggests that the motives of these attacks may
have been different.199

2. Unlawful killings
139. The Mission amassed a consistent and credible body of information establishing a
pattern of violations of the right to life, with numerous unlawful killings. These mostly
occur in the context of military operations, as a consequence of indiscriminate attacks,
attacks directed at civilians, or the murder or extrajudicial execution of persons in
Tatmadaw custody. Unlawful killings also occurred in other contexts, without an immediate
or apparent link to hostilities, for example in the context of forced labour.

(a) Legal framework

140. Under international human rights law, the right to life is a non-derogable right which
forms part of customary international law.200 The prohibition of the arbitrary deprivation of
life is a rule of jus cogens. This right protects individuals against killings by security forces.
It is a violation of the right to life when State officials deliberately kill a person when it is
not strictly necessary to protect life. This includes extrajudicial killings or executions,
whereby a person is killed by, at the behest of, or with the acquiescence of State agents in
the absence of a judicial process. The State is responsible for violations committed by non-
State actors operating in support or as agents of State authorities. 201
141. Life is also protected under international humanitarian law. Common article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions prohibits “violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds” of civilians and persons hors de combat. A person hors de combat is anyone who is
in the power of an opposing party; who is defenseless because of unconsciousness or
injury; or who clearly expresses an intention to surrender. 202 The intentional killing of
civilians or persons hors de combat, if the conduct took place in the context of and was
associated with the armed conflict, constitutes the war crime of murder.
142. However, not all killings of civilians are unlawful under international humanitarian
law. Civilians lose their protection for such time as they take direct part in hostilities
(although, in case of doubt as to a person’s status, s/he should be considered civilian).203 A
killing is unlawful if it is as a result of violations of the rules on the conduct of hostilities,
for example, from a direct attack against civilians, from an indiscriminate attack, or from an
attack against military objectives causing excessive loss of civilian life.

(b) Findings

Unlawful killings in the context of hostilities

143. The Mission amassed a considerable body of consistent information drawing the
pattern of the Tatmadaw unlawfully killing civilians, including men, women and children,
during their numerous military operations or incursions into villages and towns in Kachin
and Shan States.204 These result from the Tatmadaw’s disrespect for the fundamental
international humanitarian law principle of distinction between civilians and fighters, the

199 K-134, PI-039, PI-104, SI-003, V-116, V-125.

200 The right to life is protected under ICCPR, art. 6(1); CRC, art. 6; CRPD, art. 10; as well as in UDHR,
art. 3 and ASEAN Declaration, art. 11. It is also protected under the Constitution of Myanmar, s. 353.
201
See A/HRC/14/24, paras. 46(a) and (b).
202 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 47.
203 E.g. ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols, para. 4789, and ICRC/N. Melzer, Interpretive
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law
(ICRC, Geneva, 2009), pp. 75-76.
204 DI-057, K-131, PI-043, PI-044, PI-047, PI-073, PI-087, QI-094.

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Tatmadaw’s failure to respect the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, and its systematic
failure to take precautions in attacks to protect the civilian population. The manner in which
the Tatmadaw conducts military operations in civilian-populated areas necessarily results in
civilian casualties.
144. As presented above, the Tatmadaw routinely targets civilians and conducts
indiscriminate attacks. In many of the instances verified by the Mission, these have led to
unlawful killings. In none of these cases was there any indication that the civilians were
directly participating in hostilities, that the attack was directed at a military objective, or
that sufficient precaution had been taken to minimize the impact on the civilian population.
145. For example, the Tatmadaw has shot at or shelled mortar directly at civilians,
including women and girls,205 while they were fleeing and seeking shelter, resulting in
civilians being killed or injured.206 A witness reported that on 11 August 2017 in the village
of Kasung, Mogaung Township, in Kachin State, the Tatmadaw shot and killed his friend as
he was trying to run away from approximately 200 Tatmadaw soldiers entering the
village.207 Another example is the killing of Ja Seng Ing, a 14-year old girl, by Tatmadaw
soldiers on 13 September 2012 in Sut Ngai Yang village, Hpakant Township, Kachin State.
She had sought shelter with her classmates after hearing an explosion detonated by the
KIA. Tatmadaw soldiers stationed in the village started shooting as a response to the
explosion. Soon after, two Tatmadaw soldiers standing close to where she was hiding shot
directly at her and she was hit in the hip. She was severely injured and died as a
consequence of the shooting and the denial of timely access to medical care. 208
146. The Tatmadaw has also repeatedly launched mortar shelling and airstrikes on
civilian residential areas across northern Myanmar, throughout the reporting period.
Explosives have landed on or near civilian homes, in populated residential areas, including
in IDP camps, killing and injuring villagers and destroying property. These attacks also
resulted in burning of property and civilians were killed in these fires.209

Unlawful killings of persons while in Tatmadaw custody

147. Many killings reported to the Mission were committed while the victims were in the
custody of the Tatmadaw.210 The Tatmadaw often apprehended and detained men,211 and
then questioned them regarding their occupations and possible affiliations with armed
groups, the whereabouts of members or bases of EAOs, or related matters. The questioning
was often undertaken using torture or ill-treatment,212 and the men were subsequently
killed.
148. For example, at the end of June 2017, in Man Lan village, Namhsan Township, Shan
State, the Tatmadaw detained and tortured a man suspected of being a member of the
TNLA. When he denied this, he was repeatedly beaten. His corpse was found the next day
with a TNLA uniform on. 213 Similarly, on 26 May 2017, in Mansi Township, Kachin State,
the Mission corroborated that Tatmadaw soldiers executed three civilian displaced persons

205 K-131, PI-044, PI-047, PI-073.

206 DI-057, DI-069 (2009), PI-043, PI-044, PI-047, PI-073, PI-087, QI-094.
207 PI-044.
208 K-131, PI-105, V-126; see this chapter, section C.3: Lack of recourse.
209 DI-057, DI-061, DI-062, PI-044, PI-045, PI-053, PI-065; see this chapter, conduct of hostilities
section; see this chapter, section A.8: Emblematic incidents (Tanai).
210 DI-067, K-139, K-140, PI-034, PI-040, PI-041, PI-053, PI-054, PI-062, PI-074, PI-082, QI-086,
QI-095, V-019, V-020.
211 See this chapter, section A.5: Arbitrary deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance.
212 PI-062, PI-074, QI-089; see this chapter, section A.3: Torture and other ill-treatment; section A.8:
Emblematic incidents (Tanai).
213 K-134, PI-074, V-093.

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in their custody. According to information received, the three men were killed because they
were Kachin and as such suspected of being KIA members. 214
149. The Mission received further credible and consistent accounts of civilian men, who
have been apprehended and detained by the Tatmadaw, being found dead days or weeks
later.215 For example, a witness explained how his father was detained by the Tatmadaw on
the suspicion of supporting the SSA-S in 2011 in Loilen Township, Shan State, and was
found dead a week later in the forest:
In October or November 2011, at about midnight, the six Tatmadaw soldiers came
to our home and detained my father. They also wanted to detain me, but I managed
to escape. My father was accused of providing food and shelter to the SSA-S,
although that was not true. They tied my father’s hands with a rope and took him
away. A week later, we had not received any news from him, so we searched for him
in the jungle. We found his body at the bottom of a mountain. I did not see any bullet
wounds; it appeared that he was beaten to death. His hands were still tied with a
rope. I also found other bodies that day; there were two more next to my father’s.
All the people killed were just regular farmers. 216
150. Similarly, the Mission received credible reports of the killing of two residents of the
Maing Hkawng IDP camp in Mansi Township, Kachin State, last seen on 31 January 2018
in the custody of the Tatmadaw. Their bodies were found in a grave on 8 March 2018 by
local residents. Reports received suggest that the men were civilians, but they were found in
KIA uniforms when their corpses were recovered.217
151. The Mission also received credible reports of the Tatmadaw capturing or detaining
fighters of EAOs and subsequently killing them. 218 Those killed included men and women.
For example, reliable reports suggest that, on 16 July 2018, Tatmadaw soldiers arrested six
TNLA female medics and three TNLA fighters following clashes between the parties in
Namkham Township, Shan State. It was reported that one TNLA male fighter was shot
dead on the spot while two others were wounded and managed to escape. The bodies of the
six women were found in a ditch nearby on 14 July 2018. Material examined by the
Mission shows one corpse with a devastating head injury. The Mission’s forensic analysis
points to two possible causes: massive blunt force trauma or high velocity gunshot wound.
Given the context the latter seems more likely. Multiple victims with single gunshot
wounds to the head suggests execution style killings. The Mission also received reports of
the women being raped before being killed but was unable to verify these allegations. 219
152. Unlawful killings in Tatmadaw custody are also widespread in areas where there is
no active fighting.220 For example, one witness described the killing of his 25-year old
brother on 15 July 2012, in a village near Myitkyina in Kachin State. He said:
On that Sunday evening, I went to the church service with my brother. A group of
five Tatmadaw soldiers stopped us, and asked, “Where are you going and are you
Kachin?” When we answered that we were Kachin, the soldiers started beating me.
They punched me in the face. They confiscated our student IDs and asked where the
KIA post was located, and where the KIA fighters were. We said that we did not
know, but the soldiers did not believe us and took us to the military camp. There they
tortured my brother with a heated knife, and they also tortured me. We were beaten
with rifle butts. I was crying and screaming. They repeatedly asked us where the

214 K-140, PI-040.

215 K-139, PI-040, PI-082, PI-106, V-019; see this chapter, section A.5: Arbitrary deprivation of liberty
and enforced disappearance.
216 PI-082.
217 K-139, V-019, V-020.
218 K-141, PI-053; see this chapter, section A.3: Torture and other ill-treatment; section A.8: Emblematic
incidents (Tanai).
219 K-141.
220 PI-040, PI-052, PI-070.

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KIA post was. Then they stabbed my brother with a knife in front of me and he died.
I closed my eyes because I could not watch my brother die. They told me to remain
there and they carried my brother’s body out of the room. I do not know where they
took his body. The soldiers told me that if I ran away, I would be killed. 221
153. Similarly, on 26 May 2017, in a government controlled area in Mansi Township,
Kachin State, where there was no fighting, 15 to 20 Tatmadaw soldiers executed three
Kachin civilian internally displaced persons of about 25 to 30 years old. The three bodies
were found a few days later, buried together in a small shallow pit. These men were
reportedly suspected of being KIA members. 222 On 29 May 2017, the three bodies were
brought to Mansi Township hospital for post mortem analysis and were returned to the
families in the afternoon. The Myanmar Police Force at Mansi Township opened a murder
case. According to information received, the post mortem results show severe injuries on all
victims, including multiple gunshot wounds, deep cuts on body parts, skull fractures and
damage to eyes and ears. In January 2018, a Myanmar military tribunal sentenced six 319th
Light Infantry Battalion223 soldiers to 10 years in prison for the killing of these men. 224

Killing of civilians during forced labour

154. The Mission also received many consistent accounts of men and women killed by
the Tatmadaw in the context of forced labour.225 Tatmadaw soldiers have intentionally
killed individuals for trying to escape or for refusing to participate, or simply because they
were unable to continue working. 226 The following examples are illustrative:
• A witness described the events in December 2016 that led to the killing of one of his
neighbours in a village near Myitkyina in Kachin State. 15 Tatmadaw soldiers
approached the plantation where he was working, together with three other villagers:
The soldiers asked for our names, identification documents and some other basic
information. Initially the situation did not seem too worrying. But then the soldiers
told us that we needed to go and work for them. One of the men, my friend who was
28 years old, said he couldn’t go because he had to look after his family. The
soldiers became angry and threatened us. My friend tried to run away, but one of
the senior officers shot him in the back and he fell. My friend died. Later, I saw the
soldiers throw his body into the river. The soldiers threatened us that, if we did not
do as they requested, they would shoot us like they had shot my friend. 227
• Another witness explained that he saw how another individual was killed while they
were both engaged in forced labour in May 2012, in Puta-O Township, Kachin
State:
We were forced to put up a fence, and to clean the surrounding area at a new
military camp. Another villager found the work very difficult. He could not walk,
was very tired, and he fell. The soldiers were very angry and told him to get up.
Although he begged them not to kill him, he was shot in the head from close range
and died.228
• In another case, in January 2017 in Muse Township, Shan State, a witness described
an account of two villagers who were killed when they were no longer able to carry
the heavy materials:

221 PI-05.2
222 K-140, PI-040.
223 One of the organic units of the Northern Command.
224 K-140, PI-040; see this chapter, section C.3: Lack of recourse.
225 See this chapter, section A.6: Forced labour and forced recruitment of adults and children.
226 DI-057, DI-063, PI-077, PI-090, QI-078, QI-086, QI-095.
227 DI-063.
228 QI-078.

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More than 20 villagers were taken by the military for portering, to carry things for
them. I heard after some returned 12 days later that they were not properly fed. Two
villagers were taken for about one month. One villager who was not able to carry
what he had been asked to, was beaten to death. Another villager who had become
weak was shot and killed. I saw their bodies when I had to retrieve them. 229

Commonalities
155. In nearly all reports of unlawful killings received by the Mission, Tatmadaw soldiers
were the perpetrators. In some cases, militia groups were also involved. 230 For example, on
1 March 2017, the Kachin Defence Army (KDA), working alongside the Tatmadaw, in
Kutkai Township, Shan State, allegedly killed a 24-year old Ta’ang man and injured a
number of others, apparently on suspicion of their membership in an armed group. The
victim was shot in the back as he attempted to flee when the Tatmadaw and KDA entered
the house, and was then stabbed. Other men were also wounded. The victim’s body was
found by his family at Lashio morgue a few days later.231
156. Victims and witnesses consistently describe how the Tatmadaw repeatedly targets
individuals of the same ethnic background as specific armed groups.232 When the
Tatmadaw believes an individual belongs to or sympathizes with an EAO, it needs no proof
beyond sharing the same ethnicity of that EAO. This specifically affects men between the
ages of 18 and 40 years old, considered of fighting age.233 In addition to the cases cited
above, a witness recounted for example that her 21-year old husband was killed by
Tatmadaw soldiers at the end of March 2016 in Manton Township, Shan State after the
Tatmadaw intentionally shot multiple times at her house. She said her husband, who was
Ta’ang, was suspected of being a member of the TNLA and that their house was targeted
for that reason.234
157. The importance of the counter-insurgency justification for its actions against
civilians appears to be borne out by the care taken by the Tatmadaw to disguise civilian
victims as members of EAOs when killing them. Witnesses reported many cases where the
bodies of civilian men were later found in uniforms of an EAO.235 In one case, a source
attested that her father, accompanied by another villager, was taken by the Tatmadaw on
the way to their farm in Bhamo Township, Kachin State, in late January 2018. A month
later, their corpses were found in a ditch, showing signs of bullet wounds and in KIA
uniforms.236
158. Tatmadaw killings are often brutal.237 For example, a witness reported that
Tatmadaw soldiers beheaded his father and then burned his body, apparently on suspicion
of collaborating with the KIA during the Northern Alliance offensive in Muse Township,
Shan State on 6 December 2016.238 Other witnesses reported that the Tatmadaw killed
civilians in public and/or in front of their family members. 239 For example, a witness said
that, on 18 September 2014, the Tatmadaw beat her father and the village administrator to
death, because they were suspected of supporting Shan ethnic armed groups. The beatings
occurred in the centre of their village, in Mong Hsu Township, Shan State, in front of

229 DI-057.
230 PI-070; PI-054; PI-053; SI-004; V-018; see this chapter, section A.8 : Emblematic incidents (Tanai).
231 PI-070.
232 DI-067, PI-034, PI-040, PI-041, PI-053, PI-054, PI-065, PI-074, PI-090, QI-095; see this chapter,
section A.8 : Emblematic incidents (Tanai).
233 PI-040, PI-053, PI-054, PI-062, PI-065, PI-074, QI-095.
234 PI-065.
235 K-137, K-139, PI-074, PI-106, V-093, V-019, V-020.
236 PI-106.
237 PI-034, PI-041, PI-062, PI-074, PI-090.
238 PI-041.
239 PI-034, PI-052, PI-074, PI-090.

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villagers and the families of the victims. 240 Another witness reported that her father was
killed by the Tatmadaw in June 2011 in Puta-O Township, Kachin State, because he
refused to agree to her marrying a Tatmadaw officer who she did not want to marry. Her
father was beaten in front of his family so severely that his stomach burst and he died as a
result of his injuries.241 The mother of another victim reported that, while her son was being
tortured and subsequently killed by Tatmadaw soldiers in a village of Namhsan Township,
Shan State in late June 2017, she could hear her son crying out her name for help.242
159. The Mission received credible reports of the Tatmadaw committing mass killings in
conflict prone areas in northern Myanmar. In one reported incident, the Tatmadaw detained
at least six women and five men on 25 June 2016 in Long Mon village, near the sub-
Township of Mong Yaw, Shan State, after hostilities erupted between the Tatmadaw and
the TNLA. Seven bodies were later found in shallow graves. In July 2016, a Tatmadaw
senior general admitted publically that five villagers had been killed by the Tatmadaw
during interrogation and that the perpetrators would be brought to justice. 243 Similarly,
reports suggests that a mass grave containing the remains of 18 villagers, including a two-
year old boy, was discovered in a forest near the Kokang village of Mung Lung Nam Hkye
Ho in Monekoe Township, Shan State, on 20 December 2016 during fighting between the
Northern Alliance and the Tatmadaw. 244 Accounts indicate that the bodies were badly
burned before they were buried. The 18 villagers were reportedly detained by the
Tatmadaw on 28 November 2016.245

3. Torture and other ill-treatment

160. Similar patterns emerged for cases of torture and other forms of ill-treatment, often
against women and children, not only men, to obtain information or confessions regarding
the activities of EAOs, or as punishment for perceived sympathy for the Tatmadaw’s
opponents. Torture and ill-treatment were also used to coerce individuals into forced
labour. Conditions of detention often amounted to ill-treatment.

(a) Legal framework

161. Torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment are prohibited under
international human rights law246 and under international humanitarian law. 247 The
prohibition of torture is absolute: as a peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens), it
can never be subject to derogation or exception, that is, it cannot be limited or repealed. 248
162. Under international human rights law, torture is defined as acts that cause severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental; are inflicted intentionally; are committed for
a specific purpose; and involve a public official, either directly or indirectly. 249 Acts
considered to amount to “severe pain or suffering” for the purpose of the definition include:
severe beatings, punches and kicks; rape, attempted rape and other forms of sexual
violence; electric shocks; deprivation of sleep, food or water; and administration of
substances against the will of a person deprived of liberty. 250 Examples of treatment causing

240 PI-034.
241 PI-090.
242 PI-074
243 V-021, V-022; see this chapter, section C.3: Lack of recourse.
244 From the 88th and 99th LIDs.
245 V-131, V-132.
246 UDHR, art. 5; ICCPR, art. 7 and 10; CAT; CRC art. 37(a); ASEAN Declaration, art. 14. Torture is
also prohibited under the Myanmar Penal Code (s. 330-331), although the definition is not fully in
line with international law.
247 Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions prohibits “cruel treatment and torture” and “outrages
upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment” of civilians and
persons hors de combat. See also ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 90.
248 ICCPR, art. 4(2); CAT, arts. 2(2) and (3).
249 CAT, art. 1; see also A/HRC/13/39/Add.5, paras. 30-39.
250 For further examples, see A/HRC/13/39/Add.5, para. 51.

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mental suffering includes: mock executions, abuse of specific personal phobias, prolonged
solitary confinement and threats of death or violence.251 To constitute torture the acts must
be committed directly by public officials or other persons acting in an official capacity, or
be ordered or tolerated by them252 for a specific purpose, such as extracting a confession,
obtaining information, punishment, intimidation, humiliation, coercion or any reason based
on discrimination.253 Acts which fall short of this definition may still constitute cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (ill-treatment), which is also prohibited
under international law.254 The absence of the element of purpose is the key distinguishing
factor between torture and ill-treatment.
163. Under international humanitarian law, the definition of torture does not require that
the pain or suffering be inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.

(b) Findings

Principal victims
164. The Tatmadaw tortured men suspected of being members or supporters of EAOs, or
who had participated in military operations. Torture victims were usually men between the
ages of approximately 18 and 40 years, considered able to participate in fighting. 255
However, older men, often village administrators or community leaders, were also accused
of associating or collaborating with EAOs and subjected to torture.256 Torture victims
usually belonged to the same ethnic group as enemy fighters with whom the Tatmadaw was
engaged in conflict.257 Women were also targeted by the Tatmadaw, and raped or subjected
to other forms of sexual violence as a method of torture. 258
165. In a typical example, a 23-year old male victim reported that he was tortured by
Tatmadaw soldiers for three days at a military camp in March 2016 in Kutkai Township,
Shan State. He was Ta’ang and was accused of being a member of the TNLA, who are of
the same ethnic group. He was detained with 18 other Ta’ang men. He was repeatedly
beaten all over his body with a rope and a piece of firewood, and was burned with cigarette
stubs. Tatmadaw soldiers also poked his neck with a knife, making small cuts. The other
detainees were also tortured.259
166. While most torture victims were adults, the Mission also received information on the
torture of children.260 One individual stated that, when he was 14 years old, in 2013, two
Tatmadaw soldiers beat him inside the monastery where he lived in Kyauyme Township,
Shan State. They used rifle butts to beat him, and interrogated him on the whereabouts of
his brother. The brother had deserted the Tatmadaw after he had been forcibly recruited by
them.261
167. Information was also received of elderly persons being subjected to torture and ill-
treatment. For example, Tatmadaw soldiers tortured a man over 60 years old on 9 August
2017 in Kutkai Township, Shan State. The man, who was living in a camp for internally

251 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20: Article 7 (Prohibition of
Torture, or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), 10 March 1992, para. 6;
Communication No. 74/1980 Estrella v Uruguay, Views adopted by the Human Rights Committee on
29 March 1983, paras 1.6, 10; see also A/56/156, para. 8.
252 CAT art. 1; United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20, para. 2.
253 These purposes of torture are expressly listed in CAT, art. 1. See also A/HRC/13/39/Add.5, paras. 35
and 58-71.
254 ICCPR, art. 7; CAT, art. 16; see also E/CN.4/2006/6, para. 35.
255 DI-066, PI-062, PI-079, PI-109, QI-089.
256 DI-067, PI-035, PI-038, PI-111.
257 DI-066, PI-062, PI-079, PI-109, PI-111, QI-089.
258 See this chapter, section A.4: Sexual and gender-based violence.
259 PI-109.
260 QI-079, QI-094.
261 QI-079.

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displaced persons, was suspected of being a messenger for the TNLA. 262 The victim was
tortured for more than 24 hours at his place of employment, and later at a military base near
his village where he was transferred blindfolded. The Tatmadaw soldiers asked him where
the messengers for the TNLA were, and beat him severely, causing the victim to lose some
of his teeth. The victim was also tied-up with rope and had hot wax poured on him. The
soldiers made the man kneel for hours on small sharp stones during questioning, broke his
arm and forced him to sleep on the injured arm overnight. 263
168. Similarly, reliable sources have confirmed that a community leader in his sixties was
tortured at a military camp near Muse town before being transferred to a prison in Shan
State in late 2017. At the military camp, the elderly victim was offered little food for
several days and severely beaten. Soldiers also placed dogs in his cell to terrify him. The
Tatmadaw soldiers wanted the victim to admit that he was a KIA supporter. 264
169. Village administrators and community leaders were also tortured because they were
often the only individuals able to speak Myanmar language. 265 For example, on 10 January
2016 in Kunhing Township, Shan State, a victim reported that Tatmadaw soldiers detained
him with another civilian and the village administrator in a monastery. The Tatmadaw and
the TNLA had been fighting in the area. Their hands were tied behind their backs, and the
Tatmadaw soldiers slapped them on the face and hit them on their chests. They also poked
them in the neck with a sharp knife. They were interrogated about the whereabouts of the
TNLA. One Tatmadaw soldier also threatened them: “if you do not tell us where the TNLA
men are, you will die and dig your own grave”. 266

Perpetrators
170. Tatmadaw soldiers were identified as perpetrators in most of the accounts of torture
in northern Myanmar verified by the Mission. 267 In some cases, they were accompanied by
militias (Pyi Thu Sit),268 or the Myanmar Intelligence Office (commonly referred to by its
Myanmar acronym SaYaPa),269 the branch of the Myanmar armed forces tasked with
intelligence gathering. All accounts of sexualised torture reported in the context of
detention were perpetrated by the SaYaPa.270
171. Most torture cases were committed by Tatmadaw soldiers during military
operations, patrols or forced labour. For example, a victim said that soldiers tortured him in
Shan State in 2012. He was taken by Tatmadaw soldiers to their military camp along with
three other men. They were beaten and questioned about their connections with Shan
EAOs. The soldiers requested money for their release which was paid by the victim’s
family members.271
172. Another victim described how the Tatmadaw detained and tortured him while he
was fishing at a river next to his village in Tanai Township, Kachin State in December
2017. At that time, the Tatmadaw had arrived at the victim’s village in large numbers. The
victim was later taken to the military camp for the purpose of forced labour. He said:
Ten Tatmadaw soldiers suddenly surrounded me and asked, “What are you doing in
the forest?” I answered that I was a simple villager and wanted to fish. They did not
believe me because I am young, 26-years old. They beat me with a bamboo stick,
and also rolled the stick on my thighs which really hurt. They asked, “Are you a
rebel?” I answered again that I simply work for my daily wages to survive, and that
I had never joined the KIA. They took me to their army base where I was held

262 PI-035.
263 PI-035.
264 K-147.
265 DI-067, PI-035, PI-038, PI-111.
266 PI-111.
267 PI-038, PI-044, PI-054, PI-079, QI-090.
268 PI-053, PI-054, PI-056, SI-004; see this chapter, section A.8: Emblematic incidents (Tanai).
269 PI-052, PI-055, PI-056.
270 PI-052; PI-056; PI-055; see this chapter, section A.4: Sexual and gender-based violence.
271 QI-090.

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captive for over a month. We moved from one base to another, and I was beaten
regularly. Every morning, the Tatmadaw soldiers woke me up very early, beat me
and forced me to do various tasks. I slept on the ground in the jungle without a
blanket, I was always cold at night.272
173. Torture and ill-treatment were also perpetrated by the SaYaPa. For instance, a victim
described how he was tortured by the SaYaPa in June 2012, for approximately a week, at
the SaYaPa office in Myitkyina, Kachin State. He was subsequently accused of associating
with the KIA, pursuant to the Unlawful Association Act section 17(1). He said that the
SaYaPa tortured him, and forced him to say that he was a KIA member:
SaYaPa agents tortured me for about a week. They insisted that I was a KIA
member. I kept on repeating that I wasn’t, but they tortured me more. They burned
me on the stomach with a hot knife, and poured hot wax from a candle on my face.
They made me eat stones and burned my arms with cigarette butts. They also made
me kneel on top of small stones for hours. They took two bamboo sticks and tied
them in between my legs. They stabbed me in the thighs with a knife. I have 15 scars
on one leg and five scars on the other. They took turns to kick me in the chest. They
tied me to a chair, and beat me with a bamboo stick. I felt numb from the pain at
some point. My vision was blurred because I was beaten repeatedly. They also
pushed on my eyeballs for a long time – I felt like they would pop out. I really
thought I was going to be killed. They dug a hole behind the SaYaPa office and I
thought they would throw my corpse in it, So, I finally said that I was a KIA
soldier.273

Purposes
174. Torture and ill-treatment were used either to obtain confessions that the victim was a
member of an EAO, or to elicit information related to hostilities, for example about the
locations, weapons, and movements of fighters. 274 Some victims were tortured while in the
custody of Tatmadaw soldiers or the SaYaPa prior to, or frequently after, being detained
under the Unlawful Association Act, section 17(1).275
175. For instance, a victim reported that he was detained and tortured by Tatmadaw
soldiers on 2 December 2016 on suspicion of detonating an explosive on behalf of the
TNLA in Namhsan Township, Shan State. He said:
I was collecting wood in the forest when the Tatmadaw detained me. They beat me
until I was bleeding from the nose and ears. They asked, “Why are you here, what
are you doing?” I answered that I was collecting wood. The soldiers then tied-up my
hands behind me with a rope. I was taken with other villagers to a small hut in the
village, used as an army post. They kicked me in the head and accused us of
collaborating with the TNLA and to have detonated an explosive. The Tatmadaw
commander said that all people of Ta’ang ethnicity were TNLA. I told him I was just
an ordinary man, a tea farmer.276
176. Another victim gave an account of being tortured by Tatmadaw soldiers, along with
15 other civilians including four village administrators, on 15 December 2015 in
Sumprabum Township, Kachin State. The Tatmadaw and KIA were fighting in and around
his village when the civilians were apprehended by soldiers on suspicion of being KIA
members and taken to the military camp located nine miles away from his village. They
were kept in the military camp for one week, tortured and ill-treated. The torture included
death threats and beatings. He said:
We were tied-up with our hands behind our backs and we had to stand outside the
military tents. We were interrogated repeatedly and accused of being KIA members.

272 PI-079.
273 PI-055.
274 PI-059, PI-074, PI-075, PI-109, PI-111.
275 PI-038, PI-052, PI-055, PI-056; see this chapter, section A.5: Arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
276 PI-075.

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They insulted us constantly. The Tatmadaw said, “We are questioning you, and if
you do not answer, we will kill you”. I responded that I was not a KIA member and
we were simple villagers. They retorted, “You have to be a KIA soldier!” Every day,
for a week, they asked us the same questions and we responded in the same manner,
and we were beaten.277
177. In other instances, torture and ill-treatment were instrumental in punishing and
dehumanizing members of ethnic minorities in Shan and Kachin States. The Tatmadaw
verbally denigrated their religions and ethnicities during torture sessions. 278 For example,
one victim who was detained for a month from 16 June 2012 said:
The SaYaPa agents asked constantly if I was responsible for explosives that were
planted in the Myitkyina area. Because I am Christian, they made me imitate Jesus
on a cross like the crucifixion. We were treated like animals because they look down
on Kachins.279
178. In some cases, the Tatmadaw tortured civilians as retribution for battlefield
casualties inflicted against them by the EAOs. 280 Many civilians were also tortured or ill-
treated to force them to work for the Tatmadaw. This included children. Many victims
reported that the Tatmadaw apprehended them in or near their village in Shan and Kachin
States.281 They were tortured and/or ill-treated and thereafter forced to work for the
Tatmadaw. Other forms of torture or ill-treatment were also perpetrated while they were
detained for forced labour.282
179. For example, a 16-year old child at the time of the incident reported that he was
tortured and ill-treated by Tatmadaw soldiers and then coerced into forced labour during
three days in June 2011 in Waingmaw Township, Kachin State. Most civilians from his
village had fled from the fighting, while he remained behind with approximately 10 other
villagers. The child mentioned that soldiers questioned the men and when they were not
satisfied with the answers the victims were beaten more. One soldier hit the child with the
butt of his gun and he lost a tooth. Tatmadaw soldiers forced the 10 men and child to dig
holes and carry heavy packs. On the first day, they were not given food or water to drink.
They were given small portions of food and some water only in the middle of the second
day.283 Another adult victim gave an account of how the Tatmadaw ill-treated and subjected
him to forced labour for three days at the beginning of August 2011 in Kunhing Township,
Shan State. He stated that the Tatmadaw arrived at his village and asked the residents if
they had seen members of the Shan ethnic armed organizations. The Tatmadaw
subsequently detained and beat the victim, along with other civilians, and forced him to
carry heavy material. He was not fed properly and he was kicked and punched when he did
not walk fast enough.284

Methods and techniques

180. The Mission received accounts of the Tatmadaw using various torture techniques.
The following techniques have been corroborated:
• beating with a bamboo stick or metal rod;285
• laying bamboo across the shins of the victim, and standing or jumping on it; 286
• tying up hands and/or feet with ropes;287

277 DI-067.
278 PI-038, PI-056, PI-074, PI-075.
279 PI-056.
280 DI-066, PI-044, PI-086, PI-088, see this chapter, section A.8: Emblematic incidents (Tanai).
281 QI-085, QI-094, QI-098.
282 See this chapter, section A.6: Forced labour and forced recruitment of adults and children.
283 QI-094.
284 PI-083.
285 PI-053, PI-055, PI-056.
286 PI-056, V-133.

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• beating on several parts of the body; 288

• hitting on the head with the butt of a firearm;289
• pointing a firearm at their temple;290
• blindfolding;291
• using death threats, instilling a justified fear of being killed; 292
• killing other detainees in front of victim; 293
• performing sexual violence, including rape;294
• using insults of an ethnic or religious nature; 295
• burning the skin with a hot knife or cigarette stubs; 296
• pouring hot wax on skin;297
• forcing nudity, fully and partially; 298
• forcing to kneel several hours on the ground, sometimes on stones; 299
• jabbing the skin with a needle or sharp knife;300
• making victims dig their “own” graves;301 and
• placing dogs inside or outside a cell to terrify the victim. 302
181. The Mission received credible reports of other torture techniques, requiring further
investigation.
182. Perpetrators often used many of these torture techniques simultaneously. For
example, a victim mentioned that he was detained and tortured on 12 June 2012 at a
monastery in a village near Myitkyina in Kachin State. He was suspected of being a KIA
member:
I was questioned by many Tatmadaw soldiers from Light Infantry Division 37. They
asked me my ethnicity and where I was from. The soldiers said that villagers from
my native village are all members or supporters of the KIA. I responded that I was
never a KIA member. They insisted and wanted me to admit by force that I was with
the KIA. The soldiers kicked me in the stomach and on the chest, and slapped me in
the face. I was beaten on the head with the butt of their guns. I was hit so many
times on the head and on my ears that I could not hear anymore and my face was
very swollen. They hit me on the head with a wooden stick until the stick broke. They
took my legs and placed them in between two bamboo tree trunks and then jumped
on my legs attached to the trunks until I could not walk anymore. I had to be

287 DI-066, PI-035, PI-044, PI-053, PI-054, PI-074, PI-075, SI-004.

288 DI-066, PI-035, PI-038, PI-044, PI-053, PI-054, PI-055, PI-056, PI-074, PI-075, PI-109,
QI-090, SI-004.
289 PI-035, PI-038, PI-044, PI-056.
290 DI-066, PI-086.
291 PI-035, PI-054, V-137.
292 DI-068, PI-035, PI-038, PI-054, PI-055, PI-059, PI-062, PI-111.
293 PI-062, SI-004.
294 PI-052, PI-055, PI-056, PI-066. See this chapter, section A.4: Sexual and gender-based violence.
295 PI-038, PI-056, PI-059, PI-074, PI-075.
296 PI-055, PI-056, PI-109.
297 PI-035, PI-055.
298 DI-066, PI-052, PI-056.
299 DI-066, PI-035, PI-055.
300 PI-056, PI-109, PI-111.
301 PI-055, V-133.
302 PI-037, PI-038.

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dragged out by soldiers. I spent two nights and three days at the monastery being
tortured.303

Locations
183. Victims reported that the torture and ill-treatment took place in various places,
including in the SaYaPa office in Myitkyina,304 but mostly in their own towns or villages in
locations including houses, forest areas,305 monasteries,306 military camps,307 as well as
official places of detention.308 Most torture took place in or near villages and towns.
184. Usually, the torture ceased when the victims were transferred to official detention
locations.309 For example, a victim mentioned the torture stopped when he was transferred
to Myitkyina prison from the SaYaPa office in Myitkyina, Kachin State in July 2012. 310
185. Torture also often took place in military camps. A victim reported that he was
tortured while detained at a military camp in Mogaung Township, Kachin State, in August
2017 shortly after the Tatmadaw’s incursion in the Kasung region. The victim reported that
he was apprehended by the Tatmadaw under suspicions of being part of the KIA. He said:
I was taken to the military base and tortured by two soldiers for three days. We were
a group of ten civilians detained together, and there were 20 soldiers surrounding
us. I was beaten all over my body, especially on my back and chest. The Tatmadaw
tied my hands together behind my back with a rope. They also laced a rope around
my neck. They asked me, “Are most people in the village KIA members?” I
answered that there were simple farmers. They repeatedly asked who in the village
was KIA and beat me more. The soldiers who were beating me told me that all
Kachin men are KIA. The Tatmadaw did not want to understand that we were
villagers. They also beat me with the butt of their guns and showed me a sword to
scare me. They took a KIA uniform and forced me to wear it. I never admitted that I
was a KIA and kept on repeating that I was an ordinary man. 311

Ill-treatment while in detention

186. The detention conditions in which civilians, including men, women and children,
were held, while in the custody of the Tatmadaw, amount to ill-treatment. Detention
conditions in formal and informal detention locations were sub-standard.312 Victims
systematically reported that they were given very little food, had no contact with their
families and had no access to health care.313
187. The Mission also received a reliable and consistent body of information pertaining
to inhuman conditions in forced labour settings, either at military camps or while the
Tatmadaw was moving their base of operations. Victims included children. Victims
mentioned that they were beaten when walking too slowly as porters, or because they were
too weak. In addition, civilians in the custody of the Tatmadaw for forced labour
consistently stated that they ate insufficiently and felt hungry, rarely had access to adequate
drinking water, slept on the ground with no blanket and felt cold, and received death
threats. Victims were also subjected to sexual violence, including rape, gang rape and

303 PI-056.
304 PI-052, PI-055, PI-056.
305 DI-066, PI-035, PI-074, PI-075, PI-086, PI-088.
306 PI-056, PI-074, PI-111.
307 PI-035, PI-038, PI-044, PI-052.
308 PI-038, V-133.
309 PI-052, PI-109.
310 PI-052.
311 PI-044.
312 See this chapter, section A.5: Arbitrary deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance.
313 DI-060, PI-035, PI-052, PI-055, PI-056, PI-013.

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threats of being raped, while being detained for forced labour. 314 The following are
illustrative examples:
• A survivor reported that 12 Tatmadaw soldiers came to her house in Myitkyina
Township, Kachin State, in 2012 and threatened to take her mother away if she did
not go with them. She spent six to seven months performing forced labour in a
military camp near her village. On one occasion, she was raped by a senior officer
with another soldier watching. On another night, soldiers told her to drink juice that
caused her to lose consciousness. She woke up without underwear next to a sleeping
soldier, with pain in her back, anus, vagina and thighs. A week later, she was taken
to the same senior officer but escaped before another rape was committed. 315
• A girl who was 14 years old at the time of the events reported that the Tatmadaw
detained her for forced labour for three or four days at a military camp near her
village in Mongkaung Township, Shan State in 2011. She had to carry heavy bags
and was not properly fed nor had access to enough drinking water. One day she was
beaten on her legs because she asked a soldier for water. 316
• Another victim reported that in October 2011, in Waingmaw Township, Kachin
State, he was taken by the Tatmadaw to forcibly work as their porter. He reported:
They chained our ankles. We walked for five days carrying very heavy packages.
The Tatmadaw told us to walk faster and they slapped us, kicked us from behind.
When we were thirsty, we were not given enough water, and sometimes we could not
drink at all. We were often beaten with rifle butts and punched.317
• Another victim reported the humiliating and dehumanizing ill-treatment inflicted on
him by the Tatmadaw while in their custody for forced labour. He was apprehended
on 15 November 2014 in Kutkai Township, Shan State. He said:
We walked the entire night. We stopped and rested for breakfast the next morning,
although I remained tied-up. After breakfast, the Tatmadaw poured the inedible
leftovers on a plate and asked us if we were hungry – two other civilians were
detained as well. The soldiers said to eat and “since you are a rebel, you do not
have to eat”. The soldier said, “Oh, this disgusts you?” I said yes, and the soldier
said, “Even a rebel won’t eat this?” And then they started beating me again. One of
the soldiers spat on the food and then so did the others. Then they pointed a gun at
my head and said “If you don’t eat, we will kill you.” So, I ate the food. The
Tatmadaw laughed at me as I ate. After breakfast, they packed up and moved on.
One soldier said, “Let’s also get this rebel to carry our things”. Later, we stopped
and rested by a narrow stream and one of the soldiers made me drink muddy water.
He said “You are a rebel, not a human, you should do what the animals do.”318
• Another victim provided a detailed account of the ill-treatment he suffered while
taken for forced labour by the Tatmadaw in late May 2014 in Manton Township,
Kachin State:
We were all required to carry very heavy burdens. We walked for three hours and
then reached a village on a hill. Those who didn’t do this well were beaten by the
soldiers. We were kicked and slapped on the head. They hit me from behind with a
rifle butt, and pushed me to walk faster. We spent the night in that village and we
were chained up by our legs. We were not given any food. We could just use our
hands to drink from streams on the route, but that night we were not given water.319

314 DI-063, DI-065, DI-071, PI-001, PI-021, PI-067, PI-068, PI-077, PI-080, QI-079, QI-080, QI-085,
QI-094, QI-095, QI-096, QI-097, QI-098; see this chapter, section A.4: Sexual and gender-based
violence; section A.6: Forced labour.
315 PI-068.
316 DI-071.
317 QI-097.
318 QI-096.
319 QI-098.

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4. Sexual and gender-based violence

188. The Mission found that the Tatmadaw has targeted civilians, especially women and
girls but also men. Women have been subjected to abduction, rape, including gang rape,
and other sexual violence. There are also credible reports of forced marriage and sexual
slavery. In many cases, sexual violence was accompanied by degrading behaviour,
including insults and spitting. When women did escape, Tatmadaw soldiers would
frequently search for them, threaten and physically abuse their family, and destroy or steal
their property. Sexual violence against men has been inflicted as a means of torture,
including to obtain information or confessions from detainees. 320
189. The findings in this section are based on 38 interviews with survivors, families of
survivors, eyewitnesses, and expert witnesses. The prevailing context of insecurity in
northern Myanmar, combined with culturally based stigmatisation and ostracism of sexual
violence survivors, and the continuing presence of the military and armed groups, suggest
significant underreporting.321

(a) Legal framework

190. Sexual violence is conduct of a sexual nature that is perpetrated without a person’s
consent, often by force or coercion. Under international human rights law, such conduct
may violate the right to security of the person, the right to be protected from torture and
other ill-treatment, and other rights enshrined in international treaties. Rape, which consists
of sexual penetration without consent, is one form of sexual violence. Acts falling within
the category of other sexual violence include: attempted rape; forced prostitution and
trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation; sexual slavery; forced marriage or
cohabitation; forced pregnancy; forced abortion or sterilization; violent acts against the
sexual integrity of a person and other acts of a sexual nature that cause offence or
humiliation (for example, forced public nudity, demanding sex in return for favours, sexual
harassment).322
191. Rape and other forms of sexual violence are also prohibited under international
humanitarian law.323 Depending on the circumstances, such acts may constitute war crimes,
crimes against humanity or genocide.324
192. Violence against women and girls, including sexual and gender-based violence, is
also a form of discrimination prohibited by the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women and is a violation of human rights. 325 The obligations of
States parties, including Myanmar, do not cease in periods of armed conflict. 326 States
parties have a due diligence obligation to prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish acts of
sexual and gender-based violence.327
193. A limited number of legal protections from sexual and gender-based violence exist
in Myanmar domestic law. The Constitution guarantees equality before the law, 328 freedom
from discrimination on grounds of gender,329 and a prohibition of trafficking and

320 See this chapter, section A.3: Torture and other ill-treatment.
321 See also A/HRC/31/71, para. 48.
322 See e.g. ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(g).
323 See Common art. 3 of the Geneva Conventions (prohibiting “violence to life and person” including
cruel treatment and torture and “outrages upon personal dignity”), and ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 93.
324 See ICC Statute, arts. 7(1)(g), 8(b)(xxii), 8(c)(ii), 8(e)(vi); ICC Elements of Crimes, art. (6)(b) para. 1.
325 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, “General
recommendation No. 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict and post-conflict situations”
(CEDAW/C/GC/30), para. 34; “General recommendation No. 35 on gender-based violence against
women, updating general recommendation No. 19” (CEDAW/C/GC/35), para. 21.
326 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, “General
recommendation No. 28 on the core obligations of States parties under article 2 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women” (CEDAW/C/GC/28), paras. 11-12.
327 E.g. CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 30, para. 15, 23.
328 Constitution of Myanmar, s. 347.
329 Constitution of Myanmar, s. 348.

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enslavement.330 The Penal Code, enacted in 1860, prohibits rape and other forms of sexual
assault, though the definition of rape is outdated and legally vague and does not meet
international best practice standards. Penal Code provisions criminalising “kidnapping,
abduction, slavery and forced labour” are piecemeal. For example, the prohibition of the
importation of women for the purposes of sexual exploitation is only applicable if the
woman is under the age of 21.

(b) Findings

Abductions, rape and sexual violence by the Tatmadaw

194. The Mission found a pattern of individual Tatmadaw soldiers or groups of them
abducting women and girls and raping, attempting to rape, or gang raping them in forests.
Parents, relatives and neighbours reported that they saw women and girls being forcibly
taken by the Tatmadaw and, in some cases, saw or learned from others they had been
killed.331
195. For example, a female victim recounted that in 2017, when she was 15-years old,
she was sexually assaulted by a Tatmadaw soldier while cutting grass near her home in
Tanai Township, Kachin State. She stated that other girls experienced similar sexual
assault, including a friend who told her that she was raped.332
196. On 20 February 2018, one woman reported being abducted near Nam Byu village in
the amber mining area in Tanai Township by five soldiers on her way, and forced to walk
two hours into the forest to meet with a more senior officer. When she refused to take off
her clothes, three soldiers forcibly undressed her while two soldiers stood guard. The senior
officer raped her while insulting her, telling the other officers, “I will take her first and then
you can have her” and telling the victim, “I will fuck you to death”. The victim believed she
was targeted because she was Kachin and the Tatmadaw soldiers look down at the Kachin
people because of their different history, religion and language. 333
197. A survivor in Kutkai Township, Shan State, was abducted with her mother from her
farm and raped in the forest in 2011. Two Tatmadaw soldiers guarded her while another
soldier took her inside an abandoned hut and raped her. During the abduction and rape, the
survivor was also accused of supporting TNLA soldiers:
They pointed their guns at our heads, and they said that we had told the TNLA about
the position of the soldiers, and because of that, the TNLA had taken their horse.
There were about five or six Burmese soldiers. Then they took me to their military
base. On the way there, three soldiers took me to a small hut in the jungle. They
asked me, “Why did you pass the message to the TNLA?” I told them that I did not,
but they didn’t believe me and slapped me. One soldier told the other two to wait
outside. He then raped me on the floor on a dry grass mattress. He ripped all my
clothes off, so I was completely naked.334
198. Another survivor from Kutkai Township, Shan State, was abducted from her farm in
September 2012 by five Tatmadaw soldiers bearing guns. She was forced to work as a
porter and cook for the soldiers during the day. One night the senior officer asked her for a
massage and then took his clothes off and attempted to rape her. The survivor was able to
push him off and escape even though soldiers fired guns in her direction. 335 Another
survivor from Kutkai was abducted from her house in 2011 by Tatmadaw soldiers who
destroyed her shop before forcing her to carry heavy items to a military base. She and

330 Constitution of Myanmar, s. 358.

331 PI-003, PI-004, PI-007, PI-029, PI-067, PI-069, PI-089, PI-096.
332 PI-063.
333 PI-069.
334 PI-066.
335 QI-084.

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another woman were able to escape that night after the soldiers had told the women they
would have to have sex with them.336
199. Several witnesses across both Kachin and Shan States saw sexual abuse and rape
committed in military bases337 or in the jungle.338 One witness described seeing 20 soldiers
surrounding two girls aged about 15 to 16 years old in the jungle in December 2017, in
Tanai Township, Kachin State:
The soldiers were punching and slapping them. They pulled their hair. They pushed
them on the ground and tore off their clothing. The girls were naked on the ground.
200. The witness ran from the scene in fear and later learned that villagers had found the
bodies of the two girls.339
201. Other witnesses personally knew women who had been taken away by the
military,340 women who had been raped, sometimes by several soldiers at once, 341 and
women who had fallen pregnant as a result of the rape, 342 or had been killed after the
rape.343 For example, in 2011, one source who was forcibly recruited for labour by the
Tatmadaw in Kunhing Township, Shan State, witnessed three Tatmadaw soldiers force a
husband to work as a porter while they took his wife to the forest and raped her. 344

Rape and sexual violence in the home

202. There are consistent accounts of Tatmadaw soldiers, either individually or in groups,
attempting to rape women and girls in their homes. 345 Women who were raped in their
homes or following abduction recognized the Tatmadaw insignia and the military
uniforms.346 One survivor in Lashio Township in Shan State described how, in 2012, when
there was fighting between the KIA and the Tatmadaw in her area, a group of soldiers
entered her house, killed her parents and raped her:
I was beaten with belts and knives. Both my parents were killed. They were tied up
and burned. Their house was set on fire by five soldiers. They took me outside the
house to rape me. I was taken by one man with three stars on his badge to the back
of the house. He beat me with the butt of his gun and a belt. They wanted money and
were not happy because my family was Christian. The soldier ripped my shirt and
cut my trousers with a knife. Under the banana tree, he raped me on the ground. He
inserted his penis in my vagina and my anus. He inserted a banana leaf in my mouth
to make me stop screaming. I heard, “If you don’t keep quiet, I will shoot you with
my gun”.347
203. In another case, on 16 March 2016 in Kutkai Township, Shan State, a Tatmadaw
soldier grabbed a victim when visiting her home to buy a chicken. She told him she was
three months pregnant and asked him not to rape her. She escaped but he threatened to

336 PI-023.
337 PI-025, PI-029.
338 PI-029, PI-083, PI-099.
339 PI-069.
340 PI-096, QI-078.
341 PI-068, QI-072, QI-082, QI-086, QI-089.
342 PI-069, QI-082, QI-098.
343 PI-069, QI-079.
344 PI-083.
345 PI-005, PI-037, PI-057, PI-110, PI-117; see also Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF), Update by
the Shan Human Rights Foundation (April 2016); SHRF, Update by the Shan Human Rights
Foundation (November 2015); Ta’ang Women’s Organization, Trained to torture: Systematic war
crimes by the Burmese Army in Ta'ang areas of Northern Shan State (March 2011-March 2016);
SHRF, Summary of HR violations committed by Burma Army troops during military offensive in Tang
Yan, Shan State, from 14-15 April 2013 (April 2013); Kachin Women's Association Thailand, State of
Terror in Kachin Hills (February 2013).
346 PI-003, PI-004, PI-005, PI-007, PI-067, PI-068, PI-069, PI-089, QI-082.
347 PI-117.

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return the following day. She reported the incident to the village administrator but she later
learned that Tatmadaw soldiers had beaten him to prevent an official report being filed. 348
204. The Mission verified a well-publicised case involving two volunteer Kachin
teachers, Maran Lu Ra, and Tangbau Hkawn Nan Tsin, who were attacked at home in
Kawng Kha Shabuk village in Kutkai Township, Shan State on 19 January 2015, the night
that over 40 Tatmadaw soldiers arrived in the village. A couple staying nearby heard shouts
at 1am in the morning, but there was no response when they knocked on the teachers’ door
so they left. Other villagers saw several Tatmadaw officers picked up by a vehicle and
leave the village approximately four hours later. The two teachers’ bodies were discovered
later that morning, naked from the waist down, lying on the bed in their home in pools of
blood, with blood flowing from their vaginas. A military badge was found on the bed, but
no forensic evidence of the crime scene was collected by authorities. Later that day, the
Tatmadaw Major staying in the village threatened to “use machine guns on the school” and
“burn down the village” if the Tatmadaw was accused of the crimes. 349
205. According to a source interviewed by the Mission, the doctor who examined the two
bodies at Muse hospital provided two contradictory medical reports. The first report
concluded that approximately four perpetrators were involved in the rape and murder of the
two teachers. The second report concluded that there were only two perpetrators, only one
of the women was raped, and the military were not involved. 350 Forensic analysis conducted
by the Mission however suggests that the first victim was attacked with a knife initially and
raped, then or simultaneously stabbed, after which she was bludgeoned as a final act. The
second victim was initially assaulted with a knife, resisted and was repeatedly stabbed and
cut leading to death from haemorrhage; there is no disturbance of clothing from the
material analysed to indicate a completed rape.
206. The police investigation stalled before any court proceedings were initiated. The
Tatmadaw has prevented any questioning of its officers and has publicly declared it will
take legal action if its officers are accused by representatives of the victims. 351

Sexual violence against men in interrogation or detention contexts

207. In addition to other forms of torture during interrogation and/or detention, the
Mission found credible accounts supporting a pattern of sexual violence perpetrated as
torture or ill-treatment against men from Kachin and Shan States. All accounts of
sexualised torture reported in the context of detention were perpetrated by the Myanmar
Intelligence Office (commonly referred to by its Myanmar acronym SaYaPa), the branch of
the Myanmar armed forces tasked with intelligence gathering. 352
208. For example, the Mission received consistent reports regarding two survivors who
were tortured, including through rape and sexual violence, in June 2012 by the SaYaPa in
Myitkyina Township, Kachin State. The survivors were physically tortured in other
locations while being questioned, including about membership of the KIA, before they
were transferred to and detained by the SaYaPa.353 During the course of questioning by the

348 PI-057.
349 PI-037, K-133a; Also, Shan Human Rights Foundation, Burma Army kill villager in front of his
parents, then force over 1,200 villagers to demonstrate against “insurgents” for killing civilians in
Murng Yawng (1 January 2015); Legal Aid Network and Kachin Women’s Association in Thailand,
Justice Delayed, Justice Denied: Seeking Truth about Sexual Violence and War Crime Case in Burma
(2016) pp.3-14; Aye Nay, Kachin church ‘powerless’ to investigate teachers’ murders (7 July 2015);
US State Department, Burma 2015 Human Rights Report (2015), p. 2.
350 PI-037; A/HRC/28/72, para.59.
351 Ibid.
352 PI-052, PI-056, PI-055.
353 PI-052, PI-056; A/HRC/67/383, paras. 15-16; United Nations Human Rights Council Working Group
on Arbitrary Detention, “Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its sixty-
ninth session (22 April-1 May 2014) No. 6/2014” (1 July 2014); S. Martov, “Burma’s New Political
Prisoners in Kachin State” (The Irrawaddy, 17 July 2012); see this chapter, section A.3: Torture and
other ill-treatment.

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SaYaPa, both survivors were forced to undress until they were nude and then penetrate each
other anally. The SaYaPa agents were watching the men as they raped each other,
humiliating and laughing at them. They asked, “Are you enjoying yourselves?” The
survivors were begging for the rapes to stop but they were forced to continue. 354
209. In a separate incident, a survivor reported attending a SaYaPa office in Myitkyina
Township, Kachin State, on 17 June 2012 to answer questions about a bombing in the area.
He was then arrested, detained and tortured until he confessed to KIA membership because
he thought he would be killed otherwise. This included sexual torture such as rubbing his
penis until the skin was torn, peeled and bleeding: “my penis was bleeding, I was really
hurting. I don’t know how long this lasted; I was numb from the pain at some point.” 355
210. Typically, for reasons of fear of stigma, emasculation and shame, reports of sexual
violence by male survivors are exceptional, but may not accurately reflect rates of
incidence. In northern Myanmar, the use of sexual torture as a documented technique by
authorities in certain cases,356 combined with the more widespread practice of physical
torture perpetrated along with forced nudity, requires further research and investigation to
accurately identify the full scope of the use of sexual violence as a form of torture.

Sexual slavery and forced marriages

211. The Mission received two credible accounts relating to sexual slavery and forced
marriages in northern Myanmar. These accounts are consistent with prior United Nations
reports357 and suggest both practices may be more widespread than is currently
documented. In such circumstances, further investigation is required to determine the scale
and nature of both sexual slavery and forced marriage.
212. In one case reported, a teacher in Bhamo Township in Kachin State said that she was
abducted in 2012 on her way to school and taken to a military base for forced labour. One
night a soldier took her to the tent of a senior Tatmadaw officer. When she fought this
officer’s attempt to rape her, he burned her arms with cigarette stubs, hit her with the butt of
his rifle, knifed her neck and arms, and ultimately punched her so she lost consciousness.
She regained consciousness during the rape, and was again knocked unconscious by the
perpetrator. The survivor was kept in the senior officer’s tent for five to seven days and
penetrated repeatedly in the vagina, anus and mouth. She was threatened with gang rape if
she resisted. After being raped, she was not allowed to bathe and had to sleep with other
detainees on the ground with no blanket. She observed other girls kept in similar conditions
by soldiers at the base, and said that three or four girls were repeatedly raped while she was
there.358
213. The limited information on sexual slavery in northern Myanmar available to the
Mission does not lead it to conclude that its incidence is low, especially considering its
prevalence in Rakhine State.359 There are good explanations for the limited information.
The close monitoring and restricted movement of sexual slavery victims and the physical
injuries caused by the frequency and severity of abuse they experienced lowers the rate of
successful escapes and thus of information becoming available. Further, victims confined to
officers’ private quarters are less likely to be seen by others or identified as sexual slaves.
The survivor’s observation of other sex slaves at the base in the above account suggests that
sexual slavery was not an isolated practice of the Tatmadaw forces at least in that base.
214. There are also credible reports of Tatmadaw soldiers attempting to abduct women to
forcibly marry them, including to more senior officers. These instances have been
accompanied by intimidation, serious physical violence and the killing of family members

354 PI-052, PI-056.

355 PI-055.
356 See this chapter, section A.3: Torture and other ill-treatment.
357 A/HRC/32/18, para. 60; S/2018/250, paras. 57-58.
358 PI-067.
359 See chapter V, section D.1.b: A human rights catastrophe – Patterns of serious human rights
violations by the Myanmar security forces.

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of the targeted woman.360 For example, in June 2011, Tatmadaw soldiers visited one
interviewee’s home in Puta-O, Kachin State and asked her father if they could take her
away so that a general could marry her. When her father refused, the soldiers beat him so
severely that he died.361 There is information to suggest that certain Christian Kachin
women are targeted for forced marriage, but also that such women are covertly forced to
convert to Buddhism when they marry higher-ranking Tatmadaw officers, or when their
husbands are promoted above a certain rank within the Tatmadaw.362

Threats and retaliation for escape

215. Women who either attempted to escape or fight, or whose rape was interrupted by
other events, were threatened by their perpetrators,363 including with death.364 The Mission
found a consistent pattern that when women successfully escaped either during an
attempted rape or after rape, the perpetrator soldier/s subsequently went to the survivor’s
home searching for her,365 including with his superior officer.366 In two cases, the survivor’s
relative at home was told to return the survivor to the military camp as soon as she returned
home.367 Such visits were accompanied by physically abusing the survivor’s relatives and
confiscating personal property including identification cards.368 In one case, Tatmadaw
soldiers destroyed a survivor’s parents’ kitchen, beat her parents and took them away for
forced labour for a week. 369
216. This pattern further reinforces the systematic character of abduction of victims from
their homes by Tatmadaw soldiers.370 The involvement of senior officers to forcibly return
women to lower-ranking soldiers reinforces the likelihood this is a widespread practice
endorsed implicitly or explicitly by senior Tatmadaw commanders.

Persecutory and cruel nature of the sexual violence

217. The investigation found a pattern of persecutory and derogatory behaviour
accompanying perpetration of sexual abuse by Tatmadaw soldiers against Kachin women,
including insults, spitting, and physical abuse. 371 One survivor recounted she was called a
“Kachin bitch” and “children of the fucker”.372 Another survivor said her perpetrators
compared Kachin people to dogs. 373 A further witness to the gang rape of two teenage girls
by 20 soldiers in a forest heard the soldiers call the girls “witches” and tell them “we will
torture you Kachin bitches until you are extinct”. 374
218. The brutality and cruelty of the sexual violence committed by the Tatmadaw is not
only present in reports of persecution. Patterns of accompanying extreme physical violence
and torture, including by groups rather than individual Tatmadaw soldiers, reflect a
widespread culture of tolerance, if not an explicit policy, towards humiliation and the
deliberate infliction of suffering on civilians. Both the opportunistic and more calculated
commission of sexual violence against women and their relatives in their homes reinforce
the Tatmadaw soldiers’ confidence in, and enjoyment of, absolute impunity for such
violations.

360 PI-068, PI-090.

361 PI-090.
362 K-134, PI-007.
363 DI-065, PI-005.
364 PI-00.
365 PI-003, PI-005, PI-007, PI-067, PI-068, QI-084.
366 PI-005.
367 PI-005, PI-007.
368 PI-007, PI-023.
369 PI-063.
370 PI-005, PI-023, PI-057, PI-110, QI-084.
371 PI-003, PI-004.
372 PI-004.
373 PI-023.
374 PI-069.

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Sexual violence facilitated by insecurity

219. The Mission received credible reports of opportunistic and isolated sexual violence
facilitated by the prevailing context of insecurity that were not directly connected to armed
conflict.375 In these cases, sexual violence is a violation of international human rights law
when committed by public officials, at their instigation or with their consent or
acquiescence, but also when the State does not demonstrate diligence to protect persons
from sexual violence by non-State agents and entities, including by investigating such acts
and punishing perpetrators in accordance with national law. 376

5. Arbitrary deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance

220. The Tatmadaw has engaged in arbitrary arrest and detention, in many cases
amounting to enforced disappearance. Men and women, and in some cases children, were
taken from their villages and detained for forced labour or because of suspected links to
EAOs. Victims have been held incommunicado in unofficial places of detention for periods
between a day and two years. Most were not informed of the reason for arrest, nor brought
before a judge.

(a) Legal framework

221. International human rights law enshrines the right to liberty and security of the
person and to freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, 377 as well as the State’s
obligation to ensure that people arrested or detained are informed of the reasons for arrest
or detention, and are brought before a court promptly, regardless of whether this right of
challenge is exercised or not.378 Freedom from arbitrary detention is a rule of customary
international law; it is even considered peremptory law (jus cogens), that is, it cannot be
limited or derogated from.379 An arrest or detention violates international human rights law
if it is unlawful, meaning that is not imposed on such grounds and in accordance with such
procedure as are established by law, 380 or is otherwise arbitrary in the sense of being
inappropriate, unjust, unreasonable or unnecessary in the circumstances. 381
222. Arbitrary deprivation of liberty is also prohibited under international humanitarian
law.382 Detention of civilians or other protected persons, other than for reasons and in
circumstances permitted by international law, is considered unlawful confinement. While
international humanitarian law does not explicitly address security detention of civilians in

375 PI-007, PI-093, PI-110.

376 United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, art. 4 (c), (d) and (o);
ICCPR, art. 2; United Nations Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No. 31 - The Nature of
the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant” (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.
13), para. 15 and 18; United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women, “General recommendation No. 28 on the core obligations of States parties under article 2 of
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women”
(CEDAW/C/GC/28), para. 17, and “General recommendation No. 35 on gender-based violence
against women, updating general recommendation No. 19” (CEDAW/C/GC/35), paras. 24-25.
377 UDHR, art. 9; ICCPR, art. 9(4); CRC, art. 37(b); CAT, art. 11; ICRMW, art. 16(1), (4) and (9);
CRPD, art. 14; CPED, art. 17.
378 ICCPR, art 9(3).
379 See e.g. United Nations Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No. 24: Issues Relating to
Reservations Made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto,
or in Relation to Declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant” (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6), para. 8;
“General Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations during a State of Emergency”
(CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11), para. 11.
380 United Nations Human Rights Committee, “General comment No. 35 - Article 9 (Liberty and security
of person)” (CCPR/C/GC/35), para. 11.
381 Ibid. para. 12: “The notion of “arbitrariness” is not to be equated with “against the law”, but must be
interpreted more broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and
due process of law, as well as elements of reasonableness, necessity and proportionality.
382 See common art. 3 of the Geneva Conventions, requiring that all civilians and persons hors de combat
are treated humanely. Arbitrary detention is considered incompatible with this requirement. See also
ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 99.

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the context of a non-international armed conflict, its requirement of humane treatment of

persons implies freedom from arbitrary deprivation of liberty and comparable protection of
procedural rights (for example, to be informed of the reasons and given an opportunity to
challenge the lawfulness of the detention).
223. Under the national law of Myanmar, both the Constitution and the Criminal
Procedure Code prohibit detention of civilians for more than 24 hours without a court’s
permission;383 with a constitutional exception if such detention is a matter for
“precautionary measures taken for the security of the Union or prevalence of law and order,
peace and tranquillity in accord with the law in the interest of the public”. 384 The Criminal
Procedure Code allows judges to extend the 24-hour custody period to 15 days, or 30 days
in the case of offences punishable by more than seven years imprisonment. 385
224. Under Myanmar domestic law, the powers of arrest principally lie with the Police.
However, under the Criminal Procedure Code, Tatmadaw officers may also arrest or
confine persons forming part of an assembly that manifestly endangers public security
when no magistrate can be communicated with, but they must communicate with a
magistrate when it becomes practicable to do so.386 Furthermore, the State Protection Act,
in force from 1975 until its repeal in May 2016, allowed Tatmadaw officers to arrest and
detain any person when ordered to do so by the “Central Board”.387 Anyone taken into
custody by the Tatmadaw must be swiftly handed over to police authorities.
225. The prohibition of enforced disappearances is a norm of peremptory law (jus
cogens). Enforced disappearances violate the right to liberty and security of the person and
violate or constitute a grave threat to the right to life, along with several other rights.
International humanitarian law also prohibits enforced disappearances. 388 An enforced
disappearance is constituted by three elements: (1) a person is detained or otherwise
deprived of liberty; (2) the deprivation of liberty is carried out by State agents or by persons
or groups of persons acting with the authorisation, support or acquiescence of the State; and
(3) a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty, or concealing the fate or
whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of
the law.389

(b) Findings

Arbitrary deprivation of liberty

226. The Mission received widespread and consistent accounts of individuals being
arbitrarily arrested and then detained by the Tatmadaw throughout the reporting period, and
from across Kachin and Shan States. Many individuals were detained for the purpose of
forced labour. The Mission also received reliable and consistent accounts of individuals
being arrested and detained after the Tatmadaw were attacked by EAOs, or during military
operations, because they were suspected of being a member or supporter of the
organization.390 Individuals were seemingly arrested simply because they were in the
vicinity of a recent attack, or because they were from a village near to the incident, and of
the same ethnicity as the group in question. This appeared to reflect a mentality that all
individuals of a given ethnicity supported the associated EAO. 391 For example, one victim
from Mogaung Township, Kachin State, who was detained for three days in August 2017,
reported that soldiers from the Tatmadaw repeatedly questioned him about who from his

383 Constitution of Myanmar, s. 21(b); Criminal Procedure Code of Myanmar, s. 61.

384 Constitution of Myanmar, s. 376.
385 Criminal Procedure Code of Myanmar, s. 60-61, 81, 167.
386 Criminal Procedure Code of Myanmar, s. 131.
387 State Protection Act (1975), s. 15; Criminal Procedure Code of Myanmar, s. 21. As per s. 8 of the
State Protection Act, a Central Board is formed by the Cabinet and chaired by the Minister for Home
and Religious Affairs, and includes the Minister for Defence and the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
388 ICRC/Customary IHL, rules 98 and 150.
389 CPED, art. 2.
390 DI-060, DI-066, DI-067, PI-035, PI-044, PI-047, PI-058, PI-086, SI-004.
391 DI-066, PI-054, PI-059, PI-074, PI-075, PI-086.

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village was a member of the KIA, refusing to believe him when he responded that the
villagers were simply “ordinary people”, with one of the members of the Tatmadaw
insisting that “all Kachin men are members of the KIA.” 392
227. The victims of arbitrary arrest and detention included men 393 and women.394 In some
cases men395 and village leaders were selectively targeted. 396 Children were also detained,
because they were themselves suspected, were subjected to forced labour, or were detained
with their mothers.397
228. The Mission received accounts of mass-arrests and detention.398 For example, during
intense fighting between the Northern Alliance and the Tatmadaw in Monekoe, Muse
Township, Shan State, more than 100 people were arrested on 20 November 2016 and
detained by the Tatmadaw in a military base.399
229. The Mission also received credible information indicating that the Tatmadaw has
detained individuals, primarily or partially, in order to extract bribes.400 For example, one
male victim reported that he was arrested at a checkpoint while travelling from Hpakant to
Myitkyina, Kachin State in 2016 and asked for jade or money. He was kept overnight in a
tent serving as a makeshift lock-up before being released.401

Duration and perpetrators

230. In most of the accounts received, individuals were detained for several days. 402
However, in some cases, individuals were detained for longer periods, of one month or
more.403 One victim from a village in Kyethi Township, Shan State, reporting being
detained for two years in a forced labour camp from 2015 to 2017. 404
231. In nearly all accounts, Tatmadaw soldiers were identified as the perpetrators of
arbitrary arrests and detention.405 The Mission also received credible accounts of militias
participating in arrests and detention alongside members of the Tatmadaw. 406 Accounts
were also received of the SaYaPa intelligence officers being responsible.407

Lack of compliance with procedural safeguards

232. The Mission amassed a consistent body of information drawing a pattern of civilians
being detained in locations not officially recognised as places of detention, both in the
context of forced labour and because they were suspected of links with ethnic armed
organizations. Detained individuals were often kept in military bases or camps, 408
sometimes in makeshift lock ups,409 and in SaYaPa offices.410 Other places of detention

392 PI-044.
393 DI-067, PI-059, PI-062, PI-075.
394 PI-058, PI-066, PI-086.
395 DI-063, PI-074, PI-084.
396 DI-067, PI-035, PI-111.
397 DI-071, PI-047, PI-063, QI-094, SI-003, V-055.
398 DI-066. See this chapter, section A.8: Emblematic incidents (Tanai).
399 DI-058, DI-060, V-056. See this chapter, section A.8: Emblematic incidents (Monekoe).
400 DI-064, DI-072, PI-011, PI-022.
401 DI-064.
402 One day or less: PI-029, PI-054, PI-058, PI-081. Two days; PI-033, PI-047, SI-004.
Three days: PI-044 PI-092, PI-083, PI-061. Four days: PI-021, PI-084, PI-095.
Six days: PI-006, PI-077.1 week: DI-067, PI-080.
403 15 days: DI-060.1 month: PI-011, PI-019, PI-079, PI-111. 2.5 months: PI-085. 6-7 months: PI-068.
404 PI-013.
405 PI-006, PI-011, PI-020, PI-021, PI-026, PI-062, PI-068, PI-074, PI-089, PI-096.
406 PI-054, PI-056, SI -004.
407 PI-052, PI-055, PI-056.
408 DI-067, DI-058, DI-060, PI-006, PI-020, PI-061, PI-062, PI-066, PI-067, PI-068, PI-078, PI-079,
PI-084.
409 DI-064, PI-011.
410 PI-052, PI-055, PI-056.

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included houses411 and monasteries412 or in multiple locations in forest areas for example
during forced labour portering.413 In some cases, victims were initially held in the location
where they were arrested and then moved to military camps or SaYaPa offices. 414
233. The Tatmadaw also systematically detained individuals in these unofficial places of
detention without compliance with procedural safeguards. Victims consistently told the
Mission they were not informed of the reasons for their arrest. 415 For example, a female
victim reported how she was arrested, together with her two children, without being given
reasons, in Mogaung Township, Kachin State, in August 2017:
There was fighting between the Tatmadaw and the KIA. We ran away and when we
came back to the village there were soldiers everywhere. I was arrested with my two
children. I was taken to a primary school and put in a classroom with a guard. They
did not give us any reasons, they just locked us in all day. In the evening they took us
to the forest, and two days later they let us go.416
234. Most victims were held incommunicado without being able to inform their families
of their location, had no access to a lawyer and were not brought before a court. 417
235. In some cases, individuals arrested and detained for suspected links to armed groups
were eventually brought to court and charged, usually under the Unlawful Associations
Act.418 However, in these instances this was after a period of being detained
incommunicado in unofficial places of detention. 419 For example one individual from
Waingmaw Township, Kachin State, reported how her relative was arrested and held on a
farm before being transferred to a Police Station:
In 2016, my relative was on the way to farm crops when he was arrested by the
Tatmadaw. A friend told me they saw him tied-up with guns pointed at him. The
soldiers were saying that he was a member of the KIA and my brother was denying
this. The soldiers asked for 3,000 Kyat in exchange for his release. We tried to
gather the money but they said it was taking too long so they took him to a farm
nearby. Then he was moved to a district police station and held there for one month.
Now he is in prison. 420
236. The Mission received information that, in some instances, individuals, including
children, who were transferred to recognised places of detention were still not afforded full
procedural safeguards, including:
• not being provided with information about the charges against them in a language
which they understand;421
• being held incommunicado; and422
• being denied access to legal counsel until after their hearing. 423
237. The Mission received accounts of Tatmadaw soldiers or SaYaPa officers forcing
victims to sign pre-written statements during detention. Victims reported different issues in
relation to these statements, including not being aware of the contents of the written
statement or document;424 the statements wrongly asserting the individual had not been

411 PI-053, PI-075, SI-004.

412 PI-056, PI-074, PI-076, PI-111.
413 PI-047, PI-080, PI-085, PI-095, PI-096.
414 PI-035, PI-052, PI-056.
415 PI-011, PI-019, PI-047, PI-054, QI-080.
416 PI-047.
417 DI-067, PI-006, PI-035, PI-044, PI-077, PI-080.
418 See this chapter, section A.C: Lack of recourse.
419 PI-022, PI-052, PI-055, PI-056, PI-109.
420 PI-022.
421 V-055.
422 PI-052 V-118.
423 V-055, V-112.
424 PI-046, PI-056.

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subject to ill-treatment;425 or the statements being admissions of guilt. 426 For example, one
victim from a village in Kyaukme Township, Shan State, who was arrested in August 2017
and held for more than 24 hours, was made to sign a document with his thumb which stated
that he was “the enemy”, was involved in political activities and would “not be involved
with political activities in the future”. 427

Detention in inhuman conditions

238. Victims consistently gave accounts of inhuman conditions in unofficial places of
detention which could amount to ill-treatment428 including being held for periods:
• in inadequate accommodation, including in the open air without bedding; 429
• without access to adequate sanitary facilities; 430
• without adequate food being provided, including being denied food, 431 receiving
insufficient food or food of poor quality;432
• without access to safe drinking water when needed, including being denied access to
water entirely or being allowed only a limited amount or only water that is unsafe; 433
and
• without access to health care, 434 in one account leading to death.435
239. For example, a male victim from a village in Puta-O Township, Kachin State, who
was detained for six days in 2017 reported poor conditions and his friend dying in
detention:
I was arrested by the Tatmadaw during a church festival with nine other people. We
had to carry rice between a military base and our village. We were given only a
small portion of hard rice to eat each day and felt hungry all the time. We could only
drink one cup of water per day and were not allowed to drink from the stream
nearby. One day one of my friends was very sick with stomach problems and could
not walk. One of the soldiers kicked him in the stomach making it worse. We carried
him but before reaching the village my friend died. The soldiers said we were
responsible for his death and would be placed in jail and tortured because we had
killed him. We managed to escape but afterwards Tatmadaw soldiers came to my
house to look for me and said they had opened a case against me for the death of my
friend.436
240. The Mission was able to collect only limited information on conditions in official
places of detention, but credible reports indicate that individuals detained there were also
held in inhuman conditions, including in inadequate accommodation in overcrowded cells
with an insufficient number of beds. 437 The Myanmar National Human Rights Commission
has acknowledged that detainees are kept in overcrowded conditions in several detention
facilities including in Lashio and Myitkyina prisons. 438

425 PI-044.
426 PI-035, PI-052.
427 PI-035.
428 See this chapter, section A.3: Torture and other ill-treatment.
429 DI-058, DI-060, PI-079, PI-095.
430 DI-058, DI-060, PI-109.
431 DI-060, PI-038, PI- 096.
432 DI-058, DI-060, PI-019, PI-020, PI-044, PI-080, PI-083, PI-085, PI-092, PI-095.
433 DI-060, PI-019, PI-020, PI-077, PI-083, PI-084, PI-085, PI-095.
434 PI-035, PI-077, PI-080.
435 PI-077.
436 PI-077.
437 PI-038, PI-109.
438 Republic of the Union of Myanmar - Myanmar National Human Rights Commission, e.g. “Statement
regarding visit to Mandalay, Naung Cho, Thi Paw and Lashio Township Prisons and Work Stations
Statement No. (8/2015)” and “Statement by the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission on its

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Torture, ill-treatment, sexual violence, and killings in unofficial places of detention

241. Detained individuals were frequently subjected to torture and ill-treatment while in
unofficial places of detention, in particular where the individual was being questioned on
suspected links to EAOs,439 or for either walking or working too slowly during forced
labour.440 Victims were also subjected to racist, ethnic or dehumanizing insults. 441 One
victim from a village in Sumprabum Township, Kachin State, described how 16 villagers
were arrested, detained and questioned during a period of fighting between the KIA and the
Tatmadaw in 2015:
In December 2015, there was fighting between the KIA and the Tatmadaw. Soldiers
entered my village and six villagers were arrested including two village
administrators. Soldiers also arrested 10 people from another village called Hka
Garan including two village administrators and took us all to a military base. The
soldiers interrogated us; they threatened to kill us if we didn’t answer properly and
accused us of being KIA soldiers. We told them that we are not soldiers and have
nothing to do with the KIA, we are just villagers but they said we had to be KIA
soldiers and hit us with the backs of their guns and insulted us. Every day for a
week, we received the same questions and every day we gave the same answers.442
242. The Mission also verified that victims were killed in detention, 443 and subjected to
sexual violence while in detention.444

End of unofficial detention

243. In some cases individuals detained for forced labour or because of suspected links to
armed groups were released by the Tatmadaw445 including following an intervention by
village administrators or upon payment of a sum of money. 446 However, victims also seized
opportunities to escape.447 For example, one female victim from Waingmaw Township,
Kachin State, reported how, after being detained for several months on a military base in
2012, she managed to escape one night, when the soldiers were drunk, and run away
through the forest.448
244. The Mission received consistent reports of Tatmadaw soldiers shooting at
individuals fleeing detention.449 Two victims further reported being left behind to die in the
forest by Tatmadaw soldiers because they were unable to walk. 450
245. In some cases, those initially held in unofficial places of detention were
subsequently transferred to official places of detention. 451

Enforced disappearance
246. The Mission received credible accounts of disappearances, many amounting to
enforced disappearances carried out by the Tatmadaw and SaYaPa. 452 In some cases,
individuals who were arrested and disappeared were later confirmed to have been in the

visit to the Kachin State (13 December 2011)”, available at http://www.mnhrc.org.mm/en/statements-

2/.
439 DI-066, DI-067, PI-004, PI-054, PI-059, PI-074, PI-086. See this chapter, section A.3: Torture and
other ill-treatment.
440 See this chapter, section A.6: Forced labour.
441 DI-066, PI-004, PI-059.
442 DI-067.
443 See this chapter, section A.2: Unlawful killings.
444 PI-006, PI-067, PI-068. See this chapter, section A.4: Sexual and gender-based violence.
445 PI-044, PI-053, PI-058, PI-081, SI-004.
446 PI-035, PI-075, PI-081.
447 PI-006, PI-029, PI-033, PI-066, PI-077, PI-079, PI-084, PI-085.
448 PI-068.
449 DI-067, PI-026, PI-029, PI-084. See this chapter, section A.2: Unlawful killings.
450 PI-021, PI-080.
451 Ibid.
452 DI-059, K-138, K-139, PI-037, PI-038, PI-052, PI-069, PI-106, V-056, V-057, V-121, V-122.

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custody of the Tatmadaw or SaYaPa.453 Active efforts were made to conceal the fate, or
whereabouts, of these individuals.
247. For example, Dumdaw Nawng Lat, President of the Kachin Baptist Church in
Monekoe, Muse Township, Shan State, and his nephew and assistant pastor Langjaw Gam
Seng, were called to a military base on 24 December 2016 and then disappeared.454 In early
December 2016, the pastors had shown journalists around their damaged church, which
they alleged had been hit by a Tatmadaw airstrike. News articles featuring pictures of the
church had been released in the weeks prior to their disappearance, with one article
explicitly alleging Tatmadaw responsibility, published on 23 December 2016.455 A missing
person’s report was filed with police on 4 January 2017. On 10 January 2017, Presidential
Spokesperson Zaw Htay reportedly denied that they were detained by the military and
suggested they may have been taken by the KIA.456 On 19 January 2017, the Commander-
in-Chief, Senior-General Min Aung Laing, confirmed in a Facebook post that the men were
detained by the military.457 It was later confirmed that they had been detained in a military
camp, before being transferred to Muse police station on 24 January 2017, a month after
they had first been detained. During their detention they were coerced to sign
confessions.458
248. The Mission received credible examples of individuals who were searching for
disappeared victims being given conflicting information on their fate by the authorities. 459
For instance, an individual searching for Laphai Gam, a villager from Muse Township who
disappeared in December 2016, was reportedly told by the police that he had been arrested
by the Tatmadaw and would be released in a few days. When he did not appear a few days
later, the individual went to a Tatmadaw base and was told by a soldier that the victim had
been seen talking to the KIA and that the KIA may be responsible. Later, they heard
through an intermediary that a Tatmadaw commander had indicated that the victim had
been detained and then released. The whereabouts of the victim remains unknown to
date.460
249. Another case involves Sumlut Roi Ja, who was reportedly arrested by the Tatmadaw
on 28 October 2011 from a field and detained in a military camp near Hkai Ban village,
Moemauk Township, Kachin State. She was reportedly arrested alongside two other
individuals who managed to escape. She was later seen in the military camp, and an Army
Commander stated she was detained and would be released the next day, but she did not
appear. Letters were sent to the Kachin State Chief Minister, copied to several other
authorities,461 and a habeas corpus petition brought before the Supreme Court in 2012. The
Supreme Court rejected the petition based on a case file from an investigation carried out
by the Northern Regional Command’s Base Strategic Operation Command located in Moe
Meik.462 The Myanmar Government responded to a communication from the Special
Rapporteur on Myanmar and other special procedures mandate holders in 2013, stating that
personnel from the military post “did not carry out any activities whatsoever outside their
camp”.463 However, in a documentary film released in 2015, a soldier from the military
camp in question, who was detained by the KIA, stated that the soldiers had left their camp
looking for food and had encountered Sumlut Roi Ja, and that their commanding officer had

453 PI-037, PI-038, PI-052.

454 PI-037, PI-038, V-057.
455 L. Weng, “Bishop Says Mong Ko Church Damaged by Government Air Strikes” (The Irrawaddy, 23
December 2016).
456 J. Zaw, “Concern mounts for two missing Baptists in Shan State” (UCA news, 10 January 2017).
457 Post on file with the Mission.
458 PI-037, PI-038, V-058. See also this chapter, section C.3: Lack of recourse.
459 DI-059, K-138, K-139, V-056.
460 K-149, V-056.
461 K-138.3.
462 K-138.2.
463 Letter from the Permenant Mission of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar to the United Nations
Office andother International Organizations in Geneva, 16 March 2013, available at
https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=82270

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falsely told the Northern Command that they had not left their camp.464 No new
investigations have been conducted and her fate remains unknown. 465
250. The lack of compliance with procedural safeguards for detention which should
protect against disappearances (see above) meant family members were frequently unaware
of the whereabouts of their detained relatives until they escaped, were released or were
transferred to official places of detention, which in some cases was weeks or months
later.466 In other cases, individuals arrested by the Tatmadaw never returned and their
families do not know their fate. 467 For example, one woman from a village in Tanai
Township, Kachin State, reported that her husband disappeared after he went gold mining
in January 2014. She was told by witnesses that he was detained by the Tatmadaw in April
2014 and taken to do forced labour, but he has not been heard from since. 468 A victim
arrested by the Tatmadaw in Monekoe, Muse Township, Shan State in November 2016, and
later released, told the Mission, “I was worried that if I die here, my family would not even
find my body”.469 Other individuals reported being arrested alongside family members, but
leaving them behind when they managed to escape detention and never hearing from them
again.470
251. The Mission also received accounts of cases where individuals were detained by the
Tatmadaw and, after family members searched for them, were found dead, often buried,
and sometimes with ropes binding their wrists. 471 In two cases reported to the Mission,
Tatmadaw solders were reportedly later found to be responsible for the killings.472 The
Mission has also received credible reports of the Tatmadaw committing killings of multiple
individuals at the same time and the discovery of graves containing the remains of a
number of individuals.473 These and other accounts received by the Mission point to a
pattern of intentional concealing of the remains of individuals who are killed during
detention.474
252. In some cases family members or persons associated with disappeared individuals
submitted complaints to the authorities about the disappearance.475 However, others did not.
One individual told the Mission of being too afraid to complain, and it is likely that many in
this situation shared the same fears. 476 These fears are not unfounded given the numerous
cases verified by the Mission where the Tatmadaw threatened or brought legal charges
against individuals reporting or alleging its involvement in violations. 477 Some said they did
not see any point in filing a complaint with the police or Tatmadaw, and instead they
themselves searched for the missing person. 478 One individual from Loilen Township, Shan
State, told the Mission he did not file a complaint concerning his missing father as “the
government does not care about us and the Tatmadaw are abusive - there is no justice for
the Shan”.479 His father was arrested by the Tatmadaw in 2011 and was then missing for a
week before his body was found in the forest with his hands tied. The Mission also received
credible information that in one case, where two individuals were missing in Mansi
Township, Kachin State in 2018, the Tatmadaw denied villagers permission to search for
them.480 In another case, an individual told the Mission how she had to persuade her village

464 K. McLeod/DVB Multimedia Group, “The Disappearance of Roi Ja” (2015).

465 V-332.
466 See this chapter, section A.2: Unlawful killings.
467 PI-004, PI-069, PI-099.
468 PI-069.
469 K-148.
470 PI-004, PI-099.
471 K-139, K-140, PI-082, PI-106, V-021, V-022. See this chapter, section A.2: Unlawful killings.
472 K-140, V-021, V-022.
473 See this chapter, section A.2: Unlawful killings.
474 DI-063, PI-062. See this chapter, section A.2: Unlawful killings.
475 DI-059, K-139, PI-037, PI-038, PI-052.
476 DI-057.
477 See this chapter, section C.3: Lack of recourse.
478 PI-069, PI-082.
479 PI-082.
480 K-139.

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administrator to look for her a relative who had been arrested by the Tatmadaw in Bhamo
Township, Kachin State in January 2018:
My relative went to check the cattle and didn’t come back. Some people told us that
they had seen him tied up and with Tatmadaw soldiers. We asked the village
administrator permission to go and look for him, but he said it was too dangerous.
We insisted and eventually we were allowed to go. We found his body one month
later, facing down in a ditch. We could see bullet wounds in his back – it looked like
he had also been beaten.481

6. Forced labour and forced recruitment of adults and children

253. Forced labour is a common feature of life for many in northern Myanmar. 482 The
Mission verified a pattern of continuing systematic use by the Tatmadaw of forced labour,
including for portering, digging trenches, guiding or cooking. Soldiers routinely arrived in
villages without warning and took people for forced labour, often for weeks at a time. Some
of those taken were required to fight for the Tatmadaw. The Tatmadaw recruited children
throughout the reporting period, although it has undertaken some efforts to address this
issue.

(a) Legal framework

254. The International Labour Organization Forced Labour Convention 1930 (No. 29),
which Myanmar acceded to in 1955, defines forced or compulsory labour as “all work or
service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which
the said person has not offered himself voluntarily”. Under this Convention, Myanmar is
obliged to suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour in all its forms within the
shortest possible period. Myanmar has also acceded to the International Labour
Organization Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention 1999 (No. 182), under which it is
obliged to take immediate and effective measures to secure the prohibition and elimination
of the worst forms of child labour as a matter of urgency. Forced or compulsory labour is
also prohibited under international human rights law. Provisions to that effect feature in
several human rights treaties ratified by Myanmar: the ICESC (art. 6.1), the CRC (art. 32)
and the CRPD (art. 27.2).
255. The definition of forced or compulsory labour comprises three basic elements: work
or service, which is exacted under the menace of a penalty, and undertaken involuntarily.
“Work or service” refers to all types of work, service or employment, occurring in any
activity, industry or sector (both public and private). “Menace of any penalty” refers to a
wide range of penalties used to compel someone to perform the work or service, including
penal sanctions and various forms of direct or indirect coercion, such as physical violence,
psychological threats or the non-payment of wages. Involuntariness refers to the free and

481 PI-106.
482 In 1998, a Commission of Inquiry of the International Labour Organization (ILO) published a report
concluding that Myanmar violated its obligation to suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour
“in a widespread and systematic manner, with a total disregard for the human dignity, safety and
health and basic needs of the people”. The Commission found that there was abundant evidence
showing “pervasive use of forced labour imposed on the civilian population throughout Myanmar by
the authorities and the military”. It concluded that “it is a story of gross denial of human rights to
which the people of Myanmar have been subjected particularly since 1988 and from which they find
no escape except fleeing from the country”. See, “Forced Labour in Myanmar (Burma). Report of the
Commission of Inquiry appointed under article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour
Organization to examine the observance by Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No.
29)” (ILO, Geneva, 1998). Some moderately positive improvements in the use of forced labour were
reported from 2002 onwards, after greater engagement with the ILO began, suggesting the central
authorities no longer requisitioned labour for major national infrastructure projects (e.g.
A/HRC/4/14, para. 44; A/HRC/7/18, para. 33). However, systematic forced labour by the military
reportedly continued unabated. See e.g. ILO Report on ILO Activities in Myanmar, 20 February
2014, GB. 320/INS/6(Rev.); A/HRC/16/59, para. 93.

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informed consent of a worker to enter into an employment relationship and the freedom to
leave the employment at any time. 483
256. International law permits some exemptions to the general prohibition of forced
labour. In addition to compulsory military service, prison labour and work in the context of
emergencies, the exemptions include normal civic obligations and minor communal
service. Examples of civic obligations include compulsory jury service and the duty to
assist a person in danger. “Minor communal service” means service performed by the
members of the community in the direct interest of the community. It must be “minor”, that
is, related primarily to maintenance work and, in exceptional cases, to the erection of
certain buildings intended to improve the social conditions of the population of the
community itself; The service must also be “communal”, that is, in the direct interest of the
community (and not related to the execution of works intended to benefit a wider group).
Importantly, the members of the community which has to perform the services, or their
direct representatives, must have the right to be consulted in regard to the need for such
services.484
257. Section 359 of the 2008 Constitution of Myanmar prohibits forced labour but allows
for exceptions (“hard labour as a punishment for crime duly convicted and duties assigned
thereupon by the Union in accordance with the law in the interest of the public”). Although
the formulation is somewhat unclear, these exceptions appear to exceed the permissible
exceptions under international labour law and international human rights law. 485 The Towns
Act (1907) and the Village Act (1908), which gave broad powers to local authorities to
requisition labour from villagers, were repealed in 2012 and replaced with the Ward and
Village Tract Administration Law. This Law explicitly sanctions the use of forced labour
(art. 27)486 as does the Myanmar Penal Code (art. 374).487

(b) Findings
258. The Mission found a pattern of systematic use of men, women and children for
forced labour across Kachin and Shan States, throughout the reporting period, including in
areas of the States not subject to active conflict. In many instances the Tatmadaw arrived in
a village and arrested many people who were then detained for forced labour, without
warning or consultation.488 Sometimes, villagers were taken directly from their homes.489 In
some cases this was done in an organized fashion, such as house by house, 490 on the basis of
a quota for each family,491 through a list,492 or with the cooperation of village leaders.493 For
example, one individual from Namhsan Township, Shan State, recounted how 40 soldiers
entered his village in March 2013 and called a meeting of the village and then took people
away for forced labour.494 Individuals were also taken for forced labour from the areas

483 See International Labour Organization, “ILO Standards on Forced Labour - The new Protocol and
Recommendation at a Glance / International Labour Office, Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work Branch” (ILO, Geneva, 2016).
484 See, “Forced Labour in Myanmar (Burma). Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed under
article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization to examine the observance by
Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29)” (ILO, Geneva, 1998), paras. 205-213.
485 See e.g. Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations, International Labour Conference, 99th Session, 2010, p. 253, para. 11.
486 “Whoever commit any threat or use force for his own interest that infringe anyone’s interest such as
forced labor shall be fined either less than one year imprisonment or 100,000 Kyat or both.”
487 “Whoever unlawfully compels any person to labour against the will of that person shall
punished with imprisonment, of either description for a term which may extend to one year,
or with fine, or with both.”
488 DI-057, PI-019, PI-081, PI-083, PI-084, PI-095, SI-003.
489 PI-081, PI-084, PI-094.
490 PI-081, QI-093.
491 PI-006, PI-007, QI-086.
492 PI-006, PI-007, PI-033.
493 PI-011, PI-033, PI-095, PI-109, PI-111.
494 PI-095.

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surrounding their villages while they were fishing or farming or running errands495 or while
travelling.496 For example, one individual from Puta-O Township, Kachin State, described
being stopped by the Tatmadaw while travelling on a highway in February 2018, then being
taken to a military base and being required to dig trenches for eight days. 497 In another
incident from 2015, individuals were taken for forced labour from a camp for internally
displaced persons in Bhamo Township, Kachin State. 498
259. Individuals stated that it was not possible to refuse to participate in forced labour,499
and no compensation of payment was received for the labour. 500 In some cases, arrest for
forced labour was accompanied by destruction of houses and looting of property, 501 or by
threats, including death threats, or ill-treatment against the individual,502 or their family
members.503 For example, a teacher from Bhamo Township, Kachin State, described how
she was threatened and ill-treated while being taken for forced labour in 2012:
I was on my way to work when four soldiers stopped me. The soldiers asked me
where I was going and I explained I was going to the school where I teach. The
soldiers said “you don’t need to teach any more, come with us.” I told them that I
had to go to school because the students had exams and needed their teacher. The
soldiers got angry. They pointed their guns at me and said “do not speak to us this
way, you need to follow us, if you don’t come with us you will die.” They slapped
me, blindfolded me and made me walk with them carrying heavy bags.504
260. While in some cases only men were taken for forced labour, 505 frequently women
were also victims.506 Children were also subjected to forced labour. 507 Most child victims
were aged 12 or over,508 but one victim from Kutkai Township, Shan State, reported being
taken for portering on multiple occasions from nine years of age until she left Myanmar
aged 27, following an attempted rape during forced labour in 2012. 509 Victims of forced
labour also included individuals suffering from health issues510 and elderly individuals. 511
For example, one child from Tanai Township, Kachin State, described how all the people in
her village were subjected to forced labour:
There is a military base nearby my village. Villagers are often forced to work for the
soldiers at the base, cooking, cleaning, building and doing other tasks. Even the
children have to participate – they carry small bricks for building and the elderly
have to plant trees and do other work.512
261. The location and duration of forced labour varied. Many individuals were subjected
to forced labour at military bases, 513 which in some cases were close to their villages. 514
Others were required to travel long distances through the forest with the Tatmadaw. 515

495 PI-060, PI-079, PI-096, QI-095.

496 PI-029, PI-067, PI-078, PI-089, PI-096, PI-111.
497 PI-078.
498 PI-026.
499 DI-064, PI-017, PI-078, QI-077, QI-086.
500 PI-005, PI-013, PI-021.
501 PI-023, PI-067, PI-080.
502 PI-022, PI-023, PI-063, PI-067, PI-099.
503 PI-022, PI-068.
504 PI-067.
505 DI-063, PI-077, PI-080.
506 PI-006, PI-063, PI-067, PI-068, PI-089, PI-099.
507 DI-063, DI-071, DI-072, DI-073, PI-022, PI-063, QI-084.
508 DI-063, DI-072, DI-073.
509 QI-084.
510 PI-033, DI-071.
511 PI-063, DI-071.
512 PI-063.
513 PI-006, PI-019, PI-020, PI-061, PI-063, PI-068, PI-077, PI-079, PI-084.
514 PI-061, PI-063, PI-077.
515 PI-033, PI-083, PI-085, PI-099.

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Individuals were also required to cook for the Tatmadaw in their own homes 516 or, in two
cases, act as translators for the Tatmadaw. 517
262. In some cases individuals would carry out forced labour during the day and then
return to their homes during the nights. 518 However, in many cases individuals subjected to
forced labour were not able to return to their homes until they were released or escaped. 519
This varied from a period of a day, 520 to a month or more, 521 or in one case two years. 522
Measures were taken to try to prevent individuals escaping, including tying up their feet
with chains,523 tying up their hands,524 and threatening retribution if they escaped.525 Victims
also reported that soldiers would shoot at those attempting to escape captivity. 526 For
example, one woman from Waingmaw Township, Kachin State, who was forced to act as a
porter for one day in December 2016, told the Mission, “I decided to escape after my friend
was raped. When we started to run, soldiers were shooting at us. I fell down a cliff and lost
consciousness. When I woke up I was covered in blood.”527
263. Forced labour has been a common feature of village life for many in Kachin and
Shan States.528 One individual reported that in her village in Kutkai Township, Shan State,
forced labour happened almost weekly. 529 Forced labour was so prevalent that another
individual from Puta-O Township, Kachin State, told the Mission she did not know it was a
human rights violation until she left the country. In the words of a victim from Myitkyina
Township, Kachin State, who was taken for forced labour twice a month or more from the
age of 12 or 13, “We have done this for our whole lives”. 530
264. Individuals subjected to forced labour were required to perform a variety of tasks.
Many of those detained were required to act as porters for the Tatmadaw,531 carrying heavy
packages including food532, clothes533 and in some cases weapons534. Porters would often
have to walk long distances over difficult terrain and for multiple consecutive days. For
example, one individual from Shan State who was forced to work as a porter in December
2014 described being required to walk carrying heavy packs and weapons over a long
distance from the south of Namhsan Township into neighbouring Manton Township, over
four days without any food.535 Other common types of work, carried out by men and
women, included:
• Acting as guides to show soldiers the route between villages 536
• Digging trenches537
• Cleaning538

516 PI-060, PI-075, PI-093, PI-094.

517 PI-111, QI-077.
518 PI-005, PI-007.
519 See this chapter, section A.5: Arbitrary deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance.
520 PI-007, PI-029, PI-081.
521 PI-011, PI-019, PI-068, PI-079, PI-085.
522 PI-013.
523 PI-019, QI-098.
524 PI-012, PI-060, PI-084, QI-093.
525 PI-025, PI-026, PI-078.
526 PI-026, PI-029, PI-084, QI-085.
527 PI-029.
528 DI-064, DI-072 (2010), PI-007, PI-022, PI-077, PI-089, PI-109, QI-090.
529 QI-084.
530 DI-063.
531 DI-057, PI-022, PI-023, PI-033, PI-060, PI-067, PI-067, PI-076, PI-077, PI-080, PI-083, PI-089,
PI-092, PI-094, PI-095.
532 PI-006, PI-011, PI-020, PI-021, PI-022, PI-029, PI-077.
533 PI-022, PI-076, PI-079.
534 DI-063, DI-064, PI-022, PI-076, PI-080, PI-096, PI-099.
535 PI-096.
536 PI-060, PI-095, QI-095.
537 PI-061, PI-084.

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• Cooking539
• Collecting firewood540
• Cutting down trees541
• Constructing roads or buildings in military compounds542
265. Individuals frequently had to perform a combination of different tasks. For example,
one person from Puta-O Township, Kachin State told the Mission about the tasks she was
required to complete when taken for forced labour on many different occasions:
In my village every family had to participate in forced labour. The soldiers came to
the village and they assigned responsibilities to each family. There was no way out.
They would register the names of the villagers who had to work. The military was
building a road, so we had to carry stones and heavy materials for them. We also
had to wash clothes, clean and cook their food. My parents were used as porters. 543
266. The Mission received repeated accounts that individuals subjected to forced labour
were made to walk at the front of the line when the Tatmadaw was travelling through the
forest in areas of active conflict.544 Some told the Mission that they were put at the front to
act as “human mine sweepers”, being the first to encounter any landmines in the area, rather
than the soldiers. Several victims of forced labour witnessed other civilians being injured or
killed by landmines during forced labour.545 Others subjected to forced labour were killed
or injured during clashes between the Tatmadaw and EAOs.546 The Mission received
information on two cases where individuals were forced to wear Tatmadaw uniforms while
walking at the front of the line, further exposing them to attacks, death and injury. 547
Victims were also intentionally killed during forced labour. 548
267. Individuals subjected to forced labour were frequently also subjected to ill-
treatment. Most of these victims who spoke to the Mission reported that they had been
beaten during forced labour,549 often for walking too slowly550 or resting551. Individuals
were also subjected to torture.552 Women detained for forced labour were vulnerable to
sexual violence, and several victims told the Mission that they were subjected to rape and
other forms of sexual violence by the military in this context. One woman who was
detained for forced labour in Bhamo Township in Kachin State in 2012 was kept as a
sexual slave for up to seven days.553
268. There was also a complete disregard for the humanity of the victims. Soldiers used
derogatory language, on ethnic or religious grounds, or dehumanising language against
victims.554 Others were subjected to death threats. 555 For example, a female victim from
Puta-O Township, Kachin State, who was subjected to forced labour for several days in
June 2015, reported being subjected to death threats:

538 PI-067, PI-078, PI-084.

539 PI-079 PI-080 PI-067 PI-068, PI-006, PI-020, PI-084, PI-080, PI-067, PI-063, PI-104.
540 DI-065, PI-006, PI-020.
541 PI-019, PI-077.
542 PI-006, PI-007, PI-020, PI-061, PI-089.
543 PI-007.
544 PI-020, PI-022, PI-076, PI-085, PI-104, QI-095.
545 PI-085, PI-104.
546 PI-022, PI-080.
547 PI-020, PI-085.
548 See this chapter, section A.2: Unlawful killings.
549 DI-066, PI-013, PI-021, PI-029, PI-033, PI-044, PI-053, PI-061, PI-078, Pi-078, PI-083, PI-084, PI-
086, PI-089, PI-094, PI-099.
550 PI-083, PI-084, PI-089, PI-099.
551 PI-078, PI-089.
552 See this chapter, section A.3: Torture and other ill-treatment.
553 PI-067. See this chapter, section A.4: Sexual and gender-based violence.
554 DI-063, DI-064, PI-007.
555 DI-065, PI-062.

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The soldiers came to our house and asked for one person for forced labour. As I was
the eldest sibling I had to go. We had to carry some bags which were very heavy. I
don’t know what was in them, the soldiers said “you shouldn’t ask anything. If you
ask we will kill you.” We weren’t allowed to rest all day. When it was dark we
stopped in the forest. We had to look for firewood and prepare dinner. Even though
we cooked the food, the soldiers did not offer us any. In the evening we had to keep
working. They kicked us saying “walk faster, walk faster.” One of the soldiers tried
to rape me but I pushed him hard and he fell down. He got very, very angry. He beat
me but said this time he would spare my life because I had lots of work still left to
do. I still have scars from the beating. The solders said that our lives were in their
hands. That they could do anything to us. They let us go but said they would be back
as they had another task for us. I felt that next time they might kill us so I could not
stay in the village any longer and I left. I will never forget this incident. Whenever it
is getting dark I remember it, I feel so overwhelmed and scared when I think about
it.556
269. Those detained for forced labour were kept in inhuman conditions. 557 A number of
individuals told the Mission that, when detained for forced labour, they had to bring food, 558
were given insufficient food or food of poor quality559 or were not able to eat at all.560
Individuals reported they did not have access to water when needed and were kept in
inadequate accommodation, including in the open air without bedding and without adequate
sanitary facilities.561
270. Children detained for forced labour were also subjected to ill-treatment and inhuman
conditions of detention.562 For example, a child from Mongkaing Township, Shan State,
who was subjected to forced labour in 2011 when she was around 13 years old, described
being beaten after asking for water:
In 2011, my father was taken for forced labour even though he was old and sick.
They did not give him proper food and drink. Two days after he returned home, he
died. Later I was taken for forced labour. I had to carry heavy bags for three days.
When we asked for food, the soldiers got upset. I asked for water and they beat me
for it.563
271. Individuals subjected to forced labour were also sometimes required to fight or
participate in hostilities. Some individuals told the Mission that, during forced labour, they
were made to wear Tatmadaw uniforms or given guns. 564 For example, one individual from
Kunhing Township, Shan State, reported how he was given a gun after fighting broke out
while he was doing forced labour in April 2012:
The Tatmadaw were staying overnight in our village and then next morning they
said they needed porters and four of us had to go with them. While walking we
encountered the SSA-S and fighting started. The Tatmadaw gave me a gun and told
me to shoot at the Shan soldiers, but I did not know how to shoot. I refused and the
soldiers beat me.565
272. Individuals acting as porters were frequently forced to carry weapons, 566 and one
individual reported being required to load ammunition into weapons. 567

556 DI-065.
557 See this chapter, section A.5: Arbitrary deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance.
558 PI-003, PI-005, PI-007, PI-022.
559 PI-019, PI-020, PI-080, PI-083, PI-085.
560 PI- 096, QI-098.
561 See this chapter, section A.5: Arbitrary deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance.
562 DI-063, DI-071, PI-022.
563 DI-071.
564 PI-011, PI-020, PI-085.
565 PI-011.
566 DI-063, DI-064, PI-022, PI-076, PI-080, PI-096, PI-099.
567 PI-080.

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273. In some cases reported to the Mission, individuals were taken from their villages for
forcible recruitment into the Tatmadaw. 568 One of these individuals was a child. 569 Credible
information received by the Mission, however, indicates that the Tatmadaw have forcibly
recruited adults and children throughout the reporting period.570 With regard to the
recruitment of adults, it needs to be examined whether these and other cases amount to
forced labour, or were imposed in manner that would render the recruitment unlawful or
arbitrary (for example, not prescribed by law; implemented in a way that is arbitrary or
discriminatory; functions and discipline of recruits not based on military needs and plans;
or not challengeable in a court of law). The Mission notes that efforts have been made to
address the issue of child recruitment.571 In 2012, the Government and the United Nations
signed a joint action plan to end the recruitment and use of child soldiers. In 2018, it was
reported that the total number of released children since the signing of the plan was over
924.572 In 2018, the Tatmadaw remained listed as a perpetrator of recruitment and use of
children in the Secretary-General’s report on children and armed conflict but it is
recognised as having put in place measures to improve protection of children during the
reporting period.573

7. Forced displacement, confiscation and destruction of property, and denial of

humanitarian assistance
274. The complete disregard for the interests and well-being of the civilian population in
Kachin and Shan States, particularly, but not only, in areas of active conflict, is further
demonstrated by patterns of movement restriction and forced displacement; the confiscation
and destruction of land and property; and the denial of humanitarian relief.

(a) Legal framework

275. It is a violation of international humanitarian law for a party to a non-international
armed conflict to order the displacement of the civilian population, in whole or in part,
unless an evacuation is required to protect the security of the civilians involved or because
of imperative military reasons.574 This displacement includes forced transfer caused by
physical force, the “threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence,
duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power against such person or
persons, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment”. 575 Parties to a conflict also
have a duty to ensure respect for their obligations under international law so as to prevent
displacement caused by their own acts.576 Unlawful transfer, deportation or displacement of
civilians in non-international armed conflicts can constitute a war crime or crime against
humanity.577
276. Even if ordering an evacuation is justified because relocation is necessary to clear a
combat zone, the party responsible for the transfer or evacuation must ensure, to the
greatest practicable extent, proper accommodation for the protected persons and
“satisfactory conditions of hygiene, health, safety and nutrition”. 578 Displaced persons have

568 PI-012, PI-016, PI-080, PI-081.

569 PI-016.
570 K-070, K-072.
571 Children must never be recruited into armed forces. This applies at a minimum to those under 15
years of age. Voluntary recruitment of children 15 years and above into State armed forces is not
prohibited by international law though preference should be given to recruiting those closest to 18
years of age. See CRC, art. 38(2)(3).
572 UNICEF, “Seventy-five children and young people released by the Myanmar Armed Forces” (3
September 2018). Also, S/2017/1099.
573 A/72/865, S/2018/465.
574 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 129B.
575 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stakić, IT-97-24-T, Appeals Judgment, 22 March 2006, para. 281. This language
was adopted and appears in the footnote of the ICC Elements of Crime, art. 7(1)(d).
576 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2), principle 5. See also,
ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 129.
577 See chapter VIII: Crimes under international law.
578 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 131.

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a right to voluntary return in safety to their homes or places of habitual residence as soon as
the reasons for their displacement cease to exist.
277. It is a violation of international humanitarian law if a party to the armed conflict, in
the context of and associated with the conflict: (i) destroys or seizes property of an
adversary, unless the destruction or seizure is required by imperative military necessity 579;
(ii) attacks civilian objects, unless and for such time as they are military objectives580; (iii)
appropriates a town or village’s property for personal use (pillage) 581; or (iv) fails to respect
the property of displaced persons, including failing to protect against destruction or the
arbitrary and illegal appropriation, occupation or use of property or possessions left
behind.582 Such violations may constitute war crimes. 583
278. Under international humanitarian law, parties to armed conflicts are required to
allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded humanitarian relief for civilians in need, and are
in breach when they: (i) impede access of humanitarian relief to civilians; or (ii) arbitrarily
deny consent to enable humanitarian relief operations; or (iii) restrict freedom of movement
of humanitarian relief personnel, other than temporarily when it is required by imperative
military necessity.584

(b) Findings

Violations related to movement of civilian populations

279. The Mission received accounts of individuals being ordered to leave their village by
the Tatmadaw; being physically prevented from returning; or ordered not to return. 585 For
example, a man from Loilen District, Shan State, reported that in November 2011 the
Tatmadaw came to his village and told the villagers “you are no longer allowed to farm and
you all need to leave the village immediately, otherwise we will burn your homes”. 586 The
Tatmadaw soldiers later burned down his house, along with others in the village. In another
case, the Mission was told how, in February 2013, a village in Bhamo Township, Kachin
State, was attacked by the Tatmadaw and five houses were burned down. The victim
escaped and later tried to return, but found that he was not able to go back because soldiers
had closed the entrance to the village and would not let civilians past. 587
280. Other individuals recounted that conditions in their villages had become so difficult
that it was impossible to remain or to return after they had fled attacks. The Mission
identified a widespread practice of attacking, destroying and looting civilian property, 588
including intentional destruction, or burning, of civilian houses. 589 Victims returning after
fleeing attacks on their villages found their houses and livelihoods destroyed, compelling
them to leave.590 For example, one woman from a village in Namkhan Township, Shan
State, narrated how her family tried to stay in her village, but eventually the village was
destroyed and they had to leave:
In December 2015 and January 2016 there were lots of planes flying overhead, and
we could hear shooting and bombing. In January 2016, the Tatmadaw attacked our
village. Many of the villagers fled but we decided to stay. But in February,
Tatmadaw soldiers entered the village. They arrested some people and then shot at

579 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 50.

580 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 10.
581 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 52.
582 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 133; Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
(E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2), principle 21(3).
583 See chapter VIII.C: War crimes.
584 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 55 and 56.
585 PI-026, PI-042, PI-082, PI-087, PI-104, V-123, V-124.
586 PI-082.
587 PI-026.
588 See this chapter, section A.1: Conduct of hostilities in flagrant disregard of civilian life and property.
589 DI-058, DI-066, PI-026, PI-029, PI-049, PI-080, PI-082, PI-086, PI-087, QI-092, QI-094.
590 PI-029, PI-080, PI-087, QI-092.

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us indiscriminately as we were trying to flee. There was no KIA post in the village –
the nearest post is several hours away – they were shooting at civilians. We fled into
the forest. The next morning we went back, but our village was entirely destroyed –
some of the houses had been burned, others kicked down. The situation had become
insufferable and we had to leave.591
281. Another person, who left his village in Namtu Township, Shan State, in 2012,
described how the intentional destruction of food supplies made survival difficult, forcing
him to move to a camp for internally displaced persons:
The Tatmadaw had a huge post in our area and there was lots of fighting. The
military would come and look for our rice stocks and destroy them. When aid
agencies would distribute provisions, the military would come and destroy those as
well. They even killed our pigs. We left because we had nothing to eat – the military
was making it impossible to survive in our village.592
282. The context in which the displacements occurred strongly indicates that there were
no imperative military or security reasons for such displacements. As explained above, the
Tatmadaw intentionally, frequently and systematically directed attacks against the civilian
population or individual civilians and terrorized the civilian population, including through
killings, torture and sexual violence. These tactics and practices have fuelled large-scale
displacements in Kachin and Shan States during the reporting period and constitute a
complete failure by the Tatmadaw to observe its obligations under international law,
including to prevent displacement caused by its own acts. One person from Muse
Township, Shan State, said, “No one lives in my village now - because the Tatmadaw were
coming often - no one wanted to live there anymore so they all moved out. It was not safe
for men or women and we still do not dare to go back.”593
283. The Mission further notes that the relocation and destruction of entire villages in
northern Myanmar was extensively reported in the period prior to 2011. 594
284. The Mission also received credible information on incidents where civilians who
wished to leave unsafe areas were prevented from doing so or denied safe passage,
including, in at least one case, despite the Tatmadaw itself having explicitly ordered the
displacement.595 In that incident, in Tanai Township, Kachin State on 5 June 2017, the
Tatmadaw dropped a leaflet ordering the evacuation by 15 June 2017 of a large area, where
an estimated 100,000 civilians resided, because the Tatmadaw would be conducting “area
clearance operations” due to unauthorised mining affecting the environment. 596 The text of
the leaflet included the following:
Within Ta’ang township … [list of 10 mines]… are not the nationally legitimized
jade mines. Mining, digging and gold extraction not only negatively affect the
environment, but also impact upon the ecosystem of the Ta’ang region. For this
reason, the Tatmadaw will be carrying out area clearance operations in the near
future.
Therefore, local citizens and temporary workers living in the jade mines are to leave
the area by 15 June 2017. Anyone who does not vacate the area by the established
date will be considered an accomplice of the Kachin insurgent group, the KIA.
During the area clearance operation, the government does not wish citizens to die
or be injured. Therefore, we would like to make this public announcement.

591 PI-087.
592 PI-035.
593 QI-095.
594 E.g. in 2010, the then United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Myanmar,
Tomas Quintana, stated that humanitarian and human rights groups had documented the destruction
and forced relocation of over 3,500 villages and hiding sites in eastern Myanmar since 1996. See
A/HRC/65/368, para. 49; for similar figures, see A/61/369, para. 44 and A/HRC/4/14, para. 54.
595 K-063.7, K-063.8, PI-049, PI-103, See also this chapter, section A.8: Emblematic incidents (Tanai).
596 Copies on file with the Mission.

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285. It is difficult to see the military necessity of such a broad order. The leaflet contains
implied threats and appears to merge civilians and fighters. In any event, the Tatmadaw
also did not ensure proper transfer, evacuation and accommodation for civilians. Instead,
four of the five exit routes were blocked and credible information indicates that some
displaced individuals were only allowed to leave on the condition that they did not travel to
Tanai town but rather to Kawng Ra, which was unsafe and subject to active conflict. 597
286. The Mission further received recent, credible information on one incident where the
Tatmadaw forced villagers who had fled to go back to their villages despite not wanting to
return due to safety concerns. 598 One person described how she and 160 others from Man
We and Hlaing Naung Hku villages in Hpakant Township, Kachin State, were detained by
the military for several days in April 2018, after fleeing their villages and were then forced
to return against their wishes:
We fled our villages on 11 April 2018 and on the 12 April 2018 we came across the
Tatmadaw in the forest. They stopped us and asked us questions, they made us cook
for them and build a tent. We were getting ready to sleep when they made us move
again. They walked us to trucks and then drove us to a field. They made us stay with
them for five days and kept asking questions about the KIA. We did not have enough
food, only one meal a day. On 16 April 2018, the commander said we should go
back to our village. We didn’t want to go back because it is not safe but the
commander forced us. The soldiers followed us back to the village to make sure we
went back. When we arrived at our village soldiers took our livestock and
belongings.599
287. Following this, they left the village once again due to the continuing conflict, but
were not allowed to set up IDP camps by the Tatmadaw, so they stayed in a local church.
Fighting in the area later ceased, and the villagers wanted to return to their village.
However, the Tatmadaw would not permit them to return. The Mission further understands
that there have been other incidents where displaced persons have been put under pressure
to return to their villages before they felt comfortable doing so. 600
288. General restrictions on freedom of movement have also had a significant impact on
the ability of civilians to access livelihoods and basic services. 601 Formal restrictions on
movement include checkpoints, accompanied by documentation checks, and curfews. 602 In
addition, in one case in December 2016, residents of the town of Monekoe, Muse
Township, Shan State, were issued with cards to prove their residence and were only
allowed to enter and leave if they were in possession of these cards. 603 Individuals also
reported limiting their own movements, including to farmland or tea plantations, because
they were afraid of nearby fighting or because of landmines. 604 For example, one person
from Namhsan Township, Shan State, reported that during fighting in December 2017 she
could not go to her tea plantation. She explained that a curfew was in place from 6am to
6pm in their village and, if people were seen outside after curfew, shots would be fired at
them.605 Credible information received by the Mission also indicates that individuals
holding identity documents issued by EAOs have been afraid to flee conflict areas, or return
to check on property, for fear of documentation checks or being stopped because of their
ethnicity.606

597 K-063.7, PI-049.

598 K-063.9, PI-104, V-135.
599 PI-104.
600 QM-002, V-331.
601 PI-046, PI-073, PI-097, V-142. See also this chapter, section A.8: Emblematic incidents (Tanai).
602 K-064, V-142.
603 See this chapter, section A.8: Emblematic incidents (Monekoe).
604 PI-046, PI-094, PI-097.
605 PI-097.
606 DI-061, K-064, V-136, V-142.

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Land confiscation and violation of property rights of displaced persons

289. Credible information received indicates widespread violation of the obligation to
respect the property rights of displaced persons. There is a practice of attacking, destroying
and looting civilian property after individuals have fled. 607 In some cases people left their
homes because of land confiscation.608 In others, the Tatmadaw or other actors confiscated
lands after the individuals had fled and were internally displaced. 609 For example, one
individual from Laukkaing Township, Kokang Self-Administered Zone, reported that, after
his village was attacked by the Tatmadaw in August 2013 and while the villagers were
displaced, the Tatmadaw took over their land:
One day in 2013, the Tatmadaw attacked our village. The village chief went to talk
to the soldiers to try to stop the fighting but they killed him. There was gunfire so we
ran into the forest to hide for one night. The next day we went back to the village but
our house was burned and all other houses in the village were burned too, so we
had to leave. After we had left, the Tatmadaw took over the farmland.610
290. Another person displaced from Waigmaw Township, Kachin State in 2011
explained that her village is now abandoned and there is a new Tatmadaw post there. 611 The
Mission has also received credible information that other actors, including corporations,
have taken over land of displaced individuals. 612
291. Some internally displaced persons told the Mission that they did not know what had
happened to their land and property as they had not been able to return since they were
originally displaced, which in many cases was several years earlier. 613 Displaced
individuals are concerned that they may be unable to prove ownership over their land
should conditions for returns be established.614 There are many impediments to this,
including: lack of formal land ownership documents; documents being lost or destroyed
during displacements; possession of non-recognised ownership documents issued by ethnic
armed organizations; lack of recognition of customary forms of land ownership; and lack of
tax receipts as individuals were displaced and therefore unable to work the land. The
situation may be further complicated by the legal framework governing land ownership and
resolution of land disputes.615
292. Land has also been confiscated by or for the benefit of the Tatmadaw from non-
displaced individuals without any proper process or compensation, including in areas where
there was no active fighting in Kachin and Shan States. 616 For example, an individual from
Puta-O Township, Kachin State, reported how his land was taken in 2014:
My land was inherited from my great-great grandfather. We used to have only one
military camp in the area but more were built around 2002 and this was when land
confiscation started. Between 2003 and 2005 two whole villages were forced to
move by the Tatmadaw and the land was confiscated. In early 2014, a government
official called me and showed me a letter. He said my farmland would be
confiscated for “security reasons.” The letter said I would not be given alternative

607 See this chapter, section A.1: Conduct of hostilities in flagrant disregard of civilian life and property.
608 PI-016, PI-082, QI-082.
609 K-142.1, K-143, PI-010, PI-055, PI-073, QI-092, QM-018, SI-002, V-144. See also this chapter,
section B: Patterns of violations and abuses committed by non-State armed actors.
610 QI-092.
611 PI-052.
612 K-142.1, QM-014, V-143.
613 PI-052, PI-056.
614 PI-031, V-143.
615 PI-031, PI-048, QM- 014, V-145, see also, Durable Peace Programme, Displaced and Dispossessed,
conflict-affected communities and their land of origin in Kachin State (May 2018).
616 PI-032, PI-048, PI-077, QI-078, V-143 see also, Human Rights Watch, “Nothing for our Land”,
Impact of Land Confiscation on Farmers in Myanmar (July 2018).

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land, and the official said all lands belong to the government. I could do nothing
and there was no compensation - they just took my land. 617
293. Individuals consistently reported that in their villages they were required to provide
food or cook for the Tatmadaw, 618 or that the Tatmadaw would come and take their food or
livestock as they wished, placing a constant strain on the their resources and ability to
survive.619 For example, one individual from Mongkaung Township, Shan State, described
how villages had to give food to the Tatmadaw and witnessing them taking food from other
farmers:
A military camp was not very far from our village. Each villager had to take food to
the Tatmadaw – we took it in turns. Sometimes my mother had to cook for the
soldiers too. One day I took some chickens to the military base but they said I
arrived late. They kept me and made me work for them. I worked for five days in the
military base and then for five days I walked with them from village to village. Each
day I saw the military take food from farmers. One farmer begged to be given his
food back but they just hit him.620
294. In some cases, the Tatmadaw would also temporarily stay in villagers’ houses. 621 For
example, one individual from Laukkaing Township, Kokang Self-Administered Zone,
described how soldiers would come regularly, as much as once a week, and stay in one of
the village houses. The villagers would have to cook for the soldiers and would sleep in
neighbours’ houses or in the forest until the soldiers left. 622 In 2015, this became more
frequent and eventually the soldiers confiscated her families’ land and house and started to
grow vegetables.623

Arbitrary denial of humanitarian relief

295. The Mission has amassed a large volume of credible information indicating that the
Government and Tatmadaw have consistently arbitrarily denied consent for humanitarian
relief operations and restricted the movement of humanitarian relief personnel for long
periods. For example, in June and July 2015, fighting between the KIA and Tatmadaw
displaced around 1,400 individuals in Sumprabum Township, Kachin State. Despite
displaced individuals lacking sufficient access to adequate food, shelter, drinking water and
medical supplies, and repeated requests for access to provide life-saving humanitarian relief
from local and international organizations, no access was granted until January 2016, more
than six months later.624
296. Access for humanitarian relief operations to persons in need has significantly
deteriorated during the reporting period, and is now at its lowest point in four years. 625 To
deliver relief, conduct assessments, or carry out other activities, international humanitarian
organizations are required to seek travel authorisations via a complex system involving
several layers of authority, both civilian and military, including the President’s Office.626
The United Nations have not been granted travel authorisations to deliver humanitarian
relief to the more than 40,000 internally displaced persons in areas beyond government
control since June 2016. They have now had no access for more than two years, despite

617 QI-082.
618 PI-016, PI-020, PI-058, PI-081, PI-093.
619 DI-072, PI-010, PI-015, PI-020, PI-074, PI-111, QI-078, QI-080.
620 PI-020.
621 PI-016, PI-020.
622 PI-016.
623 Ibid.
624 K-063.30.
625 K-064, K-069.1.
626 QM-002. Interlocutors informed the Mission that, while the process varies to some extent, travel
authorisations are generally sent to an organization’s line ministry (which varies depending on the
organization). The line ministry forwards requests to the President’s Office for a decision. The
President’s Office asks the opinion of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Home Affairs and
in some cases the relevant state governments.

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previously having had access to these areas, with indications that the needs of the most
vulnerable displaced persons are not being met.627 The Government has proposed that
individuals cross conflict lines to access assistance, which would require displaced persons,
the majority of whom are women and children, to undertake repeated long and dangerous
journeys across conflict affected areas.628 Organizations requesting permission to undertake
relief operations to these areas have reportedly been told that, if they want access, they
should tell the ethnic armed organizations to sign the National Ceasefire Agreement. 629
297. In Government-controlled areas, the international staff of international humanitarian
organizations are granted travel authorisations primarily for urban centres, with the result
that they are unable to access the majority of displaced individuals who are located in other
areas.630 National staff have also been subject to increasing restrictions.
298. Requests for authorisation to travel to deliver humanitarian relief are often refused,
without reasons, or no formal response at all is received. 631 Distributions of life-saving
relief items are routinely blocked.632 While local organizations have some access to both
Government and non-government controlled areas, they face increasing restrictions 633 and
are also unable to access certain areas.634 In some cases, even when travel authorisations are
granted, the Tatmadaw prevents deliveries being carried out, including in areas where there
was no active fighting.635
299. The Mission has also received credible information that humanitarian relief
personnel in Kachin State have been formally threatened with prosecution under the
Unlawful Associations Act, after travelling to a non-government controlled area in 2018 to
provide relief, and have been told not to travel to the area in future. 636 In addition, the
Mission has received one report of individuals being beaten and prosecuted after they tried
to deliver humanitarian relief.637
300. On the ground, the denial of humanitarian relief means displaced persons are left
without adequate shelter for long periods, including in difficult weather conditions, such as
during heavy rains, and face food shortages.638 The Mission corroborated an incident in
April 2018 in Tanai Township where 2,000 individuals, from Sut Yang, Sut Ya and Awng
Lat villages, were trapped in the forest for nearly a month, in dire conditions, without
access to assistance. Those trapped included pregnant mothers, children, elderly people and
sick and injured individuals.639 One villager recounted the difficult conditions which led to
the deaths of two children:
On 11 April 2018, there were airstrikes and shelling on our village. We fled into the
forest. We thought the shelling would stop but it was continuous. We ended up
staying in the forest for four weeks. We moved several times because of shelling and
we were afraid of the soldiers who were behind us. Sometimes there were drones
and planes overhead, but they did not provide any assistance, they were just
watching us. It was difficult in the forest. In the place where we stayed for the first
three days, there was no water because the streams had dried out. Later, we only
had access to dirty water, and many people became sick with diarrhoea. Three
women gave birth in the forest, but one of the new-born babies died at 20 days old.

627 K-069.1, V-155.

628 K-069.1, K-069.2, QM-002; A/HRC/34/67, para 52.
629 QM-002.
630 K-069.1, V-156.
631 Ibid.
632 Ibid.
633 Ibid. K-142.2, QM-014, V-157.
634 See also this chapter, section A.8: Emblematic incidents (Tanai).
635 V-147, V-308.
636 K-146.1.
637 K-146.5.
638 K-063.30, PI-029, PI-030, PI-103, V-156. See this chapter, section C: Impact of conflict, violations
and abuses on civilians.
639 See this chapter, section A.8: Emblematic incidents (Tanai).

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Another five-year old girl died while her mother was carrying her. We faced many
hardships.640
301. The lack of humanitarian access has led to dire conditions in some camps for
internally displaced persons, contributing to trafficking and raising other protection
concerns.641 One young woman, who spent three years in a camp for internally displaced
persons in a non-government controlled area of Kachin State before leaving the country in
2014, cited the lack of food as the main reason for her decision to leave:
I spent three years in the camp but then the Tatmadaw blocked all humanitarian aid.
After that, each of us would only get 4kg of rice per month and there was almost no
other food, only rice. Because there was no food, I had to leave and went to
Thailand, and then Malaysia.642
302. The Mission received credible information that a convoy of vehicles from the
Myanmar Red Cross was attacked on 17 February 2015 and for a second time on 21
February 2015 in Kokang Self-Administered Zone, Shan State.643 The attacks caused
several Red Cross personnel and civilians to be injured, with one Red Cross volunteer later
dying from the injuries he sustained during the attacks.644 The Government reportedly
stated that the MNDAA was responsible for the attacks, which was denied by the group. 645
It was not possible for the Mission to verify which party to the conflict was responsible.
Following the first attack, Kokang Self-Administered Zone was placed under martial law
until 17 November 2015.646 Humanitarian access to the 80,000 individuals displaced by
fighting between the MNDAA and the Tatmadaw was not granted until July 2015. 647 The
Mission received allegations that serious violations had taken place in the area during this
period but was unable to verify them. 648
303. The Mission also received one report of Tatmadaw soldiers intercepting and stealing
shipments of medicines intended for internally-displaced persons, but it was unable to
verify this.649
304. The Mission received credible accounts of the Tatmadaw denying or delaying access
to medical care for injured civilians.650 In one well-known case, verified by the Mission, on
13 September 2012, a Tatmadaw Battalion Commander said that Ja Seng Ing, a 13-year old
girl who had been shot by the Tatmadaw in Sut Ngai Yang village, Hpakant Township,
Kachin State, could not be taken to hospital until all soldiers had left the village. They left
in groups of five to 10 soldiers at a time, taking over an hour, before she could be taken to
the hospital.651 In another case, an individual described how her village in Namkhan
Township, Shan State, was attacked by the Tatmadaw in May 2017 and afterwards she had
to negotiate to collect the injured residents and take them to the hospital after an attack on
her village:
Afterwards, we had to negotiate with the Commander to go and rescue the injured.
The Commander said he would let women be rescued but that anyone else would be
killed. We were able to enter the village and collect my relative. She was in very bad
shape. We took her to hospital and she had to stay there several months. Now she
can hardly move and cannot work.652

640 PI-103.
641 See this chapter, section C: Impact of conflict, violations and abuses on civilians.
642 PI-030.
643 K-069.3, V-158.
644 IFRC, “Myanmar Red Cross Society mourns the death of a volunteer” (3 April 2015).
645 Moe Zaw, “Myanmar, Kokang Rebels Spar Over Red Cross Attack” (VOA, 18 February 2015).
646 K-063.23.
647 K-064.1.
648 SM-001, V-159.
649 V-144.
650 PI-064, PI-073, PI-105.
651 K-131, PI-105.
652 PI-073.

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305. An announcement from February 2018, a copy of which was seen by the Mission,
appears to indicate that there is an official policy in at least some areas of denying medical
assistance to injured fighters. The letter sent by the Township Administrator in Muse
Township, Shan State, to various township authorities, including the health department,
refers to a bilateral agreement reached between the Union Government and China. It
informs administrators and agencies to report to the nearest Tatmadaw base any injured
fighters found without delay “and to make sure insurgents do not receive any treatment,”
and that Chinese hospitals would also not accept wounded fighters. 653

8. Emblematic incidents
306. This section presents in greater detail two situations that have occurred in Kachin
and Shan States during the reporting period. They illustrate how the hostilities, and the
conduct of the Tatmadaw in particular, gives rise to the types of gross human rights
violations analysed above. They show how civilians are often victims of multiple violations
concurrently.

(a) Tanai Township, Kachin State – November 2017 to April 2018

307. The incidents that have taken place in Tanai Township, Kachin State, from
November 2017 to April 2018 are illustrative of the manner in which the Tatmadaw’s
operation directly and deliberately affect civilians. The area of Tanai that is the focus of the
Tatmadaw offensive is controlled by the KIA. The Tatmadaw’s stated aim is to clear out
the “illegal” mines in the area that provide a lucrative source of income for the KIA, and as
such the military operations are in relation to control over these natural resources. 654 Mining
in the area employs an estimated 100,000 people.655
308. Before the “clearance operations” began, the Tatmadaw dropped leaflets on 5 June
2017 to warn villagers living near the mining zones to clear the area within 10 days,
causing civilians to flee. It then launched military offensives against key positions of the
KIA. When the deadline passed, the Tatmadaw closed off routes to Tanai town, leaving
remaining civilians at risk, and over the same period, the Tatmadaw restricted the delivery
of rice and fuel to inhabitants of Tanai, creating food shortages. 656

Photo of leaflet dropped by the Tatmadaw on 5 June 2017 in Tanai Township657

309. For the next five months, the Tatmadaw and the KIA were engaged in a series of
clashes, during which the Tatmadaw engaged in indiscriminate attacks on villages and

653 K-146.2.
654 Primarily gold and amber but also jade, copper and ruby mines.
655 PI-049, PI-103, V-62.
656 Ibid. See this chapter, section A.7: Forced displacement, confiscation and destruction of property, and
denial of humanitarian assistance.
657 See for full translation of the text, this chapter, section A.7: Forced displacement, confiscation and
destruction of property, and denial of humanitarian assistance.

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committed extrajudicial killings, torture and rape among other violations. A number of
villages were burned and thousands were displaced as a consequence. 658
310. Clashes began in June 2017 but fighting intensified in November 2017, reaching a
peak in January 2018. On 22 November 2017, the KIA set up a base in a church in De Kaw
village in Tanai, and on the same day airstrikes were conducted by the Tatmadaw, which
did not appear to target the KIA base. An aerial bomb exploded next to a civilian’s house,
killing a young child and a man. The next day, Tatmadaw soldiers conducted an operation
in the village, as apparent retribution for battlefield casualties, which saw the arrest and
detention of some villagers, and the burning and destruction of the village. It caused
villagers to flee and be displaced.659 The detained villagers were divided into small groups,
beaten and tortured while questioned about KIA membership. 660 One of the victims gave
the following account:
The Tatmadaw tied us up with ropes and pointed their guns at our heads. They
accused us of being with the KIA and requested proof that we were not. It was hard
for us to give them the answers they wanted. One of the soldiers told me that they
had information that I was involved with the KIA and provided them with assistance,
which I denied. The soldier shouted at me, calling me “dog beggar”, which means
“person of very low value” in Myanmar. I was on my knees. The soldier standing in
front of me was asking questions while the one behind beat me. I was beaten in the
back, and hit on the head with the butt of a gun. All villagers detained were on their
knees. We were terrified.661
311. Throughout this period, a number of villages in Tanai were subject to artillery and
airstrikes.662 For example, Nam Kawn village, 20 kilometres from Tanai town, was targeted
by aerial bombing and heavy artillery mortar shelling from 22 to 27 January 2018, and with
heaving fighting from 25 to 27 January.663 The village is located in the Zeephury Kone area,
where both amber and gold are mined,664 and which is controlled by the KIA. 665 Reliable
reports indicate that several aerial bombs were dropped on the village on 26 January 2018,
destroying houses666 and causing two civilian deaths and four injuries, including three
women.667 The nearest KIA posts were located several miles away, and as such there was
no apparent military target.668 One of the injured victims, explained how her house was
completely destroyed following an airstrike, and both she and her sister were injured. She
spent a month in hospital.669Another witness stated that Tatmadaw soldiers, in the course of
their military operations that day, deliberately shot at or otherwise targeted the civilian
population:
People fled from the bombings, and as they were fleeing, the military was shooting
at them. People fled the area, some to the IDP camps. I think the military operation
was designed to make villagers flee the town.670
312. As the Tatmadaw progressed into KIA controlled territory, strategic KIA posts were
targeted. On 27 January 2018, a group of Tatmadaw soldiers supported by Lisu militia
killed five, possibly six, men at a KIA tax post at Aung Ja village. Shortly after,

658 K-069.1.
659 DI-066, PI-086, PI-088.
660 DI-066, PI-086, PI-088.
661 DI-066.
662 DI-061, PI-046, PI-063.
663 K-142; T. Miles, “U.N. concerned about heavy fighting in Myanmar's Kachin state” (Reuters, 6
February 2018).
664 DI-061.
665 PI-045, PI-049, V-018.
666 PI-045.
667 DI-061, DI-062, PI-043, PI-049, PI-053.
668 DI-061.
669 DI-062.
670 PI-043.

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approximately 200 Tatmadaw soldiers entered the area 671 and eight civilians, including at
least two women, were detained by the Tatmadaw and Lisu militia. They were beaten on
their backs with an iron rod over the course of some hours while their hands were tied and
some were blindfolded. During this time they were questioned, including in relation to the
routes to mining areas. Five men from the group were then extrajudicially killed by gunfire
while the other three detainees remained lying on the floor.672
313. The on-going hostilities caused displacement of civilians throughout this period. In
January 2018, over 3,500 civilians attempting to leave the area of ongoing hostilities near
amber mining villages in the “Pat Maw” area, became trapped by the Tatmadaw without
food, supplies or latrines for a period of up to 18 days at the “Samat” gate. Religious groups
bearing food for the trapped civilians were denied access by the military. Personal
belongings, including mobile phones, motorbikes, amber and money were taken by
soldiers.673 This happened in an area with active landmines, which caused at least two
civilian deaths.674 The first group of civilians, approximately 700 women and 50 civilians
over the age of 50 were released, following a letter from two Members of Parliament to the
President requesting safe passage for the trapped civilians. 675 Civilians continued to be
released in groups over the following days until 9 February 2018.676
314. Throughout the period, the Tatmadaw subjected civilians to ill-treatment and torture,
targeted on the basis of their ethnicity and often questioned about the KIA. In December
2017, several men in uniform entered the house of a man in Naumbyu village. They asked
him if he was Kachin and was then beaten repeatedly and threatened with being killed. He
saw at least 10 other men subjected to similar treatment. Their hands were tied and they
were led away, but he managed to escape in a forest.677 Another victim reported being taken
from the village of Daru Thu by a group of about 10 Tatmadaw soldiers and forced to
clean, catch fish and cook for them. He was beaten while being questioned about whether
he was a rebel.678 The Mission also received a credible report of a group of Tatmadaw
soldiers gang raping and then killing two girls in the forest. 679
315. After a temporary lull, the Tatmadaw launched a further offensive to consolidate
control over the mining area, with four airstrikes, and gunfire on the village of Awng Lat on
11 April 2018, killing one civilian and injuring at least two others. Reports indicate that
hundreds of Tatmadaw soldiers seized the area, causing approximately 2,000 civilians to
flee to fields, where some stayed for three days while the shelling continued. 680 A group of
villagers were then forced to stay in very difficult conditions in forest areas, to avoid aerial
attacks and the presence of soldiers. At least one elderly man, one child and one new born
baby died from lack of food and medicines. 681

(b) Monekoe, Shan State – November 2016 to early 2017

316. The incidents that occurred around Monekoe, Muse Township, Shan State, from
November 2016 to early 2017, also illustrate how the civilian population is subjected to
multiple violations concurrently or consecutively during active conflict. This includes mass
arrest and detention, extrajudicial killings, and indiscriminate airstrikes and aerial
bombardments or attacks in violation of the principle of precaution.

671 PI-053, PI-054, PI-059, SI-004, V-018.

672 PI-053, PI-053, SI-004, V-018.
673 DI-061, PI-045, V-018.
674 DI-061, PI-045, PI-046.
675 DI-061, V-018.
676 DI-061, PI-045.
677 PI-059.
678 PI-079.
679 PI-069; see this chapter, section A.4: Sexual and gender-based violence.
680 K-069.1, PI-103, V-063.
681 PI-103, V-063, see this chapter, section A.7: Forced displacement, confiscation and destruction of
property, and denial of humanitarian assistance.

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317. On the night of 19 November 2016, elements of the Northern Alliance attacked
Monekoe town.682 The Northern Alliance captured most of Monekoe with the exception of
a hilltop military base held by the Tatmadaw.
318. Following this, the Tatmadaw conducted the mass arrest and detention of civilians.
On 20 November 2016, Tatmadaw soldiers from the 99 th Light Infantry Division went from
house to house in Man Jat village, Monekoe and arrested more than 100 people, who were
then forced to walk to a military camp on the hilltop. 683 One interviewee was asked by the
soldier who arrested him, “It is impossible that you didn’t know about the attacks, why
didn’t you inform us?”684 Several individuals were accused of being spies, and a few were
specifically accused of being affiliated with the MNDAA, tied up and beaten. 685 About
12 hours later the Tatmadaw released the women and children, as well as some Chinese
citizens, leaving approximately 70 to 80 men detained. Several hundred soldiers as well as
militia members were stationed at the military camp. 686
319. The detainees were forced to lie on the ground, day and night, between two wire
fences, placing them between the Tatmadaw base and Northern Alliance troops. 687 They
were told not to make any noise or they would be killed. 688 Intense fighting between the
Tatmadaw and the Northern Alliance outside the military camp took place during the 13
days the group were held. Tatmadaw troops threw grenades over the heads of the detainees,
several of which fell on them after getting caught in the trees, killing at least two
individuals and injuring others. 689 The injured were not released to seek medical
attention.690 One detainee saw a mortar shell land among the detainees, although it did not
explode.691 A 90 year-old detainee was witnessed being killed when he tried to escape
during an exchange of fire.692 Detainees were exposed to the elements with no shelter,
sleeping on the ground. They had no access to washing facilities and no sanitary facilities,
initially urinating in the area they were detained and later in a pit dug behind the second
fence. Detainees were also initially not provided food for several days.693 When members of
the Northern Alliance gained access to part of the military base on 4 December 2016, the
civilians were able to escape.694 The placing of this group of civilian detainees in the line of
fire is a clear example of the Tatmadaw not taking all feasible precautions to protect the
civilian population under their control against the effects of attacks, one of the fundamental
principles of international humanitarian law. 695 In this instance, it may also amount to the
prohibited use of human shields.696
320. The Mission received credible accounts of civilians being intentionally killed by the
Tatmadaw in the Monekoe area during this period.697 For example, one man who was
detained in the military base, stated that after they escaped he witnessed another man being
shot at and then killed by a knife by one of the Tatmadaw soldiers. 698 Two cases of enforced
disappearance were also corroborated, in both cases following arrest by the Tatmadaw. 699

682 DI-058, DI-060, K-133.1, K-133.2, K-133.3, K-133.24, V-056.

683 DI-058.
684 DI-060.
685 DI-058.
686 DI-058, DI-060, K-133.6, K-133.23.
687 DI-058, DI-060, K-133.23, V-170.
688 DI-060.
689 DI-058, DI-060, K-133.23.
690 DI-060.
691 DI-060, K-133.23.
692 DI-060.
693 DI-058, DI-060.
694 DI-058, DI-060, K-133.23.
695 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 22.
696 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 97. The use of human shields is defined as using the presence (or
movements) of civilians or other protected persons to render certain points or areas (or military
forces) immune from military operations.
697 DI-058, K-133.1, K-133.16. See also this chapter, section A.2: Unlawful killings.
698 DI-058.
699 See this chapter, section A.5: Arbitrary deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance.

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The Mission was also able to corroborate that, after the civilians escaped their detention on
4 December 2016, Tatmadaw soldiers intentionally burned several nearby villages. 700
321. During the period of conflict, the Tatmadaw launched airstrikes on and fired into
Monekoe and nearby villages, destroying civilian property as well as a church, and in at
least one instance causing civilian deaths. 701 One victim reported that in early November
2016, while fighting the MNDAA, the Tatmadaw fired artillery shells at her village, one of
which hit her house. Two other villagers were killed in the shelling and children injured.702
After the artillery attack, the Tatmadaw entered the village, took the food rations and
livestock. Her family fled to China and later returned but soldiers prohibited them from
returning to their village. She told the Mission, “losing my home means we are in a dire
economic condition. The attack has traumatised me and my children and changed our lives
forever.”703
322. The fighting displaced an estimated 20,000 people, forcing many of them close to
the border or into China.704 The area was under a state of lockdown that prevented
humanitarian assistance from reaching some displaced in need; 705 and credible reports
indicate a local aid worker was injured attempting to reach the displaced population. 706
323. The Tatmadaw regained control of Monekoe town in early December 2016.
Displaced individuals who returned to the town and area were photographed and issued
with a white-coloured card.707 These cards had to be shown at all times, including when
going to cut firewood or to farmland.708 Credible reports received by the Mission describe
that soldiers would frequently check houses to confirm the number of people present and
keep family photographs in front of houses to allow for surprise checks. 709 Individuals
returning to Monekoe were in need of food and shelter assistance as houses had been
burned, but access was limited to those holding these white cards, preventing humanitarian
agencies from providing assistance.710

B. Patterns of violations and abuses committed by non-State armed actors

324. The denial of access to the country and the refusal of the Myanmar authorities to
respond to the Mission’s requests for information have greatly limited the ability of the
Mission to gather first-hand information on violations and abuses perpetrated by EAOs.
Consequently, the Mission had to draw more from secondary sources, with the
methodological challenges this entails. The sample of cases reported and verified by the
Mission may not be fully representative of the overall, highly complex situation.
Nevertheless, the Mission has a reliable, but limited body of information suggesting that
most EAOs711 fighting in Kachin and Shan States, to differing extents, have committed
international humanitarian law violations and human rights abuses.
325. The information received by the Mission suggests that violations and abuses
committed by EAOs occur on a lesser scale than those committed by the Tatmadaw.

700 DI-058, K-133.4, K-133.6, K-133.15, K-133.22, K-133.23.

701 K-133.9, K-133.10, K-133.11, K-133.13, K-133.14, K-133.17, PI-042, SM-001, V-056.
702 The Mission does not have sufficient information to ascertain whether these attacks were directed at a
legitimate target and/or adequate precautions were taken.
703 PI-042.
704 K-142.40.
705 K-069.4, K-069.5.
706 K-069.5.
707 K-142.41, QI-082.
708 DI-058, V-056.
709 K-.133.6, K-142.48, PI-041.
710 K-142.48, QI-082.
711 These include TNLA, KIA, SSA-S, MNDAA, and AA. In some instances the Mission was not able to
identify which Shan State Army (SSA) committed the violations, either the SSA-S or the SSA-N. The
Mission received extremely limited information pertaining to the United Wa State Army (UWSA).

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1. Legal framework
326. International humanitarian law applies to all parties to an armed conflict, whether
international or non-international, including non-State armed groups. Additionally, the
Mission considers that non-State actors who hold effective control over territory and
exercise government-like functions are obliged to respect human rights norms when their
conduct affects the human rights of persons under their control.712
327. Specifically with regard to the issue of recruitment, international law does not entitle
non-State armed actors, regardless of whether they are a de facto authority over a particular
part of the territory, to recruit on a compulsory or forced basis (either adults or children).
Even if the rights of a non-State actor in control of territory to conscript the population into
the armed forces were the same as that of a State, restrictions would still apply. It would
still not be allowed to impose it in a manner that would render the recruitment unlawful or
arbitrary.713 As for States, the (voluntary) recruitment of children into a non-State armed
group is prohibited.714 This includes the recruitment of children in any capacity, including
as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, or spies.715 While the age limit is not set in
customary international law, it is agreed that it at least applies to any child under 15
years.716 It is also a human rights violation when the State fails to take all feasible measures
to protect children under the age of 18 against recruitment by armed groups, whether forced
or voluntary.

2. Findings

(a) Failure to take feasible precautions in attack

328. According to the principle of precautions in attack, parties to the conflicts in
northern Myanmar must take constant care to spare the civilian population, civilians and
civilian objects. Information received by the Mission suggests that EAOs have in several
instances failed to avoid or minimize incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and
damage to civilian objects. Some EAOs have also often failed to take into account
humanitarian considerations when launching attacks, causing large numbers of civilians to
flee.
329. For example, it was reported that in May 2018, the TNLA attacked government
security posts in Muse Township, Shan State. According to this information, 18 people
were killed in addition to a police captain. The Mission was unable to verify details of this
incident, including whether the persons killed were civilians and how they had been killed.
However, the TNLA reportedly stated that the “casualties were armed militia members and
their families”.717
330. Fighting between two EAOs, the TNLA and the SSA-S, has led to massive
displacement in northern Shan State. For example, it was reported that 300 civilians fled
Mong Hway village, Mongton Township, Shan State in mid-March 2018, following clashes
between the two armed groups. It was further reported that civilians were trapped in the
cross-fire and had to be evacuated by aid workers. 718 Later in March 2018, it was also stated
that, during fighting between the TNLA and SSA-South in Taw Phe village, Kyaukme
Township, Shan State, a shell allegedly exploded in the village killing two civilians and
injuring others. As a result of the fighting, approximately 1,000 civilians fled the area. 719

712 See chapter II, section C: Legal framework.

713 See this chapter, section A.6: Forced labour and forced recruitment of adults and children.
714 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 136. See also CRC, art. 38.
715 See UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), The Paris Principles. Principles and Guidelines on Children
Associated With Armed Forces or Armed Groups, February 2007, p. 7.
716 Under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of
Children in Armed Conflict, which Myanmar signed but has not yet ratified, armed groups should not,
under any circumstances, recruit persons under the age of 18 years.
717 V-203, V-204.
718 V-205, V-300.
719 V-301.

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Earlier in July 2016, fighting between the two armed groups caused 350 civilians to flee
another village called Man Lwe in Kyaukme Township, Shan State. 720
331. In November 2016, the Northern Alliance, composed of the KIA, the TNLA, the
MNDAA, and the AA, launched an offensive attack against police and military outposts
and a business centre in Muse and Kutkai Townships in northern Shan State. Reports
estimate that at least eight people were killed and 29 wounded. Bullets also crossed the
Ruili River into Chinese territory, and wounded a Chinese national. About 3,000 residents
fled to China to escape the fighting and more than 2,700 others were reported to have been
internally displaced.721
332. In early March 2017, the Mission received credible but unverified reports that at
least 30 persons were killed when the MNDAA launched an attack against police and
military posts in the Kokang Self-Administered Zone. Thousands fled across the border into
China. A separate group of fighters later attacked locations in Laukkai. Official
Government statements, accompanied by graphic pictures of the dead and wounded,
informed that at least five civilians and five local police officers were killed in the fighting.
It also said that a further 20 “burned bodies” had been found alongside weapons reportedly
of MNDAA fighters.722

(b) Recruitment into armed groups and forced labour

333. The Mission amassed a reliable body of information drawing a pattern of some of
the EAOs forcing adults and children to join their armed ranks. 723 While some EAOs may
not have an official policy of forced recruitment – or policies that have been reformed or
changed during the reporting period – the situation on the ground demonstrates that persons
are often recruited against their will. Victims and witnesses have also told the Mission that
even if there is no policy of forced recruitment per se, there is no space to object to joining
the ranks of certain armed groups. This could be due to a general perception that ethnic
minorities in the North need to fight the Tatmadaw and defend their people. Furthermore,
there are few alternatives available to villagers, with the drugs trade and gambling
businesses the principle other employers.
334. Victims of forced recruitment that have shared their accounts with the Mission were
forcibly recruited in areas controlled by the EAOs, 724 but also in government-controlled
areas.725 In the latter cases, EAOs would recruit at night or through letters. 726 Because of the
limited information obtained, the Mission was unable to draw the specific geographical
locations of this recruitment. However, information suggests that it occurred in both Kachin
and Shan States and throughout the reporting period.
335. Sources mentioned to the Mission that the SSA-S had a compulsory recruitment
policy,727 especially during the early years of the reporting period. While the SSA-S had a
policy of one person from each household joining their ranks, one source stated that this
was enforced in a compulsory manner,728 while another source stated that it was
voluntary.729 A further interviewee stated that, “you don’t really have a choice to go fight
along the SSA-S”.730
336. Similarly, the Mission noted a comparable practice among the TNLA, but also with
conflicting information as to the extent to which the practice was “compulsory”. According

720 K-143.
721 K-143.
722 V-302, V-303.
723 DI-070, PI-033, PI-015, PI-050, PI-095, PI-096, PI-072, PI-097, PI-101, PI-112, QI-081, QI-088, QI-
092, QI-093, QI-094, QI-096.
724 PI-015, PI-095, PI-096, PI-101, QI-088.
725 PI-027, PI-033, QI-081, QI-094, QI-096.
726 QI-081, QI-094, QI-096.
727 PI-050, QI-093.
728 QI-093.
729 BM-017.
730 PI-050.

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to some sources, while it was obligatory for families who had two siblings, especially two
sons,731 exceptions to this requirement were sometimes permitted in special
circumstances,732 for example when a person had to take care of his elderly parents. One
source provided the following information on the recruitment process:
If there are two brothers then one must join the TNLA. The “person in charge” from
the TNLA would inform the village administrator about who should join. At the
beginning of 2011, the TNLA started to collect the names of people who should join
the TNLA. The understanding was that the next time they came back he would need
to join. The TNLA would collect names once every two years.733
337. Other sources stated that the policy was stricter, and each household had to provide
one person to serve and join the TNLA, with no opportunity to object.734 For example, one
woman mentioned that the TNLA recruited her 26-year old son by force in 2016, in
Namhsan Township, Shan State. The village administrator, under the orders of the TNLA,
selected her son for recruitment. He has not returned to his home, more than two years
later:
My son did not want to join the TNLA to fight. He hid for years in a monastery to
avoid forced recruitment but when he returned to the village to visit us, he was
caught. Since my son was recruited, I have not heard from him. I always check
Facebook to see if I will recognise him in a post, either dead or alive.735
338. Another victim of forced recruitment shared with the Mission that he was forced to
participate in the TNLA military training, but managed to escape during a religious festival.
He fled because he wanted to take care of his mother. But he said that he was not able to
return home to his village, because the TNLA would catch him, and he therefore went to
Yangon and eventually fled the country.736
339. According to one witness, the MNDAA also required one member of each
household, normally young men, to join their ranks. The witness mentioned that he was one
of two brothers and he had to hide from the MNDAA because he did not want to be
recruited. He eventually fled the country because he feared both the MNDAA recruitment
and the Tatmadaw.737 Another witness mentioned that he fled the Kokang Self-
Administered Zone because he feared being recruited by the MNDAA. He said, “I was
afraid to be recruited by the Kokang Army [MNDAA] so I decided to flee to Lashio. I
wanted to go back home to Kokang but I was told that the MNDAA would be looking for
me.”738
340. Accounts received indicate that the KIA may also have maintained a “voluntary”
recruitment policy which in practice amounted to forced recruitment. The KIA sent letters
to many households, including to those in IDP camps, requesting a member of each family
to voluntarily join the KIA. 739 However, according to one source, many civilians
understood recruitment to be obligatory.740 One interviewee stated that, “After receiving the
letter from the KIA, my father decided that my eldest sister would join”. 741 Another source
mentioned that, “The KIA sent us a letter asking us to join voluntarily. They came very
often and asked us to join but I had no interest in becoming a soldier. I have too many

731 PI-015, PI-095, PI-096, PI-101.

732 PI-101, QI-088.
733 QI-088.
734 PI-072, PI-096, PI-112.
735 PI-097.
736 QI-088.
737 QI-092.
738 PI-015.
739 PI-033, QI-094, QI-096.
740 QI-081.
741 QI-096.

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family responsibilities and I do not like shooting guns.” 742 Another source gave information
that indicated the manner in which the “voluntary” policy was enforced:
The KIA recruited soldiers from my town. If we did not go voluntarily, we would be
arrested and forced to go. When the war started again in 2011, the KIA told former
soldiers that they must come back to fight. My younger brother was forced to join
the KIA in 2012 – he was 20-years old.743
341. The Mission received multiple accounts of women and men escaping military
training.744 For example, one victim recounted that he escaped TNLA training in September
2011 in Namhsan, Shan State, because he wanted to look after his mother.745
342. The Mission also recorded accounts of discrimination among EAOs. Many have
affirmed that the KIA forcibly recruited from other ethnic minorities in Kachin State, such
as the Lisu, Shan or Ruwang, rather than the Jinghpaw.746 Others have said that Ta’ang
members fighting for the RCSS or KIA were not treated equally. 747 A Ta’ang community
leader mentioned that six Ta’ang young adults were forcibly recruited to join a KIA
military training in Muse Township, Shan State, in January 2016. 748 In one account
received, the RCSS forced Ta’ang villagers that had enrolled with the TNLA to join their
ranks instead. The RCSS beat villagers asking, “why did your son join the other group?” 749
343. Women were also recruited by EAOs and often had to perform more tasks than
men.750 A source mentioned that, “not many women were recruited in my village. Usually
women have to go through the same training as the men, in addition, however, they have to
also clean member’s clothes and uniforms and cook for them.” 751
344. The Mission further has reasons to believe that some EAOs have forced civilians to
work for them and that such work was not voluntary. The Mission received accounts of the
KIA and the SSA-S using civilians to dig trenches or to work as porters. 752 One source
mentioned that, from 2011 to 2013, the SSA-S would often require civilians to work for
them, and that this would increase as fighting with the Tatmadaw intensified. He said: “The
SSA-S used villagers for portering and when the villager did not want to go they would
beat them”.753 Similarly, the Mission was told by one interviewee that to his knowledge and
in the period before he fled in 2013, the MNDAA would sometimes require villagers to
carry their arms and other heavy materials in Laukkaing Township, Kokang Self-
Administered Zone.754
345. A victim shared how he was used for forced labour by the KIA in Mansi Township,
Kachin State, in 2012:
I was used by the KIA to dig a trench. The KIA came and took our names and other
details, and we were told to go and work. I worked for 2-3 weeks for the KIA,
building a large bunker and a military trench for the soldiers. The KIA did not treat
us badly – they had shower facilities, we were given meals. I wanted to sell
vegetables in the logging area controlled by the KIA and we needed support from
the KIA – as a result, when we were asked to work, we had to. We did not get paid
for this.755

742 QI-094.
743 QI-081.
744 DI-070, K-143, PI-027, PI-100, QI-088.
745 QI-088.
746 K-143, PI-001, PI-027, PI-033.
747 K-143, PI-101.
748 K-143.
749 QI-088.
750 PI-045, PI-094, PI-101.
751 PI-094.
752 QI-081, QI-093.
753 QI-093.
754 QI-092.
755 QI-081.

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(c) Forced recruitment of children

346. The Mission amassed a reliable body of information demonstrating a pattern of
EAOs recruiting children into their armed forces, in violation of international law. 756 The
Mission was able to collect information on child recruitment conducted by the TNLA, KIA,
RCSS and UWSA. Many of the Mission’s victims and witnesses clearly stated that their
recruitment and involvement with the armed groups was against their will.
347. The United Nations has verified cases of the UWSA using children in their armed
ranks in 2012, 2013 and 2014.757
348. Sources informed the Mission that the TNLA recruits boys that are no longer in
school, from the age of 14 to 15 years old. 758 The TNLA has a policy of recruiting boys and
girls from the age of 16 years old.759 One interviewee explained that the village
administrator kept a list of all the boys who are no longer in school and that the TNLA
would go through the list to recruit them. He stated that, prior to 2013, the TNLA would
only take one boy per household, but that this practice has changed, and as they now take
all brothers from a household, and even some girls: “they do not have the option of saying
no to the TNLA”.760 Further accounts suggest that young men and boys often run away
from the TNLA after being recruited, or to avoid recruitment. 761 Another source mentioned
that his brother was forcibly recruited by the TNLA after he fled his village to escape
recruitment. His brother was 16 years old when he started his military training. 762
349. Women and girls usually are recruited by the TNLA for administrative work and do
not engage directly in fighting.763 Girls are usually asked to cook for the TNLA and are not
necessarily required to fight.764 This still constitutes prohibited recruitment.
350. The KIA has also recruited boys and girls under 18-years old.765 Although one
source mentioned that this practice was in place mostly before 2010, 766 the Mission
received information to suggest its continuation. It was also reported that the KIA abducted
children to force them to join their ranks. For example, on 12 March 2014, two girls aged
15 and 16 years old, were abducted by two KIA elements in Mansi Township, Kachin
State. After four days in captivity, they were required to join the KIA in military support
roles.767 In another verified incident, the KIA abducted four girls in Lashio Township, Shan
State, on 26 November 2015. The girls were subsequently moved to different posts and
reportedly received military training. 768
351. The Mission received accounts of children being recruited in the ranks of the SSA-
S,769 with accounts of children fleeing to avoid compulsory military training by the SSA-S.
The children interviewed mentioned that they were afraid of being caught by the armed
group after their escape.770
352. A woman shared an account of forced recruitment conducted by the SSA-S in her
village of Mong Khung Township, Shan State, when she was 16 years old in August 2011.
The SSA-S arrived in her village and recruited villagers who had not fled the fighting
between the SSA-S and the Tatmadaw. The SSA-S recruited 58 villagers in total including

756 DI-070, K-061, K-064, K-143, PI-001, PI-014, PI-093, PI-095, PI-101.
757 K-061.
758 PI-093, PI-101.
759 PI-101.
760 PI-093.
761 PI-093.
762 PI-095.
763 PI-101.
764 PI-093.
765 K-061, K-064.
766 PI-001.
767 K-061.
768 K-064.
769 DI-070, K-061, PI-014.
770 DI-070, PI-014.

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children and 15 women. She was one of them, and had been forced to undertake military
training for nine months until she escaped. She said:
I was part of the SSA-S training, I was forced to go there. Three SSA-S armed men
came and said “you need to be part of our group”. The SSA-S went to each house. If
I had not accepted to go, my father would have been forced to join, but he was
already old. My father objected to me joining the SSA-S military training but they
answered “if you don’t want her to come, we will come back and get you”.
353. The victim also stated that the conditions during training were dire and they often
felt hungry: “We had to train hard and to always be on guard for the Tatmadaw. Sometimes
we had to work the entire night without eating. It was quite hard for the women in the
group.771
354. Another 16-year old girl told the Mission that she was forcibly recruited by the SSA-
S in July 2011 in Mongkaung Township, Shan State until she escaped from a SSA-S
military camp. She received training for two years, which she said was because, “they
needed to work for their country and fight back the Tatmadaw”. 772

(d) Destruction and appropriation of civilian property

355. The Mission has reasonable grounds to conclude that EAOs have confiscated and
destroyed civilian property as a means to coerce civilians to participate in military
operations, to gain control over a given territory or to punish civilians who have
collaborated with the Tatmadaw or an opposing non-State armed group.773 This
appropriation of property was closely connected to the extraction of natural resources or
farming, which appear to be imperative to the armed group’s financial survival. 774
356. For example, a source reported that the SSA-S destroyed his mother’s tea plantation
in 2013 in Namhsan Township, Shan State. The source mentioned that the SSA-S wanted to
gain control over the Ta’ang region and exploit the tea plantation for financial reasons. This
led his mother and other villagers to leave and move to Yangon as they were no longer able
to earn a living in their native village.775 The Mission also recorded other recent unverified
accounts of Ta’ang villagers being forced to leave their land in territory controlled by the
SSA-S in Shan State.776
357. In several cases reported, the TNLA confiscated the land, house or belongings of
families who refuse to give up their sons for recruitment or because they escaped after
having been recruited.777 The property is confiscated until the families allow their son to be
recruited. In one credible instance reported, the TNLA confiscated the home of the mother
of the source in 2017, Namhsan Township, Shan State, because her brother was recruited
by the TNLA, but had then “deserted” and fled to Thailand. As a consequence, the mother
was evicted from her home, under orders from the TNLA. 778
358. In another account, the TNLA confiscated the home and tea plantation of a family in
Namhsan Township, Shan State in early September 2017.779 The interviewee explained that
initially her brother was recruited, despite his mental disability, and when he had escaped
military training, she had been forcibly recruited in his place. She was informed of this by
the village administrator, acting on behalf of the TNLA. She eventually also managed to
flee, but as a consequence her parents were evicted from their home and land, and are now
displaced.780

771 DI-070.
772 PI-014.
773 PI-094, PI-101, QI-088, SI-003.
774 QI-088, SI-003.
775 QI-088.
776 PI-101.
777 PI-093, PI-094, PI-095, PI-097.
778 PI-093.
779 PI-094.
780 PI-094.

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359. The Mission has also received unverified reports of the SSA-S and TNLA looting
and pillaging civilian property during their military incursions into the opposing group’s
territory.781 For example, on 13 February 2016, it was reported that, during fighting
between the TNLA and RCSS in Nam Twe village, Langhko Township, Shan State, SSA-S
members entered the village and looted the belongings of villagers. 782 Similarly, on
7 January 2016, in Tangyan Township, Shan State, TNLA men entered a village and
requested villagers to give them rice and allegedly said “we do not care if you have rice to
eat yourselves”.783

(e) Taxes and extortion (socio-economic component)

360. Some EAOs implemented arbitrary “taxation” requirements that caused significant
economic pressure on civilians. For example, residents of villages under the control of the
TNLA in Namhsan Township, Shan State, were obliged to pay “taxes” often referred to by
villagers as “extortion money”.784 Sources informed the Mission that villagers were forced
to pay up to 10,000 Kyat and one or two bags of rice per month, which represented a major
burden for villagers who only earn wages during the short tea leave picking season, from
March to late April. The village administrator kept a list of villagers who did not comply
with the obligation to pay the taxes. When one household could not pay the TNLA,
someone else in the village had to cover for them, and they then needed to pay double the
next month.785 One source mentioned that the TNLA maintained a list of villagers who have
not paid “their dues” and that this may result in the TNLA visiting a person’s house “with
their guns to shoot at you or destroy your belongings.” 786 In already difficult economic
circumstances, this had a serious impact on villagers. One interviewee mentioned that
villagers felt intimidated by this and would share small portions of rice amongst themselves
to ensure that they had sufficient to pay the TNLA. 787
361. Another source mentioned that, when the “Shan Army” 788 controlled the tea fields
around his village in Namhsan Township, Shan State in 2011, they would require villagers
to pay them a tax to be able to cultivate the land. Reportedly, they charged 30,000 Kyat per
tea plantation. The Mission also received reports of the Shan Army 789 destroying tea
plantations in 2013 in Namhsam Township, Shan State, as a mean to coerce villagers to pay
them.790

(f) Abductions, arbitrary deprivation of liberty, torture and ill-treatment

362. The Mission has reasonable grounds to conclude that some EAOs have abducted,
arbitrarily deprived persons of their liberty, and subsequently ill-treated or tortured, as a
mean to coerce them to participate in military operations, to gain control over a given
territory, or to punish civilians who have collaborated with the Tatmadaw or an opposing
EAO.791
363. The Mission received credible accounts of the TNLA abducting the parents of
children who refused to join their ranks. 792 In one case reported to the Mission, the TNLA
abducted the mother of a boy who refused to join the TNLA. 793

781 K-137, K-144.

782 K-137.
783 K-144.
784 PI-093, PI-094, PI-096, PI-097.
785 PI-093, PI-097.
786 PI-097.
787 PI-097.
788 Unclear if Shan State Army-S (RCSS) or Shan State Army-N (SSPP). Considering the location of the
incident, it is likely to be the SSA-N (SSPP).
789 Ibid.
790 QI-088.
791 K-143, PI-095, PI-112, PI-114.
792 PI-093, PI-097, PI-112.
793 PI-093.

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364. The TNLA also arrested and detained civilians. 794 For example, a victim shared an
account of arbitrary detention and ill-treatment conducted by the TNLA in Namhsan, Shan
State, in March 2013. The victim was taken for forced labour by the Tatmadaw for four
days, but managed to escape and returned to his village which was under the control of the
TNLA. Upon his arrival at the entrance to the village, the TNLA detained and beat him
accusing him of being a spy for the Tatmadaw. The victim stated, “I was beaten and tied-up
for one entire night at the entrance of the village at the area where villagers keep their cows.
I was beaten until I could not walk anymore”. Members of the TNLA told the victim, “You
betrayed the Ta’ang people by guiding Tatmadaw soldiers”. 795
365. In another reported case, the TNLA arrested the father of a 29-year old man who
was absent when the TNLA arrived to recruit him in October 2017 in Namkham Township,
Shan State. The father was subsequently arrested and detained by the TNLA until the man
returned and was recruited. He said, “The TNLA often do this. They arrest parents in order
to force the sons to join the TNLA. They release the parents only when the sons are
recruited”.796
366. The KIA also abducted civilians to coerce them in participating in military
operations.797 For example, in a verified incident that occurred in February 2017, a 12-year
old girl was abducted by the KIA in Kutkai Township, Shan State, and held hostage by the
group because her older brothers had refused to be recruited. During her captivity, the girl
received military training.798
367. The Mission also received unverified reports of SSA-S and TNLA abducting
civilians in the course of their military incursions against each other. 799 The Mission was
not able to determine if the civilians were released following the abductions. For example,
it was reported that SSA-S abducted 11 Ta’ang villagers from a village in Kyautme
Township, Shan State, on 17 January 2016.800 Further, on 17 September 2017, it was
reported that the SSA-S abducted a monk and his brother in Thibaw Township, Shan State.
They were allegedly released 10 days after their abduction. 801
368. The Mission verified an incident involving the SSA-S arbitrarily depriving the
president and secretary of a local branch of the Ta’ang National Party of his liberty on 20
June 2015 in Mongkaung Township, Shan State. 802 The victim had erected a billboard for
the Ta’ang National Party in his village and had refused to take it down at the request of the
SSA-S. As a result, SSA-S armed men detained the victim with another member of the
party under a tree for two days. They were beaten on the head and body with rifle butts.
Their hands and legs were tied for approximately 24 hours. The victim was beaten by an
SSA-S leader who told him, “if you do not become an SSA-S soldier then you can die
here”. The SSA-S leader also pointed a gun at his temple and pulled the trigger in a mock
execution. Two days later, the victims were moved to the forest and placed under a plastic
covering with no walls, and remained detained there for 33 days. The victim was
handcuffed, making sleeping difficult. Civil society organizations intervened and eventually
secured the victims’ release. The SSA-S initially denied having the detainees in their
custody but they eventually confirmed their location and released the victims on the
condition that they do not participate in any political party or recruitment for the SSA-S.
Members of the armed group also threatened to confiscate and destroy the property of the
victims should they be politically active in the future. 803

794 K-143, K-144, PI-095.

795 PI-095.
796 PI-112.
797 K-061, K-064.
798 K-061.
799 K-137, K-144.
800 K-137.
801 K-137.
802 K-137, PI-114, V-304.
803 PI-114.

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369. Another 16-year old girl told the Mission that she was forcibly recruited by the SSA-
S in July 2011 in Mongkaung Township, Shan State. The child was ill-treated and wanted
to return home to care for her sick mother, she said:
I was beaten with a stick sometimes. The trainees were often punished by the SSA-S
members. If the soldiers did not hit us hard enough, an officer would come and hit
us harder. We were punished for serious offences such as wanting to leave the
training. The conditions in which we lived at the training camp were very hard.
Once a month a senior officer would come and ask if we had something to say about
the training. I was always beaten because I wanted to go home and because I was
the youngest.804

(g) Sexual and gender-based violence

370. One incident of sexual violence concerning perpetrators belonging to an EAO was
reported by a source and involved the rape of a headmistress by several TNLA officers at
her home in Kyaukme Township, Shan State in October 2017. Following the victim’s
report to local authorities, the TNLA negotiated for the perpetrators to pay compensation to
the victim, and brought two soldiers to kneel and apologize to her. The TNLA held a “court
case” in the forest to address the crime. The victim was invited, but chose not to attend. 805
The Mission also received unverified reports of KIA men raping women in Kachin State
during the reporting period who were subsequently tried before courts in KIO controlled
territory.806 These allegations require further verification.

(h) Killings
371. The Mission has also obtained credible but unverified information suggesting that
some EAOs have unlawfully killed civilians or fighters hors de combat in their custody.807
372. For example, the Mission recorded an account of the Shan Army 808 killing a Lahu
man in 2011 in Maungdaw Township, Shan State. According to the witness, the victim, a
former Tatmadaw soldier, was mutilated and tortured before being killed. 809 In February
2016, it was reported that an unspecified ethnic armed group killed seven civilians in
Kyaukme Township, Shan State. The bodies were found by the Tatmadaw the day after
their abduction.810 In March 2016, the UWSA reportedly executed two persons after they
were convicted of murder by the Wa Special Administrative Zone’s court. 811 A further
reported case suggests that SSA-S men killed a Ta’ang villager in Namkham Township,
Shan State, on 1 July 2016.812 Similarly, it was reported that TNLA men killed four
villagers in the forest near a village of Namkham Township, Shan State, on 8 February
2016.813
373. These cases require further verification, including regarding the protected status of
the persons killed.

C. Impact of conflict, violations and abuses on civilians

1. Fear, trauma, displacement and humanitarian impact

374. Irreversible harm has been inflicted on civilians by all parties to the conflicts in
northern Myanmar: civilians were killed and injured; families were separated and displaced

804 PI-014.
805 PI-110.
806 K-145.
807 K-143, QI-077.
808 Unclear if Shan State Army-S (RCSS) or Shan State Army-N (SSPP).
809 QI-077.
810 K-143.
811 K-143, V-305.
812 K-137.
813 K-144.

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multiple times; homes, churches and schools were looted or destroyed, also preventing
many children from attending school regularly; 814 and entire villages were burned and
destroyed. The civilian population continues to live in constant fear and terror of an army
that has thoroughly failed to protect them, and in many instances directly attacked them.
375. Victims have informed the Mission of how their lives have been altered as a
consequence of the perpetration of human rights violations. Victims remain highly
traumatised.815 For example, a source mentioned that children are afraid of opening doors
and hide when they see or hear planes.816 Other victims are no longer able to work to
sustain a livelihood.817 For instance, a tea plantation farmer explained that she can no longer
work on her plantation after she was injured from shrapnel and bullet wounds on her leg
and arm during a Tatmadaw attack in northern Shan State on 2 May 2017. She remained
hospitalised for several weeks and she can hardly move. Her husband has since become a
monk and her only income is from the work undertaken by her children. Their house was
also destroyed during the attack and they now live in a rented home. 818 A torture victim
shared that since an incident in northern Shan State in August 2017, and because of injuries
inflicted by Tatmadaw soldiers, he can no longer work and sustain his family: “The
Tatmadaw soldiers tortured me and destroyed my life”. 819 Other torture and ill-treatment
victims have stated that they suffer from severe trauma, cognitive dysfunction, and other
mental and physical consequences that require medical care. 820
376. Many victims reported that it had been extremely challenging to obtain medical
services to treat their injuries, and some have felt compelled to travel to China to seek
medical attention.821 Victims have also reportedly died because of the lack of timely
medical care.822 For example, a victim from the Monekoe area in Shan State reported that
on 15 January 2016 a mortar shell exploded in her compound, close to a main road, causing
injuries to herself and her daughter:
The shell pieces are still in our bodies. My daughter is not normal now. She doesn’t
respond to me sometimes. When I was in the hospital, doctors didn’t take the shell
pieces out of my body because it was too risky. Doctors said it might harm the baby
as I was already 8 months pregnant then. I had to have a surgery to deliver my baby
because my whole body was swollen.823
377. Victims and witnesses’ accounts indicate the Tatmadaw frequently went to the
villages of individuals who had escaped detention or forced labour looking for them, 824 and
in some cases beat family members of the escaped individual. 825 For example, one victim
from Myitkyina, Kachin State, who was arrested and detained overnight in 2012 and whose
brother was killed by the Tatmadaw during this detention, reported that after he escaped
detention and fled the country, the Tatmadaw went to his village to look for him. His
parents and siblings were afraid to stay in the village so they fled to an IDP
camp.826Another victim from Myitkyina, Kachin State reported how, as retaliation for her
escape after several months of forced labour in 2012, her house was destroyed and her
mother beaten, and made to undertake forced labour for the Tatmadaw.827

814 PI-087, DI-067, PI-016.

815 PI-042, PI-103.
816 PI-103.
817 PI-042, PI-046, PI-072.
818 PI-073.
819 PI-035.
820 PI-021, PI-035, PI-115.
821 PI-029, PI-055, PI-065, DI-057.
822 DI-070, PI-105.
823 PI-115.
824 PI-066, PI-067, PI-077, PI-078.
825 PI-007, PI-068.
826 PI-062.
827 PI-068.

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378. An estimated 97,000 people in Kachin and 9,000 people in Shan remain in
displacement camps or camp-like situations, many in overcrowded conditions with
inadequate shelters, which are in urgent need of repair and provide little privacy. Many of
them have been displaced for extended periods of up to seven years. Displaced peoples,
particularly in non-government controlled areas, have told the Mission that the quality of
education afforded in camps is poor and not recognized by the authorities to attain higher
education.828 Meeting food needs is, in the words of one local organization working in these
camps “a constant struggle”, with limited food rations and a rate of chronic malnutrition
well above the national average.829 Access to health care remains limited, and psycho-social
support is largely non-existent. Insecurity levels in camps are high and many displaced
persons have a sense of despair for the future. 830 Thousands of others, approximately 68,000
since 2017 alone, have suffered from temporary displacements over the reporting period.
Some of these individuals have been displaced multiple times.
379. Many families have been separated because of the war and many do not have
contact with family members left behind.831 For example, a woman explained that she was
separated from her child while fleeing a Tatmadaw attack on her village in November 2017
in Kachin State and had not seen her since. 832
380. Victims frequently told the Mission that after being released or escaping from
detention they were too afraid to return to their villages, 833 in particular if the Tatmadaw
had taken their identification documents. 834 Many victims decided to leave the country, 835
and in some cases family members also had to leave. 836 Leaving Myanmar also impacted
victims that fled and family members left behind. A man said that his aunt had to mortgage
her land to pay for his trip to Malaysia, after he had escaped arbitrary detention by the
Tatmadaw.837
381. Civilians continually suffer as a consequence of the continuing conflicts between the
Tatmadaw and the EAOs.838 Many express a feeling of being caught in the middle: for
example, one witness mentioned that, “villagers want nothing to do with this, all they want
is to live in peace and farm their land. Instead we are caught in between so many wars.” 839
Another stated that, “it is very difficult to live in the KIA controlled area. It is also very
hard to live under the Tatmadaw controlled areas. Why can’t we live in peace?” 840

(a) Consequences on women

382. The consequences for women, especially for those who lost their spouse or fathers
as a result of attacks, killings or whose husbands were forcibly disappeared, are particularly
severe.841 Many face a dire economic situation having lost the main breadwinner of the
family, and are vulnerable to other violations, including sexual and gender-based violence.
The mother of a victim killed by the Tatmadaw in June 2017 in Namhsan Township, Shan
State, stated the following:

828 PI-087, QM-014.

829 PI-056.
830 QM-014, QM-017.
831 PI-020, PI-027, PI-074, PI-084, PI-086.
832 PI-086.
833 PI-089, PI-085, PI-084, PI-079, PI-078.
834 PI-011, PI-029.
835 PI-062, PI-033, PI-029, PI-006.
836 PI-001, PI-008, PI-012, PI-027, PI-062, PI-096, QI-089.
837 PI-079.
838 PI-044, PI-074, PI-095, PI-094, PI-097, QI-077, QI-079, QI-080, QI-087.
839 PI-094.
840 PI-044.
841 PI-070, PI-073, PI-074.

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Before my son died, we relied on him to pay for medicine and food as we are aged.
Now without him it is very difficult to survive, and our life is very hard now. I live
with my husband, but he is also old. There is no one else to care for us anymore. 842
383. Another woman recalled the impact of the disappearance of her husband in Kachin
State in 2014:
I became the head of the household. My children lost their father, and I had to find
income to maintain my children and my aging parents. I had to start selling
vegetables and to travel from one village to another. That is where Tatmadaw
soldiers raped me in February 2018. Ever since my husband was taken away by the
Tatmadaw, we have been struggling for survival. I decided to leave my children in
Kachin State with my elderly parents so I can work abroad and ensure they stay
alive.843
384. The impact of sexual and gender-based violence on women and men reported to the
Mission is severe, varied and long-lasting. The Mission found one case of rape that resulted
in death caused by contracting HIV. 844 Other injuries reported by women included
experiencing pain in the vagina and lower abdomen region during sexual intercourse. 845
Similarly, men who experienced sexual torture in detention continue to suffer enduring
physical and psychological injuries, including bleeding from the anus, loss of cognitive
function, loss of emotional control, loss of erectile function and inability to work. 846
385. The lack of specific medical expertise related to rape exacerbates the effects of
sexual violence in the region. As victims are predominantly women, this creates gender-
based inequality in access to medical services. In several cases, women did not have the
access to medical attention and women have fallen pregnant, sometimes even after seeing a
doctor immediately after the rape, because they were not given medication to prevent
pregnancy.847 A 2017 report by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of
human rights in Myanmar had also found that the limited capacity of providers, as well as
restrictions on women’s freedom of movement due to increased militarization, limited
access to life-saving services for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence.848

2. Landmines
386. There is no systematic nationwide collection of casualty data related to landmines,
but across Myanmar at least 1,000 people have been killed or injured by anti-personnel
landmines since August 2011 across 14 states and regions. 849 Of the recorded incidents in
recent years, Kachin and Shan States have among the highest number of landmine
casualties, and numbers are increasing.850 For example, from 2016 to April 2018, the United
Nations recorded 199 casualties in Kachin State including 42 deaths, and 182 casualties in
Shan State, including 48 deaths. 851 Despite the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire
Agreement in October 2015, which committed all parties to end the use of landmines and
cooperate on mine-clearance operations, new landmines continue to be laid. 852
387. Several victims and witnesses reported instances where civilians were injured or
killed due to landmines.853 Individuals informed encountering landmines in forest areas,

842 PI-074.
843 PI-069; see this chapter, section A.4: Sexual and gender-based violence.
844 PI-007.
845 PI-063, PI-068.
846 PI-052, PI-055, PI-056.
847 PI-066, PI-067, PI-068, PI-069, QI-098.
848 A/HRC/34/67, para. 56.
849 Myanmar Information Management Unit, Townships with Known Landmine Contamination (2017)
and Casualties in Myanmar (December 2016).
850 Ibid. K-064, V-306, V-307.
851 K-064.
852 V-308.
853 PI-103, PI-104, PI-094, PI-085, PI-046, PI-045, DI-061, PI-076.

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either while detained by the Tatmadaw or while fleeing fighting, 854 while travelling to their
tea plantations or farm,855 and in or around villages.856 The Mission was unable to verify the
party responsible for laying the mines in these cases, but credible reports indicate that both
the Tatmadaw and EAOs have laid landmines. 857 Credible reports indicate that Tatmadaw
soldiers lay landmines in villages they have attacked or after civilians have fled, or on roads
frequently used by civilians. 858 Civilians have also laid landmines in order to protect their
property.859
388. The presence of landmines has a severe impact on the lives of civilians. Displaced
persons have indicated that landmines were one of the concerns preventing them from
returning to their places of origin. 860 For example, one individual from Namhsan Township,
Shan State, explained the impact of landmines:
There are many landmines planted on the route to my tea farm. There is no way to
see them, you only know they are there after stepping on them. Villagers often die
from stepping on them. My friend stepped on one and lost her leg. My father nearly
stepped on one but he was lucky, it exploded just before he put his foot on it. The
landmines make it dangerous for us to farm.861

3. Lack of recourse
389. Not only do victims and survivors live in a continuing state of insecurity and a
constant fear, they also have also no recourse to justice. The very authorities that should
protect them also fail at this level. The climate of impunity and its underlying causes it
discussed in detail in Chapter VII (impunity and accountability). This section provides a
brief overview of the experiences of victims and witnesses from Kachin and Shan States in
this regard.
390. Many victims are too afraid to complain. If complaints are made, the default reaction
appears to be of reprisal and attempts to silence rather than undertaking a genuine
investigation. In cases that have been investigated, the process has often been flawed.

(a) No possibility to file complaints

391. Individuals who escaped after having been detained and in many cases subjected to
torture, ill-treatment, sexual violence or attempted murder by the Tatmadaw, frequently told
the Mission that they were too afraid to return to their villages, let alone to file official
complaints.862 This concern was particularly apparent in cases where the Tatmadaw had
retained the individual’s identity document. 863 This fear was not unfounded as many were
later told by family members that the Tatmadaw had come and looked for them after they
had escaped.864 In some cases, the Tatmadaw had also threatened or beaten family members
of those who had fled.865 For example, one victim from Puta-O Township, Kachin State,
reported that after being sexually assaulted by a soldier in 2012 she did not return home but
the soldier went looking for her there:
I was walking back from another village when a soldier pulled me into the jungle.
He put his hand over my mouth to stop me from screaming, he beat me and touched

854 PI-016, PI-104, PI-085, PI-046, PI-045. See also this chapter, section A.6: Forced labour.
855 PI-016, PI-094.
856 DI-061, QI-094, PI-046, PI-098.
857 K-137, K-144, PI-045, PI-049, PI-094, PI-098, SI-003, V-309.
858 PI-045, PI-049, PI-094, PI-098, SI-002, SI-003.
859 PI-085; G. Cathcart, “Landmines as a form of community protection in Eastern Myanmar”, in
Conflict in Myanmar: War, Politics, Religion, 2nd ed., N. Cheesman, N. Farrelly, eds. (ISEAS, 2016),
pp. 127-131.
860 PI-103, SI-002, SI-003.
861 PI-094.
862 PI-078, PI-079, PI-084, PI-085, PI-089.
863 PI-006, PI-007, PI-011, PI-029, PI-040.
864 PI-066, PI-067, PI-077, PI-078.
865 PI-007, PI-068, PI-096.

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my body. An elderly man passing by heard the commotion and told the soldier to
leave me alone. I ran away but was too afraid to go back home so I stayed with an
elder in my village. The next day the elder went to see my parents, they said the
soldier had been to my house looking for me. He had beaten my parents and taken
my ID card from them. Because of this, I had to leave my village.866
392. Many victims therefore decided to leave the country following their escape from
detention.867
393. Individuals who did return to their villages, as well as family members of
individuals who had been killed or who had witnessed killings, told the Mission that they
did not complain as they were afraid to do so.868 This fear is not unfounded given that
reprisals have been carried out against some individuals who have complained, 869 and given
that many victims or their family members are located in rural and insecure areas often in
continued close proximity to perpetrators. Some victims or witnesses indicated that they did
not know how to file complaints or there was no one to complain to. 870 Others said they felt
there was no point in complaining. 871 For example, one individual from Loilen Township,
Shan State, whose father was killed told the Mission that he did not file a complaint as “the
government does not care about us and the Tatmadaw is abusive. There is no point in filing
a complaint – there is no justice.”872 In some cases a combination of reasons are given. One
individual from Kutkai Township in Shan State whose son was killed by the Tatmadaw in
March 2017 said “I did not complain. I do not have any money and I didn’t know how. I
was also afraid.”873 Another told the Mission that she was not aware that forced labour was
a violation until she left the country.874
394. Several individuals told the Mission that they had not shared their story with anyone
else.875 For example, a village administrator from Muse Township, Shan State, whose
village was attacked by the Tatmadaw in one incident and villagers killed in another, stated:
After the attack happened in 2016, I didn’t share the story with anyone. Nobody else
in the village shared the story either. We didn’t receive threats from the Tatmadaw
but we just understood the situation. When the members of my village were killed in
2017, I felt sad, but nobody lodged any complaints then either. We are afraid. As
village administrator, I had gone to ask compensation in the past but was told “go
and ask compensation from the rebel groups, not from us.876

(b) Reprisals for speaking out

395. Where individuals did dare to speak out about violations committed in Kachin and
Shan States, the Mission was provided with numerous examples of the police or Tatmadaw
bringing, or threatening to bring,877 court cases against them under a range of problematic
legal provisions.878 In a number of other cases brought to the attention of the Mission, 879 the
Tatmadaw’s response to alleged violations, has been to assert, often without any
investigations, that the individuals were either killed by EAOs, or were fighters of these
organizations and therefore legitimately killed. Based on such assertions, the Tatmadaw
brings cases for defamation of the image of the Tatmadaw, or under the Unlawful

866 PI-007.
867 PI-006, PI-029, PI-033, PI-062.
868 DI-057, DI-068, PI-041, PI-070.
869 DI-062, PI-070, QI-090.
870 Ibid.
871 PI-041, PI-082.
872 PI-082.
873 PI-070.
874 PI-058.
875 DI-057, DI-058, DI-062, DI-063, PI-117.
876 DI-057.
877 A/HRC/37/70; K-139, PI-037, PI-038, PI-102, PI-106, V-206.
878 See chapter VI, section A.2: Intimidation and reprisal for engagement with the United Nations.
879 K-139, PI-037, PI-106.

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Associations Act, against individuals alleging Tatmadaw responsibility for the deaths. This
is particularly problematic given that the Mission has found a pattern of individuals being
killed while in Tatmadaw custody and given information indicating that the Tatmadaw
portrays or disguises civilians that were killed as members of EAOs, such as by making
them wear the uniforms of EAOs.880
396. A well-known example is the case of Brang Shawng, who was convicted of making
“false charges,” under section 211 of the Penal Code on 13 February 2015 and sentenced to
a 50,000 Kyat fine or six months in prison. He alleged his daughter had been shot and killed
by the Tatmadaw on 13 September 2012 in Sut Ngai Yang village, Hpakant Township,
Kachin State and wrote a letter to the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission
calling for an investigation.881 Another individual from Kachin State, told the Mission that
after her father was killed after having been seen in the custody of the Tatmadaw, in 2018,
charges were brought against a relative that complained:
My relative went to the police, she tried to complain and to make a police report –
she explained that the Tatmadaw were responsible and she wanted to get justice.
The Tatmadaw said that my father was a member of the KIA, and that my relative
was lying. They brought charges against her. She was afraid so she had to leave her
home.882
397. Charges have also been brought against journalists or those interacting with them. 883
For example, police brought charges against Dumdaw Nawng Lat, President of the Kachin
Baptist Church in Monekoe, Shan State and his nephew and assistant pastor Langjaw Gam
Seng, after they guided journalists around their damaged church which they alleged had
been bombed by the Tatmadaw in November 2016. Both were sentenced to two years and
three months in prison on 27 October 2017 under section 17(1) of the Unlawful
Associations Act, with Dumdaw Nawng Lat receiving an additional two year sentence for
defamation under section 505(b) of the Penal Code, after also giving an interview to an
international news outlet.884
398. Lawyers who have taken up sensitive cases against the Tatmadaw in Kachin and
Shan States have also faced threats, leading some to be afraid of working on these cases. 885
For example, one lawyer told the Mission that he was harassed and his colleagues
threatened when working on a case against the Tatmadaw:
It was a sensitive case, so I was watched by the intelligence. Every time I went to the
place of the incident, I was harassed by police. My co-workers were threatened by
the military. They said, “If you take the case, you will have problems.”886
399. Civil society organizations working in Kachin and Shan States face constant
surveillance and visits from the security forces, and face additional security concerns when
releasing reports that implicate the Tatmadaw. 887

(c) Flawed process when complaints are taken up

400. In a few cases, individuals reported to the Mission that they were given
compensation by the Tatmadaw but without any form of process.888 For example, a father
whose son was shot by the Tatmadaw when he was walking along a road in Kutkai

880 See this chapter, section A.2: Unlawful killings.

881 A/HRC/28/72, PI-105, V-208.
882 PI-106.
883 A/HRC/37/70; A/72/382; V-209; see also OHCHR, The Invisible Boundary – Criminal prosecutions
of journalism in Myanmar (11 September 2018).
884 Ibid. PI-037, PI-038, V-057. See this chapter, section A.5: Arbitrary deprivation of liberty and
enforcd disappearance.
885 PI-037, BM-008; International Commission of Jurists, Achieving Justice for Gross Human Rights
Violations in Myanmar Baseline Study, (Geneva, 2018).
886 BM-008.
887 BM-007; A/HRC/34/67.
888 PI-071, PI-074, PI-110.

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Township, Shan State in August 2017, was told by the Tatmadaw that they had made a
mistake and was given 500,000 Kyat for the funeral.889 The amount of compensation given
appears to be arbitrary - a mother whose son was killed by the Tatmadaw in Namhsan
Township, Shan State, in 2017 reported:
A soldier from the Tatmadaw base gave my village administrator money to pay for
the funeral but the funeral was more expensive so I had to take out a loan. I spoke to
the Tatmadaw, but was very intimidated. I explained to them that my son was the
bread winner in my family and without him we could not survive. I asked for more
compensation but they never gave us anything else.890
401. The Mission was also told of a recent case of rape in 2018 in Shan State where,
following a meeting between local authorities, a Tatmadaw commander and relatives of the
victim, the soldier responsible was slapped 10 times and compensation of 200,000 Kyat
provided to a male family member of the victim. 891
402. Due to the lack of cooperation from the Government of Myanmar, the Mission did
not have access to official information on prosecutions against members of the Tatmadaw
for violations. However, the Mission is aware that in a small number of cases, members of
the Tatmadaw have been prosecuted for violations including killings and sexual violence.
For example, in relation to the killing of three IDPs in Mansi Township, Kachin State in
May 2017, a military tribunal sentenced six Tatmadaw soldiers to 10 years’ imprisonment
in January 2018.892 The Mission is also aware of a case of a child who was raped in Kachin
State where a soldier was sentenced to 10 years in prison with hard labour.893 However,
investigations and prosecutions appear to be limited to a small number of often high-profile
cases. The default approach is to deny Tatmadaw responsibility, dismiss the complainant,
and in some cases threatening prosecution against anyone alleging Tatmadaw involvement
in the incident, and only when these approaches fail to deflect attention, to undertake some
form of investigation which generally does not comply with international investigative
standards.894
403. For example, the Tatmadaw has threatened legal action in relation to the killings of
the volunteer teachers named Maran Lu Ra and Tangbau Hkawn Nan Tsin in Shan State on
19 January 2015, and there were serious concerns about the investigation methods. 895 A
similar pattern can be seen in incidents of arrest, for example in the case of Dumdaw
Nawng Lat and Langjaw Gam Seng in Monekoe, Muse Township, Shan State, where the
Presidential spokesperson denied on 10 January 2017 they were held by the Tatmadaw, but
it later transpired that they had in fact been detained in a military base from 24 December
2016.896 Credible information received on the killing of seven individuals in Mong Yaw,
Shan State in June 2016 indicates that following an incident where witnesses saw two
individuals being shot by the Tatmadaw after they ignored an order to stop at a checkpoint,
and five other individuals being detained near their farm land and not returning, the military
ordered villagers not to leave their village for three days. 897 When villagers were able to go
back to their farms, the bodies of the seven individuals were found in two sites. On 2 July
2016, the Myawaddy military-owned newspaper, stated that “rumours on social media that
Tatmadaw had killed seven civilians, which were not true,” continuing that two of the
individuals were TNLA members and the other five bodies had been found by troops
during “area clearance.”898 However, later a Tatmadaw senior general reportedly admitted

889 PI-071.
890 PI-074.
891 PI-110.
892 A/HRC/37/70, para. 36.
893 PI-037.
894 See chapter X: Impunity and accountability.
895 See this chapter, section A.4: Sexual and gender-based violence.
896 See this chapter, section A.5: Arbitrary deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance.
897 K-076.21.
898 Article on file with the Mission.

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publically that five villagers were killed by the Tatmadaw during an interrogation, 899 and in
September 2016, seven soldiers were reportedly sentenced to five years in prison with hard
labour for the killings.900 It does not appear further investigations have been conducted into
the two individuals allegedly killed at the checkpoint.
404. The Mission also received credible information indicating that even when cases are
brought before authorities, the process is often flawed. For example, a lawyer who has
taken up several cases against the Tatmadaw identified a number of issues related to the
functioning of courts in their experience:
When cases are tried by a military court, the charges are often not what is expected
because the military code is different. For example, in a case of sexual violence,
there is no such charge, so a perpetrator was sentenced instead for intoxication
during official duty and got a lighter sentence. Sometimes lawyers are allowed to go
to military hearings but mostly we are not, we just get informed of the outcome, we
never get a written copy, we are just told orally. We also never know whether or not
the rulings are implemented. Even cases before civilian courts have problems. Like
with the military courts, we are not given a copy of the judgments. Sometimes if we
request them we get them but it takes a long time. For sensitive cases we are
generally not allowed to see them – we are told they are lost or in Naypyidaw.901

V. Emblematic situation 2: Rakhine State

405. Rakhine State is located in western Myanmar. It extends some 560 km along the
Bay of Bengal and shares a border with Bangladesh. It is geographically remote – much of
its internal borders with other states of Myanmar are mountainous and infrastructure links
to the rest of the country are limited. Despite its strategic location and fertility, the state
remains one of Myanmar’s poorest, with an estimated 44 per cent of the population living
below the poverty line.902 All communities in the state are affected by scarcity of livelihood
opportunities903 and it scores poorly on many social development indicators.904
406. The state comprises various ethnic and religious groups. The majority of the
population is ethnic Rakhine and Buddhist. 905 Muslims constitute the second largest
religious group, the majority of whom are Rohingya,906 with a smaller proportion of
Kaman. There are also a number of other minorities such as Chin, Daingnet, Khami,
Maramagyi, Mro, Thet and Hindus. The distribution of ethnic and religious minorities in

899 W. Lone, “In rare move, Myanmar military admits soldiers killed five villagers” (Reuters, 20 July
2016).
900 Frontier Myanmar, “Tatmadaw soldiers jailed for killing Mong Yaw villagers” (16 September 2016).
901 BM-007.
902 UNDP, Poverty Profile, Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey in Myanmar - 2009-2010
(2011). Rakhine State continues to rank low compared to other states and regions in Myanmar on
many indicators of living standards. See UNDP, Myanmar Living Conditions Survey 2017 (June
2018).
903 Center for Diversity and National Harmony, Rakhine Needs Assessment II (January 2017).
904 UNICEF, Rakhine State – A Snapshot of Child Wellbeing, available at:
https://www.unicef.org/myanmar/Rakhine_State_Profile_30-07-15.pdf
905 It is not possible to provide exact percentages as Rohingya were not included in the 2014 census and,
in any case, the 2014 census data on ethnicity has not been released. 63 per cent of the population in
Rakhine State was of Buddhist faith when adjusted for the non-enumerated population, principally the
Rohingya. This figure includes some other smaller Buddhist groups in addition to the ethnic Rakhine.
See also: Center for Diversity and National Harmony, Rakhine Needs Assessment (October 2015).
The report estimated the population of ethnic Rakhine at 60 per cent in Rakhine State.
906 On 29 March 2014, a day before the census was due to begin, the Government reneged on an earlier
explicit commitment to allow the Rohingya to self-identify their ethnicity on census forms. The
presidential spokesperson stated that those wishing to state their ethnicity as Rohingya would not be
registered. As a consequence, most of the Rohingya were not enumerated in the census. The census
estimates the non-enumerated population at 1,090,000 which would constitute 34 per cent of the total
population in Rakhine State.

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the state varies by region, with Rohingya constituting a large majority in the northern
district of Maungdaw, and ethnic Rakhine in most remaining districts. Estimates of
Rohingya remaining in Rakhine State after the mass exodus to Bangladesh of 2016 and
2017 vary between 200,000 and 240,000 in the northern townships and 332,000 and
360,000 for central Rakhine State.907
407. The ethnic Rakhine, like many other ethnic minorities in the country, have
grievances against the central Government, which they perceive to have favoured Bamar-
Buddhists politically and economically. They are proud of ethnic Rakhine culture, language
and history, which they feel is threatened. There is also a strong sentiment that the
development of Rakhine State has been neglected. In the words of one ethnic Rakhine who
spoke to the Mission, “in Rakhine State, there are a lot of resources but we can’t get these
resources from our own State”.908 This sentiment is fuelled by the high poverty levels.
According to data from the 2014 census, Rakhine State has the highest unemployment rate
in the country, and the lowest access to clean water and sanitation. 909 There are also
concerns that some large-scale development projects, such as the Shwe Gas pipeline, and
initial preparatory phases for the Kyaukpyu Special Economic Zone are not benefitting
local communities.910
408. In late 2015, an ethnic Rakhine armed group, the Arakan Army, started operating in
Rakhine State.911 Its stated aims include self-determination for ethnic Rakhine (Arakanese)
people, safeguarding cultural heritage and promoting the “national dignity and Arakanese
national interest”.912 It has operated in a number of townships within Rakhine State and has
since sporadically clashed with the Tatmadaw, with clashes reportedly becoming more
frequent and more deadly in recent years. 913 The casualties incurred by the Tatmadaw in
these clashes exceed those resulting from the ARSA attacks of 2016 and 2017. The clashes
have also caused displacement of civilians.
409. In September 2016, in an effort to address the concerns of all communities in the
State, the Myanmar Government formed the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State. The
Commission, composed of six national and three international members, was chaired by
former United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. It was mandated to “finding lasting
solutions to the complex and delicate issues in Rakhine State, in accordance with
established international standards”. The Commission produced a final report in August
2017, including 88 wide ranging recommendations. 914 The Office of the State Counsellor
welcomed “recommendations for meaningful and long-term solutions”. It stated that it
would give the report “full consideration with a view to carrying out the recommendations
to the fullest extent, and within the shortest timeframe possible, in line with the situation on
the ground.”915 The report noted that the situation in Rakhine State amounted to a

907 K-113.7.
908 DM-003.
909 Data from 2014 census data available on an interactive platform:
http://www.dopredatam.gov.mm/redbin/RpWebEngine.exe/Portal?BASE=MMARENG&lang=eng
910 CI-154, CI-162; International Commission of Jurists, Special Economic Zones in Myanmar and the
State Duty to Protect Human Rights (February 2017); Earth Rights International, There is no benefit,
they destroyed our farmland (June 2013).
911 The Arakan Army was created in 2009 in Kachin State, predominantly by ethnic Rakhine migrant
workers from the mines of Hpakant who received training by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA).
The Arakan Army is part of the Northern Alliance and the Federal Political Negotiation and
Consultative Committee (see chapter IV: Emblematic situation 1: Kachin and Shan States) and has
participated in hostilities in the north of Shan State, Kokang Self-administered zone and Kachin State.
912 Myanmar Peace Monitor, The Arakan Army.
913 According to credible reports, the townships where the Arakan Army operates include Buthidaung,
Kyauktaw, Maungdaw, Mrauk-U, Minbya, Ponnagyun, and Rathedaung. See: K-076.23; D.
Mathieson, “Shadowy rebels extend Myanmar’s wars (Asia Times, 11 June 2017); A. Davis,
“Myanmar’s other Rakhine problem (Asia Times, 29 November 2017).
914 Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, Final Report, Towards a peaceful, fair and prosperous
future for the people of Rakhine (August 2017).
915 Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Office of the State Counsellor, Statement by the Office of the
State Counsellor on the Final Report of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State (24 August 2017).

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“development crisis”, a “human rights crisis”, and a “security crisis”. It underscored that
the mandate of the Advisory Commission was not to examine specific allegations of human
rights violations.916
410. The Mission has examined such specific allegations. It has focused on (1) human
rights violations against the ethnic Rakhine, (2) the systemic oppression of the Rohingya,
(3) the violence in 2012, and (4) the extreme violence in 2016 and 2017 in the context of
the ARSA attacks and security forces’ “clearance operations”.

A. Human rights violations against the ethnic Rakhine

I want to share my story with the whole world because the world does not know
what is happening in our land.917
411. The international community has focused much attention on the human rights
situation of the Rohingya. Human rights violations against ethnic Rakhine have largely
gone unnoticed. The Mission purposefully reached out to ethnic Rakhine communities,
finding consistent patterns of serious human rights violations against them. In most cases,
Tatmadaw soldiers were the perpetrators.

1. Forced or compulsory labour918

412. The Mission found a consistent pattern of the Tatmadaw using ethnic Rakhine men,
women and children for forced or compulsory labour. 919 Forced labour took place
throughout the reporting period and across Rakhine State. 920 The victims were mostly from
remote rural areas. Considering that victims also referred to family members, including
their parents,921 being subjected to similar practices in the past, it is clear that such practices
have been a feature of Rakhine rural life for many years.
413. The ethnic Rakhine have experienced multiple forms of forced or compulsory
labour. The most common form was the carrying of heavy packs, weapons and supplies for
Tatmadaw patrols, referred to as “portering”, with the victims usually being males. Both
men and women have also been forced to work in Tatmadaw compounds, with men usually
constructing infrastructure and women washing, cleaning and cooking. Other forced labour
related to road construction, breaking and carrying rocks, cutting firewood, clearing forests,
and working in paddy fields.
414. Victims told the Mission of the typical experience. Tatmadaw soldiers would arrive
in a village or where villagers were gathered, including fields while farming 922 or when
returning from work,923 and order villagers to join them without warning or consultation.
Soldiers would often physically grab people as they passed through the village, 924 or take
them from their homes.925 In such instances, the selected villagers were often unable to
inform their families. They were given no information on the work they were supposed to
do and had to embark immediately on portering or other forms of work for days or weeks.
One victim described his experience:

916
Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, Final Report, Towards a peaceful, fair and prosperous
future for the people of Rakhine (August 2017), pp. 9-10 and p. 13.
917 DI-028.
918 For legal framework, see chapter IV, section A.7: Forced labour and forced recruitment of adults and
children.
919 CI-053, CI-055, CI-056, CI-057, CI-058, CI-060, CI-153, CI-154, CI-158, CI-159, DI-014, DI-015,
DI-016, DI-017, DI-018, DI-019, DI-028, DI-029, DI-032, DI-033, DI-036, DI-039, DI-041, DI-043,
DI-044, DI-045, QI-072, QI-074, QI-075.
920 The Mission documented cases in the following townships in Rakhine State: Buthidaung, Kyaukpyu,
Kyauktaw, Mrauk-U, Maungdaw, Minbya, Pauktaw, Ponnagoyun, Ramree, Rathedaung and Sittwe.
921 DI-017, DI-029, QI-075.
922 CI-055, DI-019.
923 QI-074.
924 CI-053, CI-058, CI-060, CI-153, CI-154, CI-158, DI-018, DI-028, DI-043.
925 CI-056, DI-015, DI-017, DI-032, DI-036, DI-041, DI-044, DI-045.

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I used to go to the forest and collect firewood to sell. One day, I was on my way
back with other villagers. Suddenly, some Tatmadaw soldiers appeared and grabbed
us. They beat us and said that we had to go with them for portering. We had to go
with them straight away. We were then portering in the high hills for eight days.926
415. Alternatively, the Tatmadaw would gather labourers by telling the head of the
village to provide a number of persons. 927 One victim, who lived in a village next to a
Tatmadaw base, reported that announcements were made indicating the number required on
a particular day.928
416. Most victims had to participate in forced or compulsory labour on multiple
occasions. For some, it was once a week, for others it could be once a month, or two to
three times a year.929 It appears that proximity to a Tatmadaw base may have affected the
frequency. While there was little scope to avoid forced or compulsory labour, there are
instances where villagers paid the Tatmadaw as an alternative. 930 In some situations, one
person from each household in the village had to go for forced labour, whenever the order
came. Victims of forced labour were often required to report on a regular basis. They
frequently had to sleep in the Tatmadaw camp until the tasks were completed and they were
permitted to return home. Victims were fearful of further forced labour. When the
Tatmadaw arrived in the village, the youth would often flee to hide. No payment or
compensation was received for the labour.931
417. The duration of forced or compulsory labour has varied, lasting from a few hours to
days, weeks or months.932 Porters could be forced to travel significant distances on foot,
carrying heavy loads between towns or to other states, for up to ten days. 933 One villager
described how he had to carry a grenade launcher for eight days.934 In most cases, the
porters were not given any information about the journey, simply ordered to follow the
troops.
418. Forced labour was also imposed in the context of the conflict between the Tatmadaw
and the Arakan Army,935 exposing porters to significant dangers. In some instances, porters
were taken to conflict areas and exposed to combat or the risk of combat. 936 One victim
described how another porter was badly injured by an anti-personnel mine and had his leg
amputated and bandaged without medicine.937 Porters were also used as minesweepers, with
soldiers sending porters ahead of them. 938 One victim stated:
I was taken as a porter when working in a field. A large group of soldiers came and
told me to follow them. When I refused, they kicked me and punched me in the face.
A soldier pointed his gun in my back and said I would be killed if I did not follow.
So, I followed and carried their rations. They made me and others walk at the front,
carrying heavy bags. We travelled for three days and then there was shooting
between the Arakan Army and the soldiers. The fighting lasted about one hour. I
managed to hide in the forest, but three soldiers and other porters were killed. 939
419. Forced labourers received overt verbal threats, including death threats to themselves
or family members, insults and derogatory references to their ethnicity. Ethnic Rakhine

926 QI-074.
927 CI-056, CI-057, QI-074.
928 QI-072.
929 CI-056, DI-015, DI-016, DI-032, DI-033, DI-036, QI-072, QI-074, QI-075.
930 QI-075.
931 CI-057, CI-154, CI-158, DI-015, DI-041, QI-072, QI-075.
932 DI-039, DI-045, QI-075.
933 CI-055, DI-017, DI-019, DI-039, DI-043, QI-074.
934 QI-074.
935 The Mission is aware of allegations of abuses committed by the Arakan Army, as well as allegations
of violations perpetrated by the Tatmadaw in this context, both of which warrant further investigation.
CI-159, DI-019, DI-043, QI-074, QI-075.
936 DI-019.
937 QI-074.
938 DI-019, DI-043.
939 DI-019.

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who tried to avoid forced labour, because of sickness or other compelling reasons, were
subjected to beatings with sticks,940 or kicking and punching.941 Additionally, fines were
imposed and they faced the threat of arrest.942 Forced labourers were frequently subjected to
ill-treatment. Porters often had to walk long distances over many hours, carrying heavy
loads and with little or no rest. They were only allowed to stop when instructed. When
porters slowed down or were unable to carry the heavy loads, they were beaten with sticks
or guns,943 slapped or kicked.944 One victim stated:
I was subjected to forced labour since I was 20 years old. I had to break stones. It
happened irregularly, but it could last for about one week and sometimes three
weeks. About 50 male villagers were taken each time. If we worked slowly, we were
beaten. After nearly 10 years, I tried to refuse but the soldiers threatened to arrest
me. When I refused again I was beaten with wooden sticks. My eyebrow was broken;
I was bleeding.945
420. During patrols, porters were given minimal food and water, while the soldiers had
two or three meals a day. 946 One victim said that he only received food three times over an
eight-day period.947 Porters were forced to sleep on the ground in the open air or forest,
while soldiers had sleeping mats and blankets.948 The experience of forced labour and the
associated ill-treatment had negative health consequences, some serious. 949
421. Women were particularly vulnerable while serving in Tatmadaw camps, as they
were also subjected to rape950 and other forms of sexual violence. Some women were kept
in the camp after completion of their service, and then raped by the Tatmadaw, including at
captain rank.951
422. Children were not spared.952 Like adults, children were subjected to portering,
including the ill-treatment that often accompanies it (beaten953 or hit with a rock954). One
victim explained he still had the scars of injuries inflicted during the beatings while he was
a child.955 Another explained how she had been taken from the age of 13.956 Tatmadaw
soldiers would visit her village frequently, forcing one person from each household into
forced labour. They would often take her father, but have also taken her mother or one of
the four children. When they came, soldiers would just point at whomever they wanted. The
witness recalled that she was taken to a Tatmadaw camp a three-hour walk away, where she
was forced to break and carry stones. Sometimes she was taken for one week, sometimes
for one month. At night, she slept in the forest. If she and other victims got tired, or tried to
rest, the soldiers would abuse them verbally, threaten or beat them. She was beaten on five
occasions.
423. Some of the victims tried to escape. Despite the fact that porters were guarded by
troops,957 some managed to flee.958 Attempts to escape were dangerous, with porters being
shot at:959

940 DI-018, DI-032, DI-043, QI-072, QI-075.

941 CI-053, DI-017, DI-019, DI-045.
942 DI-032.
943 CI-056, CI-062, CI-153, CI-154, DI-017, DI-032, DI-043.
944 CI-053, CI-056, CI-062.
945 DI-032.
946 DI-019, DI-032, QI-074.
947 DI-019, QI-074.
948 DI-032, QI-075.
949 DI-017, QI-075.
950 DI-014, DI-016, DI-017, DI-036, DI-041, DI-044, QI-072, QI-073, QI-074, QI-075.
951 QI-072.
952 DI-015, DI-016, DI-017, DI-029, DI-042, QI-072, QI-075.
953 DI-015, DI-017.
954 DI-042.
955 DI-015.
956 DI-017.
957 CI-153, DI-016, DI-028.
958 CI-053, CI-153, QI-074.

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I did not try to escape. We would be shot. One person from a different village tried
to escape and he was shot. I saw this with my own eyes.960
424. Those who managed to escape lived in fear of being caught. 961 Victims felt
compelled to hide, leave their homes, and ultimately flee the country. Forced labour had a
significant impact on victims’ economic conditions. 962 The majority of the victims already
lived in economically deprived rural areas, with most living on a subsistence basis. While
undertaking forced labour, persons were unable to earn a living for themselves or their
families. The economic consequences were also a reason given for leaving Myanmar. 963

2. Forced evictions

(a) Legal framework

425. Forced eviction is a serious violation of human rights. It is the “permanent or
temporary removal against their will of individuals, families and/or communities from the
homes and/or land which they occupy, without the provision of, and access to, appropriate
forms of legal or other protection”.964 Forced evictions often directly or indirectly affect
various human rights, including the right to life; freedom from cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment; the right to security of the person; the right to an adequate standard of
living, including the right to adequate housing, food, water and sanitation; the right to non-
interference with privacy, home and family; the right to work; the right to property and the
peaceful enjoyment of possessions (including the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of
property); and the right to an effective remedy. Such violations are often the consequence
of the way evictions are decided (for example, without consultation, information, or
recourse), planned (for example, without notification, relocation, or adequate
compensation), carried out (for example, at night or in bad weather, under threats, violence
or force), or of their result (for example, loss of livelihood, property papers or
documentation). Minorities are particularly vulnerable to forced evictions, because of
discrimination or because they constitute a socially excluded, destitute or marginalised part
of society.965
426. Not all evictions are prohibited. Evictions based on arguments of public or national
interest may be justifiable. However, to be justifiable under international law, they must be
carried out only in the most exceptional circumstances and after all feasible alternatives
have been explored in consultation with the affected community, and after due process
protections are afforded.966 Evictions may not be carried out in a discriminatory manner.
Due process protections include genuine consultation, adequate and reasonable notice, as
well as legal remedies. Importantly, adequate compensation needs to be provided in
advance967 and all necessary measures should be taken to minimise the impact.
427. Protection against forced eviction is not linked to property rights. Everyone has the
right to be protected against forced evictions, regardless of the type of tenure (for example,
ownership, rental, informal settlement). Security of tenure is the cornerstone of the right to
adequate housing, which also applies to occupiers without documentation. 968
428. Under the Constitution of Myanmar, the Union is the “ultimate owner of all lands
and all natural resources above and below the ground, above and beneath the water and in

959 CI-153, DI-028.

960 DI-028.
961 CI-053, CI-056, CI-153, DI-032, QI-072, QI-074, QI-75.
962 DI-015, DI-030, DI-039, DI-055.
963 DI-032.
964 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 7:
The right to adequate housing (Art.11.1): forced evictions, 20 May 1997, E/1998/22.
965 For general overview of forced evictions and human rights, see OHCHR and UN-Habitat, Forced
Evictions – Fact Sheet No. 25/Rev. 1 (New York and Geneva, United Nations, 2014).
966 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 7: The
right to adequate housing (Art.11.1): forced evictions, 20 May 1997, E/1998/22.
967 See United Nations Commission on Human Rights resolution 1993/77.
968 Ibid.

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the atmosphere” (section 37). The 1894 Land Acquisition Act provides the framework for
land acquisition for public purposes. The Government can compulsorily acquire land for
“public purposes” or for a company when notice is given and compensation is at market
value.969 Legal reform in 2012 introduced a system similar to a private property regime. The
Farmland Law970 regulates paddy land, and the Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands
Management Law971 regulates a range of lands including unused plots and abandoned lands.
Regardless of these developments, key issues in Myanmar are still linked to large-scale
tenure insecurity and poorly kept land ownership records.

(b) Findings
429. The Mission found a pattern of the Tatmadaw arbitrarily appropriating land from
ethnic Rakhine villagers across Rakhine State, and forcibly evicting them. 972 Land was
taken for various purposes, including construction of infrastructure and food production for
soldiers.973
430. Land is frequently taken arbitrarily and immediately, not allowing the affected
person or family to prepare or to plan an alternative. A small group of up to 10 soldiers
would arrive on a plot, and put up a military flag or place a sign indicating that the land was
taken.974 Reports were received that soldiers place fences or bamboo poles around the land
and destroy existing properties on the land, for example sheds. 975 There is little or no
consultation with the affected individual or family. 976 Furthermore, land confiscation by the
Tatmadaw could affect multiple individuals and families at the same time, such as groups
of villagers with adjacent small land-holdings.977 One victim stated:
On 8 February 2012, when I was having lunch at home, I learned that the military
was taking my paddy field. I went back immediately. I saw six soldiers who had put
up bamboo poles around my paddy field. I begged them not to take the land,
pleading that it was the only thing I had and that we were dependent on it. They did
not listen. They arrested me and took me to the office of the village head. I saw many
villagers there, their hands tied up with rope. I managed to flee when I went to the
toilet. The same day the military took away the lands of three other families. 978
431. Furthermore, the affected persons generally received no compensation, and were not
informed of how to make any claims. 979 There are instances where minimal compensation
was offered, with the amount viewed as derisory compared to the actual value and the
economic loss.980 In other cases, promised compensation was never received.981 One victim
stated:
Four soldiers came while I was on my land, asking to show my land documentation.
After showing all documents, one of them said: “The military wants to build
infrastructures here. We take your land. If you don’t agree, talk to our officer.” I
went to the office with my mother. We were offered 9,000 Kyat. The market value
was 900,000 Kyat. When we refused, the officer said it was government land and

969 1984 Land Acquisition Act, arts. 4, 6, 23 and 38.

970 Farmland Law (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law No. 11 of 2012).
971 Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands Management Act (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law No.10 of 2012).
972 CI-055, CI-056, CI-059, CI-060, CI-158, CI-162, DI-015, DI-016, DI-031, DI-033, QI-072, QI-073.
The Mission documented 14 cases in Kyaukpyu, Kyauktaw, Mrauk-U, Maungdaw, Minbya,
Rathedaung and Sittwe in Rakhine State.
973 CI-055, CI-056, CI-158, QI-073.
974 CI-055, QI-072, QI-073.
975 CI-055, CI-059, QI-073.
976 CI-055, CI-158.
977 CI-056, CI-059, DI-016, QI-073.
978 CI-059.
979 CI-055, CI-158, CI-162, DI-016.
980 CI-055, CI-158.
981 CI-158.

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that they would take it anyway. The next morning, the military came again and
destroyed my tent near the land. They planted a military flag and left.982
432. After being evicted, the affected persons no longer had access to their land and
efforts to reclaim usage were routinely met with warnings, beatings and death threats. 983
Ethnic Rakhine who objected to the confiscation, or who attempted to file complaints or
find legal recourse, were subjected to beatings or detention. 984 One interviewee explained
how he was beaten when he sought recourse:
When I discovered that my land had been confiscated, I went to see the chief of the
local military camp. When I complained the first time, I was told that they need the
land for military buildings and for crop cultivation. When I went back, I was ill-
treated. Two soldiers held me, one from each side, and a third kicked me. I was
kicked on the head, my nose was bleeding and I became unconscious. My ribcage
was also damaged. I was then detained at the camp for one day and two nights. 985
433. The economic consequences of the confiscations and forced evictions were often
dire for the victims and their families. Often confiscation took away land that was the only
source of livelihood, pushing them further into poverty. 986 Alternative means of
employment and sources of income were often not available, or were considered to carry
significant risks. The evictions also negatively impacted the family life of some victims, as
they were forced to separate to earn a living, or to leave the country altogether. 987

3. Confiscation of food and livestock

434. Confiscation by the Tatmadaw of livestock, food supplies or other possessions,
either at security checkpoints or during patrols in villages, was a common experience for
ethnic Rakhine. The Tatmadaw would routinely confiscate domestic animals,988 food,989 or a
proportion of a yearly production of crops. 990
435. Resistance by victims to confiscations could lead to mistreatment by the Tatmadaw,
including beatings,991 leaving some with injuries.992 The failure to provide the Tatmadaw
with supplies could subject victims to further violations, including forced labour. 993 As with
other violations, the fear of arrest or other repercussions from the Tatmadaw compelled
some victims to flee the country. 994 One interviewee stated:
My family and I had a vegetable farm and soldiers often came to ask for vegetables.
If we did not comply, the soldiers just took them. Sometimes they asked us to give
them money. I did not have enough vegetables to sell because a lot were stolen by
the military. This went on for a long time. The soldiers also came regularly to our
shops and never paid. They just picked whatever they wanted. We could not protest.
If we protested, they would damage everything.995
436. It appears that the confiscation of property in this manner was widespread and a
common feature of ethnic Rakhine village life. The manner in which victims describe the
practice suggests that it became normalised for villagers:

982 CI-055.
983 DI-033, QI-072, QI-073.
984 CI-059, CI-162, DI-016, DI-033, QI-073.
985 QI-073.
986 CI-060, CI-158, DI-015, DI-016, DI-033.
987 DI-015, QI-073.
988 CI-054, CI-057.
989 DI-028, DI-031, DI-041, QI-073.
990 DI-036.
991 DI-031.
992 DI-028.
993 DI-036.
994 DI-028.
995 DI-041.

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The soldiers would take whatever we had from us. This included our livestock and
vegetables from the farm. They took things from us every day. This was actually
normal for us, so I didn’t think this was important to mention. 996
437. While apparently considered normal, the economic impact could be devastating.
These confiscations removed a significant part of the earnings of poor villagers existing at a
subsistence level, affecting the entire family. The practice, and associated mistreatment,
also served to build mistrust and enmity among the ethnic Rakhine towards the
Tatmadaw.997 However, powerlessness to respond appeared endemic. Information received
indicates that victims did not file any complaints in relation to these practices. 998 One
interviewee said:
We never filed any complaint. The soldiers are outside the law. Complaining to the
authorities is like complaining to the soldiers themselves.999

4. Sexual and gender-based violence

438. Ethnic Rakhine women have been subjected to rape and other forms of sexual
violence by Tatmadaw forces.1000 This has primarily taken place in the context of forced
labour and has occurred across Rakhine State. Rakhine women who have been raped by
Tatmadaw soldiers face rejection by their families or communities and fear being subjected
to further sexual violence. Incidents have occurred prior to and throughout the period
examined by the Mission.
439. In many incidents, women and girls, who are forced by Tatmadaw soldiers to carry
out cooking, cleaning or manual labour, were also subjected to rape or sexual assault. For
example, an interviewee from Kyauktaw Township, who had been subjected to forced
labour over a period of two decades, was beaten by soldiers and raped on several occasions
by a Tatmadaw captain. When she refused to return, the interviewee’s husband was
threatened by the Tatmadaw. She fled Myanmar, fearing that soldiers would return and rape
her again. She described the last occasion she was raped:
At the end of the day [working at the military camp] the “chief” told me to wait,
together with about ten other women. He chose about four or five women, and we
were taken away one by one. I initially refused to go, but two or three soldiers beat
me. In the room I was raped by one soldier, while two others stood outside the
closed door. He had three stars on his uniform. 1001
440. Another woman from Rathedaung Township described being sexually assaulted
while undertaking forced labour:
As I was washing the clothes of the soldiers, one of them came from behind and
grabbed my breasts. He took off my bra and kissed me on the cheek. He touched my
breasts with his hands. He touched me and rested his head on my shoulder. I didn’t
resist because I was afraid he would kill me.1002
441. Ethnic Rakhine men subjected to forced labour also reported witnessing rape by
Tatmadaw soldiers against Rakhine women. One former porter reported witnessing the rape
of a group of women by the roadside in Mrauk-U Township:
We were resting by the roadside and the military had brought a group of four or five
women from villages on the way. While we were there, they raped the women. They
first made the porters move away so that we couldn’t see. But I could still hear the
women crying and saying things like, “what are you doing, stop” and also heard

996 DI-028.
997 CI-053, CI-056, CI-154.
998 DI-041.
999 DI-041.
1000 DI-014, DI-036, DI-041, DI-044, QI-072, QI-073, QI-075.
1001 QI-072.
1002 DI-044.

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them being beaten. Afterwards, they sent the women back to their villages. I heard
this each time I was taken portering.1003
442. Rape and other forms of sexual violence against ethnic Rakhine have also coincided
with instances of forced evictions and other forms of pecuniary exploitation (unlawful tax
collection) by the Tatmadaw. One male interviewee from Kyaukpyu Township noted that
the rape of young women had occurred in 2014 during land confiscation coordinated by
military camp No. 543.1004 A Rakhine woman reported that when she was 17-years old, she
had been raped at gunpoint by a captain from the Tatmadaw South Western Command in
Minbya Township. This happened after her family was unable to provide the Tatmadaw
with part of their harvest of rice, framed as a “tax”. The captain said she should marry him
in exchange”. When she refused, she was raped.1005
443. There are also reported instances of rape by Tatmadaw troops in other contexts. One
interviewee described the rape of an adult female relative by a Tatmadaw soldier, while she
was cutting firewood near the forest in Ponnagyun Township.1006 In a more recent case, one
interviewee from Buthidaung Township described the general attitude of Tatmadaw
soldiers towards Rakhine villagers in the aftermath of the post-25 August 2017 violence in
Rakhine State and the attempted rape she was subjected to:
After 25 August 2017, there was an explosion and a lot of commotion. Villagers
initially relied on the Tatmadaw soldiers because they thought they would protect
us. However, soldiers did not do anything to protect Rakhine villagers. Instead, they
made the villagers cook for them and took some women. I said I didn’t want to cook
for them but they dragged me to a military base close to my house. When I arrived, I
saw four other Rakhine women. There was a group of about a dozen soldiers. They
grabbed our hands and touched us. They tried to take off my clothes and rape me.
We were all screaming. They shut our mouths with their hands but some still
managed to shout. We were about to get raped, but my uncle and others arrived and
we were released. The soldiers didn’t provide any security. Instead, they stole from
us and grabbed us.1007

5. Emblematic incident: shooting in Mrauk-U on 16 January 2018

444. The Mission received reports of repressive action against the assertion of ethnic
Rakhine identity. An emblematic case is the use of excessive force in relation to a
demonstration in the Rakhine city of Mrauk-U against the cancellation of an annual ethnic
Rakhine event. The Mission interviewed eyewitnesses of the incident. 1008
445. Mrauk-U was the last capital of the ancient Arakanese Kingdom, with a majority of
the population of Rakhine ethnicity. An annual ceremony is held to mark the end of the rule
of the Arakan dynasty following the conquest of the area by Bamar forces. After an initial
postponement due to delays in obtaining permission from the authorities, the 233rd
anniversary celebrations were scheduled for 16 January 2018. Ethnic Rakhine from across
the state arrived in Mrauk-U. However, the authorities suddenly cancelled the evening
events. The news spread among the crowd, which had gathered to attend the event. The
crowd started to demonstrate against the decision. One witness recalled:
People had started to gather in Mrauk-U since the morning. We were in the city and
ready for the celebration that night. However, we were unexpectedly informed that
the celebration was cancelled. So, the gathering became a demonstration instead of
a celebration.1009

1003 QI-075.
1004 QI-073.
1005 DI-036.
1006 DI-014.
1007 DI-041.
1008 CI-161, DI-042, DI-043.
1009 DI-042.

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446. Event participants went to the main police station and then to the District
Administration office, to know the reason for the cancellation. At the District
Administration office, the security forces had closed the gate to prevent the crowd from
entering. The demonstration continued outside, with a large crowd gathered. At 6.30 pm, it
appears that a decision was made to cut the power supply to the streetlights in the area.1010
447. The police stationed inside the compound then fired a series of live rounds. It is
reported that they first fired into the air. Local media also stated that protestors “launched
stones with slingshots and threw bricks” at the security forces, and at one point tried to
seize the weapons of two police officers.1011 The Government subsequently claimed that the
police fired about 20 warning shots with assault rifles and about 40 warning shots with bolt-
action rifles.1012
448. According to the witnesses interviewed by the Mission, live fire was also directed at
the crowd, hitting a number of demonstrators. The police also beat people with guns and
sticks, and kicked people on the ground. The witnesses stated that it was difficult to know
the direction of the shooting because of the darkness, and the chaos caused by people
running in different directions in an attempt to escape. One witness stated:
I heard gunshots and then there was rapid shooting at the crowd coming from inside
(the compound). I saw two people shot and they died instantly. Others were shot in
the arms and thighs. The police were shooting at the crowd in the dark. They were
also hitting people with guns and sticks, and stamping on people with boots. 1013
449. At least seven ethnic Rakhine demonstrators were shot and killed, and at least 12
were seriously injured. According to a statement issued by the Government, “With the
rioting escalating, authorities said security forces fired 10 shots into the crowd with assault
rifles and bolt-action rifles, killing seven people”.1014
450. In the aftermath, the police started arresting people, particularly young people. A
number of participants fled Myanmar fearing arrest. One witness stated:
Following the incident, the authorities started arresting people who participated in
the demonstration and who were witness to the incident. I was targeted because I
went to the hospital several times to see my injured friend. I could not meet my
friend because there were police within the hospital compound blocking access. The
police may have seen me in the hospital area.1015
451. Under international human rights law, the State is under an obligation to facilitate
protests. The use of force by law enforcement officials should be exceptional. Any use of
force must comply with the principles of necessity and proportionality. The degree of force
used should be limited to the minimum necessary in the circumstances, and should be
targeted at individuals using violence or to avert an imminent threat. Specific rules apply to
the use of firearms during assemblies. They may only be used against an imminent threat,
either to protect life or to prevent life-threatening injuries. There must also be no other
feasible option, such as capture or the use of non-lethal force. Firearms should never be
used simply to disperse an assembly. Indiscriminate firing into a crowd is always
unlawful.1016
452. It appears uncontested that the police used live fire to shoot into the crowd, in
complete darkness, and that at least seven protesters were killed as a result. While the
Mission notes that some protestors may have used violence (throwing of stones), there are

1010 Global New Light of Myanmar, “Seven killed, 12 injured in Mrauk-U riot” (18 January 2018).
1011 Ibid.
1012 Republic of the Union of Myanmar - Ministry of Information, “Seven killed, 12 injured in Mrauk-U
riot” (17 January 2018).
1013
DI-042.
1014 Global New Light of Myanmar, “Seven killed, 12 injured in Mrauk-U riot” (18 January 2018).
1015 CI-161.
1016 A/HRC/31/66, paras. 57-60; A/HRC/26/36, para. 75; OHCHR and United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime, “Resource book on the use of force and firearms in law enforcement” (New York, United
Nations, 2017).

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no indications that there was an imminent threat to life or life-threatening injuries that
warranted the use of lethal force, let alone the firing of assault rifles into the crowd during
the night, after the streetlights were switched off. The Mission therefore has reasonable
grounds to conclude that the police used excessive force in the management of this protest.
453. The broader context of this incident warrants further investigation. This includes an
examination of whether the restrictions imposed on the celebrations were in compliance
with international human rights law; whether the arrest and detention on charges under the
Unlawful Association Act (section 17.1) of participants and two prominent ethnic Rakhine
men (Wai Hin Aung, a Rakhine writer, and Dr. Aye Maung, the former head of the Arakan
National Party and member of Parliament) is unlawful or arbitrary; and whether the overall
handling of the events amounts to an undue and discriminatory restriction on the assertion
of ethnic Rakhine identity

6. Conclusion
454. The serious human rights violations experienced by the ethnic Rakhine are similar to
those experienced by other ethnic groups in Myanmar, mostly perpetrated by the
Tatmadaw.
455. The forced and compulsory labour imposed by the Tatmadaw against the ethnic
Rakhine is widespread, in violation of Myanmar’s obligations under international labour
law and international human rights law. The documented cases show that the work is
exacted under the menace or use of physical force and (death) threats. Victims have no free
choice and cannot but comply. The types of work consistently described to the Mission, and
the circumstances of their imposition, cannot be construed as minor communal services that
are permissible under international law. The Tatmadaw bully, force and coerce villagers
into submission. This is further manifested in the numerous forced evictions and the total
disrespect for villagers’ property rights. Tatmadaw soldiers take anything they want, when
they want. In doing so, they further push ethnic Rakhine villagers and their families into
economic hardship and poverty. The level of arbitrariness and abuse of power on the part of
the Tatmadaw is astounding.
456. Such conduct is a catalyst for numerous other human rights violations, including the
arbitrary deprivation of life, arbitrary arrest and detention, sexual and gender-based
violence, and other forms of severe ill-treatment.1017 Such violations are often linked to
attempts at escape, protest, or the inability to pay bribes.
457. The Mission is further concerned about additional information received, pointing at
other violations, including of the rights to education, health, culture, freedom of expression,
freedom of peaceful association and assembly, and freedom of religion. However, the
information on these allegations is insufficient to make findings at this stage.

B. Systemic oppression and persecution of the Rohingya

In Rakhine State, Muslims are like in a cage, they cannot travel outside. There are
no human rights for the Muslims of Rakhine. I don’t know why God sent us there. 1018
458. The Rohingya are in a situation of severe, systemic and institutionalised oppression
from birth to death. Their extreme vulnerability is a consequence of State policies and
practices implemented over decades, steadily marginalising the Rohingya and eroding their
enjoyment of human rights. The process of “othering” the Rohingya and their
discriminatory treatment started long before the period covered by the Mission.
459. The cornerstone of this system of oppression is the lack of legal status of the
Rohingya. This is compounded by restrictions affecting their movement, subsistence and
development, and numerous other human rights violations. The life of Rohingya in Rakhine
State has gradually become more and more untenable.

1017 CI-057, CI-059, CI-061, CI-157, CI-162, DI-014, DI-029, QI-072, QI-073.
1018 DI-007.

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1. Denial of legal status and identity

460. The Myanmar authorities consistently and vocally assert that “there are no Rohingya
in Myanmar”. They object to the use of the name “Rohingya”, call the group “Bengali”,
and argue that the Rohingya do not belong in Myanmar. They are not considered a
“national race” and often referred to as “illegal immigrants” from Bangladesh. This was not
always the case. Successive laws and policies regulating citizenship and legal status have
become increasingly exclusionary in their formulation, and arbitrary and discriminatory in
their application. Today, the overwhelming majority of Rohingya are de facto stateless,
without proof of legal status or identity.

(a) Denial of birth certificates

461. Legal identity starts with a birth certificate: it provides legal recognition to a child.
According to article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, all children have the
right to be registered immediately after birth. Access to registration must not be
undermined by discrimination of any kind, including on the basis of the child’s or the
child’s parents’ race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national,
ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status. All children should have
access to birth registration in the country where they are born, including non-nationals and
stateless children.1019
462. In Myanmar, there is a multiplicity of laws and procedures related to birth
registration. The system is administered by several Ministries, making procedures complex
and difficult to navigate, especially for the Rohingya.1020 According to article 9 (b) of the
Myanmar 1993 Child Law, “parents and guardians shall register the birth of the child in
accordance with the law”. The 1982 Citizenship Law contains a similar requirement but is
only applicable to “citizens born inside and outside the State”, and carries punitive
measures for parents or guardians who fail to register their children. Failure to register a
birth on time is also subject to criminal penalties under the Ward or Village Tract
Administration Law.
463. According to credible reports the authorities stopped issuing birth certificates to
Rohingya children in northern Rakhine in the 1990s, with no official reason given for this
change of policy.1021 Since then, the only “registration” of birth for Rohingya children in
northern Rakhine is their inclusion in the so-called “household list”.1022 Such inclusion is a
pre-requisite for obtaining identity documents, travel authorizations, marriage permissions,
and enrolment in most government schools. Upon the request of parents, the village
administrator or the “representative person from the village tract” can issue a “certificate of
proof of birth”.1023 The cost of this procedure varies from one location and one family to
another. Parents must then approach the immigration authorities and request that their
household list be updated, paying another arbitrary fee. 1024 One interviewee from
Buthidaung stated:
The Rohingya need to pay a large amount of money for receiving a certificate of
proof of birth and include new born babies in the family list. The amount appears to
vary from case to case. There is no written rule. The authorities made up all these
rules only for the Rohingya in northern Rakhine State.1025

1019 See A/HRC/27/22, para. 11.

1020 K-063.11. Myanmar’s birth registration system differs by geographical area and the following
Ministries have reportedly acquired parallel competences: Ministry of Immigration and Population;
Ministry of Home Affairs; Ministry of Health; and Ministry of National Planning and Economic
Development. Since 2012, village administrators were also attributed responsibilities .
1021 K-063.10, K-063.11.
1022 See this chapter, section B.5.b: Restrictions related to household lists.
1023 K-063.11.
1024 CI-061, CI-082, CI-094, DI-001, K-063.10.
1025 CI-061.

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464. An interviewee from Maungdaw explained how cumbersome this procedure is given
the restrictions on movement and the risks associated with not updating the household list
on time:
After the birth of my first daughter, I went to the village administrator and gave him
15,000 Kyat to send someone from his office to convey the message to the NaSaKa
about my daughter’s birth and to ask for her to be included on the household list. I
could not go to the checkpoint myself because of the unavailability of transportation
and the need for travel permission. I thought the village administrator had taken
action to include my daughter on the list. A few days later, the authorities came to
my village to check the family lists. They saw my daughter but she was not on the
list. I had to give them 50,000 Kyat. I managed to gather the money with the help of
others. Otherwise, I would have been imprisoned for six months.1026
465. In December 2015, a new procedure targeting Rohingya children was outlined in a
document setting out requirements for “birth list insertion of children from Bengali ethnics
in household population list”. According to credible reports, these additional administrative
requirements have further slowed down the process. As a result, only a small number of
new-borns were added to household lists in 2016, with inconsistent implementation from
one area to another and reported cases of applications being rejected .1027
466. Some Rohingya children were added to a separate “black-listed children form” or
“illegitimate children form”. This included children whose parents had not received official
marriage permission, children whose parents were not present at the household list updating
exercise, adopted children, and children born in contravention of the local order limiting the
number of children in Rohingya families to two. In April 2013, it was assessed that there
were 5,111 “black-listed” children.1028 It is believed that the number of children who were
placed on these “black lists” is much higher.
467. The registration of new-borns in the household list has not been undertaken
consistently, and as a consequence the number of unregistered Rohingya children in
Rakhine State remains unknown. Estimates suggest that almost half of the children in
Rakhine State remain unregistered.1029
468. The interim report of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State included a
recommendation to the Government to “roll out a comprehensive birth registration
campaign - with door-to-door visits carried out by mobile teams - in order to reach all
children”.1030 In July 2017, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
Myanmar stated that she had been informed by the authorities of efforts to improve birth
registration in line with the interim recommendations from the Advisory Commission. She
welcomed the issuance of over 20,000 birth certificates in Rakhine State.1031 The Mission is
not aware of further details regarding the issuance of these or any other birth certificates in
relation to the interim recommendations. In its report on implementation (January to April
2018) the Committee for Implementation of the Recommendations on Rakhine State did
not make any reference to the issuance of birth certificates for Rohingya children. 1032

1026 CI-094.
1027 K-063.12, K-076.
1028 K-063.10.
1029 See Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, Interim Report and Recommendations (March 2017), p.
12; see also: CRC/C/MMR/CO/3-4, para. 43 and 44(d).
1030 Ibid.
1031 Yanghee Lee, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, “End
of mission statement” (21 July 2017).
1032 Committee for Implementation of the Recommendations on Rakhine State, Report to the People on
the Progress of Implementation of the Recommendations on Rakhine State - January to April 2018.

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(b) Denial of citizenship

469. Legal status and identity is further determined by citizenship. The right to a
nationality has been described as the “right to have rights”. 1033 It is of vital importance to
the realization of all other human rights and is recognised and protected in a series of
international legal instruments,1034 most of which apply to Myanmar. The prerogative of
States to decide who their nationals are is not absolute. States must comply with their
human rights obligations concerning the granting and loss of nationality. 1035
470. The right to a nationality implies the right of each individual to acquire, change and
retain a nationality. International human rights law explicitly prohibits the arbitrary
deprivation of nationality. In order not to be arbitrary, denial of access to a nationality must
be in conformity with domestic law and standards of international law, in particular the
principle of proportionality. States have the obligation to ensure that all persons enjoy the
right to nationality without discrimination of any kind, and that no one is denied or
deprived of their nationality based on discriminatory grounds. 1036
471. Deprivation of nationality resulting in statelessness will generally be arbitrary,
unless it serves a legitimate purpose and is proportional. 1037 States should ensure that
nationality is not denied to persons with relevant links to that State who would otherwise be
stateless.1038 This is particularly so for children. While States are not obliged to grant
nationality to every child born in their territory, they are required to adopt every appropriate
measure, both internally and in cooperation with other States, to ensure that every child has
a nationality when he or she is born.1039 One such measure is the conferral of nationality to
a child born in the State if they would otherwise be stateless. 1040 Decisions regarding the
acquisition, retention or loss of nationality must also meet minimum procedural standards,
for example, issued in writing and open to effective administrative or judicial review. 1041
The statelessness of a person resulting from the arbitrary deprivation of his or her
nationality cannot be invoked by States as a justification for the denial of other human
rights.1042

Historical background
472. The current citizenship status of the Rohingya can only be understood in a historical
context.1043 The 1947 Constitution and the 1948 Union Citizenship Act of the newly
independent Myanmar provided a relatively inclusive citizenship framework. 1044 In addition
to citizenship based on ethnicity, section 4(2) of the Union Citizenship Act provided that
“any person descended from ancestors who for two generations at least have all made any
of the territories included within the Union their permanent home and whose parents and
himself were born in any of such territories shall be deemed to be a citizen of the

1033 See for example, S. DeGooyer, A. Hunt, et al., The Right to Have Rights (Verso, London, 2018). The
fundamental nature of the right to a nationality has been consistently reaffirmed by the United
Nations General Assembly (for example, A/RES/50/152) and the United Nations Human Rights
Council (for example, A/HRC/RES/7/10; A/HRC/RES/10/13; A/HRC/RES/13/2; A/HRC/RES/20/5;
A/HRC/RES/26/14).
1034 UDHR (art. 15), ICCPR (art. 24), CRC (art. 7), ICERD (art. 5), CEDAW (art. 9), CRPD (art. 18),
ICPRM (art. 29), ASEAN Declaration (art. 18).
1035 See A/HRC/13/34, para. 57.
1036 A/HRC/13/34, paras. 21, 29, 57-58.
1037 A/HRC/13/34, para. 59.
1038 A/HRC/13/34, para. 36; see also 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (although not
ratified by Myanmar).
1039 CRC, art. 7; United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 11:
Indigenous children and their rights under the Convention, 12 February 2009, CRC/C/GC/11; United
Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 17: Rights of the child (Art. 24), 7 April
1989.
1040 A/HRC/13/34, para. 60; A/HRC/31/29, para. 10.
1041 A/HRC/13/34, para. 43.
1042 See for example, A/HRC/RES/32/5.
1043 The Mission has relied on credible secondary sources to summarise the relevant historical context.
1044 1947 Constitution, s. 11.

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Union”.1045 Additionally, section 7 provided that a person could apply for citizenship if they
were 18 years, resided in the country for at least five continuous years, and intended to
reside in the country. As such, most long-term residents fulfilled the criteria, regardless of
whether they belonged to one of Myanmar’s “indigenous races”. 1046
473. Most Muslims who then lived in what currently constitutes Rakhine State were
therefore included, whether their ancestry could be traced to pre-colonial times, or whether
they were colonial-era migrants from the region. Additionally, there are strong indications
that at the time the Myanmar authorities accepted the Rohingya as an “indigenous group”.
Both Prime Minister U Nu, and Sao Shwe Thaike, the country’s first President, are reported
to have referred to the Rohingya as an indigenous group of Myanmar, with U Nu referring
to the Rohingya by name in a 1954 radio address, as “… our nationals, our brethren”. 1047
474. Citizens were required to register, after which a National Registration Card (NRC)
was issued. At the end of 1960, the Government reportedly claimed to have issued 18
million NRCs, nearly the entire population at the time.1048 Temporary Registration Cards
(TRCs), known as “white cards”, were issued in case of loss, damage or pending
application for the NRC. Although NRCs or TRCs were not intended to be citizenship
certificates, in reality they served as such.
475. At the start of General Ne Win’s regime, the citizenship legal framework remained
unchanged. The 1974 Constitution also did not alter the definition of “citizen” significantly.
All Rohingya who were citizens during the 1948-1962 period were still to be considered
citizens. However, in practice, the narrative that most Muslims in Rakhine State were
illegal Bengali immigrants took root, in the context of an increasing emphasis on the
importance of “national races” and the need to deport alleged aliens. 1049 In 1978, the
Tatmadaw and immigration officials implemented a nationwide project called “Operation
Dragon King” to register all citizens and aliens ahead of a national population census. Its
implementation in Rakhine State led to more than 200,000 Rohingya fleeing to Bangladesh,
amid allegations of serious human rights violations. The Government claimed that the
number of Rohingya escaping from scrutiny was an admission of their illegal status.
However, analysis suggests that the number of alleged illegal immigrants identified was
very low.1050 The Government agreed with Bangladesh to repatriate the “lawful residents of
Burma who are now sheltered in the camps in Bangladesh”. 1051 Nearly all refugees returned
to Myanmar.
476. In this context General Ne Win initiated a review of the country’s citizenship laws.
He argued that citizenship under the civilian government had been poorly administered,
often wrongly attributed, and leaving many people in legal limbo. 1052 He acknowledged that

1045 The 1948 Union Citizenship Act lists a range of other pathways to citizenship not reproduced here,
including several non-automatic modes of acquiring citizenship (for example, naturalisation).
1046 Defined as “the Arakanese, Burmese, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah, Mon or Shan race and such racial
group as has settled in any of the territories included within the Union as their permanent home from
a period anterior to 1823 A. D. (1185 B.E.)”, see 1948 Union Citizenship Act, s. 3(1).
1047 E.g. M. Haque, “Rohingya Ethnic Muslim Minority and the 1982 Citizenship Law in Burma”,
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 37:4 (2017), pp. 454-469.
1048 Nyi Nyi Kyaw, “Unpacking the Presumed Statelessness of Rohingyas”, 15(3) Journal of Immigrant
& Refugee Studies (2017), p. 276.
1049 Other groups were also considered “foreign”, including Indians and Chinese. N. Cheesman, “How in
Myanmar ‘National Races” Came to Surpass Citizenship and Exclude Rohingya”, Journal of
Contemporary Asia, Volume 47, 2017 - Issue 3, pp. 461-483.
1050 See analysis in Nyi Nyi Kyaw, “Unpacking the Presumed Statelessness of Rohingyas”, 15(3) Journal
of Immigrant & Refugee Studies (2017), pp. 274-275, where the author quotes several State officials
and State-run media indicating that the numbers of illegal immigrants found in operation Dragon
King were very low (for example, that action was taken against a total of 2,296 people across the
country).
1051 1978 Repatriation Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and
the Government of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma (9 July 1978). Available at:
https://dataspace.princeton.edu/jspui/bitstream/88435/dsp01th83kz538/1/1978%20Repatriation%20A
greement.pdf
1052 Meeting held in the Central Meeting Hall, President House, Ahlone Road, 8 October 1982; translation
of the speech by General Ne Win provided in The Working People’s Daily, 9 October 1982.

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many people had lived in Myanmar for long and that the government was “not in a position
to drive away all those people who had come at different times for different reasons from
different lands”. However, he added that “leniency on humanitarian grounds cannot be such
as to endanger ourselves”, and there should be a system based on “three classes of citizens”,
with full citizenship reserved for “pure-blooded nationals”. The two other classes were for
people who “cannot be trusted fully” and who would therefore not receive “full citizenship
and full rights”. From the statement, it is clear that the people targeted included Muslims
and Chinese.

Current citizenship regime

477. The 1982 Citizenship Law marked a further step towards an exclusively “ethnic”
concept of citizenship.1053 Together with the implementing regulations (the 1983
Procedures), the law created a citizenship framework with three distinct categories (or
“classes”) of citizens:
• Full citizenship is primarily reserved for “national ethnic groups … such as the
Kachin, Kayah, Karen (Kayin), Chin, Burman (Bamar), Mon, Arakan (Rakhine) or
Shan and ethnic groups who settled in Myanmar before 1823”.1054 The law further
states that “the Council of State may decide whether any ethnic group is national or
not”.1055 These initial eight groups were later broken down in a list of 135 sub-
groups. They do not include the Rohingya or people of Chinese, Indian or Nepali
descent.1056 Full citizens are those with both parents holding a category of
citizenship, including at least one full citizen; third generation offspring of citizens
in the two other categories of citizenship; and persons who were citizens when the
law entered into force.1057 Full citizens receive a Citizenship Scrutiny Card.
• “Associate” citizenship is for those whose application for citizenship under the 1948
Citizenship Law was pending when the 1982 law came into force. A central body is
tasked to decide on applications. 1058 They receive an Associate Citizenship Scrutiny
Card.
• “Naturalized” citizenship may be granted to persons who provide “conclusive
evidence” of entry and residence in Myanmar before 1948, and of the birth of their
children in Myanmar.1059 It may also be granted under certain circumstances by
marriage or descent. In addition, applicants for “naturalized” citizenship must be at
least 18 years, have command of one of the national languages, and be of “good
character” and “sound mind”. Naturalised citizens receive a Naturalised Citizenship
Scrutiny Card.
478. Despite this legal framework being discriminatory in intent and purpose, Rohingya
are not necessarily fully excluded from citizenship. First, the Constitution and the law
provide that whoever was a citizen at its entry into force would remain a citizen. 1060 Second,
while it is disputed whether the Rohingya are a “national race” and automatically entitled to
full citizenship on that ground, many Rohingya would have at least qualified for “associate”
or “naturalised” citizenship. Their third generation offspring would have been full citizens

1053 1948 Citizenship Act and 1948 Citizenship (Election) Act were repealed in 1982.
1054 1982 Citizenship Act, art. 3.
1055 Ibid., art. 4.
1056 The list of 135 regularly features in State publications, including for example The Working People’s
Daily issue of 26 September 1990 (“Our Union of Myanmar where 135 national races reside”).
1057 1982 Citizenship Act, arts. 5-7.
1058 1982 Citizenship Act, art. 23.
1059 1982 Citizenship Act, art. 42.
1060 Section 345 of the 2008 Constitution explicitly provides that any person who is already a citizen
according to law on the day of entry into force of the Constitution remains a citizen. Section 346
provides that citizenship, naturalisation and revocation of citizenship shall be prescribed by law. No
laws have been adopted since the 1982 Citizenship Law, so this regime still applies.

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by now. Third, the law also explicitly authorizes the State to confer any of the three
categories of citizenship on any person “in the interests of the State”. 1061
479. In reality, however, the law has been implemented in a discriminatory and arbitrary
manner.1062 The authorities commenced enforcement of the law only after the SLORC took
power in 1988. In a nationwide citizenship scrutiny exercise, the National Registration Card
(NRC) had to be turned in and replaced by a Citizenship Scrutiny Card (CSC). However,
Rohingya who presented their NRCs were reportedly refused a CSC, even when meeting
the conditions for citizenship. Such arbitrary action was facilitated by provisions of the
1982 Citizenship Law allowing for broad discretion in decision making.1063 NRCs were not
returned to Rohingya; instead they received Temporary Registration Cards (or “white
cards”).1064 These interim “white cards” became the de facto identification documentation
for the approximately 700,000 Rohingya to whom they were issued for the next 20
years.1065
480. Further security operations in Rakhine State in the early 1990s again caused
approximately 250,000 persons to leave for Bangladesh, with widespread allegations of
serious human rights violations. While the Myanmar government again made claims that
the issue was one of illegal Bengali immigrants, 1066 a repatriation agreement was signed
with Bangladesh and Rohingya were accepted back in Myanmar.

Citizenship verification process

481. In 2011, the government introduced a “citizenship process” for members of the 135
recognised ethnic groups, with expedited applications. 1067 The Rohingya were not eligible
for this process but subjected to a separate “citizenship verification” process, which has
been protracted, cumbersome and increasingly coercive. By 2017, it had been completed
for only a very small number of Rohingya.
482. A pilot citizenship verification exercises took place in Taung Pyo IDP camp in
Myebon Township in July 2014. Rohingya were required to identify as “Bengali” when
registering.1068 Following protest from both Rohingya and ethnic Rakhine 1069, the
programme was suspended, and then ended in December 2014, with less than one hundred
Citizenship Scrutiny Cards issued by August 2015.1070 Those granted citizenship in this

1061 1982 Citizenship Act, art. 8.

1062 N. Cheesman, “How in Myanmar ‘National Races’ Came to Surpass Citizenship and Exclude
Rohingya”, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Volume 47, 2017 - Issue 3, 2017, p. 12.
1063 1982 Citizenship Law, art. 71: “… no reasons need to be given by organizations invested with
authority under this law in matters carried out under this law.”
1064 N. Cheesman, “How in Myanmar ‘National Races’ Came to Surpass Citizenship and Exclude
Rohingya”, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Volume 47, 2017 - Issue 3, 2017, p. 12; Nyi Nyi Kyaw,
“Unpacking the Presumed Statelessness of Rohingyas”, 15(3) Journal of Immigrant & Refugee
Studies (2017), p. 278.
1065 Nyi Nyi Kyaw, “Unpacking the Presumed Statelessness of Rohingyas”, 15(3) Journal of Immigrant
& Refugee Studies (2017), p. 279-280, referring to sources in the Department of Immigration and
National Registration.
1066 E/CN.4/1993/62, including the response letter from the Government to the United Nations Special
Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief. The letter stated that the allegations were “fabricated by
some big countries and certain foreign news agencies”, that “among those who fled were mostly poor
people who were lured by stories that relief food and goods were being distributed on the other side”
and that “some left because they were threatened by terrorist insurgents to burn down their houses”,
that the issue was one of “illegal immigration” which had also been the cause of the “outflow of
people of Bengali stock back in 1978”, and that the “Rohingya do not exist in Myanmar either
historically, politically or legally”. These are essentially the same explanations as those given by the
Myanmar Government to the massive flight of Rohingya in late 2017.
1067 V-054.
1068 Ibid.
1069 Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, Final Report, Towards a peaceful, fair and prosperous
future for the people of Rakhine (August 2017).
1070 K-063.1. Of approximately 1,300 eligible adult applicants, around 1,200 had applied. By late August
2015, Citizenship Scrutiny Cards had been issued to 97 adults and Naturalised Citizenship Scrutiny
Cards to 820 adults, 656 children.

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process were allowed to vote in the 2015 election but remain confined in camps without
freedom of movement.1071 The citizenship verification process was extended across Rakhine
State in January 2015 but was suspended shortly after.1072
483. On 11 February 2015, President Thein Sein announced that the white cards would
expire on 31 March 2015 and ordered them to be returned by 31 May 2015. This order
pushed Rohingya further into legal uncertainty. Holders were given a “white card receipt”
in exchange for the surrendered white card.1073 By the deadline, only around 67 per cent of
cards had been surrendered of which 80 per cent in Rakhine State. 1074
484. Following the invalidation of the white cards, a new Identity Card for National
Verification (ICNVs) was introduced with the stated aim to “scrutinize whether the
applicant meets the eligibility to become a citizen of Myanmar”. 1075 Rohingya applicants
were required to indicate “Bengali” ethnicity on the application form, and the rights
associated with the card were unclear, including the implication of the limited two-year
validity.1076 A campaign to compel acceptance of the card was conducted. It was reportedly
accompanied by threats,1077 with those retaining white card receipts in parts of northern
Rakhine State facing increased restrictions. 1078 Despite this, the number of Rohingya
applying for ICNVs was very low.1079
485. The “citizen verification process” restarted in 2016 under the NLD government,
with a new attempt to persuade the Rohingya to accept the rebranded National Verification
Cards (NVCs).1080 However, scepticism following past experience and a limited
understanding of the new process remained. Following the post-9 October 2016 “clearance
operations”, reports increasingly surfaced of attempts to coerce individuals into accepting
the NVCs.1081 By January 2017, just over 6,000 NVCs had been issued in Rakhine State,
compared with nearly 400,000 white cards which were surrendered. 1082 On 8 February
2017, the Government appointed a Steering Committee in charge of issuing NVCs to
expedite the process.
486. In August 2017, the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State observed that the
sporadic implementation process and lack of communication, consultation and outreach
from the Government had undermined public trust. It made a number of recommendations
including ensuring those who had received citizenship would immediately enjoy the
associated benefits, and a simplified verification process. It also urged the Government to
ensure that the process was voluntary. 1083 In direct contradiction to this recommendation,
from October 2017, the approach of requesting NVCs to be able to fish was extended to
central Rakhine.1084 The continued coercion on the Rohingya to accept the NVCs, and the
build-up of pressure and tension in this regard in the lead-up to the August 2017 violence in
northern Rakhine State, is discussed below. 1085

1071 K-063.1
1072 K-063.2.
1073 K-063.1.
1074 Ibid.
1075 Ibid.
1076 Ibid.
1077
Ibid.
1078 Ibid.
1079 V-047.
1080 The requirement to state ethnicity on the application form and the two year validity period were
removed. See: Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, Final Report, Towards a peaceful, fair and
prosperous future for the people of Rakhine (August 2017).
1081 K-063.5, V-047. See also chapter V, section D.2: A foreseeable and planned catastrophe.
1082 The process was not only applicable in Rakhine, but also in other areas of the country. As of January
2017, over 16,000 NVCs had been issued in Shan State and 3,500 in Kayin. In both states, more than
a quarter of the population do not have identity documents. See: Notification of the State Counsellor
Office, “What is the ICNV” (27 December 2016); 2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census.
1083 Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, Final Report, Towards a peaceful, fair and prosperous
future for the people of Rakhine (August 2017), pp. 26-28.
1084 K-063.36
1085 See chapter V, section D.2: A foreseeable and planned catastrophe.

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487. The rights granted by the NVC remain unclear. Despite the State Counsellor’s
Office stating that card holders could travel anywhere in the country, specific additional
provisions were included for Rakhine State.1086 These provisions meant that, in practice,
movement for the Rohingya is still severely limited. 1087 The Minister of Social Welfare,
Resettlement and Relief indicated that movement restrictions may be relaxed. 1088 However,
the Minister for Labour, Immigration and Population indicated in April 2018 that travel for
NVC holders in Rakhine State would remain limited to travel within their townships,
reportedly stating, “the information that NVC holders are entitled to travel to any place in
the country is not true at all. We can’t allow that to happen. I want to stress that the rights,
entitlements and restrictions stipulated at the time of issuing NVCs remain unchanged.” 1089
488. Following decades of arbitrary treatment and legal uncertainty about their legal
status and documentation, it is unsurprising that the Rohingya do not trust the Myanmar
authorities and remain sceptical about the “citizenship verification process”. In their view,
these efforts and the “NVC” are a symbol of a discriminatory citizenship regime that only
serves to further entrench their status as “immigrants”.

(c) Denial of political participation

489. In the past, Rohingya have been allowed to participate in political processes. They
were able to vote and stand for election in the 1990 parliamentary elections, and four
Rohingya were elected as members of Parliament. In 2010, despite the Rohingya not
officially being considered citizens, several laws were adopted to allow white card holders
to participate in the political process. Three Rohingya were elected to Parliament and two to
the Rakhine State Government.
490. However, in March 2014, Parliament amended the Political Parties Registration law
to require leaders of political parties to be “full” citizens and members of parties to be
“full” or “naturalized” citizens.1090 Although, Parliament approved a bill in February 2015
which included a provision allowing white card holders to vote, on 11 February, following
a public outcry, the then President Thein Sein issued an order stating that white cards would
expire on 31 March 2015 and had to be returned by 31 May 2015. The Constitutional Court
further ruled that the legislative provisions allowing white card holders to vote were
unconstitutional, and the Parliament amended the election laws, removing white card
holders from those eligible to participate in elections.1091 This disenfranchised all white card
holders, the vast majority of whom were Rohingya, from participation in the 2015 general
elections.

(d) Conclusion
491. The Rohingya have gradually been denied birth registration, citizenship and
membership of the political community. This lack of legal status and identity is the
cornerstone of the oppressive system targeting the Rohingya. It is the consequence of the
discriminatory and arbitrary use of laws to target an ethnic group and deprive its members
of the legal status they once possessed. It is State-sanctioned and in violation of Myanmar’s
obligations under international law because it discriminates on the basis of race, ethnicity
and religion. It has a profound impact on the enjoyment of all other human rights.

1086 Notification of the State Counsellor Office, “What is the ICNV” (27 December 2016).
1087 See this chapter, section B.2.b: Requirement for a temporary travel permit to travel between
townships.
1088 Video available at: https://www.facebook.com/theirrawaddyburmese/videos/2008808825829926/
(accessed August 2018). See also Joshua Lipes, “Myanmar Lifts Travel Restrictions on Rohingyas
With ‘Verification Cards’” (Radio Free Asia, 19 April 2018).
1089 Video available at: https://www.facebook.com/standardtimedaily/videos/1451972574914692/
(accessed August 2018). See also the video at:
https://www.facebook.com/NewsWatchJournal/videos/1669688809735580/ (accessed August 2018).
1090 The amendments came into effect in September 2014.
1091 The Carter Center, “Preliminary Findings of the Carter Center Expert Mission to Myanmar – April-
July 2015”.

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492. Myanmar’s legal framework pertaining to citizenship, and its application to the
Rohingya in particular, is contrary to the prohibition of racial discrimination, both in the
way it defines “citizens” and in its attribution of rights to distinct classes of citizens.
Membership of a “national race” has been made the key criterion of citizenship. All others,
including those who were born and lived in the country for generations, were gradually
excluded. This extreme and narrow focus on ethnicity, and its arbitrary application in
practice, has been profoundly discriminatory in intent, purpose and impact.
493. The treatment of the Rohingya constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of nationality. It
is in violation of domestic laws. There was no permissible ground of revocation. The denial
of nationality is based on prohibited racial grounds. It has resulted in large-scale
statelessness, while it serves no discernible legitimate purpose.
494. The treatment further violates the right of every child to acquire a nationality, in
particular where the child would otherwise be stateless. Where a child is born to stateless
parents on the territory of a State Party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the
State of birth is required to grant nationality. The right to a nationality as articulated in
article 7 of the Convention would otherwise be meaningless. 1092 Its practice of not issuing
birth certificates to Rohingya children and not granting nationality or appropriate
documentation to children born on its territory is a violation of the Convention. The
practice also has rendered children extremely vulnerable to other severe human rights
violations. It deprives Rohingya children of a permanent record of existence and legal
identity. It negatively impacts their access to health, education and other services. It
deprives them of adequate protection.
495. The denial of legal status has culminated in 2015 in a complete disenfranchisement
of the Rohingya from the political process. This symbolised their exclusion from the
Myanmar political community and violates the right to participate in the government of the
country.1093
496. The complete arbitrariness with which the Rohingya population has been treated is
appalling. It violates legal certainty, the rule of law and international human rights law
generally. Arbitrariness is shown in the way in which citizenship was revoked, domestic
laws were applied or not, cards were handed out and revoked, and people were called
“illegal immigrants”, yet accepted back in repeated cycles of mass displacement and
repatriation. Arbitrariness is also illustrated by the repeated temporary solutions that
provide no legal certainty and remain largely unimplemented. The Rohingya have for
decades wavered between different levels of participation in Myanmar’s national life –from
full citizen, to non-citizen with voting rights, non-citizen without voting rights, illegal
immigrant that must leave, illegal immigrant that may stay and reside, illegal immigrant
whose citizenship must be verified, – each status symbolised by a different card or its
revocation.
497. The Myanmar State as an institution is responsible for its actions, including for the
actions of previous governments. A strict application of the 1982 Citizenship Law is not a
sign of respect for the rule of law, as professed by the current Government in its insistence
on a “citizenship verification process” in line with that law and implemented at all cost,
including coercion. It is the continuation by the civilian government of discriminatory
policies put in place by a military regime. These policies seek to implement a racist and
exclusionary vision. What is required is no less than a re-examination of the link between
citizenship and “national races”, and the removal of the latter concept in Myanmar politics
and law. This link is particularly problematic considering Myanmar’s flawed legal
framework for the protection of human rights, which is largely based on citizenship, in
contravention of international human rights law.
498. The emphasis on “national races” and the ensuing discriminatory practices have
come to define the question of Rohingya citizenship and statelessness, with the Rohingya,
ethnic Rakhine, and the Myanmar Government arguing the question of whether Rohingya

1092 A/HRC/13/34, para. 36; A/HRC/10/34, para. 64.

1093 E.g., UDHR, art. 21(1).

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are a “national race”. This is beside the point. The issues of belonging to a “national race”,
citizenship rights, and human rights should not be conflated.

2. Denial of the right to freedom of movement

(a) Overview and legal framework

499. Article 13 of the UDHR guarantees the right to freedom of movement. 1094 This
includes the right of everyone lawfully within the territory of a State to liberty of
movement.1095 It is an indispensable condition for the free development of a person.1096
Under international human rights law, once a person is lawfully within a State, no
restrictions on the right to freedom of movement, as well as any treatment different from
that accorded to nationals, may be imposed. The only exception is if provided by law and
necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the rights and
freedoms of others.1097 In the absence of such exceptions, non-citizens should have the right
to move from one place to another.1098 The overarching principle of non-discrimination also
applies to the realization of the right to freedom of movement. Importantly, the
statelessness of a person resulting from the arbitrary deprivation of nationality, cannot be
invoked by States as a justification for the denial of other human rights, including freedom
of movement.1099
500. Rohingya in Rakhine State face severe restrictions on their right to freedom of
movement which do not fall within the permissible limitations set out above. Their ability
to move between villages in the same township, between townships and outside Rakhine
State is severely curtailed, adversely impacting every aspect of life.
501. The restrictions are imposed through a complex system of written or verbal
instructions as well as security rules, physical barriers, abusive practices, and self-imposed
restrictions based on fear. Implementation is arbitrary, depending on decisions by local
officials. Movement, where permitted, is often associated with the payment of bribes and
harassment. The detailed legal basis for all the restrictions imposed on the Rohingya
remains unclear.
502. The Advisory Commission on Rakhine State summarised the situation regarding
restrictions on freedom of movement as follows:
Freedom of movement is one of the most important issues hindering progress
towards inter-communal harmony, economic growth and human development in
Rakhine State. Movement restrictions have a wide range of detrimental effects
including reduced access to education, health and services, strengthened communal
segregation, and reduced economic interaction. The Government’s rationale for
maintaining the status quo is largely related to fears of destabilization, especially as
the Rakhine community is expected to protest greater movement of Muslims within
the state. Yet, if carefully done, easing restrictions on freedom of movement could
have far-reaching positive social and economic benefits.1100

(b) Requirement for a temporary travel permit to travel between townships

503. According to an instruction issued as early as June 1997 by the Rakhine State
Immigration and National Registration Department, all Rohingya (referred to as “Bengali
races”) wishing to travel between townships in Rakhine State need to hold a temporary
travel permit, called a “Form 4”. This also applies to “foreigners and persons who are

1094 Also ASEAN Declaration, art. 15.

1095 See ICCPR, art. 12.
1096 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment 27: Freedom of movement (Art. 12), 2
November 1999, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9.
1097 Ibid.
1098 See also A/HRC/19/43, para. 8-10.
1099 E.g. A/HRC/RES/32/5.
1100 Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, Final Report, Towards a peaceful, fair and prosperous
future for the people of Rakhine (August 2017), p. 33.

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doubted as foreigners”. The traveller must report to the authorities about his or her arrival
and departure. The Form 4 is only valid for a given time and the traveller must surrender it
to the issuing officer upon completion of the approved journey.1101 Despite not belonging to
any of these categories, the Kaman, who are Myanmar citizens, have also been required to
travel with a Form 4, indicating a broader application to “Muslims”. 1102 Provisions from the
1997 instruction continue to be enforced.
504. Violation of the 1997 instruction is punishable by section 188 of the Penal Code,
with imprisonment of up to six months, or up to two years under the 1949 Residents of
Myanmar Registration Act.1103 In 2011, the Maungdaw Township General Administration
Department issued Order 1/2011 reiterating the need for Rohingya residing in Maungdaw
to obtain a Form 4 to travel between townships. The order refers to the non-observance by
“some Bengalis” of the requirement to obtain Form 4 and emphasizes that “serious
consequences would be faced in accordance with existing laws and section 188”.
505. The process for obtaining a Form 4 is onerous and lengthy, taking from a few days
to weeks or months.1104 The applicant must first obtain a letter of recommendation from the
village administrator and then travel to the township immigration office (LaWaKa) to apply
for a permit.
506. According to credible reports, until 2012 a Form 4 used to be valid for 30 days.
After the 2012 violence, the issuance of the Form 4 travel permit was temporarily
suspended for Rohingya in Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung. It was later resumed
for travel between Maungdaw and Buthidaung but with a reduced validity, often between
one and two weeks.1105 Since 2012, Rohingya residing in Rathedaung Township have not
been able to travel to the centre of Rathedaung town, which has effectively prevented them
from visiting the LaWaKa office and being able to apply for a Form 4 to travel to other
townships legally.
507. The documents to be submitted when applying for a Form 4 permit include a village
departure certificate, a copy of the household list and an identity document. Until 2015, the
Rohingya were asked to present their temporary registration certificates (“white cards”) and
since then their temporary registration certificate receipt. According to credible sources, in
early 2017 the local authorities informed community leaders in northern Rakhine State that
only holders of the National Verification Card (NVC) would be able to travel between
townships.1106

(c) Specific restrictions within northern Rakhine and harassment at checkpoints

508. In northern Rakhine State, Rohingya have faced restrictions on movement for
decades. In addition to the Form 4 procedure applicable throughout Rakhine State to move
from one township to another, Rohingya in northern Rakhine State even need permission to
travel from one village to another. In order to do so, they must obtain from their village
administrator an authorisation, called “village departure certificate”. The procedure and the
cost of the certificate vary between locations, although the price generally depends on the
duration of stay outside the village. The traveller is also required to inform the village
administrator at destination and to pay a similar fee.1107 The legal basis for these
requirements remains unclear. However, their adverse and discriminatory impact is
apparent.

1101 K-107.
1102 CI-167, CI-168, CI-171. See this chapter, section C.2: Kaman Muslims of Rakhine State.
1103 Sections 6(2) and 6(3) of the 1949 Residents of Myanmar Registration Act penalize the failure to
comply with a requirement to produce a required document with imprisonment of up to two years
with or without hard labour and/or a fine. Article 188 of the Penal Code penalizes the act of
disobeying an order given by a public servant with up to six months imprisonment and/or a fine.
1104 CI-061, CI-062, CI-065, CI-073, CI-079, CI-082, CI-085, CI-090, CI-173, DI-001, DI-003, DI-013,
DI-025, DI-046, DI-051, DI-073.
1105 K-063, V-047.
1106 K-063, K-076, V-047.
1107 CI-061, CI-063, CI-064, CI-080, CI-082, CI-089, CI-090, CI-092, CI-094, DI-001, DI-002, DI-006,
DI-010, DI-025, DI-026, DI-038, DI-051, DI-053, DI-073.

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509. Other restrictions regarding freedom of movement in northern Rakhine State stem
from curfew orders that have been in place in Maungdaw and Buthidaung since June 2012.
1108 Such orders were also in place in other parts of Rakhine State but have since been lifted.

510. In northern Rakhine State, restrictions on freedom of movement are enforced

through security checkpoints. These checkpoints were previously operated by the NaSaKa.
Since 2013, they are mainly operated by the Border Guard Police and the Myanmar Police
Force, but also the Tatmadaw. According to credible reports, as of October 2016 there were
as many as 126 checkpoints in northern Rakhine State alone. This number was reportedly
increased to 161 as of August 2017.1109 At checkpoints, Rohingya often face questioning,
searches of vehicles and harassment.1110 The ethnic Rakhine must also go through these
checkpoints but usually do not face similar intimidation and harassment. One interviewee
explained:
There were many checkpoints between villages. The security forces would check our
cars, documents, and bags. They only checked the Rohingya, never the Rakhine.
When a vehicle was stopped at a checkpoint, all the passengers had to get out, and
the women and men would stand on different sides. Officials would check bags
inside the vehicle, making a mess. Then, they would start checking people. Usually
men had to go through a body check; for women there were female officers to check
their body for anything suspicious. They would also check the handbags of women.
If they found medicine, even a very basic type, they would ask why you are taking
this. They would also check all our documents. The procedure would take between
45 minutes and one hour, depending on the number of passengers. 1111
511. Moreover, security forces regularly impose arbitrary and often substantial “transit
fees” for passage through checkpoints. 1112 One interviewee summarised how bribes had to
be paid to obtain the village departure certificate in Maungdaw, but also when passing
through checkpoints: “If you didn’t have the certificate you had to pay a lot, but even if you
had it, you had to pay something.” 1113 Rohingya who travel without the necessary
documents risk arrest1114 and prosecution under section 188 of the Penal Code or the 1949
Residents of Myanmar Registration Act. Another interview succinctly stated, “You will not
find a single person who did not pay money to the authorities”.1115

(d) Specific restrictions in central Rakhine

512. In central Rakhine, restrictions on freedom of movement of the Rohingya and the
Kaman significantly increased after the 2012 violence. They apply to both displaced and
non-displaced populations. This affects the Rohingya and Kaman residing in villages in
central Rakhine (estimates range from 200,000 to 230,000), and an additional 128,000
Rohingya and Kaman living in displacement camps and sites, the majority in rural areas of
Sittwe Township.1116
513. Rakhine and Rohingya communities have been segregated in central Rakhine since
the 2012 violence. The authorities state this is to ensure the protection of the communities,
but without any specific justification relating to the actual risks.1117 While most restrictions
are not formally codified, they are reportedly strictly enforced. According to credible

1108 See this chapter, section C.4.a: Curfews and prohibition of meetings of more than five people.
1109 K-076.
1110 CI-062, CI-063, CI-064, CI-079, DI-13, DI-026, DI-061.
1111 DI-026.
1112 CI-061, CI-063, CI-065, CI-079, CI-082, CI-090, CI-173, DI-001, DI-003, DI-013, DI-025, DI-051.
1113 DI-051.
1114 CI-089, K-076.
1115 CI-094.
1116 K-113.7.
1117 Danish Refugee Council, European Commission’s Directorate-General for European Civil Protection
and Humanitarian Aid Operations, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, CCCM Cluster,
Joint IDP Profiling Service, Sittwe Camp Profiling report (June 2017), p. 12.

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reports, when Rohingya or Kaman try to move in central Rakhine beyond locally accepted
boundaries, they are frequently arrested and subjected to ill-treatment.1118
514. Movement of the non-displaced Muslim population is tightly curtailed by the
security forces, local authorities and communities. They are not allowed to travel to Sittwe
town, or other main towns in central Rakhine, except very rarely for emergency medical
treatment or other exceptional circumstances. These towns previously had substantial
Muslim communities. Rohingya and Kaman have also been barred from entering many of
the Rakhine villages in central Rakhine State, although there are examples where local
arrangements have allowed this.1119
515. As early as September 2012, the then United Nations Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in Myanmar warned against the risks of such a policy of
segregation:
The current separation of Muslim and Buddhist communities following the violence
should not be maintained in the long term. In rebuilding towns and villages,
Government authorities should pay equal attention to rebuilding trust and respect
between communities, while confronting deep-rooted prejudices and discriminatory
attitudes based on ethnicity and religion. These have been made manifest in the anti-
Rohingya discourse and in the inaccurate and inflammatory images of the violence
in the media, including social media. A policy of integration, rather than separation
and segregation, should be developed at the local and national levels as a
priority.1120
516. Despite numerous calls by two United Nations Special Rapporteurs 1121, the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights1122 and others, six years after the 2012
violence, this policy of segregation has been maintained and contacts between communities
have been extremely limited in central Rakhine. In practice, this policy has contributed to
growing mistrust and misunderstandings. It has also provided a conducive environment for
dehumanization and hate campaigns and for wrong perceptions to be engrained in the
minds of each community.

Displacement camps and sites

517. The displacement camps and sites established after the 2012 violence 1123 are
effectively places of deprivation of liberty. They are cordoned off from the outside world,
with Rohingya and Kaman unable to move outside freely. 1124 In most cases, access is
strictly controlled by checkpoints set up by the Myanmar Police Force. Moreover, many
camps are surrounded by barbed wire fencing. There are further police checkpoints and
military posts in the camp area, further limiting freedom of movement. A large military
base is located near the Sittwe camps, where the majority of displaced people are
accommodated. According to credible reports, even some local staff members of
international organizations have not been able to leave the camps for the last few years.1125
518. Given the severe restrictions on freedom of movement imposed on the camp
population, some humanitarian actors and analysts have referred to the camps as
“internment camps”:1126

1118 K-069.
1119 K-069, V-047.
1120 A/67/383, para. 61.
1121 A/67/383, para. 61; A/68/397, para. 52; A/HRC/25/64, para. 82(c); A/HRC/28/72, para. 60.
1122 A/HRC/32/18, para. 54.
1123
See this chapter, section C.1: Emblematic incidents.
1124 Danish Refugee Council, European Commission’s Directorate-General for European Civil Protection
and Humanitarian Aid Operations, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, CCCM Cluster,
Joint IDP Profiling Service, Sittwe Camp Profiling report (June 2017), p. 12.
1125 DM-004, DM-005, V-047.
1126 QM-002, QM-005, V-337.

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These camps should be viewed as internment camps as the people there are not
seeking refuge (at the heart of the definition of a camp for internally displaced
people). Rather, they are “locked up”. To get into the camp you have to pass
through a series of barbed wire fences, then an army checkpoint, and then a police
checkpoint.1127
After 2012, the situation in central Rakhine changed with the establishment of the
camps, and the unresolved question of whether these should be considered displaced
people, or people forcibly transferred into detention centres.1128

Image from 2018 showing the guarded entrance to the Sittwe displacement
camps and the barbed wires all around

519. In 2015, the Government denied the existence of restrictions on the freedom of
movement of the displaced population in central Rakhine. In a response to a report of the
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, the Government stated:
There is no restriction on the freedom of movement of the IDPs. Security presence in
IDP camps is simply to prevent recurrence of communal violence while the level of
distrust between the two communities is still high. The two communities are staying
separately because they feel that they are safer that way. It will take time for both
communities to heal themselves to relieve from mental trauma. It needs to wait for a
reasonable time until both communities regain mutual understanding and trust.
Neither the government nor others can force them to live side-by-side.1129

1127 QM-005.
1128 QM-002.
1129 A/HRC/25/64/Add.1, para. 15.

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Image from 2018 showing the sign board at the entry of the Basara camps in Sittwe.
It states that the area is “restricted” with “no admittance without the approval of
State Government to come in and out”

Despite the statement of the Government, the existence of the restrictions on the freedom of
movement of the displaced population is undeniable. It is attested by the checkpoints and
sign boards at the entry of the camps, the barbed wires, the experience of those trying the
leave the camps, and the simple fact that 128,000 people have not been able to go back to
their place of origin, despite their desire to do so.

Aung Mingalar
520. Since June 2012, the only Muslims still living in Sittwe town are the approximately
4,000 Rohingya and Kaman remaining residents of the Aung Mingalar quarter. 1130 This area
is effectively a closed ghetto, where Muslims are trapped and have lived separately from
the rest of the population since 2012. It is guarded by armed police, checkpoints and barbed
wire. The Mission also received allegations that the Tatmadaw maintains a small presence
in the school grounds in Aung Mingalar. People can only leave the quarter with special
permission and in organized convoys with police escorts.1131 Apart from emergency
medical referrals, the only travel which Muslims can normally undertake outside Aung
Mingalar is to the displacement camps and sites in rural Sittwe, where a limited number of
people can sometimes access markets and buy food. This travel is strictly controlled by
security forces, who only allow a shuttle escorted by the police to travel from Aung
Mingalar to the camps. The shuttle requires payment to the police.1132
521. Access to the nearby medical facilities, Sittwe markets and livelihoods are largely
cut off for the residents of Aung Mingalar, who live in effective isolation. Although the
Sittwe General Hospital is nearby, residents have to go through the cumbersome emergency
referral process to access it.1133 There is a sign board at the entrance of Aung Mingalar,
similar to the one at the entrance of the Sittwe camps, restricting access (see picture above).
According to credible reports, in May 2017 Rakhine nationalists wrongly claimed that the
population of Aung Mingalar had grown from 4,000 to 20,000. The Rakhine State
Government subsequently initiated a verification process and found that the population had
remained static. Nevertheless, new restrictions were reportedly introduced after this
verification process, requiring residents of Aung Mingalar wishing to travel to the Sittwe

1130 It is reported that the population of Aung Mingalar was approximately 16,000 before the 2012
violence.
1131 K-069; V-047.
1132 DM-004; V-047.
1133 See this chapter, section B.3.b: Restrictions on access to healthcare.

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camps to buy food or access medical care, to register and have their picture taken, with the
aim of ensuring that the same individuals would return after their visit to the camps.1134

Image from 2018 of the restricted entrance to Aung Mingalar

(e) Guest registration and household inspections

522. According to the 2012 version of the Ward or Village Tract Administration Law,
people hosting overnight guests at their home – even for a single night – had to register
with the ward or village tract administrator. The law was strongly criticized by civil society
and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar 1135 as a tool for
intimidation and harassment of specific individuals, groups or communities. In northern
Rakhine State, the law was strictly implemented and combined with other restrictions on
the right to freedom of movement.1136
523. Although the Ward or Village Tract Administration Law clearly states, “The ward or
village tract administrator shall not collect any currency in respect of guest list
information”, many Rohingya in northern Rakhine had to pay the village administrator to
register overnight guests.1137 The amount was arbitrary and depended on the relationship
between the applicant and the village administrator.1138 When overnight guests without
permission were found during the nightly household inspections, Rohingya were arrested
and had to pay another bribe to get released.1139
524. In 2016, the Ward or Village Tract Administration Law was amended. The
requirement for mandatory guest registration was made applicable only to guests staying in
somebody’s house for a month or more.1140 However, additional investigation is required to
confirm whether this change in the law has been followed by a change of practice on the
ground in Rakhine and elsewhere.

(f) Conclusion
525. Rohingya across Rakhine State face severe movement restrictions. They need travel
permits to leave their township. In northern Rakhine State, movement between villages is

1134 DM-004.
1135 A/71/361, para. 19; A/HRC/31/71, Annex I; A/70/412, para. 29.
1136 CI-061, CI-062, CI-065, CI-069, CI-070, CI-079, CI-089, CI-090, DI-001, DI-004, DI-009, DI-013,
DI-025, DI-026, DI-038.
1137 CI-061, CI-062, CI-089, DI-001, DI-004, DI-026.
1138 CI-062, DI-001.
1139 CI-062, CI-065, CI-069, CI-070, DI-004, DI-009, DI-026, DI-038.
1140 Ward or Village Tract Administration Law, Chapter IX, section 17.

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also restricted and curfews are imposed. Restrictions are enforced through multiple security
checkpoints, which had reportedly risen to over 160 before 25 August 2017.1141 In central
Rakhine State, severe restrictions imposed since the 2012 violence have resulted in a policy
of segregation of communities. Rohingya can generally not move to ethnic Rakhine areas,
including the main towns and markets. For the last six years, 128,000 Rohingya and Kaman
have been confined in displacement camps or sites and 4,000 Muslims have been confined
in the Aung Mingalar ghetto in Sittwe town. These restrictions adversely impact every
aspect of their life, including their access to food, livelihood, health and education – and in
extreme cases leading to preventable deaths. They are compounded by arbitrary fees,
extortion and the risk of arrest.
526. While their citizenship rights and status are debated in Myanmar, it is not denied that
most Rohingya are residents of Myanmar. As such, they are entitled to freedom of
movement. Moreover, their non-citizenship, which results from an arbitrary deprivation of
their nationality, cannot be invoked to deny other human rights. No security requirement
necessitates the imposition of these severe and arbitrary movement restrictions for such a
long period of time, without any clear legal basis. Therefore, the restrictions violate the
right to freedom of movement of the Rohingya.
527. Specifically with regard to the displacement camps and sites established in central
Rakhine State after the 2012 violence, the Mission finds that – beyond a violation of their
right to freedom of movement – the confinement of Rohingya and Kaman constitutes a
deprivation of liberty. Deprivation of liberty involves a more severe restriction of
movement within a narrower space than interference with liberty of movement. 1142 While
Rohingya and Kaman enjoy some limited ability to move within the camps or sites, many
of the camps are surrounded by barbed wire, military camps, security guards and
checkpoints, including inside the camps. Access to the camps and sites is restricted. The
situation in the Aung Mingalar ghetto is similar or even worse on certain aspects. Residents
cannot freely leave the displacement camps and sites and Aung Mingalar. They have
inadequate access to health care, education and livelihoods. Holding a group in such
conditions for over six years amounts to a deprivation of their liberty.
528. The Government justifies their confinement on security grounds. However, the
Mission fails to see the present, direct and imperative threat that would justify the security
detention of 132,000 people1143 for over six years and that could not be addressed by
alternative and less invasive means.1144 This is aggravated by the lack of known legal basis
or review of the confinement. Were confinement of communities absolutely required to
maintain security, the Mission does not see why it should only affect the Muslim
communities of Rakhine State. The Mission has reasonable grounds to conclude that the
holding of Rohingya and Kaman in these camps and sites and in the Aung Mingalar ghetto
constitutes an arbitrary and discriminatory deprivation of their liberty.
529. Beyond the question of lawfulness, the Mission calls into question the effectiveness
of policies of segregation to mitigate an alleged or perceived security threat, especially for
long periods of time. Rather than contributing to sustainable peace in Rakhine State, they
break all relationships between communities. The Mission has concluded that they
contributed directly to the events of 2016 and 2017.
530. Considering the lack of reasonable justification for these movement restrictions, in
some cases amounting to deprivation of liberty, and their discriminatory implementation,
the Mission concludes that they are a second building block of the system of oppression and
persecution targeting the Rohingya.

1141 K-076.
1142 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35: Liberty and security of persons
(Art. 9), 16 December 2014, CCPR/C/GC/35, para. 5.
1143 128,000 Rohingya and Kaman in displacement camps and sites and 4,000 in Aung Mingalar.
1144 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35: Liberty and security of persons
(Art. 9), 16 December 2014, CCPR/C/GC/35, para. 15.

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3. Restrictions on access to food, livelihoods, health care and education

(a) Restrictions on access to food and livelihood

Overview and legal framework

531. The human right to adequate food is firmly entrenched in international human rights
law, including article 25 of the UDHR, article 11 of the ICESCR, articles 24 and 27 of the
CRC, and article 28 of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. To realize the right to food,
States must ensure that food is available, economically and physically accessible, and
adequate.1145 The right is realized when “every man, woman and child, alone or in
community with others, has physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or
means for its procurement.”1146 The right to food is closely linked with the right to life:
“without food there is no life, and with the wrong food, life is shorter and more prone to ill-
health”.1147 The right to life requires States to take measures to increase life expectancy,
especially in adopting measures to eliminate malnutrition. 1148
532. While the right to food is to be progressively realised, the United Nations
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has established that States have
immediate core obligations, regardless of resources and/or level of development, to ensure
freedom from hunger; non-discrimination; and the protection of vulnerable populations.
This includes the provision of access to the minimum essential food which is nutritionally
adequate and safe, to ensure freedom from hunger to everyone. 1149
533. In Rakhine State, the Rohingya have long relied on fishing, farming and trading to
provide for themselves and their families. However, movement restrictions generally, as
well as specific restrictions on access to fishing, agricultural lands and forests, impede their
access to food and livelihoods. The fear of crossing checkpoints – due to the harassment
and extortion it entails – has had a similarly negative impact.

Access to food and malnutrition

534. According to a survey by the Myanmar Government in 2015, Rakhine State had the
highest rates of global acute malnutrition, at 13.9 per cent, and severe acute malnutrition, at
3.7 per cent, in the country.1150 However, in northern Rakhine, where most Rohingya live,
rates were four to five times higher – for severe acute malnutrition, 19 per cent in
Maungdaw Township and 15.1 per cent in Buthidaung Township – above the World Health
Organization emergency threshold of 15 per cent.1151 The health impacts of malnutrition
may include heightened risk of preventable deaths and deterioration of pre-existing
conditions, especially for children. A Word Food Programme report on northern Rakhine
State in mid-2017 highlighted limited access to livelihoods, due largely to freedom of
movement restrictions and the increased security presence, as being a main contributory
cause of malnutrition. It summarised the situation at that time:
In line with the previous remote emergency assessments, the survey confirmed a
worsening of the food security situation in already highly vulnerable areas after the
October 2016 incidents and subsequent security operations. Nearly one third of the

1145 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 12: The
right to adequate food (Art. 11), 12 May 1999, E/C.12/1999/5.
1146 Ibid, para. 6.
1147 A. Eide, “Adequate Standard of Living”, in International Human Rights Law, 2nd ed., D. Moeckli, S.
Shah and S. Sivakumaran (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014), p. 199.
1148 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 6: Right to life (Art. 6), 30 April
1982, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, para. 5.
1149 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The
right to the highest attainable standard of health (Art. 12), 11 August 2000, E/C.12/2000/4, para
43(b).
1150 Ministry of Health and Sports, Myanmar - 2015-2016 Demographic and Health Survey - Key
Findings (2017); see also: The UN Network, “Nutrition Situation Analysis”, abridged version (June
2017).
1151 K-076.44.

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population was severely food-insecure and in need of humanitarian assistance. Only

14 per cent of women achieved minimum dietary diversity and none of the children
met the minimum adequate diet. Income opportunities were scarce and households
could not access sufficient food to cover their needs. About half of the markets were
not functioning or were only partially operational, food prices were highly volatile
and supply of affordable foods in many markets was scarce. 1152
535. The report further stated that poor child feeding practices may have increased
wasting (low weight-for-height) and stunting (low height-for-age) in children, both
symptoms of acute undernutrition. Of greatest concern, the report estimated that 80,500
children under the age of five were expected to be in need of treatment for acute
malnutrition over the subsequent 12 months. 1153 This preceded the “clearance operations”
that began on 25 August 2017.
536. The various waves of violence in Rakhine State have had a serious adverse impact
on the enjoyment of the right to food. Interviewees from northern Rakhine reported
increased hunger following the 2012 violence due to further movement restrictions and
fear.1154 One interviewee explained how they would only eat one meal a day out of fear to
leave the house.1155 The following account was also provided regarding the impact of the
violence on access to food:
People couldn’t go to work and couldn’t earn money. At one point, there was no
food. People were trying to help each other, but it was particularly difficult for very
poor people. Initially, nobody dared going outside. Then hunger was such that
people started to take risks and go out to work. They thought: “better to die by a
bullet than to die of hunger”.1156
537. The 2016 and 2017 “clearance operations” have had a devastating impact. 1157 On 9
January and 23 August 2017, a group of United Nations Special Rapporteurs addressed two
urgent appeals to the Government of Myanmar to raise the issue. 1158 The August 2017
communication highlighted information regarding “evident deterioration of the food
security situation in northern Rakhine” and raised concern about the “long term, chronic
lack of access to adequate food in the context of prolonged security operations in the area”.
The Special Rapporteurs highlighted allegations that one-third of homes in northern
Rakhine were already experiencing extreme food deprivation, and that children were
especially vulnerable, as reflected in their high malnutrition rates. It should be noted that
this urgent appeal preceded the commencement of the August 2017 “clearance operations”
by two days, after which access to food and its consequences further deteriorated
significantly.

Restrictions on access to livelihoods

538. Rohingya have faced severe restrictions on their access to livelihoods for decades.
Already in the 1990s, strict enforcement of movement restrictions against the Rohingya in
northern Rakhine had reportedly led to severe impoverishment, to the extent that many
people were in need of humanitarian assistance. 1159 Movement has been further restricted

1152 World Food Programme, Food security assessment in the northern part of Rakhine State - Final
report (July 2017).
1153 Ibid.
1154 DI-009, DI-053, DI-054.
1155 DI-009.
1156 DI-054.
1157 World Food Programme, Food security assessment in the northern part of Rakhine State - Final
report (July 2017); V-047.
1158 UA MMR 6/2016 available at:
https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=22927
and UA MMR 8/2017 available at:
https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=23297
1159 Irish Centre for Human Rights, Crimes against Humanity in Western Burma: The Situation of the
Rohingya (2010), p. 99; International Federation of Human Rights Leagues, Burma – Repression,
discrimination and ethnic cleansing in Arakan (April 2000), p. 20.

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throughout Rakhine State with each wave of violence.1160 The Rohingya in central and
northern Rakhine have been restricted from accessing fishing areas (including coastal
waters and inland waterways), farmlands, markets, or employment outside their immediate
areas, thus severely limiting their income. 1161 Restrictions on access to livelihoods have
been a principal contributory factor forcing Rohingya to leave Myanmar. 1162
539. In central Rakhine, severe restrictions on freedom of movement imposed after the
2012 violence have significantly impacted upon access to livelihoods. For example,
Rohingya in villages near Sittwe were reportedly forced to sell personal assets and reduce
the numbers of meals in order to survive. 1163 Similarly, in the first half of 2013 over 10,000
Muslims from isolated villages with very limited access to livelihoods reportedly moved to
displacement camps and sites. They were not classified as IDPs and therefore had difficulty
accessing humanitarian assistance.1164
540. Access to fishing has been severely curtailed by curfew orders since 2012. 1165 These
have often prevented access at the peak night and early morning periods. Fishermen are
routinely required to pay a fee to the security forces operating checkpoints, and on return
are often required to hand over part of their catch. According to credible reports, Rohingya
found fishing during curfew hours or in the wrong area have been subjected to ill-treatment,
arbitrary arrests and even killings. 1166 United Nations Special Rapporteurs addressed an
urgent appeal to the Government of Myanmar about the alleged torture of fishermen by
BGP officers in June 2016, causing the death of one. 1167 The Government denied the
allegations.1168

(b) Restrictions on access to healthcare

Legal framework and overview

541. Article 25 UDHR protects the right of everyone to a standard of living adequate for
their and their family’s health, including medical care. Article 12 ICESCR protects the
“right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health”. Human rights standards on the right to health are also included in article 12
CEDAW, article 24 CRC, article 25 CRPD, as well as in article 29 ASEAN.
542. The right to the highest attainable standard of health includes the right to a system of
health protection that provides equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the highest
attainable level of health.1169 Key elements of the right to health are non-discrimination and
equal treatment. This includes the right to equality of access to health care and health
services. The Committee emphasized that the ICESCR proscribes any discrimination in
access to health care and underlying determinants of health, as well as means and
entitlements for their procurement. Prohibited grounds of discrimination include race,
colour, sex, language, religion, or social origin.1170
543. The right to health is to be progressively implemented. Yet, as a party to the
ICESCR, CRC, CEDAW and CRPD, Myanmar has an immediate obligation, regardless of
resources, to ensure access to health facilities, goods and services on a non-discriminatory

1160 See this chapter, section B.2. Denial of the right to freedom of movement.
1161 K-113.3.
1162 CI-062, CI-079, CI-080.
1163 K-076
1164 K-076.
1165 See this chapter, section C.4.a: Curfews and prohibition of meetings of more than five people.
1166 K-076.
1167 UA MMR 3/2016, available at:
https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=3349
1168 Response of the Government of Myanmar to UA MMR 3/2016, 22 December 2016, available at:
https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=80722
1169 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The
right to the highest attainable standard of health (Art. 12), 8 November 2000, E/C.12/2000/4, para. 8.
1170 Ibid., paras. 18-19.

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basis, especially for vulnerable or marginalized groups. It must also ensure equitable
distribution of all health facilities, goods and services. 1171
544. The availability of functioning health facilities and services in Rakhine State for all
communities is low, with an average of five health workers per 10,000 inhabitants. This is
well below the national average of 16 health workers per 10,000 people, and the World
Health Organization recommended minimum of 22.8 health workers per 10,000 people. 1172
The Mission notes that all communities in Rakhine State have inadequate access to
healthcare, and that under-development and poor transportation make access to healthcare
difficult for all, especially those living in remote areas. The Rohingya, however, face
additional barriers due to travel restrictions, financial hurdles, cumbersome bureaucratic
procedures, and overall discriminatory treatment. 1173 Restrictions are often based on official
policies and practices.

Movement restrictions on access to health

545. Movement restrictions undermine Rohingya access to health services. The Rohingya
and Kaman communities face arbitrary and highly cumbersome procedures to travel to
hospitals. These are particularly harmful in the case of medical emergencies as they lead to
late diagnosis and delays in life-saving treatment. They can result in preventable deaths. For
example, one interviewee from northern Rakhine explained that it was easier to access
medical treatment by travelling to Bangladesh than to nearby Sittwe hospital. 1174 Another
stated:
One of my relatives had to go to Yangon to get medical treatment. She tried to get
the necessary papers to travel to Yangon but didn’t get them and died at the Sittwe
hospital. If Rohingya have a minor sickness it is okay, but if the sickness is serious
they can’t get proper treatment.1175
546. In central Rakhine State, the restrictions on freedom of movement imposed after the
2012 violence resulted in Rohingya and Kaman being denied access to their nearest
hospitals and clinics.
547. One United Nations official shared an experience about attempts to engage with
township authorities and Rakhine community leaders in central Rakhine. When the official
tried to challenge township authorities about their failure to ensure that Rohingya could
access emergency medical care, the response was that this was a policy matter that needed
to be discussed at a higher level. Rakhine community leaders on the other hand justified
this approach on various grounds, including the claims that Muslim communities “do not
belong to Myanmar” and that their population “needs to be controlled”. 1176
548. As a mitigating measure, humanitarian actors have put in place a medical emergency
referral system for Rohingya and Kaman patients. This system usually requires a
humanitarian actor to liaise with the Rakhine State Health Department to take patients to
the Sittwe General Hospital. The process is cumbersome, bureaucratic and slow. The
patient may then require hours of travel. 1177 To secure an emergency medical referral, a
local township medical officer must first certify the need. The patient, supported by a
humanitarian actor, must then get permission to travel, arrange transport, organize a police
escort, and pay the associated costs.1178 Even when all arrangements are in place,
ambulances reportedly may refuse to go to Rohingya villages, camps or sites, and ultra-

1171 Ibid., para. 43.

1172 Ministry of Health and Sports, Myanmar - 2015-2016 Demographic and Health Survey - Key
Findings (2017).
1173 See also: Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, Towards a peaceful, fair and prosperous future for
the people of Rakhine (August 2017), p. 42.
1174 DI-004.
1175 DI-013.
1176 DM-005.
1177 V-047.
1178 DM-005.

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nationalist Rakhine groups sometimes prevent patients from reaching Sittwe General
Hospital.1179
549. In central Rakhine, the Aung Mingalar ghetto in Sittwe town is located only a short
distance away from Sittwe General Hospital. Mobile health clinics operated by
international organizations visit on certain days of the week and can facilitate more rapid
referrals. However, those requiring medical treatment outside those times, including those
requiring emergency treatment, must first travel to a health centre at the Sittwe
displacement camp to obtain a medical referral. If successful, they are then referred back to
Sittwe General Hospital.1180

Adverse consequences
550. The movement restrictions and lengthy bureaucratic procedures have led to
numerous undue delays in reaching medical facilities. 1181 Restrictions have been enforced
strictly, even in the case of women in obstructed labour, infants needing emergency
oxygen, people suffering from heart attacks, and people with severe disabilities. In some
cases, the delays caused by these restrictions have been fatal.1182 One researcher told the
Mission: “Almost every Rohingya village in Rakhine State that I have visited has a story
about someone who died due to not being able to receive medical care, and not being able
to get transferred out”.1183

Discrimination in health facilities

551. Even when they manage to access government health facilities, Rohingya in
Rakhine State face discriminatory treatment, including further delays. 1184 Interviewees also
reported having to pay bribes or higher fees to receive treatment. One interviewee from
Maungdaw stated:
The treatment depends on the amount of money you have. If you pay more you will
receive medicine and proper care. They charge more from Muslims than from the
Rakhine.1185
552. Rohingya must also pay additional costs such as a “guard fee” for medicine and for
food, phone fees, as Rohingya are not allowed to use their own phones, and translator and
“guardian” fees.1186
553. According to credible reports,1187 both ethnic Rakhine and Muslim (Rohingya and
Kaman) patients experience unacceptable behaviour from hospital staff in Sittwe General
Hospital, including requests by nurses for bribes to receive “better communication”.
Patients also reported verbal abuse, inattention and, in some cases, physical abuse and
medical neglect. However, according to further credible information, 1188 certain
discriminatory practices at Sittwe General Hospital are only faced by Muslim patients. For
example, they are placed in a small segregated ward of only 20 beds, under constant
surveillance by security guards, and they can only leave under supervision. To be admitted
to the hospital, a patient needs an accompanying “guardian”. In the case of the Rohingya,
this can only be a woman (supposedly for security concerns) and she must speak Myanmar
language or Rakhine. As only very few Muslim women speak these languages, families

1179 K-076.12.
1180 K-113.1.
1181 K-076.12.
1182 DI-013, K-076.12, K-113, DM-005, QM-005. It is very difficult to quantify the number of
preventable deaths. Some humanitarian actors estimate that there have been hundreds of
preventable deaths in central Rakhine since 2012 (DM-005).
1183 K-120.
1184 CI-061, CI-064, CI-078, CI-079, CI-080, CI-173, CI-174, DI-001, DI-002, DI-004, DI-038, DI-051.
1185 CI-173.
1186 K-113.1, K-120.
1187 K-113.1.
1188 K-113.1

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must hire female translators to do this (which is an additional financial burden) or decide
not to hire anyone, meaning that the patient is left on his or her own at the hospital.
554. In some instances, delays in treating Rohingya patients in health facilities have led
to preventable deaths.1189 A Rohingya NGO worker shared her experience at Buthidaung
hospital:
One day, I went to Buthidaung hospital with an eight-year-old boy who was
unconscious. In the registration room they said: “We have a lot of patients, we can’t
do anything for this boy now. Go and sit there. Why are you coming to ask us?” The
nurses prioritised a Rakhine patient. I had to wait 30 minutes and the boy died. This
happened to me with three patients in total. They were all children. 1190
555. Communication and language issues fuel pervasive and damaging misinformation
and rumours regarding the treatment of Rohingya in government hospitals and facilities.
Many Rohingya believe that, beyond neglect and discriminatory treatment, they actually
face the danger of being killed by medical staff if they go to a hospital. 1191 One interviewee
told the Mission that, following the 2012 violence, “The hospital people started killing
Rohingyas”.1192 Belief in these rumours has resulted in people limiting or delaying seeking
medical treatment, including in emergency situations. One researcher explained that “in
many cases people were to die of preventable disease as a result of not seeking healthcare,
because of a steadfast belief in the veracity of these rumours”. 1193 The rumours are also
fuelled by the simple fact that, given the delays in reaching medical facilities - because of
restrictions on freedom of movement and other restrictions - patients often reach the
hospital when they are already in critical condition.

(c) Restrictions on access to education

Legal framework and overview

556. The right to education is protected by article 26 UDHR, article 13 ICESCR and
article 28 CRC. According to these provisions, primary education should be “compulsory
and available free to all”, secondary education should be “made generally available and
accessible to all” and higher education should be “made equally accessible to all, on the
basis of capacity”. The right to education is an “empowerment right”. It is “the primary
vehicle by which economically and socially marginalized adults and children can lift
themselves out of poverty and obtain the means to participate fully in their
communities”.1194
557. One key element of the right to education is the prohibition against any form of
discrimination. This prohibition “applies fully and immediately to all aspects of education
and encompasses all international prohibited grounds of discrimination”. The principle of
non-discrimination extends to “all persons of school age residing in the territory of a State
party, including non-nationals, and irrespective of their legal status”. 1195
558. Through its discriminatory policies and practices, the Government of Myanmar
violates the right to education of Rohingya children and youth at the primary, secondary
and higher education levels. Rohingya interviewees repeatedly described to the Mission
how they were denied equal access to education and the highly adverse impact this had on
their lives:1196

1189 CI-173, DI-038.

1190 DI-038.
1191 CI-073, CI-080, CI-089, CI-174, DI-009, DI-046, DI-053, DI-054.
1192 CI-080.
1193 K-120.
1194 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 13: The
right to education (Art. 13), 8 December 1999, E/C.12/1999/10, para. 1.
1195 Ibid, para. 31 and 34. See also art. 2 CRC and art. 3(e) of the UNESCO Convention against
Discrimination in Education.
1196 BI-004, BI-018, CI-019, CI-062, CI-063, CI-065, CI-069, CI-072, CI-073, CI-078, CI-079, CI-080,
CI-125, CI-173, DI-003, DI-004, DI-005, DI-007, DI-010, DI-013, DI-022, DI-025, DI-026, DI-034,

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Because of the 2012 violence, the dream of my parents for education got shattered.
My father and brother were teachers and look at me, I couldn’t even study! Now
when I meet educated people, I think, “Oh my God, I haven’t even passed class 10”.
But I still have hope that one day if I can save a bit of money, I will restart my
education because it is so important. The military backed Government snatched our
life from us. They ruined the entire Rohingya community in the country.1197

Discrimination at school in northern Rakhine

559. A large majority of children in northern Rakhine State have relied on government-
run basic education schools for their education. 1198 Rohingya have faced severe
discrimination in these schools. This includes the humiliating practice of seating Rohingya
children at the back of the class, while ethnic Rakhine children sat at the front, or Rohingya
and Rakhine students being placed in different classrooms. 1199 Many government-appointed
teachers neglect Rohingya students and treat them differently from Rakhine students. 1200
Some actively undermine Rohingya students, with examples of them being called “Kalar”,
or being told that they are not Myanmar citizens or that they “do not have any country”. 1201
One young Rohingya woman from Maungdaw shared her experience at school:
The only regret I have in my life is that no teacher ever considered me as their
favourite student. You have no idea, what I was doing to try to get the attention of
my teachers and learn like any other student. I obeyed. I behaved nicely. If they
wrote anything on the black board, I would help to erase it afterwards. The teachers
used to bring their lunch in a box. When I would see them, I would quickly offer to
carry their lunch-boxes. Even after all this, they hardly checked my homework or
classwork to see if I was learning properly. I always heard that teachers are nice
and caring but this was not the case with me. I always completed my homework on
time and wanted them to look at it but they would simply put a right or wrong sign
on the paper without explaining anything. For the Rakhine students it was different,
their homework was checked.1202
560. Another barrier consistently highlighted by interviewees is language. Depending on
the grade, classes in public schools are taught in Rakhine or Myanmar language, which
many Rohingya students do not understand.1203 Rohingya interviewees stated that their
classes were irregular, with a high level of absenteeism by teachers, and that often they had
little to do at school.1204 One interviewee explained how the Rohingya students at his school
were kept in a separate room and that the teacher would only greet them in the morning
before spending the rest of the day with the ethnic Rakhine students. The Rohingya students
were unable to communicate properly with the teacher.1205
561. After the 2012 violence, some schools closed. In 2015, it was assessed that the
primary level teacher-student ratios were 83:1 in Buthidaung and 123:1 in Maungdaw,
respectively more than double and triple the international benchmark and well above the
reported target of 30:1 set out by the Ministry of Education of Myanmar.1206 Government

DI-038, DI-046, DI-047, DI-050, DI-052, DI-053, DI-073, DI-076, LI-055, LI-087, LI-092, LI-098,
LI-101, LI-103, LI-116, LI-131, LI-135, QI-069.
1197 DI-047.
1198 PLAN and REACH, Joint education sector needs assessment, north Rakhine State, Myanmar (2015),
p. 4.
1199 BI-018, CI-173, DI-005, DI-026, DI-038, DI-050, DI-053.
1200 CI-062.
1201 CI-065, CI-069, CI-072, CI-078, CI-073.
1202 DI-026.
1203 DI-004, DI-010, DI-026, DI-038.
1204 DI-005, DI-025, DI-052, LI-116.
1205 DI-005.
1206 PLAN and REACH, Joint education sector needs assessment, north Rakhine State, Myanmar (2015),
p. 5. According to UNESCO: “In the absence of a global target on pupil-teacher ratios (PTR) in
primary education, the most widely used international benchmark is 40:1.” Education for All Global
Monitoring Report and UNESCO Education Sector, “Policy Paper 19: The challenge of teacher

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teachers reportedly attended schools even less frequently, especially in Maungdaw and
Buthidaung, supposedly due to security concerns. As a consequence, a parallel education
system staffed by volunteers was started to teach Rohingya children in northern
Rakhine.1207

Situation in central Rakhine

562. According to credible reports, in central Rakhine many Rohingya and Kaman
children are prevented from attending the formal education system because of the
combination of movement restrictions, the lack of schools, and the confinement of an
estimated 60,000 displaced children. In displacement camps and sites, primary education is
mainly accessible through “temporary learning centres” set up after the 2012 violence and
supported by the United Nations and international organizations. These centres follow the
government’s curriculum. They are open to both displaced children and children from
Muslim villages who do not have access to government schools. However, these centres are
only primary school level, lack support from the Government, are under-resourced and lack
qualified teachers.1208
563. Middle school and high school opportunities are even more limited for Muslim
students in central Rakhine, and almost non-existent for those living outside Sittwe
Township. There is only one high school for Rohingya and Kaman children in central
Rakhine, located in Thet Kae Pyin in Sittwe Township. It provides schooling for
approximately 3,500 students. At the high school level, there are reportedly only six
teachers in total, with a ratio of 102 students per teacher. Out of the total of 57 teachers, it is
reported that only five are government-appointed (all of whom are Kaman), with all the
others being “volunteer teachers”.1209
564. In 2018, the UNICEF spokesperson summarised the situation of Rohingya children
with regards to access to education in central Rakhine as follows:
While the eyes of the world are on the situation in northern Rakhine and in Cox’s
Bazaar, over 60,000 Rohingya children remain almost forgotten, trapped in 23
camps in central Rakhine they were driven into by violence in 2012. (…) The
movement restrictions are shrinking horizons for children in the camps – nowhere
more so than in terms of education. (…) Rohingya children desperately need
education if they are to have any kind of prospects for a better future. Temporary
solutions need to be improved immediately and more durable arrangements
providing children with access to formal education, provided by properly trained
teachers and recognized by the education system, must be set in place quickly.
Otherwise this generation’s future prospects will be permanently damaged.1210

Discrimination at university
565. Until 2012, a limited number of Rohingya could access higher education, mostly at
Sittwe University. A very small minority – students from wealthy or prominent families –
could travel to Yangon to study. Travel to Sittwe or Yangon remained a challenge because
of the movement restrictions.1211 As “non-citizens”, Rohingya were not permitted to study
certain “professional” subjects (including law, computer science, engineering and
medicine). They were also not allowed to study beyond a bachelor’s degree level.1212

shortage and quality: Have we succeeded in getting enough quality teachers into classrooms?” (April
2015).
1207 PLAN and REACH, Joint education sector needs assessment, north Rakhine State, Myanmar (2015),
p. 5, LI-116
1208 QM-002, QM-005; K-113.2; UNICEF, Briefing on the situation of children in Rakhine State (January
2018).
1209 QM-005; K-113.2.
1210 UNICEF, Briefing on the situation of children in Rakhine State (January 2018).
1211 CI-065, CI-069, CI-080, DI-004, LI-135.
1212 CI-065, CI-069, CI-078, DI-003, DI-007, DI-013, DI-034, DI-073, DI-076, LI-135.

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566. In some cases, Rohingya students were not given a certificate upon completion of
their studies.1213 One interviewee explained that, because Sittwe University refused to issue
her a certificate upon completion of three years of zoology studies, she had to work as an
office cleaner.1214 Another interviewee said she had to bribe the university to obtain a
certificate which did not correspond to the actual subject of her studies. Despite this, she
explained the importance of receiving this document:
I finally received my certificate from university. That is the only thing I was hiding
in my blouse when I left Myanmar by boat. In the boat, everyone was asking me why
I cared so much about this piece of paper. My whole life had been devoted to my
studies. This is the only piece of paper I cared about.1215
567. Since 2012, Rohingya students have been unable to enrol at Sittwe University, due
to unspecified “security concerns”. In practice, this effectively denied them access to higher
education.1216 In 2017, the authorities put in place distance learning for Rohingya and
Kaman students.1217 However, only a small number of mainly Kaman students were
reportedly enrolled in the programme, which is only limited to history and Myanmar
language courses.1218 The Mission views this initiative as totally inadequate in meeting
Myanmar’s obligations under international law, to provide access to higher education for
Rohingya and Kaman students. The students need full access to all universities in
Myanmar.

(d) Conclusion
568. In addition to, and often because of, the lack of legal status, severe movement
restrictions, the Rohingya also face restrictions on access to food, livelihood, healthcare and
education.
569. Rakhine State is one of the poorest states in Myanmar. All communities suffer from
poverty, poor social services and scarcity of livelihood opportunities, despite it being
fertile, relatively well-endowed with natural resources and strategically located. 1219 The
extreme levels of malnutrition in Rakhine State, and in particular in northern Rakhine, must
be seen in light of the policies and practices of the authorities. They are a consequence of
the authorities’ actions and omissions. The severe movement restrictions and other
discriminatory policies, affecting Rohingya’s access to land, forests, fishing grounds and
markets, have a direct impact on their food security and health, threatening their right to life
and ability to live in dignity and free from hunger. An already difficult situation has been
further compounded by the waves of violence and security operations in Rakhine State, and
the Government’s strict restrictions on humanitarian assistance. The Government of
Myanmar manifestly fails in its obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the right of
Rohingya individuals to an adequate standard of living, including their right to food.
570. The same analysis applies in relation to access to healthcare. The Mission notes that
all communities in Rakhine State suffer from low availability and quality of healthcare.
However, the severe movement restrictions, the arbitrary and cumbersome procedures to
access hospitals and health facilities, the additional fees and bribes they must pay, the
discrimination faced in health facilities, and the language barriers, put adequate healthcare
entirely out of reach for the Rohingya. They experience delays, forgo healthcare, or rely on
alternative healthcare strategies, putting them at greater risk. The Government of Myanmar
fails in its obligation to ensure access to health care that is available, accessible, acceptable,
and of good quality. Such failure has undermined the dignity of the Rohingya, exposed

1213 CI-078, DI-050, DI-076; see also: A/HRC/28/72, para. 55.

1214 DI-078.
1215 DI-050.
1216 CI-080, DI-026, DI-073, LI-135.
1217 Ministry of Information, “Distance University students studying peacefully in Rakhine State” (12
November 2017).
1218 Ibid.
1219 Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, Final Report, Towards a peaceful, fair and prosperous
future for the people of Rakhine (August 2017), p. 20.

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them to unnecessary suffering, immediate and long-term health risks, and preventable
deaths.1220 In such instances it also amounts to a violation of the right to life and to physical
and mental integrity.
571. Rohingya are also subjected to discrimination in education. Quality education is
unattainable to them. The discrimination faced in primary and secondary schools, and the
denial of access to higher education, amount to violations of the right to education.
However, they are also powerful tools to ensure cross-generational marginalisation. The
restrictions to access to education described above contribute to the slow erosion and
weakening of the Rohingya community as a whole. As one interviewee told the Mission:
The Government didn’t allow Muslims equal access to education. We were
excluded, and with no education, you are side-lined. You are separated from the
other citizens in a systematic way.1221
572. What permeates all these restrictions is the blatant discrimination on ethnic or
religious grounds, targeting the Rohingya in particular. It is the consequence of policies and
practices established, condoned and/or left unaddressed by the State. The restrictions form
part of a system of severe and institutionalised oppression, amounting to persecution, of the
Rohingya, marginalising and excluding them.

4. Restrictions on humanitarian access

573. In various circumstances, the Government suspends or severely restricts
humanitarian access to areas in Rakhine State that are in dire need of assistance, especially
in Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung. This happened after the 2012 violence as well
as after the “clearance operations” in October 2016 and August 2017. Such restrictions
have a serious adverse impact on the population, who are left without critical and lifesaving
assistance, including access to food and health services. 1222
574. According to credible reports, restrictions on humanitarian access to northern
Rakhine were tightened in June and July of 2017, even before the attacks on 25 August
2017 and subsequent “clearance operations”. Following the appointment of a new Security
Minister, some organizations were denied travel authorizations. Furthermore, following the
publication of a July 2017 World Food Programme (WFP) assessment on food insecurity in
northern Rakhine State, the Government circulated a letter addressed to international non-
governmental organizations banning such assessments.1223 The alleged discovery by the
authorities of WFP food assistance in a supposed ARSA training camp on 30 July was used
as a further reason to justify restrictions. An official statement stated that the “terrorists”
were using WFP support for IDPs.1224 It was later reported that these biscuits had actually
not been distributed directly by WFP.1225
575. After 25 August 2017, all humanitarian access to northern Rakhine was suspended.
The Government also accused some staff members of international non-governmental
organizations of participating in the ARSA attacks, while repeating allegations related to
the WFP food rations, which reportedly caused a large number of humanitarian aid workers
to leave the area.1226 Access then slowly resumed. The Government initially only granted

1220 CI-063, CI-064, CI-073, CI-080, CI-089, CI-090, CI-092, CI-173, DI-002, DI-004, DI-054,
DI-073; K-076.12.
1221 DI-025.
1222 K-069.1, K-069.7.
1223 K-069.13.
1224 Information Committee, “Commodities found close to the suspicious huts built to shelter the
extremist terrorists” (Facebook post, 31 July 2017), available at:
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/773457006160741.
1225 K-069.13.
1226 Information Committee, “State Counsellor Office Information Committee’s Statement regarding
Extremist Terrorists” (Facebook post, 27 August 2017), available at:
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/state-counsellor-office-information-
committees-statement-regarding-extremist-ter/786270838212691/.

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access to northern Rakhine to the Red Cross Movement 1227 in September 2017, and two
months later to WFP. Beyond these two organizations, the Government reportedly selected
a few other international organizations to whom it granted limited access, but none of them
had experience working in northern Rakhine before August 2017. 1228 One humanitarian
actor told the Mission:
Some other organizations have permission to operate in northern Rakhine, but are
not provided with travel authorisations. This appears to be a deliberate attempt by
the authorities to appear to be giving access, but in reality denying it.1229
576. As of August 2018, the majority of humanitarian organizations that were active in
northern Rakhine State before August 2017 have not been allowed to resume their field
activities in the area.1230 Even when granted access, humanitarian organizations are
constrained in their work by restrictive procedures, including the short validity of their
travel authorisations. There has been no comprehensive assessment of humanitarian needs
in northern Rakhine State. Yet, it is beyond question that the current partial access is wholly
inadequate to meet all the needs.
577. In central Rakhine, humanitarian agencies need prior authorisation to visit the camps
and other displacement sites. They face questions about the purpose of their visit and are
required to submit detailed movement plans. Vehicles entering Sittwe rural camps are
stopped at the entry of the camps and asked to provide the necessary authorisations. Access
for humanitarian agencies may be restricted without notice.
578. In February 2018, the Emergency Coordination Committee1231 reportedly gave the
following stringent instructions to international actors: 1232
• Programmatic needs assessments: A requirement to obtain permission from the
Ethics Committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – which can take up to six
months – to carry out assessments, particularly those used in new areas or for
publication. In the case of surveys or reviews, the applicable questionnaires must be
shared with the relevant line Ministry in advance.
• Memorandums of understanding (MoU): A requirement to include all activities to be
undertaken by the organization in the MoU, including details at the village level.
Organizations may be required to prove that they deliver equal assistance to ethnic
Rakhine and Muslims, regardless of the actual needs of each community. If this is
not met, the organization risks expulsion.
• Travel authorisations: A requirement to submit requests two weeks in advance for
any given two-week period.
579. These instructions are of serious concern. Those related to needs assessment and
travel authorisations severely curtail the ability of international organizations to undertake
their work effectively and may lead to self-censorship on assessments to be shared publicly.
Any requirement that humanitarian assistance be delivered on the basis of ethnicity or other
factors apart from humanitarian need could contravene the humanitarian principle of
impartiality.

5. Restrictions affecting private life

580. Beyond the arbitrary denial of legal status, the severe movement restrictions, and the
denial of access to livelihood, health and education, Rohingya face other discriminatory

1227 The ICRC, IFRC and Myanmar Red Cross work together on their response in northern Rakhine and
collectively refer to themselves as the “Red Cross Movement”.
1228 QM-005.
1229 Ibid.
1230 K-069.7.
1231 The Emergency Coordination Committee is a body comprised of government representatives, ethnic
Rakhine elders, civil society and humanitarian organizations. It vets and monitors the activities of
international organizations. K-069.11; V-169, V-345.
1232 K-113.4.

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policies and practices, tightly controlling almost every aspect of their private lives. They
include restrictions related to marriage, the number and “spacing” of children, and the
building and repair of houses.
581. Most of these policies are based on administrative instructions issued by bodies such
as the Border Area Immigration Control Headquarters (NaSaKa) or the Immigration and
National Registration Department (INRD), and by township and district officials, primarily
in northern Rakhine State. These are commonly known as “local orders”. In 2008, the
NaSaKa issued an instruction called “Regional order and processes for controlling Bengali
population”. It circulated regional orders first issued in 1993 and 2008 and added specific
instructions to control the Rohingya, including in the following areas:
• population control
• “spot checking” related to household registration
• moving in and out of a household list
• taking family pictures for the household list
• marriage permissions
• birth and death.
582. Many restrictions appear to stem from these documents or similar instructions issued
later. According to credible reports, after the disbandment of the NaSaKa in July 2013,
Rohingya in northern Rakhine State described a temporary easing in their implementation.
However, by early 2014, the Border Guard Police (BGP), the Committee for Prevention of
Illegal Immigration of Foreigners (MaKhaPa) and township authorities had resumed many
of the practices.1233 On 13 August 2018, the Union Government issued an announcement
abolishing eight local orders mainly targeting the Rohingya, including six issued by the
NaSaKa.1234 The Mission welcomes this positive step by the Union Government, although
the extent to which this announcement will be implemented on the ground remains to be
seen. The information below reflects the situation prior to August 2018.

(a) Restrictions related to household lists

583. Every household in Myanmar is required to have an up-to-date “household list” of
its permanent residents. Since the expiration of TRCs on 31 March 2015,1235 household lists
have been the only form of identification for many Rohingya. The document is necessary
for administrative procedures, including NVC-applications and marriage or travel
permissions.
584. Household lists are issued and updated by the Ministry of Immigration and
Population and the Ministry of Home Affairs. 1236 Births, deaths and marriages must be
reported. Unlike in the rest of the country, the authorities in northern Rakhine State conduct
yearly inspections of Rohingya households to “update” their household list. The stated
purpose is to delete the names of those who left or are deceased, and to add new-borns.
Although updating the list is a civilian administrative procedure, in northern Rakhine it is

1233 K-063.13.
1234 Announcement 88/2018 by the Union Government of Myanmar (13 August 2018). The
announcement abolished six orders issued by the NaSaKa: (a) the order to systematize the marriage
permission, (b) the permission for marriage, (c) the issue on the divorce permission of Bengali people,
(d) the issue of recording those who are of another race and are not ethnic people, by their father’s
name in the household list, (e) the issue of trying to create a separate household for Bengali people,
(f) the issue of prohibiting those with Kalar names to also have a Myanmar name. The announcement
also abolished two orders issued by the Directorate of People’s militia and Border Area Units,
Ministry of Defence: (a) the issue of enlisting the illegally-born Bengali babies in the household list,
(b) the permission on marriage of Bengali people.
1235 See this chapter, section B.1.c: Denial of citizenship.
1236 Household lists are issued by the Immigration and National Identification Headquarters, which is
jointly maintained by the General Administration Department, a branch under the military-controlled
Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population.

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jointly conducted with and overseen by security forces. Since 2015 this has been
undertaken by the BGP and MaKhaPa.1237 The annual inspections are carried out in a
discriminatory manner, targeting the Rohingya in northern Rakhine and providing the
authorities unfettered power to add or remove individuals from the list, with no recourse to
appeal. Inspections are often accompanied by intimidation, coercion, arbitrary arrests and
random deletions from the list.1238
585. The process includes taking photographs of the permanent residents of a household.
Family members often have to carry a card representing their “serial number” on the
household list. According to the rules annexed to the regional order issued by the NaSaKa
in 2008, if there is any suspicion of a child being “substituted” to mislead the inspectors,
the mother will “be made to breastfeed the child”, or the children “will be questioned
separately”.1239 This violates the right to privacy of the mother and may constitute cruel or
degrading treatment. It is certainly not in the best interest of the child.
586. The authorities often conduct checks during the night, waking up the household.1240
One interviewee explained how armed NaSaKa officers would visit her house in the early
hours, forcing everyone to wake up, including young children: “If there was anyone in the
house that was not on the list, they would be taken away”. 1241 During the inspections,
Rohingya have to pay arbitrary amounts to get names removed or added to the list.1242 The
experience of one interviewee from Maungdaw demonstrates the arbitrariness and
extortion:
When immigration officers came to update our household list, my wife had to pay
10,000 Kyat because I had left. Previously, I paid 10,000 Kyat for the inclusion of
each of my first four children. For my youngest, I had to pay 30,000 Kyat. Following
my departure, whenever the military or the NaSaKa came to my house, they asked
for money. So my family joined me in Malaysia.1243
587. According to credible reports, Rohingya who are not at home during the updating
exercise may be removed from the list. Additionally, punitive removal of persons allegedly
associated with the 2012 violence have reportedly taken place. Once deleted, a person is
extremely vulnerable. Effectively denied proof of residence, they face heightened risks of
arrest and conviction for immigration offences. 1244
588. A household list updating exercise took place between December 2016 and January
2017, during the “area clearance operations” that followed the 9 October 2016 ARSA
attacks. This was earlier in the year than usual. In southern Maungdaw, the displaced were
reportedly deleted from the list. Some of those who were absent were reportedly recorded
on a separate list as “on travel” or “missing”.1245 Additionally, 1,900 buildings were
identified as illegal and marked for demolition.

(b) Restrictions related to marriage and children

589. Rohingya in northern Rakhine have faced targeted and discriminatory restrictions
related to marriage and birth for many years. These have been implemented by the General
Administration Department as well as by law enforcement officials. To officially register a
marriage, Rohingya have to undergo a complex and lengthy procedure which is arbitrary

1237 K-063.12.
1238 CI-061, CI-062, CI-065, CI-073, CI-080, CI-082, CI-090, CI-092, CI-094, DI-001, DI-009, DI-013,
DI-025, DI-026, DI-053.
1239 NaSaKa, Regional Order on Processes for Controlling Bengali Population (11 February 2008),
Addendum on “Drawing maps, making a record of buildings, and reviewing household registrations”;
K-076.
1240 CI-090, DI-013, DI-026.
1241 DI-026.
1242 CI-061, CI-062, CI-065, CI-072, CI-073, CI-079, CI-080, CI-082, CI-090, CI-092, CI-094, DI-001,
DI-025.
1243 CI-073.
1244 V-047.
1245 K-063.12

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and subject to extortion. They must also comply with discriminatory requirements related to
the number and spacing of children. Contravention is subject to criminal penalties. These
procedures have not applied elsewhere in Rakhine State. However, in 2015, the local
provisions were supplemented by national legislation directed towards “non-Buddhists”
generally in Myanmar.

Restrictions on marriages
590. A regional order from the Township Peace and Development Council in 2005 aimed
at controlling marriages in Maungdaw Township. It referred to a “dense” population, an
“extremely high” birth rate, and the risk that there is “likely to be starvation”. 1246 While
most of the order is drafted in general terms, section 1(c) is applicable only to people who
marry “as per the Islamic religion”. It requires permission to marry from the Council,
following a check by the village level council and the NaSaKa Sector Command. Those
who receive permission to marry must limit the number of children. Widows and widowers
can only apply for permission to remarry after three years. The order states that “effective
actions” will be taken against those who marry or divorce in violation of the order. In 2008,
the NaSaKa outlined the application requirements in more detail, including a requirement
for men to submit a photograph without a beard (except for religious persons, known as
“Mawlawis”) and specific punishments under the Penal Code for contravening the order.1247
591. A further NaSaKa local order from August 2009 contains similar provisions,
prescribing that violation of the rules can lead to lengthy prison sentences. The order sets
out similarly circuitous procedures for obtaining permission to marry, including an
interview and at least three witnesses. The application forms had the word “Islam” pre-
printed on it, clearly demonstrating discriminatory intent.
592. According to credible reports, harassment and humiliation were frequent during this
procedure. Couples could be asked intrusive personal questions about their relationship.
Some couples were reportedly forced to hold hands or make other physical displays of
affection. Male applicants were sometimes requested to shave their beards and female
applicants to remove their hijab or headscarf. Women were reportedly sometimes required
to prove they were not already pregnant by taking a pregnancy test at a government clinic,
showing their stomach to male officers, or having them touch their stomach.1248 These
practices constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Moreover, being particularly
aimed at females, they also discriminate based on sex. They violate Myanmar’s obligations
under article 16(1)(a) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women “to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women in all matters relating to marriage”.
593. The marriage authorisation procedure applicable to the Rohingya is reported to have
caused delays of up to two years in obtaining permission and payment of exorbitant fees.
Couples who did not obtain official marriage permission also risked criminal punishment,
including fines. In addition, their children risked exclusion from the household list. 1249
594. Because of the delays and the costs, couples often only married religiously, without
first applying for a certificate, risking the consequences. One interviewee from Buthidaung
explained how his sister married and had a child before receiving official permission. She
had to hide when the police were searching for her. 1250 Another interviewee spoke of the
bribes associated with the process, and potential consequences of not obtaining permission:

1246 Peace and Development Council of Maungdaw Township, Regional Order 1/2005 (1 May 2005), on
file with the Mission; K-076.
1247 NaSaKa, Regional Order on Processes for Controlling Bengali Population (11 February 2008),
Addendum on “Population control activities” and “Requirements for Bengalis who apply for
permission to marry”, on file with the Mission; K-076.
1248 K-076.15.
1249 CI-061, CI-062, CI-064, CI-065, CI-070, CI-072, CI-073, CI-079, CI-082, CI-090, CI-092,
CI-094, CI-173, DI-001, DI-004, DI-009; K-063.15, K-076.15.
1250 DI-009.

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Although my elder brother paid 100,000 Kyat to the NaSaKa for a marriage
permission letter, it wasn’t issued, and he proceeded to get married religiously. One
day, the NaSaKa went to his house and found his wife pregnant. They asked for the
official marriage document, but they didn’t have one. The NaSaKa arrested my
brother and he was detained in Buthidaung jail for five years. 1251
595. Although not uniformly enforced, credible reports indicate that the practice of
restricting the marriages of Rohingya in northern Rakhine continued after the disbandment
of the NaSaKa in 2013. It was enforced by the BGP, MaKaPha and the General
Administration Department.1252 On 28 April 2016, the BGP in Maungdaw issued a new
instruction on marriage permission. Although it is not known whether this new instruction
was applied throughout northern Rakhine State, it is alleged that similar instructions were
issued in various BGP sectors across Maungdaw and Buthidaung. The instruction on
“marriage related matters of Bengali races” imposes additional requirements for marriage
permission. The introduction states:
The population density (…) is greater than international standard. For that reason,
in our sector jurisdiction, the movement of the Bengali races and population
increasing rate has been controlled through the household list updating exercise.1253

Restrictions on number and spacing of children

596. Regional Order 1/2005 of the Maungdaw Township Peace and Development
Council states that those who have permission to marry must “limit” the number of children
they have, without giving further details. However, as part of the marriage permission
procedure, Rohingya couples were made to promise not to have more than two children and
to use contraception.1254
597. In May 2013, the authorities in Rakhine State announced the reinforcement of the
rule limiting to two the permissible number of children in Maungdaw and Buthidaung. 1255
The spokesperson of the Rakhine State Government reportedly recognized that the two-
child policy was only applicable to the Rohingya:
Regarding family planning, they [the Rohingya] can only get two children. (…) The
rule is only for certain groups (…). For Buddhist people, we don’t need that rule,
because Buddhist people only have one wife. It is being implemented to control the
population growth, because it is becoming too crowded there. 1256
598. According to credible reports, the Union Immigration Minister also confirmed the
existence of this policy in 2013 but stated that it did not come from either the Union or
State government. He highlighted that it would “benefit Bengali women”. At the time, Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi had reportedly called the policy “discriminatory,” stating that it was
“not in line with human rights”.1257

Adverse consequences
599. According to credible reports, the highly cumbersome and arbitrary marriage
permission process, and risks associated with it, has led many Rohingya to leave Myanmar.
Women reportedly resorted to unsafe abortions for fear of contravening local orders and
associated criminal penalties. Women were often afraid to seek healthcare because they
feared repercussions for having had an illegal abortion, or for living with someone without
marriage permission. This has led to preventable deaths of mothers and infants and long-
term health impacts for women who survive. 1258

1251 CI-064.
1252 K-063.15.
1253 K-076.
1254 K-063.15, K-076.15.
1255 K-063.16.
1256 The Irrawaddy, “Govt sets two-child limit for Rohingyas in northern Arakan” (20 May 2013).
1257 Reuters, “Myanmar minister backs two-child policy for Rohingya minority” (11 June 2013).
1258 K-076.15.

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“Race and religion” laws

600. In June 2013, the monk Ashin Wirathu called for a law on inter-religious marriage.
This was subsequently expanded to a package of four bills to “safeguard nationality and
religion”. The MaBaTha submitted a petition to President Thein Sein supporting this
proposal, with more than 1.3 million signatures. Despite concerns raised about compliance
with human rights standards, including by United Nations experts 1259, these four bills
became law between May and August 2015. The laws make reference to “non-Buddhists”,
not explicitly naming Rohingya or Muslims. However, given rhetoric in the lead-up to their
adoption, the laws clearly had a discriminatory intent against the Rohingya. They were built
on a number of prevailing stereotypes, including that Rohingya are polygamous and have a
high birth rate, and that Buddhist women need protection from conversion to Islam and
marriage to Muslims.
• Buddhist Women’s Special Marriage Law: imposes disproportionate penalties
and gender discriminatory barriers on non-Buddhist men; restricts the rights of non-
Buddhist husbands of Buddhist wives, including denying them custody of children
in the case of dissolution of marriage or divorce; discriminates against women by
placing a number of restrictions only on Buddhist women who wish to marry outside
their faith; and provides protection against some forms of domestic violence only for
Buddhist women marrying outside of their religion.
• The Population Control Healthcare Law: adopts a coercive and selective
approach to realising the stated goals of poverty alleviation and improvement of
living standards; lacks essential safeguards to ensure freedom from discrimination;
and allows township groups to “organize”1260 couples to practice 36-month birth
spacing, raising concerns of coercion.
• Religious Conversion Law: establishes a cumbersome and state-regulated system
for changing religion, requiring state approval following registration and interview;
prevents children from changing their religion.
• Monogamy Law: bans polygamy in accordance with international human rights
requirements but some provisions adopt a restrictive and discriminatory approach to
marriage regulation; makes references to “non-Buddhist persons”; does not prohibit
other discriminatory forms of marriage, including early and forced marriages,
practised by other population groups.
601. The laws remain in force, but little information is available on their implementation.
Some reports indicate that, while the first case brought under the Monogamy law was
against a Muslim,1261 many of the following cases were predominantly against Buddhists
reported for extramarital affairs.1262

(c) Restrictions related to repairs of houses

602. The applicable legal framework in relation to construction and repairs of buildings is
unclear. The Rohingya face many difficulties accessing administrative procedures in this
regard, including applications for permits. The informal authorisation of construction and
repair of buildings is facilitated by unofficial payments and bribes. These sums are paid to
the General Administration Department and the Border Guard Police (and formerly the
NaSaKa) to permit Rohingya to construct or repair their houses, especially in rural areas.1263
The authorisation offers no security and is subject to demands for bribes. Those who do not
comply, or who construct without authorisation, risk arrest. One interviewee stated:

1259 MMR 4/2014, available at:

https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=22569
and 11 May 2015; MMR 5/2015 available at
https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=20241.
1260 Vague term used in the law.
1261 A/70/412, para. 76.
1262 V-244.
1263 CI-073, CI-090, DI-010, DI-038, DI-054.

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I had all the necessary permission to build a new house. On the very first day of the
construction, about five police officers came to the site with the village
administrator. They asked to show the documents related to the construction and we
did. The police said there was no signature on the documents, although I knew the
documents were 100 per cent correct. I could not protest, otherwise they would have
arrested me. I offered them chickens worth 10,000 Kyat and 2kg of rice. They
demanded 100,000 Kyat instead. It took me two months to gather this amount.1264
603. In addition, Rohingya face restrictions on construction and repairs related to the
implementation of local orders. For example, a couple without official permission to marry
cannot initiate a new household list, which is necessary to obtain permission to
construct.1265
604. In September 2016, the State Security Minister of Rakhine announced that buildings
constructed without the required permissions would be demolished. Implementation began
in November 2016, during the “clearance operation” undertaken by the Tatmadaw. As of
January 2017, credible reports indicate that a total of 1,082 buildings had been demolished
out of 1,984 which had been identified for demolition. This also included mosques and
madrassahs.1266 As a consequence, a total of 4,480 people were reportedly forcibly evicted.
It is unclear how the procedure for the designation of buildings constructed without
permission was conducted and if the process also assessed homes and structures belonging
to and occupied by other ethnic groups.

(d) Conclusion
605. The control of the Rohingya does not stop at denial of legal status and severe
restrictions on movement and access to food, health and education. It also affects their
private life, including through marriage restrictions, birth spacing policies, and undue
control on the building and repair of homes and religious edifices. Cumbersome and opaque
procedures are put in place for every aspect of life, generally applied arbitrarily and
requiring the payment of fees and bribes.
606. These policies and practices have emerged in a context of rhetoric labelling
Rohingya as “illegal immigrants”, having “incontrollable birth-rates”. The presence of
Rohingya is seen as a threat, not only to the local Buddhist communities, but also to the
nation and its Buddhist character as a whole.1267 The discriminatory and persecutory intent
of such policies is apparent. They also violate a range of human rights, including the right
to privacy and family life and freedom from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.

6. Oppression through arbitrary arrest and detention

607. The Mission further found a pattern of widespread and systematic arbitrary detention
of Rohingya across Rakhine State, but particularly in the northern townships. These arrests
are discriminatory, with the Rohingya systematically targeted. The arrests are perpetrated
by different law enforcement agencies, including the BGP and previously the NaSaKa, as
well as other security forces, including the Tatmadaw. Arrests generally occur during night
raids on villages, in houses or shops, at checkpoints or during house searches or household
list verifications.1268
608. The levels of arbitrary arrest and detention throughout the period under review have
been extremely high, with significant spikes during periods of heightened tension, such as
the 2012 violence and the post-October 2016 security operations. Arrests were random, not
based on evidence or a warrant, often with male villagers arrested during a “sweep” of the
village. For example, following the June 2012 violence, credible reports suggest that more

1264 CI-090.
1265 According to Addendum 2 of the 2008 NaSaKa regional order applicable only to the Rohingya,
“action must be taken against people who fix, expand or build a house without a permit”.
1266 K-063.17.
1267 See Chapter III, section B.2: Place of Buddhism in society.
1268 K-076.46.

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than 1,000 persons were arrested and detained in northern Rakhine State 1269. Such mass
arrests may constitute collective punishment of the Rohingya population.
609. These patterns are fully in line with reports of the Special Rapporteurs on the
situation of human rights in Myanmar, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights 1270 and others, who have invariably expressed concern about the issue. Other reports
also suggest that arbitrary arrest and detention has been a routine aspect of the life of the
Rohingya throughout the period under review and prior. One detailed study published in
2010 stated, “The arbitrary detention of the Rohingyas is so prevalent as to be considered to
have reached industrial levels”.1271 Another study of a third of village tracts in Maungdaw
over a three month period in 2014 found an average of nearly 90 arrests per month. 1272 A
second study in 2015 in northern Rakhine State found an average of approximately 330
arrests per month1273.
610. A primary motivating factor of perpetrators is extortion. Nearly all such incidents
corroborated by the Mission involved either the payment of bribes to secure release, or
continued detention due to the non-payment of bribes1274. The practice was commonplace,
implemented by the NaSaKa, the BGP, the Myanmar Police Force, the LaWaKa, SaYaPa
(Military Intelligence) and the Tatmadaw. The amount of the bribes varied and sometimes
forced villagers to borrow large sums from neighbours. The economic impact has been
significant. One interviewee from Maungdaw Township stated:
When my father was arrested, my mother used to pay the military to get him
released. He would stay in detention for various lengths of time, depending on how
fast my mother would pay. The amount would vary greatly, and my mother would
borrow money from others to pay the bribe. Then, my father had to work to pay back
this money. They would arrest him without giving any reason. When we asked why
he was arrested, the response was that we were Muslims, we were “Kalar”.1275
611. In some instances the arrests were in relation to vague “offences”, including travel to
Bangladesh, possessing a mobile phone or Bangladeshi SIM card, or the collection of
firewood1276. One interviewee informed the Mission that his brother was detained for being
in possession of a mobile phone. His family could not pay the bribe asked by the police and
he remained in detention for seven months. 1277 It has also been suggested that persons who
were more affluent were targeted, as they could pay higher bribes.
612. Arbitrary arrest and detention were frequently associated with torture and ill-
treatment.1278 One interviewee described how he was arbitrarily detained in 2011,
seemingly in relation to his involvement in an appeal against the confiscation of the village
graveyard by the NaSaKa. He was repeatedly beaten with a large wooden stick. 1279 Deaths
in custody following arbitrary detention were also reported.1280

7. Other forms of oppression

613. Rohingya face several other forms of oppression at the hands of the Myanmar
authorities, in particular the security forces. These include forced labour, confiscation of
property, extortion and sexual and gender-based violence. These are not necessarily unique
to the Rohingya. As described above, they are also faced to a large extent by the ethnic

1269 K-076.46.
1270 For example, A/HR/32/18.
1271 Irish Centre for Human Rights, Crimes against Humanity in Western Burma: The Situation
of the Rohingyas (2010).
1272 V-246.
1273 K-076.
1274 CI-064, CI-065, CI-082, CI-089, DI-009, DI-013, DI-020, DI-025, DI-054, DI-056.
1275 DI-009.
1276 CI-064, DI-025, DI-054.
1277 DI-054.
1278 CI-064, CI-065, CI-082, CI-089, DI-025, DI-056.
1279 CI-065.
1280 K-076.46; V-245.

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Rakhine and probably other groups as well. However, in the case of the Rohingya, these are
added on to all other forms of oppression and persecution described above.

(a) Forced or compulsory labour

614. As with the ethnic Rakhine population, forced or compulsory labour has been a
common experience for many Rohingya in Rakhine State. The Mission corroborated cases
from Maungdaw and Buthidaung Townships in northern Rakhine State,1281 although it is
likely that Rohingya in central and southern regions have had similar experiences. Forced
labour has been prevalent for many years, with reports that more than two-thirds of
Rohingya families in the two townships had to provide forced labour prior to 2011.1282 The
Mission found incidents of forced labour in 2012 and 2013, although credible information
indicates that the practice continued in northern Rakhine until 2016, and possibly beyond,
albeit at a reduced rate.1283 Perpetrators of forced labour have primarily been the Tatmadaw
and the NaSaKa (until its disbandment in 2013).
615. The established patterns are very similar to those outlined in relation to the ethnic
Rakhine, including in terms of the types of forced labour (for example, portering,
construction work, farming, maintenance of security camps), the frequency of the work, the
general ill-treatment suffered in the context of such labour (including beatings and verbal
abuse), and the economic impact on the individual and their families. In some cases there
appears to have been an option to avoid forced labour, through the payment of bribes, or
through paying other villagers to perform the task on their behalf. 1284

(b) Confiscation and extortion

616. Like the ethnic Rakhine, the Rohingya suffer from arbitrary confiscation of livestock
and goods by security forces, usually with total impunity. 1285 One interviewee explained:
Looting of vegetables and domestic animals, by the military, the NaSaKa and the
police was common. They used to take anything they wanted from the land, without
paying. They took also commodities from the villagers whenever they thought they
might need them.1286
617. Already extremely vulnerable because of their lack of legal status and other forms of
systemic oppression, the Rohingya additionally suffer from extortion at the hands of
security forces and other authorities. It affects many aspects of their lives. 1287 This includes
having to pay to obtain permission to move from one place to another, stay overnight in
another household, and pass checkpoints.1288 They also have to make payments or pay
bribes to obtain marriage permissions, have a child included on the household list, have a
family member deleted from the list, 1289 obtain the necessary authorisations to build or
repair their homes, bring back wood or bamboo from the forest, 1290 as well as avoid or be

1281 CI-062, CI-072, CI-079, CI-089, CI-092, CI-093, CI-094, CI-173, DI-001, DI-002, DI-005.
1282 K-063.
1283 K-063.
1284 CI-080, CI-089, DI-047.
1285 CI-062, CI-064, CI-065, CI-073, DI-013, DI-025, DI-038.
1286 CI-073.
1287 CI-061, CI-062, CI-063, CI-064, CI-065, CI-069, CI-070, CI-072, CI-073, CI-076, CI-079, CI-080,
CI-082, CI-085, CI-089, CI-090, CI-092, CI-094, CI-098, CI-100, CI-133, CI-134, CI-136, CI-144,
CI-146, CI-149, CI-162, CI-173, CI-174, CI-175, CI-176, CI-179, CI-181, CI-183, CI-186, CI-189,
CI-190, CI-192, CI-194, DI-001, DI-003, DI-004, DI-008, DI-010, DI-013, DI-020, DI-025, DI-026,
DI-037, DI-038, DI-046, DI-047, DI-050, DI-054, DI-076, LI-105, ZI-002.
1288 CI-061, CI-063, CI-064, CI-065, CI-069, CI-070, CI-072, CI-073, CI-079, CI-080, CI-082, CI-090,
CI-174, DI-001, DI-003, DI-020, DI-025, LI-105.
1289 CI-061, CI-062, CI-064, CI-065, CI-070, CI-072, CI-073, CI-076, CI-079, CI-082, CI-089, CI-092,
CI-173, DI-001, DI-004, DI-025.
1290 CI-061, CI-073, CI-079, CI-082, CI-090, DI-038, DI-10.

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released from arbitrary detention.1291 An interviewee from Maungdaw, explained how

Tatmadaw soldiers would come to the market or village and simply arrest whomever they
found, take them to the police station, and then ask money from the family for their
release.1292 An interviewee from Buthidaung also shared the following account:
If we wanted to change anything in the house, we had to pay. Our family had to
change two bamboo poles in the railing of our house. When the NaSaKa officers
heard the sound of repair, they came and asked for money.1293
618. Sometimes payments were made, but the issue remained unresolved. One
interviewee explained that his brother paid 100,000 Kyat to the NaSaKa to obtain his
marriage authorisation but it was not issued. He was later detained for five years for not
having a permit. 1294Another interviewee explained how he was detained at a police station
and the police officer said he would be released if he paid a large bribe. However, although
he paid, he was not released.1295
619. The amounts extracted from the Rohingya are exorbitant compared to their revenue.
It adversely affects their right to an adequate standard of living, including to food and
livelihood, and to health and dignity. It often leads to unbreakable cycles of debt, household
impoverishment and desperate coping mechanisms:
The police said that if we couldn’t give them 350,000 Kyat, I would be put in prison.
My mother had to arrange the money. She sold our land to ensure my release.1296

(c) Sexual and gender-based violence

620. There are credible and consistent reports of sexual and gender-based violence
against Rohingya women and girls by members of the Tatmadaw, the police and the
NaSaKa.1297 The experience shared by one interviewee illustrates the prevalence of such
acts, even outside the periods of extreme violence in 2012, 2016 and 2017:
I was taken to a large government building next to the high school in Maungdaw.
There were many police officers. I was taken to a room where there were already
about 10 other Rohingya women. Men in uniform took away women in groups of
four and then I heard screaming. I think they were being raped. I heard girls saying,
“Oh Allah, save me” and “please don’t rape me”. Other women were giving
massages to men from various security forces, not just the police. It was humiliating.
If a girl was not massaging, she was hit by the police. It was very weird because the
place was like an office but all of this was happening there. I saw girls with bite
marks on their cheeks, and one fully naked girl running away. I managed to escape
through a very small hole1298.
621. This is consistent with other credible reports published throughout the years. For
example, a report of the United Nations Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual
violence noted in 2012 that rape was condoned by military commanders. 1299 Examples of
reported sexual violence include the rape of 13 Rohingya girls and women by NaSaKa
forces in northern Maungdaw Township on 20 February 2013; the gang rape of a 16-year
old Rohingya girl by police in early 2014; 14 cases of gang rape and sexual assault between

1291 CI-062, CI-065, CI-069, CI-072, CI-073, CI-082, CI-090, CI-092, CI-094, CI-100, CI-133, CI-134,
CI-136, CI-144, CI-146, CI-149, CI-179, CI-181, CI-183, CI-186, CI-189, CI-190, DI-010, DI-020,
DI-025, DI-026, DI-037, DI-038, DI-046, DI-050, ZI-002.
1292 DI-025.
1293 DI-010.
1294 CI-064.
1295 DI-037.
1296 DI-025.
1297 CI-074, CI-077, CI-174, DI-038, DI-048, DI-050.
1298 DI-048.
1299 A/66/657*–S/2012/33*.

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January and June 2014;1300 and the rape of a 10-year old girl by the military in early
2015.1301

8. Conclusion
622. The level of oppression faced by the Rohingya is hard to fathom. Cumulatively all
the rules, regulations, orders and practices laid out in this section have made life for the
Rohingya in Rakhine State slowly but steadily unbearable. Rights were eroded and
removed, in a process of marginalisation, exclusion and “othering”. Layers of
discrimination and ill-treatment have been added. This occurred in the context of hateful
and divisive rhetoric targeting the Rohingya on the basis of their ethnicity, religion and
status. The multiple elements of oppression are based on State-sanctioned policies and
practices and occur in the context of State-sanctioned discriminatory rhetoric. The Mission
concludes that this severe, systemic and institutionalised oppression, from birth to death,
amounts to persecution.
623. This persecution has put the Rohingya population in a situation of extreme
vulnerability, undermining all aspects of their lives and eroding their living conditions and
their coping mechanisms. The daily attacks on human dignity have created intolerable
conditions, and have weakened individuals, families and communities, pushing them
further into destitution and insecurity. It is this oppressive climate, and the fear and
desperation resulting from it, that forced thousands of Rohingya to leave Rakhine State by
boat in the years since 2012. It is also against this backdrop that the episodes of violence in
2012, 2016 and 2017 must be examined.

C. Violence in 2012

1. Emblematic incidents
624. Two events that took place on 28 May 2012, in Ramree Township, and on 3 June
2012, in Toungup Township, played a key role in the violence that erupted in Rakhine State
on 8 June 2012. While the Mission did not investigate these two events, the following is a
summary based on publicly available information, including accounts in the State-run
newspaper The New Light of Myanmar, and the report of the Myanmar Government’s
“Inquiry Commission on Sectarian Violence in Rakhine State” (the Rakhine Inquiry
Commission).
625. On 28 May 2012, Ma Thida Htwe, a 27-year-old Buddhist woman, was killed in the
Kyauk Ni Maw village tract of Ramree Township in the south of Rakhine State. On 5 June
2012, The New Light of Myanmar reported the case as murder and rape. It published the
names of the three suspects, along with a mention of their origin as being
“Bengali/Islam”.1302 The three accused were subsequently prosecuted and sentenced to
death. One of them reportedly hung himself while in custody on 9 June 2012.1303 There
appears to be no doubt about the murder of the woman but the Mission understands there
are doubts about the rape allegation and the ethnic origin of the accused. 1304 In the following
days and weeks, it was mainly the rape allegation, more than the murder, which was used to
incite violence and hatred against the Rohingya. The Mission notes that other episodes of
anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar followed rape allegations, some of which were later
found to be untrue.1305

1300 S/2015/203, p. 12
1301 K-125
1302 New Light of Myanmar, “Three murderers who raped, stabbed a woman to death to be brought to trial
soonest” (5 June 2012).
1303 MNA (Myanmar News Agency), “Two who rob, rape and murder a woman from Kyauknimaw
Village sentenced to death” (The New Light of Myanmar, 19 June 2012), available at:
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs13/NLM2012-06-19.pdf, p.2; DI-012.
1304 DI-012, DI-077, DM-066.
1305 See this chapter, section C.6.b: Pre-planning, instigation and role of security forces.

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626. Prior to the coverage of this incident in The New Light of Myanmar, graphic images
of the woman’s dead body were disseminated, accompanied by incendiary comments
blaming the incident on “Kalars”.1306 The Rakhine Inquiry Commission noted the rapid
circulation of these images “together with incendiary remarks” through “anonymous
channels on the internet”. It highlighted that the “pictures and news spread even to Rakhine
villages and towns without internet access”. 1307
627. According to The New Light of Myanmar, on 3 June 2012 the Wunthanu Rakkhita
Association distributed leaflets to the local population at crowded places in Toungup,
southern Rakhine State, with the woman’s picture. They asked the population of Toungup
to “take notice” that Muslims were “intentionally assaulting” Rakhine women. On the same
day, a crowd of 300 people in Toungup killed a group of 10 Muslim pilgrims travelling by
bus to Yangon.1308 Given the circumstances described in the article, the attack appears to
have been pre-planned.
628. From 8 June 2012 onwards, violence spread across Rakhine State and lasted at least
until August 2012. A second wave of violence hit Rakhine State in October 2012. It
affected the Rohingya, ethnic Rakhine and Kaman communities across 12 townships.
Further violence took place in Thandwe in 2013. Between 2012 and 2013, security forces -
sometimes acting alongside the Rakhine - committed serious human rights violations
against Rohingya and Kaman across Rakhine State. This included the burning of houses, 1309
looting of shops, extrajudicial and indiscriminate killings, including of women, children
and elderly people.1310 Bodies were often taken by the authorities, with the subsequent
whereabouts unknown.1311 The authorities also conducted mass arbitrary arrests of
Rohingya and subjected them to torture in police stations and in Buthidaung prison.1312 The
security forces also willingly failed to intervene to stop the violence committed by the
ethnic Rakhine or by the Rohingya. There was also a further tightening of general
restrictions against the Muslim population. 1313 According to the Rakhine Inquiry
Commission, 192 people were killed, more than 265 were injured and 8,614 houses were
destroyed. These figures are believed to be well below the actual scale of the violence.
629. While many other townships were also affected by the violence, the Mission
examined in detail events in three main locations as emblematic of the broader picture:
Maungdaw in June 2012, Sittwe in June 2012 and Kyaukpyu in October 2012.

(a) Maungdaw violence – June 2012

Maungdaw town - 8 June 2012
630. On Friday 8 June 2012, during the weekly Jumma prayer, the Muslim community in
Maungdaw town honoured the 10 Muslim men killed in Toungup five days earlier. 1314 The
prayer gathering was planned to take place at the Munshi mosque 1315 in the town centre. A

1306 See, for example, the following two blog posts:

http://hlaoo1980.blogspot.com/2012/06/arrakan-boiling-with-anti-islamic-fever.html (accessed
August 2018) and http://terrorist2012.blogspot.com/2012/08/blog-post.html (accessed August 2018).
Many such articles have since been deleted.
1307 Inquiry Commission on Sectarian Violence in Rakhine State, Final report (July 2013), p. 8.
1308 New Light of Myanmar, “10 Muslims killed in bus attack” (5 June 2012).
1309 CI-052, CI-066, CI-068, CI-069, CI-076, CI-077, CI-078, CI-082, CI-083, CI-084, CI-085, CI-087,
CI-088, CI-091, CI-094, CI-097, CI-098, CI-163, CI-165, CI-167, CI-168, CI-170, CI-171, CI-172,
CI-173, CI-174, DI-004, DI-007, DI-012, DI-020, DI-021, DI-023, DI-024, DI-038, DI-051, DI-054,
DI-055, DI-075, QI-076.
1310 CI-069, CI-074, CI-077, CI-080, CI-083, CI-085, CI-086, CI-165, CI-166, CI-167, CI-168, CI-170,
CI-173, CI-192, CI-193, DI-002, DI-004, DI-007, DI-008, DI-020, DI-021, DI-022, DI-023, DI-024,
DI-038, DI-047, DI-049, DI-054, DI-073, QI-076, ZI-002.
1311 CI-061, CI-068, CI-088, CI-174, DI-002, DI-022, DI-038.
1312 CI-065, CI-068, CI-072, CI-073, CI-076, CI-079, CI-080, CI-083, CI-087, CI-089, CI-091, CI-094,
CI-096, CI-173, CI-175, CI-193, DI-004, DI-006, DI-012, DI-020, DI-037, DI-038, DI-054, DI-073.
1313 See this chapter, section B: Systermic oppression and persecution of the Rohingya.
1314 CI-173, CI-174, CI-175, CI-192, CI-193, DI-004, DI-012, DI-025, DI-073, XI-008.
1315 Also known as Jame mosque.

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large number of men arrived at the mosque. Muslim leaders tried to stop further people
from gathering as the mosque was very crowded.1316 The prayer ended abruptly, including
because stones were thrown towards the mosque from the nearby Myoma monastery.
People left the mosque and ran in different directions,1317 with security forces surrounding
the area soon after.1318
631. Many of the Rohingya present took part in a protest in the streets of Maungdaw
town1319 and the situation deteriorated, with confrontations between Rohingya
demonstrators and ethnic Rakhine at the nearby United Guest House and clock tower area,
a few hundred metres to the south. According to one interviewee, a group of ethnic Rakhine
and monks had gathered at the Myoma monastery, some armed with swords. 1320 Another
interviewee explained how she had been warned earlier on that day by a monk about the
presence of “Rakhine with long knives” in the vicinity and told that she should go back
home.1321 At the United Guest House, the Rohingya crowd and ethnic Rakhine on top of the
building threw stones at each other. A video was made showing the Rohingya crowd
throwing stones but not the violence on the side of the ethnic Rakhine. 1322 This video was
widely used by the Government to demonstrate that the Rohingya had “rioted” on 8 June
2012. It projected a distorted image of the events.
632. The security forces fired their weapons at Rohingya. 1323 A number of people,
including minors, were killed and others were injured. A 10-year old boy was shot and
killed.1324 The violence escalated and witnesses heard the sound of gunshots throughout the
night.1325
633. In various locations in Maungdaw Township, Rohingya and ethnic Rakhine houses
were set on fire by members of the other community.1326 Muslim shops were looted and
destroyed.1327 The looting was carried out either by ethnic Rakhine in the presence of
security forces or directly by the later. Both Rakhine and Rohingya witnesses described the
inaction of security forces, including when they were called to help stop the violence. 1328
According to one ethnic Rakhine interviewee:
On 8 June at around 9 pm, I saw Muslims surrounding Rakhine villages so I ran to
the hills. From there, I saw Muslims setting my village on fire. The village
administrator called the security forces but they said they didn’t have the capacity to
come and help.1329
634. Soon after the first incidents in Maungdaw, national media started publishing stories
blaming the Rohingya for the violence. They used incendiary headlines with reference to
“terrorism” and to Rohingya “mobs” attacking the ethnic Rakhine community after the
Friday prayer, with no mention of violence by ethnic Rakhine, nor the active participation
of security forces in the violence.1330

1316 DI-056, DI-073.

1317 CI-192, CI-193, ZI-002.
1318 CI-192, ZI-002.
1319 CI-173, CI-175.
1320 DI-073.
1321 DI-075.
1322 CI-080, CI-175, DI-012, DI-073.
1323 CI-173, CI-175, CI-193, CI-192, DI-004, DI-025, DI-038, DI-051, DI-054, DI-073, QI-100, XI-008,
ZI-002.
1324 DI-054, ZI-002.
1325 DI-004, DI-025, DI-054, DI-073.
1326 CI-076, CI-082, CI-091, CI-092, CI-153, CI-173, CI-174, DI-004, DI-012, DI-038, DI-039, DI-040,
DI-045, DI-051, DI-054, DI-075, QI-106, XI-008.
1327 CI-080, CI-091, DI-073, XI-008.
1328 DI-040, DI-045.
1329 DI-040.
1330 E.g., Myanmar Express, “Circulating news says the Yangon City Hall will be set on fire” (8 June
2012), available at: http://eaglefighter050.blogspot.com/2012/06/blog-post_1187.html (accessed
September 2018); Eleven Media Group, “Riots escalate due to insufficient security in Rakhine city”

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635. In the following weeks, police officers and Tatmadaw soldiers killed Rohingya in
Maungdaw, including women and children.1331 The killings were unlawful and arbitrary.
One witness recalled witnessing a young girl, 8 or 9-years old, who was selling vegetables,
shot and killed by the police at a market. The police later said that this had been a
mistake.1332 Another interviewee described the killing of a Rohingya woman by the police:
There was a small market close to my house in Hari hamlet. On 9 June 2012, I went
there to buy food for my friend. At around 9:30 am, 10 police officers came to the
market. One police officer shot at a 30-year old woman who was running. I saw this
with my own eyes. The police took the woman in their car.1333
636. Villagers were prevented from collecting dead bodies, or even injured persons, and
soldiers shot at persons who did this. 1334 Often, police or soldiers would remove the dead
bodies in their vehicles. The Mission received credible reports alleging the presence of two
mass graves just outside Maungdaw town on the road leading to Buthidaung. 1335 Moreover,
one interviewee stated that he saw soldiers come several times at night to put dead bodies in
a pit in a field. He said that dead bodies were swept into the adjacent river, where he saw
them floating.1336
637. In addition to killings by security forces, the Mission received reports of killings of
ethnic Rakhine by Rohingya and killings of Rohingya by ethnic Rakhine.
Arbitrary arrests
638. Arbitrary arrests of large numbers of Rohingya by the police, NaSaKa and
Tatmadaw was a further feature of events after 8 June 2012. This continued for some
months.1337 Many of those arrested were arbitrarily accused of participation in the violence,
in an apparent act of collective punishment. One interviewee explained how, on 9 June
2012, many Rohingya were taken to the police station near Munshi mosque in big open
trucks that could take about 50 people.1338 In some instances, the detainees subsequently
disappeared.1339 On many occasions, the authorities offered to release a detainee against
payment of a heavy bribe. People who could not pay the bribe were often transferred to
Buthidaung prison.1340 One interviewee stated:
When the police or Tatmadaw soldiers arrested someone, they used to keep them for
two or three days in the local police station and wait for relatives to pay them
bribes. Those who managed to pay the money were released. The others were sent to
prison. I was arrested, along with seven other villagers and accused of participation
in the violence. Some villagers were poor and couldn’t pay the bribe. They were
taken to Buthidaung prison and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. Others,
including myself, bribed the authorities and were released.1341
639. Some ethnic Rakhine were also arbitrarily arrested and detained, accused of
participation in the violence.1342

(10 June 2012). One interviewee stated that he was very surprised to discover that Eleven Media
already posted pictures about the violence on 8 June when both the phone lines and the internet were
cut (DI-176).
1331 CI-082, CI-173, CI-192, CI-193, DI-003, DI-004, DI-025, DI-038, DI-073, XI-008, ZI-002.
1332 DI-073.
1333 DI-003
1334 CI-082, CI-173, DI-054.
1335 K-106.4.
1336 CI-173.
1337 CI-072, CI-076, CI-082, CI-091, CI-136, CI-173, CI-174, CI-175, CI-192, CI-193, DI-006, DI-025,
DI-038, DI-054, DI-073, DI-075, QI-108, QI-106, XI-008, ZI-002.
1338 DI-073.
1339 CI-173, DI-025.
1340 See this chapter, section C.3: Torture and ill-treatment at Buthidaung prison.
1341 CI-065.
1342 DI-039.

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640. In addition to the mass arrests of Rohingya, the authorities also arrested specific
Rohingya whose names were on prepared lists.1343 Young men, educated people, NGO
workers and religious leaders were targeted. 1344 NGO workers from Maungdaw and
Buthidaung Townships described receiving a letter asking them to go to the police station
because of their alleged involvement in the violence. Some were released upon payment of
a bribe, others transferred to Buthidaung prison. One interviewee was told by a police
officer that his name was on a list of persons “who pass information to the international
community”. The police officer said that he had received orders “from higher authorities”
to monitor and report on him and asked him to pay a bribe. 1345 Fear of arrest meant that
many Rohingya mostly stayed at home or in hiding when security forces approached their
village.1346 Rohingya started suffering from hunger, especially children. 1347

(b) Sittwe violence – June 2012

641. It is estimated that before the June 2012 violence Sittwe town was home to about
73,000 Muslims (Rohingya and Kaman), about half of the total population.1348
642. Soon after violence commenced in Maungdaw on 8 June 2012, there was violence in
Sittwe, more than 100 kilometres to the south. 1349 Most of the violence took place in the
first few days. According to the report of the Rakhine Inquiry Commission, the violence in
Sittwe led to the death of 11 Rakhine and 24 Rohingya as well as the destruction of 666
Rakhine houses and 2,967 Rohingya houses.1350 The actual scale of casualties and
destruction in Sittwe is believed to be much higher.
643. The violence saw the burning and looting of houses, murders, summary executions
and large-scale displacement affecting both ethnic Rakhine and Muslims. The majority of
the Muslim population of Sittwe town was displaced by the violence. Six years on, most
still live in displacement camps and sites built in the Sittwe countryside, totally segregated
from the ethnic Rakhine population. Aung Mingalar, often referred to as a “Muslim
ghetto”, is the only remaining Muslim area in Sittwe town.1351
644. Given its lack of access to Myanmar, the Mission has not been able to gather
sufficient information on the violence perpetrated against ethnic Rakhine in Sittwe in June
2012. According to credible reports, groups of Muslims carried out arson attacks against
houses of ethnic Rakhine and monasteries. 1352 This warrant further investigation.

Involvement of security forces

645. The security forces played an active role in the violence against Muslims in Sittwe,
often attacking them and their houses alongside ethnic Rakhine.1353 In other cases, security
forces provided support to Rakhine who were leading the attacks 1354 or refused to assist
Muslims who sought their protection.1355 One Kaman interviewee who sought protection
was told by the security forces that they could not assist in the absence of an instruction
from higher authorities.1356 Similarly, a Rohingya interviewee explained that, on 10 June, a
large group of ethnic Rakhine attacked his village and Rohingya families took shelter in a

1343 CI-061, CI-136, CI-173, CI-175, DI-025.

1344 CI-061, CI-065, DI-003, DI-004, DI-025, DI-037, DI-038, DI-051, DI-056, QI-106.
1345 CI-061
1346 DI-025.
1347 DI-009, DI-054, DI-075.
1348 V-237
1349 CI-096; K-076.9.15.
1350 Inquiry Commission on Sectarian Violence in Rakhine State, Final report (July 2013).
1351 See this chapter, section B.2.d: Specific restrictions in central Rakhine State.
1352 KI-076.9.01, KI-076.18.
1353 CI-066, CI-086, CI-166, DI-020, DI-023, DI-035, DI-049, DI-050, DI-055.
1354 CI-069, CI-086.
1355 CI-066, CI-166.
1356 CI-166, V-166.

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house. They called the police for assistance but, when the officer understood that they were
Rohingya, he hung up.1357

Murders and summary executions

646. Ethnic Rakhine, police officers and Tatmadaw soldiers killed Muslims in Sittwe in
June 2012. In the majority of cases, ethnic Rakhine killed their victims with large
knives,1358 while the security forces used guns. 1359 Sometimes, ethnic Rakhine perpetrators
were known to Muslims villagers. 1360 One interviewee from Yasina hamlet explained how
he recognised some of the ethnic Rakhine who were armed with large knives:
I recognized many of them. We had a very good relationship before. When I saw
this, I had tears in my eyes. These were people with whom we used to share our
meals for Eid and now they were standing there to kill us.1361
647. In contrast, the Mission received an account from one Rohingya describing how an
ethnic Rakhine person saved the life of her mother who was about to be killed by another
Rakhine.1362
648. In some cases, ethnic Rakhine slit the throats of their victims.1363 In other cases, they
mutilated their bodies, including the breasts of women. 1364 In addition to killings by ethnic
Rakhine, Tatmadaw soldiers, police officers or Lon Htein 1365 shot indiscriminately at
Muslims, including while their houses were being burned. 1366 One interviewee described
seeing his brother shot and killed when soldiers opened fire on a group of Muslims sitting
in a paddy field.1367 Another interviewee described the killing of her neighbour by a
Tatmadaw soldier in Sittwe town, because he was outside five minutes after the curfew
started.1368

Arson attacks
649. There was extensive burning and destruction of houses and mosques in Sittwe. 1369
Narzi hamlet was one of the most affected. Houses of ethnic Rakhine were also burned, but
Muslims were disproportionality affected. Security forces actively participated in the
burning of Muslim houses. In some cases, ethnic Rakhine and security forces jointly burned
Muslim houses. Witnesses described to the Mission how the Tatmadaw and/or the police
either helped set the houses on fire1370 or provided physical protection to ethnic Rakhine
who were doing so.1371 For example, ethnic Rakhine threw bottles filled with petrol on
Muslim houses, while security forces shot at the bottles causing the fire to spread. 1372 In
other instances, security forces set houses on fire on their own, targeting Muslim houses. 1373

1357 CI-066.
1358 CI-066, CI-075, CI-078, CI-086, CI-097, DI-020, DI-049, DI-050.
1359 CI-077, CI-086, DI-007, DI-020, DI-023, DI-035, DI-049, DI-050.
1360 CI-066, DI-023.
1361 DI-023.
1362 DI-050.
1363 CI-097, DI-023.
1364 CI-077, CI-078, CI-086, DI-020, DI-049; KI-076.9.16.
1365 Lon Htein is short for Lon-chon-hmu Htein-thein Tat-yin, or “security preservation battalion”. It is
also known as the “special police” or “riot police”.
1366 CI-069, CI-077, CI-086, DI-007, DI-020.
1367 DI-020.
1368 DI-050.
1369 CI-066, CI-067, CI-068, CI-069, CI-078, CI-086, CI-096, CI-097, CI-156, CI-159, CI-166, DI-007,
DI-020, DI-023, DI-035, DI-049, DI-050, DI-055, K-076.1
1370 CI-066, DI-007, DI-020, DI-035, DI-055.
1371 CI-068, CI-069, CI-077, CI-086.
1372 CI-066, DI-035, DI-055.
1373 DI-023.

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The security forces also shot at villagers attempting to extinguish the fires.1374 One
interviewee described his experience in Narzi hamlet on 12 June:
First, the Rakhine were throwing bottles filled with petrol on huts. Muslims were
trying to stop the burning by pouring water on the fire, but the police and Tatmadaw
soldiers shot at them to prevent them from doing this. Afterwards, security forces
came and started using fire launchers to burn the buildings that had not yet burned
properly.1375

Displacement and move to IDP camps

650. Most Rohingya and Kaman from Sittwe town and the surrounding areas were
displaced.1376 Some fled to Muslim villages outside Sittwe town.1377 Some left on the advice
of the authorities.1378 One interviewee described how Muslims sheltering in a mosque in
Konchi hamlet were removed by police and left at gunpoint.1379 In some instances,
Tatmadaw soldiers provided support to Muslim victims, although one victim reported that
this was on the condition that they leave the town. 1380 Soldiers escorted victims outside
Sittwe town towards Muslim villages in the countryside, with some such as pregnant
women and children transported in military cars. 1381 Muslims initially took refuge in places
such as schools, later moving to displacement camps. As of 30 September 2013, 95,500
people were displaced in Sittwe Township, mainly Muslims (Rohingya and Kaman) with a
smaller number of ethnic Rakhine. 1382 One elderly interviewee from Narzi hamlet shared
the pain associated with leaving his village:
We cried when we left. 25 years of hard work was lost. If I do something wrong to
you, then you can do something back to me. But if I am innocent, why are you
torturing me? What did we do wrong? My time is almost finished, but what will
happen to my children and my grandchildren?1383

(c) Kyaukpyu violence – October 2012

651. Kyaukpyu Township is a coastal township in Rakhine State, along the Bay of
Bengal, about 120 kilometres southeast of Sittwe with a population of approximately
165,000 people.1384 Prior to October 2012, the township had a majority ethnic Rakhine
population, with Kaman and Rohingya minorities. There was no major violence reported in
Kyaukpyu in June 2012.1385 However, a larger number of security forces were deployed
there after June.1386
652. From 22 to 25 October 2012, ethnic Rakhine attacked Rohingya and Kaman in
Kyaukpyu, destroying mosques, burning houses, and looting properties. 1387 Several wards
and village tracts were affected, with Paik Seik ward being one of the most affected
areas.1388 The report of the Rakhine Inquiry Commission stated that violence led to 11
deaths, 42 injuries (affecting both ethnic Rakhine and Rohingya) and the destruction of 860

1374 DI-007, KI-076.9.15; KI-076.9.16, V-166.

1375 DI-007.
1376 CI-066, CI-069, CI-077, CI-078, CI-096, DI-007, DI-023, DI-035.
1377
CI-096, DI-007.
1378 DI-023.
1379 DI-035.
1380 CI-069.
1381 CI-066, CI-077, CI-078.
1382 K-69.
1383 DI-007.
1384 Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population, Department of Population, “The 2014 Myanmar
Population and Housing Census – Rakhine State, Kyaukpyu district” (October 2017).
1385 CI-165, CI-167, CI-168, CI-170.
1386 CI-084, CI-088, CI-165, CI-168, CI-170.
1387 CI-167, CI-168, CI -170, DI-021; KI-109, V-050.
1388 Including the wards of Ah Yar Shi, Paik Seik (East and West) and Than Pan Chaung; and the village
tracts of Taung Yin, Pyin Hpyu Maw and Myin Pyin.

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Rohingya houses. However, the number of casualties is believed to be much higher. The
Mission interviewed ethnic Rakhine, Kaman and Rohingya in relation to the violence in
Kyaukpyu.
653. Ahead of the October 2012 violence, there was increased tension in Kyaukpyu and
rumours about possible attacks on Muslim villagers by ethnic Rakhine. Muslim villagers
were informed by their ethnic Rakhine friends of the likelihood of an attack.1389 One
interviewee recalled a phone call from an ethnic Rakhine friend, informing him that there
was a “high chance” that there would soon be an attack by Rakhine and the security
forces.1390 A meeting was held shortly before the violence when Muslims were warned
about the possibility of such an attack.1391
654. The Paik Seik ward was mixed, with Kaman the majority in the east and ethnic
Rakhine in the west. After the June 2012 violence, villagers were already paying the
security forces for protection.1392 Security forces initially provided such protection but left
Paik Seik on 22 October 2012. At 8pm on 22 October 2012, a group of ethnic Rakhine
arrived and set fire to a Muslim house, leaving shortly afterwards. 1393 Other security forces
were in the vicinity when this happened.1394
655. On 23 October, more than 100 ethnic Rakhine, armed with swords, knives,
slingshots and other rudimentary weapons, attacked east Paik Seik. They also brought tyres
and bottles filled with flammable liquid.1395 There were violent attacks on both Kaman and
Rohingya villagers, and the looting and burning of their properties.1396 The ethnic Rakhine
were accompanied by the police and soldiers armed with rifles.1397 Witnesses stated that
they did not recognize the majority of the ethnic Rakhine who participated in the
violence.1398
656. There was a clash between ethnic Rakhine and a large group of Rohingya and
Kaman around the Jame mosque in east Paik Seik.1399 The mosque was partially burned 1400
and some people were injured,1401 with Muslim houses burned.1402 The report of the
Rakhine Inquiry Commission states that two ethnic Rakhine were killed in the clashes.1403
657. Soldiers told villagers to return to their houses, but they then opened fire at Kaman
and Rohingya villagers gathered near the mosque.1404 Ten persons, including a child, were
killed and a number of others injured.1405
658. On the same night, ethnic Rakhine and security forces burned Kaman and Rohingya
houses in west Paik Seik.1406 Soldiers and police opened fire on the Rohingya and Kaman
who tried to extinguish fires, killing two and injuring others. 1407 One interviewee explained

1389 CI-085, CI-165, CI-167, DI-021, V-050.

1390 CI-165.
1391 QI-076, KI-109, V-050.
1392 CI-165, DI-021, DI-024, KI-109.
1393 CI-168, DI-021, QI-076, KI-109, V-050, V-051.
1394 DI-021, V-050.
1395 CI-165, V-050.
1396 CI-083, CI-165, CI-168, CI-170, DI-024, QI-076.
1397 BM-025, CI-083, CI-165, CI-168, DI-021, QI-076; V-050.
1398 CI-085, DI-021; V-050.
1399 CI-083, CI-085, CI-088, CI-165, CI -168, CI-170; V-051.
1400 CI-085, CI-165, CI-168, CI-170.
1401 CI-168, V-051.
1402 CI-083, DI-022.
1403 CI-083, CI-084, CI-088.
1404 CI-085, CI-165, CI-167, CI- 168, CI-170, QI-076; K-109; V-049, V-050.
1405 CI-083, CI-085, CI-165, CI-167, CI-168, CI-170, DI-022, DI-024.
1406 CI-088, CI-170, QI-076.
1407 QI-076, DI-021; V-050.

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how he and others had tried to extinguish burning houses, but that members of the security
forces had pointed their weapons and told them not to do so.1408
659. Many Kaman and Rohingya villagers were forced to spend the night on the beach,
from where they watched their village burn. 1409 The burnings continued the following day,
with the police and soldiers using “launchers”,1410 alongside the ethnic Rakhine using
bottles filled with flammable liquid.1411 Soldiers were also seen removing dead bodies from
the village.1412 Ethnic Rakhine and the security forces came to the seashore and prevented
villagers from returning to the village, while those still in the village were forced to go to
the seashore.1413 A 15-year old boy, who reportedly had a mental disability, was stabbed to
death by a group of ethnic Rakhine in the presence of security forces. 1414 Ethnic Rakhine
and security forces then looted the empty houses and shops.1415 One man described being
ordered to leave his house by the police and carrying his elderly mother:
The police kept saying that time was up. One police officer hit me on my hands with
a stick, and I dropped my mother. She hurt her back and died 10 days later. I still
remember the incident and cannot bear it. My mother died because of me.1416
660. When the tide was sufficiently high, towards nightfall, many Muslim villagers left
on approximately 50 fishing boats. Most boats headed north towards Sittwe.1417 The
majority of the displaced from Paik Seik ultimately moved to the displacement camps and
sites in Sittwe.
661. The violence continued in many areas of Kyaukpyu until 25 October 2012. Credible
satellite imagery analysis indicates that the areas affected by burning and destruction in
Kyaukpyu were all predominantly Muslim neighbourhoods. 1418

(d) Sexual and gender-based violence during the 2012 violence

662. During the 2012 violence, Rohingya women and girls were raped, mutilated,
abducted and killed. For example, a female eyewitness from Maungdaw town described
how in June 2012 she saw her 16-year old neighbour being raped outside her house and
then killed by soldiers and police.1419 A 27-year old female from Sittwe described the
killing of her cousin:1420
On Monday 12 June, my 14-year old cousin went out of the house to look for her
mother and never returned home. At around 2am, her dead body was found. She was
covered with a piece of cloth. I was shocked when I saw her body. Her left breast
was cut and the other one was severely injured, with bite marks. It was difficult to

1408 QI-076.
1409 CI-083, CI-084, CI-165, CI-170, DI-021, DI-022, QI-076; V-051.
1410 Tatmadaw soldiers used weapons referred to by victims as “launchers”. They were described as
making loud explosive sounds, after which a whole building or set of buildings rapidly caught fire.
“Launcher” likely refers to a weapon that fires a munition that explodes upon impact.
1411 CI-088, CI-165, CI-170, QI-076.
1412 CI-088, DI-022; V-050.
1413 CI-085, CI-088.
1414 CI-085, CI-168, CI-170, V-051.
1415 CI-083, CI-168, DI-021, V-050.
1416 CI-165, V-050.
1417 CI-170.
1418 Human Rights Watch, Damage Assessment Summary for Kyaukpyu – Based on satellite imagery
recorded on morning of 25 October 2012; Human Rights Watch, Burma: New Violence in Arakan
State – Satellite Imagery Shows Widespread Destruction of Rohingya Homes, Property (26 October
2012).
1419 DI-038.
1420 CI-077.

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recognize her face as her neck was twisted and it was not in the right position. I
think she was raped.1421
663. There are also credible reports that up to 20 women and girls were abducted in June
2012 from the Narzi quarter of Sittwe and subjected to sexual slavery by soldiers. 1422
Another woman, approximately 22-years old, was reportedly detained at a military hospital
and forced to marry a soldier from the Tatmadaw medical corps.1423 In most cases of sexual
violence during this period, the alleged perpetrators were members of the Tatmadaw, the
NaSaKa or other security forces. Sexual violence was perpetrated during home searches 1424
or on security forces’ compounds. 1425 Most sexual violence was not reported to the
authorities as Rohingya considered that this would result in ill-treatment or arrest.1426

2. Kaman Muslims of Rakhine State

664. Unlike the Rohingya, Kaman Muslims are one of the 135 officially recognized
ethnic groups of Myanmar, the only Muslim group to have been granted this status. The
Rohingya not having been counted in the 2014 census, most of the 28,700 Muslims
recorded in Rakhine State were likely Kaman. Despite being citizens of Myanmar, and not
appearing to have problematic relationships with ethnic Rakhine neighbours prior to the
2012 violence,1427 the Kaman have suffered serious human rights violations. This has
significantly worsened since the 2012 violence, possibly attributable both to the prevailing
anti-Muslim sentiment and to the frequent absence of distinction between the Kaman and
the Rohingya. One Kaman refugee, who previously lived in Kyaukpyu, stated:
In Myanmar, it is a crime to be a Muslim. The authorities are saying that the
Rohingya are illegal Bengalis. Then what about us? We are nationals of Myanmar. I
believe the main issue for the authorities is religion.1428
665. In March 2018, a former Minister and member of Parliament from the Union
Solidarity and Development Party opposed a decision by the Government to resettle a small
group of Kaman from displacement camps to Yangon. He reportedly said:
I think it will be more appropriate if we treat the cancer that is occurring in Rakhine
State within Rakhine State itself. Allowing the Kaman families to resettle in Yangon
would be like allowing the cancer to spread across the country.1429
666. The Kaman were directly affected by the 2012 violence, particularly the second
wave in October. Kaman were killed and injured, including by security forces. Many were
displaced and moved to several displacement camps and sites in Rakhine State. The actual
number of Kaman affected is unclear. The report of the Rakhine Inquiry Commission
provided no information on Kaman, referring only to “Bengali Muslims” or “Muslims”.1430
667. The Kaman have shared similar experiences to the Rohingya, including being
insulted and called “Kalar”.1431 One interviewee stated that at school Kaman students were
only referred to as “Kalar” and never by their names, and he was told by a teacher that he
was slow in class because he was an “uneducated Kalar”.1432 Like the Rohingya, Kaman
had to obtain authorisation to travel between townships (known as a “Form 4”), even

1421 CI-077.
1422 K-076.19.
1423 K-076.19.
1424 K-076.6.
1425 K-076.7.
1426 K-076.8.
1427 V-355.
1428 CI-165.
1429 V-355.
1430 A. South and M. Lall (editors), Citizenship in Myanmar: Ways of being in and from Burma (ISEAS –
Yusof Ishak Institute/Chiang Mai University Press, 2017).
1431 CI-052, CI-167.
1432 CI-167.

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though they do not fall into the category of either “foreigners” or “Bengali”. 1433 The process
to obtain a travel authorisation is expensive, lengthy and involves considerable bribes. 1434
668. Thousands of Kaman remain in displacement camps and sites in Rakhine State, six
years after the 2012 violence. Others have moved to Yangon or abroad. The Myanmar
authorities appear to have taken no concrete steps towards facilitating the return of Kaman
to their places of origin. Recently it was reported that, although more than 1,000 Kaman
continue to live in a displacement camp close to their place of origin in Kyaukpyu, the
authorities continue to deny their right to return, citing unspecified security concerns. 1435

3. Torture and ill-treatment at Buthidaung prison

In Buthidaung prison, the situation was terrible. They beat everybody with wooden
sticks. There were restrictions on everything: going to the toilets, speaking, moving.
When we went out of the cell we were beaten, and when we came back we were
beaten. People had to behave like robots. At night, we couldn’t move or we would
get kicked. Buthidaung prison was like hell.1436
669. The Mission received multiple accounts of torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment against Rohingya men and boys held in Buthidaung
prison following the 2012 violence.1437 Similar violations were verified up until 2017,
indicating that ill-treatment at Buthidaung prison is endemic. Mistreatment was particularly
rife in the period after the June 2012 violence in Rakhine State. However, similar patterns
were seen in the aftermath of the 9 October 2016 attacks by ARSA and the subsequent
“clearance operations”, when significant numbers of Rohingya men were arrested. There
are indications that similar abuse also occurred in the context of the “clearance operations”
after 25 August 2017.1438 Much of the abuse was perpetrated directly by the prison
authorities, but also by ethnic Rakhine fellow-detainees,1439 with facilitation or sanction
from the prison authorities. Information received suggests that the mistreatment was
particularly acute against pre-trial detainees and that conditions improved once a person
had received a custodial sentence.1440
670. Detainees frequently suffered mistreatment prior to their arrival at the prison, while
being transported, or when taken from the prison to court hearings. 1441 Tatmadaw soldiers
usually provided transportation, with detainees transported in large, open military trucks.
Detainees would be literally thrown into the back of the trucks, normally after their hands
had been tied behind their backs. They were routinely covered with a large tarpaulin and
then subjected to repeated beatings, with rifle butts or clubs, or kicked by soldiers. Soldiers
would also sit on or walk over the detainees under the tarpaulin. Beatings and other forms
of mistreatment would continue throughout the journey. One interviewee described the
treatment he suffered:
As well as hitting us with rifle butts, Tatmadaw soldiers put cigarettes out on our
faces. While he forced a lit cigarette into my nose, one soldier said, “please, have a
cigarette”. The hair inside my nose burned and it was very painful. The soldiers
tortured us all like this throughout the 16 kilometres journey to the prison.1442

1433 See this chapter, section B.2.b: Requirement for a temporary travel permit to travel between
townships.
1434 CI-052, CI-167, CI-171.
1435 V-356.
1436 DI-037.
1437 While the Mission has not received information to suggest that detainees from other ethnic groups
were treated in a similarly manner, this should not be discounted and warrants further investigation.
1438 CI-176, RI-013.
1439 CI-136, QI-105, QI-106, QI-107, RI-011.
1440 K-076.3.
1441 CI-136, DI-037, QI-105, QI-106, RI-011, K-076.
1442 CI-136.

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671. The mistreatment during transportation led to serious injuries among detainees,
including broken bones and head injuries, sometimes with lasting consequences. One
interviewee described the difficulties he had in breathing due to the impact on his chest, 1443
while another explained how he lost consciousness during the journey because of the
beatings.1444 Another interviewee explained that, more than five years later, he still had
difficulties walking, due to the pain from his back and a broken wrist. 1445 Another
interviewee remembered how a fellow detainee was beaten unconscious on a journey back
from a court hearing.1446
672. Once detainees had arrived at Buthidaung prison, they continued to suffer ill-
treatment. Cells were extremely cramped, with numbers vastly exceeding capacity. There
were no beds or bedding, and often not even the space to lie down. Former detainees
estimate that the number of detainees in the cells was up to seven times the actual capacity,
with hundreds of men held together in the same room. 1447 Food and drink was insufficient,
often only involving small portions of rice, with allegations of instances when the rice was
thrown on the ground for them to eat by licking the floor. 1448 Fluids given to detainees
appear to have deliberately included urine at times.1449
673. Much of the mistreatment was perpetrated by ethnic Rakhine detainees, facilitated
by the prison authorities.1450 There are allegations that some Rakhine may have been
brought into the prison for this specific purpose. 1451 One former detainee referred to 10
ethnic Rakhine detainees who were “in charge of discipline”, 1452 although the overall
number involved may have been larger. 1453 The ethnic Rakhine detainees perpetrated the
abuse throughout all hours of the day, particularly when they were sharing the same cells as
Rohingya detainees. Mostly it involved severe, repeated and systematic beatings with
wooden sticks, including while being forced to adopt a “praying position”, kneeling on the
ground. Similar beatings were also carried out by prison guards. Guards used catapults to
fire pellets at detainees from outside the cells and some reportedly made detainees crawl on
the floor and beat them in this position.1454
674. The beatings were accompanied by insults and references to retribution for the
alleged violence.1455 For example, one interviewee stated that the ethnic Rakhine detainee
beating him said, “you burned our homes, you killed our people. Is this your country?” 1456 It
appears that men with beards, often religious persons, were particularly targeted and
suffered mistreatment focused on the forced removal of their beards. 1457 One Rohingya

1443 DI-037.
1444 QI-106.
1445 QI-105.
1446 DI-037.
1447 CI-130, CI-136, DI-037, QI-105, QI-106, QI-107, QI-108, RI-011.
1448 CI-130, CI-136, CI-176, DI-037, QI-105, QI-107, KI-076.4.
1449 CI-136, CI-176, QI-108.
1450 DI-037; KI-076.2, KI-076.3, KI-076.5.
1451 In 2013, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar said: “In Rakhine State,
following violence in June 2012, Muslim men and boys were allegedly arbitrarily detained in
Buthidaung prison. They were subjected to three months of systematic torture and ill-treatment by
prison guards and up to 20 prison inmates, who appear to have been brought into the prison for the
specific purpose of administering beatings to Muslim prisoners”, A/68/397, para. 10; KI-076.4.
1452 DI-037.
1453 A/68/397, para. 10.
1454 QI-105, QI-107, QI-108; KI-076.4, KI-076.5. Similar beatings continued more recently. One
interviewee informed the Mission that, when he visited his relatives in the prison in early 2017, they
were “hardly recognisable”, with marks on their bodies and their faces swollen and black.
1455 CI-130, CI-136, QI-105, QI-106, QI-108.
1456 QI-105.
1457 CI-082, CI-176. This happened to Rohingya men detained during the post-25 August 2017 “clearance
operation”, including an account of more than 30 religious leaders whose beards were burned off with
gas lighters.

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interviewee stated that he was forced to “pull out the beards” of 10 to 20 detainees, with his
hand: “It was very painful for all of them. They were bleeding, and I was helpless. I did not
have any other option. I felt bad.”1458
675. For the period following the June 2012 violence, there are also credible and
consistent reports of men and boys being subjected to sexual violence, including rape,
sexualised torture and humiliation, either by authorities or in their presence. 1459 Rohingya
boys were detained in the same cells as adult men. Detainees stated that guards anally raped
Rohingya boys. At night, groups of boys and young men were subjected to penile rape,
both orally and anally, by ethnic Rakhine detainees, often in the same cell as other
detainees. One former detainee described how boys were taken into the latrine after dark:
Almost every night they took these boys to the latrine in the cell. They forced them to
perform oral sex and raped them. If they refused, they put their face into the latrine.
We used to hear the screaming of the victims, but we were helpless and could do
nothing.1460
676. Rohingya men and boys were also subjected to sexual humiliation, often in the
presence of other inmates. Detainees experienced the degrading treatment of being forced
to walk naked from their cell to the shower and showering in groups of up to 20 to 30
persons in front of one another, including family members, which was particularly
uncomfortable and considered shameful.1461 Detainees reportedly had to wait outside their
cells naked until they dried.1462 Another detainee described how guards burned the genitals
of Rohingya detainees.1463
677. A significant number of Rohingya detainees died because of mistreatment in
Buthidaung prison. Some were beaten to death and corpses were dragged out of the
cells.1464 One former detainee described seeing four people killed in his cell: “They were
beaten to death by the guards in front of me. Three others, who were beaten a lot, died a
few months later.”1465
678. Detainees also suffered serious injuries, including broken bones, infected wounds
and other life-changing injuries.1466 One former detainee described the impact of his regular
beatings, for more than a month, by both ethnic Rakhine and guards:
My back was injured, and I can no longer carry things on my back. They beat me on
my toes and ankle and my little finger was broken. I have scars on my hands and feet
and suffer pain on my back and waist.1467
679. Corruption was also prevalent within Buthidaung prison. Prison guards demanded
bribes to reduce or end the beatings or to provide preferential treatment. 1468 Relatives or
friends had to pay a fee to visit detainees. 1469 Large payments could also get prisoners
released.1470

1458 CI-136.
1459 CI-136, DI-037, QI-107, QI-108.
1460 CI-136.
1461 CI-130, CI-136, DI-037, QI-105, QI-106, QI-108; KI-076.3, KI-076.4, KI-076.5.
1462 KI-076.3, KI-076.4.
1463 DI-037.
1464 CI-136, DI-037, QI-105, QI-106, QI-107, QI-108, RI-011; KI-076.2, KI-076.4, KI-076.5.
1465 QI-106.
1466 CI-136, DI-037, QI-107.
1467 CI-136.
1468 CI-082, CI-175, DI-037, QI-104, QI-107.
1469 CI-082, CI-136, QI-104, QI-107.
1470 DI-010, DI-037; K-076.4.

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4. Government response to the 2012 violence

(a) Curfews and prohibition of meetings of more than five people

680. One of the first responses of the Government to the violence in Maungdaw was the
imposition by the Maungdaw Township Administrator on 8 June of a curfew and
prohibition of public gatherings of more than five people.1471 Similar 2012 orders were
imposed in Buthidaung, Kyaukpyu, Ramree, Sittwe and Thandwe townships. 1472 According
to the law, such orders should only remain in force for two months, unless the President
directs otherwise in “cases of danger to human life, health or safety, or a likelihood of a riot
or an affray”.1473
681. By September 2014, all curfew orders in Rakhine State were lifted, except in
Maungdaw and Buthidaung Townships, where they have remained in force continuously
since 2012.1474 According to credible reports, the orders are more strictly enforced in
Maungdaw and Buthidaung towns than in surrounding rural areas. 1475
682. According to the curfew orders, people were not allowed to be outside their homes
between 6pm and 6am. These times were later shortened but, on 25 August 2017, the
curfew hours in Maungdaw and Buthidaung Townships were again extended.1476 Although
the curfew orders were drafted in general terms, in practice they have been enforced mainly
against Muslims generally, and in Maungdaw and Buthidaung Townships against the
Rohingya. Enforcement has been undertaken by village administrators, the NaSaKa, the
BGP and the Tatmadaw.1477
683. Many Rohingya interviewees referred to the curfew as one of the serious restrictions
they faced after the 2012 violence.1478 Given its prolonged and discriminatory application, it
has had severe, adverse effects on the lives of the Rohingya in Rakhine State, including on
access to livelihoods.1479 Interviewees also said that they were not allowed to keep lights or
candles on during curfew hours.1480 In some isolated cases, security forces were more
lenient and made exceptions, allowing Rohingya to be outside during curfew hours. 1481
However, in the majority of cases, the curfew was strictly enforced, especially in 2012, and
in the periods after the ARSA attacks in 2016 and 2017. In some cases, security forces went

1471 Township General Administration Department, Curfew Order No. 1/2012 (8 June 2012), available at:
http://www.myanmargeneva.org/pressrelease/2.%20Preventive%20measures%20and%20actions%20t
aken%20by%20the%20government.pdf. See page 7. The power to impose such curfew orders appears
to have been increasingly used by the General Administration Department, through township
administrators. It is viewed as an indirect way for the Tatmadaw to exercise control. See: M. Crouch,
“The Everyday Emergency: Between the Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure”, in
Constitutional Change and Legal Reform in Myanmar, A. Harding, Khin Khin Oo, eds. (Hart
Publishing/Bloomsbury, 2017), p. 165.
1472 See presentation posted by the Permanent Mission of the Union of Myanmar to the United Nations
and other international organizations in Geneva on “Preventive measures and actions taken by the
Government”, p. 2, available at:
http://www.myanmargeneva.org/pressrelease/2.%20Preventive%20measures%20and%20actions%20t
aken%20by%20the%20government.pdf
1473 Code of Criminal Procedure, s. 144(6).
1474 V-047.
1475 V-047.
1476 See also chapter V, section D.3: An enduring catastrophe.
1477 CI-125, DI-073, V-047. See also A/HRC/32/18
1478 CI-062, CI-063, CI-064, CI-076, CI-079, CI-080, CI-082, CI-084, CI-089, CI-092, CI-094, CI-174,
CI-175, CI-181, CI-183, CI-184, CI-185, CI-186, CI-187, CI-188, CI-189, CI-192, CI-194, CI-195,
CI-196, CI-198, CI-199, DI-003, DI-004, DI-047, DI-050, DI-052, DI-053, DI-054, DI-073, DI-075,
DI-076, RI-002, RI-003, RI-009, RI-010, RI-012, RI-015, RI-017.
1479 DI-053.
1480 CI-082, CI-094, DI-053.
1481 DI-075, DI-076.

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as far as killing Rohingya – including elderly people – who were outside during curfew
hours.1482
684. The curfew orders also prohibited gatherings of more than five people on “roads,
streets, the main road, lanes, garden (or) mosques and public schools”. 1483 This has had a
far-reaching adverse impact over the subsequent six years. The list of public places where
gatherings of more than five people is not allowed reveals discriminatory intent, as it
includes mosques but not monasteries or temples. Given the importance to Muslims of
congregational prayers in mosques, this prohibition represents a serious obstacle to the right
to freedom of religion, including religious worship, protected under international human
rights law, including by article 18 of the UDHR and article 14 of the CRC. Credible reports
indicate that some Rohingya have gathered secretly to pray in private houses, makeshift
mosques or madrasas in remote areas.1484 This long-lasting prohibition of gatherings of
more than five people is also a violation of the right to peaceful assembly, protected for
example by article 20(1) of the UDHR and article 15 of the CRC.

(b) State of emergency

685. On 10 June 2012, President Thein Sein reinforced the curfew orders by declaring a
state of emergency in Rakhine State under section 412(a) of the Constitution. 1485 He stated
that this was to “bring about security and peace and stability for the people immediately”.
In his declaration, the President invoked section 413(a) of the Constitution, the power to
“obtain the assistance of the Defence Services”. According to section 414(b), when
declaring a state of emergency, the President may, if necessary, restrict or suspend one or
more fundamental rights of the citizens residing in the areas where the state of emergency is
in operation. However, the ordinance adopted by the President did not invoke this power.
686. The state of emergency in Rakhine State remained in force for nearly four years.
According to international human rights law, a state of emergency can only be invoked in
the presence of a “public emergency which threatens the life of the nation” 1486. The
Myanmar Government itself did not see the situation in Rakhine State in those terms. On
the contrary, in November 2015, at Myanmar’s second Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in
the United Nations Human Rights Council, the Permanent Representative of Myanmar
stated that there had been no inter-communal violence in Rakhine State since 2012, and that
“peace and stability in Rakhine State has been restored”. He highlighted that communities
in Buthidaung and Maungdaw were now “engaging in inter-communal trade and business”
with their children attending school together.1487
687. The Mission considers that the prevailing situation in Rakhine State was not
“threatening the life of the nation” and that the continuance of the state of emergency and
curfew orders was unjustified. Instead, these measures were a means to restrict the lives of

1482 CI-076, CI-174, DI-050, DI-054, DI-073.

1483 Township General Administration Department, Curfew Order No. 1/2012 (8 June 2012), available at:
http://www.myanmargeneva.org/pressrelease/2.%20Preventive%20measures%20and%20actions%20t
aken%20by%20the%20government.pdf. See page 7.
1484 V-047.
1485 Republic of the Union of Myanmar, President Office, Ordinance No. 1/2012 (10 June 2012), available
at:
http://www.myanmargeneva.org/pressrelease/2.%20Preventive%20measures%20and%20actions%20t
aken%20by%20the%20government.pdf . See page 10
1486 United Nations Human Rights Committee: General Comment No. 29: Derogations during a State of
Emergency (31 August 2001), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11. The Human Rights Committee specified
that, “not every disturbance or catastrophe qualifies as a public emergency which threatens the life of
the nation”. The declaration of the state of emergency may also be viewed as unconstitutional since it
did not specify its duration, as required by section 414(a) of the Constitution.
1487 Statement by Mr. Maung Wai, Permanent Representative of the Union of Myanmar to the United
Nations and other international organizations in Geneva, “Situation of Rakhine State and Cooperation
with UNSG’s Special Advisor” (6 November 2015), available at:
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/upr/Sessions/23session/Myanmar/Statements/103.1_Closing%20Rema
rka%20-%201%20-%20Situation%20of%20Rakhine%20State_UPR_Myanmar.pdf

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the Rohingya and the Kaman through their discriminatory application and to provide more
powers to the Tatmadaw. President Thein Sein lifted the state of emergency on 28 March
2016, shortly before handing over power to the newly appointed NLD-led government.1488

(c) Inquiry Commission on Sectarian Violence in Rakhine State

688. On 17 August 2012, the President established the Inquiry Commission on Sectarian
Violence in Rakhine State”.1489 While it was a positive step that the President set up the
Commission, the composition of the Commission as well as the way it executed its mandate
were fundamentally flawed. The Commission was initially composed of 27 members,
including six Muslims, but did not include a single Rohingya. Two out of the six Muslim
members were expelled from the Commission1490, reportedly because of their overly
independent stand on some issues.1491 The Commission also included members who held
strong public anti-Rohingya stands, such as Dr. Aye Maung, the Chair of the Rakhine
Nationalities Democratic Party (RNDP), and U Ko Ko Gyi, one of the leaders of the 88
Generation Students Group.1492 The Chair of the Commission was Dr. Myo Myint, former
Director-General at the Ministry of Religious Affairs; concerns were expressed to the
Mission about his lack of independence.1493 The Commission published its report on 8 July
2013.1494 The Mission welcomes the fact that some parts of the report seek to reflect the
perspectives of both communities on the violence. However, the report contains
fundamental flaws that undermine its credibility. 1495

(d) Displacement camps and sites

689. As of July 2013, about 140,000 people (Rohingya, Rakhine, Kaman and
Maramagyi) were displaced in Rakhine State as a result of the 2012 violence. They initially
lived in 76 displacement camps and sites. 1496 Another 36,000 people were considered as
“people in humanitarian need” having been adversely affected by the violence but without
having been displaced. The displacement camps and sites were located across Rakhine
State (see details in the map below).1497 About 95 per cent of those who were displaced in
2012-13 were Muslims, the great majority of them Rohingya, and the remaining five per
cent were ethnic Rakhine and Maramagyi.1498

1488 Announcement on the lifting of the state of emergency available at:

http://www.moi.gov.mm/moi:eng/?q=news/29/03/2016/id-6792
1489 The New Light of Myanmar, “Investigation Commission formed” (18 August 2012).
1490 Haji U Nyunt Maung Shein and U Tin Maung Than.
1491 DI-077; K-240.
1492 See this chapter, section C.5: Spreading hate.
1493 DI-077.
1494 Inquiry Commission on Sectarian Violence in Rakhine State, Final report (July 2013)
1495 See chapter X, section B.2.b: Case study 2: violence and oppression in Rakhine State.
1496 Approximately 100,000 people were displaced in the June 2012 violence, and the rest as a result of
the October 2012 violence.
1497 United Nations, Rakhine Response Plan (Myanmar) – July 2012 – December 2013, p. 4
1498 K-069.

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OCHA map of June 2013 showing the populatino affected by the 2012 violence in
Rakhine State

690. By mid-2013, about 20 displacement sites in Sittwe and Maungdaw had closed.
These were small sites, such as monasteries, where mostly ethnic Rakhine people had
stayed for a short period. By the end of 2015, approximately 25,000 displaced people,
including most of the Rakhine, had been assisted to return to their homes or to resettle, with
individual housing assistance provided by the Rakhine State Government with support from
the international community.1499

1499 K-069.

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691. As of 31 July 2018, 128,000 people – mainly Rohingya along with a small number
of Kaman – still remained in 23 displacement camps and sites across central Rakhine
State.1500 They have not been allowed to return to their places of origin, and have been
confined with severe restrictions on their freedom of movement. The majority of the
displaced live in a large area on the outskirts of Sittwe town (see details in the map below).

OCHA map of July 2018 showing the displaced population in Rakhine State

1500 OCHA, “Myanmar: IDP Sites in Rakhine State - as of 31 July 2018” (20 August 2018).

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692. The camps in Rakhine State do not meet international standards for long-term camp
populations. Moreover, as highlighted above, the Mission considers that the holding of
Rohingya and Kaman in these camps and sites since 2012 constitutes an arbitrary and
discriminatory deprivation of their liberty. 1501
693. According to credible reports, when the camps were established, the authorities
decided on their location and stated that they would not be permanent. 1502 However, six
years later, little has changed, with no indication that the situation will be resolved in the
foreseeable future. The displaced population is heavily dependent on humanitarian
assistance. The humanitarian community faces multiple challenges in seeking to improve
conditions in the camps. Most of the displaced live in over-crowded long-houses with
inadequate privacy and restrictions on access to livelihoods, health and education. 4,000
people displaced in the Nget Chaung 2 camp in Pauktaw Township live in muddy, wet,
unsanitary conditions because the camp is located on low-lying land, which is continuously
flooded.1503 During her visit in April 2018, the United Nations Assistant Secretary-General
for Humanitarian Affairs described the conditions in the camps as “beyond the dignity of
any people”.1504
694. In its interim report of March 2017, the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State (the
Advisory Commission) recommended that the Government prepares a comprehensive
strategy towards the closure of all the IDP camps “through a consultation process with
affected communities”.1505 As a “first step and sign of goodwill”, the Commission called for
the return and relocation of displaced people from three locations in Ramree, Pauktaw and
Kyaukpyu. The Government claimed in May 2017 to have achieved this. However, while it
successfully moved ethnic Rakhine from Kyaukpyu to a relocation site within Rakhine
State, 55 Kaman households were relocated from Ramree to Yangon. They were told that
they would not be allowed to return to their places of origin and were given small financial
incentives. Furthermore, rather than returning the Rohingya from Kyein Ni Pyin camp
(Pauktaw) to their places of origin, or offering them a durable solution elsewhere, the
Government built individual houses on their displacement site.1506 Similarly, the
Government’s pilot project to start closing the remaining displacement camps in Rakhine
State, announced on 2 January 2018, is highly unsatisfactory.1507 According to credible
reports, instead of closing the 10 camps in the pilot project, and returning the displaced to
their places of origin or relocating them, the intention is to convert some of the
displacement camps into villages. This goes against the wish, expressed by the majority of
the displaced, to return to their places of origin, often located in urban centres.1508 It is also
contrary to the final recommendations of the Advisory Commission. Implementation of
these plans, as with Kyein Ni Pyin, will further entrench marginalization, segregation and
confinement.
695. The Mission is extremely concerned about the protracted confinement of Rohingya
and Kaman communities in these camps and sites, which has a devastating impact on the
human rights of these individuals. It urges the Myanmar authorities to resolve the situation
urgently in line with the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Its
principle 28 underscores the primary duty and responsibility of the competent authorities to
establish conditions, as well as provide the means, which allow displaced persons to return
voluntarily, in safety and with dignity, to their homes or places of habitual residence, or to
resettle voluntarily to another part of the country. It further stipulates that authorities shall

1501 See this chapter, section B.2.f: Conclusion.

1502 K-069.1.
1503 K-069.1.
1504 See video: https://twitter.com/uschimuller/status/981625075953782784?lang=fr
1505 Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, Interim Report and Recommendations (March 2017), p. 12-
13
1506 Inquiry Commission on Sectarian Violence in Rakhine State, Final report (July 2013), p. 35; K-063
1507 The Global New Light of Myanmar, “Meeting on IDP camps, freedom of movement matters held in
Rakhine State” (3 January 2018); Statement by the Office of the State Counsellor on the Final Report
of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State (24 August 2017).
1508 K-063, K-069.1.

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endeavour to facilitate the reintegration of returnees, and that special efforts should be
made to ensure the full participation of the affected persons in the planning and
management of their return.

5. Spreading hate

(a) Inciting anti-Rohingya sentiment

696. The Mission has examined documents, publications, statements, Facebook posts and
audio-visual materials that have contributed to shaping public opinion on the Rohingya and
Muslims more generally. The analysis demonstrates that a carefully crafted hate campaign
has developed a negative perception of Muslims among the broad population in Myanmar.
This campaign has been the work of a few key players: nationalistic political parties and
politicians, leading monks, academics, prominent individuals and members of the
Government. This hate campaign, which continues to the present day, portrays the
Rohingya and other Muslims as an existential threat to Myanmar and to Buddhism. 1509 In
the case of the Rohingya, it has gone a step further. It is accompanied by dehumanising
language and the branding of the entire community as “illegal Bengali immigrants”. This
discourse created a conducive environment for the 2012 and 2013 anti-Muslim violence in
Rakhine State and beyond, without strong opposition from the general population. It also
enabled the hardening of repressive measures against the Rohingya and Kaman in Rakhine
State and subsequent waves of State-led violence in 2016 and 2017.
697. Anti-Muslim campaigns are not a recent phenomenon in Myanmar. A book
published in the 1980s by an anonymous author, spells out a series of anti-Muslim concepts
and admonitions that would resurface and gain traction 20 and 30 years later. Entitled “Fear
of extinction of the race”, the book presents Islam as a serious threat to Buddhism and calls
on people to “protect their race and religion”. It states that Buddhist women are particularly
vulnerable and that children should be taught not to be friendly with people of other
religions. The book also calls the readers not to do business with Muslims (referred to by
the derogatory term “Kalars”1510) and states that, “it is certain that in 100 years, the glorious
Buddhism along with Myanmar ethnic people will disappear completely”. It also calls for a
boycott of Muslim shops (“… buying from them is like watering poisonous plants …”) and
states:
If we are not careful, it is certain that the whole country will be swallowed by the
Muslim Kalars (…). When we study world-history, we can see that different races of
the world did not get swallowed to extinction by the earth, but only by other
humans.1511
698. This book was published close to the adoption of the discriminatory 1982
Citizenship Law. According to credible reports, it was initially banned by the military
Government but was later distributed either in full or in shorter anti-Muslim pamphlets.1512
In 2001, violence broke out in Taungoo (Pegu division), reportedly after the distribution of
these pamphlets by the Union Solidarity and Development Association, which later became
the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), established in 2010 by former senior
military officers. The violence reportedly left around 200 Muslims dead, mosques
destroyed and houses burned.1513 The main narrative of the book and the calls for boycotts
of Muslim businesses were amplified by the 969 movement in 2012 and later by
MaBaTha.1514 More generally, the idea that there is risk for one race to extinguish another

1509 See chapter VI, section B.2: Findings on the issue of hate speech.
1510 The word “Kalar” is used as a racist slur to insult and highlight someone’s dark skin or foreign
ancestry.
1511 K-112. Unofficial translation of A Myo Pyaut Mhar Soe Kyaut Sayar
1512 K-111.
1513 K-111.
1514 For a brief description of 969 and MaBaTha, see chapter III, section B.2: Place of Buddhism in
society.

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can be found in the motto of the Ministry of Immigration and Population, now the Ministry
of Labour, Immigration and Population:
The earth will not swallow a race to extinction but another race will.
699. The Ministry has had this motto since its establishment in 1995 but some reports
trace it back to the first military dictator, General Ne Win, around 1962. Credible reports
indicate that until recently this motto was displayed prominently on billboards and in
offices.1515 Although this motto now appears to be less prominent, it is still featured on the
Ministry’s website. On 26 August 2011, during a discussion in the lower house of
Parliament about the issuance of white cards to the Rohingya, the then Minister of
Immigration stated: “Our Ministry is trying its best to uphold the slogan ‘Race is not
swallowed by the earth but by another race’”. 1516
700. Another influential publication in relation to the hate narrative against the Rohingya
is the book Influx viruses – The illegal Muslims in Arakan by U Shwe Zan and Dr. Aye
Chan, published in the United States in August 2005.1517 The title and content of the
publication refer to the Rohingya in an offensive and degrading manner, with a stark
difference between the English and Myanmar language sections. The latter refer to the
Rohingya as “hairy with long beards” and to “Bengali Kalars … swallowing other races”.
Similar patterns are seen with the Paccima zone magazine, where the English content –
some of which was also authored by Dr. Aye Chan – was drafted in a very different tone
and style to the Myanmar language content, possibly in an attempt to project a more
acceptable image to the international community.
701. Several interlocutors informed the Mission that the publication of the Paccima zone
magazine in February 2012 marked a turning point in the targeted campaign of hate and
hostility against the Rohingya in Rakhine State. 1518 The first volume of the magazine
includes a foreword drafted by the Maungdaw District Administrator. It also lists some of
the most senior State officials and police chiefs from Maungdaw and Buthidaung
Townships as “patrons” and “committee members” and includes the names and pictures of
monks who were “consultants”.1519
702. The magazine includes one section containing a series of anti-Rohingya articles
written with provocative titles such as “Black tsunami in a pitiful disguise” or “Slow
invasion”. Articles present the entire Rohingya population as terrorists; assert that the term
“Rohingya” was invented to take over the land; make reference to a “Rohingya invasion”;
challenge the claim that the Rohingya suffer human rights violations; portray the Rohingya
as perpetrators of serious abuses; and accuse the international community of believing
“Rohingya lies” and in prioritising Maungdaw and Buthidaung over other parts of Rakhine
State. In one article, the Rohingya are referred to as the “common enemy” of all the ethnic
groups in Myanmar.1520 Another article, “What the Rohingya is”, states:

1515 V-240.
1516 Pyithu Hluttaw, “Question from U Thein Nyunt of Thingankyun Constituency, on whether the Union
Government was aware of the fact that the Township Immigration Offices incurred arbitrary delays
for people of Islamic faith to go through the nationality verification process, to obtain household list
and birth certificates, as answered by the Minister of Immigration and Population, U Khin Yi” (26
August 2011), available at: https://pyithu.hluttaw.mm/question-2747
1517 K-112. The first author used to be an immigration officer in Rakhine State, while the second author is
a Rakhine historian and professor at Kanda University of International Studies in Japan. He is
currently the Chair of the “Ancillary Committee for Reconstruction of Rakhine National Territory in
the Western Frontier”, a body set up after the 25 August 2017 attacks.
1518 Paccima zone magazine, volume 1. On file with the Mission (K-112). “Paccima zone” refers to the
Maungdaw-Buthidaung region.
1519 Maungdaw District Administrator; Chief of Maungdaw District Police Force; Maungdaw District
Planner; Buthidaung Township Administrator; Chief of Buthidaung Township Police Force; Chief of
Buthidaung Township Planning Administration, and the Administrator of GAD for Buthidaung
Township.
1520 Paccima zone magazine, volume 1, “Local people’s view on the so-called Rohingya” (February
2012), pp. 60-61.

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What the Rohingya is, is the latest weapon of the religious extremist terrorists… they
are trying their very best to steal the land. Current actions of the Muslim extremists
are extremely frightful.1521
703. The presence of key northern Rakhine State officials in the editorial board indicates
that these articles had their backing or at least their tacit approval. It gives an indication of
the attitude of State officials towards the Rohingya shortly ahead of the 2012 violence. The
themes covered in the magazine were amplified and used more systematically to cultivate
the hate environment against the Rohingya prior to and after the commencement of the
violence.
704. On 29 May 2012, seven days before the report in the New Light of Myanmar, the
Narinjara newspaper published an article about the murder of Ma Thida Htwe the previous
day, and referred to it as the “worst homicide case in Myanmar”. Quoting a police officer,
the article stated that the woman was raped by “Kalars”. This article was republished in the
Arakan Independent Bulletin with a graphic picture of her dead body. The author called on
all the ethnic Rakhine to be united when dealing with the Rohingya issue.1522
705. On 1 June 2012 – three days after the murder of Ma Thida Htwe and two days
before the killing of the 10 Muslims in Toungup – Zaw Htay, the spokesperson of the
President of Myanmar, posted a statement on his personal Facebook account. He warned
about the arrival from abroad of “Rohingya terrorists” from the Rohingya Solidarity
Organization (RSO) and stated that the Myanmar troops would “completely destroy them”:
Rohingya terrorists as members of the RSO are crossing the border into Myanmar
with weapons. … Our troops have received the news in advance so they will
completely destroy them [the Rohingya]. It can be assumed that the troops are
already destroying them [the Rohingya]. We don’t want to hear any humanitarian
or human rights excuses. We don’t want to hear your moral superiority, or so-called
peace and loving kindness. (Go and look at Buthidaung, Maungdaw areas in
Rakhine State. Our ethnic people are in constant fear in their own land. I feel very
bitter about this. This is our country. This is our land.) (I’m talking to you, national
parties, MPs, civil societies, who are always opposing the President and the
Government.)1523
706. Although this post was later deleted, the impact of a high official equating the
Rohingya population with terrorism may have been significant ahead of the 2012 violence,
which erupted a week later.
707. On 8 June 2012, the newspaper Eleven Media – one of the most widely read
publications in Myanmar – reported on the violence that took place that day in Maungdaw.
Under the title “Curfew imposed in Rakhine Township amidst Rohingya terrorist attacks”,
it attributed the violence exclusively to “Rohingya terrorist attacks” and made no mention
of the violence carried out by ethnic Rakhine and security forces against the Rohingya. 1524
708. Both the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party (RNDP) and the 88 Generation
Students group made anti-Rohingya statements in two articles published by Eleven Media.
These quotes went far beyond the specific events that took place in Maungdaw on 8 June
2012. The RNDP statement was reported as being made as early as 4.15 pm on 8 June, only
about three hours after the beginning of the violence. It labelled the violence as “terrorist
attacks” and stressed the fact that the Rohingya were not among the 135 recognised ethnic
groups in Myanmar:

1521 San Shwe Maung, “What the Rohingya is” (Paccima zone magazine, volume 1, February 2012) pp.
30-32.
1522 Arakan Independent Bulletin, Issue 4, No. 11 (May 2012), pages 3-6.
1523 V-247.
1524 Eleven Media, “Curfew imposed in Rakhine township amidst Rohingya terrorist attacks” (8 June
2012), available at: http://aboutarakaneng.blogspot.com/2012/06/curfew-imposed-in-rakhine-
township.html

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Rohingyas are not the national ethnics. As successive government officials favoured
and issued them national registration cards by taking briberies, they are acting as
the over-indulgent persons. Due to the control of Rakhine ethnics, they could not
widely spread until now. The prevailing attacks mean insulting the hosts by the
guests. This is a terrorist attack.1525
709. On the same day, Eleven Media also published a statement of Dr. Aye Maung, the
Chair of the RNDP, in which he drew parallels between the violence in Maungdaw on 8
June 2012 and the 1942 violence when more than 60,000 Rohingya and ethnic Rakhine are
believed to have been killed in inter-communal violence during the Second World War. 1526
He referred to “attacks that seriously threaten the Arakanese people” and called for the
establishment of paramilitary forces in Rakhine and Shan States. He went on to state that
“the persons behind the curtain”, presumably alleging that Rohingya groups have instigated
the violence, will be “responsible for the consequences”. 1527
710. The 88 Generation Students group made similar statements, with Ko Mya Aye, a
prominent leader of the group and former political prisoner, quoted as describing the
incident as a “terrorist attack”, referring to “infiltrations” by “illegal migrants”, and calling
for a “firm and solid immigration law” in response. The article also quoted Ko Ko Gyi,
another prominent member of the 88 Generation Students group and former political
prisoner, as stating that the Rohingya were not a Myanmar ethnic race and that this incident
might “threaten the sovereignty of the State”. 1528
711. On 25 June 2012, Eleven Media published an op-ed by its editor-in-chief warning
about the “risk and danger of ethnic cleansing or genocide”, as a result of the threat posed
by the Rohingya. It claimed that swift action had save(d) “the lives of the Rakhine nationals
from being attack of genocide”.1529
712. On 11 July 2012, President Thein Sein held a meeting in Naypyidaw with Mr.
Antonio Guterres, then United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. During this
meeting, the President referred to “illegal migrants” who “sneaked into” Myanmar and
“later took the name Rohingya”. He stated that he could not take responsibility for them
and that they should either be sent to IDP camps and be supported by UNHCR, or be sent to
a third country.1530 A depiction of this nature by Myanmar’s highest official further
stigmatised the Rohingya in an already tense climate.
713. From mid-June 2012, various groups, including the RNDP, the All Rakhine Refugee
Committee, the Wunthanu Rakhita Association and Buddhist monks’ associations, such as
the Arakanese Youth Monk’s Association, stepped up activities that served to incite the
population in Rakhine State against the Rohingya. They included increasingly extreme calls
to the Rakhine population to act, and other provocative statements, with a common theme
of the perceived threat represented by the Rohingya and the need to sever ties between
communities.1531 For example, on 26 June 2012, the RNDP warned against the threat of the
“present population of Bengali” and called for a “final solution”. One of the
recommendations of the RNDP was to “relocate the non-Myanmar national Bengali to a

1525 Eleven Media, “Curfew imposed in Rakhine township amidst Rohingya terrorist attacks” (8 June
2012), available at: http://aboutarakaneng.blogspot.com/2012/06/curfew-imposed-in-rakhine-
township.html
1526 See for a study on the 1942 events: J. Leider, “Conflict and Mass violence in Arakan (Rakhine State)
– The 1942 Events and Political Identity Formation”, in Citizenship in Myanmar, A. South, M. Lall
(eds.), (Chiang Mai University Press, 2018), pp. 193-221, noting that “the waves of communal
clashes of 1942 have been poorly documented, sparsely investigated and rarely studied” (p. 194) and
that “the absence of a factual master narrative, which both Buddhists and Muslims could have agreed
upon, barred the emergence of consensual interpretations of the events” (p. 211).
1527 Eleven Media, “Curfew imposed in Rakhine township amidst Rohingya terrorist attacks” (8 June
2012), available at: http://aboutarakaneng.blogspot.com/2012/06/curfew-imposed-in-rakhine-
township.html
1528 Ibid.
1529 Than Htut Aung, “I will tell the real truth” (Eleven, 25 June 2012).
1530 V-243.
1531 K-112.

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third country”.1532 The RNDP also praised Hitler and argued that inhuman acts were
sometimes necessary to maintain a race. In a November 2012 publication, it identified a
collective need to take “a decisive stand on the issue of Bengali Muslims”. It went on, “if
we do not courageously solve these problems, which we have inherited from several
previous generations, and instead hand them over to the next generation, we will go down
in history as irresponsible”:
Although Hitler and Eichmann were the greatest enemies of the Jews, they were
probably heroes to the Germans. America had to drop nuclear bombs on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. Why? If inhumane acts are sometimes permitted to maintain a race, a
country and the sovereignty... our endeavours to maintain the Rakhine race and the
sovereignty and longevity of the Union of Myanmar cannot be labelled as
inhumane.1533
714. In July 2012, a group of monks published a statement calling on the ethnic Rakhine
to implement a “great plan of staying away from bad Bengali (Kalar)” to prevent a
“Rakhine ethnic cleaning programme”. The statement called on ethnic Rakhine not to
employ Rohingya and not to trade with them. In October, a conference of monks concluded
that there was a need to “expose sympathisers of Bengali Kalars as national traitors along
with photos and to spread the information to every township”. 1534
715. In August 2012, a blog called “Terrorist 2012” published a poem called “To Thida
Htwe, record written in blood, oath declared in blood”.1535 In 2016, the MaBaTha released a
video re-enacting the murder of Ma Thida Htwe and including a background song with
similar lyrics. The video was widely circulated on CDs and other formats.1536
716. Specific efforts were also made to sow fear and hatred against the Rohingya among
new recruits to the Tatmadaw. In October 2012, soldiers reportedly received specific
training at the Naypyidaw Divisional Military Headquarters on the “expansion of Islam”
and the “extinction of Buddhism”. A presentation titled “Fear of extinction of the race”
echoed some of the main anti-Muslim themes of the book published 30 years before. It
concluded with the need to “protect our race and religion as much as possible”. 1537

(b) Inciting negative sentiments against the international community

717. Following the 2012 violence, the operating conditions for international organizations
in Rakhine State deteriorated severely. Humanitarian organizations assisting Rohingya
communities faced extreme hostility or even violence. This took place regardless of
whether they also assisted ethnic Rakhine. Rumours were spread that the Rohingya were
being unfairly prioritised for humanitarian assistance over the ethnic Rakhine. This
translated into hostility against international organizations.1538 This hostility was already
prevalent in northern Rakhine State prior to the 2012 violence but afterwards, with the
support given to displacement camps and sites in central Rakhine, it became more apparent
in central Rakhine also. Again, it was fuelled by nationalist groups, political parties and
monks. For example, the Group of Wunthanu Ethnic People circulated a letter accusing the
United Nations and international organizations of “watering poisonous plants”, using a
recurrent analogy.1539 The letter labelled nine leading international organizations as
“traitors” for assisting the Rohingya. The group also warned landlords against renting
properties to organizations assisting the Rohingya. 1540

1532 V-242.
1533 RNDP, Toe Thet Yay Journal, vol. 2(12) (November 2012).
1534 K-112.
1535 http://terrorist2012.blogspot.com/2012/08/blog-post.html.
1536 Facebook posts with the video have since been deleted. A copy is on file with the Mission (V-234).
1537 K-106.3.
1538 A/69/398.
1539 Analogy originally used in the book Fear of extinction of the race in the 1980s. See this chapter,
section C.5: Spreading hate.
1540 On file with the Mission (K-112).

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718. This narrative was also spread by some government officials. In late February 2014,
an international organization, one of the main health care providers in northern Rakhine
State, was ordered to cease operations throughout Myanmar, shortly after releasing a
statement on reported killings in Du Chee Yar Tan, Maungdaw Township. 1541 The
Presidential spokesperson reportedly said it was “giving Bengalis preferential
treatment”.1542 The organization was not permitted to return to Rakhine State until
December 2014.1543 This left many beneficiaries, particularly in the north of Rakhine State,
without access to vital, and in some cases life-saving, health services.
719. On 26 and 27 March 2014, in the lead up to the national census, 1544 the premises of
more than 30 United Nations and other international organizations in Sittwe were attacked
by large groups of ethnic Rakhine. There was extensive looting and destruction of
property.1545 A stray bullet from the security forces engaged in crowd control reportedly
struck and killed an ethnic Rakhine child. 1546 Around 300 humanitarian staff members were
temporarily evacuated and most humanitarian activities ceased for four weeks. The
dominant narrative is that the violence was sparked by reports that a Buddhist flag, hung in
opposition to the census, had been removed by a humanitarian worker from outside her
house.1547 However, credible reports indicate that the violence was coordinated and pre-
planned.1548 Shortly afterwards, on 29 March 2014, the Government reneged on an explicit
commitment to allow the Rohingya to self-identify in the census.
720. These incidents had a significant impact on the provision of services to both
communities, but particularly to the Rohingya. By June 2014, the capacity of the
humanitarian community was only 60 per cent of what it was before March 2014, 1549
leaving populations in need without access to vital services for a prolonged period.
721. During this period, the Government also reportedly started to require that the
Rohingya and ethnic Rakhine communities each receive 50 per cent of any assistance,
regardless of humanitarian need.1550 The Emergency Coordination Center (ECC), a body
intended to facilitate humanitarian activities in Rakhine State, was expanded to include
local Rakhine community leaders alongside the original membership of the authorities and
police.1551 The delay in resumption of humanitarian operations appears to have been at least
to some extent due to the ECC.1552 The ECC also appears to have taken on a monitoring
function, to ensure “balanced” distribution of aid. 1553
722. Ethnic Rakhine national staff of international organizations faced threats and
intimidation from their community and reported feeling like traitors for continuing their
work.1554 International staff faced harassment in the streets and in some cases threats. 1555
723. Successive United Nations Special Rapporteurs on the situation of human rights in
Myanmar were met with protests and in some cases faced threats. In August 2013, then
Special Rapporteur Thomas Quintana was surrounded with demonstrators, some of whom
punched and kicked the doors of vehicles in his convoy when he attempted to visit Meiktila

1541 In January 2014, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a press release
calling on the Government to investigate credible reports that more than 40 Rohingya had been killed
in Du Chee Yar Tan between 9 and 13 January 2014. The Government strongly denied these
allegations.
1542 V-053, V-333.
1543 V-335.
1544 See this chapter, introduction.
1545 K-069.9; V-337.
1546 V-338.
1547 Ibid, V-339.
1548 K-069.10; V-168, V-337.
1549 V-340.
1550 V-169.
1551 K-069.11.
1552 K-069.12.
1553 V-169.
1554 K-069.11.
1555 V-341.

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(Mandalay Region) after the violent attacks against the Muslim community. 1556 In January
2015, during a public rally promoting the “Race and Religion” bills,1557 Ashin Wirathu
called the current Special Rapporteur, Yanghee Lee, a “bitch” and a “whore”.1558 He later
threatened her with violence in response to her report to the United Nations Human Rights
Council.1559According to credible reports, there have been instances where ultra-nationalist
ethnic Rakhine individuals or organizations have prevented international organizations
from delivering aid to Rohingya communities or transferring those in need of medical care
to hospitals.1560

6. Overall analysis

(a) Relationships between communities before the 2012 violence

724. The problems in Rakhine State are often ascribed to poor relations between the
Rohingya and the ethnic Rakhine, reflective of deeply-rooted grievances and prejudices.
Yet, the majority of Rohingya and Rakhine interviewed by the Mission on this topic
indicated that their relationship with the other community before the 2012 violence was
good1561 or very good.1562 Others stated that there were “no problems” or “no tension”
before 2012.1563 Some mentioned having friends from the other community, engaging in
various business dealings, studying together, visiting each other’s houses or even
celebrating each other’s festivals. Some Rakhine interviewees stated they had no interaction
with the Rohingya, as there were no Rohingya in or near their villages. 1564
725. One ethnic Rakhine from Maungdaw stated that he had many Muslim friends but
mistrust grew between the two communities after the 2012 violence.1565Another Rakhine
from Kyaukpyu, who left Myanmar after the 2012 violence, said:
The relation between Rakhine and Rohingya was peaceful until I left Myanmar.
Rakhine do not have any problem with the Muslims. The problem is with the
repression by the military.1566
726. One Rohingya from Maungdaw town said:
Before the 2012 violence, the relationship between the Buddhists and the Muslims
was good. We had no problems. We went to their houses and they came to ours.
Even in the monastery we had good relationships. We used to exchange food for
Muslim and Buddhist festivals. I used to go to the monastery compound nearby and
play football with the young monks.1567
727. Some Rohingya expressed negative feelings against the way ethnic Rakhine treated
them at school or at university. A few interviewees did speak about difficulties with their
Rakhine neighbours before the 2012 violence. 1568 However, after the 2012 violence, the

1556 V-168; Tomás Ojea Quintana, “Statement of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights
in Myanmar” (21 August 2013), available at:
http://yangon.sites.unicnetwork.org/2013/08/21/statement-of-the-special-rapporteur-on-the-situation-
of-human-rights-in-myanmar-2/
1557 See this chapter, section B.5.b: Restrictions related to marriage and child.
1558 Video available on youtube at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=comAfSalvEY
1559 Yanghee Lee, “Statement of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar at
the 28th session of the Human Rights Council” (16 March 2015), available at
https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15713&LangID=E
1560 V-343, V-344.
1561 CI-057, CI-062, CI-063, CI-064, CI-082, CI-083, CI-086, CI-091, CI-097, CI-154, CI-155, CI-162,
DI-003, DI-017, DI-047, DI-051, DI-053, DI-073, QI-072, QI-073, QI-075, QI-076.
1562 CI-065, CI-085, CI-088, CI-158, CI-159, CI-173, CI-175, DI-022, DI-023, DI-075, QI-105.
1563 CI-153, CI-157, DI-014, DI-019, DI-031, DI-055, DM-002.
1564 DI-018, DI-028, DI-029, DI-030, DI-032, DI-033, QI-074.
1565 CI-158.
1566 CI-154.
1567 DI-073.
1568 DI-001, DI-004, DI-020.

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relationship between the ethnic Rakhine and the Rohingya communities seriously
deteriorated.1569 Many interactions between the communities stopped or were significantly
reduced, either out of fear or because of the policy of segregation imposed in central
Rakhine.1570

(b) Pre-planning, instigation and role of security forces

728. The Government’s portrayal of the 2012 violence as “intercommunal” between the
Rohingya and Rakhine has prevailed but is inaccurate. While there certainly was violence
between Rohingya and Rakhine groups, resulting in killing and destruction of property,
these attacks were not spontaneous outbursts of hostility. They resulted from a plan to
instigate violence and build tensions. This was facilitated and amplified by the hate
campaign that started in February 2012 and intensified significantly after 28 May 2012. 1571
Myanmar security forces failed to stop the violence and often actively participated.

Distribution of pamphlets inciting ethnic Rakhine

729. According to credible information, incendiary letters or pamphlets were distributed
to ethnic Rakhine before some of the incidents. In Sittwe, a few days before the violence in
June 2012, pamphlets were reportedly received by members of the ethnic Rakhine
community1572 requesting each household to send at least one person to participate in
planned attacks on Rohingya neighbourhoods, while others were asked to remain behind to
defend their village in case of retaliatory attacks. One credible report quotes Rohingya
interviewees stating that before the violence they saw pamphlets being distributed to
Rakhine houses by people on motorbikes. They realised that something was happening but
even close Rakhine friends would not tell them what the pamphlets said. 1573An interviewee
from the town of Ramree, which also saw significant violence in June 2012, referred to
pamphlets stating that Muslims should not be allowed in Myanmar. He was warned by one
of his Rakhine friends that some of the Rakhine were planning to attack Muslims and
destroy his village.1574

Transportation of ethnic Rakhine and distribution of weapons

730. Ethnic Rakhine were transported in groups ahead of the violence and weapons were
also distributed. According to credible reports, in June 2012, groups of Rakhine were
brought to Sittwe downtown on boats and buses. 1575 As they were waiting next to the bus,
they were reportedly given sticks and machetes.1576 Another report states that before one of
the attacks, men on motorbikes had allegedly driven around shouting that the attack would
take place at 2 pm, as later transpired.1577 Similarly, one Kaman interviewee from
Kyaukpyu told the Mission that, ahead of the violence in Paik Seik on 25 October 2012, he
saw members of the RNDP distributing alcohol, machetes and knives to the ethnic Rakhine,
in the presence of security forces.1578
731. One interviewee, who lived in Shikdar hamlet, near the entrance of Maungdaw
town, witnessed the arrival at various monasteries of a large number of ethnic Rakhine who
she did not recognise, reportedly in military vehicles.1579 Similarly, another interviewee
described how, on 8 June 2012, she saw Tatmadaw soldiers collect ethnic Rakhine and their

1569 CI-086, CI-158, CI-159, CI-160, CI-162, CI-163, DI-022, DI-023, DI-047, DI-051, DI-075, QI-105.
1570 See this chapter, section B.2.d: Specific restrictions in central Rakhine State.
1571 See this chapter, section C.5: Spreading hate.
1572 K-114, K-076.9.20, K-076.9.24.
1573 K-076.9.24.
1574 CI-171.
1575 K-076.9.18, K-114, V-168.
1576 V-168.
1577 K-076.17.
1578 CI-165.
1579 DI-026.

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valuables in their vehicles, reportedly to protect them from the burning of houses that took
place soon after.1580
732. The simultaneous nature of many of the incidents further indicates pre-planning. The
initial violence in Maungdaw on 8 June 2012 was followed within 12 hours by a significant
outbreak of violence in Sittwe, some 60 kilometres to the south. Similarly, in October 2012,
attacks by ethnic Rakhine against Muslims took place almost simultaneously in nine
townships across Rakhine State between 21 and 25 October 2012.1581

Involvement of local officials and security forces

733. State actors, including village administrators and members of the security forces,
were involved significantly in the violence. The security forces actively participated in
violence or failed to stop it.1582 For example, on 10 June 2012, security forces stood aside
and watched as an ethnic Rakhine mob burned Kaman houses in Ramree. 1583 The police and
Tatmadaw had the capacity to intervene and halt the violence but chose not to do so. In
October 2012, while Rakhine State was under a state of emergency, interviewees stated
that, when they approached district and township officials to seek protection, they were
refused assistance.1584 One interviewee from Kyaukpyu received a similar response from a
senior township official in October 2012 in west Paik Seik who told him that the fire engine
could not be used to put out the burning houses because no permission had been given by
“high officials”.1585 A credible source reported that police and ethnic Rakhine casually
stood together during the burning in areas of Kyaukpyu. While the Muslims attempted to
extinguish fires, ethnic Rakhine, the security forces and a fire truck all waited idly at the
other end of the road.1586
734. The Mission also received accounts from both Sittwe and Kyaukpyu of fire brigades
- which fall under the authority of the Tatmadaw - actually spreading fires instead of
extinguishing them.1587 One interviewee from Sittwe shared the following account from
June 2012:
A vehicle came to extinguish the fires. However, when the firefighters spread liquid
from the vehicle, I realized that they were spreading petrol and not water. It
increased the flames instead of stopping the fire.1588
735. In Kyaukpyu, local government officials were present when ethnic Rakhine were
setting houses on fire in October 2012.1589 Instead of intervening, one official accused
Kaman and Rohingya villagers of burning the houses and told them to leave. 1590 Also in
Kyaukpyu, security forces, who had been paid by Muslim villagers for weeks to ensure
their protection in Paik Seik, left in the morning of 22 October 2012, just a few hours
before ethnic Rakhine attacked the area.1591

Involvement of monks and political parties

736. Rakhine nationalist political parties and organizations as well as influential monks
also played an important role in the violence, through either instigation or direct
participation. Monks and members of the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party

1580 DI-054.
1581 V-050.
1582 See this chapter, section C.1: Emblematic incidents.
1583 CI-163, CI-171.
1584 CI-085, CI-165, CI-168, CI-170.
1585 CI-168.
1586 V-050.
1587 CI 083, CI-084, CI-166, CI-168, DI- 021, DI-022; K-109, KI-076.17.
1588 CI-166; KI-076.17.
1589 CI-165, CI-168, CI-170.
1590 CI-085, CI-165, CI-168, CI-170.
1591 DI-021, DI-024; V-050.

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(RNDP) were reportedly involved in the attacks that took place in Sittwe. 1592 More
generally, influential Buddhist organizations and the 969 movement appear to have been
engaged from the earliest stages in 2012, fuelling anti-Muslim sentiments, instigating ethnic
Rakhine to carry out the violence, or directly participating in violence.1593
737. In Kyaukpyu, a group of ethnic Rakhine from other areas was reportedly led by a
local leader of the 969 group to burn Kaman houses in October 2012.1594 Similarly, violence
that targeted Thandwe’s Kaman community in 2013 was instigated and led by members of
the 969 movement, with the active or passive support of security forces. 1595 One Kaman
interviewee recognised the leader of the 969 group in Thandwe, who was also reportedly
connected with the killing of the 10 Muslims in Toungoup on 3 June 2012.1596 Credible
reports also suggest the involvement of the RNDP in inciting ethnic Rakhine before the
violence in Kyaukpyu.1597
738. Moreover, the Mission received credible reports suggesting linkages between the
leadership of 969 and MaBaTha and the Tatmadaw or some members of the Government
affiliated with the Tatmadaw.1598 One report suggests that senior officials approached
former leaders of the 2007 “Saffron revolution”, upon their release from prison, and
encouraged them to join 969 or MaBaTha and offering financial and other incentives to do
so. It is reported that some monks refused this, while others, notably Ashin Wirathu,
accepted.1599 Given the important role played by 969 and MaBaTha in fuelling anti-Muslim
violence in Myanmar, these allegations are significant and warrant further investigation.

Specific events in Maungdaw

739. Various accounts by Rakhine and Rohingya witnesses suggest that men might have
been brought to Maungdaw to participate in the violence1600 or that the security forces
themselves might have been responsible for some of the burning of Rakhine houses in
Maungdaw.1601

President Thein Sein stating the violence was instigated

740. In a statement issued on 25 October 2012, President Thein Sein himself stated that
the violence was being orchestrated by “persons and organizations who are conducting
manipulations in the incidents in Rakhine State behind the scene”. He promised that
perpetrators would be “exposed” and legal action taken against them.1602 However, no legal
action was taken and the President never clarified who were the alleged perpetrators of the
instigation. Echoing the above statement, a credible report quoted an anonymous military
source in the central government stating that the October 2012 attacks were carefully
organized. The military source reportedly accused “Rakhine nationalists with ties to the
Rakhine Nationalities Development Party” of leading the mobs, who were “fuelled by
Buddhist monks spreading anti-Muslim rhetoric”.1603A year later, on 3 October 2013, the
President once again claimed the violence was being instigated, this time referring to
“outsiders” responsible for the violence in Thandwe:
Ethnic Rakhine and ethnic Kaman have been living here in peaceful coexistence for
many years. External motives instigated violence and conflicts. According to the

1592 CI-171; K-114, K-076.9.16, K-076.9.17, K-076.9.20, K-076.9.22, K-076.9.23, K-076.9.32.

1593 CI-164.
1594 CI-167.
1595 CI-164, CI-169.
1596 CI-164, CI-169.
1597 CI-165; V-050, V-051.
1598 DI-011; K-101, K-106; See also C4ADS, Sticks and Stones - Hate Speech Narratives and Facilitators
in Myanmar (2016).
1599 DI-011, K-106, DM-002.
1600 DI-038, DI-045, QI-106.
1601 CI-153.
1602 The New Light of Myanmar (26 October 2012).
1603 V-051.

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evidence in hand, rioters who set fire to the villages are outsiders. Participation of
all is needed to expose and arrest those who got involved in the incident and those
instigating the conflict behind the scene. Only then can root cause of the problem be
addressed.1604

Similarities with other anti-Muslim violence elsewhere

741. Myanmar experienced other waves of anti-Muslim violence beyond Rakhine State in
2013 and 2014 and included the destruction or burning of mosques. Incidents were reported
in the following locations: Yangon town (February 2013), Mandalay and Bago Divisions
(March 2013), Oakkan in Yangon Division (April-May 2013), Hpakant in Kachin State
(May 2013), Lashio in Shan State (May 2013), Mone in Bago Division (May 2013) and
Mandalay town (July 2014).1605
742. The Mission did not investigate these incidents. However, given their relevance in
understanding the overall dynamics at play in Myanmar in anti-Muslim violence, it
examined credible accounts that indicate many of these incidents were pre-planned and
instigated, following a similar pattern.1606 There was often an allegation of rape or another
crime by a Muslim perpetrator against a Buddhist victim, which was quickly spread by 969,
whether true or not. Then a public rally was held, aimed at spreading hatred and inciting
violence against Muslims. Credible information indicates that almost every major outbreak
of communal violence since October 2012 was preceded by a 969-sponsored preaching tour
in the area, usually by Ashin Wirathu himself”.1607
743. In Meiktila, groups of people reportedly went door to door one week before the
violence to distribute 969 stickers to Buddhists asking them to put them on their houses to
ensure that they would not get burned in the anti-Muslim violence that followed. Monks
were allegedly involved in the violence. 1608
744. In Mandalay, one Muslim and one Buddhist were killed in riots after a social media
post went viral, falsely alleging that two Muslim men had raped a Buddhist woman.
Credible reports established that the violence was instigated and perpetrated by outside
agitators. The instigation included two fabricated rape allegations made by a Buddhist
woman and a Muslim woman, reportedly both hired by the same man. 1609 In March 2015,
these two women and three other persons were reportedly convicted and sentenced to 21
years imprisonment under the Emergency Provisions Act and the Penal Code for making
false rape allegations.1610 Senior abbots from Mandalay stated in a pubic report that the
rioters – some of them allegedly drunk and dressed like monks – visited them at night,
trying unsuccessfully to recruit them to take part in the violence. Similarly, Muslim
community leaders from Mandalay stated in the same report that unknown people tried
similar tactics on them but they also refused to join.1611 The attitude of both Buddhist and
Muslim leaders prevented the violence from spreading further. Moreover, the President’s
Office reportedly decided to temporarily block access to Facebook in Mandalay to prevent
the circulation of the fabricated rape allegations and related information. 1612

1604 The New Light of Myanmar, “No winner in Myanmar’s 60-year old armed conflict – Government to
use all ways and means vested by the Constitution for restoring peace and stability, ensuring rule of
law in Rakhine State: President” (4 October 2013), available at:
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs16/NLM-2013-10-04-red.pdf
1605 V-049.
1606 V-167.
1607 V-167.
1608 V-049.
1609 V-167.
1610 The information was first published in the Burmese version of the State-run newspaper, Myanma
Alinn Daily (19 March 2015), available at: http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/19.Mar_.15_mal.pdf,
p.14; K-238.
1611 V-167.
1612 T. McLaunghlin, “How Facebook’s rise fueled chaos and confusion in Myanmar” (Wired, 7 June
2018).

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7. Conclusion
745. The official narrative according to which the 2012 violence was “intercommunal”
has prevailed both in Myanmar and internationally. While some human rights
organizations, commentators and journalists have questioned it, they remained isolated
voices. Regardless of whether it was the intent and purpose from the outset, the Myanmar
authorities have used the narrative as a justification to further oppress the Rohingya and the
Kaman communities, impose segregation in central Rakhine and confine Muslims to
displacement camps and sites for more than six years.
746. Both Rakhine and Rohingya leaders told the Mission that they believed the violence
was instigated to divert the attention of the ethnic Rakhine from the Kyaukpyu development
project that started in 2009 and was met with strong resistance and protests. They also
indicated that it might have been a way for some elements in the Tatmadaw to derail the
democratic transition and claim back additional power. 1613
747. The Mission has reasonable grounds to conclude that the 2012 and 2013 violence in
Rakhine State was pre-planned and instigated and that the Myanmar security forces were
actively involved and complicit. They participated in acts of violence. They refused to fulfil
their duty to provide protection, especially to Rohingya and Kaman in need and their
properties. Local authorities, ultranationalist Rakhine organizations and politicians, as well
as radical monks instigated and/or assisted in acts of violence, to varying degrees. Given
the role of the Tatmadaw in the area at the time, allegations that it had a “hidden hand” in
instigating the violence merit further investigation.
748. The extreme levels of violence perpetrated against the Rohingya in northern Rakhine
State in 2016 and 2017, and their mass expulsion – as discussed in the next sections – can
only be understood against this backdrop:
• Years of concerted hate campaigns against the Rohingya portraying them as “illegal
immigrants” constituting a threat to the nation and the Buddhist character of the
country, using dehumanising language – with the involvement of and condoning by
State authorities and influential figures of authority;
• Decades of gradual marginalisation and eroding of rights, resulting in a State-
sanctioned and institutionalised system of oppression affecting the lives of Rohingya
from birth to death;
• Denial of legal identity, restrictions on movement, access to food, livelihood, health
and education significantly weakening the Rohingya population for years;
• Actively instigated violence between the ethnic Rakhine and the Rohingya, with the
involvement of State institutions and other figures of authority, resulting in mass
arrests of Rohingya, policies of segregation and the mass displacement and
confinement of Rohingya into squalid and barb-wired “displacement” sites and
camps in central Rakhine, where they have been arbitrarily detained for more than
six years; and
• A Government response that has consistently failed to attribute responsibilities,
giving the perpetrators a stamp of approval.

D. 25 August 2017 and the “clearance operations”

That day felt like the last day of this world, as if the whole world was collapsing. I
thought judgment day had arrived.1614
749. What happened in northern Rakhine State on 25 August 2017 and the following
days and weeks was the realisation of a disaster long in the making. It resulted from the
systemic oppression of the Rohingya, the 2012 violence, and the Government’s subsequent

1613 DM-002, DM-006, DM-007, DM-008, DI-012.

1614 LI-120.

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actions and omissions. It caused the disintegration of a community and resulted in a human
rights catastrophe, the effects of which will span generations.
750. In the early hours of 25 August, ARSA launched coordinated attacks on a military
base and up to 30 security force outposts across northern Rakhine State, in an apparent
response to increased pressure on Rohingya communities and with the goal of gaining
global attention. A small number of minimally-trained leaders had some arms, and a
significant number of untrained villagers wielded sticks and knives. Some had improvised
explosive devices. Twelve security personnel were killed.
751. The security forces’ response was immediate, within hours, brutal and grossly
disproportionate. Ostensibly to eliminate the “terrorist threat” posed by ARSA, in the days
and weeks that followed it encompassed hundreds of villages across Maungdaw,
Buthidaung and Rathedaung Townships. The operations targeted and terrorised the entire
Rohingya population; the authorities called them “clearance operations”. They continued
for more than two months, and for a considerable period after the Government claimed their
completion on 5 September 2017.1615 During the course of the operation more than 40 per
cent of all villages in northern Rakhine State were partially or totally destroyed. The most
intense phase was the first three weeks when more than 80 per cent of the destruction was
perpetrated. As a result, over 725,000 Rohingya had fled to Bangladesh by September
2018.1616
752. Despite the operations covering a broad geographic area, they were strikingly
similar. Tatmadaw soldiers would attack a village in the early hours, frequently joined by
other security forces, often by ethnic Rakhine men and sometimes men from other ethnic
minorities. Elements of the Tatmadaw’s 33rd and 99th Light Infantry Divisions had been
deployed to Rakhine State earlier in August. The operations were designed to instil
immediate terror, with people woken by intense rapid weapons fire, explosions, or the
shouts and screams of villagers. Structures were set ablaze and Tatmadaw soldiers fired
their guns indiscriminately into houses and fields, and at villagers.
753. The nature, scale and organization of the operations suggests a level of preplanning
and design on the part of the Tatmadaw leadership consistent with the vision of the
Commander-in-Chief, Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing, who stated at the height of the
operations, “The Bengali problem was a long-standing one which has become an unfinished
job despite the efforts of the previous governments to solve it. The government in office is
taking great care in solving the problem.”1617

1. A human rights catastrophe

754. The Mission obtained a wealth of information on these events, including over 600
interviews with victims and eyewitnesses, satellite imagery, documents, photographs and
videos. It examined many incidents in detail. It found consistent patterns of the most
serious human rights violations and abuses.

(a) Most serious incidents

755. The events in six villages or areas are set out in detail below, as verified by the
Mission. Based on the information collected by the Mission, these are among the gravest
incidents in the course of the “clearance operations”.

1615 “Speech delivered by Her Excellency Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, State Counsellor of the Republic of
the Union of Myanmar on Government’s efforts with regard to National Reconciliation and Peace”
(Facebook post, 19 September 2017), https://www.facebook.com/state.counsellor/posts/speech-
delivered-by-her-excellency-daw-aung-san-suu-kyi-state-counsellor-of-the-/1121130291354519.
1616 https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/
documents/files/iscg_situation_report_05_september_2018.pdf
1617 Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing, “Entire government institutions and people must defend the
country with strong patriotism” (Facebook post, 2 September 2017), now defunct, post on file
with the Mission.

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Min Gyi (Tula Toli)

756. Min Gyi (known in Rohingya as Tula Toli) is a village tract located in Maungdaw
Township in northern Rakhine State. With a population of approximately 4,300 Rohingya
and 400 ethnic Rakhine1618, it is surrounded by a river on three sides. Across this river on
the eastern side are two other village tracts, Wet Kyein (known in Rohingya as Wed
Kayaung) and Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit (known in Rohingya as Diyal Toli).

Image from 13 February 2018 showing the village tracts in the vicinity of Min Gyi
village tract

757. On 25 and 26 August 2017, two ARSA attacks took place near Min Gyi.1619
Witnesses reported hearing gunshots close to Min Gyi on the same dates. 1620 The
Government further reported that ARSA burned down 30 houses and set off a handmade
mine in Wet Kyein on 29 August. 1621 On the same day, the Government also reported that
ARSA burned ethnic Mro homes in Khu Daing (Myo) village in Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit
village tract and was responsible for violent acts against Mro villagers during this attack. 1622
758. Between 26 and 29 August 2017, Tatmadaw soldiers carried out two “clearance
operations” in the Rohingya villages in Wet Kyein and Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit village tracts,
east of Min Gyi.1623 As they entered Wet Kyein, they used “launchers” 1624 to set houses on

1618 V-064, V-065, V-066, V-067.

1619 According to the Government, on 25 August “at around 3.35am”, ARSA attacked a police checkpoint
in Net Chaung village, a few kilometres north of Min Gyi. A second Government statement issued a
day later reported that, on 26 August 2017, another ARSA attack took place in Wet Kyein at around
7.16pm at a deserted police checkpoint. Information Committee, “Breaking News 8: Extremist
terrorists continue carrying out violent attacks” (Facebook post, 26 August 2017),
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/786222098217565; K-154.2.
1620 CI-041, CI-042, CI-046, CI-144, CI-189, EI-066, QI-030.
1621 Information Committee, “Breaking News 12: Extremist terrorists continue carrying out violent
attacks” (Facebook post, 29 August 2017),
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/787636841409424
1622 Information Committee, “Breaking News 17: Extremist terrorists continue setting houses on fire”
(Facebook post 30 August 2017),
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/788328661340242; EI-098, RI-008, V-067,
V-068, Satellite imagery confirms that ethnic Mro homes in Khu Daing were burned down, and while
the Mission believes this information to be credible, it has not been able to verify these allegations.
See this chapter, section D.1.c: Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army.
1623 CI-040, CI-041, CI-042, LI-073, Q1-058, QI-071, QI-114, V-064, V-065.

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fire1625 while shooting villagers escaping towards the hills. 1626 Then they moved to Pa Da
Kar Ywar Thit and continued shooting towards villagers and setting houses on fire. 1627
Many were injured. One villager who escaped from Wet Kyein recalled that the military
were firing at the village from a bridge, using “launchers” and guns. As he tried to flee,
carrying his 3-year-old son, he was shot in the thigh. The bullet went through his leg and
entered his son’s chest, who died on the spot.1628 Another interviewee, a medical shop
owner, said he treated at least 20 people wounded by gunshots, and estimated that at least
100 people were shot and injured while fleeing. 1629 Similar accounts suggest that many
others were also shot and killed in both Wet Kyein and Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit. 1630
759. The first-hand accounts of homes burning are corroborated by satellite images
analysed by UNOSAT showing the destruction of approximately 900 structures in Wet
Kyein and Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit village tracts. 1631
760. Some villagers who escaped from Wet Kyein and Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit, fled
towards Min Gyi.1632 The ethnic Rakhine chairperson of Min Gyi had reassured villagers,
including those who had fled from Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit and Wed Kyein, that it was safe to
remain in Min Gyi.1633 He told them that the soldiers would come but reassured the
villagers not to flee, as they would not be harmed. 1634
761. On the morning of 30 August 2017, between 8 and 9am, Tatmadaw soldiers entered
Min Gyi, across the river and west of Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit, 1635 accompanied by armed
ethnic Rakhine, members of other ethnic groups and police security forces. 1636 They entered
the village from the north, 1637 opened fire and began burning houses using “launchers” from
the village outskirts.1638 As the soldiers advanced, villagers fled. Some were able to flee to
the hills,1639 others fled towards a large sandbank area beside the river, known as the
shore.1640 The soldiers then opened fire directly at the large number of people fleeing
towards the shore.1641 Many people were shot. One man reported:
When I came out of my house that morning on hearing gunshots and seeing the
village burning, I could see the military about half a kilometre away. They were
firing their weapons. I immediately ran from my house in the other direction,
towards the river and the shore. I think that everybody from my village was running
towards the shore. While I was running, there was a lot of shooting and I saw many
people hit and falling down. There were a huge amount of people at the shore. Five
minutes after I arrived, the military moved to the shore and encircled the group. By
this point many houses in the village were burning.1642

1624 Tatmadaw soldiers used weapons referred to by many victims as “launchers”. They were described as
making loud explosive sounds, after which a whole building or set of buildings rapidly caught fire.
“Launcher” likely refers to a weapon that fires a munition that explodes upon impact.
1625 CI-042, LI-073.
1626 CI-040, LI-073.
1627 CI-040, CI-041, CI-144, LI-105, LI-128, QI-058, QI-114, XI-006.
1628 LI-073.
1629 QI-114.
1630 CI-189, LI-105, LI-106, LI-128, RI-008, XI-006.
1631 Satellite imagery analysis prepared for the Mission by UNOSAT.
1632 CI-040, CI-042, CI-144, CI-197, LI-097, QI-059, QI-071, QI-114.
1633 CI-040, CI-041, CI-042, EI-066, LI-078, LI-095, QI-058, QI-059, QI-071, WI-037, WI-038, YI-025,
V-064, V-065, V-066, V-069, V-072.
1634 CI-197, LI-078, LI-095, QI-71, WI-038.
1635 CI-046, CI-144, QI-066, QI-067, QI-068, WI-004, WI-037, WI-039, YI-025, V-064, V-065, V-066.
1636 CI-197, CI-198, EI-066, LI-075, LI-078, LI-098, QI-030, QI-058, QI-059, QI-067, QI-071, YI-008,
YI-025.
1637 CI-041, CI -197, QI-030, QI-058, QI-114, WI-037, YI-025.
1638 CI-042, CI-046, CI-198, EI-102, QI-058, QI-059, QI-060, QI-067, QI-068, WI-039.
1639 WI-038, WI-039, YI-025.
1640 CI-046, CI-197, EI-066, EI-102, LI-075, QI-030, QI-058, QI-066, QI-067, QI-068, QI-071, WI-037.
1641 CI-041, EI-102, LI-078, QI-066, QI-067, WI-037.
1642 QI-067.

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762. A helicopter was observed flying over the village during the morning. 1643 Some
described seeing a helicopter landing in the nearby ethnic Rakhine village1644 and unloading
containers of petrol.1645
763. The villagers who made it to the shore were then effectively trapped, on one side by
the river, and on the other side by soldiers. “We were running to the sandy field as we
didn’t know where to go. There was nowhere to flee”, reported an elderly woman. 1646
764. Some attempted to swim across the river eastward to Wet Kyein and Pa Da Kar
Ywar Thit on the far side. Some made it across.1647 Numerous persons, especially elderly
and children, drowned.1648 Others were shot by the military while trying to cross the
river.1649
765. One interviewee recounted that he was shot by soldiers but managed to get away by
jumping into the river, where he saw another man shot just in front of him. He then swam
across the river and saw bodies floating. He could also hear shooting and screaming from
the shore.1650 Several accounts described bodies of men, women and children floating in the
river.1651 Dozens of bodies were recovered by a group of men at the other side of the
river.1652
766. Those who remained on the shore, who numbered in the hundreds, were then
rounded up. The soldiers separated women and children from the men. 1653 Soldiers then
systematically killed the men.1654 As one witness described:
The first round of shooting was like a rain of bullets. The second round was slow as
the soldiers killed the men individually. They aimed a gun at each man and shot.1655
767. Soldiers then killed those who had survived gunshot wounds with long knives,
including children.1656 One woman described how she saw her husband shot, after which his
throat was slit,1657 and another woman, who lost seven children, reported that:
Soldiers separated the groups into men and women. The men were all in one group,
and were killed. Men who were not shot dead, who were struggling or severely
injured, were killed with a knife.1658
768. The dead bodies were then thrown into pits dug by the military and ethnic Rakhine,
covered with tarpaulin, and set on fire with gasoline. 1659
They put all dead bodies into those three pits and then set them on fire. I think that
the military used petrol to burn the dead bodies because flames from the fire rose up
very high and fast.1660

1643 CI-041, CI-046, CI-197, EI-066, LI-078, LI-095, LI-098, LI-128, QI-058, QI-068, WI-037, YI-008,
YI-025.
1644 CI-197, LI-078, LI-098, QI-058, YI-008, V-067.
1645 CI-144, EI-066, LI-095, YI-025.
1646 LI-078.
1647 CI-198, LI-095, WI-037.
1648 CI-197, LI-097.
1649 QI-066, QI-067, QI-068, YI-025.
1650 QI-067.
1651 CI-040, CI-042, EI-066, LM-018, QI-058, QI-066, QI-067, YI-025.
1652 CI-040, CI-042, CI-197, LI-097, LM-018.
1653 CI-197, CI-198, EI-066, LI-078, LI-095, QI-058, QI-059, QI-060, QI-067, QI-071.
1654 CI-042, CI-046, CI-197, CI-198, EI-066, EI-081, LI-075, LI-078, QI-030, QI-058, QI-059, QI-060,
QI-071.
1655 CI-046.
1656 CI-197, LI-078, QI-68, QI-071, WI-037.
1657 EI-102.
1658 LI-078.
1659 CI-041, CI-042, CI-046, CI-144, CI-197, CI-198, EI-066, EI-102, LI-075, LI-095, LI-097, QI-030,
QI-058, QI-059, QI-067, QI-068, QI-071, WI-038, YI-008, YI-025, V-064, V-065.
1660 CI-046.

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769. Soldiers also removed jewellery and other valuable items from the dead bodies
before setting them on fire. 1661
770. Soldiers then turned to the women and children who, after being separated from the
men, were forced to sit in a lowered area on the shore. Some of the children were shot, 1662
some thrown into the river, 1663 and others thrown onto a fire. 1664 One witness said that, after
the departure of the helicopter, the soldiers took infants from their mothers’ laps and threw
them into the river. She described seeing children’s bodies “floating away”. 1665 Another
witness described seeing soldiers stabbing a 10-year-old boy who was trying to run away
with a knife. She described her body turning numb with fear. 1666
771. The soldiers then took women and girls in groups of between five and seven to some
larger houses in the village.1667 Many women had their young children and infants with
them. One mother said that she was with her daughter when the soldiers took her, her two
sisters-in-law, an elderly woman and three of her younger brothers-in-law aged between
seven and ten years old. On the way to the houses, they were taken past the large pits in
which bodies were being put. A soldier grabbed the woman’s daughter from her, and threw
her into one of the pits. She did not want to leave her daughter and just stood there. A
soldier then beat her repeatedly and she was forced to move on towards the houses. 1668
772. Women and girls were taken into rooms where their jewellery and money was taken
from them.1669 They were beaten,1670 brutally raped1671 and frequently stabbed. Children or
infants who were with them in the room were also killed or severely injured, often by
stabbing.1672 The houses were then locked and set on fire.1673 The few women who survived,
and who spoke with the Mission, displayed both serious burn marks and stab wounds,
which were consistent with their accounts, 1674 and were deeply traumatised.1675 They also
described seeing dead bodies of men, women and children in the houses.1676 A survivor
described how she was taken together with her sister, her mother, two neighbours and her
young daughter and son to one of the houses. When she entered the house she saw women
being raped. Then they were taken to an empty room where they were robbed, undressed
and raped. Her sister, mother and son were killed: “My daughter woke me up saying she
was getting burned. They had locked the house and set it on fire. I managed to break down
the door, and my daughter and I managed to escape. I had no clothes on and my skin was
very badly burned.”1677 Another survivor recounted a similar experience:
I entered the house with four of my neighbours, and three of us had babies. I knew
the house. There were dead bodies on the floor, young boys and older men from our
village. After we entered the house, the soldiers locked the door. One soldier raped
me. They stabbed me in the back of my neck and in my abdomen. I was trying to save
my baby who was only 28 days old but they threw him on the ground and he died.
The other women who were there were also raped. It was late in the afternoon when

1661 CI-046, CI-197, LI-098, QI-068.

1662 LI-078.
1663 CI-046, CI-144, CI-197, EI-102, LI-078, V-064, V-065.
1664 EI-102, LI-097.
1665 CI-046.
1666 LI-078.
1667 CI-042, CI-046, CI-197, EI-066, EI-080, EI-081, LI-075, LI-078, QI-030, QI-058, QI-059, QI-060,
QI-068, QI-071, WI-037, WI-038 YI-025, YI-0081.
1668 QI-071.
1669 EI-080, QI-071.
1670 EI-080, EI-081, QI-071, LI-075, LI-078.
1671 CI-046, EI-080, EI-081, LI-075, QI-071, QI-114, K-150, K-151.
1672 EI-080, EI-081, LI-078, QI-071, WI-004.
1673 CI-042, CI-046, CI-197, CI-198, EI-066, LI-075, LI-078, QI-030, QI-058, QI-059, QI-060, QI-068,
QI-071, WI-037, WI-038, YI-008, YI-025.
1674 EI-081, EI-102.
1675 EI-081, EI-102.
1676 EI-081, EI-102
1677 EI-102.

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I became conscious. I awoke because small flames were dropping from the roof onto
my body. I was the only one who survived in that room. I could barely move but I
realised I was going to burn to death. Although my baby was dead, I held him close
to my heart, but I could not bring his body with me. I escaped through a small door
in the kitchen, which was unlocked.1678
773. During the course of the “clearance operation”, the houses and other structures in the
various Rohingya hamlets of Min Gyi were completely burned and destroyed. Satellite
imagery analysis confirms that Min Gyi was destroyed by 16 September 2017 and that
approximately 440 structures were burned. The ethnic Rakhine village to the south remains
intact (referred to in the image as “Min Gyi (Tu Lar Tu Li)”). 1679

Image from 25 May 2017 shows intact settlements in Min Gyi

Image from 16 September 2017 shows destroyed Rohingya settlements and intact
Rakhine settlement (in bottom left corner) in Min Gyi

1678 EI-081.
1679 Satellite imagery analysis prepared for the Mission by UNITAR-UNOSAT.

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774. Credible information collected by Rohingya community volunteers in the refugee

camps in southern Bangladesh indicates that at least 750 people died in Min Gyi on
30 August 2017, including at least 400 who had been residents of Min Gyi. 1680 The total
number includes villagers from Wet Kyein, Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit and elsewhere who had
sought safety in Min Gyi.1681 People died from being shot, stabbed, slit across the throat by
a knife, beaten to death, drowned and burned. Many more were injured, and others remain
unaccounted.
775. While the Mission has not been able to verify the accuracy of the full list, the
Mission interviewed dozens of victims who had lost many family members in Min Gyi.
One 25-year old man interviewed had lost his entire family: his father and his three younger
brothers of 13, nine and seven years old were shot and killed and he believes his mother,
wife and sisters were killed by soldiers inside the houses.1682 A 27-year old woman saw
11 family members killed that day on the shore, including her 20-day old baby who she said
was slaughtered with a knife and thrown on the ground. 1683 A 22-year old man reported
returning to the village to collect the dead bodies of his family though he found only burned
bodies.1684 A 25-year old female survivor of rape reported that she lost eight members of
her family, including her 28-day old baby.1685
776. All interviewees identified Tatmadaw soldiers as the main perpetrators.1686 A
number recognised the insignia of the Western Command on the shoulder patch. 1687 Many
accounts also described helmeted soldiers in camouflage uniform that were distinguishable
from other regular uniformed soldiers.1688 The Mission believes these soldiers to be from
the 99th LID.1689 Credible sources have identified the 99th LID as being present in Min Gyi
during the attack.1690
777. Ethnic Rakhine and members of other ethnic minorities participated. Several
interviewees identified ethnic Rakhine, as well as Mro (Murong), Chakma and Kui from
nearby villages.1691 They were equipped with long knives, machetes and other type of local
weapons.1692 Some saw them also use knives to kill, including children. 1693
778. Survivors of rape in Min Gyi also identified members of the Tatmadaw and soldiers
in camouflage as the perpetrators of rape and killing of women and children in the houses.
It is likely that this indicates the involvement of the 99th LID as perpetrators of these
rapes.1694

Chut Pyin
779. Chut Pyin (known in Rohingya as Shuap Parung) is in northern Rathedaung, at the
intersection of the three townships of northern Rakhine State. Chut Pyin includes a
Rohingya village, with an original population estimated as approximately 1,200 inhabitants,
and an ethnic Rakhine hamlet, Thet (known in Rohingya as Chak Para), inhabited by
approximately 400 ethnic Rakhine, located a short distance away. Within the village tract

1680 K-153.1.
1681 K-153.1, V-070.
1682 YI-025.
1683 EI-066.
1684 CI-041.
1685 EI-082.
1686 CI-041, CI-046, CI-197, CI-198, EI-065, EI-066, EI-081, EI-102, LI-021, LI-075, LI-078, LI-095, LI-
098, QI-030, QI-058, QI-059, QI-60, QI-066, QI-067, QI-068, QI-071, WI-034, WI-037, WI-038,
WI-039, YI-008, YI-025.
1687 QI-060, QI-114.
1688 CI-197, CI-198, EI-066, EI-102, QI-059, QI-071, WI-004.
1689 CI-197, CI-198, LI-098, XM-008, YM-008.
1690 LM-014, XM-008, V-067, V-071.
1691 CI-197, CI-198, EI-066, LI-075, LI-078, LI-098, QI-030, QI-058, QI-059, QI-067, QI-071, YI-008,
YI-025.
1692 CI-197, EI-066, LI-075, LI-078, QI-030, QI-058, QI-059, QI-067, QI-071, YI-008, YI-025.
1693 CI-197, LI-098, EI-066, LI-075, LI-078.
1694 CI-046, EI-080, EI-081, LI-075, QI-071, QI-114, WI-004.

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there was another Rohingya village, Chin (Pyaing Taung). There was one security forces’
camp to the north of the Rohingya hamlet located close to Thet, where Tatmadaw, Police
and BGP had been stationed.1695
780. A number of events, occurring throughout July and August 2017 in and around Chut
Pyin village tract, had heightened tensions in the north of Rathedaung Township. 1696 An
increased military presence led to severely restricted freedom of movement for villagers in
the weeks prior to the “clearance operation”, and a meeting was convened for village
leaders at which Tatmadaw soldiers of the 33rd LID made death threats.1697
781. Myanmar authorities reported that the “Chopyin outpost in Region-11” was attacked
by ARSA on 27 August 2017 “with homemade bombs” but that the attack was “repulsed by
security personnel”. No casualties were reported.1698 The Mission was unable to verify this
attack.1699 However, plans for a “clearance operation” in Chut Pyin appear to have been
made prior to this. Different groups of people fleeing from the “clearance operation” in
nearby Zay Di Pyin the previous day were instructed by soldiers present not to enter Chut
Pyin. One Rohingya village elder stated that he received a phone call from the village
administrator of Chin (Pyaing Taung) to this effect.1700 Consequently, villagers fleeing Zay
Di Pyin sought refuge in Chin (Pyaing Taung) instead.1701
782. On 27 August 2017, Chut Pyin was subject to a particularly brutal “clearance
operation”. At around 2pm,1702 a large group of hundreds of Tatmadaw soldiers,1703
including members of the 33rd LID1704 as well as other security forces,1705 came out of the
Rakhine hamlet1706 and surrounded Chut Pyin.1707 They were accompanied by a smaller
number of ethnic Rakhine from neighbouring villages. 1708
783. The security forces then opened fire, shooting at villagers, including those who were
fleeing.1709 Soldiers also dragged people from houses and shot some of them at point blank
range.1710 Others were killed by having their throats slit with large knives. 1711 “If people
were not killed by the gunshots, they were slaughtered to make sure they were really dead”,
reported one survivor.1712 Killing with knives was frequently perpetrated by ethnic
Rakhine.1713
784. During the course of the operation, structures in Chut Pyin were burned and
destroyed. The security forces used “launchers” to set houses on fire, including those still

1695 BI-007, BI-009, CI-185, WI-003, WI-006, V-072, V-073.

1696 See this chapter, section D.2.b. The build-up to 25 August 2017.
1697 RI-001, RI-004; See this chapter, section D.2.b. The build-up to 25 August 2017.
1698 Information Committee, “Breaking News 10: Terrorists trying to destroy Maungtaw“ (Facebook post,
27 August 2017), https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/786691611503947
1699 K-154.1.
1700 CI-145, LI-118, LI-129, QI-115, K-155.1.
1701 CI-145, CI-184, LI-118, LI-129, QI-115, K-155.1.
1702 BI-007, BI-008, BI-009, BI-010, CI-019, CI-177, CI-185, CI-191, LI-008, QI-050, QI-052, RI-001, WI-003, WI-005,
WI-006, WI-027, V-067.
1703 BI-007, BI-008, BI-009, CI-019, CI-177, CI-191, EI-003, EI-004, EI-005, LI-008, LI-009, LI-010, QI-050, QI-052,
WI-003, WI-005, WI-006, WI-024, WI-027, LM-006, LM-012, LM-018, K-151, K-155.1, V-075.
1704 CI-191, LM-014, XM-008, V-067, V-071.
1705 BI-007, BI-008, BI-009, BI-010, CI-019, WI-003, WI-006, WI-024, LM-012, V-073, V-067.
1706 CI-177, WI-003.
1707 BI-007, BI-008, BI-009, BI-010, CI-185, CI-191, LI-010, QI-052, WI-005, LM-006.
1708 BI-008, BI-009, CI-019, CI-177, CI-185, CI-191, EI-003, EI-004, EI-005, LI-042, QI-031, QI-052,
RI-001, RI-004, WI-005, WI-006, WI-027.
1709 BI-008, BI-009, BI-010, CI-019, EI-003, EI-004, EI-005, LI-009, LI-010, QI-050, WI-003, WI-005,
WI-006, WI-024, WI-027.
1710 BI-008, LI-008, WI-024, LM-006.
1711 CI-191, LI-008, LI-009, WI-002, WI-005, WI-027.
1712 WI-005.
1713 BI-009, CI-191, LI-042, QI-050, WI-024, WI-027, K-155.2, V-073, V-075.

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occupied.1714A number of people were forced inside houses, which were then intentionally
set alight.1715 In one house, a group of between six and seven men were forced inside; some
escaped, others were burned alive.1716
785. One elderly woman described how she was pulled out of her house, together with
her 70-years old brother:
Soldiers used rifle butts to beat my brother on the head and I saw his brains come
out. I saw people being killed with long knives. The soldiers were also spraying
bullets and many people were injured and killed. Our village was full of dead
bodies. I saw dozens of people killed. First, they shot the people and then if they
were still alive and the body was moving they used a machete to slaughter across
the throat.1717
786. She managed to escape with her 10-year old granddaughter who was shot in the leg.
As the child recalled in shock: “They were shooting at us so we were just crawling through
the bodies”.1718 The child said that she saw her father, mother, sister and brother killed.1719
The girl and her grandmother told the Mission that they lost seven members of their family
that day.1720
787. The chaos of the situation was described vividly by one woman who was shot in her
arm while trying to escape:
They began to set fire to the houses so I ran. That is when I was shot. It wasn’t easy
to get away, as I had to hide behind whatever I could find to avoid bullets. As I was
running, I saw others running to save their lives too. People were being shot,
slaughtered and beaten, forcing us to move from one place to another. Everyone
was desperate as we didn’t know where to flee.1721
788. The operations in Chut Pyin lasted until about 7pm. 1722 Rohingya from nearby
villages confirmed seeing smoke rising from Chut Pyin from 2pm until the evening, when it
started to rain, and hearing the sound of bullets until around 7pm. 1723 Satellite imagery
analysis from 16 September 2017 shows the extent of the destruction in Chut Pyin. The
entire Rohingya village of Chut Pyin was destroyed, while the nearby non-Rohingya village
of Thet remains intact.

1714 BI-008, BI-009, BI-010, EI-003, EI-004, LI-008, LI-009, LI-010, QI-050, RI-001, WI-003, WI-005,
WI-024, WI-027.
1715 WI-003, WI-005.
1716 WI-003, WI 005, V-075.
1717 LI-008.
1718 LI-009.
1719 LI-009.
1720 LI-008, LI-009.
1721 WI-003, V-075.
1722 CI-177, RI-001, WI-005, V-075.
1723 LI-118, LI-129, QI-031, QI-115.

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Image of Chut Pyin from 16 September 2017 showing burned structures

789. A large number of women and children were victims of the attacks. 1724 Children,
including infants and babies, were specifically targeted; some were wrenched from their
mothers’ arms and thrown to the ground, others were thrown into fires and burned alive. 1725
As one woman explained, women were sometimes slower to flee and therefore easier
targets, particularly if they were carrying their infants and children.1726 One woman was
inside her house with a group of children when the house was set on fire. She ran to escape,
carrying her 20-month old baby, and dragging along her eight-year old child. She was then
shot. The bullet hit both her and her baby, who died immediately. Her eight year old was
also shot, and died later that night in the paddy field where they were hiding. 1727 Another
mother recalled the death of her young son who was two and a half years old and who was
shot in the side of his upper torso. His last words were, “I need water, mother, I am very
thirsty.” She held his dead body in her arms all night. 1728
790. Women and girls were also subjected to rape, gang rape, sexual mutilation and
sexual humiliation during the “clearance operations” in Chut Pyin.1729 Credible and
consistent reports describe how members of the Tatmadaw separated women and girls.
They selected some of them, taking them to a school, which was being used as a military
base, where mass gang rape took place.1730 Women and girls were subjected to serious
physical injuries either before being raped or after being killed, including the mutilation of
their breasts.1731 An interviewee described how he saw two groups of five Tatmadaw
soldiers arrive in Chut Pyin from the nearby military compound. From his hiding place, he
saw them “grabbing” women and heard the women screaming. He saw the military cutting
off the breast of a woman who later died.1732 The Tatmadaw also assaulted and humiliated
women and girls while stealing from them.1733

1724 EI-003, EI-004, EI-005, LI-009, QI-050, WI-003, WI-005, WI-006, K-155.1.
1725 QI-052, WI-003, WI-005, LM-018.
1726 WI-006.
1727 WI-003.
1728 QI-050.
1729 CI-177, LI-009, QI-052, WI-005, WI-006, WI-027, K-151, K-155.1.
1730 CI-191, EI-093, QI-052, K-151, K-155.1.
1731 WI-005, WI-006, WI-027, LM-018.
1732 WI-005.
1733 BI-010, WI-003, WI-005.

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791. A large group of 57 men, mostly teachers and other educated people, were taken
away by soldiers during the “clearance operation”. There has been no further information
regarding their whereabouts.1734
792. Some persons who managed to survive did so by hiding in the long grass of the
paddy fields or in ponds.1735 From their hiding places, some of these saw many dead
bodies.1736 Others who returned to the village later that evening reported seeing bodies
strewn across the village, including inside houses and outside compounds.1737 Another man
who passed through Chut Pyin a few days later noted, “There were dead bodies
everywhere, and many children’s bodies were floating in the river. We were terrified, and
had to cover our mouths because of the bad smell.”1738
793. Rohingya villagers who survived fled to neighbouring villages, with a large number
finding refuge in Ah Htet Nan Yar village (known in Rohingya as Razar Bil), where local
Rohingya provided them with basic medical care, food and shelter.1739 One woman
described the situation:
Everyone was crying, as everyone had lost someone, members of their families. I
have never seen so many people mourning the deaths of loved ones at the same
time.1740
794. A number of survivors died soon afterwards in Ah Htet Nan Yar due to a lack of
access to adequate medical care. Bodies recovered from Chut Pyin were also brought to Ah
Htet Nan Yar and buried in collective graves.1741 As one villager from Ah Htet Nan Yaar
explained:
That night, many people who had fled from Chut Pyin came to our village. Some of
my relatives brought with them 16 dead bodies from Chut Pyin. I arranged the
funeral and buried them in the graveyard in the village. There were many dead
bodies and injured people brought by other villagers as well.1742
795. The Mission received video footage, time-stamped 29 August 2017, of injured
Rohingya describing the attack on Chut Pyin, as well as footage of sites described as mass
graves of those that were buried in Ah Htet Nan Yar.1743 Forensic analysis of the footage,
which shows Rohingya, including men, women and children, with gunshot wounds and
other serious injuries, is consistent with the testimonies received.1744 Forensic analysis
further indicates areas of freshly disturbed earth indicative of gravesites.
796. A list prepared by Rohingya community volunteers in the refugee camps of southern
Bangladesh indicates that 358 persons were killed that day. The list further details that 127
children aged five or under were killed; 19 women raped; 94 people lost limbs due to
injuries sustained; and 57 people remain unaccounted.1745 While the Mission cannot
confirm the accuracy of the list, it is consistent with information received, and many deaths
documented by the Mission appear on the list. Almost all of the more than 20 people from
Chut Pyin interviewed by the Mission reported deaths of many family members and
neighbours.

1734 CI-185, CI-191, RI-001, K-153.3.

1735 BI-009, BI-010, CI-185, RI-001, WI-003, WI-027, LM-006.
1736 BI-007, BI-008, BI-010, QI-050, QI-052, WI-003.
1737 CI-019, CI-177, LI-042, QI-031.
1738 LI-118.
1739 BI-007, BI-009, BI-010, CI-019, CI-177, CI-185, CI-191, LI-008, LI-042, RI-001, WI-003, WI-006,
WI-027, LM-006, LM-018.
1740 WI-006.
1741 CI-019, CI-177, CI-191, CI-199, WI-027, LM-006, LM-012, QI-050.
1742 CI-199.
1743 CI-200.
1744 CI-191.
1745 CI-185.

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797. The Chut Pyin “clearance operations” were led by the Tatmadaw. 1746 A number of
victims recognised the insignia of the Western Command. 1747 Consistent and credible
sources, as well as the Myanmar media,1748 indicate that the 33rd LID led or actively
participated.1749 The Tatmadaw were accompanied by other security forces 1750 and ethnic
Rakhine.1751 Individuals from the neighbouring ethnic Rakhine village were recognised as
participants1752 and some ethnic Rakhine men assisted the military in identifying specific
Rohingya villagers.1753 In particular, the Rakhine chairperson of Chut Pyin participated in
the violence, armed with a knife or sword, guiding the military through the village.1754
798. Some of the ethnic Rakhine were in non-military clothing,1755 equipped with swords,
knives and machetes, or other types of local weapons. 1756 Others were wearing military
style uniforms and equipped with guns.1757 This may indicate the involvement of the ethnic
Rakhine militia, who are sometimes referred to as Pyi Thu Sit.

Maung Nu
799. Maung Nu (known in Rohingya as Monu Para) is a village in the Chin Tha Mar
village tract of Buthidaung Township with approximately 400 Rohingya households. 1758
Less than one kilometre north, Hpaung Taw Pyin village (known in Rohingya as Pondu
Prang) has approximately 350 Rohingya households 1759 and a BGP outpost.
800. There are two military bases near Maung Nu, both under the Western Command.
Light Infantry Battalion 564 is just south of Maung Nu and Light Infantry Battalion 552 is
approximately 10 to 12 kilometres north, in Nga Yant Chaung village tract (also known as
Taung Bazar).
801. Early on 25 August 2017, ARSA attacked the BGP outpost in Hpaung Taw Pyin.1760
Villagers in Maung Nu and Hpaung Taw Pyin heard gunshots coming from this direction in
the early morning.1761 The Government stated that two police officers and two assailants
were killed.1762
802. There were two additional ARSA attacks near Maung Nu early that morning; the
first at the military base occupied by the Light Infantry Battalion 552, and the second
shortly afterwards at the BGP outpost, both in Nga Yant Chaung village tract. The
Government said it recovered seven bodies of assailants involved.1763 One interviewee

1746 BI-007, BI-008, BI-009, CI-019, EI-003, EI-004, EI-005, LI-008, LI-009, LI-010, QI-050, QI-052,
WI-003, WI-005, WI-006, WI-024, WI-027, LM-006, LM-018, K-155.1.
1747 BI-009, QI-050, V-067.
1748 K-163, V-256; “It was reported that extremist Bengali terrorists and Myanmar Tatmadaw LID 33
were fighting in Chut Pyin village, Rathedaung Township" (Eleven Media Group, 27 August 2017).
1749 CI-191, K-155.2, V-067, V-071.
1750 BI-007, BI-008, BI-009, BI-010, CI-019, WI-003, WI-006, WI-024.
1751 BI-008, BI-009, CI-019, CI-177, CI-185, CI-191, EI-003, EI-004, EI-005, LI-042, QI-031, QI-052,
RI-001, RI-004, WI-005, WI-006, WI-027.
1752 CI-019, QI-052, WI-005, LM-006, K-155.2.
1753 BI-010, WI-005.
1754 BI-007, BI-010, QI-115, LM-006, LM-012.
1755 BI-008, CI-019, LI-042.
1756 BI-008, BI-009, CI-019, CI-191, EI-003, LI-042, QI-031, RI-001, RI-004, WI-006.
1757 EI-003, EI-004, EI-005, QI-052, RI-004, WI-005, WI-027, LM-006, K-155.2.
1758 CI-196, LI-055, V-076.
1759 CI-026, CI-109, LI-055.
1760 K-154.1, K-154.2.
1761 CI-026, CI-044, CI-109, CI-110, CI-195, CI-196, EI-019, LI-055, LI-084, WI-017, YI-032, YI-033.
1762 Information Committee, “Breaking News 2” (Facebook post, 25 August 2017),
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/785202504986191
1763 Information Committee, “Breaking News 1: Many police outposts and police stations in Maungtaw
attacked by extremist terrorists” (Facebook post, 25 August 2017),
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/photos/a.639477959558647.1073741828.63945620
6227489/785096194996822/?type=3

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reported that at approximately 8am that day, after the shooting had ended, he came out of
his house and saw security forces dragging seven bodies onto a boat.1764
803. Later that morning, Tatmadaw soldiers entered Hpaung Taw Pyin in their vehicles
and stopped near the BGP outpost. They opened fire and people started to flee. 1765
Interviewees reported that soldiers and other security forces that morning arrested four
young boys, including the 15-year old son of a Rohingya village leader and a 22-year old
religious scholar. Both were believed to have been killed. 1766
804. Many people from Hpaung Taw Pyin and surrounding areas fled south to Maung
Nu.1767 Some families sought shelter in relatives’ homes, and some in a large compound
owned by two Rohingya relatives, who were known to have good relations with the security
forces in the area.1768 Within the compound were a large two-story house and other smaller
houses.1769 Most of the men hid upstairs in the main house, while most of the women and
children sought shelter downstairs. Eventually approximately 200 people had sought shelter
inside the compound.1770
805. A large group of Tatmadaw soldiers entered Maung Nu on 27 August 2017, between
10 and 11am.1771 They arrived in military trucks and spread out in small groups on foot
making their way towards the compound, while firing in the air. 1772
806. Once in the compound, the soldiers ordered people to come out of the houses,1773
with the threat that otherwise the houses would be set on fire. 1774 Soldiers then broke down
a door of the main house, and a number of them entered and continued to fire sporadically
once inside.1775 A child was hit in the head by a bullet and died shortly afterwards.1776
The soldiers broke down a door and started firing inside. I saw my brother’s 10-
year old son shot in the head. His head was split open and his brain splattered on
the wall.1777
807. As people started to come out from the houses, the soldiers separated women and
children from men. Soldiers ordered the women at gunpoint to remove their headscarves,
with some soldiers pulling them off. They also searched the women repeatedly for valuable
items, ripping open their clothes.1778 One interviewee had an earring ripped from her ear by
a soldier, leaving her wounded.1779 Soldiers then separated the women and children into
different groups and locked them inside smaller houses within the compound. 1780
808. One of the men who owned the compound was among the first to be killed. While
two soldiers held him, a third stabbed him with a knife. Two of his sons were shot dead
while trying to intervene.1781 The killings then became more organized. In the courtyard,
men and boys were rounded up, most having their hands bound with rope, and made to
kneel face down, pointing eastwards. Soldiers also used some of the women’s headscarves
to blindfold the men and boys, and to tie their hands behind their back. 1782 They then

1764 LI-055, V-077, V-078.

1765 EI-019, WI-017.
1766 CI-195, LI-084, V-067, V-076.
1767 CI-109, CI-110, CI-026, CI-196, EI-019, LI-055, WI-017, YI-032.
1768 CI-026, CI-110, CI-195, CI-196, LI-081, LI-084, LI-094, QI-042, WI-017, YI-032.
1769 CI-026, CI-194, CI-195, LI-094.
1770 CI-026, CI-196, LI-079, QI-042, YI-032.
1771 CI-026, CI-110, CI-196, LI-079, LI-084, QI-042, WI-017.
1772 CI-026, CI-110, CI-195, CI-196, LI-055, YI-033.
1773 CI-026, CI-109, CI-110, EI-019, LI-081, QI-042, WI-017, YI-032.
1774 CI-195, LI-079, QI-042, WI-017, YI-032, V-076.
1775 CI-195, EI-019, YI-032, YI-033.
1776 QI-042, YI-032, YI-033, V-076. K-156.
1777 QI-042.
1778 LI-079, LI-084, QI-042, WI-017, YI-032, YI-033.
1779 LI-084.
1780 LI-079, QI-042, YI-032, YI-033.
1781 CI-026, CI-109, CI-110, CI-196, WI-017.
1782 CI-026, CI-109, EI-019, QI-042, WI-017, YI-032, YI-033.

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opened fire on the men and boys. Soldiers also slit their throats with knives.1783 A small
group of men and boys were taken from the courtyard to an area of scrubland a few minutes
walking distance away, where they were killed. 1784One interviewee who managed to hide
within the compound recounted:
The soldiers took the men out of the house and tied up their hands behind their back
with a rope. When the rope had finished they used women’s headscarves to tie them
up. Soldiers forced them to lie with their chest and face down on the ground. Some
of them were shot first and then their throats were slit with a knife. Others just had
their throats slit.1785
809. Soldiers killed a number of children in the courtyard. 1786 One interviewee saw a
young child stabbed by soldiers while crying. 1787 Another woman saw soldiers kill her two
nephews through a crack in a door of one of the compound houses:
The soldiers killed the male members of my family. They shot at them first and then
slit their throats. The courtyard was full of blood. They killed my husband, my
father-in-law and my two nephews of 15 and eight years old. They even killed the
child in the same way.1788
810. Women and girls were also gang raped, killed and mutilated. 1789 One interviewee
saw two women being raped by two or three members of the Tatmadaw. The screams he
heard led the interviewee to conclude that the two women were then killed. 1790 Another
witness who was hiding nearby described one woman being killed by being knifed in her
vagina.1791
811. A female survivor from Maung Nu described how soldiers caught her and other
women while trying to flee the village:
I ran to the hills to escape the shooting. My husband and I were caught by the
military. My husband was badly beaten and could not move. Three members of the
military took me. One man held me down and pushed me to the ground. They tore of
my clothes. Two men raped me. My husband could still see me. They took many
other women – maybe around 10-20 women. I saw them being raped. They took
women at different times. I knew some of the women – they were from my village.1792
812. The incident lasted until sunset. After the killings, soldiers loaded a number of
bodies, wrapped in tarpaulin, onto military trucks. 1793 One interviewee who had been hiding
nearby saw soldiers leaving the village in the early evening in three military trucks. 1794
Another witness in hiding saw military trucks leave and later return to the village several
times. He believed that soldiers were transporting bodies to the military base. 1795
813. Later that evening, after the soldiers had left, villagers returned and rescued women
and children. Witnesses described seeing blood and the ground feeling “sticky”.1796 Others
described seeing bodies, including of children, and body parts scattered on the ground. 1797
One interviewee described stepping on peoples’ clothes and headscarves that were covered
with blood, and then finding a dead body, with a slit throat. He returned the following day

1783 CI-026, CI-109, CI-110, CI-194, CI-196, EI-018, LI-079, LI-094, QI-042, WI-017.
1784 CI-194, CI-196, V-067.
1785 C1-196.
1786 LM-018, V-077.
1787 CI-109.
1788 LI-079.
1789 EI-019, EI-027, LI-081, LI-094.
1790 LI-094.
1791 LI-081.
1792 EI-027.
1793 CI-026, CI-194, CI-195, CI-196, LI-094, QI-042, WI-017, YI-033.
1794 LI-055.
1795 CI-196.
1796 LI-084, LI-094, YI-033.
1797 CI-026, CI-044, CI-194, LI-055, LI-079, LI-094.

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and found a pit where the soil was disturbed and where he presumed bodies had been
buried.1798
814. Credible reports suggest that soldiers buried some bodies in shallow pits in a nearby
field.1799 The Mission analysed video footage and photos that show patches of blood in a
scrubland area said to be near the compound.1800 It has also reviewed footage of tarpaulin
bags buried just below the surface in an area similar to the one previously described. A
human leg, already in an advanced stage of decomposition, is visibly protruding from one
of the bags. The Mission was not able to independently verify the geo-location or date of
the video footage; however, the details shown, such as patches of blood, women’s
headscarves and other elements, are consistent with eyewitness accounts of the events in
Maung Nu.
815. Information indicates that up to 100 people, mostly men and boys, were executed in
Maung Nu.1801 The Mission has received a non-exhaustive list of the dead compiled by
Rohingya community volunteers in the refugee camps of southern Bangladesh. It details the
names, ages and professions of 82 people killed (48 people from Maung Nu and 34 from
Hpaung Taw Pyin). Aside from one woman, they are all men and boys, with 28 under 18
years old, the youngest six years old. While the Mission cannot confirm the accuracy of the
full list, it is consistent with information received, and names of persons documented by the
Mission as killed appear on the list.1802
816. Maung Nu and Hpaung Taw Pyin were burned over a period of several days.
Satellite imagery shows the burning and destruction of structures in Maung Nu and Hpaung
Taw Pyin by 16 September 2017. The images show that more than 320 structures were
destroyed by fire in both locations. 1803

Image of Maung Nu from 16 September 2017 showing areas of burned structures

1798 LI-055, V-067.

1799 VI-067.
1800 K-157.1.
1801 EI-019, LI-055, V-076, V-079.
1802 CI-026, CI-109, EI-019, LI-055, LI-079, LI-084, QI-042, WI-019.
1803 Satellite image analysis prepared for the mission by UNITAR-UNOSAT.

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817. Tatmadaw soldiers led the operation in Maung Nu,1804 with witnesses recognising
soldiers from Light Infantry Battalion 564.1805 Many accounts identified by name one of the
soldiers, who appeared to have directly led and participated in the killings of men and boys
in the courtyard of the compound. 1806

Gu Dar Pyin
818. Gu Dar Pyin is a village tract in southern Buthidaung Township, approximately 15
kilometres south of Buthidaung town. There are three ethnic Rakhine settlements, and two
larger Rohingya villages. Gu Dar Pyin is the main settlement of the Rohingya population,
who know it as Gudam Para. There is one police camp in the village tract, which is located
in Kyauk Sar Taing, about a mile from Gu Dar Pyin.1807
819. Although the Government did not initially report an ARSA attack in Gu Dar Pyin on
or after 25 August 2017,1808 there are unverified reports of an incident, including a possible
explosion on or near a bridge in the vicinity. 1809 The following days saw a significant build-
up of security force personnel at the police camp. A large number of Tatmadaw soldiers
were seen arriving at the camp, some on motorcycles. 1810 One interviewee saw white sacks
being transported to the camp on the motorcycles.1811 There may also have been a meeting
at around this time between the soldiers and Rohingya village leaders. 1812 Information
suggests that some local ethnic Rakhine villagers warned Rohingya neighbours that
something would happen, urging them to leave.1813
820. The Tatmadaw and police conducted an initial operation on around 28 August 2017.
Security forces entered the main village of Gu Dar Pyin in the early morning and opened
fire from the side of the main road.1814 It is unclear whether people were killed; one
interviewee mentioned that two people might have sustained bullet injuries. 1815 The gunfire
caused panic among village residents, who fled. For many, this meant crossing the river
running down the eastern edge of the village. One interviewee described how she fled with
her children into the forest and then had to cross the river: “Some children died trying to
cross the river, as it was raining and the water level was so high.” 1816 The operation ended
in the early hours of the morning, with the security forces returning to the police camp. A
number of villagers returned to their homes.
821. The main “clearance operation” took place the following day, in the early
afternoon.1817 The Tatmadaw led the operation, accompanied by armed police and non-
uniformed individuals, identified as ethnic Rakhine. According to one interviewee, the
security forces first gathered on a hill above the village. They then surrounded the village
and entered from multiple directions. The soldiers and armed police opened fire as they
entered, including at people who ran to escape. A large number of Rohingya villagers were
shot and killed or injured as they tried to flee, including children. One interviewee

1804 CI-026, LI-079, LI-084, QI -042, WI-017.

1805 EI-019, LI-094, WI-007.
1806 CI-026, CI-109, CI-195, LI-094, LM-018, V-076, V-077.
1807 CI-103.
1808 Although no mention was made of an attack on Gu Dar Pyin at the time, on 3 February 2018, in a
response to a media article providing details of the “clearance operation” in Gu Dar Pyin, the
Government claimed that an ARSA attack did take place. See Global New Light of Myanmar,
“Authorities refute AP’s report on mass graves in Buthidaung” (3 February 2018), stating that in Gu
Dar Pyin, “security forces were attacked by a combined group of ARSA terrorists, and some 500
villagers had attacked the security forces on 28 August 2017.”
1809 LM-004, V-067.
1810 CI-103, LI-062, LI-063.
1811 LI-063.
1812 CI-103, YI-013.
1813 LI-065.
1814 CI-103, LI-062, LI-063, LI-088, YI-013, YI-014, YI-015, YI-016, YI-018.
1815 LI-062.
1816 YI-015.
1817 LI-062, LI-063, LI-064, LI-065, LI-088, YI-014, YI-017.

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described how his cousin, a 15-year old boy, was shot dead while trying to untether his
family’s cows.1818 Ethnic Rakhine men, armed with local swords known as “da”, then killed
captured or injured persons by slitting their throats. 1819 The soldiers and armed police also
used knives to kill people captured or injured.
822. During the operation, buildings were set on fire by the security forces and ethnic
Rakhine men. The Tatmadaw used “launchers” and the ethnic Rakhine used petrol.1820
Burning the entire village took two to three days.
823. One woman watching from a neighbouring village on the other side of the river
described what she saw:
The soldiers were shooting at the people, who were running from burning houses to
save their lives. People were running everywhere, in the paddy fields, jumping into
the river, and hiding in trees. I saw people burning, and people being cut.1821
824. As the security forces had entered the village from three sides, villagers able to flee
were forced to head east and attempt to cross the river. Rohingya villagers were shot as they
crossed. One interviewee, watching from a hamlet on the other side of the river, described
seeing many bodies floating in the water.1822 Some drowned in the river, including women
and children. Another interviewee helped four men on the other side of the river, each with
gunshot wounds.1823
825. One mother described how she had to choose which of her children to save. The
security forces had entered her house and grabbed her young daughter. Her son tried to save
his sister and was attacked by the security forces. The mother watched from the other end
of the house and made the split second decision that that these two children would not live,
but that she could perhaps still save her two younger children. Her husband returned the
next morning to the village and dug through pits of bodies until he found the corpse of their
son. They never found the body of their daughter. The mother told the Mission with
haunted eyes: “How can I continue with my life having made this choice?” 1824
826. Women and girls were subjected to sexual and gender-based violence, including
rape, gang rape and abductions.1825 They were gang raped by members of the Tatmadaw in
bushy and forested areas as they fled.1826 They were also abducted from their homes,
sometimes prior to the main “clearance operation” commencing. 1827 Based on credible
reports received, and in light of similar patterns established in other locations, it is likely
that abducted women and girls were raped or gang raped. A 50-year old mother said:
The soldiers came to my house and took my daughter away. I do not know what
happened to her. I saw soldiers taking quite a lot of beautiful girls when we were
fleeing.1828
827. Some of those who participated in the operation were recognised as locals from the
nearby NaTaLa1829 village, Kyauk Sar Taing. A short time before the operation was

1818 YI-015.
1819 LI-065, LI-062, YI-014, V-080.
1820 LI-062, LI-063, YI-014, YI-015, YI-016, YI-018.
1821 WI-014.
1822 LI-088.
1823 YI-017.
1824 EI-079.
1825 EI-078, EI-079, EI-080, K-151.
1826 EI-078, EI-079, EI-080.
1827 EI-078, EI-079, EI-080, K-151.
1828 EI-079.
1829 The Myanmar authorities have engaged in the policy of building “model villages” since the 1990s
taking the name of “NaTaLa” from the Ministry for Development of Border Areas and National
Races that designates and establishes them. Farmland was appropriated, and individuals and families
were resettled from urban areas to border regions. In northern Rakhine State, “model villages” were
largely intended to allow for the resettlement of ethnic Rakhine from other parts of Myanmar, or to
encourage persons of ethnic Rakhine origin (and possibly other ethnicities) to move from Bangladesh.

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conducted, a new group of men had arrived in Kyak Sar Taing 1830 and it appears they may
also have been brought to the village by the Tatmadaw.
828. Satellite imagery analysis confirms that all structures in Gu Dar Pyin were burned by
16 September.1831

Satellite imagery analysis from 10 October 2017 showed burning detected

on 16 September

829. In the aftermath of the operation, numerous corpses were strewn throughout the
village. Witnesses saw bodies and in some instances separated heads, showing signs of both
gunshot and knife or sword wounds, including in the compounds of houses and a large
number in paddy fields.1832
830. Efforts were made by the Tatmadaw, police and the ethnic Rakhine men to dispose
of bodies. A series of pits were dug in different locations and the bodies put in them. 1833 A
number of villagers who returned to Gu Dar Pyin some days after the operation described
seeing bodies, uncovered in shallow graves, that were blackened and swollen. Video
footage reviewed by the Mission shows blackened and swollen human heads demonstrating
putrefactive change (decomposition). 1834
831. One interviewee, who returned to the village about three days after the operation,
described moving some soil away from one of the pits, and seeing many black corpses, with
faces looking as though they had been burned. The sight and smell made him nauseous. 1835
Another interviewee described that, when he returned to the village 12 days after the
“clearance operation”, he saw a big pit of bodies:
They were not properly covered so I could see that the bodies were swollen and the
faces were black. I could not perform any funerals because the bodies were so

The apparent purpose appears to have been, at least in part, to transform the demographic profile of
northern Rakhine State through increasing the ethnic Rakhine or Buddhist population; K-063.20, K-
160.1, K-160.2.
1830 LI-062, LI-063, LI-065.
1831 Satellite imagery analysis prepared for the Mission by UNITAR-UNOSAT.
1832 CI-103, LI-065, YI-016.
1833 CI-103, LI-062, LI-063, LI-088, YI-016.
1834 LI-062, LI-063.
1835 LI-063.

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rotten. I saw many heads separated from bodies. There were bodies in a number of
different places, scattered around. Some were piled together and some were buried
in the pits. There were the bodies of women and children. I only stayed in the village
for an hour, but it was so horrific that I was crying on the entire journey to
Bangladesh.1836
832. Rohingya who escaped took shelter in neighbouring Rohingya settlements across the
river, or hid in forest areas.1837 Some days later, men from the village returned to collect
food and other items. However, they again encountered the Tatmadaw and a number were
shot and killed as they tried to flee.1838
833. Despite the difficulties in calculating the exact number of Rohingya villagers killed
during the “clearance operation” in Gu Dar Pyin, Rohingya community volunteers have
compiled lists from discussions with villagers who managed to escape the violence. They
estimate that 243 persons were killed in the course of the operation. 1839 While the Mission
cannot confirm the accuracy of the list, it is consistent with information received that large
numbers of people died.

Koe Tan Kauk

834. Koe Tan Kauk (known in Rohingya as Ko Tan Kaung) is a village tract in
Rathedaung Township, with a shoreline along the Bay of Bengal, bordering the
southernmost tip of Maungdaw. The village tract contained four villages, two Rohingya and
two ethnic Rakhine. The largest Rohingya village of Koe Tan Kauk (known in Rohingya as
Dun Say Para) had approximately 1,000 households. 1840 The village tract contained two IDP
settlements, both of which housed Rohingya who were internally displaced from elsewhere
in Rathedaung in 2012.1841 Within the village tract there was a military compound and a
BGP post.1842
835. As the location of one of the 9 October 2016 ARSA attacks, 1843 Koe Tan Kauk had
been under constant surveillance. This included an increased military presence, resulting in
continued and increased oppression of villagers. 1844 In November 2016, torture and mass
arrests were carried out as a reprisal for the community engaging with the United Nations
Resident Coordinator.1845 Tensions increased further in August 2017, with threatening
meetings demanding that villagers accept the National Verification Card.1846 Credible
reports indicate that the 33rd LID arrived in the village tract around this time, 1847 and may
have been responsible for beating one man, who died a few days later. 1848 By mid-August
2017, two navy boats were also stationed off the shore of Koe Tan Kauk. 1849
836. On 25 August 2017, around 4am, the Tatmadaw alleged that two ARSA attacks took
place in Koe Tan Kauk village tract.1850 Gunshots were heard by residents of both Koe Tan

1836 LI-062.
1837 LI-062, YI-013, YI-014, YI-018.
1838 CI-103, YI-015.
1839 K-154.2.
1840 QI-113, K-158.3, K-158.4.
1841 RI-002, RI-003.
1842 CI-116, CI-137, LI-100, YI-007.
1843 See this chapter, section D.1.c: Arakan Rohingya Salavation Army.
1844 CI-118, CI-119, CI-181, CI-182, LI-045, LI-053, LI-118.
1845 See this chapter, section D.1.c: Arakan Rohingya Salavation Army.
1846 CI-181, CI-182, CI-183.
1847 CI-181, CI-182, LM-014, V-067.
1848 CI-181, CI-182.
1849 LI-045, LI-052, LI-053, LI-100, QI-113.
1850 Information Committee reported that ARSA attacked the Koe Tan Kauk police station at 4:50 a.m.;
“[t]he military columns arrived… at 5:15 a.m. and returned fires [sic],” killing six attackers.
Information Committee, “Breaking News 2,” (Facebook post, 25 August 2017),
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/785202504986191

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Kauk1851 and nearby Chein Khar Li.1852 The Government did not report any casualties;
however, it noted that seven ARSA members were killed. 1853
837. Early on 25 August 2017, Tatmadaw soldiers, 1854 accompanied by other security
forces1855 and ethnic Rakhine,1856 entered Chein Khar Li from the south,1857 shooting at
villagers.1858 Some Rohingya ran towards the forested hills 1859 and many people were shot
when fleeing.1860 Others died in more targeted killings by having their throats slit or other
stabbings.1861 Those who returned to the village after the attack found bodies with throats
cut and decapitated heads, including those of children. 1862 One survivor who returned to the
village recalled:
I found my six-month old son’s body lying next to my wife’s body. She had been shot.
My baby son was stabbed in his stomach and his intestine and liver were coming
out. When I took his small body into my lap, I was showered with his blood. 1863
838. Soldiers then started to burn houses in a systematic fashion, from the south and
moving north.1864 “Launchers” were used,1865 as well as petrol and matches.1866 One villager
commented: “They burned everything. Not one tree was left.” 1867 A number of persons
unable to escape, including disabled persons, children and the elderly, were burned inside
their houses.1868 A number of corpses were thrown into burning houses. 1869
839. On 28 August 2017, the Tatmadaw undertook a further “clearance operation” in Koe
Tan Kauk village, one and a half kilometres to the north. 1870 Early that morning, a group of
Tatmadaw soldiers, accompanied by other security forces1871 and ethnic Rakhine,1872 entered
the village from both sides.1873 The Tatmadaw led the operation, shooting into the village
and towards people fleeing.
840. Weapons were also fired towards the village from naval ships that had been
stationed just off the shore.1874 The military also fired “launchers” towards homes. 1875 A
number of elderly1876 and disabled persons1877 were burned in their houses, with their bodies

1851 CI-116, LI-100.

1852 CI-014, CI-030, CI-031, CI-137, CI-181, QI-003.
1853 Information Committee, “Breaking News 2” (Facebook post, 25 August 2017),
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/785202504986191
1854 CI-014, CI-030, CI-031, CI-137, LI-045, LI-052, LI-053, LI-100, YI -006, YI-007, WI-029, WI-030,
V-067.
1855 CI-137, LI-053, QI-002.
1856 CI-137, LI-052, LI-053, YI-006, LI-045, K-076.22.
1857 CI-014, CI-030, LI-052, LI-053, QI-002.
1858 CI-014, CI-137.
1859 CI-014, CI-030, CI-031, CI-137, LI-053, WI-029, WI-030, YI-007, V-067.
1860 CI-030, CI-137, LI-053.
1861 CI-030, CI-137, LI-045.
1862 CI-030, CI-137, LI-052, WI-030, YI-006.
1863 CI-030.
1864 CI-014, LI-052, LI-053, WI-029.
1865 CI-014, C-030, CI-137, YI-006, YI-007.
1866 CI-030.
1867 LI-045.
1868 CI-030, CI-137, LI-045, LI-052, LI-053.
1869 CI-137, LI-053, WI-029.
1870 CI-116, V-067.
1871 CI-116, CI-118, LI-100.
1872 CI-116, LI-100, QI-003, QI-33.
1873 CI-116, CI-118, LI-100, QI-113, XI-001, K-076.21.
1874 CI-183, LI-100, QI-113, V-081.
1875 CI-118, LI-100, QI-33, QI-034.
1876 QI-113.
1877 CI-116, CI-119, LI-100, QI-113.

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found by relatives who returned to the village in subsequent days to search for survivors or
recover food and belongings. 1878
841. Rape and sexual violence also occurred in both locations. In Koe Tan Kauk village,
one man found a young girl naked and bleeding, who told him she had been raped by the
military. She died.1879 The Mission received a report of a man from Chein Khar Li who saw
Tatmadaw soldiers rape and kill his wife by slitting her throat, as well as kill his three
children, all aged under five. 1880
842. Satellite imagery analysis from 16 September 2017 confirms that all the Rohingya
hamlets and two IDP camps inside the village tract were burned and destroyed. The two
ethnic Rakhine hamlets remained intact. 1881
843. While total numbers of persons killed remain unknown, the number of casualties, as
compiled by Rohingya community volunteers in the refugee camps of southern Bangladesh,
suggest that 94 Rohingya died in Chein Khar Li and 94 Rohingya died in Koe Tan Kauk,
resulting in a total number of more than 180 deaths within the village tract.1882 While the
Mission was not able to verify the number of casualties, it notes that almost every person
interviewed reported losing at least one family member in the “clearance operation”, with
many having lost multiple family members and other credible sources further note
significant casualties sustained in this village tract. 1883
844. The Tatmadaw led the operation, with credible independent sources identifying the
presence of the 33rd LID.1884 Ethnic Rakhine were also involved with neighbours identified,
including current and former village chairmen. 1885 Most ethnic Rakhine wore civilian
clothes and were armed with swords;1886 in Chein Khar Li, some wore uniforms and carried
guns.1887 Members of the local ethnic Rakhine militia, active since 2012, were also
identified as participating in Chein Khar Li.1888 In Koe Tan Kauk, ethnic Rakhine were
involved in burning houses and looting.1889

Southern Maungdaw
845. Southern Maungdaw Township was one of the main targets of the Tatmadaw’s
“clearance operations” in the initial phase from 25 August 2017. A number of these
operations commenced in the early morning on 25 August. In a matter of days, operations
were implemented across a vast swathe of territory encompassing dozens of Rohingya
villages stretching along the fertile plains between the Bay of Bengal and the forested hills
separating Maungdaw and Buthidaung Townships. This was also a region where a number
of ARSA attacks took place. The Mission has collected detailed information on the
operations in four village tracts, although these are reflective of patterns seen across this
area.

Kyauk Pan Du
846. Kyauk Pan Du village tract, known in Rohingya as Shitar Fawrikka, has two
Rohingya hamlets and one ethnic Rakhine NaTaLa village. A BGP camp is located in the
NaTaLa village.1890 ARSA attacked the BGP camp in Kyauk Pan Du on 25 August, 1891 and

1878 LI-100, QI-034, QI-113.

1879 XI-001.
1880 CI-181, CI-182, LI-052.
1881 K-158.4. Satellite imagery analysis prepared for the Mission by UNITAR-UNOSAT.
1882 K-153.2.
1883 See for example, Amnesty International, We Will Destroy Everything: Military Responsibility for
Crimes Against Humanity in Rakhine State (2018), pp. 76-69.
1884 K-153.3, V-067.
1885 CI-030, CI-137, LI-052.
1886 LI-052, LI-053, YI-006, K-076.22.
1887 YI-006
1888 CI-181, CI-183, LI-052.
1889 CI-016, CI-183, LI-100, QI-002, XI-001.
1890 LI-130.

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there is official reference to ARSA destroying a small bridge nearby. 1892 Rohingya villagers
heard gunfire from approximately 3am on 25 August.1893
847. The Tatmadaw immediately commenced a “clearance operation” in the two
neighbouring Rohingya hamlets, arriving from the direction of the BGP camp. They were
accompanied by armed BGP officers and some non-uniformed individuals believed to be
ethnic Rakhine villagers, carrying knives. 1894 Members of the 99th LID participated in the
operation.1895 The “clearance operation” lasted for at least two days, resulting in a large
number of people killed or injured, and the burning of both hamlets and ultimately nearly
all Rohingya property1896 in the village tract.1897 On the second day, it is reported that
additional Tatmadaw soldiers arrived on foot from the direction of the neighbouring Thin
Baw Kwe village tract to the south.1898
848. During the operation, as people left their houses, the security forces opened fire with
automatic weapons. Fleeing people were shot, injured or killed. 1899 One elderly woman
stayed in her house after her family members fled. Her son came back to get her; he was
shot in the head and killed.1900
849. Knives were used to kill some Rohingya villagers who had been captured or
injured.1901 One witness’ brother-in-law was killed after being shot in the thigh and unable
to run. He was surrounded by approximately 12 soldiers, two of whom held him, one
pulling his head back, while a third slit his throat. 1902 Another witness described how he and
his family hid next to a river and watched as four elderly men, who were unable to run fast,
were captured and beaten. He later heard they were killed.1903 A number of people took
shelter in paddy fields and ditches between the hamlets and the forested hills; some were
killed.1904 One villager who later returned to the village saw 12 bodies in a ditch, including
his father and his niece. He had seen people taking cover there, and believed soldiers found
and killed them.1905 Captured or injured people were also seen being pushed into burning
houses by the security forces.1906 It appears that other persons unable to flee were also
burned in their houses.
850. The destruction of the village took at least two days, and involved the use of
“launchers”.1907 The whole village was destroyed by fire, including the mosque and
school.1908
851. Villagers who were able to flee took shelter in the forested hills to the west, 1909 and
hid for days in difficult conditions. Some villagers were able to return to their hamlets at
night, after the security forces had returned to the camp in the north. 1910 They found a large

1891 K-154.2, Information Committee, “Breaking News 2” (Facebook post, 25 August 2017),
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/785202504986191.
1892 “Kyaut pandu: At 8:5 am, extremist terrorists blew out a small old-concrete bridge near Kyaukpandu
Village.” Information Committee, “Breaking News 2”, (Facebook post, 25 August 2017),
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/785202504986191
1893 CI-138, WI-016.
1894 CI-138, LI-039, LI-120, QI-013, WI-016, YI-010.
1895 RI-012, ZI-001, K-153.3.
1896 Satellite imagery analysis prepared for the Mission by UNITAR-UNOSAT.
1897 CI-138, LI-020, WI-016.
1898 LI-120.
1899 CI-014, CI-138, LI-005, LI-028, LI-039, RI-012, WI-016, ZI-001.
1900 LI-039.
1901 LI-039, WI-016.
1902 WI-016.
1903 LI-120.
1904 CI-138, QI-013.
1905 QI-013.
1906 LI-005, LI-039.
1907 CI-138, LI-039, LI-120, QI-013, YI-010.
1908 LI-039, WI-016.
1909 LI-120, WI-016.
1910 LI-028, LI-039, WI-016.

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number of corpses and performed funerals for some. One villager who returned recalled
burying around 25 of the dead, whose ages varied from 1 month to 80 years old, both male
and female. He also saw 10 elderly people who had been burned in their houses. 1911
852. Ethnic Rakhine villagers looted belongings from Rohingya houses before they were
burned, piling items outside which were then removed on vehicles. 1912
853. After days in hiding, and unable to return home, many villagers left for Bangladesh.
One person described walking north to Myin Hlut, known in Rohingya as May Rulla, and
spending a night there before it too was attacked, forcing them to flee from a “clearance
operation” for a second time. 1913
854. During the “clearance operation” in Kyauk Pan Du, women and girls were gang
raped and subjected to serious physical injuries by members of the Tatmadaw and ethnic
Rakhine men. This included mass gang rapes.1914 A young woman, 20-years old, described
her experience:
My husband was shot and then he had his throat cut. I was raped. It is so difficult to
say what happened. They tore off my clothes, then six soldiers raped me, and after
that two ethnic Rakhine men, whom I recognised, raped me. They pressed my
breasts and face continuously. My face almost turned blue. I knew the ethnic
Rakhine who lived nearby.1915
855. A list of casualties developed by by Rohingya community volunteers in the refugee
camps of sourthern Bangladesh put an estimate of deaths at 38. While the Mission has not
been able to verify this number, it is consistent with testimony received.

Myin Hlut
People were running in different directions, and I wasn’t even able to carry my
children. Everyone was just running for their lives.1916
856. Myin Hlut, known in Rohingya as May Rulla, is a village tract to the north of Kyauk
Pan Du. There are 10 hamlets spread along fertile land near the coast, the majority of which
were Rohingya, and with a police post in the western part of the village tract.
857. On 25 August 2017, an ARSA attack took place in Myin Hlut, and the Tatmadaw
alleged that two police officers were killed. 1917 Continuous gunfire was heard in the early
hours.1918 One villager described how his family gathered out of fear. Bullets entered their
compound. One of his cousins was hit and killed inside his uncle’s house. 1919
858. An initial “clearance operation” in the village started in the early morning of
25 August, with Tatmadaw soldiers and members of the BGP entering from the west and
firing weapons at people fleeing and burning properties. 1920 A number of people were shot
and died, some while trying to escape.1921 The security forces also killed people by cutting
their throats with knives.1922

1911 WI-016.
1912 CI-138, LI-120, QI-013.
1913 LI-120.
1914 EI-007, EI-072, LI-020, LI-039, WI-016.
1915 EI-072.
1916 QI-111.
1917 K-154.2, V-082; Information Committee, “Breaking News 2: Extremist terrorists launch series of
attacks on police stations and police outposts in Maungtaw Township” (Facebook post, 25 August
2017).
1918 BI-002, QI-111, QI-112, YI-010.
1919 QI-111.
1920 BI-002, YI-010.
1921 EI-035, QI-112, WI-022, YI-010.
1922 WI-020, WI-022.

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859. One witness, who hid in a dumping site, recognized BGP members involved in the
operation. He knew them from playing football together. 1923 A large number of properties in
Myin Hlut West and South were burned by “launchers”. 1924 A witness saw the security
forces first burning the market buildings and madrassa to the west, then moving through the
first hamlet, burning houses as they proceeded. As he ran with family members, he was
shot in the leg:
Everyone was running for their lives. I was helping my younger sisters to flee. I was
shot in the leg and the bullet fractured my leg. I fell down, but my father and uncle
carried me to the hamlet next to the forest. There they tried to stop the bleeding. 1925
860. The “clearance operation” took several days.1926 It appears that the security forces
first launched operations in the more south-westerly hamlets, closest to the police camp,
later moving east and north. They burned buildings as they proceeded. A witness described
leaving his house when he saw the security forces approaching:
I left my house and ran, but as I was running through a paddy field, I was hit by a
bullet in my mouth. I fell down and lay there unconscious. When I regained
consciousness, I realised that my mother, brother and sister had come to rescue me
and had carried me to the forest. I could see that our house was completely burned,
as well as many other houses.1927
861. Some people ran towards Shee Dar, the most northern hamlet, and then towards the
forested hills. People, including the injured, women and children, hid in the forest for some
days. Persons with serious injuries, received treatment in the forest from a villager with
some medical knowledge.1928
862. Women and girls were subjected to sexual violence, including rape by members of
the Tatmadaw and the police both in their homes and in the forest when trying to escape. 1929
One survivor recalled:
The military came to our village. I hid in the toilet outhouse, some distance from our
house. I saw that our house was surrounded by 10 soldiers and some police. I was
able to see what happened. First they tied up my parents. Then they shot my father
and raped my mother; later they killed her too. After this, they burned our house.
The toilet was far from the house, so I was able to escape.1930
863. Satellite imagery analysis demonstrates that the Rohingya hamlets of Myin Hlut
village tract were burned and destroyed by 16 September 2017. Further satellite imagery
analysis shows that the area was bulldozed and cleared of all buildings and vegetation by
13 February 2018.1931
864. A list of casualties developed by Rohingya community volunteers in the refugee
camps of southern Bangladesh indicate that up to 70 persons were killed in Min Hlut.
While the Mission has not been able to verify this number, it is consistent with testimony
received.

Ah Lel Than Kyaw

865. Ah Lel Than Kyaw (known in Rohingya as Hassu Rata) is a village tract with
approximately six kilometres of coastline. It has seven main hamlets and a large majority
Rohingya population. There is a small ethnic Rakhine population in the northeast of the
tract. There is also a BGP checkpoint and camp, where Tatmadaw soldiers were based too.

1923 YI-010.
1924 BI-014, WI-022, YI -010.
1925 BI-002.
1926 EI-017, LI-120.
1927 BI-014.
1928 BI-014.
1929 BI-002, WI-020, V-085, V-127.
1930 WI-020.
1931 Satellite imagery analysis prepared for the Mission by UNITAR-UNOSAT.

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It appears that the presence of security forces increased significantly at these locations from
October 2016 onwards.1932
866. At around 4am on 25 August 2017, ARSA launched attacks on the two BGP
locations. According to the Government, the Deputy Township Immigration Officer was
killed. One police official reportedly stated that 17 participants in the ARSA attack were
killed during a three-hour encounter.1933 The same police official reportedly also stated that
he had been given advance warning and had taken the non-Muslim population into the
camp for protection.1934 The sound of gunfire was heard by residents of the village tract, and
from neighbouring Chein Khar Li village tract to the north. 1935
867. A “clearance operation” was launched shortly afterwards 1936 from the BGP camp,
with continuous shooting from BGP officers and Tatmadaw soldiers. The security forces
moved to various locations, including a football field, and continued shooting towards
people’s houses and at people fleeing. 1937 One witness stated that he later saw seven or eight
people who had been shot dead inside their homes. 1938 The operation caused people to run
towards the forested hills, a few kilometres northeast. Later that day, the security forces
went to the market area of the village in Zay Kone Tan. Shooting continued there. 1939
According to one witness, these shootings happened after ethnic Rakhine villagers started
to loot market stalls, causing a confrontation with local Rohingya stall-owners.1940 Up to 15
corpses were later found at the bottom of a well in the market area.1941
868. The “clearance operation” lasted for at least three days, and led to the burning and
destruction of most Rohingya property. One villager described how he returned to his home
after the security forces had left and found the burned bodies of his two nephews, two and
three years old.1942 Buildings in the village were still smouldering as late as 6 September
2017, indicating that burnings may have taken place for up to 12 days. 1943 Members of the
security forces used “launchers” to burn properties.1944 Ethnic Rakhine were involved in
killings and looting.1945 One witness stated that Tatmadaw Special Forces reinforcements
arrived in the village in the evening of 26 August and that he saw three trucks of soldiers
arrive. He believed them to be from the 99 th LID. The more intense phase of the operation
started the following day, causing those remaining to flee.1946
869. While assessing the numbers killed or injured in the village tract is challenging,
there are indications that the numbers are high. A list of casualties developed by Rohingya
villagers indicate that up to 77 persons were killed in Ah Lel Than Kyaw. While the
Mission has not been able to verify this number, it is consistent with testimony received.

1932 CI-129, CI-192, LI-111, LI-112, ZI-006.

1933 XI-008, V-083; Information Committee, “Breaking News 2: Extremist terrorists launch series of
attacks on police stations and police outposts in Maungtaw Township” (Facebook post, 25 August
2018), https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/785202504986191, where they state:
“Alel Than Kyaw: At 4:50 am, an unidentified number of extremist terrorists attacked Ale Thankyaw
police station in Region-8, leaving Deputy Township Immigration Officer Zar Moung dead. The
policemen repulsed the terrorists who retreated from the scene.”
1934 V-083.
1935 BI-012, CI-013, CI-038, CI-039, CI-065, CI-129, LI-111, LI-112.
1936 CI-013, CI-039, CI-129, CI-187, LI-112, ZI-006.
1937 LI-068.
1938 LI-112.
1939 CI-129, LI-112.
1940 LI-112.
1941 CI-129, LI-112.
1942 CI-035.
1943 V-083.
1944 CI-035, CI-129, LI-111, LI-112.
1945 CI-013.
1946 LI-112.

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870. Villagers from further south observed dead bodies in the village when en route to
Bangladesh.1947 One villager from Inn Din stated the following:
When we passed though Hassu Rata, I saw 15 dead bodies in different houses, all
with bullet wounds. We had planned to sleep there, but decided not to sleep
alongside dead bodies.1948

Inn Din
871. Inn Din is a village tract of up to six separate Rohingya settlements, and two small
ethnic Rakhine hamlets, one of which is a NaTaLa village. Before the ‘clearance
operations’ the population of Inn Din was approximately 7,000, 90 per cent of whom were
Rohingya.1949 Although there were no ARSA attacks in Inn Din on 25 August 2017, there
were attacks on BGP posts in village tracts directly to the north and to the south, in Thin
Baw Kwe and Tha Win Chaung.
872. Tensions were heightened in the immediate aftermath of 25 August, with villagers
reporting the presence of Tatmadaw soldiers and ethnic Rakhine and a number of shootings
which caused injuries to Rohingya villagers. 1950 An ethnic Rakhine man, who had taken his
cattle to a forested area, also went missing, and this appears to have further increased
tensions.1951 Other credible reports suggest that many of the ethnic Rakhine residents of Inn
Din took shelter in the local monastery, where there were also Tatmadaw soldiers and BGP
officers present.1952
873. A “clearance operation” was launched across Inn Din in a similar manner to
neighbouring village tracts. It was led by the Tatmadaw, with the active engagement of
ethnic Rakhine. Over the course of up to a week, the Rohingya settlements of Inn Din were
targeted, with the rapid arrival of soldiers and ethnic Rakhine, often in the early morning.
Their arrival was accompanied by gunfire and the burning of houses and other Rohingya
property, including through the extensive use of “launchers”. Men, women and children
were killed and wounded. They were shot. They were stabbed or slashed with large knives
and swords, including by persons in civilian clothes, believed to be ethnic Rakhine. 1953
874. Many interviewees saw Rohingya villagers shot or stabbed. One elderly woman,
interviewed in a Bangladeshi hospital in mid-September 2017, had seen soldiers setting
houses on fire and shooting people, including her elderly neighbour. 1954 A young mother
gave a sense of the surprise nature of the operations. She was at home in the early hours of
the morning when she heard gunfire. She saw her neighbour’s house ignite in flames.
Bullets then entered her house and her three-year old son was killed. She ran to the forest
with her other children and could see houses across the village burning. She also saw the
bodies of her uncle and her brother-in-law, with slit throats.1955 In another incident, three
members of the same family were executed by Tatmadaw soldiers and ethnic Rakhine. A
witness, who hid with one of his sons in a latrine, later found the bodies of his other son, his
father-in-law and uncle, who had been stabbed and had their throats slit.1956
875. At one point there appears to have been an attempt by a large group of Rohingya
men to offer some resistance in one of the hamlets, known to the Rohingya residents as Bor
Para. Men gathered with the aim of preventing the soldiers and ethnic Rakhine from

1947 LI-112, QI-116, YI-010.

1948 QI-116.
1949 V-084.
1950 CI-146, LI-006, LI-130, QI-116.
1951 LI-130, V-067; Wa Lone, Kyaw Soe Oo, S. Lewis, A. Slodkowski, “Massacre in Myanmar” (Reuters,
8 February 2018).
1952 V-067.
1953 CI-029, CI-146, EI-006, EI-008, EI-057, LI-006, LI-027, LI-130, QI-006, QI-051, QI-116.
1954 EI-006.
1955 LI-027.
1956 QI-051.

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entering the hamlet. The soldiers opened fire on the group, which then dispersed, with at
least one man killed.1957
876. Many villagers who were able to escape took shelter in the forested hills to the
eastern side of the village tract. Some reported spending up to a week in the hills in difficult
conditions under makeshift shelters. 1958 Tatmadaw soldiers also shot into forests where
people were sheltering, causing further injuries and possibly deaths. 1959
877. Other villagers congregated on the beach. Reports suggest that some felt forced to
leave the forested hills due to the difficult conditions and lack of food and water, moving to
the beach with the aim of continuing on to Bangladesh.1960 Reuters journalists investigated
the separation of 10 men from a group of several hundreds gathered on the beach on 1
September 2017, who were executed the following day. 1961 This account is consistent with
information verified by the Mission,1962 including the account of the wife of one of the men,
given shortly after she had arrived in Bangladesh in September 2017. She explained how
she and family members had gathered on the beach. Then the men were separated and made
to sit in rows with their hands tied behind their backs, including her husband and brother.
She had not seen them since and had been told that they were killed.1963
878. The “clearance operations” in Inn Din were led and largely undertaken by
Tatmadaw soldiers, supported by local BGP officers and ethnic Rakhine. Locally-based
soldiers from the Western Command were joined by members of the 33 rd LID during the
course of the operation.1964 Some of the ethnic Rakhine who participated were from local
villages; they were recognised by Rohingya witnesses. 1965 However, some soldiers and
police may also have worn civilian clothes alongside ethnic Rakhine villagers, in an attempt
to avoid being recognised as members of the security forces.1966
879. Satellite imagery analysis indicates that, by 16 September 2017, the majority and
possibly all Rohingya houses and buildings inside Inn Din were burned and destroyed. 1967
The neighbouring NaTaLa village of Pae Youne was untouched. Further satellite imagery
analysis shows that, by 16 February 2018, most of the burned Rohingya properties, along
with trees and other vegetation, were bulldozed and cleared.1968

Other verified incidents

880. “Clearance operations” following the same modus operandi took place in numerous
other Rohingya villages across northern Rakhine State. The Mission verified, through
multiple interviews and other information, “clearance operations” similar to those detailed
above in a total of 54 separate locations, and it received first-hand accounts of additional
“clearance operations” in a further 22 locations.
881. For example, in northern Maungdaw Township, the Mission verified additional
“clearance operations”, which saw serious human rights violations against Rohingya, in the
village tracts of Kun Thee Pyin, 1969 Tha Man Thar,1970 Kha Maung Seik,1971 Pa Da Ga Day

1957 CI-146, LI-130.

1958 CI-146, QI-051.
1959 CI-029, LI-027, QI-116.
1960 V-067, V-084.
1961 Wa Lone, Kyaw Soe Oo, S. Lewis, A. Slodkowski, “Massacre in Myanmar” (Reuters, 8 February
2018).
1962 CI-146, LI-006, LI-130, QI-051, RI-012.
1963 LI-006.
1964 LI-112, ZI-001, V-067, V-084.
1965 LI-006, LI-027.
1966 Wa Lone, Kyaw Soe Oo, S. Lewis, A. Slodkowski, “Massacre in Myanmar” (Reuters, 8 February
2018).
1967 Satellite imagery of Inn Din is reproduced below.
1968 Satellite imagery analysis prepared for the Mission by UNITAR-UNOSAT.
1969 LI-015, LI-017, LI-032.
1970 BI-006, CI-049, CI-050, CI-124, LI-014, LI-103, LI-104, QI-070, WI-048.

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Wa Na Li / Net Chaung1972 and Kyein Chaung.1973 Similarly, in Buthidaung Township, the

Mission verified “clearance operations” in Tin May1974, as well as in a large cluster of
villages, known collectively in Rohingya as Taung Bazar. Multiple Rohingya villages in
this region were subjected to a wave of “clearance operations” as soldiers moved from one
village to the next over a period of days. These included operations in the village tracts of
Mee Chaung Zay,1975 Nga Yant Chaung,1976 and Thin Gar Net.1977
882. Each of these incidents saw a similar pattern of conduct on the part of the Myanmar
military and security forces. There was an attack on the village by Tatmadaw soldiers, and
often other perpetrators, the burning of Rohingya property, and the killing and injuring of
civilians through indiscriminate shooting or targeted killing, leading to multiple deaths. In
many cases, women and girls were subjected to rape and other forms of sexual violence.

(b) Patterns of serious human rights violations by the Myanmar security forces
883. The “clearance operations” constituted a human rights catastrophe. The Myanmar
military and other security forces committed human rights violations on a colossal scale, in
violation of all basic tenets of international law. The operations had a devastating impact on
the Rohingya civilian population, which was targeted, brutalised and terrorised. Thousands
of Rohingya villagers were killed and injured. Women and girls were subjected to rape and
other forms of sexual violence, and frequently then killed. Children were attacked
deliberately and callously and subjected to grave violations. Men and boys were
disappeared, probably killed. The arduous journey to Bangladesh caused further death and
injury. Rohingya-populated areas across the three townships of northern Rakhine State
were deliberately destroyed, in a targeted manner.

Unlawful killings and other forms of excessive and indiscriminate use of force
884. Many Rohingya were killed or injured by indiscriminate shooting. Rohingya
villages were approached without warning, usually from more than one direction, and often
in the early morning, by armed Tatmadaw soldiers. They were often accompanied by other
armed security forces, including the BGP, the Myanmar Police Force and riot police
(known as lon htein), and frequently by ethnic Rakhine civilians. Members of the security
forces, primarily Tatmadaw soldiers of the Western Command and the 33 rd and 99th LIDs,
shot assault rifles towards the Rohingya villages from a distance, not targeting any
particular military objective or making any distinction between ARSA fighters and
civilians. Men, women and children were all shot at.1978 Many victims referred to the

1971 CI-002, CI-004, CI-048, CI-104, CI-121, CI-122, EI-014, EI-049, EI-064, EI-089, EI-090, LI-101, LI-
102, QI-069, WI-047.
1972 CI-131, LI-076, LI-113, LI-119, QI-114, XI-003.
1973 CI-114, CI-123, CI-125, EI-023, EI-028, EI-045, EI-096, EI-097, EI-098, EI-104, LI-031, LI-107, LI-
109, LI-110, QI-114, WI-004, YI-023.
1974 CI-021, CI-115, EI-001, EI-067, EI-068, EI-069, EI-071, LI-056, LI-116, YI-029.
1975 CI-112, CI-135, EI-021, EI-107, LI-044, QI-024, XI-005.
1976 EI-093, WI-007, YI-030.
1977 BI-013, LI-081, YI-031.
1978 CI-001, CI-002, CI-005, CI-006, CI-007, CI-008, CI-013, CI-014, CI-015, CI-017, CI-019, CI-020,
CI-021, CI-024, CI-029, CI-030, CI-033, CI-034, CI-035, CI-040, CI-050, CI-103, CI-105, CI-106,
CI-108, CI-118, CI-109, CI-110, CI-111, 112, CI-113, CI-114, CI-115, CI-116, CI-118, CI-120, CI-
121, CI-122, CI-123, CI-124, CI-126, CI-127, CI-128, CI-129, CI-131, CI-132, CI-133, CI-134, CI-
135, CI-137, CI-138, CI-139, CI-140, CI-142, CI-143, CI-144, CI-146, CI-147, CI-148, CI-149, CI-
150, CI-177, CI-178, CI-179, CI-180, CI-181, CI-184, CI-185, CI-186, CI-187, CI-188, CI-189, CI-
191, CI-192, CI-193,CI-195, CI-196, CI-197, CI-198, CI-199, EI-001, EI-003, EI-004, EI-005, EI-
006, EI-008, EI-009, EI-010, EI-011, EI-013, EI-015, EI-018, EI-019, EI-020, EI-024, EI-027, EI-
029, EI-030, EI-035, EI-039, EI-040, EI-041, EI-044, EI-045, EI-047, EI-048, EI-049, EI-050, EI-
051, EI-053, EI-061, EI-062, EI-064, EI-065, EI-066, EI-071, EI-076, EI-078, EI-080, EI-081, EI-
082, EI-083, EI-097, EI-098,EI-102, LI-005, LI-008, LI-010, LI-011, LI-012, LI-013, LI-015, LI-016,
LI-017, LI-018, LI-020, LI-021, LI-022, LI-027, LI-028, LI-030, LI-031, LI-032, LI-036, LI-039, LI-
041, LI-042, LI-044, LI-045, LI-046, LI-047, LI-054, LI-062, LI-064, LI-065, LI-067, LI-069, LI-
070, LI-072, LI-073, LI-074, LI-076, LI-080, LI-081, LI-102, LI-103, LI-104, LI-105, LI-109, LI-

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volume of gunfire, with some describing it as “raining bullets”.1979 Many were shot and
killed or injured while attempting to flee.
885. Witnesses saw relatives, friends, neighbours or fellow villagers shot and fall down
while they themselves were running away, and saw people lying on the ground, shot dead
or wounded. One young girl described the operation in Maungdaw Township:
When the soldiers came to my village, we all ran, and they shot at us. We were
around 50 people, and maybe half of us were shot. The people shot fell down while
they were running. Some died and some escaped. Somehow, I escaped.1980
886. Another man described how his wife was shot as they were fleeing their village in
Thit Tone Nar Gwa Son Village Tract, Maungdaw Township:
I was in my house with my family, and my wife had just finished cooking the rice. We
heard shooting and so we ran out of our house. My wife followed me, but she was hit
by a bullet in her chest just outside the house. I tried to hold her. Then I realized she
was dead. I couldn’t carry her body because the shooting did not stop. There was
shooting everywhere and I had to run to save my life. I could have been hit by the
same bullet but I was lucky.1981
887. Others who had found shelter, such as in nearby forested hills, witnessed fellow
villagers being shot. Some who were able to return to their villages in the following days,
often at night, saw many dead bodies with bullet injuries. 1982
888. Many villagers who sustained non-fatal bullet wounds had to be left behind by
fleeing relatives, and are presumed dead. The intensity of the “clearance operations” made
their rescue impossible. One man from Kyein Chaung village tract, known in Rohingya as
Boli Bazar, in northern Maungdaw Township explained the circumstances in which his
daughter was killed:
I don’t know how many people died that day. The military, they were just shooting at
whomever. They were shooting at people whenever they saw them, on the streets or
in the houses. When they were shooting, there was no time to look back and care for
those who were shot. As people were running, they were shooting at them. That is
how my daughter died. She was hit fleeing. I couldn’t go back and carry her. 1983
889. Some people risked their lives to carry injured or otherwise stranded relatives to
safety, or to try to recover possessions. One elderly woman stranded in Kyauk Pan Du,
Maungdaw Township, was rescued by her son who was subsequently killed. She described
what happened:
It was complete chaos. All we could hear were the sounds of bullets. All the other
family members ran away, but I was an old woman, so I stayed behind. Then my son
came back to get me. He helped me and I joined my family. But then he went back to
the house to get our belongings and some rice. My son was shot inside our house.
The bullet went into the house and hit my son in the head. Later that night, after the
military left, I went back to see my son’s dead body. He was 30 years old.1984

111, LI-112, LI-114, LI-117, LI-119, LI-120, LI-124, LI-128, LI-130, LI-131, LI-132, QI-001, QI-
003, QI-004, QI-008, QI-009, QI-011, QI-012, QI-014, QI-016, QI-023, QI-025, QI-028, QI-029, QI-
048, QI-070, QI-106, QI-107, QI-112, QI-113, QI-114, QI-116, RI-002, RI-003, RI-004, RI-005, RI-
007, RI-008, RI-010, RI-012, RI-013, RI-016, RI-018, WI-001, WI-002, WI-009, WI-015, WI-017,
WI-024, WI-039, XI-001, XI-002, XI-003, XI-004, XI-006, YI-006, YI-007, YI-009, YI-010, YI-011,
YI-013, YI-014, YI-018, YI-025, YI-030, YI-031, YI-032, YI-033. V-128, K-061, V-128; See also
XChange.com, The Rohingya Survey (15 December 2017), where 40 per cent of respondents reported
indiscriminate shooting.
1979 CI-033, CI-112, CI-150, LI-120, QI-036, QI-116, RI-012.
1980 LI-011.
1981 YI-009.
1982 CI-030, LI-028, LI-029, LI-042, LI-074, LI-093, LI-114, QI-002, QI-027.
1983 LI-107.
1984 LI-029.

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890. The indiscriminate shooting disproportionately affected those unable to move

quickly, often children, pregnant women or those with young children, the elderly and
disabled persons.1985 Their dead bodies were often discovered later, with bullet wounds.
One man explained what happened to an elderly woman in his village in Kha Maung Seik,
northern Maungdaw Township:
There was a very old woman in my hamlet, and she was left behind by her family
when the military came, as they couldn’t help her escape. When I went back to my
village a few days later, I saw that she had been shot dead. I saw the bullet
wound.1986
891. Some Rohingya villagers who could not flee, or who sought shelter inside their
houses, were also shot and killed or injured, when bullets penetrated thatched roofs and
bamboo walls.1987 Villagers were shot in other locations where they had found shelter,
including through rapid arms fire into forested hills where they had fled. 1988
892. Many Rohingya were killed in targeted attacks too. The Mission has provided
detailed accounts above of corroborated mass killings perpetrated in the villages of Min
Gyi, Maung Nu, Chut Pyin, Gu Dar Pyin, the villages of Koe Tan Kauk. Dozens, and in
some cases hundreds, of men, women and children were killed. Additional organized mass
killings are likely to have taken place. Witnesses reported seeing bodies of large numbers of
Rohingya, including those with gunshot and machete wounds, as well as decapitated heads,
in burned villages en route to Bangladesh.1989 The Mission is concerned that other such
mass killings remain undocumented. Moreover, other “clearance operations” in the villages
of northern Rakhine State verified by the Mission resulted in a significant numbers of
casualties, with numbers of killed often in the dozens. These incidents also constitute mass
killings, although seemingly implemented in a less organized manner.
893. In addition to these instances of mass targeted killings, members of the security
forces shot individual persons, including at point blank range, 1990 and executed people,
including those injured, by slitting their throats using long knives. In some cases, these
targeted killings occurred as Tatmadaw soldiers and other security forces systematically
moved from house to house, pulling people out of their homes and executing them, or
shooting them inside their houses, or as they left their houses, often in front of family
members.1991 Ethnic Rakhine, working alongside the Tatmadaw and other security forces,
also targeted and killed victims with long knives.
894. A woman from Kyein Chaung village tract, northern Maungdaw Township, saw
many family members executed. Her mother-in-law was shot and killed and her husband
was shot while fleeing. Two of her children were also killed, while a third child sustained
multiple stab wounds to the head, but survived:
Soldiers took to me into a house and beat me and my youngest child. He was one
and a half years old, and he died as a result of the beating. My four year old son’s
hand was being held by my daughter, who was also stabbed in the head. He started
crying and then the military stabbed him and he died. It was with a long knife, the
length of a forearm. After they killed him, the soldiers washed the knife.1992
895. Another man described the killings of a group of women and children inside a house
in Kyet Yoe Pyin village tract, Maungdaw Township:

1985 LI-039, LI-093, QI-014, QI-071, WI-032, YI-018, YI-019.

1986 LI-102.
1987 LI-025, LI-027, LI-029, LI-039, LI-041, LI-099, LI-107, QI-111, YI-011.
1988 WI-007.
1989 BI-013, CI-014, CI-016, CI-023, CI-183, QI-063, QI-065, QI-116.
1990 EI-024, LI-011, LI-027, LI-030, QI-035, QI-038, WI-039, WI-007, WI-010, XI-006; See this chapter,
section D.1.a: Most serious incidents.
1991 EI-024, LI-011, LI-027, QI-038, WI-039, XI-006.
1992 WI-004.

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A pregnant woman in labour was being assisted by a midwife as well as a number of

other female relatives. I saw approximately five soldiers enter the house and heard a
few gunshots. Later I went back and saw the dead bodies of an elderly woman, the
mother, a two-year old girl, and another girl who was 16 to 18 years old and the
new-born baby.1993
896. Tatmadaw soldiers and the ethnic Rakhine used swords, knives or machetes, known
locally as “da”, to injure and kill, most notably through the intentional slitting of throats of
Rohingya villagers. Numerous interviewees shared accounts of such killings that they had
witnessed.1994 One man, who was hiding in a paddy field, watched as a group of soldiers
took his 70-year old mother from their house. One soldier slit her throat with a large knife,
leaving her dead on the ground. 1995 Another young woman from a village in northern
Maungdaw also witnessed her mother’s murder: “I was inside our house to get my baby,
but just at that moment a soldier took out a big knife and cut my mother’s throat. I saw her
body fall to the ground.” 1996
897. In some instances, ethnic Rakhine appeared to have a specific role of killing
Rohingya villagers who had been shot and injured. 1997 They mostly used the same kind of
swords or large knives .1998 One woman from Maung Ghi Taung (known in Rohingya as
Shab Bazar) in Buthidaung Township recalled seeing six people, who had been shot and
injured, having their throats slit by ethnic Rakhine using knives. 1999
898. In some villages, people identified as ethnic Rakhine, who in some instances wore
uniforms, were carrying firearms, shooting and killing Rohingya. 2000 At times, they used
homemade guns with a single-load function, known locally as “thela” or “jaitani”, 2001 while
in other cases they used military-grade weapons.2002 Military-grade guns were also seen
being distributed to ethnic Rakhine by the Tatmadaw, in some cases immediately in
advance of the “clearance operation” itself. 2003
899. Other Rohingya were summarily executed while trying to help family members and
neighbours, including those being subjected to sexual violence. One woman from Kun Thee
Pin, northern Maungdaw, described the following incident:
I was inside my house, together with my mother-in-law, my three children, my
husband and some other relatives. It was early in the morning when soldiers
approached our village and were shooting their weapons. Bullets hit the trees in our
yard. I could see that some houses were burning. Then they came straight into our
house. They were touching my body and pulling my hair. They pulled off my scarf
and tried to undo my dress and to lie on top of me on the ground. My husband tried

1993 CI-111.
1994 CI-029, CI-045, EI-029, EI-034, LI-003, LI-008, LI-010, LI-011, LI-012, LI-013, LI-063, LI-072, QI-
028, WI-001, WI-002, WI-009.
1995 QI-028.
1996 EI-029.
1997 EI-030, LI-073, LI-027, LI-065, WI-016, WI-024, YI-014; See this chapter, section D.1.a: Most
serious incidents.
1998 CI-001, CI-029, CI-114, CI-124, EI-030, EI-049, EI-057, EI-066, EI-073 EI-102, LI-003, LI-027, LI-
039, LI-062, LI-063, LI-065, LI-071, LI-073, LI-081, LI-104, LI-118, LI-129, QI-004, QI-011, QI-
029, QI-066, WI-004, WI-005, WI-016, WI-024, WI-027, WI-036, WI-037, WI-038, WI-041, WI-
042, WI-044, WI-048, XI-003, YI-004, YI-014, YI-027.
1998 CI-001, CI-029, CI-114, CI-124, EI-030, EI-049, LI-003, LI-027, LI-039, LI-062, LI-063, LI-065, LI-
071, LI-073, LI-081, LI-104, LI-118, LI-129, QI-004, QI-011, QI-029, QI-066, WI-016, WI-048, YI-
014, YI-027.
1999 EI-030.
2000 CI-120, EI 003, EI 004, EI-005, LI-052, QI-052, WI-005, WI-027, YI-006, YI-031.
2001 CI-124, LI-062, LI-065, LI-069, WI-048.
2002 CI-120, LI-052, LI-054, LI-120, YI-031.
2003 LI-052, LI-103, YI-031.

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to stop them and protect me. They shot him straight in the face and then used a big
knife and slit his throat. He was 35 years old.2004
900. Rohingya fleeing the “clearance operations” also faced violent attacks at border
crossing points, resulting in loss of life and serious injuries. Soldiers opened fire on groups
of Rohingya at or close to border crossing points, including large numbers gathered on the
shores of the Bay of Bengal or Naf River, while waiting to cross into Bangladesh. 2005 A
man from Nga Yant Chaung village tract, Buthidaung Township, described arriving at the
Naf River in mid-September 2017 and being fired upon by soldiers. Some of the people
ran; others, like him, lay on the ground. He said that 25 people were killed, including three
of his relatives.2006
901. Soldiers also shot at boats carrying Rohingya to Bangladesh, resulting in further
casualties.2007 One witness explained how the boat she was in was shot at by soldiers as it
crossed the Naf River, killing three men and two women.2008 Another witness described her
experience while waiting for a boat:
Soldiers started shooting, so we crawled away and lay down behind the plants in the
mud. I saw many people being shot at. Dead bodies of men, women and children
were floating in the river.2009
902. Soldiers also used large knives to kill or attempt to kill Rohingya individuals
crossing the border.2010 A 13-year old boy explained that he was part of a large group
waiting to cross the Naf River when they were attacked by soldiers. The boy was struck
with a large knife and his arm was cut, but he managed to escape in the water. He saw the
bodies of seven people who had been killed.2011 The Mission viewed the wound on the
boy’s arm and found it consistent with wounds from a large knife or other sharp implement.
903. Tatmadaw soldiers also opened fire at groups of Rohingya gathered at the border,
causing fear and panic but apparently no casualties.2012 This gunfire seemed intended to
instil fear and ensure Rohingya left Myanmar. Other groups of Rohingya who encountered
the military en route were not subject to violence, but were threatened. 2013 One victim
explained that he was part of a large group of approximately 200 Rohingya walking
towards the border. They encountered a group of soldiers who surrounded them and said
that, if they went to Bangladesh and promised never to come back, then they would allow
them to go free. If they did not, the soldiers said they would be killed. 2014 Another victim
was also approached by a group of armed Tatmadaw soldiers and told explicitly to leave or
be killed:
We were heading towards one of the main crossing point across the Naf River. We
saw armed Tatmadaw soldiers there, who told us: “Go quickly to Bangladesh,
otherwise we will kill you.”2015
904. Other Rohingya were killed and injured through beatings, 2016 which sometimes
targeted the most vulnerable, including children, women and the elderly. 2017 A witness from
Chut Pyin, Rathedaung Township, saw soldiers using their rifle butts to repeatedly beat her

2004 LI-032
2005 CI-050, EI-065, LI-030, LI-070, LI-076, LI-077, LI-127, LI-131, QI-069, QI-109, WI-007, XI-006.
2006 QI-109.
2007 BI-017, EI-034, EI-065, LI-107, LI-127, QI-026, QI-099, QI-109, WI-007, XI-001.
2008 EI-034.
2009 EI-034.
2010 LI-019, LI-068.
2011 LI-019.
2012 LI-099, LI-028.
2013 LI-099, LI-028.
2014 LI-048.
2015 LI-099.
2016 CI-006, CI-146, EI-024, LI-008, LI-022, QI-018, YI-001.
2017 EI-052, LI-008, LI-022, LI-061.

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70-year old brother in the head until he died. The beating was so severe that part of his
brain came out of his head.2018 A survey estimated that 18.4 per cent of deaths during the
“clearance operations” were as a result of beatings, the second highest reported cause of
death after bullet wounds.2019
905. Another feature of the “clearance operations” was the widespread destruction of
Rohingya homes and villages, causing further death and injury through burning. Houses
were burned both manually using flammable liquid and matches, and by the use of
“launchers”, weapons firing a munition that explodes upon impact. 2020 This latter method in
particular meant that victims were often caught by surprise and had little time to escape.
Death by burning in this manner disproportionately affected vulnerable persons less able to
run and escape from the “clearance operations”, including the elderly, disabled, young
children and pregnant women. Numerous witnesses reported that family members and
others were left behind when they fled the fires. Information indicates that the number of
people killed in this manner is high and likely underreported.
906. Those who were able to return to their villages reported seeing burned corpses in
houses. A man who returned to Kyauk Pan Du in southern Maungdaw saw the burned
corpses of 10 elderly people and one younger person inside their houses. 2021 A man from a
village in Buthidaung Township was able to return to his hamlet after dark and found
around 12 bodies of elderly people who had been burned in their homes. 2022 Another victim
from Ta Man Thar in northern Maungdaw Township returned to find the charred bodies of
a disabled man and two elderly people in their houses. 2023 A female victim from a village in
Maungdaw that was subjected to a “clearance operation” in early September 2017
described her experience:
My house was in the west of the hamlet and the military entered from the east. They
started burning houses and I could see the flames. My disabled brother had a house
in the east. His wife and children fled, but she told me that he was not able to. He
burned inside his house, as he was unable to get out. After two days of hiding and
watching the village burn, we left for Bangladesh.2024
907. One interviewee described fleeing when soldiers entered his village, Zone Kar Yar
in Tha Pyay Taw village tract, southern Maungdaw, and set fire to houses from one end of
the village. His 80-year old mother was unable to run. Shortly afterwards, he could see his
house burning from where he was hiding. The following day, when he returned to his
village, he found the charred body of his mother. 2025 Another witness reported seeing the
bodies of his grandmother and his two infant nephews, who had been burned to death in his
grandmother’s house in Ah Lel Than Kyaw, southern Maungdaw Township. 2026
908. The Mission further verified a pattern of Tatmadaw soldiers intentionally forcing
people into houses that were either burning or about to be set alight, and even locking them
inside.2027 One victim from Ngan Chuang in northern Maungdaw recounted:
The military came into my village and burned the houses with launchers. I was
inside my house with my children when they locked the door from the outside. The

2018 LI-008.
2019 Médecins Sans Frontiers, “Retrospective mortality, nutrition and measles vaccination coverage
survey in Balukhali 2 & Tasnimarkhola camps” (Bangladesh, 2017).
2020 Details regarding the methods used to burn houses are set out later in this section.
2021 WI-016.
2022 QI-007.
2023 QI-070.
2024 QI-025.
2025 QI-012.
2026 CI-025.
2027 BI-006, CI-023, EI-007, EI-058, EI-066, LI-005, LI-012, LI-059, LI-071, LI-075, LI-078, QI-049, QI-
059, QI-111, WI-003, WI-004, WI-005, WI-016, WI-029, XI-001, YI-008.

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house was burning, but I was able to break down a bamboo wall and then rescued
my children one by one. However, my 11-year old daughter was severely burned.2028
909. During the operations in Min Gyi, soldiers took women and children to houses
where they were raped and gang raped, after which the doors were locked and the houses
set on fire. Most victims, including young children who had accompanied their mothers,
were unable to escape and burned to death. Similarly, in Chut Pyin, a number of people
were forced inside houses, which were then intentionally set alight by soldiers.2029
910. Multiple accounts were received of people, including babies and children, being
pushed or thrown into burning houses by soldiers. 2030 One interviewee reported seeing two
young children, six or seven years old, running out of a burning house, only to be pushed
back in by soldiers during the operation in Myin Hlut, Maungdaw Township. 2031 An
interviewee from Kyauk Pan Du, Maungdaw, also described a group of approximately 10
women, children and elderly persons trying to escape a burning house, but being pushed
back inside by soldiers. He saw one soldier stabbing a child, and then pushing the child
inside the burning house. The entire group were burned alive in the house. 2032
911. In a similar incident, a woman from Ku Lar Bil in Thu U Law village tract,
Maungdaw Township, described fleeing with her husband and their nine-year old daughter
from their burning house. Her husband was holding their daughter’s hand but was shot in
his leg by a bullet. Their daughter stopped to help him and soldiers dragged them both into
their burning house. They were both burned alive. “I wish it had been me holding my
daughter's hand, rather than my husband.”2033
912. Landmines, planted by the Tatmadaw in and around Rohingya villages as part of the
“clearance operations” also caused death and injury. 2034 On or around 26 August 2017, a
group of Tatmadaw soldiers approached Sin Oe Pyin (Ywar Gyi) hamlet, in Maung Gyi
Taung village tract, Buthidaung Township. They systematically planted mines along the
main road to the village,2035 with one villager describing them as being placed “15 feet
apart”.2036 Once the operations began, the landmines killed and injured many who tried to
flee.2037 As one villager described, “The mines were put at the entrance of the village, that is
the only way out so when people were running they stepped on them and died”. 2038 Another
recalled:
Some people were running and were killed by the mines, as they didn’t know that
they were planted there. Others were hit by the mines as they were coming back
from the field. My 18-year old relative died from an explosion coming back from the
paddy field just in front of my house.2039
913. Mines laid on pedestrian routes or roads inside northern Rakhine State detonated as
villagers fled.2040 One 18-year old man, who was severely injured in a mine blast, including
broken legs and serious burns on both legs and hands, described his experience:
When I heard the sound of shooting, I started running towards my village to find my
family. As there were checkpoints on the main road, I chose to run along a smaller
path so I could reach my family quickly. When I was about 15 minutes away from
my village, I was blown up from the ground. It sounded like a huge bomb exploding.

2028 LI-071.
2029 See this chapter, section D.1.a: Most serious incidents.
2030 EI-007, EI-058, LI-005, LI-059, QI-111, WI-005.
2031 QI-011.
2032 EI-007, LI-005.
2033 EI-058.
2034 CI-006, CI-007, CI-016, YI-029, V-087.
2035 CI-132, CI-133, LI-046, LI-114, LI-117, QI-107, XI-004.
2036 LI-114.
2037 CI-132, CI-133, LI-046, LI-114, LI-117, QI-107, XI-004, YI-001.
2038 LI-046.
2039 LI-114.
2040 BI-004, CI-001, WI-009, V-087.

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Then I fainted. I took this path to school often, but had never seen or heard of an
explosion on that route before.2041
914. The Government reportedly claimed that only ARSA planted mines in the region. 2042
Although ARSA did use improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in their 25 August attacks,
there is no information to support a claim that ARSA had access to, or used, landmines. 2043
The Tatmadaw claimed to have recovered IEDs used by ARSA, but they have made no
such claim in relation to landmines.2044
915. Medicins Sans Frontiers reported that between 25 August and 3 December 2017, its
clinic in Kutupalong refugee camp treated 224 people with violence-related injuries, and
the number of people presenting with gunshot wounds started to decrease only after
25 September 2017.2045 This confirms the Mission’s conclusion that violent “clearance
operations” continued well beyond the Government’s declared end date of 5 September
2017.
916. The Mission met with a large number of victims who sustained injuries during the
“clearance operations”. It should be noted that, for the most part, it is the “walking
wounded”, those who have sustained less serious injuries and survived the journey to
Bangladesh, who were able to meet Mission members, and from whom forensic
information could be gathered. The Mission conducted forensic analysis of photo-
documented injuries, and in some cases the medical records, of more than 50 victims whom
the Mission also interviewed. This has allowed for an objective assessment as to whether
the injuries corroborate specific allegations, and as such contributes to the overall
assessment of the credibility and reliability of witnesses. In general, the forensic assessment
of the documented injuries has provided additional corroboration of allegations, sometimes
strong corroboration. In a small number of cases, the information was neutral, because of
lack of detail or non-specificity of injuries, and in only one case has the information
undermined the credibility of the allegation made. In general, where the injured victim is a
child, the very presence of an injury such as a gunshot wound is itself of great concern.
917. Illustrative examples of additional corroboration that forensic analysis has provided
include: (1) a schoolboy from Tha Yet Oke, Maungdaw Township, who was the victim of a
land-mine explosion and sustained extensive burns to all four limbs and a fracture of the
right lower leg2046; (2) a 10-year old girl from Chut Pyin, Rathedaung Township, who was
shot twice while crawling on the ground and had two untreated gunshot wounds in her
legs2047; (3) an 11-year old girl from Ngan Chaung, Maungdaw Township, who suffered an
extensive burn injury when her home was hit by a “launcher” and set on fire 2048; and (4) a
10-year old girl from Kyein Chaung, Maungdaw Township, who suffered multiple sharp
force head wounds from repeated blows from a large knife inflicted by a Tatmadaw
soldier.2049; and (5) a 45-year old woman from Myo Thu Gyi, Maungdaw Township, who
was shot in both feet while attempting to flee.2050
918. Clinics, including the Sadar Hospital in Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong Medical
College Hospital, both in Bangladesh, also treated patients with violence-related injuries.
Many private hospitals and clinics in southern Bangladesh also treated Rohingya patients.
Other medical reports from clinics and medical professionals who treated gunshot victims

2041 BI-004.
2042 V-088.
2043 See this chapter, section D.1.c: Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army.
2044 Global New Light of Myanmar, “Information released by the Tatmadaw True News Information
Team on the findings of the Investigation Team in connection with the performances of the security
troops during the terrorist attacks in Maungdaw region, Rakhine State” (14 November 2017).
2045 Médecins Sans Frontiers, Retrospective mortality, nutrition and measles vaccination coverage
survey in Balukhali 2 & Tasnimarkhola camps (Bangladesh, 2017).
2046 BI-004.
2047 LI-009.
2048 LI-071.
2049 WI-004.
2050 WI-011.

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in Bangladesh have confirmed that many patients, including women, children and the
elderly, had bullet entry points from behind, consistent with being shot while fleeing. 2051
919. No consolidated data is available on the numbers who received treatment or the
nature of their injuries. Moreover, many Rohingya in Bangladesh did not seek treatment for
their injuries, due to difficulties accessing services in the camps in Bangladesh, particularly
in the initial weeks and months when demand greatly exceeded available services. The
Mission observed that a number of its interviewees in Bangladesh, with serious bullet or
stabbing-related wounds, had not sought medical treatment. It appears that, for many
Rohingya, the practice of not seeking professional medical care, even for serious injuries,
has been normalised by the lack of access to professional medical services in northern
Rakhine State.2052

Rape, gang rape, and other forms of sexual violence

920. Rape and other sexual and gender-based violence were perpetrated on a massive
scale during the “clearances operations” from 25 August 2017. This includes mass gang
rapes, sexually humiliating acts, sexual slavery and sexual mutilations. 2053 Rohingya women
and girls were the main victims, although there were some instances involving men and
boys. Young women and girls were particularly targeted for sexual violence and were
disproportionally affected. The main perpetrators were the Tatmadaw, although other
security forces, and sometimes ethnic Rakhine men, were also involved.
921. Mass gang rape, involving multiple perpetrators and multiple victims in the same
incident, was a notable pattern,2054 and occurred in at least ten village tracts between
25 August and mid-September.2055 The Mission received further credible reports of mass
gang rapes in a number of other locations. Mass gang rapes were commonly perpetrated in
open public spaces, in front of family and neighbours, within forested areas near the
village;2056 in large houses within the village;2057 and during detention in military and police
compounds.2058 In some incidents, up to 40 women and girls were raped or gang raped
together.2059 Women and girls were commonly raped by more than one perpetrator,
frequently by many perpetrators, sometimes as many as ten. 2060 In Kyein Chaung, north
Maungdaw Township, a 35-year old woman spoke of being brutally gang raped by nine
men near her house:
I was eight months pregnant. They stamped and kicked my stomach with their boots,
and then stripped me naked. I recognised some of the Tatmadaw from the local
camp. I was blindfolded and hung by my wrists from a tree. I was raped nine times,
both anally and vaginally. I counted all of them. Whilst they were raping me, they bit
me on my breasts and neck. They left me tied to the tree. My mother found me in the
evening. My unborn baby died.2061
Another female survivor told the Mission, “I was lucky, I was only raped by three men”. 2062

2051 K-155, V-085.

2052 See chapter V.B.3: Restrictions on access to food, livelihoods, health care and education.
2053 Women and girls were also subjected to sexual assault during body searches for jewellery and money.
2054 EI-001, EI-030, EI-038, EI-039, EI-065, EI-067, EI-073, EI-075, EI-080, EI-081, EI-089, EI-094, EI-
097, EI-098, LI-105, K-128.
2055 In Maungdaw: Kha Maung Seik (Fwaira Bazar), (Min Gyi) (Tula Toli), Kyein Chaung (Boli Bazar),
Kyauk Pan Du (Shitar Fawrikka); in Buthidaung: Ba Da Kar (Fati Yaar), Nga Yant Chaung (a) Taung
Bazar (Nga Yant Chaung), Chin Tha Mar (Hang Sar Para), Gu Dar Pyin (Gudam Para), Maung Gyi
Taung (Shab Bazar) and in Rathedaung: Chut Pyin (Shuap Praung).
2056 EI-021, EI-027, EI-030, EI-064, YI-030.
2057
CI-042, CI-046, EI-021, EI-080, EI-081, QI-052, QI-060, QI-071, WI-038. K-128
2058 EI-023, EI-028, EI-064, EI-066, EI-086, EI-094, EI-097, K-151, K-127.
2059 EI-007, EI-055, LI-037.
2060 EI-007, EI-014, EI-057, EI-096, EI-102.
2061 EI-096.
2062 EI-075.

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922. Often, mass gang rape took place after the separation of women and girls from men
and boys.2063 In some instances, women and girls were brought to houses where Tatmadaw
soldiers were waiting, including men in camouflage and with helmets.2064 After entering the
houses, women and girls were beaten, stripped and brutally raped or gang raped in common
spaces or in separate rooms, toilets or other areas.2065
923. For example, a young woman, from a village in Kyet Yoe Pyin, Maungdaw
Township, explained how she was taken by members of the Tatmadaw, together with 20 to
30 other women and girls, to a large house in the village. The women were then taken to
different rooms to be raped.2066 An 18-year old woman from Maung Gyn Hanut,
Buthidaung Township, described how she and a group of 12 women and girls were gang
raped in a forest area. She was raped by two soldiers and she saw the other women and girls
being taken away by soldiers and heard screaming. Later, these women told her that they
were also raped.2067 In nearby Nga Yant Chaung, Buthidaung Township, a 23-year old
woman described how villagers were first gathered in the centre of the village, and then
soldiers took her and other women to forested areas in groups of four and five. She was
raped by two soldiers, whom she recognised from the local military compound, and saw
many other women being raped.2068
924. One of the most brutal scenes took place in Min Gyi, Maungdaw Township. 2069
Tatmadaw soldiers took dozens of women and girls to large houses. Upon arrival, each
group was taken to a different room. Once in the room, women and girls were stripped and
beaten with sticks, punched or stabbed. They were then raped in groups of up to seven
victims at a time.2070 Many of the women and girls had infants and children with them, who
were killed or severely injured, while their mothers were raped.2071 The houses were then
often locked and set on fire and most victims who were still alive were burned to death. 2072
A few women survivors described how they regained consciousness when the houses were
being burned, and saw dead women and children in the rooms. 2073 Survivors who escaped
from the burning houses exhibited serious burn marks and knife wounds to the head and
neck.2074 The Mission conducted forensic analysis of the injuries to one woman with
extensive burning to her right side, including her outer right leg, hand and wrist and right
forehead and cheek. The burn-scarring pattern is additional corroboration of her account of
being awoken in a burning house while lying on the floor and as burning material fell upon
her with her right side uppermost. This awoke her, and she was able to escape.2075
925. The rapes of Rohingya women and girls were particularly brutal, often accompanied
by acts of sexual humiliation and physical and mental torture. Many victims were injured
before the rapes began - beaten with guns, sticks, wire and fists, and kicked in the stomach
or the head.2076 Injuries included broken bones.2077 Once the women and girls were subdued,
their clothes were torn off. 2078 One survivor stated that the soldiers had brought scissors
with them, “in case they could not tear off my clothes”. 2079 Many women and girls were

2063 CI-034, CI-042, CI-046, EI-021, EI-080, EI-081, EI-097, QI-052, QI-60, QI-072, WI-038, K-151.
2064 EI-057, EI-065, EI-080, EI-081.
2065 CI-042, CI-046, EI-080, EI-081, EI-097, QI-052, QI-060, QI-072, WI-038, K-151.
2066 EI-097.
2067 EI-030.
2068 EI-021.
2069 See this chapter, section D.1.a: Most serious incidents.
2070 CI-042, CI-046, EI-080, EI-081, QI-60, QI-071, WI-038, K-150, K-151.
2071 CI-042, CI-046, EI-080, EI-81, QI-060, QI-071, WI-038, K-150, K-151; See this chapter, section
D.1.a: Most serious incidents.
2072 CI-042, CI-046, EI-080, EI-81, QI-060, QI-071, WI-038, K-150, K-151; See this chapter, section
D.1.a: Most serious incidents.
2073 EI-80, EI-081.
2074 EI-80, EI-081.
2075 EI-102.
2076 EI-007, EI-029, EI-057, EI-083.
2077 EI-029, EI-057, EI-083.
2078 EI-083, EI-089, XI-001.
2079 EI-089.

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seen running naked in forested areas in visible distress and eyewitnesses believed that they
had been raped.2080 Blindfolds were commonly used.2081 Often, one member of the
Tatmadaw would hold the victim down, often gripping her wrists, while another would rape
her. They would then change places.2082 In some instances, women and girls had their legs
tied to doors.2083 Others were strung up naked to trees in the forested areas, either by their
hands or by their hair.2084
926. During rapes, women and girls were frequently bitten on the cheeks, neck, breast
and thigh.2085 The bite marks were still visible months afterwards to members of the
Mission, United Nations doctors and counsellors. The bite-marks and other mutilations
have left permanent scars on the survivors and serve as a constant reminder to them, their
husbands, family and community of the violations and humiliations they have been
subjected to. Due to the substantial portion of women and girls affected, it is difficult to
believe that this was not an intentional act and akin to a form of branding. The Mission
conducted forensic analysis of such injuries. For example, it was able to additionally
corroborate the information of a 15-year old girl from Maungdaw who was mass gang
raped with three other girls by Tatmadaw soldiers. Forensic analysis confirms two violent
bite marks, one on each cheek, sustained during the rape. 2086
927. Many victims were killed after being raped. Most had their throats slit, or were
burned to death.2087 A large number of interviewees saw dead bodies of women and girls en
route to Bangladesh who they thought had been raped, because the bodies were naked and
large amounts of blood were visible between their legs. 2088 A number of interviewees said
that girls had been “raped to death”,2089 because of unusual amounts of blood in the genital
area. In some instances, the genital area, or their breasts, appeared mutilated. 2090 Death may
have been caused by genital trauma, 2091 especially when a woman had been gang raped, or
women and girls may have been raped with instruments, such as knives or sticks, which
caused internal organ damage, leading to death. 2092
928. Frequently, rapes took place in front of family members, including husbands,
parents and young children. 2093 A mother from Inn Din described how her adult daughter’s
legs were tied to different doors and she was raped by 10 male perpetrators. Her daughter’s
throat was then slit and the house set on fire.2094 Mothers were often gang raped in front of
their young children,2095 who were often ill-treated, and sometimes killed.2096 A mother
from Nga Yant Chaung saw her seven-year old son killed with a large knife while she was
being gang raped by five men in police uniform. 2097 Many women and girls stated that the
rape itself was only one aspect of their suffering. The loss of family members, particularly
children or unborn children, was described by mothers to the Mission as “unbearable”. 2098

2080 EI-011, EI-014, EI-022, EI-076, EI-094, LI-105, XI-001.

2081 EI-069, EI-086, EI-089, EI-096, EI-098.
2082 EI-027, EI-089.
2083 EI-034, EI-057, EI-078, EI-102.
2084 EI-096, EI-098, LI-105.
2085 EI-011, EI-014, EI-022, EI-076, EI- 094, XI-001.
2086 CI-045.
2087 E1-014, EI-064, EI-065, EI-067, EI-075, EI-076, EI-080, EI-081, EI-088, EI-094, EI-098.
2088 EI-067, EI-077, EI-078, EI-095, XI-001.
2089 EI-064, EI-067, EI-092, LI-081, LI-105, WI-006, WI-027.
2090 EI-064, EI-067, EI-092, LI-081, LI-105, WI-006, WI-027, XI-001.
2091 K-124.
2092 K-124.
2093 EI-027, EI-029, EI-057, EI-071, EI-083. See below in this section, Attacks on and grave violations
against children.
2094 EI-057.
2095 EI-025, EI-029, EI-083; See below in this section, Attacks on and grave violations against children.
2096 EI-044, EI-071, EI-083; See below in this section, Attacks on and grave violations against children.
2097 EI-083.
2098 EI-083, EI-096.

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929. The “clearance operations” also involved the systematic abduction and detention of
women in military and police compounds and bases, where they were then raped or, more
commonly, gang raped.2099 Parents, relatives and neighbours reported that they saw women
and girls being forcibly taken by the Tatmadaw who were not seen again. A large number
of Rohingya women and girls remain missing, presumed dead. The Mission received
examples of the Tatmadaw demanding a number of women or girls to be brought to their
compounds.2100 A young woman from Dar Gyi Zar, Maungdaw Township, described how
she and 20 other women and girls went to the local military compound when such a
demand was issued in late August 2017. They were locked in a room for three days, and the
two youngest girls, aged around 13 or 14 years old, were taken to the next room. Ten
Tatmadaw soldiers entered the room and she heard screaming. A few hours later, the girls’
dead bodies were carried out. They were naked from the waist up, had blood in their genital
area, and bite marks on their faces or scratches on them. 2101
930. In and around Buthidaung town, women and girls were systematically abducted,
detained, gang raped and killed in military and police compounds during the “clearance
operations.” An 18-year old woman from a village near Buthidaung town was detained and
gang raped for five days in a military compound. She could hear women in other rooms
screaming during her detention. She believed that there were up to 20 other women
detained and raped.2102 In the third week of September 2017, a 40-year old female
eyewitness saw military vehicles arrive at the military compound in Buthidaung town and
unload a group of approximately 10 girls aged between 12 and 18. She saw them being
stripped naked by the soldiers before she ran away. 2103
931. The abduction and gang rape of women and girls also took place at the military
compound next to Gu Dar Pyin village, Buthidaung Township, on the day of the “clearance
operations” in that village.2104 A woman described watching her 15-year old daughter being
forcibly taken by soldiers to the compound, along with other girls: “My daughter cried out
to me to save her. I watched her taken away until I couldn’t see her anymore. There is not a
day that I do not cry.” 2105 On the same day, another woman saw her 15-year old daughter
being taken away by soldiers from their house, while her elder son tried to intervene. She
and her husband escaped with their younger children. Her husband returned the next day
and found the body of their son. They do not know what happened to their daughter. 2106
932. Tatmadaw was the main perpetrator of sexual violence. A total of 80 per cent of
incidents of rape corroborated by the Mission were of gang rape, and 82 per cent of these
gang rapes were perpetrated by the Tatmadaw. Incidents of rape and sexual violence were
also carried out by members of the BGP, the Myanmar Police Force and ethnic Rakhine,
although considerably less so.2107 Although the majority of Rohingya women and girls do
not understand Myanmar language, those who did described the use of derogatory language
during rapes. One woman, gang raped with her sister, reported a member of the Tatmadaw
saying, “We are going to kill you this way, by raping. We are going to kill Rohingya. We
will rape you. This is not your country.” 2108 Another woman from Kha Maung Seik,
Maungdaw Township, reported a soldier saying, “We will rape you and kill you” and using
insulting terms such as “Kalar”.2109

2099 EI-022, EI-064, EI-078, EI-079, EI-080, EI-083, EI-086, XI-001.

2100 EI-022, EI-083.
2101 EI-022.
2102 EI-086.
2103 EI-064.
2104 EI-078, EI-079, EI-080, K-151.
2105 EI-078.
2106 EI-079.
2107 EI-075, EI-083, EI-084, EI-088, EI-098, EI-093.
2108 EI-084.
2109 EI-090.

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933. Women and girls of reproductive age were targeted. A review of interviews
conducted by the Mission, together with other information received, shows that the most
common age range for rape and gang rape was approximately 13 to 25 years old. Soldiers
would commonly select unmarried women or girls. 2110 It is unclear whether pregnant
women were specifically targeted but many were raped, and many suffered miscarriages or
their babies died following rape, including one woman who was eight months pregnant. 2111
Older women were also victims of sexual and gender-based violence, as were very young
girls.2112
934. Victims frequently complained of severe pain in their genital area, severe blood loss,
pain in their abdomens and severe pain on urination. 2113 Women and girls often had to be
carried to Bangladesh by husbands, brothers, sons or neighbours because they could not
walk.2114 Months after being raped, victims still suffered from severe injuries that prevented
them from having sexual intercourse with their husbands, and women voiced concerns that
their husbands would leave them and that they would no longer be able to have children. 2115
A woman from Laung Don, Maungdaw Township, underwent a hysterectomy in
Bangladesh due to injuries sustained because of gang rape. 2116 Injuries were exacerbated by
lack of access to healthcare en route to Bangladesh and on arrival. The Mission received
information of women and girls who died en route due to the severity of injuries and lack of
medical care.2117 There was also limited or no access to medication to prevent pregnancy or
to treat sexually transmitted diseases or genital trauma. Many did not realise that they could
seek medical care in Bangladesh, or feared it, due to their discriminatory experiences and
the effective denial of health care to them in Myanmar or their fear of family and
community shaming.
935. Many women and girls became pregnant from rape but the number is unknown. In
May-June 2018, the United Nations and other organizations noted a spike in the number of
pregnant women and girls in the refugee camps in Bangladesh.2118 In spite of its public
dismissal of “fake rapes” following the 2016 violence, 2119 the Government of Myanmar has
implicitly accepted that large numbers of rapes occurred and many babies were born as a
result of the rapes. The repatriation agreement it signed with Bangladesh has a clause,
section 6(v), that appears to specifically address the issue of babies born of rape: “Children
born out of unwarranted incidents are to be certified by a court of Bangladesh.” 2120
936. Medical clinics reported an increased request for late term pregnancy terminations in
March and April 2018, and girls aged 13 to 17 requested terminations from clinics stating
that they had been raped by the Tatmadaw. 2121 Health clinics have performed terminations
when requested, consistent with the laws of Bangladesh (“menstrual regulation”). Doctors
and counsellors reported that, if they were unable to obtain medical terminations, women

2110 EI-014, QI-052, WI-004.

2111 EI-014, EI-073, EI-083, EI-096.
2112 EI-067, EI-068, EI-048, V-138.
2113 EI-029, EI-025, EI-030, EI-071, EI-083, EI-089.
2114 EI-074, EI-081, EI-083, EI-090.
2115 EI-025, EI-029, EI-030, EI-083, EI-089.
2116 K-151.
2117 CI-034, QI-061.
2118 V-139, “More than 60 Rohingya babies born in Bangladesh refugee camps every day”– UNICEF, 17
May 2018. Available at: https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/more-60-rohingya-babies-born-
bangladesh-refugee-camps-every-day%E2%80%93-unicef.
2119 V-254, V-255. The “fake rape” charge appeared as a banner on the Facebook page of the State
Counsellor’s Office (screenshot on file with the Mission). It is discussed in detail in chapter X,
section B.2.a: Case study 1: the use of rape and other forms of sexual violence by the military. See
also: http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/545.
2120 “Arrangement on return of displaced persons from Rakhine” between the Government of the People’s
Republic of Bangladesh and the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (Naypyidaw,
23 November 2017).
2121 KI-129.

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and girls have resorted to unsafe terminations. Women and girls have used locally-derived
abortifacient potions or abortifacients obtained in Bangladesh, which are toxic to both the
woman and the foetus.2122
937. Babies born of rape are a constant reminder to their mothers of the events endured
and may be resented. Cases of infanticide and the killing of pregnant adolescent girls were
reported to the Mission by counsellors in Bangladesh. 2123 Rape survivors also face
stigmatisation. Many women and girls who have survived sexual violence live in fear of
their husbands, family or community finding out.2124 For unmarried women, this is
heightened. In general, if it is known that a girl has been subject to sexual violence, it is
unlikely that she will marry.
938. The circumstances in the vast overcrowded refugee camps in southern Bangladesh
mean that women and girls continue to be at risk of sexual violence and, in particular,
sexual exploitation and abuse. The Mission is concerned about reports of human trafficking
for the purpose of sexual exploitation and abuse. Women are also reportedly facing
increased levels of family violence in the camps. 2125
939. Women and girls were not the sole victims and survivors of sexual violence during
the “clearance operations”. The Mission received credible reports of sexual violence against
men and boys, including rape,2126 genital mutilation2127 and sexualised torture, sometimes
leading to death.2128 The scale of this sexual violence remains unknown. The patriarchal
nature of the Rohingya community, combined with the centrality of religious leaders in the
community, make it extremely difficult for men and boys to discuss sexual violence against
them. Isolation, attachment to cultural references and low levels of education further
prevent an accurate assessment of the extent of sexual violence against men and boys.
940. During detention, which was prevalent during the “clearance operations”, there are
consistent credible reports of men and boys being subjected to sexual violence, including
rape, sexualised torture and humiliation by authorities or in their presence. 2129 The extent of
sexual violence against men and boys in northern Rakhine throughout this period warrants
further investigation.
941. Individuals, families and the wider Rohingya community have been highly
traumatised by the brutal sexual violence, which they suffered or witnessed. Rape was used
as a form of torture, to terrorise the community and as a tactic of war. It continues to have a
devastating and lasting impact on the individuals who suffered from it, their families and
the wider Rohingya community, both physically and mentally. The Mission has concluded
that the widespread sexual violence and the manner in which it was perpetrated was an
intended effort, at least in part, to weaken the social cohesion of the Rohingya community
and contribute to the destruction of the Rohingya as a group and the breakdown of the
Rohingya way of life.2130

Attacks on and grave violations against children

942. During the “clearance operations”, infants and children were indiscriminately killed
and in some instances targeted for killing.2131 Infants and children were frequently killed by

2122 K-124.
2123 K-124.
2124 K-124.
2125 K-124.
2126 K-130, V-134.
2127
EI-092, EI-096, LI-022.
2128 EI-092, EI-096.
2129 K-151, V-134; See this chapter, section D.2.b: The build-up to 25 August 2017.
2130 K-122, K-124.
2131 CI-045, CI-131, CI-136, CI-137, LI-024, LI-025, LI-026, LI-094, LI-099, LI-105, LI-112, LI-115, LI-
119, LI-148

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gunfire, stabbed or burned to death.2132 A health survey produced by Médecins Sans

Frontiers observed that, after 25 August 2017, 57.5 per cent of child deaths under the age
of five resulted from violence and, of those deaths, 56.5 per cent of children died from
gunshot wounds.2133
943. In some instances, children were targeted for killing and their parents were left
alive.2134 A 23-year old woman from Chin Tha Mar, Buthidaung Township, described:
I was able to see the killings through the door crack to the yard. When the soldiers
started shooting, all women were screaming. They even killed an eight-year old
child. During the night, I escaped and I saw so many dead bodies including
children. Most of the children were boys, but there were girls too.2135
944. A father from Kyauk Chaung village tract, Maungdaw Township, recalled:
A son and daughter of mine were taking a bath in a pond. I was about to call them in
to have some food. They were six and four years old. My son was shot in the head.
My daughter then fell to the floor and was screaming. Then there was a second shot.
They shot my daughter in the chest. The ricochet of the bullet hit me in the foot. I
saw that the shots had come from the soldiers standing about 20 feet away from
us.2136
945. In Kyet Yoe Pyin, Maungdaw Township, one witness described finding the bodies
of a two-year old girl, a baby and a teenage girl in a yard, 2137 while another described how
he saw two young children, who were searching for their mother, being killed by soldiers.
One six-year old boy had his throat cut, while a four-year old was stamped to death, before
the body was thrown into a nearby burning house. 2138
946. Children and infants were disproportionally impacted by destruction of villages by
fire. Large numbers burned to death in houses, unable to escape.2139 Infants and young
children were often sleeping when houses were set on fire, were the slowest to leave, or
were too frightened to leave. They were also forced back into the burning houses by
Tatmadaw soldiers or others.2140 A 14-year old boy from Kyauk Pan Du, Maungdaw
Township, described how he saw around 10 people, mainly children, but also some women
and elderly, being pushed back into a house by members of the Tatmadaw during the
“clearance operations”. One of the children was stabbed when the group tried to leave the
house. The soldiers then set the house on fire and the witness believed that all inside
died.2141
947. Children and infants were also killed while their mothers were being raped or gang
raped.2142 While a woman was gang raped, her 10-year old son was killed with a knife in
Tin May, Buthidaung Township.2143 Another mother from Zay Di Pyin, Rathedaung
Township, recounted:
I don’t know how many policemen raped me, it was not my priority. The only thing I
can remember is that they were trying to take my children. They dragged my son

2132 CI-013, CI-019, CI-035, CI-045, CI-131, CI-136, CI-137, EI-080, LI-024, LI-025, LI-026, LI-054,
LI-073, LI-094, LI-099, LI-105, LI-112, LI-115, LI-119, QI-036, WI-004, YI-009; YI-028, YI-030,
V-138.
2133 V-086.
2134 EI-038, EI-075, LI-085, WI-004, K-076.25, K.076.26.
2135 LI-079.
2136 QI-026.
2137 CI-111.
2138 CI-137.
2139 EI-001, EI-007.
2140 CI-049, CI-137, LI-042, LI-135.
2141 EI-007.
2142 EI-071, EI-075, EI-081, EI-083, EI-102.
2143 EI-071.

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from under the bed. I was screaming to protect my children. I have not seen my son
again.2144
948. Children were also disproportionately affected by the conditions in which they fled,
having to sleep in the open in the forested hill areas and needing to cross rivers and the sea
to reach Bangladesh. Many children and infants drowned, as they could not swim,
particularly with the high water levels of monsoon season. Others drowned when boats
capsized.2145 An 18-year old woman from Kyein Chaung, Maungdaw Township, described
seeing four children drown when their boat capsized.2146 Parents also often became
separated from their children en route.2147 A mother fleeing the “clearance operations” in
Gu Dar Pyin, Buthidaung Township, lost her six-year old daughter in the crowd of people
fleeing. She never saw her again. 2148 A large number of children fled from Myanmar alone
or with only their siblings.
949. A 12-year old boy from Gaw Du Thar Ra (Ywar Thit Kay), Maungdaw Township,
told the Mission how he left Myanmar after his parents were killed. He is now living in a
refugee camp in Bangladesh, looking after five younger siblings: 2149
I saw smoke rising from my village. Later, when the soldiers had left, I went back to
my village with my uncle. At my house we found the burned bodies of my parents.
My one-year old sister was also dead, burned, in my mother’s lap. I saw many dead
bodies in my village. Bodies were both inside the houses and outside. They had been
shot, stabbed and burned. I couldn’t bear it. I couldn’t even take any of my clothes
with me, everything was burned.2150
950. The Mission met a large number of children in the Bangladesh refugee camps in
September and October 2017 who exhibited visible injuries corresponding with accounts of
being shot with live ammunition, stabbed with a sharp implement, or burned. For example,
the medical records of a 15-year old girl from Chut Pyin confirmed that she had been shot
by live ammunition, consistent with the account she had given of being shot by a soldier. A
12-year old girl from Nga Yant Chaung, Buthidaung Township, showed injuries to her leg
which she said occurred when she was shot by soldiers, and her Bangladesh hospital
medical records showed that she had spent 30 days in hospital for two gunshot wounds. She
was unable to walk when the Mission met her.2151
951. Children were also victims of sexual violence. Girls and young women were
targeted for rape, mass gang rape, sexual slavery and forced nudity. They were selected by
members of the Tatmadaw for sexual violence, including girls of 11 or younger, some as
young as seven. The Tatmadaw used schools as military camps during the “clearance
operations”,2152 where civilians were subject to sexual violence, beatings and tortured, and
in some instances women and girls were raped and mass gang raped. Girls were also
abducted from their homes by the Tatmadaw and police in the lead up to the 2017
“clearance operation” and were frequently raped, mass gang raped and killed following
their abduction and detention.

Disappearances of men and boys

952. The clearance operations also resulted in the arbitrary arrest and detention, as well as
the disappearance, of many Rohingya men and boys, perpetrated by the Tatmadaw, often
amounting to enforced disappearances. Their removal was usually violent, with victims

2144 EI-075.
2145 CI-123, CI-137, EI-084, LI-097, LI-114, LI-115, LI-118.
2146 CI-023.
2147 CI-148, EI-078, LI-097, LI-119, LI-122.
2148 EI-078.
2149 WI-033.
2150 WI-033.
2151 EI-040
2152 EI-077.

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beaten and rounded up into groups, with their hands tied together and sometimes
blindfolded, before being taken away. 2153
953. One mother described Tatmadaw soldiers tying up her son and other male villagers,
using rope that they had cut from cows. They were then made to lie on the
ground.2154 Another female witness described how male members of her family were
rounded up in Maung Gyi Taung village tract, in Buthidaung Township:
The military tied their hands behind their back with a rope. There were 25 men tied
in line to the same rope, including my 18-year old son and my husband. They were
badly beaten and forced to lie down on the ground.2155
954. Another villager described the experience in Nga Yant Chaung, also in Buthidaung
Township:
They were going into different houses and taking some of the men. They gathered
the men and told them to line up. They tied them up together by the hands. While
they were tying them up, they hit the men with guns, and kicked them injuring some
of them, while continuing to round men up.2156
955. Information suggests that mostly young men were targeted and detained, together
with persons considered as respected or influential, 2157 including religious leaders, teachers
and village administrators. In most instances, the men were taken away from the village,
either on foot or in military trucks or vehicles.
956. This pattern of the targeting and disappearing of men also appears to have continued
during the flight to Bangladesh. One woman described how the group she was travelling
with encountered Tatmadaw soldiers. She said that some of the men were shot, while others
were tied up, taken away and not seen again.2158 A woman provided information of her two
sons being captured in a village in Ah Lel Than Kyaw, Maungdaw Township, where they
had sought refuge during their journey to Bangladesh:
We were trying to cook some rice under a tree when soldiers came and we all
gathered. The soldiers picked out the males, including my two sons. They were
forced onto the ground, with their hands tied behind their heads. The soldiers put
their boots on the sides of my sons’ faces. Thirteen men were then taken away,
including my sons.2159
957. The men and boys detained have not been seen since and their whereabouts are
unknown.2160 The circumstances in which men were detained during the “clearance
operations” have not afforded family members the opportunity to seek information from the
authorities, with many relatives now in Bangladesh. In any event, the Tatmadaw is unlikely
to assist them with information. The Tatmadaw publicly referred to the detention of 114
“Bengalis” in October 2017, although no further details were provided regarding their
identity or whereabouts, or whether any charges had been laid or judicial process
initiated.2161 Even a conservative estimate of those disappeared far exceeds this figure.
Although relatives hope that those taken away are detained, many presume that they have
been killed. Some of these fears are based on indications given at the time men and boys
were taken away. For example, a woman who saw her son and other men taken away by
soldiers was told, “We will do nothing to you, but we will slaughter them”.2162 Another
interviewee saw men being tied up and taken into a house, after which he heard the sound

2153 EI-030, LI-048, QI-115, WI-007, WI-017, YI-001.

2154 EI-030.
2155 YI-001.
2156 WI-007.
2157 LI-001, LI-004, QI-051, XI-009, YI-001.
2158 XI-001.
2159 EI-030.
2160 BI-016, XI-006.
2161 This was stated in the Tatmadaw initial investigation in November, with the same figure reiterated in
its more recent publication, “Myanmar Politics and the Tatmadaw: Part 1” (2018).
2162 EI-030.

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of gunfire. He could not see what happened but believes that they were killed. 2163 Similarly,
in a well-documented incident, 10 men who had their hands tied and were taken away in
Inn Din, southern Maungdaw Township, were subsequently killed by the security forces
and local villagers.2164
958. The anguish of not knowing what happened to those disappeared remains
overwhelming within the Rohingya community. One man made a specific request to the
Mission:
Please help us find out about the people who were taken away, those who died are
gone, but please try to find information about these people.2165

Destruction and looting of civilian homes, property and other protected objects

Burning of property
959. Through analysing satellite imagery and witness accounts, the Mission has
established widespread, systematic, deliberate, organized and targeted destruction, mainly
by fire, of Rohingya-populated area across the three townships of northern Rakhine State.
Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung Townships are comprised of approximately 993
villages. Satellite imagery from August 2017 to March 20182166 shows that, following
25 August 2017, approximately 392 of these villages 2167 across the three townships were
partially (214 villages) or totally (178 villages) destroyed during this period. This represents
the destruction of approximately 40 per cent of villages in northern Rakhine State. More
than 70 per cent of the destroyed villages, or 277, were located in Maungdaw Township,
where the majority of Rohingya population in northern Rakhine State resided. Fire was the
main means of destruction.

2163 QI-115.
2164 CI-146, LI-006, LI-130, QI-051; See this chapter, section D.1.a. Most serious incidents; Wa Lone,
Kyaw Soe Oo, S. Lewis, A. Slodkowski, “Massacre in Myanmar” (Reuters, 8 February 2018).
Commander-in-Chief, “Tatmadaw investigation team statement on findings of discovery of
unidentified bodies in Inn Din Village Cemetery in Maungdaw Township” (Facebook post, 10
January 2018), post on file with Mission.
2165 RI-001.
2166 This is the period covered by the UNITAR-UNOSAT data analysis provided to the Mission, a
summary of which is accessible at
http://cern.ch/unosatsdn/ohchr/myanmar/UNOSAT_report_Myanmar_20180907.pdf
2167 277 villages in Maungdaw, 96 villages in Buthidaung, and 19 villages in Rathedaung.

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Map showing areas with visible destruction, through burning, of houses, other
structures and vegetation in northern Rakhine State. The map was developed through
the analysis of high-resolution satellite imagery collected on multiple dates between
25 August 2017 and 18 March 2018. Destruction is represented by coloured dots, with
colours corresponding to the date range when visible destruction was detected. Due to
cloud cover and satellite overpass range, damage is detected within a date range.
The date range refers to damage detection, as opposed to when it occurred.

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960. Within these affected villages, approximately 37,700 individual structures were
destroyed.2168 The vast majority were Rohingya homes, but the Mission has established that
other buildings, including markets, 2169 religious schools (madrassas) and mosques, 2170 were
also destroyed. The majority of the detected damage, approximately 80 per cent, was
already visible in satellite imagery as of 16 September 2017. By that date, approximately
30,800 structures had already been destroyed in 279 villages. 2171 As such, the majority of
the destruction occurred in the first three weeks of the “clearance operations”, consistent
with the timing of the most serious incidents in this report. However, the burning of houses
and structures continued over an extended period, until at least March 2018.2172
961. Villages were burned by Tatmadaw soldiers and ethnic Rakhine. Much of this
burning was done manually, through the use of flammable liquids thrown onto the
buildings and set alight using matches and through lighting buildings with flaming torches.
Tatmadaw soldiers also used weapons referred to by many victims as “launchers” and
described as making loud explosive sounds, after which a whole building, or set of
buildings, rapidly caught fire. “Launcher” likely refers to a weapon that fires a munition
that explodes upon impact. Victims generally described a hand-held or shoulder-mounted
weapon, but some also described weapons fixed to the ground using some sort of support.
Victims were most likely describing a portable anti-armour weapon such as an RPG-7
(rocket propelled grenade launcher) or the M-3 Carl Gustav recoilless rifle, both of which
are used by the Tatmadaw and match the description in terms of both use and results. It is
likely that both rocket launchers and mortars were used by Tatmadaw soldiers to destroy
buildings and homes.
962. The accounts collected further demonstrate the systematic and planned nature of the
burning of villages. Burning followed a regular pattern. Interviewees describe “launchers”
being fired by soldiers directly into Rohingya-inhabited areas, often at night or very early
morning, and setting one or more structures on fire. The ethnic Rakhine played a role,
burning Rohingya homes manually, house to house, often equipped with cans of petrol
among other equipment.2173 In some villages, other minorities fulfilled this role.2174 For
example, in Mee Chaung Zay, Buthidaung Township, interviewees stated that members of
the Hindu minority and Tatmadaw soldiers burnt their village together. The Hindus were
recognised from barber shops in the nearby Bazar.2175 The participation of ethnic Rakhine
and other ethnic communities in the burning was often coordinated with the Tatmadaw
operations. In many locations, ethnic Rakhine methodically set fire to houses, alongside the
soldiers.2176 One Rohingya from Kyauk Pan Du, Maungdaw Township, explained:

2168 UNOSAT estimated the number of destroyed structures in the affected townships between 25 August
2017 and 18 March 2018 by carrying out a damage assessment using statistical predictive analytics
based on a simple linear regression. This involved identifying a sample of representative areas and
performing a structure count in these areas. This created a “sample dataset” which was then used to
estimate the number of structures destroyed within the identified damaged areas across the three
townships. UNOSAT estimate a margin of error in counting as low as 10 per cent.
2169 BI-002, CI-189, CI-192, CI-194, QI-106, RI-008.
2170 BI-002, CI-009, CI-028, CI-042, CI-102, CI-103, CI-108, CI-114, CI-129, CI-135, CI-189, EI-017,
EI-066, LI-076, QI-001, QI-070, RI-015, RI-016, WI-005, WI-006, WI-009, WI-012, WI-013, WI-
014, WI-017, YI-001, YI-013, YI-019 YI-030.
2171 According to UNOSAT, due to the presence of extensive cloud cover in the imagery collected during
this period, the damage analysed is very likely underestimated. UNOSAT subsequently collected
additional images of those areas, which were covered by clouds on 16 September and identified
additional damage in 10 villages affecting approximately additional 1,700 individual structures.
Given the pattern of the damage and the presence of fire detections on those areas, it is likely that this
destruction might have occurred before 16 September 2017.
2172 Satellite image analysis prepared for the mission by UNITAR-UNOSAT.
2173 CI-036, CI-120, CI-124, CI-125, LI-066, LI-069, LI-102, LI-118, LI-120, LI-129, LI-132, QI-002,
QI-005, QI-115, WI-007, WI-014, WI-032, WI-016, XI-002, XI-003, XI-005, YI-006, YI-013, YI-
014, YI-015, YI-018, YI-021, YI-030.
2174 CI-125, CI-135, CI-148, EI-057, LI-044, LI-119, QI-012, QI-022, QI-035, QI-109, WI-044.
2175 CI-135, LI-044.
2176 CI-124, LI-066, LI-119, WI-016, YI-006, YI-014.

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They threw bottles full of liquid onto the houses, and then they would throw a match.
They also used large canisters containing between 10 to 20 litres of liquid. The
military were using launchers, and they were directing the Rakhine to target the
smaller houses and those that had been left unburned after the launcher had been
used.2177
963. Although significant burning took place at and around the sites where ARSA carried
out their attacks, the overall area affected was far greater, encompassing villages located
significant distances away from these attacks. 2178
964. A number of villages close to the location of ARSA attacks experienced “clearance
operations” and burning in the immediate aftermath, within hours of the attacks on
25 August 2017. Three examples are given below. Verified accounts confirm that in each
area the burning of villages commenced on 25 August and then continued for some days
afterwards. Satellite imagery analysis taken from 16 September 2017, when the absence of
cloud cover allowed for detailed imagery, shows the extent of the destruction in each
location.
965. Mee Chaung Zay village tract in Buthidaung Township was near the location of
three ARSA attacks.2179 Interviewees from Ywar Thit, Mar Zi and Hpaw Tay Ahr Li
villages reported hearing the sound of nearby gunfire in the early morning of 25 August and
seeing soldiers entering their villages soon afterwards. The soldiers shot at people and
burned homes with the use of “launchers”. Burnings took place over a series of days while
people sought shelter in the nearby forested hills. 2180 The mosque was also burned.2181

Image of Mee Chaung Zay from 11 October 2017. Burnings first detected
on 16 September 2017

2177 WI-016.
2178 Satellite image analysis prepared for the mission by UNITAR-UNOSAT.
2179 In the early hours of 25 August 2017, ARSA conducted an attack at the BGP outpost in Hpaung Taw
Pyin, at the military base occupied by the Light Infantry Battalion 552, and another shortly afterwards
at the BGP outpost in Nga Yant Chaung.
2180 CI-112, CI-135, QI -024, XI-005.
2181 CI-195, YI-030; K-164

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966. Villagers from Myo Thu Gyi village tract, Maungdaw Township, described soldiers,
accompanied by ethnic Rakhine, burning houses on the morning of 25 August 2017 and the
following days.2182 They burned several hamlets in the surrounding area. Despite not being
mentioned in official Government accounts as the location for an ARSA attack on
25 August, there is official reference to ARSA carrying out an ambush on vehicles of the
security forces in Myo Thu Gyi on 26 August 2017, which resulted in an exchange of
fire.2183

Image of Myo Thu Gyi from 11 October 2017. Burnings first detected
on 16 September 2017

967. Ywar Thit Kay, Ward Five in Maungdaw town, was also the location of an ARSA
attack.2184 One interviewee described how on 25 August, at around 3am, she heard gunshots
and a loud explosion, and joined others fleeing to a nearby village. When she returned to
her house two days later, she saw military and ethnic Rakhine setting houses on fire. 2185

2182 QI-035, QI-108, WI-011.

2183 Information Committee, “Breaking News 6”, (Facebook post, 28 August
2017),https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/786693624837079
2184 Information Committee, “Breaking News 2”, (Facebook post, 25 August 2017),
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/785202504986191; K-154.2
2185 YI-021.

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Image of Ywar Thit Kay from 25 September 2017. Burnings first detected
on 16 September 2017

968. The “clearance operations” were also initiated in the days after the ARSA attacks in
numerous other locations across northern Rakhine State that were not in the vicinity of an
ARSA attack. One example is the village of Sin Oe Pyin, in Maung Gyi Haunt village tract,
Buthidaung Township. On or around 26 August 2017, the village was set on fire by
Tatmadaw soldiers. Neither the Government nor any other source reported any ARSA
attack in the vicinity. Several interviewees said that soldiers entered the village, started
shooting at villagers and used “launchers” to burn houses:2186 “The soldiers were
everywhere; the whole village seemed full of soldiers. They were shooting towards the
people randomly and shooting launchers to burn the houses.” 2187 These accounts are consist
with satellite imagery analysed by the Mission showing that Sin Oe Pyin was burned by
16 September 2017.

2186 CI-132, LI-047, LI-114, XI-004.

2187 LI-114.

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Image of Sin Oe Pyin from 11 October 2017. Burnings first detected

on 16 September 2017

969. The security forces and ethnic Rakhine often returned to “clear” and systematically
burn villages.2188 Satellite imagery confirms that, despite the State Counsellor’s statement of
19 September 2017 that the military’s “clearance operations” ended on 5 September, 2189 the
destruction of villages continued for weeks afterwards. One example is Goke Pi village in
Buthidaung Township, which was intact as of 25 September and subsequently burned by
11 October.2190

2188 CI-043, QI-008, QI-010, QI-011, QI-017, QI-025, QI-061, QI-062, QI-107.
2189 “Speech delivered by Her Excellency Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, State Counsellor of the Republic of
the Union of Myanmar on Government’s efforts with regard to National Reconciliation and Peace”
(Facebook post, 19 September 2017), https://www.facebook.com/state.counsellor/posts/speech-
delivered-by-her-excellency-daw-aung-san-suu-kyi-state-counsellor-of-the-/1121130291354519.
2190 For example, although not the site of any ARSA attacks, Aw Lan Pyin village in Nga Kyin Tauk
village tract (Buthidaung); Mee Chaung Khaung Swea (Buthidaung); Tin May (Buthidaung); Goke Pi
(Buthidaung) were all burned after 5 September 2017.

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Image of Goke Pi from 25 September 2017. All structures remain intact

Image of Goke Pi from 11 October 2017. A large number of structures are burned

970. While in southern Bangladesh, the Mission witnessed large plumes of smoke from
near the border in neighbouring Myanmar, which indicated the presence of large fires: on
15 September, in northern Maungdaw or north-western Buthidaung; and on 17 September
in central Maungdaw, most probably in Kyauk Hlay Kar or Zin Paing Nyar village tracts in
central Maungdaw.2191

2191 Photographs taken by Mission staff member on 15 September 2017 at 1.15pm from 21°12'36.9"N
92°09'40.0"E is of burning in northern Maungdaw, or the north-western Buthidaung. Photographs

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971. Imagery further demonstrates that the destruction deliberately targeted Rohingya
villages and property. It shows that in some locations only clusters of structures appear to
be burned, while the surrounding vegetation remains untouched, suggesting that fires were
lit separately and that burning deliberately targeted specific structures. 2192 The images
below, from 5 September 2017, show Hla Poe Kaung and Maung Hna Ma villages in
Maungdaw Township, with numerous visible fires.2193 These fires appear to be distinct and
separate, rather than fire spreading from one area to another.

taken by Mission staff member on 17 September 2017 at 3.34pm from 20°53'29.0"N 92°17'44.0"E is
likely to be of burning in Kyauk Hlay Kar or Zin Paing Nyar village tracts in central Maungdaw. (On
file with FFM)
2192 V-067.
2193 US National Imaging Systems.

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972. The targeted nature of the burning is further demonstrated by the fact that, in at least
22 locations analysed, only specific Rohingya settlements were affected, while other non-
Rohingya settlements within the same village tracts remained untouched. 2194 The untouched
settlements are often more organized in layout, with evenly distributed structures in rows,
and appear to be constructed from higher quality materials, including corrugated iron roofs.
Buddhist pagodas are also often visible within, or close to, these settlements. The burned
settlements are generally less organized in layout, giving the appearance of having grown
organically over time, and usually with less robust structures, with thatched roofs. These
factors indicate that the intact areas are non-Rohingya, usually ethnic Rakhine, and the
burned areas are Rohingya.
973. Similarly, where the Mission could establish that the “clearance operations” were
carried out in mixed ethnicity villages, satellite imagery shows that only the areas populated
by the Rohingya were targeted. Accounts provided to the Mission further corroborate this
analysis.2195 For example, the image below shows one area of Zay Di Pyin, a mixed-
ethnicity village in Rathedaung Township, with an ethnic Rakhine majority population,
damaged by fire. According to accounts provided to the Mission, the area burned was
populated by Rohingya.

Image of Zay di Pyin taken on 16 September 2017

974. Many settlements that remained intact in mixed villages are “model villages”, also
known as “NaTaLa”. For example, in Inn Din, southern Maungdaw Township, there are six
Rohingya hamlets and two small ethnic Rakhine hamlets, one of which is a NaTaLa village.
Satellite imagery analysis demonstrates that most Inn Din villages have been completely
burned during the “clearance operations”, while the NaTaLa village, Pae Youne, is

2194 Kha Maung Seik (Maungdaw); Kyee Kan Pyin (Maungdaw), Laung Don (Sin Thay Pyin village,
Maungdaw); Koe Tan Kauk (Rathedaung); Myo Thu Gyi (Maungdaw); Inn Din (Maungdaw);
Nyaung Chaung (Maungdaw); (Du) Chee Yar Tan (Maungdaw); Ywar Thit Kay (Gaw Du Thar Ra
village, Maungdaw); War Cha (Maungdaw); Chut Pyin (Rathedaung); Tha Man Thar (Maungdaw);
Min Gyi (Maungdaw); Kyauk Pyin Seik (Maungdaw); Tha Yae Kone Tan (Maungdaw); Zaw Ma Tet
(Maungdaw); Kyauk Pan Du (Maungdaw); Myauk Ye (A) Pan Be Chaung (Buthidaung); Zee Hton
(Buthidaung); Zay Di Pyin (Rathedaung)
2195 CI-007, LI-006, LI-042, LI-100, LI-101, LI-118, LI-142.

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unaffected. The Mission collected numerous accounts of the targeted burning of Rohingya
settlements in Inn Din by Tatmadaw soldiers and ethnic Rakhine.

Image of Inn Din taken on 9 October 2017 showing burned structures and Pae Youne
NaTaLa village, to the west, intact (with pagoda shown in inset)

975. Similarly, satellite imagery analysis shows most of Kyauk Pan Du village tract,
southern Maungdaw Township, burned, while the NaTaLa village, characterised by a more
structured distribution of houses and a pagoda, remains untouched.

Image of Kyauk Pan Du taken on 1 December 2017

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976. Targeted destruction is also visible in satellite imagery analysis of Tha Pyay Taw
village tract, southern Maungdaw Township. A small residential area, with a pagoda in the
centre, remains intact, while the surrounding three villages, Tha Pyay Taw, Zone Kar Yar
and Thar Yar Taw, are totally destroyed, as is Myin Hlut village tract to the southeast.
Similarly, the majority of settlements in Tha Yae Kone Tan village tract in southern
Maungdaw Township were destroyed, while Tha Ray Kon Baung, the nearby NaTaLa
village, remains untouched, as does Saw Gi Nar. Pagodas unaffected by fire can be seen in
each area. A more recent image of Tha Yae Kone Tan village tract shows new road
improvements connecting the pagoda to Tha Ray Kon Baung.

Image of Tha Pyay Taw taken on 18 March 2018

Image of Tha Yae Kone Tan taken on 11 October 2017

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Image of Tha Yae Kone Tan taken on 16 December 2017

977. The Mission also received information of soldiers or local authorities demanding
large bribes from the Rohingya villagers to spare their villages from burning.2196 One
example was Zaw Ma Tet village in central Maungdaw Township where one interviewee
claimed that, after the Tatmadaw burned the local market place on 27 August, they
requested 60 million Kyat or the village would be attacked. The interviewee stated that they
were unable to pay such a large sum and so they fled to Bangladesh. Satellite imagery
analysis shows that the village was subsequently burned. 2197

Image of Zaw Ma Tet taken on 11 October 2017

2196 QI-040, QI-041, QI-106.

2197 QI-106.

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Looting
978. The “clearance operations” also encompassed the looting of goods, in which
civilians played a central role. For the most part, looting was carried out by security forces
together with ethnic Rakhine, often recognisable to their Rohingya neighbours. 2198 Other
minority groups also looted and were recognizable by their distinctive dress or
appearance.2199 Looting often took place at the outset of a “clearance operation”, with
participants arriving together with the security forces, and systematically looting Rohingya
goods and other possessions from houses prior to the burning of the village.
979. Looting was comprehensive. Often, all moveable property was stolen, including
gold and other valuables, food stocks, motorcycles, cattle, goats and other livestock. 2200 The
stolen property was then set aside so that it would not be destroyed once the burning
started.2201 One Rohingya witness described seeing ethnic Rakhine “taking
everything”2202 from his village, while another explained how the ethnic Rakhine put looted
property in sacks which were put outside before they set structures on fire. 2203 A man
described the scene in his village in southern Maungdaw:
I had fled my house and was with my family crouching and hiding in the bushes near
the river. From there I could see the ethnic Rakhine looting the houses. They were
piling up all the valuable things outside the houses before burning the houses. They
were piling things on the main road. Some things were in sacks and some were on
the road.2204
980. Sometimes goods were put directly into military vehicles, including large military
trucks, before houses were set on fire.2205 One Rohingya villager described seeing military
vehicles being loaded up and driven away and then the ethnic Rakhine leaving with all that
they could carry.2206 Another villager described how looted goods were taken to temporary
military camps.2207
981. Looting continued in the days following a “clearance operation”, with ethnic
Rakhine often returning to the cleared villages to continue looting and round up abandoned
Rohingya cattle.2208
982. The mass looting resulted not only in widespread theft of Rohingya goods, but also
contributed to the forced deportation of the Rohingya population, through forced destitution
and, in the case of livestock and other property, loss of their source of livelihood.
983. Many women and girls, including survivors and victims of sexual violence were also
systematically robbed during body searches and assaults, and frequently told of their sense
of loss for their home and possessions. 2209 Gold jewellery is an important status symbol, and
its loss has a deep psychological impact.2210 Many victims of rape also lamented the loss of
their new clothes, bought for the Eid festival just before the “clearance operations”
began.2211

2198 CI-029, CI-036, CI-120, CI-124, CI-138, LI-066, LI-069, LI-081, LI-100, LI-102, LI-109, LI-119, LI-
120, LI-131, LI-132, QI-005, QI-013, QI-027, WI-004, WI-032, YI-006, YI-009, YI-014, YI-015, YI-
018, YI-021, YI-031.
2199 CI-124, LI-076, LI-109, LI-112, LI-119.
2200 CI-138, LI-037.
2201 LI-112, LI-120, LI-132.
2202 LI-100.
2203 LI-132.
2204 LI-120.
2205 CI-034, CI-138, LI-037, QI-013.
2206 CI-034.
2207 WI-032.
2208 QI-113, XI-005.
2209 EI-034, EI-069, EI-096, EI-099.
2210 K-122.
2211 EI-086.

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The arduous journey: more deaths and hardship

984. The “clearance operations” forced hundreds of thousands of Rohingya to flee and
walk for days, or even weeks, through forests and over mountains, to reach Bangladesh. On
this journey, many more died or were killed or injured. There was minimum shelter, with
people having to sleep in the open, and little food or water.
985. Tatmadaw soldiers shot at groups of Rohingya who were en route.2212 At times,
these attacks occurred in villages that were already burned, where fleeing Rohingya were
seeking refuge on their journey.2213 At other times, attacks took place in forested areas or
when Rohingya were forced into the open, for example when crossing rivers. 2214 One
woman from Chin Tha Mar village tract, Buthidaung Township, described how, after
walking for two days, she and her group were near a river crossing when soldiers opened
fire at people as they were crossing. She saw two people shot. 2215 Another man recounted
how he and his family were awaiting a boat to carry them across a river. A group of soldiers
and police opened fire at a boat carrying people across, killing four of the passengers. 2216
986. Many dead bodies sighted on the journey exhibited bullet or stab wounds. There
appear to have been violent attacks at passes in the mountain ranges, most notably in the
“Fati Yaar Dala” range, separating the north of Buthidaung from northern Maungdaw
Township. Although the Mission was not able to verify the circumstances of these killings,
it received accounts of many Rohingya corpses indicating death from violent injuries. This
included persons with slit throats and others with bullet wounds. 2217 Witnesses spoke of
there being piles of bodies and a row of severed heads. 2218 As one man recounted:
There were a lot of bodies in the hill near to Fati Yaar. I think there were more than
50 bodies. We saw them in a place where there were many bags of abandoned rice
and other possessions. People appeared to have been gathering there when they
were killed.2219
987. Other villagers saw numerous bodies in another nearby mountain pass, the “Lobboi
Dala”, which was near Pa Da Kar Day War Nar Li/Net Chaung village tract in Maungdaw
Township.2220 One man described his journey through these mountains:
I crossed Fati Yaar Dala. There I saw dead bodies, including women, and some
severed heads. I also saw one man strangled with a vine. Then I left the Fati Yaar
Dala and crossed the Lobboi Dala, which is a smaller mountain range nearby.
There I saw many more dead bodies. I could see that people had been slaughtered
with knives; very few had bullet injuries. You can see so many dead bodies there.2221
988. Data from Médecins Sans Frontiers indicates the scale of violent deaths en route to
Bangladesh, noting that 13.4 per cent of violent deaths occurred during the period between
displacement from their village and arrival in Bangladesh.2222
989. The appalling conditions of the journey also contributed to the high number of
casualties. Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya fled with little or no notice and few, if any,
possessions. Many had sustained injuries and needed urgent medical care. Most would have
been experiencing deep psychological trauma, leaving their homes following a violent
assault during which many had witnessed the deaths of family members and neighbours, as
well as the destruction of their homes and villages. Continuing “clearance operations” and

2212 CI-001, LI-057, LI-119, WI-007, XI-001, YI-031.

2213 QI-003.
2214 CI-001, CI-050, EI-027, EI-034, LI-003, WI-007, XI-001.
2215 EI-027.
2216 CI-050.
2217 CI-135, LI-049, LI-114, LI-051, QI-024, YI-030, YI-031.
2218 LI-049, LI-051, LI-059.
2219 QI-024.
2220 CI-010, YI-030, YI-031.
2221 YI-030.
2222 Médecins Sans Frontiers, “Retrospective mortality, nutrition and measles vaccination coverage
survey in Balukhali 2 & Tasnimarkhola camps” (Bangladesh, 2017).

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the presence of large numbers of Tatmadaw soldiers and other security forces made it
dangerous to travel on main roads or to seek shelter or provisions in other villages. Instead,
Rohingya villagers walked for days or weeks in forest and mountain areas, sleeping in
makeshift shelters or in the open, during heavy monsoon rains, and without sufficient food
or water. This disproportionately affected the most vulnerable, including children and the
elderly. Many persons died and were buried in makeshift graves. A woman described her
journey, with experiences that were typical of many:
It took nine days to reach Bangladesh. On the way, I saw four or five decapitated
heads by the side of the path. One of our group died on the journey, a small boy.
One woman gave birth. I had a packet of biscuits with me, but nothing else. It was
raining heavily. Everything was burning around us.2223
990. One woman, who had seen her husband and son killed in Kha Maung Seik,
Maungdaw Township, spent three nights in a forest before arriving in Bangladesh. She
recalled how hungry her children were during this period, and how she had to feed them
with plant leaves.2224 Another man, from Buthidaung town, described walking for 16 days
through the forests to Bangladesh using a small pot to cook leaves to eat, while drinking
water from streams. Three people with him died on the journey, including his aunt. 2225
991. Villagers carried injured relatives or neighbours on the journey. 2226 Others were left
behind, unable to be carried, with people forced to make difficult decisions. 2227 A survivor
from Min Gyi, Maungdaw Township, recalled how she and her sister-in-law had to leave
behind another woman:
It was very muddy and difficult due to the heavy rain. The other woman was injured,
with stab wounds on her neck, and it was very difficult for her to walk. We were all
slipping in the mud, and we realised that we could not drag her along with us
anymore. We could hear the military and ethnic Rakhine talking nearby at a well,
and we knew that, if we kept on waiting for the other woman, we would all be killed.
We tried again to move her but we couldn't, and so we decided that we had no
choice but to leave her there. My sister-in-law dragged me away and said, “don't
look back, there's no point”.2228
992. People succumbed to their injuries, including because of lack of access to medical
treatment. Mothers gave birth to babies en route,2229 some of whom may have died or
suffered extreme malnutrition.2230 Deaths occurred on the beaches of the Bay of Bengal, as
people waited for days for a boat to take them to Bangladesh. One man described seeing
babies born on the beach and helping to bury more than 10 people who died there,
including children and the elderly: “It was very hot and there was not enough food or
water.2231
993. A large number of Rohingya also drowned while trying to flee to safety across rivers
or at sea. Most bodies of water in northern Rakhine were swollen to high levels from the
August and September monsoonal rains, and the risks were amplified by dangerous tides.
Children, women and the elderly, less able to swim, were particularly vulnerable. 2232 As one
man fleeing his village in Zay Di Pyin, Rathedaung Township, recalled, many people
attempted to cross a narrow river beside his house. The height of tides forced people to
swim rather than wade across. Two sisters, 10 and 12 years old, could not swim and

2223 QI-062.
2224 EI-049.
2225 QI-061.
2226 BI-005, BI-010, BI-014, QI-024, WI-003.
2227 CI-029, CI-116, CI-126, CI-179, CI-197, CI-198, QI-071, WI-005.
2228 QI-071.
2229 CI-111, QI-011, QI-063, See also http://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2018/8/5b75848e4/cant-save-
life-give-comfort.html.
2230 QI-036, See also http://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2018/8/5b75848e4/cant-save-life-give-
comfort.html.
2231 QI-011.
2232 CI-023, EI-065, LI-107, LI-129.

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drowned.2233 Another man, from Myaung Nar in southern Buthidaung Township, recalled,
“There were babies’ bodies floating in the water”.2234
994. Drownings were prevalent in those villages where crossing large bodies of water
were the only way to escape. Many drowned in Min Gyi, Maungdaw Township, when
trying to escape from the shore, located on the long bend of a wide river. 2235 One man
recalled that the river was so high that elderly people and children were not able to cross,
with many of them drowning. His young son probably drowned: “He was trying to swim
with us, but he was young, only 7 years old. The rest of the family could cross by
swimming, but we don’t know what happened to him.” 2236 Similarly, in Gu Dar Pyin,
Buthidaung Township, many people tried to cross a nearby river to escape the violence, but
this also led to drownings. One villager described seeing 10 to 12 people drown in the river,
mostly women.2237
995. People also drowned after being shot at and forced to jump into the water. An
elderly man recalled the military shooting at a group trying to cross the river, some of
whom jumped in the water and drowned:
My grandson, who was three-years old, died when my daughter-in-law jumped into
the river, while crossing the canal. The military started shooting at people who were
about to cross the river. She was afraid and jumped into the river with her son. The
child drowned and we found his body later on.2238
996. In certain locations, babies were thrown into the river by security forces and
intentionally drowned.2239 One woman described seeing soldiers throwing a number of
infants and babies, taken from their mothers, into the river at Maung Gyi Taung in
Buthidaung Township. Some of their parents protested and were killed, while others
managed to rescue their children from the river. She said that other mothers lost their
children as they were trying to cross the river: “The children could not hold on properly and
they were lost in the water”.2240
997. A large number of people died when boats capsized on the journey to Bangladesh,
across the Naf River or in the treacherous open waters of the Bay of Bengal. The
Bangladesh Border Guard Police recovered more than 100 bodies from the Bangladesh side
of the border. Many people saw boats capsize, people drown, and dead bodies floating in
the water.2241 One witness saw a boat capsize as she was crossing a river, and all passengers
drowned, including children. 2242 Another man recalled the large number of dead bodies he
saw in the water when he reached the Bangladesh side of the border: “There were many
people crying there, mourning their drowned family members”. 2243
998. Members of the Mission witnessed the aftermath of a boat that had capsized in the
Bay of Bengal on the coast of southern Bangladesh, in Imani, approximately 12 kilometres
north of Shamlapur, on 31 October 2017. The boat capsized in waves not far from the shore
and 10 people drowned, including elderly women and children.

Disposal of bodies
999. The “clearance operations” resulted in a large number of corpses, strewn across
villages, inside houses, along roads, in paddy fields or floating in ponds or rivers. Many
also saw dead bodies on their journey to Bangladesh, often in or near burned villages.

2233 LI-129.
2234 LI-107.
2235 See this chapter, section D.1.a: Most serious incidents.
2236 LI-097.
2237 LI-063.
2238 CI-023.
2239 CI-046, EI-030, EI-050, WI-021.
2240 EI-030.
2241 EI-045, WI-016.
2242 CI-123.
2243 QI-111.

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Witnesses able to return to their villages after “clearance operations”, normally after
nightfall, saw large numbers of dead bodies of their neighbours and relatives. However,
others who returned to their villages were unable to find the bodies of relatives who they
had witnessed being killed.2244
1000. In a number of locations, the security forces burned the bodies of Rohingya who had
been killed.2245 One person from Koe Tan Kauk village, Rathedaung Township, saw
Tatmadaw soldiers carrying bodies and putting them in a boat, which was then burned. 2246
Another witness saw a large number of burned bodies in Kha Maung Seik, Maungdaw
Township, which he said had been collected in one location. 2247 Another villager from Yae
Khat Chaung Gwa Son village tract, Maungdaw Township, observed soldiers collecting
dead bodies and putting them inside houses before setting the houses on fire. 2248 Similarly,
in Chut Pyin, bodies were burned in a house. 2249 One witness watched for two hours as
soldiers collected dead bodies and threw them into a burning house. 2250 Following the mass
killing in Min Gyi, bodies were burned in three large pits dug for this purpose, while the
bodies of multiple women were burned in the houses where they were subjected to mass
gang rapes.2251
1001. In other locations, the Tatmadaw buried bodies in mass graves. Gravesites have been
documented in a number of the locations where mass killings took place, including Maung
Nu, Gu Dar Pyin, and Inn Din. 2252 The Mission has received further reports of soldiers and
security forces digging graves and burying multiple bodies in other locations.2253 One man
saw in a house the bodies of women and girls who had been shot, but was forced to flee the
shooting. When he returned some hours later, he found that the bodies had been moved into
a pit.2254 Another man returned to his village in Ah Lel Than Kyaw to find a number of
bodies of men who had been shot thrown into a well.2255 The Mission also heard repeated
reports of bodies thrown into rivers, ponds and paddy fields. 2256
1002. The information points to a concerted effort by the Tatmadaw to dispose of
Rohingya corpses following the “clearance operations” in villages. The manner in which
the bodies were disposed of, including through the preparation of large pits, both to burn
bodies and to bury them, and the use of vehicles to transport corpses and the use of other
equipment, suggests both a level of pre-planning and an intention to destroy criminal
evidence. This has been consolidated by subsequent terrain clearance through bulldozing,
removing evidence of burned bodies and graves. It is likely that hundreds, and possibly
thousands, of bodies have been burned, buried or subsequently destroyed.
1003. The Tatmadaw were also witnessed collecting dead bodies in military vehicles, and
removing them.2257 In particular, in central Buthidaung Township, bodies were wrapped in
plastic sheets by soldiers and then removed in military vehicles from the village tract of
Chin Tha Mar, the location of the Maung Nu mass killing. 2258 Bodies were then removed in
military vehicles and trucks. One villager from Chin Tha Mar, reported seeing a number of
large trucks being driven away, each containing bodies.2259 Another witness saw military

2244 CI-079, LI-055, LI-083 LI-099, WI-002, WI-003.

2245 CI-030, LI-020, LI-048, LI-059, LI-072, LI-088, QI-002, QI-003, QI-004, QI-035, RI-004, V-075.
2246 XI-001.
2247 QI-029.
2248 LI-020.
2249 CI-177, CI-186, CI-191.
2250 CI-186
2251 See this chapter, section D.1.a: Most serious incidents.
2252 See this chapter, section D.1.a: Most serious incidents.
2253 EI-047, CI-111, CI-187, CI-195, WI-011.
2254 CI-111.
2255 CI-129, LI-112.
2256 CI-004, CI-014, CI-015, CI-021, CI-146, CI-183, LI-046, LI-055, LI-063, LI-080, LI-094.
2257 CI-016, CI-035, EI-017, LI-055.
2258 CI-027, CI-109, CI-195, LI-020, LI-046, LI-055, LI-080, QI-042, WI-017, V-067, V-75, V-077.
2259 LI-020.

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trucks leave and later return to the village several times. He believed that soldiers were
transporting bodies to the military base.2260
1004. The Mission notes the considerable efforts of some Rohingya victims to return to
their villages, normally after nightfall, and perform funerals, a significant cultural and
religious practice. These funerals were often done hurriedly, with a number of bodies
placed in one makeshift grave. 2261

Death toll of the 2017 “clearance operations”

1005. Quantifying the number of people killed or injured during the “clearance operations”
is challenging. This is due in part to the nature of the “clearance operations”. Large
numbers of people were killed without witnesses, and their bodies were subsequently
systematically disposed of, including through burnings, terrain clearance and bulldozing
vast areas of northern Rakhine. These difficulties are compounded by the lack of accurate
available demographic data on the Rohingya population of Rakhine State. While the
Myanmar authorities have maintained detailed lists of Rohingya villagers in northern
Rakhine State, obtained through the annual compilation of “household lists”, this
information is not available. Further, Rohingya people were not included in the Myanmar
national census in 2014 and so there is no public record of their numbers at that time. No
comprehensive casualty recording process has been undertaken by any actor to date. On 14
November 2017 the Tatmadaw’s Investigation Team presented results of its investigation
into the “terrorist attacks” and subsequent “military operation” in which it only makes
reference to 520 people killed, almost none of whom were Rohingya civilians. This is
patently at odds with the facts as established and assessed by the Mission.2262
1006. Rohingya community volunteers in the refugee camps in southern Bangladesh have
been developing detailed casualty lists, compiling information directly from family
members. These listed the names, ages and villages of people killed, or presumed killed.
The assessment lists 9,208 Rohingya as killed and an additional 1,358 whose whereabouts
are unknown, presumed disappeared or killed, 2,157 people in detention and up to 1,834
victims of rape.2263 These figures do not include non-violent deaths, such as those who
drowned en route, or otherwise perished. This list was incomplete and at the time of
reporting remains a work in progress. The Mission is unable to verify this list. It notes that
the numbers are in the range of other statistical studies.
1007. For example, a series of six health surveys have provided quantitative data on
casualties, providing estimates that between 9,425 and 13,759 Rohingya lost their lives in
Myanmar between 25 August and 24 September 2017, of whom between 6,759 and 9,867
died from violence. At least 730 of these were Rohingya children under the age of five. 2264
While informative, these figures only record the deaths of family members witnessed by
respondents to the survey, and should be considered conservative estimates.2265 In addition,
it should be noted that these estimates only relate to the first month of the “clearance

2260 CI-196.
2261 CI-006, CI-023, CI-030, CI-039, CI-114, CI-115, CI-122, CI-127, CI-128, CI-131, CI-194, EI-014,
LI-029, LI-041, LI-077, LI-114, LI-119, LI-131, QI-004, QI-005, QI-011, QI-026, WI-016, WI-032,
ZI-001.
2262 The reported findings of the Investigation Team refer to 376 “ARSA Bengali Terrorists” killed, 131
“ethnic/Hindu/Bengali people” and 13 “members of security force”. Global New Light of Myanmar,
“Information released by the Tatmadaw True News Information Team on the findings of the
Investigation Team in connection with the performances of the security troops during the terrorist
attacks in Maungtaw region, Rakhine State” (14 November 2017).
2263 K-153.1.
2264 Médecins Sans Frontiers, Rohingya crisis - a summary of findings from six pooled surveys
(9 December 2017).
2265 Ibid.

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operations”. Other statistically based estimates have indicated significantly higher

numbers.2266
1008. Information collected by the Mission through the course of its fact-finding into the
2017 “clearance operations” broadly corresponds with the numbers indicated in these
efforts to date, and suggests that the estimate of up to 10,000 deaths is conservative.

(c) Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army

Organization, structure and resources

1009. The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) emerged following the violence in
2012. The 2012 events, including the participation of the authorities in the violence and
widespread human rights violations against the Rohingya, combined with increasing
oppression affecting all aspects of Rohingya life, served as a trigger for many of the
founding and early members.2267 It first came to public attention in October 2016, when it
launched three coordinated attacks on security posts in Rakhine State. It became more
visible following its subsequent attacks of August 2017.
1010. In its early stages, the organization did not have a name or clearly defined goals. 2268
It was loosely organized around the principle of seeking justice for the Rohingya Muslim
community. Initially, the movement may have been open to engagement with the
authorities and to finding a political solution, particularly in view of the democratic opening
in Myanmar during this period.2269 The group appears to have waited for the 2016 transfer
of power to the civilian government, hoping it would bring positive change in the
promotion and protection of Rohingya rights. However, in the absence of any visible
improvements for the Rohingya in the months after the NLD took office, the group
prepared its military strategy. 2270
1011. On 9 October 2016, the group launched its first offensive action against government
targets, carrying out three attacks on BGP posts in Maungdaw Township. It adopted an
official name, Harakah-al-Yaqin (Faith Movement), only after these attacks. 2271
1012. In March 2017, the organization opened a Twitter account, and issued its first public
statements, using the English name Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army. 2272 ARSA issued a
series of public statements in English about its objectives and intentions, reiterating its goal
to “defend” the Rohingya and their rights. ARSA noted in its first press statement, released
on Twitter on 10 March 2017:
…our sole objective is to defend, salvage and protect the innocent Rohingya
indigenous native ethnic community of Arakan State with our best capacities as we
have the legitimate right under international law to defend ourselves in line with the
principle of self-defense. In doing so, our defensive attacks have been aimed only at
the Burmese terrorist government and its terrorist military regime in accordance
with international norms and principles until our demands are filled. 2273

2266 For example, the report of International-State Crime Initiative (ISCI) have provided an estimate of a
final death toll of 22,000 to 25,000, see ISCI, Genocide Achieved, Genocide Continues: Myanmar’s
Annihilation of the Rohingya (Queen Mary University, 19 May 2018), p.14. See also: ASEAN
Parliamentarians for Human Rights, “The Rohingya Crisis: Past, Present and Future” (Summary of
findings, 21-24 January 2018), which noted that out of approximately 688,000 new arrivals since 25
August at the time of APHR’s visit, over 36,000 children were reported to have lost at least one
parent and over 7,700 were reported to have lost both parents,
2267 LI-121, LI-122, QI-099, XI-007, XI-008, BM-024, BM-025, V-094; See chapter V.B: Systemic
oppression and persecution of the Rohingya.
2268 QI-099.
2269 LI-122, BM-024, BM-025.
2270 BM-024, BM-025, V-129, ARSA/PR/01/2017.
2271 @ARSA_Official in its biography on Twitter describes itself as “formerly called Faith Movement or
Harakah Al Yaqeen”.
2272 See: https://twitter.com/ARSA_Official
2273 BM-025. See ARSA Press Release, ARSA/PR/01/2017, 10 March 2017.

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1013. In the same press release, ARSA elaborated a 20-point list of demands, asking for a
range of political, economic, social and cultural rights for Rohingya, as well as requesting
independent investigation of all allegations, including by the United Nations,2274 and
accountability for past abuses.2275
ARSA claimed its target was the Tatmadaw, rather than civilians or members of other
ethnic groups:
ARSA, in principle, strictly does not allow any of our members to attack civilians,
their places of worship and properties regardless of their religious and ethnic
background.2276
1014. ARSA does not have stated religious motivations, but a seemingly secular ideology
with a strong Muslim identity.2277 While high-level Myanmar officials imply that ARSA
seeks an independent state, homeland or caliphate,2278 the Mission has not seen such
statements from ARSA.2279
1015. ARSA has both a military wing and a political wing. 2280 The military wing is
organized hierarchically, led by a small group of commanders, known as the Supreme
Council, with decision-making powers.2281
1016. The Commander-in-Chief is known as Ata Ullah, although he may also operate
under other pseudonyms. Credible sources indicate that he is a Rohingya Muslim born
outside Myanmar to a Rohingya refugee family, who spent much of his life in Saudi Arabia
and Pakistan. He is reported to have returned to Myanmar at some point between 2012 and
2016. Ata Ullah first gained international recognition as ARSA’s leader after releasing a
video following the ARSA attacks of 9 October 2016.2282 Since the opening of the ARSA
Twitter handle in 2017, his signature appears on all public statements, denoting him as
Commander-in-Chief. Ata Ulla appears to maintain secrecy around his identity, and it is
reported that very few ARSA members have met or seen him.2283
1017. ARSA members at the military leadership level were responsible for clusters of
villagers,2284 below which were village-level groups, referred to as “cells”.2285 Individual
members had responsibilities at each level, 2286 receiving instructions and communications
along the chain through Internet-based messaging applications. Village leaders then
communicated those orders to supporters inside the villages. 2287
1018. ARSA members were loosely divided into different roles according to assignments
and expertise. These included recruitment, training, and a group of fighters sometimes
referred to as the “Tiger Group”.2288 Others were involved in the production of locally made

2274 ARSA, Press Release, ARSA/PR/08/2017 on 6 September 2017.

2275 ARSA, Press Release, ARSA/PR/01/2017, 10 March 2017.
2276 ARSA, Press Release, ARSA/PR/27/2018, on 31 January 2018 See also: ARSA, Press Release,
ARSA/PR/01/2017 on 10 March 2017. ARSA, Press Release, ARSA/PR/02/2017, 30 May 2017.
2277 BM-025; See also, ARSA public statements 1 and 5.
2278 For example, on 11 September 2017, the Office of the Commander-in-Chief: “Because they (the
Rohingya) don’t have citizenship, and they are not “Nationality” and not a recognized ethnic group,
there is no way they could ask for a self-administered zone. That’s why they will remove the
governing structure (in Rakhine State) with whatever means possible. They will remove all the ethnic
people, everyone except their own kind, in the region. They will make sure the government and other
ethnic people cannot re-enter the region.”; Part 6 of the “Talk on Rakhine issue and security outlook”
Facebook Post (removed, post on file with the Mission).
2279 BM-025; See also, all ARSA Statements.
2280 BM-003, BM-025, BM-024.
2281 QI-099, BM-025, QM-013.
2282 Video available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qcCPxEod87o
2283 K-159, V-097.
2284 QI-099, K-159.
2285 BM-025.
2286 CI-140, QI-099, QI-100, QI-103, XI-137.
2287 LI-122, QI-99, QI-102, BM-003.
2288 QI-099, XI-008.

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explosives, intelligence-type activities and sentry duty of villages. 2289 ARSA did not have
military style uniforms,2290 although there are credible references to some of them wearing
black,2291 which is also visible in some of the videos posted online.
1019. The political wing of ARSA is made up of five people who live outside Myanmar
and who are authorised to represent the organization. 2292 They appear to have responsibility
for the political and media strategy of the organization, including the public statements
issued on ARSA’s Twitter feed. Since the October 2016 attacks, ARSA has issued at least
31 written press releases, as well as videos and messages on Twitter. 2293
1020. The number of ARSA members and supporters has varied over time. The three 2016
attacks were carried out by a small group of fighters. 2294 However, their relative success was
a turning point in terms of support. The publicity garnered by the Government’s response
increased ARSA’s visibility, both domestically and internationally, which encouraged
Rohingya men to support ARSA, and for some to formally join it. 2295 Moreover, the 9
October 2016 violence led to the first series of Tatmadaw “clearance operations” and
triggered an increase in the oppressive, discriminatory and abusive treatment of the
Rohingya by the Myanmar authorities. 2296 As a result, between October 2016 and August
2017, ARSA grew stronger in both its membership and its support base. 2297
1021. The number of ARSA members and supporters varied from village to village, with
information indicating that there may have been at least ten ARSA supporters in each
village tract where they were active.2298 However, the extent of their reach was not
consistent across all villages in the three townships of northern Rakhine. 2299
1022. Total numbers of members and supporters are difficult to ascertain. The actual
membership seems to have been small but the support base was certainly in the hundreds.
This includes the “last minute” mobilization of many Rohingya, with many of those who
participated in the 25 August 2017 attacks mobilized only shortly before that day or on the
day itself.2300 However, overall membership and support for ARSA represented a minority
of the total population.
1023. Supporters claim to be motivated by the need to fight long-standing discrimination
against the Rohingya and the denial of human rights. 2301 Some had personally suffered
oppression and abuse by the Tatmadaw or other security forces. 2302 One young man said he
joined ARSA after having been tortured over a period of days while detained by the
Tatmadaw following the October 2016 violence.2303 Another man saw his mother and
brother killed in the 2012 violence and, as a result of this experience, as well as other
oppressive measures, he joined ARSA:
The military’s goal was to kill us all. Because of all these abuses, we decided to try
to protect ourselves. We needed to establish a group to defend our rights.2304
1024. ARSA retained a strong Muslim identity as a Rohingya group, and recruitment at the
village level was sometimes conducted through local religious leaders. This may have been
due to their influence among the Rohingya population, rather than their religious function

2289 CI-137, CI-140, QI-099, QI-100.

2290 LI-054, BM-003.
2291 V-075.
2292 ARSA, Appointment of Official Representatives, ARSA/PR/21/2017, on 16 November 2017.
2293 See: https://twitter.com/ARSA_Official
2294 V-094
2295 CI-137, LI-121, LI-124, QI-102, XI-007.
2296 See this chapter, section D.2.b: The build-up to 25 August 2017.
2297 LI-121, BM-025.
2298 CI-140, LI-054, QI-099, QI-103, YI-029.
2299 BM-025.
2300 CI-140, LI-054, LI-121, QI-103, XI-007, BM-003, BM-029, BM-049, QM-013, V-079.
2301 CI-140, LI-121, LI-124, QI-099, QI-100, XI-007, XI-008, BM-024.
2302 CI-137, CI-140, LI-122, QI-103.
2303 QI-103.
2304 LI-122.

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per se.2305 Religious scholars, known as Moluvis, approached potential supporters, often
outside mosques, particularly in the months prior to the 2016 and 2017 ARSA attacks. 2306
Potential members were initially asked to undertake sentry duty for their village, and
subsequently sometimes to join the attacks.2307
1025. While joining ARSA may largely have been voluntary, 2308 credible public reports
indicate that ARSA used intimidation and coercion and pressure, as well as its influence in
the community, to push people into joining its ranks. 2309 Boys under the age of 18 were
a1so recruited, and participated in activities. 2310 One man mobilised directly prior to the
2017 attacks explained:
On the night of the attack, I wasn’t informed in advance. The leader came to my
house at around 3.30am and told me to come and fight. I felt unsure but I felt
pressured to go as they were in my house.2311
1026. It appears that some members were able to leave ARSA. 2312 One member who
participated in the October 2016 attacks was shot in the hand by the Tatmadaw. He
believed that ARSA was going to provide better support in the attack itself in terms of
participants and weapons. He was surprised by the lack of backup, as well as the violent
response by the military, and so renounced his membership. He noted that “there was not a
problem not re-joining”.2313
1027. A level of secrecy surrounded ARSA membership. Members and supporters did not
necessarily know who else was affiliated, even within the same village. An oath of secrecy
appears to have been required,2314 with members stating that they had been required to
promise not to talk about ARSA or betray it.2315 This seems to have been a strategy to
protect members, given the Tatmadaw’s interest in ARSA activities.2316
1028. Although ARSA denies having any links with foreign terrorist organizations, 2317 it
was reported after the 25 August 2017 attacks that international Islamist terrorist
organizations such as al-Qaeda called for public support for the Rohingya.2318 This appears
to have been unsolicited. The following day, ARSA issued a press release explicitly
rejecting links to Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State (Daesh or ISIS), Lashkar-e-Taiba and all
other transnational terrorist groups, noting that they “do not welcome the involvement of
these groups in the Arakan conflict”.2319 The ill-equipped nature of ARSA, as outlined
below, lends credibility to those claims, 2320 and the Mission has seen no information that
would suggest such links. ARSA has, however, received financial support from the
Rohingya diaspora.2321

2305 LI-124, BM-025.

2306 LI-054, LI-089, LI-124.
2307 LI-054, LI-074, LI-124, YI-010.
2308 CI-137, CI-140, LI-054, LI-074, LI-124, QI-103, QI-100, XI-008.
2309 LI-054, XI-009, QM-013, V-098.
2310 CI-137, XI-008.
2311 LI-054.
2312 LI-054, LI-089.
2313 LI-089.
2314 LI-054, QI-102, LM-007, V-159.
2315 LI-054, QI-102, WI-044, BM-003, LM-007.
2316 BM-003, EM-001, QM-013.
2317 ARSA, Statement, ARSA/PR/12/2017, 14 September 2017, XI-007, XI-008, BM-025, V-099, V-100
V-101, See also Official Video of ARSA, 18 August 2017,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NJoWeV1DlFM&feature=youtu.be;
2318 V-254, V-255.
2319 ARSA, Statement, ARSA/PR/12/2017, 14 September 2017.
2320 BM-049.
2321 BM-003, BM-025, QM-013, V-094.

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Training and weaponry

1029. Training received by ARSA members and supporters varied greatly. A core group of
ARSA members received some military training, including in weaponry. 2322 Some who had
received weapons training then replicated it for others, although often without weapons, by
using hand gestures and wooden models.2323 Other members were provided with basic
instructions on self-defence techniques, the use of swords and hand-to-hand combat.2324
1030. ARSA supporters mobilised shortly prior to the 2017 attacks had no training and
little information about the group.2325 As one young man explained:
I joined ARSA about one or two months before the August 2017 attacks. I didn’t
receive any training or weapons. On the night of the attack, I wasn’t informed in
advance. I heard gunshots around 1am in the distance. The leader came to my house
at around 3:30am and told me to come and fight. But I only had my small tool for
digging.2326
1031. One of the goals of the 9 October 2016 attacks was to obtain weapons. 2327 During
those attacks, ARSA did obtain a small number of firearms, including from the BGP
Headquarters at Kee Kan Pyin (Ta Na Shock), Maungdaw Township.2328
1032. Regardless, in the 2017 attacks, most ARSA members were without firearms, 2329 but
equipped with homemade weapons such as sticks, knives, swords and slings-shots and
some homemade explosives.2330 Some participants noted that even these types of
homemade weapons were difficult to obtain, given the Tatmadaw’s confiscation of knives
and other bladed objects from Rohingya households after October 2016. 2331
1033. At the village level, those who were mobilised to participate were reassured that
weapons and proper training would be provided at the right moment, although this did not
eventuate.2332 One participant stated that ARSA members had said that he and others would
be provided with training and weapons: “But all they did was give us a stick and said that
we should pretend that it is a weapon. We never got any training or weapons.” 2333
1034. ARSA did have some capacity to produce some crude IEDs 2334 but that capacity is
questionable, both in terms of production and execution. 2335 As one ARSA member
elaborated, “The IEDs were made locally by members and are not particularly strong. We
use them just to scare the military.”2336 In the attack in which he participated, the explosive
was not directed at the checkpoint as intended, 2337 and no military casualties were reported.
While the Myanmar Government’s list of ARSA attacks mentions the use of IEDs by

2322 CI-140, QI-099, BM-049.

2323 LI-121, QI-102, BM-049.
2324 CI-137, CI-140, QI-102, XI-008.
2325 CI-141, LI-054, LI-089, LI-121, BM-049, V-075, V-102.
2326 LI-054.
2327 LI-121, LI-122, XI-008; Facebook posts of Commander in Chief, removed, on file with Mission.
2328 LI-121, LI-122, BM-003, Furthermore, according to Government official statements, ARSA looted 65
to 68 firearms and many rounds of ammunitions during the 9 October 2016 attacks, of which 37 were
recovered by 16 November 2017; Multiple Facebook Posts of the Commander-In Chief See,
removed, on file with Mission.
2329 CI-140, LI-089, QI-099, QI-103, XI-007, BM-025.
2330 CI-137, CI-140, QI-102, QI-103, XI-007, XI-008.
2331 LI-054, See this chapter, section D.2.b: The build-up to 25 August 2017.
2332 LI-054, LI-089, CI-137.
2333 LI-089.
2334 CI-022, CI-137, CI-140, QI-099, XI-007, BM-003.
2335 CI-140, V-102.
2336 CI-140.
2337 CI-140.

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ARSA, none of the casualties sustained by the Myanmar security forces were reported as
having been caused by an IED.2338
1035. The Government reported that, during the 2017 “clearance operations”, it
confiscated “15 assorted arms and 97 ammunitions” and “67 home-made IEDs”.2339 These
figures demonstrate ARSA’s weaponry capacity at the time, in particular when juxtaposed
against the military capacity of the Tatmadaw. Photographs of the confiscated weapons,
published in the Government investigation report, show one relatively modern assault rifle
and a number of sticks and hand-made bladed weapons.2340

ARSA attacks on 9 October 2016

1036. On 9 October 2016, ARSA launched three attacks on the BGP headquarters in Kyee
Kan Pyin village tract (Maungdaw Township), on the BGP camp in Nga Khu Ya
(Maungdaw Township) and on a BGP camp in Koe Tan Kauk (Rathedaung Township). 2341
All three attacks were carried out by fighters mainly armed with sticks, knives and a few
firearms. Casualties occurred on both sides.2342 According to the Government reports, nine
police officers and eight assailants were killed.2343 ARSA claimed responsibility for these
attacks.2344 In response, the military and the BGP launched “area clearance operations” with
the stated purpose of recapturing guns and munitions looted by ARSA. 2345
1037. The Government has alleged that a number of further ARSA attacks involving IED-
denotations and ambushes of security force convoys took place on 12 and 13 November
2016, killing two soldiers. 2346 The Mission was not able to corroborate these incidents.
According to a statement issued by the Tatmadaw on 14 November 2016, the October and
November 2016 attacks led to 69 ARSA fighters, seven Tatmadaw soldiers and 10 police
officers killed, five Tatmadaw soldiers and six police officers injured, and 234 Rohingya
arrested.2347

2338 See the following posts from the Information Committee: “Breaking News 7: After being declared as
terrorist group, extremist terrorists continue making violent attacks” (Facebook Post, 26 August
2017), https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/786695324836909; “Breaking News
8: Extremist terrorists continue carrying out violent attacks (Facebook Post, 26 August 2017),
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/786222098217565; “Breaking News 10:
Terrorists trying to destroy Maungtaw” (Facebook post, 27 August 2017),
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/786691611503947; “Breaking News 12:
Extremist terrorists continue carrying out violent attacks” (Facebook post, 29 August 2017),
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/787636841409424; “Breaking News 14:
Terrorist hideouts discovered, items provided by int'l organizations seized” (Facebook post, 30
August 2017), https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/787634948076280; “Breaking
News 17: ARSA extremist terrorists continue setting houses on fire (Facebook post, 30 August 2017),
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/788328661340242
2339 Global New Light of Myanmar, “Information released by the Tatmadaw True News Information
Team on the findings of the Investigation Team in connection with the performances of the security
troops during the terrorist attacks in Maungdaw region, Rakhine State” (14 November 2017).
2340 Global New Light of Myanmar, “Information released by the Tatmadaw True News Information
Team on the findings of the Investigation Team in connection with the performances of the security
troops during the terrorist attacks in Maungdaw region, Rakhine State” (14 November 2017).
2341 CI-118, CI-119, Information Committee, Interim Report of the Investigation Commission on
Maungtaw (Facebook Post, 2017),
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/665265300313246; K-154.2
2342 CI-137, LI-121, LI-122.
2343 Information Committee, “Interim Report of the Investigation Commission on Maungdaw Republic of
the Union of Myanmar” (Facebook post, 3 January 2017)
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/665265300313246
2344 K-154.2.
2345 V-068; See this chapter, section D.2.a: The 2016 violence.
2346 Information released by the Office of the Commander-in-Chief (Facebook post, now defunct), on file
with Mission.
2347 Information released by the Office of the Commander-in-Chief (Facebook post, now defunct), on file
with Mission.

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ARSA attacks on 25 August 2017

1038. Early on 25 August 2017, ARSA attacked around 30 security force outposts in
northern Rakhine State. ARSA subsequently claimed responsibility in relation to the
attacks.2348 A majority of attacks took place in the early hours of 25 August 2017, with a
number of reported subsequent attacks in the following days of 27 and 28 August 2017.
The Office of the Commander-in-Chief claimed that there were 38 “engagements” on 25
August.2349 The findings of the Tatmadaw’s investigation team, reported in November
2017, refer to a total of 94 “engagements” between 25 August and 5 September 2017. 2350
The Mission has been unable to corroborate these figures.
1039. The majority of targets chosen were BGP posts and checkpoints, with the exception
of army base 552 in Chin Tha Mar village tract, Buthidaung Township. The attacks were
carried out by ARSA members together with some local villagers mobilised in support.2351
The Mission corroborated 17 separate attacks, including the attack against army base 552.
There is credible information that an additional 17 attacks took place. The Government
originally estimated the number of assailants as ranging from 10 to 20 in some locations,
100 to 300 in others, and an alleged 1,000 in relation to the attack on Myin Hlut (Mayrulla),
Maungdaw Township, police station. However, the Tatmadaw’s investigation team later
referred to between 6,200 and “more than 10,000” ARSA participants on 25 August. 2352
The Mission was not able to verify these numbers. Although the Government officially
declared 5 September 2017 to be the end of the offensive, 2353 Tatmadaw “clearance
operations” continued for some time after this date. 2354 There is nothing to indicate that the
Tatmadaw suffered any casualties during any post-25 August “engagements”. The Mission
did not find credible information to substantiate the Government’s claims of continuing
offensives or clashes with ARSA in September.
1040. On 10 September 2017, ARSA declared a one-month ceasefire, “in order to enable
humanitarian actors to assess and respond to the humanitarian crisis in Arakan State”. 2355
After the deadline for the cessation of the ceasefire, hostilities did not resume. However,
four months later, in January 2018, ARSA claimed responsibility for an ambush of a
military convoy in Turaing village, San Kar Pin Yin village tract, northern Maungdaw
Township. Video footage of this ambush, stamped with ARSA’s logo, shows a number of
fighters shooting from the bushes towards a military vehicle. 2356 No casualties were
reported.2357

2348 K-154.2.
2349 Information released by the Office of the Commander-in-Chief (Facebook post, now defunct), on file
with Mission.
2350 Global New Light of Myanmar, “Information released by the Tatmadaw True News Information
Team on the findings of the Investigation Team in connection with the performances of the security
troops during the terrorist attacks in Maungdaw region, Rakhine State” (14 November 2017).
2351 QI-099.
2352 Global New Light of Myanmar, “Information released by the Tatmadaw True News Information
Team on the findings of the Investigation Team in connection with the performances of the security
troops during the terrorist attacks in Maungdaw region, Rakhine State” (14 November 2017).
2353 “Speech delivered by Her Excellency Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, State Counsellor of the Republic of
the Union of Myanmar on Government’s efforts with regard to National Reconciliation and Peace”
(Facebook post, 19 September 2017), https://www.facebook.com/state.counsellor/posts/speech-
delivered-by-her-excellency-daw-aung-san-suu-kyi-state-counsellor-of-the-/1121130291354519.
2354 For example, Office of the Commander-in-Chief stating that “engagements were on the decrease after
5 September”: (Facebook post on file with Mission). CI-043, QI-008, QI-010, QI-011, QI-025, QI-
061, QI-062.
2355 ARSA Press Release, ARSA/PR/10/2017 on 10 September 2017.
2356 BM-049.
2357 See ARSA Statement, ARSA/PR/23/2018 on 7 January 2018. Information Committee; See also,
Information Committee, “Soldiers and civilians injured due to the attack by a group of armed
insurgents who were already under investigation” (Facebook Post, 5 January 2018),
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/photos/a.639477959558647.1073741828.63945620
6227489/855053054667802/; Facebook posts of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, on file with
Mission.

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1041. According to the Government, 376 “assailants” and 13 members of security forces
died in the 2017 attacks, and 15 assorted arms, 97 ammunitions, 30 packs of gunpowder
and 67 homemade mines were confiscated from alleged ARSA members. 2358
1042. Following the 25 August 2017 attacks, the Government declared ARSA a “terrorist
organization”, and thus a threat to national security. 2359 ARSA supporters could be held
responsible for acts of terrorism and the attacks conducted by ARSA treated as crimes that
qualify as offences under Myanmar’s Penal Code or the 2014 Counter-Terrorism Law.2360
1043. ARSA stated that the 2017 attacks were in response to what it viewed as increased
oppression of the Rohingya over the previous weeks and months, including arbitrary arrests
and interrogations, extortion, increasing restrictions on freedom of movement, and
disappearances. A “blockade” of Rohingya in Zay Di Pyin, Rathedaung Township, appears
to have had a particular impact.2361 On 15 August 2017, Ata Ullah appeared in a video, with
four armed fighters, warning the Myanmar military to stop committing abuses. He spoke
about the longstanding suffering and oppression of the Rohingya, and urged the Myanmar
Government to stop the Zay Di Pyin “blockade”.2362
1044. ARSA further stated that the “ramping up” of the military in northern Rakhine State
and the increasing oppression by the Tatmadaw and other security forces in early August
2017 were an attempt to “derail” the work and recommendations of the Advisory
Commission on Rakhine State, led by former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi
Annan.2363 The final report of the Commission2364 set out solutions for peace and
development in Rakhine State and included a series of recommendations, for example on
citizenship for the Rohingya. 2365 The ARSA attacks commenced hours after the release of
the Commission’s final report in Yangon on 24 August 2017.
1045. ARSA denied that its attacks were linked to the Advisory Commission report. They
may have been prompted by an accidental IED explosion on 25 August, raising concerns
among ARSA leadership that the Tatmadaw would be alerted to their activities.2366 It
appears that, shortly after this explosion, an order was sent through a messaging application
telling ARSA “cell” leaders to mobilise male villagers. 2367 However, this accidental
explosion only appears to have brought forward plans by one to two days.
1046. ARSA was able to carry out multiple, coordinated attacks in a highly controlled and
militarised environment, but with little military capability. The attacks employed “hit and
run” tactics with predominantly untrained civilians, mostly wielding sticks and knives. The
ARSA attacks caused minimal Tatmadaw casualties compared to their own losses.
1047. It appears, therefore, that the objectives of the ARSA attacks may not have been
military, but aimed at eliciting a response by the Tatmadaw (as in October 2016), with the
broader goal of drawing renewed global attention to the Rohingya situation. 2368 As one
ARSA member stated:

2358 Global New Light of Myanmar, “Information released by the Tatmadaw True News Information
Team on the findings of the Investigation Team in connection with the performances of the security
troops during the terrorist attacks in Maungdaw region, Rakhine State” (14 November 2017).
2359 The Republic of Union of Myanmar Anti-Terrorism Committee Order no 1/2017,” (27 Aug 2017)
http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/968.
2360 V-120.
2361 See this chapter, section D.2.b: The build-up to 25 August 2017.
2362 XI-007, V-101.
2363 ARSA statement, 25 August 2017 (https://twitter.com/ARSA_Official/status/900904120076435457).
2364 V-119.
2365 BM-025, V-117.
2366 CI-140, LI-121, QI-099, XI-008.
2367 V-068.
2368 CI-137, CI-140, XI-008, XI-009, EM-001.

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The main aim of the attacks was to get international attention, as we knew the
response [of the Tatmadaw] would be brutal. We hoped that, if the world could see
their response, they would finally understand our suffering.2369
1048. Some ARSA members noted an instruction not to use weapons against the
Tatmadaw in the 2017 attacks, as the purpose of the attack was in fact to draw attention to
the Rohingya cause.2370 While it is not known whether this instruction was followed by all,
given that some weapons were used, it adds weight to the conclusion that the operation was
aimed at drawing attention, rather than any military success.
1049. Another ARSA participant in the August 2017 attacks characterized it as follows:
We were a group of men, approaching the check-post with sticks and stones. But
then the military started shooting. We could not respond as we only had sticks and
stones. It was not really like a military attack by us, it was a protest or uprising,
claiming our rights.2371

Allegations of human rights abuses committed by ARSA

1050. ARSA has been accused of committing abuses against both the Rohingya population
and other ethnic minority groups in Rakhine State. These allegations are serious and
warrant full investigation. The Mission itself has been constrained by its lack of access to
Myanmar. For its investigation on the 2016 and 2017 situation in Rakhine State, because of
the mass-exodus of Rohingya to Bangladesh, the Mission had access to large numbers of
Rohingya victims and was able to conduct interviews in line with its established
methodology. It had no comparable access to victims of alleged abuses committed by
ARSA, given that most remained in Rakhine State. In line with protection of sources and
genuine fear of reprisals for those cooperating, the Mission did not reach out in other ways
to those affected communities inside Myanmar.
1051. Furthermore, even in Bangladesh, the Mission noted a widespread reluctance of
Rohingya to talk about ARSA and any alleged abuses committed by it. It may be that
Rohingya are fearful of ARSA or that they wish to avoid detracting from the gravity of the
violations perpetrated against themselves. The secretive nature of ARSA and lack of
knowledge about it may have also contributed.

Killing of Rohingya informants

1052. Allegations of abuses perpetrated by ARSA against Rohingya have mostly
concerned the mistreatment or killing of Rohingya individuals suspected of providing
information to Myanmar authorities. ARSA has stated that its objective was only to attack
Tatmadaw or security related targets and has denied killing civilians. 2372 However, it used
threats and intimidation, including violence, against the population to protect its plans and
activities and to ensure secrecy. Informants, known locally as “tabbe”, were present within
the Rohingya community and provided information to the Myanmar authorities. ARSA
took steps to control them, including through beatings and killings.2373 One interviewee
stated that, just before the August 2017 violence, he was approached by a religious scholar
to monitor the activities of three persons suspected of passing information on ARSA
activities to the BGP in Myin Hlut (Mayrulla).2374
1053. On 29 June 2017, the Global New Light of Myanmar, a government newspaper,
published a list of 35 alleged incidents involving the killing of 38 civilians in Maungdaw
Township between October 2016 and June 2017. Eleven of these incidents were reportedly

2369 XI-008.
2370 CI-137, CI-140.
2371 LI-121, BM-003.
2372 ARSA, Press Release, ARSA/PR/09/2017 of 30 May 2017.
2373 LI-122, QI-016, QI-102, QI-103, XI-008, YI-010, YI-022, V-0940.
2374 YI-100.

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perpetrated by “men wearing black masks”. 2375 Other sources refer to other alleged killings
of Rohingya in this period, reportedly also perpetrated by ARSA. Collectively, allegations
suggest that more than 50 “informants” may have been killed by ARSA in this period. 2376
1054. While the Mission was unable to verify each of these specific incidents, credible
reports indicate that there were killings of Rohingya and that responsibility for many of the
killings may be attributable to ARSA. 2377 The Mission received information from two
people acknowledging the killing of two informants in U Shey Kya village tract,
Maungdaw Township.2378 Other sources, referring to the same killings, stated that they
occurred after the names of eight local ARSA members were given to the BGP, leading to
BGP night raids and arrests.2379
1055. A number of additional smaller militant Rohingya groups appear to have been active
in northern Rakhine State and may also have been involved in controlling or killing
informants.2380 The Mission reviewed a number of videos showing men wearing black
masks giving death threats to villagers, whom they referred to by name and who they
suspected had passed information to the authorities. ARSA stated that the men in black
masks were not ARSA members. The Mission was not able to verify the origin of these
videos or their content.2381

Killings of members of other ethnic groups

1056. Open sources reported the first case of alleged killings of ethnic Rakhine villagers
by ARSA on 24 June 2017. ARSA members reportedly confronted four individuals who
came across an ARSA IED cache, while foraging in Kyun Pauk Pyu Su village tract,
northern Maungdaw Township. Two were shot dead and two, one of whom was injured,
fled and alerted the authorities. When the authorities returned to the location of the incident,
the materials were not found.2382 The Mission was not able to corroborate this incident, 2383
although credible sources indicate that this may indeed have been attributable to ARSA. 2384
1057. On 3 August 2017, six to seven men and women of the Mro ethnic group were
allegedly killed in the hills of Maungdaw Township near to Kine Gyi, the NaTaLa village
where they lived. The Myanmar Government has stated that ARSA is responsible for these
killings, allegations that were shared widely and publicly within Myanmar. 2385 The Mission
has not been able to verify this incident or its perpetrator. Credible information indicates,
however, that the killings may have been related to the illegal narcotics trade. 2386 ARSA has
denied involvement in this incident.2387
1058. The Government further alleged that ARSA was responsible for an attack on twenty
Daignet villagers, reportedly from Ran Khar Zay Divillage, in Kar Lar Day Hpet village
tract, travelling towards Aung Zan village in Aung Zan/Bauk Shu Hpweit village tract,
northern Maungdaw Township. While it was first reported that 19 of the group were

2375 Global New Light of Myanmar, “List of civilian murdered in Maungtaw District (2016 October to
2017 June 27)” (29 June 2017).
2376 LM-017, V-094, V-115, V-075.
2377 BM-003, LM-007, LM-017, QM-013, V-067, V-075.
2378 CI-137, XI-009.
2379 V-094.
2380 BM-025.
2381 LM-017.
2382 V-068.
2383 See this chapter, section D.2.b: The build-up to 25 August 2017.
2384 V-067, K-156.2.
2385 Information Committee, “Press Release on the Situation in Maungdaw” (Facebook post, 11 August
2017),para 4,
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/photos/pcb.778752418964533/778752095631232/?
type=3&theater
2386 BM-025, LM-007, V-094.
2387 ARSA, Statement, ARSA/PR/04/2017, of 6 August 2017; ARSA Statement, ARSA/PR/05/2017, at
13 August 2017.

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missing following an attack by ARSA, it was later reported that five of the group had been
killed.2388 The Mission has been unable to verify this incident.
1059. ARSA has also been accused of the alleged killings and disappearances of up to 100
Hindu men and women from Kha Maung Seik village tract, in northern Maungdaw
Township. It is alleged that, on 25 August 2017, ARSA killed 45 Hindus in the hamlet of
Au Nauk Ka Maung Seik2389 and a similar number from a second hamlet in the same village
tract, Ye Bauk Kyar village (Reak Kya Para).2390 Referring to this incident, Amnesty
International has concluded that ARSA is responsible “… for at least one, and potentially a
second, massacre of up to 99 Hindu women, men, and children as well as additional
unlawful killings and abductions of Hindu villagers in August 2017”.2391 ARSA is also
alleged to be responsible for the killings of six other Hindus, on the outskirts of Maungdaw
town, near Myo Thu Gyi village on 26 August 2017.2392 The Myanmar Government has
stated that ARSA was responsible for these incidents.2393 On 27 September 2017, the
Myanmar authorities organized a public event in Kha Maung Seik with national and
international media representatives, during which it displayed a large number of corpses. It
stated the bodies were of the Hindu victims of Ah Nauk Kha Maung Seik that had been
excavated from a mass grave.2394 ARSA denies any involvement in these killings. 2395
1060. The Mission interviewed seven Hindus from Au Nauk Kha Maung Seik (Shab
Bazar) and nearby villages who witnessed these events or were victims of abuses in
September 2017.2396 The Mission has verified that a large number of Hindu victims were
killed on 25 August 2017 in Au Nauk Kha Maung Seik. However, the information received
was contradictory, including regarding the language spoken by the perpetrators, which,
according to the accounts taken, was a key identifying feature since the perpetrators
reportedly had their faces covered. The Mission’s information is insufficient to make any
determinations on reasonable grounds regarding the identity of the perpetrators. The
Mission has also been unable to verify the facts regarding the killing of Hindus in Myo Thu
Gyi.

Burning of non-Rohingya villages

1061. On 28 August 2017, three days after the commencement of the “clearance
operations”, an audio order to burn down non-Rohingya villages was allegedly given by

2388 V-113; Ministry of Information, “Interview with the family members of the villagers slain by ARSA
extremist terrorists” (4 September 2017), http://www.moi.gov.mm/moi:eng/?q=news/4/09/2017/id-
11434; Multiple Facebook posts, now defunct, of the Commander-in-Chief, on file with the Mission.
2389 V-067; Global New Light of Myanmar, “Interview with bereaved families of Hindus killed by ARSA
terrorists” (27 September 2017); http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/1041
2390 V-067.
2391 V-108.
2392 Information Committee, “Breaking News 22: Local and foreign media continue coverage of news in
Maungtaw and Sittway” (Facebook post, 1 September 2017),
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/789155627924212; Information Committee,
“Interview with Hindus who fled from their villages” (Facebook post, 1 September 2018);
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/788602791312829; Presidents Office,
“Hindu women and children escape from terrorists,” (3 September 2017), State Counsellors Office,
“Interview with bereaved families of Hindus killed by ARSA terrorists” (27 September 2017)
http://www.president-office.gov.mm/en/?q=issues/rakhine-state-affairs/id-7656; V-067.
2393 See, for example, Information Committee, “Interview with Hindus who fled from their villages”
(Facebook post, 1 September 2017),
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/788602791312829; Information Committee,
“The words of bereaved families of Hindus killed by ARSA terrorists” (Facebook post, 27 September
2017), https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/807089859464122; Multiple
Facebook posts, now defunct, of the Commander-in-Chief, on file with the Mission.
2394 V-106, Global New Light of Myanmar, “Slaughtered Hindus testament to brutality of ARSA
terrorists” (28 September 2017).
2395 ARSA Statement, ARSA/PR/13/2017, on 27 September 2017 ; ARSA Statement, ARSA/PR/28/2018,
25 May 2018.
2396 LI-023, LI-024, LI-025, LI-026, QI-019, QI-020, QI-021.

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Ata Ullah through a messaging application. 2397 The Mission received a copy of the audio
file, which contained an instruction for Rohingya to burn down non-Rohingya villages. It
was unable to ascertain the authenticity of the recording or its source.
1062. Regardless of the authenticity of the audio message, ASRA burned down the
Rakhine village of Ah Htet Pyu Ma village. 2398 A Rohingya interviewee saw the village
burning. He described hearing an exchange of fire between ARSA and the police at an
outpost near Purma Fume in Ah Htet Pyu Ma village tract in the early morning of
25 August 2017. “I heard the gunfire and I saw the trailers of gunfire passing in each
direction. I got out of bed and went outside to see. It was about two miles away and it went
on for one and a half hours.” The interviewee said that the Rakhine villagers fled the
following day and, after that, ARSA set the village on fire. 2399 Approximately 100 Rakhine
families had been living there. While ARSA did not claim responsibility for burning
villages, it did claim an attack on a police station in Ah Htet Pyu Ma village tract. 2400
1063. Satellite imagery analysis confirms the burning of Ah Htet Pyu Ma. The imagery
reveals that there are two parts of the village, the northern part, containing structures
distributed in a more organized manner and made of higher quality materials, indicative of
an area inhabited by ethnic Rakhine, and a more southern part, likely Rohingya. Both parts
of the village were burned.2401 This contrasts with the burning that took place in a large
majority of village tracts, where the Rakhine hamlets were left intact. 2402

Comparative images of Ah Htet Pyu Ma on 23 May and 16 September 2017,

showing burning of both Rohingya and ethnic Rakhine settlements

1064. ARSA also reportedly burned the Mro village of Khu Daing (Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit
village tract) on 28 August 2017.2403 Satellite imagery analysis confirms the burning and
destruction of Khu Daing by 16 September 2017. The Mission has credible information that
Rohingya or ARSA were responsible for the burning of this village. 2404 Other sources also

2397 K-163.01, K-163.02.

2398 QI-018, V-067.
2399 QI-018.
2400 K-154.2.
2401 Satellite image analysis prepared for the mission by UNITAR-UNOSAT.
2402 See this chapter, section D.1.b. Patterns of serious human rights violations by the Myanmar security
forces.
2403 Information Committee, “Breaking News 17: ARSA extremist terrorists continue setting houses on
fire” (Facebook post, 30 August 2017),
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/788328661340242; V-067, Global New
Light of Myanmar, “Seven more civilians killed in Rakhine” (31 August 2017).
2404 RI-008, LM-007, LM-017, V-067.

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report that ARSA was responsible for violent acts against Mro villagers as part of this
attack, with a number of persons injured and others assumed killed,2405 although the
Mission has not been able to verify these allegations.

Image of Khu Daing from 25 May 2017 showing an intact settlement

Image of Khu Daing from 11 October 2017 showing a burned and destroyed
settlement. The burning was first detected on 16 September 2017

1065. In numerous Facebook posts, the Tatmadaw has indicated that ARSA was
responsible for burning other Rakhine and ethnic minority houses and villages. 2406 The
information in these posts is unclear and no other evidence has been provided to support

2405 V-067, Global New Light of Myanmar, “Seven more civilians killed in Rakhine” (31 August 2017).
2406 Multiple Facebook posts, now defunct, of the Commander-in-Chief, on file with the Mission.

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these claims. There appears to be no other official Government sources that provide clarity
around these allegations. The Mission has not been able to verify these assertions.

Government allegations regarding the burning of Rohingya villages by ARSA

1066. The Government has alleged that ARSA set fire to multiple Rohingya villages, and
that the widespread fires that led to the destruction of Rohingya villages in northern
Rakhine State were a result of ARSA’s own actions.2407 Indeed, in its own internal
investigation of the 2017 crisis, the Tatmadaw stated that ARSA was responsible for the
burning of Rohingya houses and that the hundreds of thousands of Rohingya who fled
Myanmar did so on instruction, and because they feared ARSA. 2408 ARSA denies these
allegations.2409
1067. The Government has provided no credible evidence to support its version of events.
To the contrary, the Mission has established that the burning of Rohingya villages was
systematically undertaken by Tatmadaw soldiers, together with other security forces and
ethnic Rakhines, as well as other ethnic and religious minorities, through the use of
“launchers” and other means.2410

2. A foreseeable and planned catastrophe

1068. The 2017 ARSA attacks and ensuing “clearance operations” did not occur in a
vacuum. They were foreseeable and planned.

(a) The 2016 violence

Overview
1069. On 9 October 2016, ARSA launched a small first offensive against three Border
Guard Police posts in northern Rakhine State. Nine police officers were killed. Security
forces, led by the Tatmadaw, responded by conducting “clearance operations” across an
“area clearance zone” between Taungpyoletwa and Maungdaw, in central Maungdaw
Township.
1070. In the weeks that followed, Rohingya victims who fled to Bangladesh revealed that
these operations had been characterised by serious human rights violations, including
torture, rape and sexual assault, killings, and the destruction of homes and mosques. The
same tactics and violations were seen in this operation as later in 2017, albeit on a smaller
scale. The means and methods of attack, which would later form the modus operandi of the
August 2017 operations, were already present. By December 2016, satellite imagery
analysis undertaken by Human Rights Watch estimated that 1,500 structures had been
burned in eleven separate locations in Maungdaw Township. 2411 Active military operations
continued for at least two months, and the Myanmar Government declared an end to the
operation on 16 February 2017.2412 Ultimately, some 87,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh.

2407 Information Committee, “Breaking News 7: After being declared as terrorist group, extremist
terrorists continue making violent attacks” (Facebook post, 28 August 2018),
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/786695324836909; Multiple Facebook posts,
now defunct, of the Commander-in-Chief, on file with the Mission.
2408 Facebook posts, now defunct, of the Commander-in-Chief, on file with the Mission.
2409 ARSA, Statement, ARSA/PR/06/2017, on 28 August 2017.
2410 See this chapter, section D.1.a: Patterns of serious human rights violations by the Myanmar security
forces.
2411 Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Military Burned Villages in Rakhine State” (13 December 2016),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/13/burma-military-burned-villages-rakhine-state.
2412 The Republic of the Union of Myanmar - President’s Office, “Tatmataw ends area clearance
operations in northern Rakhine”, http://www.president-office.gov.mm/en/?q=print/7288.

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1071. A Government Investigation Commission, led by the Vice-President, and the

security forces’ own inquiries cleared the security forces of wrongdoing, endorsing the
“lawfulness and appropriateness of the response”.2413

Verified incidents of the 2016 “area clearance operations”

1072. The 2016 “area clearance operations” took place across a large area of northern
Maungdaw, with at least 11 different locations affected. The Mission focused its fact-
finding work on two key incidents, which are considered to be among the most grave. This
focus should in no way detract from the scale or significance of the 2016 violence, which
warrants further investigation and documentation.

Pwint Hpyu Chaung

1073. Pwint Hpyu Chaung village tract yai khutis in northern Maungdaw Township,
approximately 12 kilometres north of Maungdaw town. It is made up of three Rohingya
hamlets. The Tatmadaw led “area clearance operations” in Pwint Hpyu Chaung on 11 and
12 November 2016.2414
1074. Following the 9 October 2016 ARSA attacks, soldiers had increased visits, held
regular meetings with the village elders and came to the village twice a week to look for
“bad people”.2415
1075. The situation deteriorated early on 11 November 2016, when soldiers detained a
large number of men attending prayers at the local mosques. Between 60 and 80 men were
detained and held for two or more hours before being released. Some were subjected to
beatings and other ill-treatment.2416 One man described being taken from a mosque to the
school building and tied together with ropes. As well as being kicked and beaten with rifle
butts, the soldiers burned his beard and chin with matches. The detainees were called
“Bengali” and “Kalar”.2417
1076. After their release, the men who had originally been detained were told by the
Tatmadaw commander to return at 12pm to the village meeting place. Word spread that
other men from the village should attend also. Approximately 60 men came to the meeting
place as instructed at around 12pm on 11 November. They were taken away to Buthidaung
prison in two military trucks and detained for at least one year. At least one individual, an
elderly man, died on the way to prison.2418 One man who later visited relatives in the group
believed from their appearance that they were ill-treated.2419
1077. From 3am the following morning, 12 November 2016, a large number of Tatmadaw
soldiers and police arrived in the village tract in military vehicles and commenced an “area
clearance operation”, moving through the three hamlets. Weapons were fired, followed by
the burning of houses, starting from the southern end of the village. Villagers fled, many
running for nearby forested areas or neighbouring villages. Petrol was used to burn houses,
as were weapons described as “launchers”. The burning continued all day, with dozens of
houses set alight.2420
1078. Although the number of people killed or wounded is unknown, up to nine died from
bullet wounds.2421 One interviewee saw four of his male relatives, between the ages of 13
and 77, having their hands tied and being put inside a house that he later saw on fire. He has

2413 See chapter X: Impunity and accountability.

2414 LI-133.
2415 CI-142, LI-133, QI-104.
2416 CI-142, CI-143, LI-127, LI-133, QI-104.
2417 LI-127.
2418 CI-142, CI-143, LI-096, LI-127, QI-104.
2419 QI-104.
2420 CI-142, CI-143, CI-150, LI-127, LI-133, QI-104.
2421 CI-142, CI-143, CI-150, LI-127, LI-133, QI-104, QI-100, XI-009.

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not seen any of them since, and believes that they were killed.2422 A group of village elders
who were able to return a few days later discovered the bodies of four or five people burned
in a house.2423
1079. There are strong indications that a number of women and girls were subjected to
sexual and gender-based violence during the operation.2424 One witness reported how he hid
and watched his niece being gang raped and then shot and killed by soldiers. 2425
1080. The group of village elders recorded the impact of the “area clearance operation” on
their village tract. They listed approximately 170 houses as burned and destroyed, together
with two mosques, two or three madrassas and 16 shops. The shops were also looted and
more than 1,000 animals and dozens of motorcycles were stolen. 2426 Credible satellite
imagery analysis confirms that at least 65 structures were burned and destroyed in the
village tract between 10 and 17 November 2017.2427
1081. The perpetrators of the violations were Tatmadaw soldiers, accompanied by
police.2428
1082. While the majority of villagers from Pwint Hpyu Chaung eventually fled to
Bangladesh, a number returned in late 2016 or early 2017 and lived in tents and makeshift
shelters, receiving international humanitarian assistance. Since the 2017 “clearance
operations”, it appears that the majority of the villagers, if not all, have relocated to
Bangladesh.2429

Dar Gyi Zar

1083. Dar Gyi Zar village tract, known to the Rohingya as Choto Go Zi Bil, is made up of
a series of hamlets, located three to four kilometres south of Pwint Hpyu Chaung in
northern Maungdaw Township. The Tatmadaw launched “area clearance operations” in Dar
Gyi Zar on 12 November 2016 and in Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son village tract, directly to
the north. The operation in Dar Gyi Zar continued for two days.
1084. The “area clearance operation” commenced in Dar Gyi Zar with the arrival of two or
three helicopters, from which soldiers opened fire using automatic weapons. This caused
panic, with villagers running to seek shelter. People were shot and killed or injured, both
outside and inside houses. Shooting from the helicopters continued for up to two hours. At
least one woman was shot and killed inside her house and witnesses saw up to 15 other
bodies of people killed by gunfire from the helicopters. 2430 A number of villagers,
particularly women and children, headed to the Kula Bil area in the south of the village
tract.
1085. The following morning, a group of up to 200 soldiers entered Dar Gyi Zar along the
main road. They opened fire in an indiscriminate manner and started to burn houses,
including by using “launchers”. People again fled; some were shot as they ran.2431 One
witness estimated that he saw 16 people shot. 2432 People ran and hid in the paddy fields.

2422 LI-133.
2423 CI-143, LI-127, LI-133, QI-104.
2424 CI-150, LI-127, QI-100.
2425 LI-127.
2426 CI-142, CI-143, LI-133.
2427 Human Rights Watch, Updated Damage Assessment of Affected Villages in Maungdaw District, 18
November 2016.
2428 CI-142, LI-127, LI-133, QI-100.
2429 LI-127, QI-104.
2430 CI-139, LI-123, LI-125, LI-135, QI-101, XI-009.
2431 CI-139, LI-123, LI-135.
2432 LI-123.

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From there they watched as the village was systematically burned. 2433 Through the course
of the day, nearly all of the houses in the village were burned.2434
1086. Tatmadaw soldiers captured a group of up to 200 men, women and children, and
took them to a paddy field, where they were told to kneel. People were beaten, following
which the men and boys of approximately 12 years or older were separated from the group.
The men were told to take off their shirts and the women were searched and robbed of
jewellery, being touched inappropriately in the process. The women and younger children
were then taken and held in a mud-walled house, while the men and boys were kept
outside. The women then heard repeated gunfire and the screams of the men and boys
outside.2435
1087. At sunset, the soldiers left and the women, girls and young children were able to
leave the house. The bodies of the men and boys had been put in a pile, or series of piles,
and burned using hay, harvested rice and the removed shirts. A number of other witnesses
saw the pile of burned bodies. Two weeks later piles of bones were also seen. 2436 The total
number of bodies is unclear, although it appears that there were up to 40 men and boys
burned, possibly more.2437 One victim who had been held inside the mud-walled house
informed the Mission that her husband and two young sons, aged 10 and 13 years old, had
been killed and burned.2438 Other families were burned in their houses, with the corpses
found later by fellow villagers.2439
1088. The total number of people killed in Dar Gyi Zar on 12 and 13 November is
estimated to be 75, according to a list developed by Rohingya community organizations in
the refugee camps of southern Bangladesh.2440 While the Mission is not able to verify the
accuracy of this number, it is consistent with other information received by the Mission of a
high number of casualties.
1089. The situation in the surrounding area after the burning of Dar Gyi Zar was very
difficult, with large numbers of villagers sleeping in the open and further visits from
Tatmadaw soldiers. The local ethnic Rakhine village administrator appears to have
negotiated with the Tatmadaw regarding the return of the displaced Rohingya. Eventually
some were able to return. They lived in constructed tents and temporary shelters on the sites
of their former homes, with intermittent international aid distributions. Others made the
journey to the refugee camps in Bangladesh. 2441
1090. Credible satellite imagery analysis shows that 265 structures were burned and
destroyed in the village between 10 and 17 November 2017.2442 Rohingya community
organizations have stated that a total of 400 structures were burned in Dar Gyi Zar, as well
as five mosques and 38 shops, which were also looted.2443

Sexual and gender-based violence

1091. Rape, gang rape, and other forms of sexual violence were widely perpetrated in the
course of the 2016 “area clearance operations”. Mass gang rapes, led by the Tatmadaw, 2444
were a significant pattern of the violence from October to December 2016. According to
information verified by the Mission, they were perpetrated in Yae Khst Chaung Gwa Son,

2433 CI-139, LI-135.

2434 CI-139, LI-123, LI-135.
2435 LI-125, LI-126.
2436 LI-135.
2437 LI-123, LI-126, LI-135.
2438 LI-125.
2439 CI-139, LI-123, LI-135.
2440 K-153.3.
2441 CI-139, LI-123, LI-125, LI-126, LI-135.
2442 V-150.
2443 K-153.3.
2444 CI-106, EI-055, EI-091, EI-093, EI-094, EI-095, LI-105, K-127, K-128.

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Kyein Chaung and Kyet Yoe Pyin, amongst other locations. A 14-year old girl from
Maungdaw described her experience:
We were hiding in the forest and the soldiers took my sister, who was 12-year old,
and eight other girls. Four of them were raped and killed. Then the soldiers took
me. There were around 40 women and girls in the forest. I remember the first man
who raped me, feeling all the pain. I became numb to the next three men and then I
went unconscious. They were raping most of the women and girls. 2445
1092. The Kyet Yoe Pyin “area clearance operation” in Maungdaw Township saw a
particularly brutal level of sexual violence. Women and girls were subjected to mass gang
rape, forced nudity, sexual humiliation and sexual assault. 2446 One 30-year old survivor,
who was pregnant, described how a large group of soldiers arrived in a military truck. They
then went house-to-house, taking jewellery, money and other belongings, before raping the
women. She said that six members of her family were raped, including her two nieces aged
10 and 15.2447
1093. Some of the women and girls who were raped in Kyet Yoe Pyin, were then killed.2448
One survivor described eight to ten Tatmadaw soldiers entering the house she was in and
taking two young girls to the toilet. She held a child in her lap so that the Tatmadaw would
realise that she was a mother and would not rape her. The soldiers threw the child aside;
five to six men raped her. She said that she had pain everywhere afterwards and bled until
she reached Bangladesh. She heard that the two girls who were taken to the toilet died. 2449
Another female survivor, aged 25, from Kyet Yoe Pyin explained that she was gang raped
by four Tatmadaw soldiers in her house during this time. 2450
1094. Despite the “area clearance operations” being focused on an area of central
Maungdaw Township, rapes and gang rapes were also perpetrated in Buthidaung
Township.2451 A 25-year old female interviewee from Maung Gyi Taung described how she
was gang raped in her house after her village chairman failed to take girls to the local
military compound as instructed. She was severely bitten on her forehead, cheeks and left
breast. Having lost consciousness, she does not know how many men raped her. She was
pregnant at the time of the rape and miscarried shortly afterwards. 2452
1095. Women and girls were also sexually assaulted and humiliated during intrusive body
searches by Tatmadaw soldiers.2453 A 30-years old woman from U Shey Key, Maungdaw
Township stated that the military did the “most embarrassing body checks ever – they
would put hands inside our tops, press our breasts and pinch our nipples in front of
everyone.”2454 Another woman, aged 20 year from Doe Tan, Maungdaw Township
described how the military arrived and surrounded her village and invasively searched the
women for jewellery and money. Women were made to sit in a field with their heads down
and many women had their headscarves taken off. 2455

(b) The build-up to 25 August 2017

Since October 2016, life had become so difficult. We were not even allowed to put
the light on in our house at night, or buy anything at the bazar. We could not pray.
The military did not allow our men to sit in a tea stall or in a coffee shop. We could
not go to the hospital, even those who were really ill. Because the lights were off in

2445 EI-055.
2446 CI-106, K-076.25, K-076.27, K-076.28, K-076.29, K-076.30, K-076.31, K-076.33, K-076.34, K-
076.35, K-076.36.
2447 CI-106.
2448 CI-105, CI-106, EI-054.
2449 K-076.28.
2450 CI-105.
2451 EI-094, EI-095, EI-107.
2452 EI-094.
2453 CI-105, EI-091, EI-106, K-076.41.
2454 K-127.
2455 EI-091.

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our house, we could not eat anything at night, so we had to go to bed so early. The
military also robbed us and our shops in the market.2456
1096. While systematic discrimination and restrictions had long been part of Rohingya life
in Rakhine State, the period following the 9 October 2016 attacks saw an intensification of
restrictive measures targeting the Rohingya, particularly in northern Rakhine State. These
measures, coupled with the increased presence of security forces on the ground, resulted in
a wide spectrum of human rights violations against the Rohingya in the period between
October 2016 and August 2017.

Campaign of increased intimidation by the Myanmar security forces

Increased presence of security forces

1097. The presence of security forces near Rohingya villages increased following October
2016. New military camps and checkpoints were established inside villages,2457 for
example, a new BGP checkpoint near Tin May, Buthidaung Township; 2458 a temporary
military camp in Nan Yar Kone, near Buthidaung town; 2459 and a new police checkpoint in
Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit, northern Maungdaw Township.2460
1098. Additional troops were stationed inside existing military or BGP compounds 2461 or
occupied community structures such as schools and religious buildings. 2462 Following the
9 October 2016 attack on Koe Tan Kauk BGP base, additional Tatmadaw soldiers were
stationed in the Chein Khar Li village military compound, located in Koe Tan Kauk village
tract, providing additional support.2463
1099. In Myin Hlut, Maungdaw Township, early August saw increased foot patrols of 50
to 100 personnel from security forces, and greater movement of military vehicles.
Previously, Tatmadaw soldiers were rarely seen in the area.2464
1100. This build up became particularly pronounced after 10 August 2017, when elements
of the 33rd and 99th LIDs arrived in northern Rakhine State.2465

Arbitrary arrest, detention, torture and ill-treatment

1101. The increased presence of security forces resulted in more frequent patrols, during
which villagers were often beaten, particularly targeting young men. 2466 These patrols led to
a range of other violations against Rohingya, including an increase in arbitrary arrests and
looting.
1102. Wealthy, educated and influential men were often targeted for arbitrary arrests,
purportedly in an effort to locate ARSA members or gather information about their
activities. Those arrested were often beaten or tortured, and accused of being ARSA
members, with security forces often saying they were looking for “bad people” or “anti-
government people”.2467 Release usually required the payment of bribes.2468 This practice

2456 LI-084.
2457 CI-112, CI-115, CI-144, CI-145, LI-053, LI-054, LI-057, LI-073, LI-074, LI-103, LI-105, WI-010.
2458 CI-115.
2459 LI-057.
2460 LI-074.
2461 CI-119, LI-100, WI-010.
2462 CI-183, LI-046, QI-101, YI-021, K-063.35.
2463 CI-119, LI-100.
2464 QI-111, QI-112.
2465 V-213, V-231
2466 CI-181, CI-182, LI-053, XI-001, YI-006, YI-007.
2467 CI-007, CI-016, CI-021, CI-028, CI-032, CI- 034, CI-048, CI -071, CI-104, CI-105, CI-106, CI-111,
CI-112, CI-118, CI-119, CI-133, CI-134, CI-140, CI-144, LI- 002, LI-030, LI-051, LI-053, LI-066,
LI-069, LI-073, LI-074, LI-076, QI-002, QI-014, QI-015, QI-022, QI-038, QI-040, QI-062, QI-102,
QI-111, WI-006, WI-044, YI-001, YI-002, YI-003, YI-007, YI-012, YI-021, BM-025, V-073.
2468 CI-118, CI-145, LI-066, LI-073, LI-074, LI-076, XI-005, YI-003.

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was widespread across the three townships. One Rohingya man from Pwint Hpyu Chaung,
Maungdaw Township, described his experience following the October 2016 attacks:
They broke the door to my shop open, tied me up and beat me for five hours. Then I
was taken to the military camp. They kept me for three days and three nights in a
kneeling position with my hands tied behind my back. I was together with 25 other
Rohingya men. We were not even offered water. They tortured us in many ways: they
forced the barrel of the gun in our mouths, stubbed burning cigarettes into our flesh,
and dripped hot wax onto our penises. Five men died from the torture. Of the
remaining 20 men, 18 were able to pay a huge amount to be released. 2469
1103. Villagers from Pa Da Kar Ywarmin gyi Thit, Maungdaw Township, described how,
after 9 October 2016, the police would visit their village regularly and arrest men at night.
Police accused the men of being part of ARSA and demanded payment for their release. 2470
1104. Given that those “arrested”, apparently for having collaborated with ARSA, were
regularly released on payment of bribes, the Mission considers that in many cases the
arrests were without legal or factual basis. Rather, it was a tactic employed by Myanmar
security forces to oppress, abuse and extort from Rohingya. As one Rohingya witness
commented: “To the authorities you are a bad person unless you can pay, then you are
good”.2471 It may explain why the wealthiest were often targeted. However, this extortion
had a disproportionate impact on poorer members of the community and others who could
not pay.
1105. In some cases, detainees have not been seen again. 2472 In May or June 2017, a large
group of Tatmadaw soldiers detained six or seven men from Gudar Pyin, Buthidaung
Township. The group included an Imam and religious scholars. According to one
interviewee, the soldiers brought a list of names of men they were looking for, and sought
the assistance of the ethnic Rakhine village chairperson to identify them. 2473 The
whereabouts of the men remains unknown.2474 The number of people who have disappeared
in this manner is difficult to estimate. Some think their family members may have been
transferred to Sittwe or Buthidaung prison and may have been charged or sentenced for
alleged involvement with ARSA. Others suspect they were killed. 2475
1106. Some people do appear to have been charged and sentenced for the ARSA attacks of
2016, and Rohingya villagers provided information on relatives having been arrested and
charged for such acts.2476 However, reliable or accurate information remains scarce. One
interviewee from Myin Hlut, Maungdaw Township, said that, on or around 14 October
2016, the police and military came to his village and searched houses. He ran into the hills
with other villagers, but a businessperson and a teacher were detained. According to the
interviewee, they were later sentenced to 10 and seven years imprisonment respectively,
although he had no information about the charges or trials. 2477
1107. The government initially reported that 575 persons were detained and charged in
connection with the attacks.2478 No information was provided on the charges applied

2469 QI-103.
2470 CI-144, LI-074.
2471
QI-114.
2472 CI-111, LI-002; United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “FLASH
REPORT: Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh Interviews with Rohingyas fleeing from
Myanmar since 9 October 2016”, 3 February 2017.
2473 YI-014.
2474 LI-063, YI-013, YI-015, YI-016.
2475 LI-002, LI-116.
2476 CI-189, LI-104, QI-111, RI-008.
2477 QI-111.
2478 State Counsellor’s Office, “470 suspects still under investigation in northern Maungtaw attacks.
|http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/481. According to the report, of the 575 detained on
suspicion of their participation in the 9 October 2016 attacks and subsequent violence, 88 were
sentenced, 11 were released, and six died in detention. It further noted that470 suspects remained
under investigation.

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against those detained and if all had been formally charged with an offence. A judgment
issued by Buthidaung Township’s court, dated 8 February 2018, listed 416 people tried in
relation to the October and November 2016 events under sections 17/1 and 17/2 of the
Unlawful Associations Act. Of the 416 people, the judgment indicates that 392 were
convicted and 24 acquitted.2479
1108. The Mission also received credible information that from January 2017, “special
courts” at the Township and District levels were opened at Myo Thit Taung Ward in
Buthidaung Town to try the cases of persons detained in connection with the 9 October
2016 attacks. It is reported that warehouse buildings were transformed into temporary
detention facilities during the hearings period, and into courtrooms for the trials. It remains
unclear whether the “special courts” were established by law and officially gazetted and if
this process was completed before trials were initiated.2480 In January 2017, detainees in
Buthidaung prison were reportedly transported to these “special courts” where expedited
trials were conducted. Detainees were reportedly not represented by lawyers nor had access
to lawyers during the expedited trials.2481
1109. It is alleged that by January 2017, 500 detainees had been tried and sentenced in
these special courts, and many of those tried were sentenced to death or life
imprisonment.2482 The Mission notes the lack of clarity regarding whether procedural
guarantees were provided, including the presumption of innocence, and the right to review
by a higher court. Other credible reports indicated that that children as young as 10-year old
were arrested and charged.2483 There are also multiple credible reports of Rohingya deaths
in custody in connection with these arrests and detentions. 2484

Sexual and gender-based violence

For more than a year, we could not sleep in our houses because the military was
coming frequently and arresting people, extorting money and taking women.2485
1110. In the months before the “clearance operations” of 25 August 2017, women and girls
were raped, gang raped and subjected to sexual slavery across the three townships of
Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung. Sexual and gender-based violence by soldiers
increased after 9 October 2016, with soldiers visiting villages more frequently and either
raping women in their homes or taking them to military bases, where they were raped and
gang raped.2486
1111. For example, in Kyet Yoe Pyin village, Maungdaw Township, one survivor
estimated that more than 100 females were raped. She stated that she used to hide her
daughters whenever soldiers came.2487 Similarly, a witness from Hpon Nyo Leik village,
Buthidaung Township, described soldiers visiting around twice a week to take women, who
were then raped.2488 In another village, up to 15 women were estimated to have died after
excessive bleeding from rapes.2489 A 20-year old female survivor from Thet Oo Chaung,
Maungdaw Township, described how Tatmadaw soldiers came to her village in March

2479 K-166.
2480 K-076.36, K.076.38,
2481
Ibid.
2482 K-076.37.
2483 QI-107, K.076.36, K.076.38, V-257. See also: Ministry of Information, “Child detainee hospitalised
for 2nd time” (3 February 2017), http://www.moi.gov.mm/moi:eng/?q=news/2/03/2017/id-10083
2484 K-076.41, V-215, See also, Special Procedures Communications to the Government of Myanmar, UA
MMR 3/2017, (11 July 2017) and UA MMR 4/2016, (21 October 2016),
https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=23089;
https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=22815
2485 LI-117.
2486 CI-105, CI-119, CI-133, CI-145, EI-094, LI-004, LI-045, LI-059, LI-077, LI-117, QI-063, QI-105,
QI-114.
2487 CI-105.
2488 LI-077.
2489 LI-004.

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2017 and she was gang raped by three to four Tatmadaw soldiers in her house. 2490 In Koe
Tan Kauk village, Rathedaung Township, sexual assaults on women were common and
some of the women and girls taken to military camps did not return. 2491
1112. Witnesses gave corroborating accounts of village administrators or other villagers
being asked to supply the women to the military, sometimes in groups of up to 10 women
in a night, with one being told that this was to “serve the nation”. 2492 In Maung Hna Ma
village, Maungdaw Township, a witness saw women and girls being taken to the bases of
battalions Nos. 564 and 345. He stated that those who came back had been raped. 2493
Another witness recalled an announcement by megaphone in Chin Tha Mar, Buthidaung
Township. It told young women to go to the military camp where they would be taught to
sew and do handicrafts. Seven girls went and were never seen again. The witness did not
know what happened to them.2494

Increased restrictions and oppression

1113. Rohingya had long suffered restrictions on their freedom of movement. This became
more pronounced after 2012,2495 but in the post-October 2016 period Rohingya reported
facing ever greater difficulties and restrictions in their movements. Even if a travel permit
was issued, travelling between villages required passing through an increasing number of
checkpoints, where Rohingya were increasingly exposed to threats, extortion and physical
violence. For many it became very difficult, or impossible, to visit family, conduct
business, or make a living.2496 Although many of the restrictions were already in place prior
to October 2016, the Mission understands that, after this time, they were more strictly and
violently enforced.
1114. One witness recounted his experience at a checkpoint in early August 2017 while
travelling to another village tract to visit a family member. He was on his motorbike,
together with his grandson, when they were stopped by Tatmadaw soldiers and taken to a
nearby military camp. The soldiers forced the witness to shave off his beard and confiscated
his motorbike keys, demanding 60,000 Kyat to get them back. He could not pay, so the
soldiers beat both him and his grandson and took their phones. They were released only
after the chairperson of their village identified them. The motorbike was not returned. 2497
1115. After 9 October 2016, the Tatmadaw declared the whole of the three townships an
“operational area”.2498 The timings of the curfew was extended to 7pm to 6am following the
9 October attacks in Buthidaung and Maungdaw. It was shortened to 9pm until 5am in
February 2017.2499 These curfews were strictly enforced, with villagers subject to arrest,
physical violence, or more often extortion by local authorities and police. 2500
1116. One interviewee reported that, on 11 November 2016, the military arrested a large
number of men who were praying in three different mosques in Pwint Hpyu Chaung village
tract, Maungdaw Township, outside curfew hours.2501 As part of the imposition of the
curfew, people were not allowed to light up their houses after dark. 2502

2490 EI-041.
2491 CI-119, LI-045, XI-001.
2492 CI-145, LI-059, LI-117.
2493 LI-117.
2494 QI-063.
2495 See this chapter, section B.2: Denial of the right to freedom of movement.
2496 CI-112, LI-069, QI-051, QI-110, QI-111, YI-005.
2497 YI-023.
2498 V-211.
2499 V-047.
2500 CI-118, CI-134, CI-140, LI-066, LI-074, LI-104, QI-113, YI-021, YI-028.
2501 QI-104.
2502 LI-084, RI-005.

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1117. Movement restrictions and the curfew meant many could not access markets in
neighbouring ethnic Rakhine villages to buy and sell goods2503 or access paddy fields.2504
Interviewees described needing permission from the village administrator, which often
involved payment.2505 Many could not buy food or medicine.
1118. In the one or two months preceding the August 2017 violence, in some locations
Rohingya were no longer able to leave their village, under any circumstances. 2506 As one
man from Chut Pyin, Rathedaung Township, explained:
Everything changed about two months before the violence. In the past, other village
tracts were accessible if you had the relevant token from the chairperson, but
suddenly people were no longer able to move between villages using these tokens.
Even villages within the same village tract became inaccessible. We were not
allowed to go outside the village. 2507
1119. Theft, intimidation and extortion by security forces, already a large part of daily
Rohingya life,2508 also increased during this period, largely as a result of the increased
presence of the Tatmadaw and other security forces in the region after October 2016.
1120. Rohingya were required to pay exorbitant informal taxes or bribes in all aspects of
their personal, business and community life. 2509 Extortion, intimidation and theft took place
in the context of regular patrolling by the security forces. The security forces, stole from the
Rohingya and regularly looted belongings and valuables, and extorted money. 2510 Rohingya
cattle and animals were regularly stolen.2511
1121. Theft from Rohingya shops was very common. 2512 One interviewee said that the
military would come regularly to his medicine shop in Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit, Maungdaw
Township, to extort money. Once, he was detained, beaten, and forced to pay a “fine” to be
released.2513 Another interviewee was forced to close his shop any time the police visited
his village; otherwise, they would steal from him. 2514 If the villagers slaughtered an animal,
they were forced to share it with the BGP.2515
1122. Public gatherings of more than five Rohingya were prohibited after 2012, in
accordance with curfew orders imposed at the time. 2516 However, while curfew orders were
lifted in most of Rakhine State in September 2014, they have remained in force in
Buthidaung and Maungdaw until the present day. It appears this prohibition became more
strictly enforced against Rohingya following the October 2016 violence. This measure
prevented Rohingya from coming together to practise their faith. 2517 After October 2016,
several interviewees reported that mosques and madrassas were locked, closed down or
destroyed.2518 One interviewee, a religious leader from Buthidaung Township, recalled that
their madrassas and mosques had been closed after October 2016 and Qur’ans had been
destroyed. Due to religious people being targeted, he stopped wearing his religious

2503 CI-122, LI-053, LI-066, LI- 072, LI-084, LI-105, QI-067, WI-007, YI-019.
2504 LI-045, LI-053.
2505 LI-053, LI-105, QI-058, QI-059, QI-060, QI-067.
2506 RI-001, RI-004.
2507 RI-004.
2508 See this chapter, section B.7: Other forms of oppression.
2509 LI-104, XI-008.
2510 CI-118, CI-119, CI-140, LI-049, LI-053, LI-067, LI-084, LI-118.
2511 CI-012, CI-105, CI-133, LI-050, LI-057, WI-010.
2512 CI-047, CI-049, CI-105, CI-112, CI-118, CI-119, CI-133, LI-050, LI-057, LI-084, QI-002, QI-051,
QI-063, QI-114, QI-036, WI-005, WI-006, WI-010.
2513 QI-114.
2514 QI-036.
2515 QI-002.
2516 See this chapter, section C.5: Spreading hate.
2517 CI-140, LI-053, LI-104, QI-106, XI-008, YI-012.
2518 LI -049, LI-050, LI-053, LI-066, LI-067, LI-076, LI-104, LI-124, QI-106, QI-111, YI-010, YI-025.

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clothes.2519 Security forces also engaged in the humiliating and degrading practice of cutting
the beards of Rohingya men.2520
1123. One notable incident during this period was the arson attack against the mosque of
Zay Di Pyin, Rathedaung Township, in June 2017, during the month of Ramadan, and the
failure of the security forces to protect it. The mosque, which was over 100 years old, was
set alight by local ethnic Rakhine, 2521 who also prevented Rohingya villagers attempting to
put out the fire.2522 Rather than assisting, the BGP took a number of religious leaders to
their base, where they were forced to sign a document stating that they had set the mosque
alight themselves.2523 It appears that a number of religious items were destroyed, including
Qur’ans and the religious garments of the Imam.
1124. During this period, Rohingya houses across the three townships of northern Rakhine
State were frequently searched. The authorities confiscated sharp objects, including small
knives and other implements used for cooking and harvesting. 2524 One woman noted, “They
did not leave a single small tool, not even to clean fish”. 2525 These house searches were
purportedly in relation to countering insurgent activities, but in practice they deprived
Rohingya families of the tools and implements needed to conduct daily activities, and in
some cases deprived them of their livelihood. One man noted:
In July, soldiers came and took all of our sharp implements, such as knives,
cleavers, etc. They only left us with the small scissors used for beetle nuts – this was
all that we had to cut food to cook.2526
1125. On 9 June 2016, the General Administration Department, under the authority of the
Ministry of Home Affairs, wrote to village administrators in Maungdaw Township
regarding the zinc sheets commonly used by Rohingya around their properties. The letter
cited a decision by the township management committee prohibiting this type of fence, but
authorising the use of fencing with concrete poles and barbed wire. 2527
1126. Following the October 2016 violence, implementation of this administrative order
accelerated. Rohingya villagers in northern Rakhine State were ordered to remove their
fences from around their properties. This was widely implemented in the three townships,
generally communicated by the ethnic Rakhine village administrator. In some instances, the
village administrator was accompanied by security forces, with soldiers or police removing
fences by force. Non-compliance with this order would often result in beatings and fines. 2528
An interviewee from Kha Maung Seik village tract, Maungdaw Township, reported:
A few months before the August 2017 incident, the village chairman, an ethnic
Rakhine, accompanied by the military, demanded us to remove the fences from the
yards and around the houses. They visited the village together with the police three
times in one month since the order of removing the fences was issued. The villagers
who did not implement the order were beaten and had to pay fines to the
chairman.2529
1127. While this measure was purportedly justified by “security considerations”, it greatly
limited the ability of Rohingya to keep their homes private, which is of particular cultural
importance. Villagers felt more vulnerable and exposed to intimidation and harassment by

2519 LI-124.
2520 LI-046, LI-051, LI-068, LI-127, YI-023.
2521 CI-145, CI-178, LI-129.
2522 CI-145, LI-129.
2523 CI-145, CI-178.
2524 BI-001, CI-044, CI-048, CI-100, CI-118, CI-119, CI-122, CI-182, LI-023, LI-053, LI-054, LI-066,
LI-105, QI-002, QI-014, QI-052, QI-061, QI-069, RI-006, RI-007, WI-002, WI-027, WI-031, WI-
032, YI-003, YI-010.
2525 CI-118.
2526 QI-069.
2527 K-076.41.
2528 CI-044, CI-046, CI-048, CI-112, CI-115, CI-118, CI-120, LI-105, QI-110, QI-111, YI-019, YI-025.
2529 CI-048.

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security forces and ethnic Rakhine, making it difficult for them to shelter safely in their
own homes.2530 It also had a disproportionate impact on women, who felt particularly
vulnerable and insecure, as bathing and toilet facilities were often located within those
fences in the compounds of the houses.2531 One young Rohingya woman explained that it
was difficult for her to go to the bathroom after the fences had been removed. She described
it as having to use “open toilets”.2532 The effect of the removal of fences was precisely to
open up Rohingya households to greater surveillance and to facilitate the movement of
security forces into and across Rohingya property.
1128. On 5 March 2017, the Maungdaw District Fisheries Department issued a letter
regarding a decision of the District Administration Office in Maungdaw that only NVC
holders could go fishing, and fishermen would be examined at security checkpoints. 2533
Several interviewees reported that they were no longer allowed to fish after this. 2534 One
villager from Ah Lel Than Kyaw village tract, Maungdaw Township, explained:
The Tatmadaw closed the dock for boats on the shore in our village. They also
removed the engines and fans from all our fishing boats. The soldiers said that they
were doing this as per government order. Then they went to each village and said
that people could only use their boats and recover the engines and fans if they
accepted the NVC.2535
1129. Similar restrictions were reportedly applied to people collecting firewood, forest
products and others who needed to travel to make a living. 2536 Families and communities
were denied their livelihoods and food security was affected.
1130. Pressure to accept the NVC increased in the months leading up to August 2017. On
8 February 2017, the Government appointed a Steering Committee to expedite the
process.2537 Despite this, there was little information about the process and many
interviewees stated that they refused to accept the cards, which they viewed as likely to
entrench their status as “Bengali immigrants”, while providing no guarantee for
citizenship.2538 Some Rohingya believed that accepting the NVC would prevent them from
retaining title to property and make them lose their land. 2539 Frequent meetings with
Rohingya villagers were convened by the authorities, often organized by the ethnic Rakhine
village administrators, together with the immigration authorities (LaWaKa), and often
attended by BGP, police and soldiers.2540 While the purpose of these meetings appears to
have been to persuade the Rohingya to accept the cards, they also instilled fear. Rohingya
attending these meetings were subjected to threats and intimidation, including warnings that
failure to accept would result in greater restrictions on their freedom of movement and
livelihoods.2541 Others were told to accept the NVC or they would be forced to leave the
country.2542
1131. A series of more targeted and aggressive meetings were held with Rohingya elders
in mid-August 2017, convened by the BGP and Tatmadaw soldiers, often including

2530 K-104.
2531 A/HRC/34/67.
2532 QI-069.
2533 Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Irrigation District Fisheries Department Maungdaw
District, Maungdaw Letter No. Fisheries-District/Maungdaw-13/ 2017(1829/1831); K-076.40.
2534 LI-045, LI-053, LI-077, LI-103, QI-106, YI-005, YI-012.
2535 RI-006.
2536 K-076.42.
2537 Formation of the Steering Committee for issuance of National Verification Card (NVC) in Rakhine
State for those who will undergo verification for citizenship, Notification No.21/2017 (8 February
2017).
2538 CI-178, CI-194, CI-196, CI-198, LI-066, RI-008.
2539 WI-040, V-073, V-151.
2540 BI-017, CI-178, CI-179, CI-181, CI-182, CI-194, CI-195, LI-057, LI-066, QI-058, QI-060, QI-066,
QI-070, QI-106, RI-010, RI-017, WI-016, WI-042, YI-004, ZI-006, V-073, V-222.
2541 CI-182, LI-045, LI-053, LI-066, LI-077, LI-103, QI-106, WI-041, YI-004, YI-005, YI-012, V-073.
2542 CI-182, CI-179, CI-181, CI-183, CI-192.

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members of the recently deployed 33rd and 99th Light Infantry Divisions, sometimes
together with ethnic Rakhine village administrators. 2543 They took place in a number of
locations, including Chut Pyin and Koe Tan Kauk in Rathedaung Township, and Min Gyi
and Kyauk Pan Du in Maungdaw Township. Some of the most brutal “clearance
operations” subsequently took place in these locations. Threats were made regarding the
continued refusal of the NVCs at these meetings. 2544
1132. One significant meeting was held on 22 August 2017, convened by members of the
33rd LID at the school located in the Rakhine hamlet of Chut Pyin. During the meeting,
leaders of the 33rd LID threatened the Rohingya elders in attendance, including elders from
Chut Pyin as well as from other nearby villages. 2545 A commander of the 33rd LID, whose
name is on file with the Mission2546, explained that together with his Division he had
recently been deployed from Kachin State. He stated that Rohingya must accept the NVC,
or else they would be killed, as had happened to villagers in northern Myanmar.2547 The
meeting was also attended by the Rakhine chairman of Chut Pyin. 2548 Following the
meeting, village leaders discussed the proposal, but eventually reported back that they
would not accept the NVC.2549 After this, villagers were reportedly confined to their homes
and oppression increased further.2550
1133. Immediately preceding the 25 August 2017 attacks, the ethnic Rakhine chairman of
Min Gyi had organized a meeting during which he made a speech instructing Rohingya to
take the cards2551 or they “would not be allowed to stay in Myanmar”. 2552 One interviewee
from Min Gyi (Tula Toli) described:
There were meetings where we were told, “You must accept the NVCs”. We always
refused. This pressure was for a year but the worst incident was two or three months
ago [prior to August 2017 violence] when the chairman came with the military, who
were armed, and told us to take the cards with guns pointed at us. We refused.2553

Rising tension in northern Rakhine State

1134. After October 2016, the State Counsellor’s Information Committee, State media, and
other national media increased the focus on ARSA activities, with increased monitoring and
reporting. The inflammatory nature of much of this reporting, often characterizing
Rohingya as “Bengali terrorists”, coupled with rising vitriolic discourse and hate speech
against the Rohingya, fuelled an already volatile situation. 2554
1135. These reports, which had regional and national prominence, contributed to a fear
among non-Rohingya communities in Rakhine State of alleged terrorist activities. They
deepened inter-communal suspicion and fear. They were likely a factor in a notable
breakdown in the relationship between the communities, particularly in the weeks leading
up to 25 August 2017.
1136. Between May and July 2017, media sources reported a number of alleged ARSA
activities, including reports on the killing of Rohingya informants by ARSA, 2555 and an
accidental explosion during a training course, killing seven individuals, 2556 including two

2543 CI-197, CI-198, ZI-001.

2544
QI-058, V-076.
2545 CI-185, CI-186, CI-191, LM-006, LM-012, K-155, V-067, V-076.
2546 CI-186, CI-191, LM-006, V-067, V-076, K-155.
2547 CI-177, CI-185, CI-186, CI-191, RI-001, LM-006, LM-012, LM-018, K-155, V-067, V-076.
2548 CI-186, RI-004.
2549 CI-185, CI-191.
2550 LM-006, V-076.
2551 QI-058, QI-060, QI-066, QI-067, WI-037, V-073.
2552 QI-060.
2553 QI-058; See this chapter, section D.1.a: Most serious incidents.
2554 See chapter VI, section B.2: The issue of “hate speech”: Findings.
2555 Global New Light of Myanmar, “Rakhine slayings by insurgents” (22 July 2017).
2556 V-094, V-216; Global New Light of Myanmar, “Five bodies unearthed near 5 May explosion site in
Buthidaung” (16 May 2017).

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“foreigners”. The media also reported the discovery of alleged ARSA training camps in
different locations, where materials for making explosives and other weapons were
recovered, and ARSA members were killed. 2557 This reportedly prompted security forces to
undertake violent evictions and arrests in the area, particularly around Tin May village
tract, killing several people and prompting some families to flee to Bangladesh in May and
June.2558 On 22 June 2017, the State Counsellor’s Information Committee released photos
of an alleged ARSA terrorist training camp in the Mayu Mountain range and published
pages of information about ARSA and its activities, including the alleged killing of
informants.2559
1137. There were also public reports on killings by ARSA of members of non-Rohingya
communities. On 24 June 2017, the Global New Light of Myanmar, a Government
newspaper, reported that ARSA members had shot and killed two ethnic Rakhine villagers
and injured two others, when they inadvertently discovered materials for explosives in
Kyun Pauk Pyu Su village tract, Maungdaw Township.2560 The Mission has not been able to
verify responsibility for these killings, although credible reports indicate that they may have
been perpetrated by ARSA.2561 On 3 August 2017, the State Counsellor’s Information
Committee claimed ARSA was responsible for the killing of seven ethnic Mro, whose
bodies were found near their village of Kine Gyi, Maungdaw Township. Some had been
shot and others killed by machete. 2562 Credible but unconfirmed information suggests these
killings were not connected to ARSA, but to unrelated criminal activity. 2563
1138. Rohingya interviewees gave accounts of deteriorating relations between the
communities throughout this period, with ethnic Rakhine neighbours ceasing to engage in
business relations and instances of appropriation of Rohingya land.2564 One interviewee said
that ethnic Rakhine confiscated his land and fenced it with red flags, after which he no
longer had access.2565 Another interviewee was told by his neighbour that his farmland was
“not his land”, after which he was forced to live off his food stocks, which eventually
depleted.2566 Some Rohingya noted the breakdown immediately preceding the 25 August
2017 violence.2567 For example, one interviewee reported that, by mid-August 2017, he was
no longer able to sell goods to the ethnic Rakhine.2568
1139. The Mission also received reports where ethnic Rakhine neighbours actively issued
warnings to their Rohingya neighbours about impending violence. 2569 For example, one
interviewee from Zay Di Pyin, Rathedaung Township, said that he was warned by an ethnic
Rakhine friend of his that:
You [Rohingya] cannot stay here and we cannot control the bad behaviour of our
own people. The government is planning to drive away your people.2570

2557 The Irrawaddy, “Five Bodies Found in Buthidaung”, (15 May 2017); Global New Light of Myanmar,
“Terrorist training camps, guns uncovered in Mayu Mountains” (22 June 2017); Global New Light of
Myanmar, “Tents of violent attackers discovered in Mayu Mountain” (1 August 2018).
2558 V-094.
2559 Global New Light of Myanmar, “Terrorist training camps, guns uncovered in Mayu Mountains” (22
June 2017).
2560 V-067, V-152; Global New Light of Myanmar, “Four local ethnic people were attacked by swords
and killed two” (26 June 2017).
2561 See this chapter, section D.1.c. Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army.
2562 Information Committee, “Press Release on the situation in Maungdaw” (Facebook Post, 11 August
2017), para. 4,
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/photos/pcb.778752418964533/778752095631232/?
type=3&theater
2563 See this chapter, section D.1.c: Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army.
2564 LI-077, LI-114, QI-040, YI-005.
2565 YI-005.
2566 QI-040.
2567 LI-065, LI-081, LI-114.
2568 LI-114.
2569 LI-033, LI-118.
2570 LI-118.

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1140. It is also of interest to note that, one to two days before 25 August 2017, a small
group of up to 10 Hindu families left the Myin Hlut village tract in southern Maungdaw
Township. They had lived in rented shops, including barbershops, but left their
accommodation at short notice. One witness said that people had gone to the shops as usual,
but had then discovered that the Hindu families had left. 2571
1141. The Mission notes, that the breakdown of intercommunal relationships, as well as
the warnings given by some ethnic Rakhine to their neighbours, and the departure of other
groups in advance of the violence, may indicate that some non-Rohingya were informed of
or aware of the upcoming plans of the Tatmadaw regarding the impending “clearance
operations”.
1142. In some locations, ethnic Rakhine village chairpersons, who were particularly
aggressive towards the Rohingya, contributed to the further breakdown of relationships. For
example, many accounts indicate that the relationship between the Rohingya and their
ethnic Rakhine neighbours in Min Gyi (Tula Toli) had initially been amicable. Relations
began to deteriorate when a new chairman was elected in 2015, and continued to worsen
through 2017, including through severely restricted access to the market in a nearby
village.2572
1143. During this period, the Myanmar authorities made increasing efforts to recruit ethnic
Rakhine as members of the security apparatus. In November 2016, the Chief of the Rakhine
State Police reportedly stated that his police force was recruiting a new “Regional Police”
from among ethnic Rakhine and other non-Muslim ethnic minorities living in Maungdaw
Township to serve in their own villages. 2573 It was reported that they intended to provide the
recruits with weapons, other equipment, and compensation. 2574 On 17 November 2016,
Myanmar police authorities officially reported that 116 new police members had started
“special” four-month security training “to protect local people from various forms of
crimes”. Recruits would receive training in martial arts, weapon use, and riot control
tactics. The announcement continued, “Every Rakhine national wishing to protect their
state will have a chance to become part of the local armed police”.2575 This auxiliary police
force, which would wear police uniforms, was to fall under the command of the BGP,
which ultimately falls under control of the Tatmadaw during military operations. 2576
1144. Moreover, the recruitment of non-Rohingya to Government-supported militias,
known as Pyi Thu Sit (“People’s Army”), continued throughout this period in Rakhine
State.2577 The Government appears to have supported the establishment of Pyi Thu Sit after
the violence of 2012,2578 and they were subsequently set up in specific village tracts in
northern Rakhine State, armed by the Government and provided with uniforms and
training.2579 Often, Rohingya villagers could identify Pyi Thu Sit participants, either
because they knew them, or because they were recognisable from some type of adapted
military uniform distinguishing them from the Tatmadaw or police.2580
1145. Independent of Pyi Thu Sit, the Myanmar authorities also mobilised and armed other
Rakhine militia groups after October 2016.2581 One interviewee stated that these groups did

2571 QI-111, QI-112.

2572 QI-058, QI-059, QI-060, QI-066, QI-067.
2573 V-153, V-154.
2574 V-153.
2575 The Republic of the Union of Myanmar Ministry of Information, “Police training aims to raise
security in Rakhine State,” (17 November 2016),
http://www.moi.gov.mm/moi:eng/?q=news/18/11/2016/id-9208
2576 V-165.
2577 Constitution of Myanmar, s. 340, although this would require the approval of the National Defence
and Security Council.
2578 V-164.
2579 LI-052, LI-101, LI-103, LI-104, LI-118, YI-009.
2580 LI-052, LI-104, LI-118.
2581 LI-054, LI-101, LI-103, YI-009.

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not have uniforms.2582 Another villager, a village administrator, stated that he saw weapons
being transported by the Tatmadaw and handed out to ethnic Rakhine. 2583 The Government
has confirmed the establishment of these “new” militias during a parliamentary debate in
January 2018.2584 The Deputy Minister for Home Affairs stated that, following the October
2016 violence, 34 more Rakhine community militia groups had been established in the
Maungdaw-Buthidaung region, three of which were armed by the Tatmadaw and had been
provided tactical weapons training up to an advanced level in February and March 2017. 2585
On 8 August 2017, the Rakhine State General Administrative Department issued an
announcement referring to acts of “extremist terrorism” perpetrated by “Muslim Bengalis”
that forced “local residents to flee their native homes”. Significantly, the statement also
referenced “a security system and cooperation among the public and particular security
forces.”2586
1146. On 9 August 2017, a seven-member delegation from the Arakan National Party
visited Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing, the Commander-in-Chief of the Tatmadaw, in
Naypyidaw to discuss local concerns and to call for further heightened security measures in
Rakhine State.2587 The next day, the Rakhine State Government announced that the
Tatmadaw would be carrying out an “area clearance operation” in the Mayu mountain
range.2588 According to a media source, the announcement was intended to alert ethnic
Rakhine, so that they would avoid the mountains and not be mistaken as targets. 2589
1147. Intercommunal relationships were likely further weakened by divisive rhetoric from
Rakhine politicians, repeated calls for ethnic Rakhine to be armed to protect themselves,
and the actual arming and training of some ethnic Rakhine.
1148. In some village tracts, new non-Rohingya people were brought into northern
Rakhine State, including into NaTaLa villages, directly in advance of the clearance
operations.2590 It remains unclear who these people were, although some were believed to
be Buddhists from Bangladesh. 2591 One interviewee from Kyauk Pan Du, southern
Maungdaw Township, witnessed new people arriving in the nearby NaTaLa village for two
to three months prior to August 2017. He said that there was a large group of youths who
would stay for about a week and then leave and return later, and that he subsequently
identified these people as participants in the “clearance operation”. 2592 A number of other
interviewees also informed the Mission that new arrivals to NaTaLa villages had been seen
participating in the “clearance operations”.2593
1149. In Gu Dar Pyin village, Buthidaung Township, villagers observed the arrivals of
these new people in the week directly preceding 25 August. One Rohingya man observed:
Recently new people were brought to live in the NaTaLa. Our Rohingya villagers
always had a good relationship with our Rakhine neighbours. Even after October
2016, the relationship was good. But then the new arrivals came, about one week
before the violence. All the relationships broke down. 2594

2582 YI-009.
2583 LI-101.
2584
“2nd Amyotha Hluttaw, 7th regular session, 9th day on 30 January 2018”, meeting minutes, available
at: https://bit.ly/2NaW1SQ
2585 Ibid., See also Myoe Mint, “Deputy Minister Says Tatmadaw Arming, Training up to 30 Militias in
Maungdaw” (The Irrawaddy, 30 January 2018).
2586 Republic of Union of Myanmar, State Administrative Government, Rakhine State Announcement 1/
2007 (8 August 2017).
2587 V-229.
2588 V-231
2589 http://thevoicemyanmar.com/news/10992-mrt
2590 LI-054, LI-061, LI-063, LI-065, LI-066, LI-071, LI-110.
2591 LI-054, LI-110, WI-048.
2592 ZI-001.
2593 LI-054, LI-061, LI-063, LI-065, LI-066, LI-071, LI-110.
2594 LI-062.

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Increased military build-up in northern Rakhine State after October 2016

1150. In the weeks prior to the 25 August ARSA attacks, there was a noticeable build-up
of troops and other military assets across the three townships. 2595
1151. On 10 August 2017, more than 1,600 members of the Tatmadaw’s 33 rd and 99th
Light Infantry Divisions (LIDs) based outside Rakhine State, were airlifted to Rakhine
State from their deployment in northern Myanmar. This re-deployment was reported in the
national media; reference was made to the troops “going to northern Rakhine to carry out
area clearance”.2596
1152. Other military units were shifted from other military bases and attached to Military
Operational Command (MOC)-15, whose area of responsibility covers Buthidaung
Township. As many as nine battalions from other Western Regional Command units were
attached to MOC-15, as well as one Armoured Brigade consisting of up to 60 tanks and
armoured personnel carriers.2597 Eight MI-17 helicopters were also relocated to Rakhine
State.2598 The deployment of tanks, heavy artillery and this number of helicopters was
considered unusual.2599
1153. Furthermore, in the weeks just prior to 25 August 2017, Tatmadaw soldiers moved
closer to the border areas, and the movement of helicopters into and out of BGP camps in
Rakhine State increased. Areas that were normally guarded by BGP units now also had a
significant presence of Tatmadaw soldiers. 2600 The arrival of new troops at the beginning of
August was noticeable to villagers.2601 Some new troops travelled in convoys of military
vehicles.2602 Some were garrisoned inside military and other security force compounds. 2603
One villager commented, “It was clear to us that there were new soldiers, as they had
different uniforms to the soldiers who were permanently stationed inside the compounds,
who we knew and recognised”.2604 In relation to the reputation of the LIDs, one interviewee
stated the following:
New soldiers had come from Yangon and they were very tough. My Rakhine
neighbour said to me, “Now you Rohingya are doomed because the government is
sending military from Yangon who are coming here to kill every Muslim. Someday
in Rakhine State there will be no Rohingya Muslims at all.” 2605
1154. Deliveries of military equipment were made to the Tatmadaw and other security
forces in advance of 25 August 2017.2606 A villager with a shop next to a military camp
explained:
Approximately four days before the [clearance operation] in my village there were
many vehicles arriving to the base. Five trucks were full of troops, and the other two
trucks were full of equipment. The trucks with equipment were full of white sacks.
When the new arrivals got out of vehicles, they were handing out the things inside
the sack. I saw that they were distributing “launchers”.2607
1155. In Maung Gyi Taung village tract, Buthidaung Township, what appears to be
artillery was installed in the hills overlooking the village approximately one week prior to

2595 LI-071, QI-111, QI-112, QI-116, WM-003.

2596 V-212, V-213.
2597 K-002.
2598 K-002.
2599 XM-005.
2600 QM-001, XM-005.
2601 LI-062, LI-081, LI-100, QI-069, QI-110, QI-111, QI-112.
2602
LI-069, LI-081, LI-112.
2603 LI-081, QI-110, QI-116.
2604 LI-081.
2605 LI-092.
2606 LI-063, LI-081.
2607 LI-081.

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25 August 2017. It was used in the “clearance operation” a week later. 2608 A witness
reported that when this weapon was fired, it made a loud sound and the subsequent
explosion “destroyed” a paddy field.2609
1156. Approximately two weeks prior to 25 August 2017, two navy vessels, not normally
seen in the area, were operating in the Bay of Bengal, in the area of southern Maungdaw
and coastal Rathedaung Township.2610 At least one of these vessels fired on a Rohingya
village.2611
1157. This level of build-up, both in quantity and nature, would have required significant
logistical planning over a considerable period. It would have required decisions at the most
senior levels of the Tatmadaw. The Mission has concluded that this preparation, the joint
nature of the operations,2612 and the deployment of the LIDs indicate that the “clearance
operations”, or at least the ability to carry out a large and widespread operation, was
planned and ordered well in advance of 25 August 2017.

Incidents in Rathedaung Township, July and August 2017

1158. A number of incidents took place in northern Rathedaung Township in July and
August 2017 that contributed to the rapidly escalating tensions across Rakhine State. These
were not isolated events but took place in close proximity to each other, in a series of
neighbouring village tracts.
1159. These incidents were well publicized, reported on by Rakhine media 2613 as well as in
national2614 and international media.2615 In a public statement, ARSA stated that these
incidents were “pre-planned and organized crimes” which it viewed as being aimed at
causing intercommunal violence in Rakhine State “to trigger a repeat of 2012-style
violence”.2616

2608 LI-114, LI-117.

2609 LI-117.
2610 LI-045, LI-052, LI-053, LI-100, QI-113.
2611 See this chapter, section D.1.a: Most serious incidents, for details on the “clearance operation” in Koe
Tan Kauk.
2612 Joint Operations are operations involving two or more of the military branches; Army, Navy and/or
Air Force.
2613 Narinjara, “Cows are still being stolen, killed and eaten, despite the increased security in Zay Di Pyin,
Mayu coastal area” (Narinjara News, 13 August 2017): https://bit.ly/2xbYja9
2614 For example, Global New Light on Myanmar, “Attack on police force arresting financial supporter of
violent attackers in Yathedaung” (5 August 2017).
2615 S. Naing, “Rohingya villagers blockaded amid fresh tensions in Myanmar's Rakhine – residents”
(Reuters, 22 August 2017).
2616 ARSA Statement, ARSA/PR/04/2017, on 6 August 2017.

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Map of northern Rathedaung Township, which highlights the proximity of villages of

Chut Pyin, Ah Htet Nan Yar, Auk Nan Yar and Zay Di Pyin and Chin (Pyaing
Taung). The red marking indicates the subsequent burning of the villages in
“clearance operations” detected by 16 September 2017.

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Visit of Ashin Wirathu to northern Rakhine State

1160. In May and July 2017, the monk Ashin Wirathu visited northern Rakhine State. In
early May, Wirathu reportedly visited the locations of the 9 October 2016 attacks, among
other villages, with an armed escort from the BGP. 2617 It was also reported that, as part of
this trip, Wirathu had a private meeting with the Brigadier General of the BGP in Kyi Kan
Pyin. At the end of this five-day trip, Wirathu was reportedly seen off by high-ranking
military officials, including a colonel of the Western Command. The Arakan National Party
(ANP) welcomed the visit publicly and reportedly made donations for his entourage. 2618
1161. Wirathu returned to Rakhine State on 11 July 2017. 2619 He travelled from Sittwe to
northern Rathedaung, where he visited both Zay Di Pyin and Chut Pyin village tracts. Both
are majority ethnic Rakhine areas but with a significant Rohingya population, and both
were locations of “clearance operations” encompassing serious human rights violations
some weeks later.2620 Wirathu first convened a meeting and delivered a sermon at the Zay
Di Pyin monastery, reportedly attended by a large number of people,2621 and travelled to
nearby Chut Pyin the following day for a similar meeting. 2622 As one Rohingya man
commented:
I myself saw Wirathu in Zay Di Pyin. When Wirathu came, all the villagers were
welcoming him using their Buddhist flags. Rakhine villagers announced with a
megaphone the arrival of the “Honourable Monk Wirathu”. After the meeting, I also
learned from some Rakhine friends that Wirathu was there.2623
Given the incendiary nature of Wirathu’s public statements towards Muslims and the
Rohingya, this visit is likely to have heightened tensions in the area. A few days after the
visit of Wirathu to Zay Di Pyin, the Rakhine village administrator reportedly called the
Rohingya elders to a meeting. One person who attended was told: “This is not your land.
This is not your country. Go away from here.”2624 Another villager in Chut Pyin noted that,
after the visit, harassment of Rohingya villagers, by both Tatmadaw soldiers and ethnic
Rakhine, increased.2625

Arrest, detention and torture of Rohingya from Chut Pyin

1162. On approximately 14 July 2017,2626 a group of Tatmadaw soldiers and BGP entered
the village of Chin (Pyaing Taung), Chut Pyin village tract, Rathedaung Township, in the
middle of the night. They rounded up and arrested eight men. The men were severely
beaten, handcuffed, tied up together to a metal chain and marched to the BGP base in Zay
Di Pyin.2627 For four or five days, the men were tortured, including through continuous
beatings and burning of their genitals with candles. 2628 Four men were then released,
following payment of a significant bribe by their village elders. 2629 The other four were
reportedly sent to Sittwe prison to be charged with terrorism offences. There is no
information about their whereabouts, charges laid against them or any judicial process. 2630

2617 V-223, V-224, V-225, V-226. See also Wirathu’s own website noting his “West Gate Security Tour
of May and July”, https://www.eng.wirathu.com/2017/07/25/west-gate-security-trips-1/ (accessed
August 2018).
2618 V-227, V-228.
2619 V-223, V-224.
2620 CI-177, LI-129, QI-115, LM-012.
2621 LI-129, QI-115, LM-012.
2622 LI-129, LM-012.
2623 LI-129.
2624 LI-129.
2625 CI-177.
2626 V-067, V-218.
2627 CI-186, CI-190, RI-005, RI-009, V-067.
2628 CI-190, RI-009, V-067.
2629 CI-186, CI-190, RI-009.
2630 CI-186, CI-190.

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Disappearance of Rakhine man from Chut Pyin and killing of three Rohingya
1163. On 29 July 2017, an ethnic Rakhine man from a village in Chut Pyin village tract
went missing in the forest.2631 The following day hundreds of ethnic Rakhine reportedly
mobilised to search for him, armed with swords and sticks, 2632 and an armed ethnic Rakhine
mob approached the Rohingya village in Ah Htet Nan Yar in apparent retaliation. Rohingya
villagers prepared to defend themselves. The military and BGP intervened and controlled
the situation.2633 However, the bodies of three Rohingya, two men and a 15-year old boy,
were found the next day in a stream. 2634 The Government stated that these were killings of
Rohingya informants perpetrated by ARSA, although reports also indicate that these were
revenge killings perpetrated by ethnic Rakhine in retaliation for the missing ethnic Rakhine
man.2635 After these incidents, Muslims were banned from Zay Di Pyin market, 2636 the main
market for all surrounding villages, including Rohingya villages. 2637 These restrictions
caused severe problems in terms of access to livelihoods and food security for surrounding
Rohingya communities.

Zay Di Pyin blockade

1164. On or around 1 August 2017, a group of ethnic Rakhine, in the presence of the
security forces, surrounded Kiyan Taung, a small Rohingya hamlet surrounded by Rakhine
villages in Zay Di Pyin village tract. They installing a barbed wire fence around the village
and poles at the entrances to it. This initiated an effective blockade of the hamlet, with the
entrance to the village guarded by ethnic Rakhine and security forces. 2638 The ethnic
Rakhine “sentries” were armed with traditional swords, iron rods, homemade rifles and
slingshots, and threw stones at the Rohingya who were trapped inside. 2639
1165. The fear of being attacked meant that, even within the besieged village, people were
unable to leave their houses for fear of being injured. A villager explained:
We had to have our dinner before sunset because if they saw a light on, they would
shoot stones towards that house. We could not use the toilet at night, because we
would be shot at with a slingshot. Behind my house, there were many guava in the
trees but we couldn’t even pick one.2640
1166. The blockaded Rohingya could not access fresh water, which they usually collected
from the local water source outside the village. 2641 Although they collected some rainwater,
one villager recalled, “There was no firewood to cook with, so at a certain point we had to
eat raw rice”.2642 Reserves of food quickly diminished. 2643 Following complaints by the
Rohingya to the security forces, at one point a small group of Rohingya men was escorted
to a nearby village to replenish food stocks. 2644 The Rohingya were unable to tend to their
cattle, many of which were stolen.2645 Without access to medical treatment, people suffered
from untreated illnesses.2646

2631 CI-177, CI-199, QI-115, V-067, V-163; Global New Light of Myanmar, “Tents of violent attackers
discovered in Mayu Mountain” (1 August 2017).
2632 V-218, K-063.35.
2633 CI-177, CI-199, K-063.35.
2634 QI-115, V-163, K-063.35.
2635 KI-002, LM-006, V-163.
2636 K-063.35.
2637 CI-177, CI-199, K-063.35.
2638 CI-145, CI-178, LI-118, LI-129, QI-115, LM-006, V-068.
2639 CI-145, CI-178, LI-129, QI-115.
2640 LI-129.
2641 CI-145, LI-129, V-163.
2642 LI-118.
2643 CI-145, LI-118, LI-129, QI-115.
2644 QI-115, V-163.
2645 CI-178, LI-118, LI-129.
2646 CI-178, K-063.35.

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1167. The blockade on Zay Di Pyin was reported by national 2647 and international
media.2648 On 16 August 2017, ARSA uploaded a video of its commander, Ata Ullah,
flanked by armed fighters and warning the Myanmar military to demilitarise northern
Rakhine State and end “abuses of Rohingya”, specifically referring to the blockade in Zay
Di Pyin.2649
1168. The blockade lasted approximately one month. 2650 On 25 August 2017, a meeting
was announced by megaphone, asking all Buddhists to attend.2651 After this, the mosque
and a number of houses were burned.2652 The following day, ethnic Rakhine armed with
swords removed the fences2653 and a “clearance operation” commenced in the village,
perpetrated by Tatmadaw soldiers and police security forces, together with ethnic
Rakhine.2654 Many of the ethnic Rakhine who participated were recognised as being from
the neighbouring villages.2655 Security forces shot and fired “launchers” towards the
village.2656 Houses were also burned by ethnic Rakhine using matches and petrol.2657 A
family of five, including three children, was burned alive.2658 Those who were able to flee
crossed a river to escape to the neighbouring village tract, however, a number of persons
including women and children, drowned whilst attempting to cross. 2659

Incident in Auk Nan Yar

1169. On 4 August 2017, security forces2660 entered the village of Auk Nan Yar and
detained four men, reportedly on suspicion of being ARSA leaders. 2661 Rohingya men
gathered, armed with sticks, protesting what they believed to be an arbitrary arrest. To
disperse the protesters, security forces fired into the crowd. A number of people were shot
and injured,2662 with two reported to have sustained critical injuries. 2663 The BGP arrested a
further five Rohingya villagers who were then held at a BGP post in Zay Di Pyin. 2664 It has
been reported that, after nine days, one man was released. Credible sources who
interviewed him indicated that he was tortured in a manner consistent with methods used at
the same location on other detainees. 2665 The other detainees are believed to have been
moved to Sittwe prison.2666

Abuse in Ah Htet Nan Yar

1170. Between 23 and 24 August 2017, Tatmadaw soldiers, reportedly including the 33 rd
LID, and the BGP carried out mass arrests in the Rohingya village of Ah Thet Nan Yaar
village tract, Rathedaung Township, and the Pan Kain IDP Camp.2667 Ethnic Rakhine, many

2647 V-219.
2648 V-163.
2649 XI-007, BM-025. “ARSA Commander Addresses Rohingya diaspora & the world; Warns Myanmar
military”, video available on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NJoWeV1DlFM
(accessed August 2018).
2650 CI-145, CI-178, LI-118, QI-115, K-063.35.
2651 LI-129, QI-115.
2652 LI-118.
2653 CI-145, LI-118, LI-129.
2654 CI-145, LI-129, QI-115.
2655 CI-145, LI-118.
2656 CI-145, LI-129.
2657 CI-145, LI-118, QI-115; Burning confirmed through satellite imagery analysis provided for the
Mission by UNITAR-UNOSAT.
2658 CI-145, LI-118, LM-006.
2659 CI-145, QI-115, LI-118, LI-129.
2660 CI-140, LI-033, K-063.35.
2661 CI-140, V-220.
2662 CI-140, LI-033, K-063.34, V-218, V-221.
2663 K-063.34, K-063.35.
2664 CI-140, LI-033, K-063.34, K-063.35, V-067.
2665 V-067.
2666 CI-140.
2667 CI-199, LI-037, LI-038, LI-118, QI-033, LM-012, K-063.34.

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of whom were recognizable to the Rohingya as coming from nearby Rakhine villages, were
present.2668 In the Pan Kain IDP Camp, the forces gathered villagers in a paddy field. 2669
The men and women were separated. Both groups were tied up, beaten, and their valuables
stolen.2670 Younger females were taken away,2671 with one witness believing they were
taken to the BGP base in a nearby Rakhine village.2672 One mother said some months later
that soldiers had taken away her daughter and that she was still missing:
I have not seen her since then and I fear that she has been raped, and worse may
have happened. I am so worried about my daughter. I am tortured thinking about
what might have happened to her.2673
1171. Another woman, who also saw girls and young women being taken away, saw some
return. They were in tears, with torn clothing, 2674 and they told her that the security forces
had “done something bad” to them, but had been told not to talk about it. 2675 Based on
established patterns of behaviour of the Tatmadaw, it is likely that some or all of these
women and girls were subjected to rape, gang rape, or other forms of sexual violence, and
some may have been killed.2676
1172. Over these two days, two large groups of more than 50 Rohingya men were beaten,
tied up and taken away in military vehicles. When some resisted, the security forces fired
shots, killing three Rohingya men. 2677 While some were released the same day, a large
group were taken to the Zay Di Pyin BGP base,2678 where they were tortured and ill-treated.
One man was killed in detention.2679 The village of Ah Thet Nan Yaar and the Pan Gain
IDP Camp were subject to “clearance operations” on 28 August 2017, during which both
locations were destroyed by fire.2680

Conclusion
1173. While purportedly to quash ARSA activity, the post-October 2016 period saw the
Tatmadaw turn much of northern Rakhine State into a security zone. Oppression against the
Rohingya intensified and daily life became untenable. In parallel, inflammatory reporting of
the “Bengali terrorist” threat increased, strengthened by vitriolic State-sponsored hate
speech and divisive rhetoric from Rakhine politicians and radical Buddhists. Fear was
instilled amongst other ethnic communities, inter-communal relations weakened and local
militias were strengthened. The weeks leading up to the 25 August 2017 saw multiple
warning signs. There was a significant military build-up, with the deployment of LIDs, and
a series of events in northern Rathedaung Township that further escalated tensions. An
environment was created which both encouraged and enabled the ARSA attacks and the
Tatmadaw “clearance operations”. The human rights catastrophe of 2017 was planned,
foreseeable and inevitable.

2668 LI-037, LI-038, LI-040, QI-010, LM-012, K-063.34.

2669 CI-199, LI-037, LI-038, LI-040, QI-031.
2670 LI-037, LI-038, LI-040, K-063.34.
2671 LI-037, LI-040, V-218.
2672 LI-037.
2673 LI-040.
2674 LI-037.
2675 LI-037.
2676 See chapter VII, Hallmarks of Tatmadaw operations, section B: Sexual violence.
2677 CI-199, LI-038, LI-040, QI-010, QI-031, LM-012, K-063.34.
2678 CI-199, LI-038, QI-010, QI-031, K-063.34, V-067.
2679 LI-038, V-067.
2680 QI-031.

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3. An enduring catastrophe

(a) Impact of the “clearance operations”

1174. By September 2018, over 725,000 Rohingya had crossed the border into Bangladesh
as a consequence of the 2017 “clearance operations”, joining those who had fled earlier. 2681
There are now over one million Rohingya living in the refugee camps. Bangladesh has
played an important role, opening its borders and providing access to shelter, emergency
assistance and protection. However, overall conditions in the camps are dire. The Rohingya
are housed in temporary, inadequate shelters in densely populated camps, with no access to
meaningful work, entirely dependent on humanitarian aid. Limited education opportunities
for children and uncertainty about the future contribute to these difficulties. These factors
increase vulnerability, in particular for women and girls, to trafficking and other
exploitation.2682 Notwithstanding the compassionate humanitarian response from
Bangladesh, the camps there are not a sustainable or durable solution. Many Rohingya
interviewees told the Mission that they wanted to return to Myanmar, albeit under
conditions of security, justice and respect for their rights. 2683 One interviewee from Gu Dar
Pyin, Buthidaung Township, told the Mission:
If the Government would accept us I would go back. I want the same rights as all
other Myanmar citizens. I love my country so much. My father and mother are
buried there. I have my paddy fields. Here in the camps it’s difficult. I do not want to
spend my life sitting in this camp. I want to work. 2684
1175. According to Myanmar media reports, 30,000 non-Rohingya civilians were also
displaced by the violence within Rakhine State.2685 By mid-September 2017, nearly 4,300 of
them had reportedly returned to their homes.2686 It appears that a major project is being
implemented to resettle those non-Rohingya displaced persons in Rakhine State who have
not yet returned, with construction of new villages and houses underway, intended for these
affected communities.2687 Details of some of this new construction, much of it on land
previously inhabited by the Rohingya, are set out below.

(b) Legal framework

1176. The right of refugees to return to their country of origin is recognized in
international law. Article 13(2) of the UDHR, for example, provides that “everyone has the
right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country”. The return of
Rohingya to Myanmar must occur in full respect for the norms and standards of
international human rights law and international refugee law. It must be in accordance with

2681 Inter Sector Coordination Group, “Situation Report Rohingya Refugee Crisis”, 5 September 2018.
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/is
cg_situation_report_05_september_2018.pdf
2682 E.g. International Organization for Migration, “Thousands at Risk of Trafficking Amid Rohingya
Refugee Crisis” (Press Release, 31 July 2018).
2683 BI-002, BI-014, BI-017, CI-002, CI-116, CI-118, CI-119, CI-133, CI-138, LI-065, LI-102, LI-103,
LI-109, LI-110, LI-112, LI-122, LI-130, RI-011, RI-012, RI-013, RI-015. See also XChange,
“Rohingya Repatriation Survey” (23 May 2018), http://xchange.org/rohingya-repatriation-survey,
who undertook a quantitative study through 1,823 interviews with Rohingya in southern Bangladesh.
Almost all respondents (99 per cent) said that they would go back only if certain conditions were met,
with the majority mentioning citizenship of Myanmar with acknowledgement that they are Rohingya,
freedom of movement and religion, and their rights and dignity restored.
2684 LI-065.
2685 Ministry of Information, “More than 4,200 IDPs from local ethnic villages return home” (13
September 2017), http://www.moi.gov.mm/moi:eng/?q=news/14/09/2017/id-11511
2686 Ibid.
2687 Union Enterprise for Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement and Development in Rakhine State,
“Nearly 800 houses under construction for displaced villagers in Maungtaw” (News Release, 6
December 2017). http://rakhine.unionenterprise.org/latest-news-en/235-nearly-800-houses-under-
construction-for-displaced-villagers-in-maungtaw

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the key principles of voluntariness, dignity, and safety, and in line with the principle of
non-refoulement.
1177. Accordingly, those displaced in and from Rakhine State should be able to return
safely to their places of origin and participate in activities to rehabilitate and restore their
homes and livelihoods. Importantly, a safe return for the displaced requires a guarantee that
their human rights will be respected, protected and fulfilled. This includes the right to a
nationality, but also the fundamental rights to life; liberty and security of person; not to be
subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; and freedom
of movement. It requires access to livelihood, education and health care. Underlying all
these rights is the principle of non-discrimination.
1178. As will be discussed in detail in chapter VIII on accountability, victims of serious
human rights violations also have the right to equal and effective access to justice;
adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered; and access to relevant
information concerning violations and reparation mechanism. They have the right to truth
and justice and to guarantees of non-recurrence.
1179. The Government of Myanmar is under an obligation to ensure the realization of
these rights for the displaced Rohingya. To respect its duties under international law, the
Government must facilitate their return. This includes the creation of conditions and the
provision of means that allow them to return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity to their
homes or places of habitual residence, or to resettle voluntarily in another part of the
country.2688

(c) Impossibility of return

1180. A series of factors provide a bleak outlook for the possibility of Rohingya refugees
returning to Myanmar. The circumstances of Rohingya who have remained in Rakhine
State since August 2017 are difficult, with widespread human rights violations still being
perpetrated. This is exemplified by the fact that, as of August 2018, Rohingya have
continued to leave Myanmar at an average rate of 1,733 a month throughout 2018.
1181. While the Myanmar Government has, in principle, committed to Rohingya
repatriation,2689 nothing thus far indicates this will be in a manner ensuring respect for
human rights, essential for a safe, dignified and sustainable return. The repatriation
procedure requires acceptance of National Verification Cards (NVCs) and processing in
barbed-wired reception centres. The root causes of the exodus, including State-sanctioned
oppression and an exclusionary and divisive rhetoric, are denied and continue unabated.
The security forces who perpetrated gross human rights violations, with impunity, would be
responsible for ensuring the security of returnees. Repatriation in such condition is
inconceivable. As such, at the current time there is little or no realistic prospect of
repatriation. OCHA2690, UNHCR, 2691 and the ICRC2692 have each publicly stated, in April
and July 2018 respectively, that the conditions do not exist for returns to take place.
1182. On the contrary, Myanmar is making active efforts to prevent this return, through the
consolidation of the destruction of Rohingya villages, through appropriation of vacated land
and terrain clearance, erasing every trace of the Rohingya communities, and the
construction on this land of houses for other ethnic groups. Other infrastructure projects
appropriating Rohingya lands, including new roads and mines, are also underway.

2688 See e.g. United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998), principle 28.
2689 Republic of the Union of Myanmar - Office of the President, (Press Release, 7 September 2018),
http://www.president-office.gov.mm/en/?q=briefing-room/news/2018/09/07/id-8986
2690
OCHA, “UN Deputy Humanitarian Chief: All people affected by humanitarian crises in Myanmar
must get the assistance and protection they need” (End of Mission Statement, 8 April 2018); V-147
2691 UNHCR, “Bangladesh and UNHCR agree on voluntary returns framework for when refugees decide
conditions are right” (Press Release, 13 April 2018).
2692 ICRC, “ICRC President Peter Maurer calls Bangladesh-Myanmar crises ‘lose-lose situation for
people’” (Statement, 3 July 2018).

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An inadequate framework for repatriation

1183. On 23 November 2017, State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and Bangladesh’s
Foreign Minister Mahmood Ali agreed upon a framework for cooperation and repatriation
of Rohingya.2693 A joint working group on repatriation was formed, with initial indications
of repatriations starting as of 23 January 2018. Myanmar was reported to have agreed to the
repatriation of 1,500 Rohingya per week. 2694 At this rate, it would take more than 12 years
to repatriate the Rohingya to their homes – and only once the repatriation begins, which it
has not yet.
1184. Furthermore, the Myanmar Government has made repatriation of Rohingya refugees
contingent on their verification as former residents of Myanmar and on their acceptance of
NVCs. These conditions make returns difficult, if not impossible. The Rohingya have
largely rejected acceptance of the NVCs, fearing that it would remove their right to remain
in Myanmar. Moreover, the manner in which Rohingya left Myanmar meant that most no
longer possess any documentation to prove former residency in Myanmar. Many
interviewees informed the Mission that they were unable to bring any documentation when
they fled. The Myanmar authorities have proof of identity and of residence for each
Rohingya person resident in Rakhine State through their annual household registration
process, but there is no information to suggest that these records have been made available
to facilitate identification and repatriation.
1185. In June 2018, the Government of Myanmar, UNHCR and UNDP signed a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in relation to the repatriation process. 2695 The MoU
was not developed in consultation with Rohingya refugees, as is required by UNHCR’s
Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation.2696 As of September 2018, details of the MoU have
not been made public and the Mission has not been afforded the opportunity to review its
content. A leaked version circulating online suggests that some fundamental human rights
issues may not be adequately addressed by the MOU, including the core issues of freedom
of movement for the Rohingya beyond the borders of Rakhine State, and citizenship and
statelessness.2697
1186. Between 17 and 23 January 2018, the Myanmar authorities 2698 published lists with
the names, photos and identifying information of more than 1,300 men, women and
children who they accused of being involved in, or associated with, terrorism-related acts in
Rakhine State. The lists contain photos accompanied by captions with information
variously including the name, age, village, alleged offence, and other identifying
information. Most individuals are identified as “the terrorist” while others are characterized

2693 The Republic of the Union of Myanmar – Presidents Office, “Arrangement on Return of Displaced
Persons from Rakhine State”, Agreement signed by the Union Minister for the Office of State
Counsellor of Myanmar, and the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh (News Release, 23 November
2017), http://www.president-office.gov.mm/en/?q=issues/rakhine-state-affairs/id-8028
2694 BBC, “Rohingya crisis: Bangladesh and Myanmar agree repatriation timeframe” (16 January 2018);
Z. Siddiqui “More Rohingya flee Myanmar as Bangladesh prepares to start repatriation” (Reuters, 18
January 2018); V. Milko, “The plan to repatriate Rohingya refugees leads to fears of new dangers”
(Washington Post, 31 January 2018).
2695 UNHCR, “UNHCR and UNDP sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Myanmar to
support the creation of conditions for the return of refugees from Bangladesh” (Press Release, 6 June
2018).
2696 UNHCR, “Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection” (Handbook, 1996).
2697 Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry for Labour, Immigration and Population of the
Government of the Republic of Myanmar and the United Nations Development Program and the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Memorandum of Understanding, 30
May 2018), leaked version available at: https://www.scribd.com/document/382854287/The-MOU-
between-Myanmar-Government-and-UNDP-and-UNHCR.
2698 Lists were published in the English-language Global New Light of Myanmar newspaper, published by
the Ministry of Information. Extracts were also published by the Office of the President of the Union,
and by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which on 16 January 2018 requested Bangladesh authorities to
extradite “accused” persons to Myanmar.

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as a “family member of terrorists” or having “sympathized with the terrorist groups.”2699

The full detailed list, prepared by the BGP and reportedly submitted to the Bangladesh
government, includes the names of more than 3,000 alleged ARSA “terrorists”, “family
members” and “sympathisers”.2700
1187. These lists were published without any form of due process and without offering any
supporting evidence or information about any verification measures taken, putting the lives
of both the individuals listed as “terrorists” and their families at risk. This will have served
as a deterrent to repatriation.
1188. In February 2018, an initial list of over 8,000 Rohingya was submitted by the
Bangladesh authorities to the Government of Myanmar for repatriation. 2701 At first,
Myanmar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that only 374 people listed qualified for
repatriation, less than five per cent.2702 On 18 May 2018, it then announced it would
repatriate a total of 1,100 from the list.2703 The Mission does not know if the persons on this
list had indicated a wish to return to Myanmar voluntarily, and there are no indications that
any have subsequently returned.
1189. Moreover, the Myanmar government has announced plans to temporarily house
those Rohingya who they consider qualify for repatriation in “reception centres”, before
they are sent to one of 11 designated settlement areas. It is reported that the sites are
undeveloped and returnees will have to build their own houses. The Government has also
reportedly claimed to have arranged a “cash for work” programme for the returnees so they
can use the income they earn to cover housing costs. 2704 In an address to a visiting
delegation from the United Nations Security Council in Naypyidaw on 30 April 2017, the
Commander-in-Chief, Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing, confirmed that Rohingya if
repatriated would be sent to these specific sites. “There is no need to be worried about [the
Bengali’s] security if they stay in the areas designated for them.” 2705
1190. To date, the Myanmar Government has built two “reception centres” in Maungdaw
Township and a “temporary medium camp” on former Rohingya-owned farmland,2706 close
to Rohingya villages destroyed in “clearance operations”, where “accepted” Rohingya will
reportedly be temporarily sheltered.2707 The “reception centres” are surrounded by newly-
constructed perimeter fences. Satellite imagery analysis shows one of the three sites, Aung
Zay Ya, with buildings enclosed within a perimeter barbed wire fence. Increased security
measures have also been observed around the transit centre, where a new perimeter fence

2699 E.g. Global New Light of Myanmar, “Member of ARSA Terrorist Group: Photos and information of
ARSA terrorists who involved in Maung Taw counter attacks on 25 August 2017” (18, 19 and 20
January 2018), supplement, A-P;; Republic of the Union of Myanmar – Presidents Office, “Names of
more than 1,300 ARSA terrorists sent to Bangladesh” (17 January 2018), http://www.president-
office.gov.mm/en/?q=issues/rakhine-state-affairs/id-8356
2700 K-002.
2701 V-161.
2702 Global New Light of Myanmar, “Union officials explain cause for exodus, ARSA threats, repatriation
obstruction” (15 March 2018).
2703 Global New Light of Myanmar, “Myanmar Delegation attends the Second Joint Working Group
Meeting on the Repatriation of Verified Displaced Persons from Bangladesh” (18 May 2018).
2704 Sithu Aung Myint, “The Rohingya repatriation agreement and its many, many challenges” (Frontier
Myanmar, 4 February 2018).
2705 “Discussions between Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing and permanent envoys of UNSC” (Website
post, 4 May 2018), https://www.seniorgeneralminaunghlaing.com.mm/en/6841/discussions-senior-
general-min-aung-hlaing-permanent-envoys-unsc/
2706 VI-067, VI-172. One “reception centre” is in Taung Pyo Let Yar village tract, two kilometres south of
the Bangladesh border in Aung Zay Ya village, which was destroyed by fire during the “clearance
operations”. The new buildings are constructed next to hundreds of destroyed structures. The second
“reception centre” is in Nga Khu Ya, in Nga Khu Ya village tract. The buildings are located
predominantly on agricultural land, with satellite imagery showing that at least six nearby villages
were destroyed by fire during the “clearance operations”.
2707 Republic of the Union of Myanmar – Presidents Office, “Repatriation Camps will be ready ontime”
(Press Release, 14 January 2018), http://www.president-office.gov.mm/en/?q=issues/rakhine-state-
affairs/id-8337

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has been built around a security post located approximately one kilometre to the east, near
Thea Chaung Ywar Thit Kay village. 2708 The presence of BGP and Tatmadaw soldiers at
both reception centres has also been reported,2709 suggesting that freedom of movement will
be restricted.

Image dated 7 March 2018 showing increased security measures around Aung Zay Ya
reception centre. Nearby burned Rohingya villages are shown within the red lines.

1191. Returns in the current environment will result in further segregation and
confinement of Rohingya into controlled camps that will likely mirror those of central
Rakhine. The aftermath of the 2012 violence has seen the confinement of 132,000
Rohingya and Kaman in displacement camps and sites in central Rakhine State. Despite a
desire to return to their home villages, they have not been allowed to leave these camps and
sites for six years. The conditions of these camps have been described above, and amount
to undue restrictions of freedom of movement as well as an arbitrary deprivation of their
liberty.
1192. By September 2018, one year after the mass exodus of Rohingya started, the
repatriation plan had not commenced. On 14 April 2018, Government sources reported that
a Muslim family of five had returned voluntarily to Myanmar, 2710 been received at “Taung
Pyo Latwei” and accepted NVCs. Credible sources have dismissed the announcement as a
publicity stunt,2711 with some claiming that the family were not even Rohingya refugees. 2712
Bangladesh and UNHCR acknowledged that the alleged repatriation was not undertaken in
the context of the repatriation agreements. 2713

2708 Satellite imagery analysis prepared for the Mission by UNITAR-UNOSAT.

2709 V-067.
2710 Global New Light of Myanmar, “Displaced persons return to Taung Pyo Letwe reception centre” (16
April 2018).
2711 V-173, V-236.
2712 V-236.
2713 V-175, V-236.

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Lack of conditions conducive for return

1193. For the Rohingya who remain in northern Rakhine State, estimated in September
2018 to number between 200,000 and 240,000, circumstances remain extremely
challenging, with the continuing perpetration of serious human rights violations against
them.
1194. The Mission interviewed a significant number of Rohingya who remained in
northern Rakhine State after the “clearance operations” from October 2017 until June 2018,
and only later fled to Bangladesh. Largely from Buthidaung and Rathedaung Townships,
the overall picture painted was one of extremely difficult conditions, and a significant
deterioration of conditions in comparison with pre-August 2017.2714
1195. Interviewees reported a further tightening of restrictions on freedom of movement,
viewed as confinement to their villages. 2715 In some locations, villagers reported being
confined to their house compounds. 2716 These restrictions, which included an inability to
access markets and livelihoods,2717 led to a severe lack of food.2718 This scarcity was
compounded by restrictions on all humanitarian food aid to northern Rakhine State. 2719
These targeted actions to deny access to food appear to constitute a policy of forcing
Rohingya to flee through food deprivation.2720 As one Rohingya man who arrived in
Bangladesh in February 2018 from his village in Nyaung Pin Gyi village tract, southern
Rathedaung Township, stated:
The WFP did not deliver the rations for four months, and it was hard to feed the
family every day. There were some reserves, but it was very difficult. There was
sometimes only enough to eat once a day, and sometimes there was no food.2721
1196. In remaining Rohingya villages, security forces have continued to engage in
oppression. They have engaged in violent intimidation, sporadic violence, including
beatings and killings, sexual and gender-based violence and property violations, including
burning of properties and theft and extortion. 2722 The constant fear of violence from the
security forces and uncertainty as to the future force many to flee. Of particular concern,
many interviewees noted that Tatmadaw soldiers have continued the practice of coming
into villages and violently rounding up men, arbitrarily detaining them and taking them
away. Some of those detained have not been seen again. 2723 Some who were taken away
were reportedly ill-treated or tortured.2724 One man taken away in such a rounding up
reported being tortured in detention, but eventually released on payment of a bribe. 2725
1197. Security forces also continued to engage in sexual and gender-based violence,
including the abduction and rape of Rohingya women, some of whom have not been seen
again.2726 One Rohingya man described how in late October 2017, one Tatmadaw soldier
and one BGP officer entered his neighbour’s house, tied up an elderly woman and raped the
two younger women inside. As he explained:

2714 CI-025, CI-100, CI-101, CI-102, CI-103, CI-107, CI-108, CI-151, LI-049, LI-051, LI-057, LI-058,
LI-059, LI-060, LI-061, LI-077, LI-085, LI-086, LI-087, LI-088, LI-091, LI-092, QI-040, QI-064, QI-
065, RI-014, RI-015, WI-014, WI-041, YI-004, YI-005, YI-012, YI-026, ZI-004.
2715 LI-107, V-067.
2716 LI-085, LI-088, LI-091.
2717 CI-100, CI-102, LI-091, LI-092.
2718 CI-100, CI-102, CI-103, CI-107, LI-057, LI-061, LI-085, LI-086, LI-092, QI-040, WI-014.
2719 LI-092; See this chapter, section B.3: Restrictions on access to food, livelihoods, health care and
education.
2720 The Mission takes note that Amnesty International has called this a policy of forced starvation.
Amnesty International, We Will Destroy Everything, pp. 101-103.
2721 LI-092.
2722 CI-100, CI-101, CI-102, CI-108, CI-151, LI-041, LI-057, LI-059, LI-077, LI-085, LI-086, LI-087,
QI-040, WI-014, YI-026.
2723 CI-100, CI-101, CI-102, CI-107, CI-108, CI-151, LI-059, LI-085, LI-086, LI-092, QI-040, V-067.
2724 LI-057, LI-087.
2725 LI-057.
2726 CI-151, LI-057, LI-085, LI-091, LI-092, V-067.

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The two women were screaming and crying that they were being raped. I could hear
noises and that they were being slapped. The men stayed around two hours with the
women and then they left. I saw the women afterwards. They were bleeding and they
both had bite marks on their cheeks and their breasts had been stabbed. After that
incident, I decided to leave for Bangladesh.2727
1198. The Rohingya have no protection from vigilante attacks by ethnic Rakhine, which
are also prevalent. These include violent attacks, continuing burnings, and theft of land,
cattle and property.2728 To the contrary, it appears that the Tatmadaw has facilitated the
ethnic Rakhine to carry out attacks. One Rohingya man who fled his village in southern
Buthidaung Township in February 2018 explained that, after August 2017, soldiers were
regularly patrolling in his village, but more recently they had stopped coming. Instead,
ethnic Rakhine were coming into the village and abusing Rohingya. He was told by the
ethnic Rakhine chairman of his village tract that the Tatmadaw “have given us the
responsibility to protect the country from Rohingya”. 2729 Another Rohingya man saw his
paddy fields taken by his Rakhine neighbours who said that they were told to do so by the
Tatmadaw.2730
1199. The continuing destruction of Rohingya properties through fires has compounded
the oppressive conditions in northern Rakhine State. 20 per cent of the total destruction
occurred after 16 September 2017, a total of more than 7,000 structures, and destruction has
continued until at least March 2018.2731
1200. Myanmar authorities have continued to pressurise Rohingya to accept NVCs or
leave Myanmar in the period since the 25 August 2017 violence. 2732 One villager reported
that some villagers took the NVC, issued by the authorities in February 2018, “to save their
lives.”2733 Another villager from Kyaung Taung, Buthidaung Township, explained his
experience:
The soldiers told us that they will leave us in peace, but that we must take the NVCs.
We said that we would not take them. The soldiers said that, if we do not accept the
NVCs, we must leave.2734
1201. Since 25 August 2017, humanitarian access to vulnerable people in Maungdaw,
Buthidaung and Rathedaung Townships has been severely curtailed for humanitarian
actors, who have been prevented by the Myanmar authorities from providing assistance. A
series of bureaucratic procedures are being used to limit access. Organizations that have
received some level of approval have found that restrictions apply to significantly curtail
their ability to operate effectively. Access restrictions have also led a number of
humanitarian agencies to withdraw staff from Rakhine State. While some humanitarian
agencies have been able to provide some assistance: as it has not been possible for any
humanitarian needs assessment to be conducted, the actual circumstances of the Rohingya
and other communities remaining in northern Rakhine State are not fully understood. 2735
1202. Conditions have also been extremely difficult for a group of approximately 6,500
Rohingya who were displaced in northern Rakhine and who have subsequently settled in an
area referred to as the “zero point” or “no man’s land”, between Bangladesh and Myanmar,
adjacent to the Taung Pyo Let Yar area of northern Maungdaw Township. Although this
area is outside Myanmar’s border fence, it is Myanmar territory. Some Rohingya reportedly
settled there with the hope that this may afford them a better right of return.

2727 LI-057.
2728 CI-100, LI-059, LI-087, LI-092, QI-040, QI-064, WI-041, YI-005, YI-026.
2729 LI-092.
2730
WI-041.
2731 Satellite imagery analysis prepared for the Mission by UNITAR-UNOSAT.
2732 CI-151, LI-057, QI-063, QI-116, WI-041.
2733 CI-151.
2734 LI-057.
2735 K-069.

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1203. This group has been subject to continuing threats, and instacnes of violence from
the Myanmar authorities, and urged to go to Bangladesh. From approximately February
2018, the Tatmadaw used loudspeakers to broadcast negative abusive message to the
Rohingya.2736 The broadcasts including statements such as: “Leave, stateless Bengali”;
“Motherfuckers, leave from here”; “You motherfucker, it is not your mother’s land, you
don’t have any rights to this land”.2737 In March 2018, Myanmar troops reinforced their
presence along this section of the border, and there were shots fired from the Myanmar side
towards the Rohingya in the “zero point”.2738 Myanmar security forces also used slingshots
to shoot hard stones across the border towards the Rohingya inside “zero point”, 2739 with
one young girl injured and taken for treatment in Bangladesh. 2740
1204. There have been credible reports that a very small number of Rohingya have
voluntarily returned to Myanmar to assess the conditions there for the possible return of
others. They have been detained, charged and convicted with crimes of illegal border
crossing.2741 Information indicates that some men who voluntarily returned were arrested
and ill-treated while in detention. They were reportedly convicted in absentia, imprisoned
but subsequently pardoned. Upon their release, they were reportedly forced to accept the
NVC and then taken to a securitized detention centre, where they were again threatened. 2742
Many managed to escape, or were permitted to escape, and to return to Bangladesh.

Use of landmines at the border

1205. Landmines were planted by Tatmadaw soldiers along border crossing points in
northern Maungdaw Township.2743 Soldiers were seen by witnesses laying mines in border
areas in the period after 25 August 2017.2744 Mines were planted, for example, on the
Myanmar side of “zero point” between Bangladesh and Myanmar. 2745
1206. A number of explosions in early September 2017 in this region caused deaths and
serious permanent injuries to Rohingya, including children. 2746 Some of the explosions
occurred when fleeing Rohingya stepped on landmines while crossing the land border into
Bangladesh.2747 Other injuries and fatalities were sustained by those trying to return to their
villages from Bangladesh or “zero point” to recover possessions or bring remaining
relatives with them.2748
1207. Two members of the same Rohingya family were casualties of mines in this border
region. This family fled the “clearance operations”, leaving behind one younger man to try
to protect the family property. Eventually, he also fled the violence. As he crossed the
border at Nga Yant Chaung village tract, in northern Maungdaw, he stepped on and
detonated a landmine and was critically injured. Two of his brothers travelled from
Bangladesh to assist him or recover his body. When they arrived, they found only remnants
of his clothing at the site of the explosion. During this attempt to find him, one of the other

2736 LI-131.
2737 CI-147, CI-148, LI-131, LI-132.
2738
CI-147, CI-148, LI-132.
2739 CI-147, CI-148, LI-131, LI-132.
2740 CI-147, CI-148.
2741 CI-147, V-190, V-189. Government of the Republic of Myanmar, State Counsellors Office “The First
Returnee’s in the camps in Cox’s Bazaar arrived in Reception Centres” (Facebook post, 27 May
2018),
https://www.facebook.com/state.counsellor/photos/pcb.1285956094871937/1285955904871956
2742 Ibid.
2743 CI-147, CI-148, LI-132, QM-001, XM-005, V-087, V-176.
2744 CI-147, CI-148, LI-132, QM-001, XM-005, V-087, V-176.
2745 CI-009, CI-147, CI-148, LI-132, WI-001, WI-002.
2746 QM-001, WM-003, K-076.20, V-177, V-178, V-179.
2747 V-067, V-087.
2748 CI-009, CI-147, CI-148, LI-132, WI-001, WI-002.

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brothers also stepped on a landmine and sustained severe injuries, losing a part of both legs
and an arm, and being blinded in one eye. 2749
1208. The Mission met with another young man who had been severely injured by a
landmine, losing his left foot and the vision in his right eye, among other injuries. He had
been sheltering in the “zero point” area following the “clearance operations” but had
returned to Myanmar in an effort to recover some of his cattle. He stepped on the mine as
he was returning to Myanmar.2750 In a further incident, a middle-aged woman stepped on a
landmine in the “zero point” area and lost both her legs.2751 Although fleeing Rohingya
constituted the majority of those injured by landmines, media reports suggest that others
may have been affected, including two Bangladeshi nationals. 2752
1209. Once the “clearance operations” began, the Tatmadaw faced no notable resistance
from ARSA, nor any threat from across the Bangladesh border. This indicates that the use
of landmines was intended to target fleeing Rohingya civilians and to prevent those who
had already left from returning.
1210. On 6 September 2017, it was reported that Bangladesh filed a formal complaint with
Myanmar regarding its use of mines. 2753 On 21 September 2017, Bangladesh Prime
Minister Sheikh Hasina informed the United Nations General Assembly that:
We are horrified to see that the Myanmar authorities are laying landmines along
their stretch of the border to prevent the Rohingya from returning to Myanmar.2754
1211. Only five months earlier, in April 2017, it was reported that the Myanmar and
Bangladesh governments had agreed to remove landmines and IEDs from the border
area.2755 By August, however, the Tatmadaw was laying landmines along the border, not
removing them.
1212. Displaced Rohingya living in the “zero point” area in the months following 25
August 2017 managed to dig up some landmines with bamboo sticks. 2756 Photographs of the
mines excavated by Rohingya, subsequently analysed, confirm that at least some of these
are PMN-1 type, which Myanmar is known to produce and purchase and which the
Tatmadaw is known to use.2757 The severity of wounds observed is also consistent with the
use of PMN-1 type landmines.2758 It has been reported that the Tatmadaw has claimed that
all mines in the region had been planted more than 20 years ago. 2759 However, this claim is
difficult to reconcile with information that the Tatmadaw used anti-personnel landmines in
its military operations in Rakhine State, 2760 and with first-hand accounts of the Tatmadaw
planting the mines during the “clearance operations”.
1213. Furthermore, the first mine explosion was reported in early September 2017, less
than two weeks after the “clearance operations” had commenced, and after at least 400,000

2749 WI-001, WI-002, V-180.

2750 CI-009.
2751 CI-148, LI-132.
2752 S. Bashu Das “Bangladeshi among Rohingya refugees killed by landmines at Bandarban border,”
(Dhaka Tribune, 13 September 2017); Radio Free Asia: “Bangladesh: Landmine Kills Buddhist
Trying to Enter Myanmar”, (15 March 2018).
2753 K.N. Dash, “Bangladesh protests over Myanmar’s suspected landmine use near border,” (Reuters, 6
September 2017.
2754 Statement of H.E. Ms. Sheikh Hasina, Prime Minister of Bangladesh to the 72 nd General Assembly,
available at https://gadebate.un.org/en/72/bangladesh
2755 V-183, V-201.
2756 CI-148, V-067, V-087.
2757 Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor, Myanmar Burma: Mine Ban Policy, 16 November 2016,
footnotes 40 & 42 (indicating Myanmar’s acquisition and use of foreign-produced landmines
including the PMN type landmine and the China Type-58, which is similar to the PMN; as well as the
domestic production of what Myanmar calls the MM2, a copy of the China Type-58).
2758 V-067.
2759 K.N. Das, “Bangladesh Protests of Myanmar’s Suspected Landmine Use Near Border” (Reuters, 6
September 2017).
2760 V-067, V-184, V-185, V-186, V-187, V-188.

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Rohingya had already crossed into Bangladesh, including by using the crossing points
where landmine explosions were subsequently recorded.2761 The locations where
detonations occurred had been regularly used by Rohingya villagers prior to the 2017
“clearance operations”,2762 with no blasts or injuries reported.
1214. As such, the Mission has reasonable grounds to conclude that landmines were
planted by the Tatmadaw, both in the border regions as well as within northern Rakhine
State, as part of the “clearance operations” with the intended or foreseeable effect of
injuring or killing Rohingya civilians fleeing to Bangladesh. Further, it seems likely that
new anti-personnel mines were placed in border areas as part of a deliberate and planned
strategy of dissuading Rohingya refugees from attempting to return to Myanmar.

Construction of the border fence

1215. The construction of a significantly more robust fence along the Bangladeshi border
is a further indication of an official plan to prevent, or significantly control, the return of
Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh. This strengthening of border fencing commenced in
early September 2017, with the Commander-in-Chief, Min Aung Hlaing, making public
statements confirming the construction at that time.2763 Sharpened sticks have been placed
in the ground, pointing in the direction from which refugees would be returning. 2764 As of
March 2018, this new fencing has reportedly been completed along all but 60 kilometres of
the border,2765 following a February 2018 parliamentary approval of 15 million US dollars
for this purpose.2766 The new fence is being built by the Ministry of Home Affairs, which
falls under the control of the Tatmadaw. The border area has reportedly been further
fortified with additional troops and military posts. 2767

(d) Terrain clearance and construction

1216. In December 2017, the Myanmar Government embarked on a major operation to
remove and clear burned structures, with the use of heavy machinery, and build new
infrastructure in their place. The Government said that this was in preparation for Rohingya
returnees.2768 Through this process, many Rohingya villages have been rendered
unrecognisable, devoid of all structures, trees and vegetation. Authorities are building new
security structures, developing new infrastructure projects and constructing new “model
villages”, predominantly, possibly exclusively, for non-Rohingya communities.2769
Bangladeshi families are reportedly being invited by Myanmar to Rakhine State on the
promise of land, citizenship, and free food.2770 Rohingya who fled Myanmar in 2018 saw

2761 QM-001.
2762 BI-004, QM-001.
2763 Global New Light of Myanmar, “Senior General meets locals in N-Rakhine, receives Japanese
delegation in Nay Pyi Taw” (22 September 2017).
2764 QM-001, XM-002, XM-006.
2765 V-189.
2766 V-207; Global New Light of Myanmar, “Pyidaungsu Hluttaw discusses housing, infrastructure loans”
(23 May 2018); Meeting summary, 9th day of the 7th Regular Session, 2nd Pyidaungsu Hluttaw,
Republic of Union of Myanmar (Official meeting notes, 22 February 2018),
https://pyidaungsu.hluttaw.mm/uploads/pdf/okyLLx_9%20Day%20Meeting(22-2-2018).pdf
2767 J. Emont, “Myanmar Blocks Rohingya Return With Fence, Barbed Wire and Land Mines” (Wall
Street Journal, 20 March 2018).
2768 V-191; see also Rebuttal Statement at the Interactive Dialogue on the Situation of Human Rights in
Myanmar during 37th Session of Human Rights Council during which the Myanmar Ambassador
stated, “In preparing facilities for the repatriation, bulldozing the ground is part of the process”,
http://www.president-office.gov.mm/en/?q=issues/rakhine-state-affairs/id-8555
2769 Union Enterprise for Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement and Development in Rakhine State,
“Nearly 800 houses under construction for displaced villagers in Maungtaw” (News Release, 6
December 2017), http://rakhine.unionenterprise.org/latest-news-en/235-nearly-800-houses-under-
construction-for-displaced-villagers-in-maungtaw
2770 LM-016; Reuters, “Myanmar lures Bangladeshi Buddhists to take over Rohingya land” (2 April
2018); RFA, “Land, Citizenship Await Them in Myanmar, Bangladeshi Tribespeople Told” (24 April
2018).

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bulldozers and other types of land clearance. 2771 As one Rohingya woman who fled
Myanmar in the mid-February 2018, from her village in southern Buthidaung, told the
Mission:
While crossing Maungdaw, we did not see any trees and houses. All were removed.
We saw the bulldozers. The Government is clearing the land to erase the signs of
their destruction.2772
1217. The seizure of Rohingya land has been further entrenched through the purported
application of laws that would further dispossess Rohingya. On 26 August 2017, the Union
Minister for Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement, Dr Win Myat Aye, stated that the
“redevelopment of Maungdaw region” would be implemented according to the Natural
Disaster Management Law (NDML):2773
There is a need to follow a law in managing the redevelopment works for terrorist
acts that had occurred. In some places, it became a burnt land. According to the
law, burnt lands become government-managed lands. The law that governs burnt
land is national disaster management law.2774
1218. Article 2 of the NDML defines natural disaster as the destruction of property,
livelihood infrastructure, “… due to natural or man-made accidents or negligence such as
fire … or violence and armed insurgencies.”2775 The National Natural Disaster Management
Committee, formed by the Government to implement this law, is responsible for leading the
implementation of projects for the “rehabilitation and reconstruction activities after the
natural disaster”.2776 The law precludes criminal liability against responsible parties, such as
the Government or the national disaster management committee, where disaster
management “is done in good faith”. 2777
1219. In the view of the Mission, this is a misapplication of the law in the present context.
The Tatmadaw is responsible for the intentional burning and destruction of Rohingya
villages and property. Reference to this law in this context further demonstrates the failure
of the Government of Myanmar to take responsibility for its actions, and further leads to the
conclusion that a safe, voluntary and dignified return from Bangladesh is impossible.

2771 CI-101, CI-102, CI-103, CI-107, CI-151.

2772 CI-102.
2773 Natural Disaster Management Law (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law No. 21, 2013).
2774 Ministry of Information, “Redevelopment of Maungtaw region as per Disaster Management Law” (26
September 2017), www.moi.gov.mm/moi:eng/?q=news/27/09/2017/id-11604
2775 Natural Disaster Management Law, art 2.
2776 Natural Disaster Management Law, art 5.
2777 Natural Disaster Management Law, art 35.

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Demolition and other forms of terrain clearance

Image of Chein Khar Li and Thaung Paing Nyar villages in southern Maungdaw,
taken on 20 February 2018, showing extensive terrain clearance through bulldozing

1220. The Mission has analysed satellite imagery and aerial photographs showing large
areas of cleared terrain across Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung Townships, in
villages where the Rohingya lived prior to the “clearance operations”. Through this
analysis, the Mission has identified at least 78 villages across the three townships which, by
March 2018, presented signs of demolition or other forms of terrain clearance. 2778 Of these
78 villages, 50 were totally destroyed, and 28 partially destroyed, by fire during the
“clearance operations”.
1221. Terrain clearance was visible from November 2017 in Maungdaw town and in the
Rohingya villages of Ho Kay Day Kone Nar and Zay Di in Kyauk Pan Du village tract,
Maungdaw Township.2779 It also took place in numerous villages in northern Maungdaw,
mainly around Laung Don and Kyein Chaung village tracts, from late 2017 and intensified
in January 2018 along the coast of southern Maungdaw. Terrain clearance was also visible
during this period in seven villages in Rathedaung Township and two in Buthidaung
Township, including in areas where the most serious incidents highlighted in this report
took place.2780 Terrain clearance activities across all three townships continued from
January until at least March 2018.2781

2778 Satellite imagery analysis prepared for the Mission by UNITAR-UNOSAT.

2779 Ibid.
2780 For example in Maung Nu (Buthidaung Township), Chut Pyin and Ah Htet Nan Yar (Rathedaung
Township).
2781 After March 2018, the availability of clear satellite imagery diminished due to the increased presence
of thick haze and clouds. Nonetheless, a partially cloudy image collected on 9 April 2018 and
analysed by the Mission showed new signs of scorching affecting trees, vegetation and houses in
northern Maungdaw Township. The image shows 8 kilometres of damaged area from north-west to
south-east, between the villages of Kyaung Toe (Bauk Shu Hpweit/Aung Zan village tract) and Mi
Kyaung Chaung (Min Ga Lar Gi village tract). This is an area that was only slightly affected by
destruction at the beginning of September 2017 and it is now completely destroyed.

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1222. While this large-scale terrain clearance occurred predominantly in areas that had
previously been burned, some structures that survived the earlier burning were also cleared.
This pattern was observed in settlements in the village tracts Chein Khar Li, War Char,
Gaw Du Thar Ra (Ywar Thit Kay), (Du) Chee Yar Tan, and Myin Hlut, all in Maungdaw
Township.2782
1223. Satellite image analysis of Myin Hlut and Gaw Du Tha Ra village tracts, Maungdaw
Township, shows widespread destruction through burning of structures by 16 September
2017. Further imagery analysis shows some structures remaining on 9 January 2018.
However, terrain clearance has removed all structures and vegetation from both locations
by 13 February 2018.2783

Image of Myin Hlut village tract, taken on 9 January 2018 showing the destruction of
structures, through burning, inside the red lines. This damage was first detected on
16 September 2017. Structures outside of the red lines remained intact as of
9 January 2018, including in the magnified area.

2782 Satellite imagery analysis prepared for the Mission by UNITAR-UNOSAT; V-067.
2783 Satellite imagery analysis prepared for the Mission by UNITAR-UNOSAT; V-194, V-195.

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Image of Myin Hlut village tract, taken on 13 February 2018, five weeks later,
showing terrain clearance across the entire area removing all burned and intact
structures, and vegetation, including in the magnified area. All signs of the village
are erased.

Image of Gaw Du Tha Ra village tract, taken on 9 January 2018 showing the
destruction of structures, through burning, inside the red lines. This damage was first
detected on 16 September 2017. Structures outside the red lines remained intact as of
9 January 2018, including most structures in the magnified area.

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Image of Gaw Du Tha Ra village tract, taken on 13 February 2018, five weeks later,
showing terrain clearance across the entire area removing all burned and intact
structures, including in the magnified area. All signs of the village are erased.

New construction
1224. Terrain clearing has been followed by rapid construction and development of new
buildings and infrastructure. The Mission analysed satellite images of 36 villages that show
new construction, a majority in Maungdaw Township. In 23 villages, construction has taken
place near destroyed or partially destroyed villages, mainly in the surrounding fields. In
13 villages, new structures have been constructed in areas burned during the “clearance
operations” and subsequently cleared. Satellite imagery analysis indicates that the new
construction is mostly security structures as well as new villages and houses, resettlement
camps, and other type of civilian infrastructure.
New villages and houses
1225. On 6 December 2017, the Union Enterprise for Humanitarian Assistance,
Resettlement and Development in Rakhine2784 announced a plan for the construction of
nearly 800 houses in approximately 26 villages in Maungdaw Township destroyed after 25
August 2017.2785 On 11 January 2018, the Office of the President announced the
commencement of these construction works, including “three repatriation and assessment

2784 The Union Enterprise for Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement and Development (UEHRD) in
Rakhine is a public-private enterprise with three stated goals: providing humanitarian assistance,
carrying out resettlement and rehabilitation and working for development in Rakhine State. State
Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi acts as Chairperson and Dr. Win Myat Aye the Union Minister
for Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement, acts as Vice Chairman.
http://rakhine.unionenterprise.org/
2785 Union Enterprise for Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement and Development in Rakhine State,
“Nearly 800 houses under construction for displaced villagers in Maungtaw” (News Release, 6
December 2017), http://rakhine.unionenterprise.org/latest-news-en/235-nearly-800-houses-under-
construction-for-displaced-villagers-in-maungtaw.

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camps”, with a view to “accepting and resettling ethnic nationals, Hindus and Muslims”
who were displaced by “terrorist activities”. 2786
1226. While satellite imagery analysis confirms that construction is continuing in the
majority of these 26 locations, the Mission notes that the plan foresees the construction of
only 22 houses, approximately three per cent of the total, for displaced Rohingya (referred
to as “Bengali”). These 22 houses are being built in Ywa Thit village in Pan Taw Pyin
village tract, which was almost totally destroyed by fire during the “clearance
operations”.2787 The remaining 97 per cent of the nearly 800 houses listed in the plan are to
be allocated to other ethnic communities.
1227. For instance, the original plan foresaw the construction of 73 houses for ethnic
Rakhine in Min Gyi, the location of one of the largest and most egregious mass killings. 2788
On 14 May 2018, the authorities announced that this construction in Min Gyi would
include more than 80 houses, a school and a monastery for “displaced ethnic people of
Rakhine State”.2789 Rohingya are not considered as one of Myanmar’s ethnic nationalities
and so are not potential beneficiaries.
1228. As of 26 July 2018, satellite imagery analysis did not show signs of terrain clearance
or reconstruction in Min Gyi village. However, the construction of a new “model village” is
visible in the south of Min Gyi village tract, close to Kyet Kyein village in Done Paik
village tract. It was further reported in the media that houses will be built in the “new” Min
Gyi village which “has been relocated (beside the) Maungdaw-Taung Pyo road”.2790 As of
June 2018, approximately 72 new structures were visible in this location (50 fully
completed and foundations for the remaining structures).2791
1229. Building “new villages” close to the sites of previous Rohingya villages appears to
be an attempt to change the demographic landscape of northern Rakhine State. Tin Maung
Swe, Rakhine state secretary and a senior official with the military-controlled General
Administration Department, has publicly stated that government departments, led by the
Ministry of Home Affairs, would reclassify or re-zone land previously occupied by
Rohingya villages, for purposes such as agriculture or forestry, with new villages being
built close-by for settlers. He also said that returning refugees would not be entitled to
return to their original villages. 2792 This cannot be reconciled with Principle 28 of the
Guiding Principles to return “in safety and with dignity to their homes or places of habitual
residence”.
1230. Satellite imagery analysis has identified large-scale construction of organized
permanent structures, which appear to be new “model villages”, in nine locations:
• Pa Da Kar Taung (Net Chaung/Pa Da Kar Day War Nar Li village tract); Thit Tone
Nar Gwa Son (Thit Tone Nar Gwa Son village tract); Du Than Dar (Than Dar
village tract); Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit (Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit village tract); Kyet Kyein
(Kyet Kyein village tract); Ah Htet Pyu Ma (Ah Htet Pyu Ma village tract); and
Maungdaw town in Maungdaw Township;

2786 The Republic of the Union of Myanmar – Presidents Office, “UEHRD leads preparation to receive
displaced persons in Rakhine State” (11 January 2018), http://www.president-
office.gov.mm/en/?q=issues/rakhine-state-affairs/id-8308
2787 Satellite imagery analysis by UNITAR-UNOSAT for the Mission confirms the construction of likely
22 buildings in the northern part of the village, on ground cleared of the ruins of over 100 destroyed
Rohingya homes.
2788 See this chapter, section D.1.a: Most serious incidents.
2789 The Republic of the Union of Myanmar – Presidents Office, “More than 80 houses built for ethnic
people in Rakhine” (13 May 2018), http://www.president-office.gov.mm/en/?q=issues/rakhine-state-
affairs/id-8761
2790 V-196.
2791 Satellite imagery analysis prepared for the Mission by UNITAR-UNOSAT.
2792 V-198; see also The Republic of the Union of Myanmar – Ministry of Information, “Redevelopment
of Maungtaw region as per Disaster Management Law 26 September 2017” (26 September 2017),
www.moi.gov.mm/moi:eng/?q=news/27/09/2017/id-11604

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• Yin Ma Zay (Nga Yant Chuang village tract) in Buthidaung Township; and
• Koe Tan Kauk in Rathedaung Township.
1231. The four images below are of Thit Tone Nar Gwa Son village tract in northern
Maungdaw Township, the site of one of the new “model” villages. The images show the
evolution of the area from 25 May 2017, prior to the “clearance operation”, when there was
no damage, to 13 February 2018, when there have been extensive terrain clearance and new
construction of houses with metal roofs in an organized layout. Thit Tone Nar Gwa Son is
one of the 26 locations in the Union Enterprise for Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement
and Development in Rakhine’s house reconstruction plan mentioned above. The plan lists
four ethnic Mro villages where 86 houses will be built “near Thittonena Gwa Sone village”,
in “Thittonena Gwa Sone” village tract.2793

Image of Thit Tone Nar Gwa Son dated 25 May 2017 showing no damage

2793 Information published by the Myanmar Government’s Union Enterprise for Humanitarian Assistance,
Resettlement and Development in Rakhine State lists the names of four new ethnic Mro villages
where 86 houses will be built for 559 people, “near Thittonena Gwa Sone village”, in “Thittonena
Gwa Sone” village tract. See: http://rakhine.unionenterprise.org/latest-news-en/235-nearly-800-
houses-under-construction-fordisplaced-villagers-in-maungtaw; Global New Light of Myanmar,
“New homes for residents in Maungtaw, Rakhine State” (24 February 2018).

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Image of Thit Tone Nar Gwa Son dated 16 September 2017 showing structures
damaged by fire

Image of Thit Tone Nar Gwa Son dated 16 December 2017: showing terrain clearance
and new construction on previously burned land

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Image of Thit Tone Nar Gwa Son dated 13 February 2018 showing further extensive
terrain clearance and additional new construction

1232. Similarly, the four images below show the evolution of part of Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit
village tract between 25 May 2017 and 13 February 2018, and the subsequent construction
of new well-organized houses with metal roofs on the same previously damaged area. Pa
Da Kar Ywar Thit (known in Rohingya as Diyal Toli) was burned during the “clearance
operations” a few days before the events in Min Gyi. It used to be home to Rohingya and
Mro communities.2794 More than 600 structures were burned and destroyed. 2795 The
Government’s construction plan foresees the reconstruction of 140 houses in Pa Da Kar
Ywar Thit, although only for displaced ethnic Mro.2796

2794 See this chapter, section D.1.a: Most serious incidents.

2795 Satellite imagery analysis prepared for the Mission by UNITAR-UNOSAT.
2796 Information published by the Myanmar Government’s Union Enterprise for Humanitarian Assistance,
Resettlement and Development in Rakhine, dated 6 December 2017, lists the names of five new
ethnic Mro villages where 132 houses will be built for 763 people, in “Padaka Ywathit group”, in
“Padaka Ywathit” village tract. See: http://rakhine.unionenterprise.org/latest-news-en/235-nearly-
800-houses-under-construction-fordisplaced-villagers-in-maungtaw

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Image of Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit dated 25 May 2017 showing no damage

Image of Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit dated 16 September 2017 showing structures damaged
by fire

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Image of Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit dated 26 November 2017 showing new construction,
including road construction

Image of Pa Da Kar Ywar Thit dated 13 February 2018 showing extensive new
construction

Security-related construction
1233. In other locations, satellite imagery indicates that new construction has a security or
military purpose. Images show the construction of new security outposts and military bases,
and the enlargement or reinforcement of previously existing security and military posts.

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1234. Maung Nu village was burned over several days from 27 August 2017. The four
images below show the evolution of Maung Nu from 25 May 2017 to 18 March 2018 and
the construction of a new security or military facility. Satellite imagery analysis confirms
the destruction of additional structures between 9 January and 18 March 2018. An open
source report referred to the burning, by security forces, of 13 houses on the evening of
5 March 2018. The same report states that a new BGP post is being constructed to replace
the BGP post attacked by ARSA on 25 August 2017 in Hpaung Taw Pyin. 2797

Image of Maung Nu dated 26 May 2017 showing no damage

2797 V-197. See this chapter, section D.1.a: Most serious incidents, for details of the “clearance operation”
in Maung Nu.

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Image of Maung Nu dated 25 October 2017 showing structures damaged by fire,

and an area prior to terrain clearance

Image of Maung Nu dated 9 January 2018 showing structures damaged by fire, and
an area with terrain clearance, further damaged structures and on-going construction
of a new military or security facility

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Image of Maung Nu taken on 18 March 2018 showing an additional 13 structures

damaged by fire (red areas), further terrain clearance, and further construction
of a new military or security facility

1235. Satellite imagery analysis shows the presence of new structures surrounded by a
perimeter fence in Kan Kya, Maungdaw Township. A similar pattern is observed in the
southern part of Inn Din in southern Maungdaw, 2798 where satellite imagery analysis shows
new large structures built on sites where Rohingya structures had previously been located.
Credible reports indicate that construction activities in both locations are for new BGP
bases.2799

2798 Inn Din was the location of the only mass killing during the “clearance operations” that the
Government has acknowledged. See this chapter, section D.1.a: Most serious incidents, for details of
the “clearance operation” in Inn Din.
2799 LM-019, V-067, V-192.

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Image of Kan Kya taken on 27 February 2018 showing the construction of extensive
new security structures and a perimeter fence.

Image of Inn Din taken on 16 February 2018 showing new security structures
constructed on land where Rohingya structures had previously stood, and the intact
NaTaLa village to the west (with pagoda shown)

1236. The Mission received reports that between January and February 2018 the Myanmar
authorities confiscated hundreds of acres of Rohingya farmland in Ah Lel Chaung village
tract, Buthidaung Township. According to the reports, this area had remained intact during
the “clearance operations” and was still inhabited and used by Rohingya until the time of

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the land confiscation.2800 Further reports indicate that the Rohingya were forced to leave the
village as a consequence of subsequent terrain clearance and new constructions on their
land.2801 Satellite imagery analysis from March 2018 shows new construction near Let Thar
village in Ah Lel Chaung. The image below shows new roads, large structures and a
perimeter fence under construction, indicating the likely establishment of a new security
force base.

Image of Let Thar village, Ah Lel Chaung village tract, below taken on 20 May 2018
showing terrain clearance, and extensive new construction of military structures on
former Rohingya farmland

1237. Construction was also observed in pre-existing security facilities across the three
townships. New secondary defensive fences, covering a larger perimeter, have been built
around security facilities in Inn Din and Zay Di Pyin in Rathedaung Township. A similar
pattern has been observed in two smaller security outposts in Maungdaw Township, and Ta
Man Thar Bo Hmu Gyi, Ta Man Thar village tract, Buthidaung Township. Reinforcement
measures, in the form of possible new fences or trenches within the limits of the compound,
can be seen in the security facilities in Tha Pyay Taw, Tha Pyay Taw village tract,
Maungdaw Township, and Pale Taung, Chin Tha Mar, Buthidaung Township.

2800 V-199.
2801 V-067, V-200.

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Image of a security / military facility in Tha Pyay Taw, taken on 18 March 2018,
showing a possible new trench constructed inside the compound

Close-up images of the security facility in Tha Pyay Taw taken on 16 December 2017
(left), and 9 January 2018 (right), showing the presence of new reinforcements,
possibly a trench.

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Close-up images of the security facility in Kyauk Hlay Kar village tract, Maungdaw,
taken on 9 January 2018 (left) and 20 February 2018 (right), showing a possible new
defensive wall constructed inside the compound

1238. In addition, at least six new large buildings have been built at the military bases in
Let Wea Det Pyin Shey village tract, Buthidaung Township, and further expansion is
visible in a security facility one kilometre west of Buthidaung town. Signs of expansion
have also been detected in a small military camp in Yin Ma Zay, Buthidaung Township.

Construction of other infrastructure

1239. The Mission analysed images showing the construction of new roads across
previously destroyed areas. Satellite imagery analysis and aerial photos of Kyauk Pan Du
village tract, Maungdaw Township, from February and March 2018, indicate that,
following the terrain clearance, a new road has been built across the burned villages of Ho
Kay Day Kone Nar and Zay Di, and across land where Rohingya houses and compounds
previously stood.2802

2802 The first signs of terrain clearance were visible as early as November 2017 in Kyauk Pan Du; See this
chapter, section D.1.a: Most serious incidents, for details of the “clearance operation” in Kyauk Pan
Du.

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Images taken in February and March 2018 showing new road construction in
northern Rakhine State

1240. These roads have been built over areas of at least eight villages across the three
townships (five in Maungdaw, two in Rathedaung and one in Buthidaung). Two large roads
are being constructed across the May Yu mountain range, with one connecting the town of
Goke Pi, Buthidaung Township, with Kyein Chaung, Maungdaw Township, where a large
area of land has been cleared and appears to have been prepared for new construction. The
second road connects Ah Htet Nan Yar in Rathedaung Township with Ho Kay Day Kone
Nar in Maungdaw Township. The construction of new houses and terrain clearance is also
visible in this latter location. In some instances, these new roads are constructed across
previously destroyed villages, like in Ah Htet Nan Yar in Rathedaung Township and Zay
Di in Maungdaw Township.

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1241. Other new infrastructure in the area includes new telecommunications antennae and
a new electricity or gas line between Rathedaung and southern Buthidaung Townships.
New helipads built after the beginning of violence in northern Rakhine were observed in
eight locations in Maungdaw and two locations in Buthidaung townships.

The destruction of evidence

1242. The mass demolition and terrain clearance throughout northern Rakhine State raise
serious concerns about the potential destruction of evidence and its effect on future
investigation into crimes, including the gravest crimes under international law. 2803 Many of
these villages were the location of serious crimes, including Min Gyi, Myin Hlut, Kyauk
Pan Du and Inn Din.
1243. Terrain clearance on this scale, without prior on site information gathering and
investigation, will inevitably make it more difficult to locate crime scenes and burial sites,
collect evidence for forensic analysis, and for investigators to piece together exactly what
happened. The destruction of evidence also makes it more difficult for the Rohingya to
bring legal claims. Moreover, the Rohingya have not been consulted, offered compensation
for destroyed houses and seized lands, or given any indication they can rebuild their homes
and livelihoods.
1244. This amounts to a deliberate and concerted attempt to obstruct justice. It is in
violation of the State’s obligation to undertake prompt, effective and thorough, independent
and impartial investigations, with a view to ensuring the prosecution and adjudication of
those responsible for crimes.2804 Since it first became apparent that villages were being
bulldozed and cleared, concerns have been raised. On 13 February 2018, in a meeting at the
United Nations Security Council on the situation in Myanmar, the representatives of
Bangladesh referred to “reports of the bulldozing and clearing of villages” and raised
concerns that this will, “not only eliminate features of recognition to establish ownership
rights, but would also seek to wipe out any remaining proof or evidence of alleged
atrocities committed against the forcibly displaced people.” 2805

2803 V-067, V-194.

2804 See chapter X: Impunity and accountability.
2805 S/PV.8179

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4. Perpetrators

(a) Tatmadaw
1245. The “clearance operations” were led by the Tatmadaw. Tatmadaw soldiers were
sighted in every “clearance operation” verified by the Mission. The Tatmadaw was in the
lead throughout these attacks and bore greatest responsibility for violations perpetrated.
They were responsible for the majority of killings, both indiscriminate and targeted, and
were responsible for the incidents of mass killing and mass gang rapes. They were also
responsible for other violations, including the widespread destruction of properties through
fire, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances and the forced displacement of the
Rohingya. Rohingya villagers had little difficulty in identifying the involvement of
Tatmadaw soldiers, with clear recognition of their uniform and other identifying
characteristics.
1246. The Mission has maintained a list of names of individual Tatmadaw officers and
soldiers who participated in the “clearance operations”, including in specific incidents of
mass killing.
1247. The manner in which the Tatmadaw implemented the “clearance operations”
required a significant amount of logistical planning. The joint nature of the operations,
combined with the deployment of the LIDs, indicates pre-planning at the highest level. 2806
The issue of command responsibility is addressed in chapter IX below.

Western Regional Military Command

1248. Units of the Western Command, the Regional Command responsible for Rakhine
State, were directly involved throughout the “clearance operations” in the perpetration of
violations against the civilian population. Military units were shifted from other military
bases and attached to Military Operational Command (MOC)-15, with Buthidaung as area
of responsibility. It appears that as many as nine battalions from other Western Regional
Command units were attached to MOC-15, as well as one armoured brigade consisting of
up to 60 tanks and armoured personnel carriers. 2807
1249. Certain military bases of the Western Command were specifically involved in
certain areas of the “clearance operations”. Of note is the prominent role of troops from
Light Infantry Battalion 564, which has a large base in Chin Tha Mar village tract, in the
Maung Nu mass killing, as well as in “clearance operations” in the villages of the Taung
Bazaar area of Buthidaung Township. The Mission also notes the role of Light Infantry
Battalion 552, located in Nga Yant Chaung village tract, in the same “clearance operations”
in the Taung Bazaar area. On 20 September 2017, Commander-in-Chief, Senior-General
Min Aung Hlaing travelled to Rakhine State where he visited the troops of base 552.2808

2806 Joint Operations are operations involving two or more of the military branches, Army, Navy and/or
Air Force.
2807 KI-002.
2808 Website of Commander in Chief Min Aung Hlaing, “Gallant efforts to defend the HQ against terrorist
attacks and brilliant efforts to restore regional peace, security are honoured” (21 September 2017),
https://www.seniorgeneralminaunghlaing.com.mm/en/1346/gallant-efforts-to-defend-the-hq-against-
terrorist-attacks-and-brilliant-efforts-to-restore-regional-peace-security-are-honoured/ (accessed
September 2018).

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The insignia of the Western Command

33rd and 99th Light Infantry Divisions (LIDs)

1250. On 11 August 2017, battalions of the Tatmadaw’s 33 rd and 99th LIDs, including
more than 1,600 soldiers normally based outside Rakhine State, were airlifted into Rakhine
State. From Sittwe, it was reported in the national media that these troops were going to
northern Rakhine State to carry out “area clearance”. 2809
1251. The LIDs are considered the most battle-hardened and experienced units within the
Tatmadaw. They are often deployed as the main strike force of an operation and directed
for use in counter-insurgency operations against non-State armed groups. Allegations of
serious human rights violations have been levelled against them, and in particular the 33 rd
and 99th LIDs, in the context of other operations, including in Kachin and Shan States.2810
The insignia of the 33rd LID The insignia of the 99th LID

1252. Following the arrival of the LIDs in northern Rakhine State, during the two weeks
prior to the commencement of the “clearance operations”, there were numerous instances of
violations being perpetrated by them, including theft, extortion and violent beatings, and
even killings. Officers from the LIDs also actively participated in meetings in which
Rohingya were threatened, which included death threats.
1253. During the “clearance operations”, the LIDs played an instrumental role in some of
the gravest mass killings verified by the Mission. It appears that 99 th LID was
predominantly operational in northern Maungdaw Township. 2811 In Min Gyi, the soldiers of
the 99th LID played a central role in both the mass killings and gang rape of Rohingya
villagers. It appears that the same soldiers may have been involved in the previous day’s
attack in Dial Toli, which also caused significant casualties. The 99 th LID reportedly
remained in Min Gyi until at least November 2017.2812
1254. After deployment to Rakhine State, the 33rd LID appears to have primarily operated
in southern Maungdaw Township and Rathedaung Township. Facebook posts reveal their

2809 E.g., The Irrawaddy, “Myanmar Army Deployed in Maungdaw” (11 August 2017).
2810 V-133; also e.g. Amnesty International, All the civilians suffer: Conflict, displacement and abuse in
Northern Myanmar (2017).
2811 XM-008, V-067, V-239.
2812 XM-008, V-239.

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arrival in Rathedaung town around this time. 2813 The 33rd LID carried out mass killings in
Chut Pyin, and credible reports indicate that they played a role in the clearance operations
in Inn Din, and the series of clearance operations in Koe Tan Kauk village tract. Other
information indicates that they may have also played a key role in a number of other
“clearance operations” in southern Maungdaw Township.2814 Photos published on the
Commander-in-Chief’s Facebook page showed the 33rd LID leaving Zay Di Pyin,
Rathedaung Township, in January 2018.2815

(b) Border Guard Police, Myanmar Police Force and Lon Htein
1255. The BGP played a role in the continuing oppression of Rohingya in the lead-up to
August 2017, throughout the period after October 2016. The BGP gathered and arrested
men, some of whom they tortured, including inside the BGP base in Zay Di Pyin, where
sexualized torture was also perpetrated. BGP officers also engaged in extortion of Rohingya
civilians on a considerable scale. During “clearance operations”, the Tatmadaw were often
accompanied by the BGP and committed crimes alongside them.
1256. Similarly, the Myanmar Police Force, which reports to the Ministry of Home
Affairs, played an active role in the “clearance operations”. In Inn Din, police were
responsible for, at a minimum, the extrajudicial killing of 10 men. Police officers were
identified as having participated in “clearance operations” in other villages, but further
investigation is needed to determine their precise involvement. Riot security police, known
in Myanmar language as Lon Htein, which is part of the Myanmar Police Force, were also
identified as participants in certain locations. Mass gang rapes of women were perpetrated
inside police compounds. The police were perpetrators in some of these instances.
1257. Many Rohingya victims were able to identify particular police uniforms, and
distinguish between the different police units, but not always. Identification was
particularly challenging in the chaos of the “clearance operations”. As such, further
investigation is needed to better understand the specific roles of these various groups. At
the same time, the Mission confirms the participation of all three institutions in the 2017
“clearance operations”. Moreover, the coordinated manner of their involvement in these
wider operations indicates that they were acting under the Tatmadaw’s effective control.

(c) Civilian perpetrators

1258. While the range and gravity of acts of non-security forces varied from village to
village, the participation of ethnic Rakhine and members of other minority groups in the
“clearance operations” was widespread. These civilians participated in identifiable and
consistent ways, carrying out specific functions. They acted alongside, complementary to,
and usually in tandem with, the Tatmadaw and other security forces. Civilian participants
systematically arrived at Rohingya villages as part of the military operation, with the
necessary tools, equipment or weaponry to carry out the specific designated tasks: matches
and inflammable liquids for burning; sacks or vehicles for looting; and swords or guns for
violent acts, including killings. Civilian perpetrators were particularly involved in the
systematic burning of Rohingya structures and appear to have been responsible for the
continued burning of properties after the completion of the “clearance operations”, and as
recently as March 2018. Sometimes ethnic Rakhine were also perpetrators of rape and
other forms of sexual violence.
1259. In some specific locations, the Tatmadaw actively distributed the weaponry to ethnic
Rakhine in the course of the “clearance operations”. This pattern of behaviour, across
different villages and locations, demonstrate that the participation of these groups was
organized and not ad hoc or opportunistic in nature. The manner in which ethnic Rakhine
and other minorities participated in the “clearance operations” demonstrates that their

2813 Facebook posts and photos, on file with the Mission, V-067.
2814 LI-112, ZI-001, RI-012, LM-006. See also S. Lewis, Z. Siddiqui, C. Baldwin, A. Marshall, “The
Shock Troops who expelled the Rohingya from Myanmar” (Reuters, 22 June 2018).
2815 Facebook photos, on file with the Mission.

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involvement was planned, coordinated and implemented under the command and control of
the Tatmadaw.
1260. The Mission has maintained a list of names of individual civilian perpetrators for
whom it has received indications that they were involved in the “clearance operations”,
including village administrators or former village administrators.

Ethnic Rakhine and NaTaLa residents

1261. In a large number of Rohingya villages where “clearance operations” were
conducted, participating ethnic Rakhine were recognized by witnesses as neighbours from
nearby Rakhine villagers.2816 In other cases, villagers participating in violent acts were
identified as residents of nearby NaTaLa “model” villages,2817 some of whom were
identified as ethnic Rakhine, although, given the mixed-ethnicity of NaTaLa villages, this
cannot be assumed. In the majority of such cases, ethnic Rakhine and NaTaLa villagers
who participated in the “clearance operations” wore the regular, traditional clothes, such as
t-shirts and mid-length shorts (“bombi”) or sarongs (“longyi”) that are worn by ethnic
Rakhine villagers in everyday life. 2818
1262. In other instances, Rohingya villagers noted the participation in the “clearance
operations” of persons they presumed to be ethnic Rakhine, although they did not recognise
the individuals themselves. In certain locations there was an indication of new persons
being transported into Rakhine State in advance of 25 August 2017, including new
residents seen arriving in NaTaLa villages. Some of these new arrivals were later witnessed
participating in “clearance operations” in specific locations.2819
1263. Some current and former ethnic Rakhine village-level administrators also played
prominent roles in specific “clearance operations”. For example, in two of the most serious
incidents, in Chut Pyin and Min Gyi, the role of the Rakhine village tract administrator
appears to have been pivotal in both assisting the Tatmadaw in advance of the operation,
including allegedly ensuring that the Rohingya villagers were inside the village at the time
of the attack, and during the “clearance operation” itself.
1264. In other locations, ethnic Rakhine administrators or former administrators were also
seen actively participating in the violence.2820 In two villages, armed administrators
reportedly guided the Tatmadaw soldiers through the village, showing them the way and
identifying relevant targets.2821
1265. The Mission notes that the Tatmadaw are undisciplined in relation to the consistent
wearing of uniforms, and notes credible reports of security forces deliberately wearing
civilian clothes to obscure their identity during the 2017 “clearance operations”. 2822 In some
cases, members of the security forces in civilian clothes could have been mistakenly
identified as ethnic Rakhine (or members of other minority groups). However, in light of
the overwhelming number of accounts from Rohingya who recognised their neighbours, the
Mission confirms the direct role played by ethnic Rakhine in the “clearance operations”.

Pyi Thu Sit and other armed Rakhine, including militias

1266. In some locations, Rakhine militias (Pyi Thu Sit) participated in acts of violence
against Rohingya. In some cases, villagers actively could identify them as such, because

2816 CI-029, CI-034, CI-049, CI-050, CI-120, CI-124, LI-006, LI-033, LI-037, LI-059, LI-062, LI-065, LI-
066, LI-069, LI-081, LI-102, LI-103, LI-104, LI-109, LI-112, LI-120, LI-129, LI-132, WI-005, WI-
006, WI-032, WI-044, WI-048, QI-002, QI-005, QI-012, QI-027, QI-049, QI-058, QI-061, QI-071,
YI-006, YI-019, YI-025, YI-030, YI-031.
2817 CI-034, CI-125, LI-054, LI-066, LI-102, LI-120, LI-132, WI-048, V-075.
2818 CI-029, CI-137, CI-138, CI-146, LI-003, LI-037.
2819 LI-054, LI-061, LI-063, LI-065, LI-066, LI-071, LM-006.
2820 CI-049, CI-050, CI-124, LI-102, WI-032.
2821 LI-102, YI-030.
2822 E.g. Wa Lone, Kyaw Soe Oo, S. Lewis, A. Slodkowski, “Reuters Special Report: Massacre in
Myanmar” (Reuters, 8 February 2018).

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either they knew of the existence of these groups and the identity of members of the Pyi
Thu Sit in their village, they witnessed groups being trained in public areas, or because they
were recognisable as they wore some type of adapted military uniform. 2823 For example, a
man from Ta Man Thar Village Tract, northern Maungdaw Township, could easily
recognise and identify the Pyi Thu Sit in his village because, as the local tailor, he altered
their uniforms.2824
1267. In other villages, however, ethnic Rakhine were not in uniform but were armed with
military-grade weapons. In some cases, these weapons were seen being distributed to ethnic
Rakhine by the Tatmadaw immediately prior to a “clearance operation”. 2825 As noted
above,2826 the Government has acknowledged that it had actively organized Rakhine militia
groups after 2016. In view of this, it is possible that, in locations where ethnic Rakhine
were using military grade weapons, the Tatmadaw had mobilised them as part of the
strategy of arming new militias.

Role of other minority groups

1268. In fewer villages, other minority groups were identified as participating in the
“clearance operations”. This included sightings of Khami, Hindu, Mro (also referred to as
Murong), Thet, Daignet (also referred to as Chakma) and Borua (Myamagi) individuals. 2827
There were also references to Bangladeshi Rakhines who had recently returned to
Myanmar.2828
1269. Rohingya villagers were able to identify the minorities who were participating in the
“clearance operations”, either through their distinctive dress or because they were
personally known to them.2829 In three locations, however, Hindus were identified as
participating in “clearance operations” while wearing clothes traditionally worn by
Muslims.2830 As one Rohingya witness noted:
I saw about six members of the Hindu community walking with the military. I was
surprised as they were wearing Muslim dress. I recognized these men because they
were known to me, they were the barbers at the market from Taung Bazaar, but they
often came to our village market too. They were wearing white cleric clothes (kurta)
and skullcaps.2831
1270. While the Mission has not been able to verify these allegations, it takes note of
credible reports that described how the government had circulated false photos of persons
revealed to be Hindus dressed in Muslim traditional dress, allegedly burning their own
village, provided on a State-sponsored international tour of Rakhine State in September
2017.2832
1271. Moreover, Rohingya often use the collective term “Mog”, usually to refer to a
person of ethnic-Rakhine ethnicity. In some cases, the label is used more broadly to refer to
any person of non-Rohingya identity. As such, in all cases, the Mission sought to clarify the
ethnic identity of persons identified in this way. Indeed, in most cases interviewees were
able to provide specific clarification as to who was being identified. However, given the
fluidity of the term’s use, the role of other groups in the “clearance operations” will require
additional investigation.

2823 LI-052, LI-104, LI-118.

2824 LI-104.
2825 LI-052, LI-103, YI-031.
2826 See this chapter, section D.2.b: The build-up to 25 August 2017.
2827 CI-124, CI-125, CI-135, CI-148, CI-189, CI-198, EI-051, EI-053, LI-044, LI-059, LI-076, LI-104, LI-
109, LI-111, LI-119, WI-034, WI-044, QI-012, QI-022, QI-058, QI-109, RI-007, WI-034, WI-044.
2828 WI-034, LI-054.
2829 CI-135, CI-148, CI-189, CI-198, EI-053, LI-044, QI-012, QI-022, QI-058, RI-007, WI-044.
2830 LI-044, LI-059, QI-012.
2831 LI-044.
2832 See for example J. Head, “Rohingya crisis: Seeing through the official story in Myanmar” (BBC, 11
September 2017)

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(d) ARSA
1272. ARSA also committed serious human rights abuses, including the killing of dozens
of suspected informants and the burning of the Rakhine village of Ah Htet Pyu Ma on 25
August 2017. Although the Government has claimed that ARSA burned Rohingya villages,
the Mission found no indication of this. Other abuses allegedly perpetrated by ARSA,
including several incidents where Rakhine and members of other ethnic groups, including
the Mro, were killed, require further investigation, as does the killing of up to 100 Hindu
men and women from Kha Maung Seik. The Mission’s primary source information on the
latter incident corroborates the killing, but is inconclusive as to the perpetrator. Other
militant or criminal groups were also active in the region and may have been responsible
also for abuses.

5. Violations of international law

1273. The “clearance operations” of both 2016 and then again of 2017 in northern Rakhine
State were brutal and disproportionate. They were undertaken in total disregard for human
life and dignity, without any respect for human rights, in complete and consistent violation
of all cardinal principles of international humanitarian law. Violations of this gravity and
scope are only possible when driven by absolute contempt for the victims against which
they are perpetrated.
1274. This section provides a brief overview of the kinds of violations of international law
perpetrated in the course of the “clearance operations”, focusing on international human
rights law and international humanitarian law. The extent to which these serious human
rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law may amount to serious
crimes under international law is examined in chapter VIII below.

(a) International human rights law

1275. The use of excessive force is prohibited under international human rights law. 2833 For
the use of force not to be excessive, it must comply with the principles of legality, necessity
and proportionality, and the degree of force should be limited to the minimum necessary in
the circumstances. It must be targeted at individuals using violence, or at averting an
imminent threat. These criteria were manifestly not fulfilled in the “clearance operations”
of 2016 and from 25 August 2017 in Rakhine State. The operations have thereby given rise
to an overwhelming breadth of violations against civilians in Rakhine State, in particular
the Rohingya, under international human rights law. The widespread killings in Rakhine
State violated the right to life, a non-derogable right, which forms part of customary
international law. The Mission considers that the estimate of 10,000 persons killed as a
consequence of the 2017 “clearance operations” alone, is conservative.
1276. The endemic rapes, mass gang rapes, and sexual violence against Rohingya women
and girls, and sometimes men and boys, violated the rights of these victims to security of
the person, and the right to be protected from torture and other ill-treatment. Violence
against women and girls, including sexual and gender-based violence, is also a form of
discrimination prohibited by the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women. Myanmar’s failure to prevent, investigate, prosecute and
punish acts of sexual and gender-based violence violates its obligations as a State party to
this convention.2834 The deliberate killing and indiscriminate attacks on children and infants
also violated the Convention on the Rights of the Child. As a State party, Myanmar is
obligated to guarantee children, that is, all persons under the age of 18, the rights to life,
survival and development, and to protection from all forms of physical or mental violence,
injury and abuse, including sexual abuse; and not to be tortured, nor suffer other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 2835 Under the CRC, governments must do
everything they can to protect and care for children affected by armed conflicts. In the

2833 See chapter II, section C: Legal framework.

2834 CEDAW, arts. 2 and 15.
2835 CRC, arts. 1, 4, 6, 7, 19, 24, 28, 34, 37.

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context of the clearance operations, rather than being protected and cared for, children and
infants were directly targeted and killed, often as their parents looked on.
1277. The arbitrary arrests and, in some cases, enforced disappearances of Rohingya in
Rakhine State during the “clearance operations” violated the right to liberty and security of
the person and to freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, as well as Myanmar’s
obligation to ensure that people arrested or detained are informed of the reasons for arrest
or detention, are brought before a court promptly, and are afforded a fair and public hearing
by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Enforced
disappearance, whereby the authorities have refused to acknowledge the arrest, or
concealed the detention, of Rohingya, taking them outside the protection of the law, put
Myanmar in breach of the customary law prohibition on enforced disappearances, and the
Declaration on the Protection of Persons from Enforced Disappearances. The torture that
often accompanied these arbitrary arrests is also prohibited, the prohibition against torture
being absolute under international human rights law.
1278. The destruction and burning of Rohingya homes and the obliteration of their former
villages violate the right to adequate housing as provided for under the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), to which Myanmar is a
party. The destruction of entire Rohingya villages, which was often preceded by wide scale
looting, and the subsequent endemic terrain clearance and rebuilding, also violates the
rights to own property and not to be arbitrarily deprived of it.2836
1279. The ICESCR also protects the right to adequate food and housing. 2837 Following the
ARSA attacks of October 2016, access to agricultural land, forests, and fishing was
severely limited, which denied Rohingya access to food, livelihoods and income. Lack of
access to adequate food and housing was also a notable feature of the journey to
Bangladesh, with many in Bangladesh continuing to suffer, having lost all ability to support
themselves. The severity of the restrictions from November 2017 onwards for those who
remained in Rakhine State, has led many of the remaining Rohingya to leave Myanmar,
including as a result of food deprivation.
1280. The ICESCR also protects the right to the highest attainable standards of physical
and mental health.2838 The total absence of any medical assistance for those wounded, who
then had to walk days or weeks through forests, across rivers and over mountains, led to
further casualties. In addition to the wide-scale arbitrary deprivation of Rohingya life, a
large number of villagers were left with significant physical injuries, many life-changing
and permanent, as well as deep and enduring psychological trauma.
1281. Reports also estimate that 30,000 non-Rohingya civilians were displaced from their
homes and villages as a result the violence in Rakhine State. The rights of these people to
adequate food, housing, and the highest attainable standards of physical and mental health
were also violated.
1282. Some of ARSA’s conduct also constitutes human rights abuses, notably where they
have killed suspected Rohingya informants or burned the Rakhine village of Ah Htet Pyu
Ma.

(b) International humanitarian law

1283. The Mission considers, from the patterns described in this report, that the Tatmadaw
and other security forces have not distinguished between civilians and civilian objects, on
the one hand, and fighters and military objectives, on the other. They have readily engaged
in attacks that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, that is clearly excessive to any
concrete and direct military advantage that could be anticipated. No efforts have been made
to take any feasible precautions to avoid and minimize incidental loss of civilian life, injury

2836 UDHR, art. 17.

2837 ICESCR, art. 11.
2838 ICESCR, art. 12(1).

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and damage to civilian objects. On the contrary, the Mission has concluded that civilians,
including children, were deliberately targeted. Rohingya villages were burned, and now in
many cases cleared, to leave no trace of having once existed. Through this conduct, the
Tatmadaw has consistently violated the fundamental tenets of international humanitarian
law.2839
1284. There is no indication that the “clearance operations” were, in any way, necessary to
address a concrete military threat posed by ARSA or were proportionate. No military or
security objective could ever justify the complete dismissal of a group’s basic human rights,
including the non-derogable rights to life and physical and mental integrity. The widespread
burning and destruction of houses, mosques, and madrassas, all civilian property, also
violate international humanitarian law.
1285. There can never be a necessity to engage in mass killings, including of women and
children; in rape and sexual violence on a massive scale; in the specific targeting of
children; or in the large-scale and deliberate looting and destruction of complete villages
across three townships. The conduct exhibited by the Tatmadaw and other security forces,
with the support of local ethnic Rakhine, resulted in violations of international humanitarian
law at shocking levels.
1286. ARSA is also bound by international humanitarian law, which it has violated. For
example, the burning of the Rakhine village of Ah Htet Pyu Ma would in all likelihood be a
violation of the principle of distinction and proportionality.

VI. Emblematic situation 3: Democratic space and the exercise of

fundamental freedoms
1287. Since 2011, there has been a remarkable opening up of democratic space in
Myanmar compared with the preceding 50 years, including a more open environment for
people to express themselves and to participate in protests, a freer media environment, and
increased access to and freedom for Internet users, including through social media.2840 For
example, the release of prisoners of conscience has been highlighted as one of the main
achievements of the Myanmar government since 2011, benefitting thousands of
prisoners.2841
1288. However, while Myanmar has made significant strides, challenges and negative
trends have emerged too, especially since 2015. The democratic transformation of the
country remains in its early stages. Indeed it has barely begun with the military maintaining
a dominating role in politics. Observers reported increased restrictions on the rights to
freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly; continuing arrest and detention
of individuals in relation to the exercise of these rights; and an increasing intimidation,
monitoring and surveillance of human rights defenders.2842 Despite the release of many
political prisoners, their number was still reported as “alarmingly high”. 2843
1289. The Mission focused its examination of the issue on two related trends: the apparent
discomfort of the Myanmar authorities with scrutiny and criticism, resulting in the active
silencing of critical voices, and the authorities’ inadequate response to, and fuelling of,
“hate speech”.

2839 As explained in chapter II, section C: Legal framework, the Mission considers the situation in
Rakhine State to amount to a non-international armed conflict since at least August 2017.
2840 E.g. A/HRC/22/58, paras. 15, 24; A/HRC/28/72, para. 4; A/HRC/31/71, para. 18.
2841 See A/HRC/22/58, para. 6; A/HRC/25/64, para. 4; A/HRC/31/71, para. 28.
2842 E.g. A/HRC/28/72, para. 8.
2843 E.g. A/HRC/22/58, para. 7; A/HRC/28/72, para. 15; A/HRC/31/71, para. 28.

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A. Silencing of critical voices

1290. The Mission observed at least three aspects of a broader trend to deliberately silence
critical voices, negatively affecting democratic space: the continued use of a range of
domestic laws criminalising the peaceful exercise of fundamental freedoms; the
intimidation of and reprisals against individuals for their (perceived) engagement with the
United Nations and other international actors; and the curtailment of peaceful protests.

1. Legal toolbox for restricting fundamental freedoms

1291. The interrelated rights to freedom of opinion and expression, association, and
peaceful assembly are fundamental freedoms, critical to the functioning of a democracy and
necessary for the realization of all other rights. They are firmly protected under
international human rights law.2844 Although Myanmar has not yet ratified the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the ICCPR’s provisions regarding the
rights to freedom of opinion and expression, association, and peaceful assembly, as well as
the interpretation and application of these provisions in international jurisprudence, remain
relevant. Myanmar has ratified other treaties with comparable provisions, most notably the
Convention on the Rights of the Child.
1292. Under international human rights law, the rights to freedom of expression,
association and peaceful assembly are not absolute. The exercise of the right to freedom of
expression (which includes the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
of all kinds) may be subject to restrictions. However, such restrictions must be provided by
law and be necessary in a democratic society for the respect of the rights or reputations of
others, or for the protection of national security or public order, or of public health or
morals.2845 Necessary restrictions must be proportionate and formulated with sufficient
precision. Where restrictions seek to protect national security, they are permissible only in
serious cases of political or military threat to the entire nation. The right to freedom of
expression embraces even expression that may be regarded as deeply offensive. All public
figures, including those exercising the highest political authority, are legitimately subject to
criticism and political opposition. Criticism of such officials, even where considered
insulting, is insufficient to justify the imposition of penalties. 2846 The exercise of the rights
to freedom of association and of peaceful assembly can be limited under similarly strict
conditions only.
1293. The problem with the Myanmar domestic legal framework is twofold. First, the
constitutional human rights guarantees with respect to the rights to freedom of opinion and
expression, association and peaceful assembly are weak and ambiguous. Section 354 of the
2008 Constitution protects these rights for “citizens”, if “not contrary to the laws, enacted
for Union security, prevalence of law and order, community peace and tranquillity or public
order and morality”. Apart from the fact that, under international law, these rights should
not be limited to citizens only, the concept of “community peace and tranquillity” is
impermissibly vague and broad. In addition, the key requirement that the restriction be
“necessary” to achieve the stated goals is missing. Second, multiple domestic laws contain
imprecise or overly broad restrictions on the exercise of fundamental freedoms, including
through the criminalisation of the peaceful exercise of such rights.
1294. Problematic laws that are frequently used to arrest, prosecute and convict civil
society actors, journalists, lawyers and human rights defenders, with a view to intimidate
and silence them, include:
• Sections 143-147 of the Penal Code, penalising unlawful assemblies: these
provisions contain an overly broad definition of unlawful assemblies, which may
encompass peaceful assemblies. Importantly, section 147 stipulates that, when force

2844 UDHR, arts. 19-20; ICCPR, arts. 19-22; CRC, arts. 13, 15; CPRD, art. 21; ASEAN Declaration,
arts. 23-24.
2845 ICCPR, art. 19(3); CRC, art. 13.
2846 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment no. 34 (CCPR/C/GC/34).

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or violence is used by an unlawful assembly, or by any member thereof, every

member of such assembly is guilty of the offence of rioting. However, the right to
peaceful assembly is an individual right: therefore, an assembly cannot be
considered violent because a few people in the assembly take violent action.
Individuals who do not engage in violence or incitement to violence should not be
held responsible for the actions of others.2847 Such provisions allow for treating
entire public protests as “unlawful” and for resorting to mass arrests of participants.
• Sections 499-502 of the Penal Code, criminalising defamation2848: under
international human rights norms and standards, imposing criminal penalties for
defamation is an unjustifiable restriction on the freedom of expression.
Criminalising defamation dissuades individuals from criticizing officials or
government policy. Civil liability proceedings should be the sole form of redress for
complaints of damage to reputation.2849 In Myanmar, defamation laws are frequently
used against journalists and other media workers for articles critical of the
government or of security forces.
• Section 505(b) of the Penal Code criminalising whoever makes, publishes or
circulates any statement, rumour or report with intent to cause, or which is likely to
cause, “fear or alarm to the public or to any section of the public whereby any
person may be induced to commit an offence against the State or against the public
tranquillity”. This provision is too broad and imprecise, according to international
human rights norms and standards. Criminally restricting speech because it is “likely
to cause alarm” that “may” lead a person to commit an offence against “public
tranquillity” cannot be justified as a necessary measure in a democracy. The
terminology used is also too vague for an individual to know what is impermissible,
and opens the door for abuse by law enforcement officials, notably to silence critical
voices. This provision has been used regularly against critics of the Myanmar
government or military, for example, in relation to public protests. After the Arakan
Liberation Party (AKP) published a statement in April 2016 alleging that the
Tatmadaw had committed violations against civilians in Rakhine State, including
forced labour and ill-treatment, Khaing Myo Htun, who was at the time the AKP’s
deputy information officer, was convicted under sections 505(b) and (c) and
sentenced to 18 months in prison, despite having provided evidence to substantiate
the allegations.2850
• The Official Secrets Act, penalising the receipt or dissemination of a broad range of
documents and information, particularly government documents. Several provisions,
in particular sections 3 and 5, are contrary to international norms and standards
because they are too broad to be “necessary” in a democratic society. In essence,
they cover any type of information, including what may be in the public interest.
Restrictions on freedom of expression (including the freedom to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas of all kinds) are permissible for the protection of
national security but only in serious cases of political or military threat to the entire
nation.2851 Article 5, however, criminalises the disclosure, possession or receipt of
documents or information without the requirement of demonstrating that its
disclosure threatens national security or public order. The Act can easily be used to
deny information to the public and to conceal government wrongdoing. Article
3(1)(c) further includes a particularly broad definition of “spying”, including the
making, receiving or communication of any document that is “calculated to be”,
“might be” or is “intended to be” “directly or indirectly useful to a foreign country”.
The penalty for such forms of spying is imprisonment up to 14 years. The Act does

2847 A/HRC/31/66, para. 20.

2848 Other domestic laws also criminalize defamation, including the Telecommunications Law, the
Electronic Transactions Act, and the News Media Law.
2849 See A/HRC/14/23, para. 83-84. See also United Nations Human Rights Committee, General
Comment No. 34 (CCPR/C/GC/34), para. 47.
2850 K-104; A/HRC/34/67; MMR 2/2016.
2851 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34 (CCPR/C/GC/34).

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not require actual harm to national security, or even a real risk of such harm.
However, the potential usefulness of the information to another country does not
necessarily equal a threat to national security. As the case against the two Reuters
journalists shows, as detailed below, the Official Secrets Act can be abused to
intimidate journalists from undertaking legitimate journalistic work.
• Article 66(d) of the 2013 Telecommunications Act, criminalising defamation using a
telecommunication network. This provision made seven online acts punishable:
blackmailing, bullying, making wrongful restraint on, defaming, disturbing, exerting
undue influence on or threatening a person. An amendment adopted in 2017 limited
these offenses to extorting, defaming, disturbing or threatening a person using a
telecommunications network, and reduced the maximum sentence to two years
imprisonment (from three). None of these punishable acts are defined, and some of
the concepts are subjective, opening the door to abuse. Some of the acts, such as
“disturbing” a person, would also not constitute a legitimate aim necessitating
restriction in a democratic society. As mentioned in relation to sections 499-502 of
the Penal Code, defamation should also not be criminalised. Article 66(d) has been
described as “the most notorious symbol of the unsuitability of the legal framework,
regularly appearing in the media and online as a tool to repress and punish those
speaking truth to power”.2852
• Other similarly problematic laws include the Emergency Provisions Act (1950) 2853,
the State Protection Act (1975)2854, the Electronic Transactions Act, the News Media
Law, the Printing and Publishing Enterprise Law, the Law Protecting the Privacy
and Security of Citizens, the Unlawful Associations Act (section 17.1), the Peaceful
Assembly and Peaceful Procession Act, and several other provisions of the Penal
Code (e.g. section 124a regarding sedition). These have all been used in cases
against human rights defenders and journalists. 2855
1295. These problematic laws constitute a veritable toolbox for State officials and
representatives wishing to stifle dissent and evade legitimate scrutiny of their actions. It
provides them with various options to curtail and punish the legitimate exercise of the
rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly. 2856 The use of these
laws to silence critical voices has been a regular, and increasing, occurrence throughout the
period under review. Individuals who are critical of the government or security forces, and
who expose or speak out against human rights violations, are particularly vulnerable. 2857
Persons targeted include those who have taken a public stance in relation to land
confiscation, large-scale development projects, environmental degradation, constitutional
reform, and on military and security operations across the country. The use of such laws has
curbed the democratic space in Myanmar.
1296. One notable example has been the case of the two Reuters journalists, Wa Lone and
Kyaw Soe Oo, who were arrested and detained in December 2017, ostensibly for alleged
violations of the Official Secrets Act, but in reality in an attempt to prevent or punish them
from publishing a story about serious human rights violations committed by the Myanmar
security forces. In July 2018, they were charged with offences under the Act with a
maximum sentence of 14 years imprisonment. On 3 September 2018 they were convicted
and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. 2858 The prosecution of acts of investigative

2852 Free Expression Myanmar, “66(d): No real change” (December 2017).

2853 Repealed in 2016.
2854 Repealed in 2016.
2855 E.g. A/HRC/32/71, para. 19.
2856 For example, in 2017, the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Myanmar stated to
have received information on approximately 170 individuals imprisoned for peacefully exercising
their rights to freedom of opinion and expression, and of association and assembly (A/HRC/34/67,
para. 26).
2857 E.g. BM-007, BM-008, BM-039, PI-037, PI-038, PI-106, QM-006.
2858 Reuters, “Statement from Stephen J. Adler, President and Editor-in-Chief, Reuters, on reporters Wa
Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo, Sep 3, 2018” (3 September 2018); OHCHR, “Comment by UN High

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journalism into allegations of human rights violations in Rakhine State, which are issues of
the highest public interest, is of grave concern. 2859 The Mission considers that the two
journalists have been convicted and are now being punished severely for carrying out their
responsibilities as journalists relating to the exposure of serious human rights violations.
This high-profile case sends a chilling message to other journalists and human rights
defenders, not only undermining freedom of expression and access to information but also
deterring the protection and promotion of human rights.

2. Intimidation and reprisal for engagement with the United Nations

1297. There have been numerous allegations of intimidation and reprisals against
individuals who have engaged with United Nations officials in the country or abroad,
including the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar during her
visits to the country. The Special Rapporteur and other mandate holders, as well as the
United Nations Secretary-General, have raised concern about such allegations. 2860 The
Human Rights Council emphasized in its resolution 34/22 on the human rights situation in
Myanmar that no one should face reprisals, monitoring, surveillance, threats, harassment or
intimidation for cooperating or speaking with special procedures, including the Special
Rapporteur, the Fact-Finding Mission or the United Nations.
1298. The Mission received many reports of such intimidation or reprisals for actual or
perceived engagement with the United Nations or other international actors, including
members of the diplomatic community. For example, the Mission corroborated an incident
in Koe Tan Kauk Village Tract, Rathedaung Township, Rakhine State, in November 2016,
following a high-level visit including the then United Nations Resident Coordinator and
several ambassadors. During the visit, Rohingya villagers shared information about their
situation with the delegation.2861 Officials took photos and videos of persons interacting
with the delegation.2862 A few days later, security forces came to the village, rounding up
men and boys, subjecting them to ill-treatment and verbal abuse. One of the security
officers filmed the incident, footage that was later circulated on the Internet. 2863 While the
women and children were abused for a few hours, the men and boys were detained for two
days. In the course of their ill-treatment, references to the United Nations were made,
asking villagers why they explained their problems to the United Nations 2864, or accusing
them of “eating food provided by UNHCR or WFP”.2865 A number of men were
subsequently taken to Sittwe prison. 2866 The Mission received credible information
suggesting that one detainee may have been killed while in custody. 2867 After the video
entered the public domain, the Government issued a public statement claiming that a police
operation had been launched in relation to an ARSA attack, the perpetrators of which were
supposedly hiding in Koe Tan Kauk. However, it was also acknowledged that the security
forces were looking for a man who “distributed documents and placards enclosing fake
information to villagers while a team of foreign diplomats arrived in this village”.2868 The

Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet on the conviction of two Reuters journalists in
Myanmar” (3 September 2018).
2859 See also Y. Lee, D. Kaye, “Myanmar: UN experts gravely concerned by court charges against Reuters
journalists” (press release, 11 July 2018),
(https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23357&LangID=E).
2860 E.g. A/HRC/34/75, para. 10; A/HRC/36/31, paras. 43-45.
2861 EI-070, QI-113, XI-001.
2862 CI-116, CI-118, CI-119.
2863 BBC News, “Myanmar police officers detained over Rohingya beatings video”, 2 January 2017
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vJLAZKTPQgE).
2864 XI-001.
2865 RI-003.
2866 CI-116, CI-118, CI-119, CI-179, XI-001.
2867 CI-116, CI-118, CI-119, XI-001.
2868 Information Committee, “Press Release on a video clip which members of Police Forces took during
area clearance operation in Kotankauk Village, Maungdaw”, 2 January 2017
(https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/663761827130260).

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Mission is satisfied that this incident is linked to the visit of foreign dignitaries and
constitutes a reprisal.2869
1299. Numerous interlocutors of the Mission expressed fear that their possible engagement
or sharing of information with the Mission might lead to intimidation, harassment and other
forms of reprisals from the Myanmar government and security forces. Civil society actors
and human rights defenders in particular spoke of the constant threat of punishment for the
exercise of their rights and for being in contact with United Nations officials. The Mission
considers that the anti-United Nations climate actively fostered by the Myanmar authorities
has contributed to this situation.

3. Curtailment of peaceful protests

1300. The Mission corroborated cases of excessive use of force in the management of
protests and demonstrations, and prosecution of participants in protests and demonstrations,
curtailing the right to peaceful assembly. A notable case is the shooting of protesters by the
police in Mrauk-U in January 2018.2870 In another recent example, individuals holding
peace protests in late April and May 2018, in several cities including Myitkyina, Bago,
Mandalay and Yangon, in solidarity with internally displaced persons trapped in Kachin
State, have been charged under the Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Act.2871 In
Yangon, protestors were also beaten. One participant told the Mission:
On 12 May 2018, we started to march and sing songs but police with water cannons
blocked our way. The police said they had an order to block the march. We had
decided to end the march when the police started to beat up protestors. There were
also plainclothes individuals present who were not police but working alongside
them. The police arrested nine people, including some protestors and some passers-
by. Now, 17 people have been charged.2872
1301. Considering these, together with other credible reports of similar instances 2873, the
Mission concludes that there is a pattern of using excessive force in the management of
protests and demonstrations and prosecuting participants, with the purpose or effect of
silencing critical voices.

B. The issue of “hate speech”

1302. Anti-Rohingya and broader anti-Muslim sentiment, including “hate speech”, is

widely prevalent in Myanmar, even in the most progressive pro-democracy circles. As
discussed above2874, in relation to the 2012 violence in Rakhine State, a campaign of hate
and dehumanisation of the Rohingya had been underway for months prior to the violence.
This campaign was led by the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party (RNDP), various
ethnic Rakhine organizations, radical Buddhist monk organizations (including the
969 group), several officials and influential figures.
1303. Virulent hate speech against the Rohingya, and Muslims in general, has not stopped
since then.2875 On the contrary, it has intensified. While messages of hatred are propagated

2869 Several of the Mission’s interlocutors stated that the incident took place in relation to a visit of the
UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Myanmar, Yanghee Lee. The Mission
believes that these individuals witnessed the same incident, but confused the United Nations officials
visiting.
2870 See chapter V, section A.5: Emblematic incident: shooting in Mrauk-U on 16 January 2018.
2871 See also Progressive Voice, “Time to Hear Our Voices – Freedom of Assembly and the Youth Peace
Movement in Myanmar”, July 2018.
2872 PI-102.
2873 E.g. A/HRC/22/58, para. 30; A/HRC/25/64, para. 28; A/HRC/28/72, paras. 19, 50; A/61/311, para.
35. Also PI-048.
2874 See chapter V, section C.5: Violence in 2012, Spreading hate.
2875 Several reports have also drawn attention to “hate speech” targeting other segments of the population,
such as other ethnic or religious minority groups, women, and politicians. See e.g. Pen Myanmar,
“Hate Speech: A Study of Print, Movies, Songs and Social Media in Myanmar” (2015); Institute for

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by a multitude of actors, it is commonly recognised that ultranationalist elements within the

Buddhist monkhood are the most active, well-resourced and effective in this regard. This
includes the 969 movement, created in 2012, and the Organization for the Protection of
Race and Religion (known as MaBaTha), which emerged in 2014. High-profile monks,
including Wirathu, Parmaukkha and Sitagu Sayadaw, have openly and actively espoused
and promoted anti-Muslim narratives for many years.
1304. The Mission undertook an in-depth examination of the types of messages and
narratives that are spread in such hate campaigns, as well as the Myanmar authorities’ role
and response. It considered such assessment critical in light of the alleged role of “hate
speech” in the outbreaks of violence across Myanmar, but also because some observers
have suggested a link between “hate speech” and the opening of democratic space in
Myanmar, including increased levels of freedom of expression, a freer publishing and
media environment, and easier access to the Internet and social media.

1. Legal framework
1305. The issue of “hate speech” should be considered in light of both the right to freedom
of opinion and expression, and the rights to equality and non-discrimination. In principle,
the right to freedom of opinion and expression embraces even expression that may be
deeply offensive.2876 However, under international human rights law, the exercise of human
rights must not violate the rights and freedoms of others. Manifestations and expressions of
deep-rooted hatred can undermine the rights of others under certain circumstances. 2877 With
this in mind, international law distinguishes between expressions of hate that must be
prohibited, those that may be prohibited, and those that should be protected from restriction.
1306. Expressions of hate that must be prohibited under international law include the direct
and public incitement to commit genocide 2878; any advocacy of national, racial or religious
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence 2879; and all
dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, and on incitement to racial
discrimination.2880 In contrast, the exercise of freedom of expression may be restricted
where it presents a serious danger for others and for their enjoyment of human rights. Such
restrictions must be provided by law in a clear and precise manner; be necessary in a
democratic society for the respect of the rights or reputations of others or for the protection
of national security or public order; and be proportionate. 2881 Forms of expression that do
not fall under these categories, even where they are deeply offensive, are lawful and should
be protected from restriction. This does not mean, however, that such speech should be
considered acceptable. It may still pose a problem in terms of tolerance and may require a
critical response from the State, in particular to address the underlying prejudices of which
the speech is a symptom.
1307. While there is no definition of the term “hate speech” under international human
rights law, this report uses it to refer to any expression of violent or discriminatory hatred
towards people. In this sense, it encompasses expressions from each of the above
mentioned categories (those that must be prohibited, those that may be prohibited, and
those that must not be prohibited but may require a critical response).
1308. In resolution 34/22, the Human Rights Council calls on the Government of
Myanmar to take further action to address the issue of hate speech in accordance with its
resolution 16/18 and the Rabat Plan of Action. Human Rights Council resolution 16/18 on

War and Peace Reporting, “No Hate Speech Project” (2017):

https://www.facebook.com/NoHateSpeechProject/; see also A/72/382, para. 56. However, in light of
the particular scale and intensity of the hate campaigns against Muslims, and Rohingya in particular,
the Mission focused its attention on this phenomenon.
2876 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34 (CCPR/C/GC/34).
2877 A/67/357, para. 37.
2878 Genocide Convention, art. III (c).
2879 ICCPR, art. 20 (2).
2880 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 4.
2881 See this chapter, section A.1: Legal toolbox for restricting fundamental freedoms.

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“intolerance, negative stereotyping and stigmatisation of, and discrimination, incitement to

violence, and violence against persons based on religion or belief” sets out an action plan
for addressing intolerance based on religion and belief. It rests on the rationale that the
promotion of inclusion, diversity and pluralism is the best antidote to intolerant expression,
coupled with polices and laws to tackle the root causes of discrimination. The Rabat Plan of
Action, adopted by experts following a consultative process under the auspices of OHCHR,
provides authoritative guidance to States on the prohibition of “any advocacy of national,
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence”.2882 The Mission considered these instruments in its assessment of the Myanmar
Government’s response to the issue of hate speech.

2. Findings
1309. The Mission received a substantial amount of information regarding instances of
hate speech, as well as analytical reports examining patterns of hate speech in Myanmar. 2883
It also undertook its own research and verification. It actively monitored and consulted a
wide range of publications and broadcasts, as well as a large number of online accounts,
groups and pages that appeared to be regular disseminators of hate speech.

(a) Prevalance of hate speech targeting Muslims, Rohingya in particular

1310. There is no doubt that hate speech against Muslims in general, and Rohingya in
particular, is extremely widespread in Myanmar. This includes prohibited advocacy of
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence. The Mission has seen a vast amount of hate speech across all types of platforms,
including the print media, broadcasts, pamphlets, CD/DVDs, songs, webpages and social
media accounts. For example, the Mission encountered over 150 online public social media
accounts, pages and groups that have regularly spread messages amounting to hate speech
against Muslims in general or Rohingya in particular. Given Facebook’s dominance in
Myanmar, the Mission paid specific attention to a number of Facebook accounts that appear
to be particularly influential considering the number of followers (all over 10,000, but some
over 1 million), the high levels of engagement of the followers with the posts (commenting
and sharing), and the frequency of new posts (often daily, if not hourly). In addition to
those accounts, this chapter also draws from randomly encountered instances of hate
speech.
1311. The examples presented here are but a small sample of the kinds of messages that
have circulated in Myanmar in recent years. As posts can be shared by followers and then
by their followers without limit, it has not been possible for the Mission to trace the full
extent of the exposure they received. Subtleties in the Myanmar language and the use of
fables and allegories make some potentially dangerous posts difficult to detect. Many
messages are reportedly also shared through private communications means, such as Viber
and Messenger, which are not accessible to the Mission.
1312. There is a great variety of derogatory terms used to refer to the Rohingya, or to
Muslims in general. Typical descriptors for Rohingya are the terms “Bengali” (implying
foreign origins) or “Kalar”. The latter word is commonly attributed to people of South
Asian descent. While some argue that it can be used in a benign manner, it is often used as
a racist slur to insult and highlight someone’s dark skin or foreign ancestry, signifying
inferiority compared to “ethnic” Myanmar people. There is a range of other terms being
used as well, some more subtle than others: 2884
• Mout Kalar (“Muslim Kalar”): a term combining mout, short for Muslim, with
kalar. The term was regularly used by the monk Wirathu, generally for all Muslims,
sometimes specifically for Rohingya. For example, the late U Ko Ni, a well-known

2882 A/HRC/22/17/Add.4. See also:

https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomReligion/Pages/RabatPlanOfAction.aspx.
2883 B-001, B-002, B-003, B-004, K-070, K-093, K-098, K-101.
2884 The examples in the following paragraphs have all been seen by the Mission. Some have
subsequently been deleted; screenshots of the examples are on file with the Mission.

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Muslim and legal advisor of the NLD, was frequently targeted on Facebook with
insults such as “Mout Kalar MP” and “Mout Kalar Nga Ni”, “Nga Ni” being a
rude name usually attributed to dogs.2885 In one post from March 2016, a photo of U
Ko Ni next to President Htin Kyaw was captioned “this Mout Kalar getting his foot
in the door in Myanmar politics is not something we should sit by and watch. We
need to do something right away.” 2886 The post received over 800 reactions, 450
shares and 60 comments. Several comments called for U Ko Ni to be “removed”:
Dear NLD and Htin Kyaw, you need to eradicate this Nga Ni. […] Mout
Kalar and the President should not be together. We don’t want a Nga Ni.
[…] There is no time to sit and wait. This is the time to stand up and kick him
out.2887
There is still time. Take action! […] If not the 135 will have to cry. […]Don’t
let a dog in the parliament.2888
The Mission has seen multiple other posts with a similar message and threats
towards U Ko Ni dating from between March and October 2016. 2889 On 29 January
2017, U Ko Ni was assassinated at Yangon International Airport.2890
• Kway Kalar (“Muslim dog”): kway means dog. In Myanmar, “dog” is extremely
insulting when used in relation to a person or population, as dogs are considered part
of the lowest categories of animals. In October 2017, a Facebook post by one
influential and active disseminator of hate messages against Rohingya stated: “Now
that the Sarong-covered Government is in power [the NLD Government led by the
State Counsellor], Pa Khote Khu’s history gets desecrated”. This was in response to
an interfaith event held in the town of Pa Khote Khu. The user talked about how in
the past, the local “Kway Kalar” never dared to raise their heads while walking
outside in Pa Khote Khu, a town close to the so-called Muslim-free Kyauk Pa
Daung city. “I want to see when they will hold this kind of interfaith event in Kyauk
Pa Daung. I’ll be waiting”, the author declared in a profanity-filled text, using the
term “Kway Kalar” nine times in a short paragraph. 2891 The post was still active in
July 2018, with over 200 reactions, 380 shares and 65 comments. Comments under
the post used various expletives, accompanied by insulting pictures of dogs,
criticizing the NLD government for organizing interfaith events and catering to the
“Muslim dogs”.2892 Highly publicized interfaith “praying ceremonies” conducted in
every state and region in Myanmar in October and November 2017 have attracted
similarly negative and derogatory online commentary. The term “Muslim dog” has
also been used by the Myanmar security forces during the post-August 2017
“clearance operations”.
• Ro-lein-nyar (“Ro-liars”/“Rohingya are liars”): in Myanmar language, the
pronunciation of the word “Rohingya” sounds similar to that of “Ro-lein-nyar”,
meaning “Ro-liar”. This play on words implies that all Rohingya are liars, and is
part of a widespread narrative claiming that there are no Rohingya, only “Ro-lein-
nya”. Often, the term is used in response to images and reports of abuses against the
Rohingya. The term is also used when sharing or commenting on international
media reports about the Rohingya to dispute the coverage. For example, on
11 February 2018 (two days after Reuters published its special report on the killing
of 10 Rohingya in Inn Din), Shwewiki.com, a self-proclaimed “Media/News
Company in Yangon” with over 1.3 million followers on Facebook, posted a link to

2885 V-023, V-030.

2886 V-023.
2887 V-024.
2888 V-025.
2889 V-027, V-028, V-029.
2890 The Republic of the Union of Myanmar – President Office, “Press release regarding assassination of
U Ko Ni”, 30 January 2017.
2891 V-031.
2892 V-032, V-033, V-034.

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an article titled, “The lies of the Ro-lein-nyars are exposed”.2893 It stated that the
photos featured in the Reuters article were from “Boko Haram in Pakistan”, where
the “Huti insurgents” were killing the soldiers.2894 The post called the Reuters article
“fake news” promoting the “Ro-liars”. The article refers to several ASEAN leaders
supposedly condemning this “fake news”. At the end, there is a “#Asia News Media
Council Press Release” tag, claiming this is an official piece of news from a trusted
source. The post had received over 4,000 reactions, 1,000 shares and 65 comments
when last seen by the Mission. It has since been removed from the original
Facebook and blog, but was still available on other online blogs. 2895
• Ro-gein-nya (“Rohingya are lying dogs”): the term combines the sound “gein” – a
sound that is attributed to dogs in Myanmar language – with Ro-lein-nyar mentioned
above. Usually in cartoons, when a dog is hit, it makes the sound “gein”. This
dehumanizing term is used to depict the Rohingya as “lying dogs that need to be
hit”. One example of this usage is a June 2016 post from a monk, advertising the
upcoming anti-Rohingya protests in Magwe Division and Karen State. The posts
stated that “Magwe Division and Karen State are holding events to drive out the
“Ro-gein-nya”. The text in the photo said, “as the government did not issue an
official objection to deny the request of the lying race (Rohingya), the people (in
various regions) have organized protests”.2896 As of August 2018, the post was still
on Facebook.
• Anout Ta Kha (“west gate”): a term connoting the western “entrance” to the
country, namely Rakhine State and the western border with Bangladesh. The term is
often used to raise fear among the public in relation to immigration and “foreign
invasion”. For example, on 12 October 2016, a few days after the first ARSA
attacks, Dr. Tun Lwin, a well-known meteorologist with over 1.5 million followers
on Facebook, called on the Myanmar people to be united to secure the “west gate”
and to be alert “now that there is a common enemy”. He further stated that Myanmar
does not tolerate invaders. As of August 2018, the post had 47,000 reactions, over
830 comments, and nearly 10,000 shares.2897 Several comments called for immediate
“uprooting” and “eradication” of the Rohingya, citing the situation in Rakhine State
as a “Muslim invasion”.2898
• Yay Myaw Kan Tin (“unwanted person”): referring to “trash that is floating along a
river reaches the shore, but no one knows its origins”. In the Rohingya context, it
has been commonly used to refer to “boat people”, in particular during the 2015
Andaman Sea crisis when thousands of Rohingya fled Myanmar on boats. For
example, in January 2017, a self-described pro-Myanmar patriot with more than
17,000 followers on Facebook posted a graphic video of police violence against
civilians in another country. He captioned the post as follows: “Watch this video.
The kicks and the beatings are very brutal. I watch the video and feel that it is not
enough. In the future, ‘Yay Myaw Kan Tin’ 786 Bengali disgusting race of Kalar
terrorists who sneaked into our country by boat, need to be beaten like that. We need
to beat them until we are satisfied.” One comment under the post reads: “It is very
satisfying to watch this. […] It’s sad that Myanmar security forces are not as skilful
in their beating”. In July 2018, the post had over 23,000 views, 830 reactions and
517 shares.2899

2893 V-035.
2894 Boko Haram is operating in Nigeria, not Pakistan. ‘Huti’ presumably refers to the Hoothi who are
active in Yemen, again not in Pakistan.
2895 E.g. https://www.apyolay.com/archives/9670 (accessed July 2018).
2896 https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1601058356872424&set=a.1381500878828174.
1073741828.100009048252137&type=3; V-036.
2897 https://www.facebook.com/tunlwin48/posts/1424521840895717; V-037.
2898 V-040, V-041, V-042.
2899 On file with the Mission.

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• Ae Soe (“bad guest”): a term connoting the non-indigenous status of the Rohingya
in Myanmar, referring to them as guests from another country and as “bad”. This
term is used to imply that Rohingya are “bad guests” because they “insult the host”.
For example, one account holder, supposedly a monk, posted a poem with graphic
photos allegedly showing Buddhist Mros killed by the “Bengali” on 3 August 2017,
along with photos of damage to a pagoda allegedly done by “Bengali”. The poem
goes “the bad guests destroyed a pagoda, killed and tortured our people – this we
must not tolerate”. The pictures from the post were still available on Facebook as of
August 2018.2900 The poem has been removed.
• Kalar-Oak (“camel”): Kalar-Oak as one word means camel, but also a “group of
Kalar” (oak means group). The use of this derogatory term is linked to a Myanmar
parable about a camel which gradually takes more and more space in his merchant’s
tent, until eventually the merchant is forced out. The parable implies that, if a few
“Kalar” are let into the country, they will slowly take over and will force the original
inhabitants out. In a post from the official Facebook page of the Office of the
Tatmadaw Commander-in-Chief, Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing, this parable was
explained in detail in connection with the issue of the Rohingya in Rakhine State.
The post is one of a series of excerpts from the event “Talk on Rakhine Issue and
Security Outlook”, organized by the Myawaddy Media Group on 8 September 2017,
and live-streamed on the Myawaddy Media and the Facebook pages of the Office of
the Commander-in-Chief. After describing the merchant and camel parable, the
moderator stated that “Islam is a disease spreading globally” and that “Muslims
were attempting to islamise the whole world”. Prior to its deletion by Facebook in
August 2018, the post had almost 10,000 reactions, over 6,000 shares and 146
comments.2901
• Khoe Win Bengali (“Bengali that sneaked in”): in the Myanmar language, the term
suggests that the Rohingya have illegally entered the country by stealth and that
there is a plan to launch an invasion. For example, a post published on 26 August
2017 used the term numerous times interchangeably with the word “terrorists” to
refer to ARSA and the Rohingya population together. Titled “a just war has started”,
the post wrote: “Even the UN that supports the Bengali... the US and British
embassies... and the international community all condemned the actions of the Khoe
Win Bengali terrorists. So, in this just war, to avenge the deaths of the ethnic people
who got beheaded, and the policemen who got hacked into pieces, we are asking the
Tatmadaw to turn these terrorists into powder and not leave any piece of them
behind.” The post, which included no examples in relation to the alleged killing of
“ethnic people” and policemen, had 20,000 reactions, over 11,000 shares and 4,100
comments by July 2018.2902
• Kalasoe (“Bad Kalar”): the term precedes the emergence of ARSA and implies that
Rohingya are violent. It has been prominently used after the 2012 violence in
Rakhine State. For example, in June 2014, an excerpt of an article from the journal
Myanmar Express was posted on an online blog. The excerpt featured an interview
with a former military officer, Khin Nyunt, on the question of Rohingya. 2903 Khin
Nyunt stated: “There is no Rohingya, because Rohingya are insurgents. There is
RSO. We call them Kalasoe. Kalasoe insurgents are the RSO group, short for
Rohingya Solidarity Organization. Rohingya is the name of insurgents”. 2904

2900 https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=276331909519563&set=pb.100014282670913.-
2207520000.1523636460.&type=3&size=607%2C873; V-043.
2901 On file with the Mission.
2902 On file with the Mission.
2903 From 1997 to 2003 Khin Nyunt, then a General, was First Secretary (de facto Prime Minister) of the
State Peace and Development Council, the military junta, and then he was formally Prime Minister
from 2003 to 2004, when he was purged by the junta,
2904 http://theimageofpeople.blogspot.com/2014/06/rso.html.

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1313. Expressions using these derogatory terms are found frequently and in very large
numbers, both offline and online. They are often accompanied by cartoons, memes or
graphic content, amplifying the impact of the message. Below are two examples of widely
shared cartoons. The first one is by Harn Lay, a famous Myanmar cartoonist.

1314. An in-depth content analysis of these and similar messages shows that they are all
linked to the core theme of a “Muslim threat” endangering the Buddhist character of the
nation. Underlying this theme are multiple narratives, including of Muslims/Rohingya as an
existential threat to the country, of Muslims/Rohingya as a threat to Burmese racial purity,
and of Islam as a threat to Buddhist religious sanctity and its status in Myanmar. 2905 Such
narratives latch onto long-standing anti-Muslim prejudices and stereotypes; they are
designed to stoke fear.
1315. First, Muslims, and Rohingya in particular, are represented as an existential threat to
the country. Messages under this narrative revolve around mass illegal immigration and an
invasion of the country (for example, “Bengali illegal immigrants”, “illegal Bengali”, “they
will swallow us”, “they sneak into the country”, “boat people”, “need to protect the
Western Gate against a Muslim invasion”, “they want to take away northern Rakhine as
their independent state”), terrorism (for example, “Bengali extremist terrorists”, “jihadists”)
and insecurity (for example, “criminals and rapists”). Such messages are frequently
accompanied by news stories and graphic imagery pertaining to crimes committed by
foreign terrorist groups such as ISIS, drawing also from pro-Rohingya statements made by
such groups. The overall narrative is that Myanmar “ethnic” people should not tolerate
mass illegal Muslim immigration, because “Bengali immigrants” or “terrorists” will
violently alter the Buddhist character of the country and cause its demise. This is often
made explicit with references to Afghanistan or Indonesia, underscoring how these
countries were once Buddhist and are now majority Muslim. The following examples are
illustrative:
• Thaki Thway, a MaBaTha’s periodical, No 22 Issue 3, published on 6 May 2016,
carried an article with a picture of Win Ko Ko Latt 2906 and others in an anti-
Rohingya protest. Entitled “Let’s oppose the Bengali trying to be Rohingya”, the
article stated that “the Bengali issue has been challenging successive governments
and is growing bigger as a result. The Bengali are posing as refugees in the eyes of

2905 See also C4ADS, Sticks and Stones - Hate Speech Narratives and Facilitators in Myanmar, February
2016.
2906 Win Ko Ko Latt is the chairman of Myanmar National Network, a nationalist organization closely
related to MaBaTha. In 2017, he was arrested along with the monk Parmaukkha for their protest in
front of the United States Embassy (in a protest against the use of the word “Rohingya”).

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the world, while trying to create an independent Islamic state within Myanmar”. 2907
The author went on to describe the connection between the Rohingya and other
Islamic terrorist groups, such as ISIS, and how they have been trying to take over
parts of other south-east Asian countries.
• Another MaBaTha magazine, Aung Zeyathu, No 149, published on 18 November
2016, featured an article entitled “the Myanmar race can go extinct due to the
Bengali”. Written by a monk, it warns that, because of the ARSA “terrorist” attacks,
Muslims in Rakhine State are not to be trusted and are using various means to
swallow and overpower Buddhism in Myanmar, especially by demanding
citizenship, which will, one day, lead to there being Muslim members in the
Parliament. “At the new Parliament held on 1 February 2016, there was no Muslim.
This is a surprise the Myanmar people should be proud of. In the future, we need to
be careful and make sure that there is still no Muslim in the Parliament. If we do not
succeed, we will need to issue laws to protect our country”. 2908
• Aung Zeyathu on 26 May 2017 also carried an article entitled “Our country, race and
religion can only survive, if we defend them”. The text warned that, if the people of
Myanmar gave too much attention to human rights, Myanmar would “turn into a
Muslim country”.2909
• On his personal blog, Wirathu had posted a series of videos entitled “Defend against
the dangers of Jihad”; “Jihad and the future”; and “Jihad war and future
Myanmar”2910, all calling for action against the “immediate” Islamic threat facing the
country.
• The screenshot on the left below is an official statement issued by MaBaTha Baho
(nationwide) on 1 June 2015. It reads: “There were instances when the race and
religion were lost in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, south
Philippines, south Thailand, and the Rakhine region in Myanmar. The 200 Bengali
that were recently accepted into Rakhine State could not be sent back, and they were
harming the locals. Because we felt sorry for the boat people... we lost our homes in
our own land. MaBaTha hereby declares that immediate action is needed to make
sure those (Rohingya) who are already in Myanmar leave as soon as possible, and
future boat people never enter Myanmar's border.” 2911

• The second screenshot below is of the cover of the 13 September 2017 issue of
Atumashi, another MaBaTha periodical. The cover photo shows Wirathu preaching
at a rally in September 2017, with the title “Will you surrender the great Maungdaw
city (to an invasion)?” Articles from this issue, as well as from other issues, are
regularly posted as images on Facebook.

2907 Photo available here: https://www.facebook.com/1448332835475983/photos/a.1449306808711919.

1073741829.1448332835475983/1535200873455845/?type=3&theater (accessed July 2018).
2908 See also No Hate Speech project, https://www.facebook.com/NoHateSpeechMyanmar/posts/
1699017717077839 (accessed July 2018).
2909 See also No Hate Speech project, https://www.facebook.com/NoHateSpeechMyanmar/photos/
a.1547581885554757.1073741828.1547579185555027/1795167930796150/?type=3&theater
(accessed July 2018).
2910 https://wirathu.blogspot.com (the website was no longer accessible in August 2018). Posts on file
with the Mission.
2911 This statement was still available on Facebook in July 2018. V-044.

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• The extent to which such discourse has become normalised is illustrated by

parliamentary discussions on the Rakhine State crisis, in the course of which several
members of parliament (mostly notably in the Amyotha Hluttaw (the upper house)
but also in the Pyithu Hluttaw (the lower house) and Pyidaungsu Hluttaw repeatedly
stressed the need to control illegal immigration and prevent the “Jihad” threat by the
“Islamic terrorists”.2912
1316. The second common narrative is of Muslims, and the Rohingya in particular, as a
threat to Burmese racial purity. This theme becomes apparent in messages on population
growth among Rohingya, negatively affecting the demographic balance (“incontrollable
birth rates”, “they breed like rabbits”, “extremely large families”), the practice of polygamy
and the negative consequences of inter-faith marriage. Many such messages and
expressions of hatred focus on the alleged “out-breeding” of Buddhists by Muslims and the
dangers of marrying Muslim men, linking it to forcible conversion to Islam and physical
abuse. The following examples are typical of these comments:
Muslims are like the African carp. They breed quickly and they are very violent and
they eat their own kind. Even though they are minorities here, we are suffering
under the burden they bring us. [Wirathu, in a July 2013 interview with the Global
Post]2913
It started with a single weed. However, after days and months later, the weed grew
uncontrollably, swallowing the other, more precious plants and flowers. Likewise,
first, only one or two Bengali arrived. However, because of their plan to marry
many wives and have as many children as possible, their population increased
disproportionately. […] If the Myanmar Government and the citizens are not
careful, in a few years, Myanmar ethnic people, like the precious flowers will be

2912 E.g. the meeting notes from 44th day of the 5th Regular Session at the 2nd Amyotha Hluttaw, on 16
August 2017, Agenda 10: http://www.amyotha.hluttaw.mm/meetings/%E1%81%84%E1%81%84-
%E1%80%9B%E1%80%80%E1%80%BA%E1%80%99%E1%80%BC%E1%80%B1%E1%80%AC
%E1%80%80%E1%80%BA%E1%80%94%E1%80%B1%E1%80%B7%E1%80%99%E1%80%BE
%E1%80%90%E1%80%BA%E1%80%90%E1%80%99%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8-%E1%81%
81%E1%81%86%E1%81%88%E1%81%82%E1%81%80%E1%81%81%E1%81%87, p. 42.
2913 Tin Aung Kyaw, “Buddhist monk Wirathu leads violent national campaign against Myanmar’s
Muslims” (Global Post, 21 June 2013).

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swallowed to extinction by the weed-like Bengali. [Article by another monk in the 9

June 2017 issue of MaBaTha publication Aung Zeyathu]2914
Myanmar Buddhists have been accused of committing genocide against the Bengali,
of making them go extinct. Actually, try collecting the number of people who died. In
total, it was only 200. That race (the Rohingya) will never go extinct. Oh how they
breed! (laughs) They are not going extinct, not in Myanmar. They breed so much
here. [Sitagu Sayadaw]2915
1317. A third narrative represents Muslims, and Rohingya in particular, as a threat to
Buddhist religious sanctity. It is often spread through generally disparaging comments on
Muslim traditions. Such messages frequently revolve around the idea that Muslim traditions
and values are incompatible with, or offensive to, Buddhism. A major example is the vitriol
against the slaughtering of cows, suggesting that Muslims are inherently violent because
they kill and eat cows. In 2015, the MaBaTha released a statement calling on the
government to ban Muslims from slaughtering animals at religious events. 2916 Other
examples include disparaging comments about Muslim traditions. About veils worn by
women, Wirathu has said that: “Muslims use the robes in suicide bombings, helping men to
pretend they are women… It is a security concern and a threat to the sovereignty of the
country. We will make that tradition stop.”2917 Below is an example of imagery widely
circulated on Facebook with graphic images of cows being slaughtered.

1318. Many such messages or posts under all three narratives elicit profuse reactions and
commentary online from sympathizers, often approving them in unambiguous language,
including death threats and explicit calls for violence. For example, a 29 September 2017
post from Shwewiki.com featuring a Twitter statement from ARSA elicited the following
comments: “Accusations of genocide are unfounded, because those that the Myanmar army
is killing are not people, but animals. We won’t go to hell for killing these creatures that are
not worth to be humans”; “If the (Myanmar) army is killing them, we Myanmar people can
accept that… current killing of the Kalar is not enough, we need to kill more!”; “If we can’t
clear them now, we will eradicate them with a world war.”

2914 See “No Hate Speech Project”:

https://www.facebook.com/NoHateSpeechMyanmar/posts/1797471910565752.
2915 Video available on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FDk4CST48PQ (accessed August
2018).
2916 Myanmar Now, “Special Report - With official help, Myanmar’s radical Buddhists target Muslim-
owned businesses”, 17 September 2015.
2917 Hnin Yadana Zaw, A. Slodkowski, “Myanmar radical monk endorses ruling party in election, raps
opposition” (Reuters, 4 October 2015).

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1319. A vast amount of these messages constitute forms of hate speech that either require
prohibition and punishment under international law (because they amount to “advocacy of
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence”) or may be prohibited (as necessary in a democratic society to protect the
enjoyment of human rights by others). In the context of crimes against humanity, some of
the extreme forms of hate speech may also amount to acts of persecution. 2918

(b) Coordinated hate campaigns and possible links to outbreaks of violence

1320. It is difficult to establish a comprehensive picture of the originators and propagators
of hate messages, especially online. Clearly, however, Buddhist charity and welfare groups,
movements such as 969 and MaBaTha, and Rakhine nationalist political parties and
individuals have waged a campaign for the protection of “race and religion”. The use of
dehumanising and stigmatising language targeting the Rohingya, and Muslims more
generally, has been a key component of such campaigns.
1321. MaBaTha’s doctrine, as suggested by the group’s name (“Organization for the
Protection of Race and Religion”), and as reflected in its publications, social media posts
and public sermons, is based on the perceived need to protect, strengthen and spread
Buddhism in Myanmar, and the assertion that Islam is in the process of overwhelming and
marginalising Buddhism. Initially, MaBaTha focused on a more general anti-Muslim
message. Its first major campaign was to propose the “Four Race and Religion Laws” and
their passage into law.2919 MaBaTha propaganda, however, has gradually shifted to a more
specific anti-Rohingya and nationalist rhetoric, focusing on the “illegal Bengali” who are
invading the country and thus represent a threat to national security.
1322. The MaBaTha rhetoric spread quickly through various channels. MaBaTha
produced inflammatory videos, including an infamous re-enactment of the alleged rape and
murder of Ma Thida Htwe in May 2012, one of the triggers of the 2012 violence in Rakhine
State.2920 These videos were distributed for free or at very low cost through pagodas, public
sermons and other events. MaBaTha views were spread through schools, including
monastic schools and Dhamma schools.2921 The textbooks of the Dhamma schools for
Grade 1 to 6 include sections warning against “improper associations” and “marrying the
bad”, and on the concept of “Buddhist countries”. 2922 MaBaTha produced at least 10
different journals and magazines, published novels and nonfiction books, and spread
messages through a variety of online platforms, including Facebook, YouTube, Twitter,
blogs and websites. MaBaTha’s doctrine has been spread in popular culture by a wide
network of writers, singers, businesses and other public figures who publicly support
MaBaTha and have promoted its messages of hate at public events.
1323. MaBaTha is said to be widely supported among the general population. This may be
partly explained by its religious and community services, including blood donation drives,
vocational training and charity activities. The messages spread by MaBaTha and associated
figures and organizations may also resonate well with the general population due to pre-
existing and long-standing prejudices against Muslims, and concerns regarding the fate of
Buddhism in the country, illegal immigration and unchecked borders. 2923 MaBaTha
certainly has a vast and well-resourced network penetrating the mainstream of Myanmar
society through schools, popular culture, charity work, online and traditional

2918 See chapter VIII, section B: Crimes against humanity.

2919 See chapter V, section B.5: Restrictions affecting private life.
2920 A copy of the video is on file with the Mission.
2921 First opened in Myanmar in 2013, Dhamma schools are Sunday schools where children learn about
Buddhism.
2922 For example, lessons taught in the Dhamma school textbook include: “The lion that (wrongly)
associated with the fox” (Grade 1), “Propitious conducts of association” (Grade 2), “Propitious way to
live” (Grade 2), “What kind of race do you want to be” (Grade 3), “Propitious social conduct” (Grade
4), “Buddhist Countries” (Grade 5 and 6). Copies on file with the Mission.
2923 See e.g. Matthew Schissler, Matthew Walton, Phyu Phyu Thi, “Threat and virtuous defence:
Listening to narratives of religious conflict in six Myanmar cities”, M.MAS Working Paper 1.1,
University of Oxford, 2015.

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communication means, exploiting long-standing prejudices and anxieties in calling on

ordinary people to “protect the nation” and its Buddhist nature. MaBaTha and associated
individuals have, in the process, succeeded in stigmatising the entire Muslim population as
such, the Rohingya in particular. The exact reach of MaBaTha across all these domains, and
the role of specific individuals serving it to spread hate speech, merit further careful
examination.
1324. Several of the hate speech messages and disinformation from the 2012-2013 period
were distributed with the involvement or tacit approval of government or security officials.
The MaBaTha campaign around the protection of race and religion has led directly to the
adoption of specific legislation affecting the Rohingya (for example, denial of voting rights
and the Race and Religion Laws).2924 From public statements and appearances at public
events, rallies and demonstrations, it is clear that a range of politicians (in particular in
Rakhine State) and officials within the military and security forces are supportive of
MaBaTha’s messages and proposed policies. There are also indications of closer links,
including of financial donations, private and public sermons in support of the military’s
operations, and the organization of public rallies and talks in support of the military. There
are allegations of personal links between MaBaTha monks and high-level politicians and
security forces commanders that warrant further examination.
1325. Whether the hate campaigns against Muslims and Rohingya have led or contributed
to actual outbreaks of violence is difficult to establish. Several reports have suggested that
outbreaks of violence have been preceded by visits or sermons of monks associated with
the MaBaTha, the distribution of anti-Muslim pamphlets and/or increased hate speech on
social media.2925 One example is the violence that broke out in Mandalay at the beginning
of July 2014. It resulted in two deaths, many persons injured and significant property
damage. It is believed that the violence was triggered by an online news report from
30 June 2014 in which it was alleged that two Muslim teashop owners had raped a Buddhist
woman, identifying the teashop by name and including its location and the full names of the
alleged perpetrators and the alleged victim. Wirathu reposted the article on his Facebook
page with a caption stating that the “Mafia flame (of the Muslims) is spreading” and that
“all Burmans must be ready”. Violence erupted the following day. The rape story turned
out to be false, with the “victim” reportedly admitting that she had fabricated the rape
allegations.2926 In an effort to contain the violence in Mandalay, the government reportedly
blocked access to Facebook in the city, acknowledging the role that the platform plays in
this regard.2927 The Chief of the Myanmar Police Force reportedly confirmed that the
government blocked Facebook to stop the incitement. 2928
1326. The Mission received information suggesting that the linkage between offline and
online hate speech and real world acts of discrimination and violence is more than
circumstantial. Patterns are emerging of hate speech sermons and rhetoric in specific
locations that have subsequently experienced violence, and so are indications of peaks of
online hate speech around outbreaks of violence. Such patterns and indications need to be
comprehensively examined.2929

2924 See chapter V, section B.5: Restrictions affecting private life.

2925 E.g. Justice Trust Policy Report, Hidden Hands Behind Communal Violence in Myanmar: Case Study
of the Mandalay Riots (March 2015); B-001.
2926 Z. Mann, “5 Accused of Sparking Mandalay Riots Sentenced to 21 Years Jail” (The Irrawaddy,
19 March 2015).
2927 T. McLaughlin, “How Facebook’s Rise Fueled Chaos and Confusion in Myanmar” (Wired, 6 July
2018).
2928 https://burma.irrawaddy.com/opinion/2014/07/04/61420.html; See also Thant Sin, “Who’s to blame
for Myanmar’s spate of sectarian riots?” (Global Voices Online, 12 July 2014).
2929 With Facebook in the early stages of improving its transparency about country-specific data, the
Mission has been unable to obtain comprehensive data from Facebook about the use of Facebook to
spread hate speech and incite violence in Myanmar. See further below.

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(c) Government and military mirroring and feeding the narrative

1327. The responsibility to address the proliferation of hate speech in the country and the
coordinated campaigns of hatred directed at Muslims and Rohingya in particular lies with
the government. The response in this regard has been wholly inadequate. In fact, the
Myanmar authorities have not only condoned such practices, they have actively participated
in and fostered them. This has contributed to and exacerbated a climate in which hate
speech thrives and in which individuals and groups may be more receptive to calls of
incitement to violence.
1328. The Mission found many deeply problematic public statements from a wide variety
of government officials or representatives, including its military and security forces and
politicians, and equally problematic statements made in official governmental or military
settings. These are indicative of their own deep-rooted discriminatory sentiments towards
Muslims, and Rohingya in particular. Below are a few of these statements:
• Bengali do not have any characteristics or culture in common with the ethnicities of
Myanmar. The tensions (in Rakhine State) were fuelled because the Bengali
demanded citizenship. [Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing, Commander-in-Chief of
the Tatmadaw, on 19 March 2018]2930
• We received news that the Rohingya terrorists, under the name “Rohingya
Solidarity Organization” (RSO), are crossing the border with weapons. This is
Rohingya infiltration from abroad. Because our troops have received the news in
advance, we are going to eradicate2931 them [the Rohingya], until the job is done. I
assume that the troops are already eradicating [the Rohingya]. Regarding this
issue, we don't want to hear any humanitarian or human rights excuses. We don't
want to hear your moral superiority, or so-called peace and loving kindness. (Go
and look at Buthidaung, Maungdaw areas in Rakhine State. Our ethnic people are
in constant fear in their own land. I feel very bitter about this. This is our country.
This is our land.) (I'm talking to you, national parties, MPs, Civil Societies, who are
always opposing the president and the government.) [Zaw Htay, then attached to
President Thein Sein’s Office, currently Director General in the Office of the State
Counsellor and Spokesperson of the Office of the President, on 1 June 2012]2932
• There were about five hundred thousand non-religious and evil soldiers, who died in
the war. Because of that, the King was not able to sleep at night, since, in Buddhism,
killing humans is one of the worst sins. The eight monks who knew about this, told
the King “Don’t worry, your Highness. Not a single one of those you killed was
Buddhist. They didn’t follow the Buddhist teachings and therefore they did not know
what was good or bad. Not knowing good or bad is the nature of animals. Out of
over five hundred thousand you killed, only one and a half were worth to be humans.
Therefore it is a small sin and does not deserve your worry. [Sitagu Sayadaw, one of
Myanmar's most revered monks, on 30 October 2017, at the Bayintnaung military
garrison and military training school in Thandaung, Karen State] 2933

2930 The statement in English posted on Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing’s website and Facebook has
since been deleted, following the United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’ public
condemnation of the remark on 26 March 2018 (see
https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sgsm18957.doc.htm). The article in Myanmar language remained
available on this personal website (https://www.seniorgeneralminaunghlaign.com.mm), last accessed
by the Mission in July 2018.
2931 The Myanmar word “Chay Mhone” meaning “completely destroy” is usually used in the context of
fighting an enemy. To replicate the strong tone used in the passage, the word is translated here as
“eradicate”.
2932 Online on Facebook, under the account Hmuu Zaw; V-045.
2933 He recounted a passage from the 5th century Buddhist chronicle Mahavamsa, in which eight monks
visited King Dutthagamani, who was suffering from deep remorse after having led a war in which
many people were killed. The sermon was given to a military audience and live-streamed on
Facebook on 30 October 2017, soon after the “clearance operations” began:
https://www.facebook.com/sitagulivedhamma/videos/705111109681007/.

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• I won’t say much, I will make it short and direct. Number one, shoot and kill them!
(the Rohingya). Number two, kill and shoot them! (the Rohingya). Number three,
shoot and bury them! (the Rohingya). Number four, bury and shoot them! (the
Rohingya). If we do not kill, shoot, and bury them, they will keep sneaking into our
country! [Nay Myo Wai, Chairman of the Peace and Diversity Party, on 27 May
2015 in Bo Sein Menn football ground in Bahan township, Yangon]2934
• They are very dirty. The Bengali/Rohingya women have a very low standard of
living and poor hygiene. They are not attractive. So neither the local Buddhist men
nor the soldiers are interested in them. [Aung Win, Arakan National Party’s MP and
Chairman of Rakhine Investigation Committee, on 7 November 2016 in interview
with BBC (responding to allegations of large-scale rape and sexual violence against
Rohingya women)]2935
• In reality, Rohingya are neither “Myanmar People” nor Myanmar's ethnic group.
You will see in the photos that their complexion is “dark brown”. The complexion of
Myanmar people is fair and soft, good looking as well. (My complexion is a typical
genuine one of a Myanmar gentleman and you will accept that how handsome your
colleague Mr. Ye is.) It is quite different from what you have seen and read in the
papers. (They are as ugly as ogres.) [Ye Myint Aung, Myanmar Consul-General for
Hong Kong and Macau (subsequently promoted to become Myanmar’s Ambassador
to the United Nations in Geneva), 9 February 2009 in a letter to all heads of Mission,
Consular Corps, Hong Kong and Macau SAR] 2936
• In fact, extremists, terrorists, ultra-opportunists and aggressive criminals can be
likened as fleas that we greatly loathe for their stench and for sucking our blood.
Those human fleas are destroying our world by killing people and harming others’
sovereignty. Likewise, our country is also facing the danger of the human fleas. A
flea cannot make a whirl of dust, but they are trying to combine with each other to
amass their force. And they are trying to disintegrate our unity and strength in many
ways, by waging armed attacks, spreading rumours and performing subversive
activities. We should not underestimate this enemy. At such a time when the country
is moving toward a federal democratic nation, with destructive elements in all
surroundings, we need to constantly be wary of the dangers of detestable human
fleas. [Op-Ed column published in the Global New Light of Myanmar, a government
newspaper, 26 November 2016]2937
• Today, the Union Government and the citizens collectively need to have a decisive
stand on the issue of Bengali Muslims. We cannot afford to waste time. As long as
we have our sovereignty, we do not need to care about any pressure… If we do not
courageously solve these problems, which we have inherited from several previous
generations…we will go down in history as cowards. For our citizens, for the
maintenance of Buddhism, for the protection of our culture, it is now time to
sacrifice. […] Although Hitler and Eichmann were the greatest enemies of the Jews,
they were probably heroes to the Germans. America had to drop nuclear bombs on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Why? If inhumane acts are sometimes permitted to
maintain a race, a country and the sovereignty... our endeavours to maintain the
Rakhine race and the sovereignty and longevity of the Union of Myanmar cannot be
labelled as inhumane. [Editorial in the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party
(RNDP) magazine “Toe Thet Yay” (Towards Development), November 2012]2938

2934 Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Special Rapporteur on minority
issues, and Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia
and related intolerance, Urgent Appeal UA MMR 7/2015, 7 July 2015
(https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=20947).
2935 J. Fisher, “Muslim civilians ‘killed by Burmese army’” (BBC News, 7 November 2016).
2936 A copy of the letter is on file with the Mission; V-046.
2937 Khin Maung Oo, “A Flea Cannot Make a Whirl of Dust, But” (The Global New Light of Myanmar,
26 November 2016).
2938 A copy of the magazine is on file with the Mission.

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• As a matter of fact, affairs in northern Rakhine are not concerned with racial and
religious conflicts. It is the sole affair which offends the sovereignty of Myanmar
and trespasses Myanmar territory. Simultaneously, Rakhine nationals are not the
aggressive ones towards foreigners who profess other religions. They have been
living together with Islamists Kamans for years. The government is responsible for
solving any problems of offending the country’s sovereignty, threatening its
populace’s lives and property, violating rule of law and causing instability. In other
words, the thorn has to be removed as it pierces. [Op-Ed column published in the
Global New Light of Myanmar, a government newspaper, on 31 October 2016] 2939
• Wirathu’s sermons are about promoting love and understanding between religions.
It is impossible he is inciting religious violence. [Sann Sint, USDP Religious Affairs
Minister, in an interview with Reuters in June 2013]2940
• How can it be ethnic cleansing? They are not an ethnic group. [Win Myaing,
Rakhine State Government Spokesman, in his interview with Reuters in May
2013]2941
1329. A systematic analysis of statements and communications from government and
security sector officials and of those in official settings indicates that – while mostly using
less inflammatory language – they mirror and promote the same narratives espoused by
MaBaTha and others. The Mission has undertaken an in-depth examination of the
communications issued by key government institutions in the months following the August
2017 events in Rakhine State. These include the official Facebook page of the Office of the
Commander-in-Chief, Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing (2.9 million followers); the official
State Counsellor’s Information Committee Facebook page (almost 400,000 followers); the
Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing’s official Facebook page (1.4 million followers); and the
official Ministry of Information Facebook page (1.3 million followers). 2942
1330. The Mission’s first finding is that the Government goes to great lengths to avoid
using the term “Rohingya”. The narrative that there are no Rohingya in Myanmar is
actively fed and repeated continuously. For example, on 1 September 2017, the
Commander-in-Chief Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing stated: “so we openly declare that
‘absolutely, our country has no Rohingya race’”. 2943 While the Mission is aware that the
history of the Rohingya in Rakhine State is contested, simplistic statements such as these,
without providing a nuanced historical perspective, feeds the narrative that the Rohingya do
not belong in Myanmar. It denies their right to self-identification and contributes to their
stigmatisation and marginalisation. Moreover, Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing draws a
direct, and deeply erroneous, consequence from his own statement: that the Tatmadaw does
not need to protect the Rohingya, as it would other communities in the country. The related
consequence is that the Tatmadaw must protect other parts of the Myanmar population,
including from the Rohingya. For example, this is demonstrated in a post from 16 October
2017: “The Senior General said he would like to note at first that those Bengali are not
Myanmar ethnics. […] Therefore, the Tatmadaw needs to take security measures for local
people” and “Bengali are not ethnic of Myanmar. Rohingya is not included on the list of
Myanmar’s ethnics. […] The Tatmadaw on its part will give priority to safeguarding the
security and interest of the ethnics while protecting the citizens residing in Myanmar”. 2944

2939 Khin Maung Oo, “The Thorn Needs Removing If It Pierces!” (The Global New Light of Myanmar,
31 October 2016).
2940 A. Marshall, “Special Report: Myanmar gives official blessing to anti-Muslim monks” (Reuters, 27
June 2013).
2941 J. Szep, “Special Report: In Myanmar, apartheid tactics against minority Muslims” (Reuters, 15 May
2013).
2942 The pages of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing and of Senior-
General Min Aung Hlaing himself were deactivated by Facebook on 27 August 2018 (see Facebook
Newsroom, “Removing Myanmar Military Officials From Facebook”,
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/08/removing-myanmar-officials/). All posts relied on in this
report are on file with the Mission.
2943 Post on file with the Mission.
2944 Note that Rohingya are not “citizens of Myanmar”. Post on file with the Mission.

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Such statements reveal a disturbingly discriminatory understanding of the role of the

Myanmar security forces and a flagrant disregard for one of the core principles of
international human rights law, non-discrimination and equal protection.
1331. The distinction between groups who belong in Myanmar (“ethnics”) and others also
arises in the way the Myanmar authorities refer to victims and civilians who are affected by
the violence. First, the Mission found almost no references to Rohingya (or “Bengali”) as
potential victims. Even when the Tatmadaw confirmed the extrajudicial killing of 10 men
found in a mass grave in Inn Din, they referred to the victims as “Bengali terrorists”. 2945
The over 700,000 Rohingya who fled the violence to Bangladesh, and their suffering, were
also rarely mentioned or acknowledged. They were referred to in convoluted phrases like
“those who fled to the other country”.2946 In fact, Rohingya victims were often portrayed
collectively as perpetrators and “terrorists” (see below). In contrast, victims from other
ethnic groups and religions (including Rakhine, Hindus and Mro,) were frequently
mentioned and humanized through interviews, photos and videos, which has led to
widespread expression of sympathy on social media for these victims. 2947
1332. The way in which the Myanmar authorities presented the return of eight Hindu
women from Bangladesh to Myanmar, for instance, showed significant bias against the
Rohingya. Photos, videos, interviews with, and stories about these women were promoted
and shared by all official accounts. The women alleged that their husbands were killed by
ARSA, that they were kidnapped and told to convert to Islam, or be killed. Accepting these
claims at face value2948, the extreme focus on this one incident in a context where other
allegations and severe incidents received no coverage or acknowledgement served the
purpose of painting Islam as a violent religion and Rohingya as trying to islamise
Myanmar. A video showing interviews with the Hindu women was posted on the official
Facebook page of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief with the caption: “Voices of the
survivors about the mass murder of Hindus […] by Bengali terrorists”. 2949 Comments under
the video included: “Stay strong, my sister. These inhuman followers of the evil-religion
will disappear from our land one day”; “Kill all these Kway Kalar. Motherfucking shit-Ro
animals”.2950
1333. Myanmar authorities actively associated Rohingya identity with terrorism. Rohingya
are typically only referred to as terrorists or suspected terrorists, often in sweeping phrases
implying that the entire group is terrorist or violent in nature. This narrative preceded the
emergence of ARSA. For example, in the 23 May 2016 issue of Myawady Daily, a
newspaper run by the Tatmadaw, an article stated, “Throughout successive eras, several
racial and religious conflicts have broken out in Rakhine State, due to the ‘Khoe Win
Bengali’ [Bengali who entered the country by stealth]. The attack on the race happened
again in 2012 in Rakhine State, between the ‘Khoe Win Bengali’, who are not citizens, and
the ethnic people. This attack was disguised as a religious conflict.” 2951 In the concluding
paragraph of the same article, the author claimed that “the issue of ‘Anout Ta Kha’ [West
Gate]… is the concern of every Myanmar citizen”.

2945 Post on file with the Mission.

2946 Post on file with the Mission.
2947 For coverage on Hindu victims, see e.g. Information Committee posts “Interview with Hindus who
fled from their villages” on 1 September 2017
(https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/788602791312829) and “The words of
bereaved families of Hindus killed by ARSA terrorists” on 27 September 2017
(https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/807089859464122), as well as posts of the
Office of the Commander-in-Chief no longer available on Facebook but on file with the Mission.
Coverage on Mro victims, e.g. Information Committee post “ARSA extremist terrorists continue
setting houses on fire” of 30 August 2017
(https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/788328661340242).
2948 See chapter V, section D.1.c: The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army.
2949 Post on file with the Mission.
2950 Post on file with the Mission.
2951 See No. 35, Vol. 6 of Myawady Daily: http://www.myawady.net.mm/index.php/download/category/
35-%E1%81%85-%E1%81%82%E1%81%80%E1%81%81%E1%81%86?download=702:2352016
&start=20, p. 13.

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1334. This narrative of the whole Rohingya population being “terrorists” and inherently
violent was reinforced in the aftermath of the ARSA attacks. When discussing the crisis in
Rakhine State, the Tatmadaw generally referred to “extremist Bengali terrorists” and on
occasion to “ARSA extremist Bengali terrorists” (sometimes even just to “Bengali”). It is
important to note the systematic inclusion of the word “Bengali”. In relation to other
insurgencies or armed conflicts in the country, the military never adds an ethnic affiliation
when referring to its opponent or an alleged perpetrator. For example, in relation to the
Kachin Independence Army, it refers to “KIA insurgents” or “KIA terrorists” but not to
“Kachin insurgents” or “extremist Kachin terrorists”. Similarly, for the Arakan Army, it
does not refer to “extremist Rakhine terrorists” but to “AA insurgents” or “AA terrorists”.
Also notable is that, in the first few days following 25 August 2017, the official Facebook
pages of the State Counsellor’s Office (Information Committee) and the Office of the
Commander-in-Chief used “extremist Bengali terrorists”, but in the later days added the
prefix ARSA, “ARSA extremist Bengali terrorists”. 2952 This narrative is further fuelled by
the authorities’ use of emotive and divisive language, such as “blood-thirsty Bengali
terrorists”2953, and posting the pictures of arrested “terrorists”. 2954
1335. This tendency towards generalising statements in referring to the Rohingya and a
manifest lack of interest in making appropriate distinctions between ARSA elements and
civilians is also illustrated by the publication in the Global New Light of Myanmar, a
government newspaper, of the names and photographs of approximately 1,300 so-called
“ARSA terrorists”, including children. 2955 This list was published without any form of due
process and without offering any supporting evidence or information about any verification
measures taken, putting the lives of both the individuals listedand their families at risk. The
list was also posted by the Office of then President Htin Kyaw.2956
1336. The Commander-in-Chief Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing has made repeated
references to the so-called “Alelthankyaw crisis” of 1942 in discussing what he calls “the
Bengali problem”. On 1 September 2017, at the height of the “clearance operations” in
Rakhine State, in a post entitled “Entire government institutions and people must defend the
country with strong patriotism”2957, he started his statement as follows: “Rakhine ethnics
lost their land in the Alelthankyaw crisis that broke out in Rakhine State in 1942 in which
Bengali attacked, murdered and coerced them into leaving their homes. We will never let
such terrible occurrence happen again. The Tatmadaw will fully safeguard the sovereignty
of Myanmar, without allowing any damage to it.” The post continues by detailing the
alleged atrocities from 1942, before stating: “The Bengali problem was a long-standing one
which has become an unfinished job despite the efforts of the previous governments to
solve it. The government in office is taking great care in solving the problem.” Reference to
the same events was regularly included in later posts as well, including on 10 and
20 September 2017.2958 Regardless of the one-sided representation of the 1942 events2959,
the Commander-in-Chief’s explicit link between the 2017 “clearance operations” in

2952 Posts on file with the Mission.

2953 https://scontent-mxp1-1.xx.fbcdn.net/v/t1.0-9/33333112_1702663973187794_20652123
38264342528_n.jpg?_nc_cat=0&oh=442ac7b0455213ea2ded951f1d9d35d8&oe=5B9F1BA8, photo
accompanying a post by the Office of Commander-in-Chief Facebook page (on file with the Mission).
2954 Photo accompanying a post by the Information Committee Facebook page:
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/855052794667828 (accessed July 2018).
2955 The Global New Light of Myanmar, issues of 18, 19, and 20 January 2018.
2956 http://www.president-office.gov.mm/en/?q=issues/rakhine-state-affairs/id-8356 (accessed July 2018).
2957 Post on file with the Mission.
2958 Posts on file with the Mission.
2959 See for a study on the 1942 events: J. Leider, “Conflict and Mass violence in Arakan (Rakhine State)
– The 1942 Events and Political Identity Formation”, in Citizenship in Myanmar, A. South, M. Lall
(eds.), (Chiang Mai University Press, 2018), pp. 193-221, noting that “the waves of communal
clashes of 1942 have been poorly documented, sparsely investigated and rarely studied” (p. 194) and
that “the absence of a factual master narrative, which both Buddhists and Muslims could have agreed
upon, barred the emergence of consensual interpretations of the events” (p. 211). The events occurred
during World War II when the Rohingya supported the British and the Rakhine supported the
Japanese. The Tatmadaw was founded during this period with the support of the Japanese Army.

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Rakhine State and an “unfinished” “Bengali problem” dating back to 1942 reveals that the
2017 military operation was not (only) to respond to the ARSA attacks and to quell the
threat posed by this group, as has been claimed. It rather speaks to a broader objective on
the part of the Tatmadaw with historical roots and reinforces the narrative that all “Bengali”
are a problem and that a distinction between “terrorists” and civilians/victims is not
relevant.

1337. Most of the Myanmar authorities’ posts and communications also directly feed the
narratives of illegal immigration and Islamic threat, as espoused by MaBaTha affiliated
groups and individuals, and as widely promoted in Myanmar, both online and through other
sources. The narrative representing the Rohingya as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh is
promoted not only by the persistent use of the word “Bengali”, but also through the focus
on citizenship and residence verification in the context of resettlement discussions and
speculation that the actual numbers of refugees must be far lower. These messages are
reinforced by government accounts that highlight the damage to Buddhist monasteries, and
efforts of the military to cooperate with local monks to rebuild damaged monasteries. 2960
For example:

1338. The motto of the Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population is: “The earth will
not swallow a race to extinction but another race will”. 2961 The same theme appears
throughout official communications from the Myanmar authorities. For example, in a
21 September 2017 post on Facebook (entitled “Gallant efforts to defend the HQ against
terrorist attacks and brilliant efforts to restore regional peace, security are honoured”) 2962,
Commander-in-Chief Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing states that, “the Bengali population
exploded and the aliens tried to seize the land of local ethnics” and “in checking the cases
in which Bengali trying to sneak into the country through various means were seized
involvement of some officials were found. Race cannot be swallowed by the ground but
only by another race. All must be loyal to the State in serving their duties, so that such
cases will never happen again.” On 11 October 2017, he stated, “…not accepting the
process means that there are lots of those born to illegal migrants and entry of illegal

2960 See, for example, the following posts from Information Committee:
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/786691611503947;
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/790059134500528;
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/photos/a.639477959558647.1073741828.63945620
6227489/787636464742795/?type=3&theater (accessed July 2018).
2961 This motto, in Myanmar language, can be seen on the front page of the Ministry’s website:
http://www.mip.gov.mm/ (accessed August 2018).
2962 Post on file with the Mission.

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migrants. There are many Bengali families each of which has about 40 members”. 2963 The
same post also argues that “the native place of Bengali is really Bengal. Therefore, they
might have fled to the other country with the same language, race and culture as theirs by
assuming that they would be safer there.” The theme of Rohingya not belonging in
Myanmar was made explicit in a March 2018 statement, in which Min Aung Hlaing said
that the “Bengali do not have any characteristics or culture in common with the ethnicities
of Myanmar. The tensions (in Rakhine State) were fuelled because the ‘Bengali’ demanded
citizenship.”2964
1339. The impact of such public statements, closely mirroring and fuelling prevalent
discriminatory narratives and sentiments, is compounded by two additional factors. First, a
constant stream of misinformation about events in Rakhine State downplays the seriousness
of the situation and misleads domestic audiences. Allegations of serious human rights
violations by the Myanmar security forces are systematically denied 2965, while the
Government spreads demonstrably false information about the situation in Rakhine State.
For example, it has regularly been suggested that the numbers of Rohingya who fled from
Myanmar were not high, or that the Rohingya left Myanmar in an orderly fashion out of
their own will. For example, on 11 October 2017 the Commander-in-Chief, Senior-General
Min Aung Hlaing, posted: “there is exaggeration to say that the number of Bengali fleeing
to Bangladesh is very large”. At the time more than 600,000 Rohingya had fled to
Myanmar in a period of six weeks. On 12 October 2017, he posted “documentary photos
show that those Bengali conveniently left for Bangladesh but they did not flee from
Myanmar in panic” and that “they had fled to Bangladesh with the same language, race and
culture as theirs. There are also some Bengali villages whose people did not flee as they did
not get involved in the attacks.” On 15 November 2017, he informed his followers that the
number of “Bengali” leaving Myanmar between 25 August and 5 September 2017 (the
official end date of the “clearance operation”) was “very small” and that “more” left
thereafter. He explained that the main reason for the exodus was that “ARSA extremist
Bengali terrorists” fled out of fear of a counterattack and took their families with them. He
added, “other Bengali were also threateningly forced to flee to Bangladesh, while some
were persuaded to live in a third country”.
1340. The State Counsellor’s Information Committee similarly dismissed allegations of
sexual violence as “rumours” under a banner stating “fake rape”.2966 The Information
Committee has repeatedly dismissed reports of serious human rights violations as “fake
news”.2967 The State Counsellor, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, referred to an “iceberg of
misinformation” about the situation in Rakhine State.2968 Some of the photographs shared
by her Information Committee to advance the narrative that Rohingya were burning their
own villages were demonstrated to have been staged. 2969 Similarly, the Tatmadaw’s
Directorate of the Public Relations and Psychological Warfare, in a 2018 publication
“Myanmar Politics and the Tatmadaw”, used photographs from Tanzania and Bangladesh,
which it claimed showed large numbers of “Bengalis” entering Rakhine State from
Bangladesh, to illustrate its allegations against the “Bengalis”.2970
1341. A second aggravating factor is the explicit call for nationalist and patriotic action
that accompanies such narratives and misinformation. The call suggests that the country is
under siege, and at least implicitly encourages citizens to take action in their own hands.
During his meeting with the ethnic people in Rakhine State on 22 September 2017, Senior-

2963 Post on file with the Mission.

2964 See also above.
2965 Several posts on file with the Mission.
2966 See detailed discussion in chapter X, section B: History and climate of impunity in Myanmar.
2967 E.g. this post about alleged mass graves:
https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/869272283245879 (accessed August 2018).
2968 https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/790712274435214 (accessed August 2018).
2969 J. Head, “Rohingya crisis: Seeing through the official story in Myanmar” (BBC News, 11 September
2017).
2970 P. McPherson, “Exclusive: Fake photos in Myanmar army’s ‘True News’ book on the Rohingya
crisis” (Reuters, 30 August 2018). The publication is on file with the Mission.

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General Min Aung Hlaing expressed his regrets for “the shortage of the security forces in
giving sufficient protection”. He added that “public cooperation and participation is
important in taking security measures. Local ethnics can strengthen the defence prowess by
living in unity and by joining hands with the administrative bodies and security forces in
oneness.” 2971 On 27 October 2017, in another Facebook post entitled “every citizen has the
duty to safeguard race, religion, cultural identities and national interest”, Commander-in-
Chief Min Aung Hlaing stated that “all must strive for the positive progress for the
flourishing of good characteristics and deeds and preserve the excellent characteristics of
the country. All the people living in the country must strive for the good of the country with
patriotism. Additionally, the national defence duty falls on every citizen.” On 21 May 2018,
Min Aung Hlaing reiterated this point, stating that “nationalistic spirit is the safeguarding of
the own country and citizens forever... Only when youths with a wider knowledge prevent
all the acts which undermine the patriotic spirit and nationalistic spirit, will the nationalistic
defence capability of the nation rise and will Myanmar be existence as long as the world
[exists]”.2972

(d) The role of Facebook and other social media platforms

1342. As elsewhere in the world, the Internet and social media platforms have enabled the
spread of this kind of hateful and divisive rhetoric. The Myanmar context is distinctive,
however, because of the relatively new exposure of the Myanmar population to the Internet
and social media. Messages portraying Rohingya as violent, dishonest, anti-Bamar, anti-
Buddhist, illegal immigrants and/or terrorists of the kind set out above are particularly
widespread on social media. Death threats, incitement to violence and discrimination, and
online harassment are common features as well, not only against the Rohingya themselves
but also against moderate commentators, human rights defenders and ordinary people who
have views that differ from the official line.
1343. Prior to 2011, the military regime heavily censored the media and the Internet was
only available to a select few, as it was prohibitively expensive. This changed with the
democratic reform process and the liberalisation of the telecommunications industry, which
led to a rapid increase in the Myanmar population’s access to mobile telephony and the
Internet.2973 While mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants stood at 1.18 in 2010, it
had reached 55.91 by 2014 and 95.65 by 2016. Similarly, mobile broadband subscriptions
per 100 inhabitants rose from 0.02 in 2011 to 56.30 in 2016. 2974 Such increased access to
information and means of communication is one of the most tangible benefits of the
democratisation process. It has undoubtedly contributed to greater enjoyment of the rights
to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, while also enabling far wider
and faster dissemination of hate speech.
1344. With access to the Internet came access to social media platforms. While statistics
on social media use in Myanmar are not readily available, Facebook is clearly by far the
most common social media platform in use in Myanmar. 2975 Although Facebook was

2971 Post on file with the Mission.

2972 Post on file with the Mission.
2973 In 2014, Telenor Myanmar Limited (TML) from Norway and Ooredoo Myanmar Limited (OML)
from Qatar received licenses to compete with the government-owned Myanmar Posts and
Telecommunications (MPT), which had been the sole operator. In 2017, a fourth license was issued to
Telecom International Myanmar Company Limited (MyTel), a consortium of Myanmar companies
and Viettel from Vietnam. It has been reported that Vietnam’s Viettel – wholly owned by the
country’s Ministry of Defence – owns 49 per cent of MNTC, and that Star High Public Company,
which has another 28 per cent, is owned by the Myanmar army through a holding company, Myanmar
Economic Corporation. This makes MyTel essentially a joint venture between the militaries of
Myanmar and Vietnam. See e.g. A. Burkitt-Gray, “Military dominates Myanmar’s fourth telecom
licence” (Capacity Media, 13 January 2017). MyTel phone numbers start with 0-969.
2974 K-074.
2975 It is suggested that Facebook enjoys a more than 90 per cent share among social media platforms in
Myanmar, and that this has been so since 2012. E.g. http://gs.statcounter.com/social-media-
stats/all/myanmar.

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available and used before, a specific Myanmar version was launched in 2015. 2976 Experts
have estimated the number of active Facebook users in Myanmar at approximately 20
million.2977 Mobile networks offer specific deals privileging access to Facebook. 2978 In July
2016, Facebook and Myanmar Post and Telecommunications jointly launched “Free
Basics” and “Facebook Flex” in Myanmar.2979 Facebook Flex is a product that enables
subscribers to have a text-only version of Facebook without incurring data charges. Free
Basics provided access to basic services without data charges on their mobile phones, with
the stated intention of providing people with an opportunity to “experience” the value and
relevance of connectivity to the Internet for free but with access only to a limited number of
sites. Free Basics was discontinued in Myanmar in September 2017. Between July 2016
and September 2017, people in Myanmar could use it to access a basic version of Facebook
and a number of utilitarian applications and content sources. 2980 It has been reported that,
when people buy a smartphone, especially when they are unfamiliar with the Internet,
shopkeepers offer to create and install a Facebook account for the customer. 2981
1345. The relative unfamiliarity of the population with the Internet and with digital
platforms and the easier and cheaper access to Facebook have led to a situation in Myanmar
where Facebook is the Internet. It has become the main mode of communication among the
public and a regularly used tool for the Myanmar authorities to reach the public. The
President, the State Counsellor, the Commander-in-Chief, the Ministry of Information, the
Tatmadaw and other key governmental institutions rely on Facebook to release news and
information. Media outlets like Eleven Media (17 million followers), 7 Days News (20.8
million followers), The Irrawaddy (12 million followers), Mizzima (12 million followers)
and BBC Burmese (13.9 million followers) use Facebook as a main way of disseminating
articles. For many people, Facebook is the main, if not only, platform for online news and
for using the Internet more broadly. In a context of low digital and social media literacy, the
Government’s use of Facebook for official announcements and sharing of information
further contributes to users’ perception of Facebook as a reliable source of information.
1346. Facebook serves to connect people, often cited by the company as its main aim, and
it facilitates communication and access to information. It can and has been used in many
ways to enhance democracy and the enjoyment of human rights. However, the wide reach,
relative user anonymity, and difficulty of monitoring or removing posts also make it a
suitable instrument to spread messages that may constitute hate speech, including advocacy
of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility
or violence. It is unsurprising that propagators of hate speech resort to Facebook to wage
hate campaigns, amplify their message, and reach new audiences. In addition to hate
speech, Facebook has also been widely used to spread misinformation, including by
government officials and the Tatmadaw, as illustrated above.

2976 Submission from Facebook. Another popular platform for social messaging in Myanmar is Viber,
with an estimated 18 million users in 2017. See Digital in Asia, “Myanmar 33 million mobile users,
smartphone usage 80%” (9 January 2017).
2977 B-005; see also J. Russell, “Myanmar group blasts Zuckerberg’s claim on Facebook hate speech
prevention” (Tech Crunch, 6 April 2018). In June 2016, the number of users was believed to have
reached 10 million; see C. Trautwein, “Facebook racks up 10m Myanmar users” (Myanmar Times, 13
June 2016).
2978 For example, MyTel offers to use Facebook to register users’ SIM cards and in exchange users
receive six months of free data for exclusive use on Facebook
(https://www.facebook.com/mytelmyanmar/posts/394974640914463).
TML has packages that offer 1GB free for exclusive use on Facebook when users recharge a certain
amount (https://www.telenor.com.mm/en/offer/facebook-free;
https://www.telenor.com.mm/en/offer/everyday-fb-bonus) and Facebook-exclusive data rates that are
cheaper than ordinary data plans (https://www.telenor.com.mm/en/offer/myanmar%E2%80%99s-
cheapest-facebook-pack). Also Oreedoo and MPT have cheaper data plans for social media, including
Facebook (http://mpt.com.mm/en/home/mobile-services/data/;
http://www.ooredoo.com.mm/en/Personal/Promotions/2017/08/01/Facebook-Plus-Pack.aspx).
2979 Submission from Facebook.
2980 Submission from Facebook.
2981 B-004, B-005.

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1347. Allegations that posts and messages on Facebook have increased discrimination and
violence in Myanmar are rife, in particular where the posts and messages are framed in
terms of an alleged Islamic “takeover” or Muslims harming Buddhists (especially women).
For example, posts early in 2012 about the alleged rape and murder by Rohingya men of a
Buddhist woman were reportedly shared widely and are considered to have contributed to
the tension and violence in Rakhine State in that year.2982 Similarly, posts about an alleged
rape of a Buddhist woman by Muslims in Mandalay are considered to have led to the riots
there in 2014.2983
1348. Another example is the instigation of communal unrest in early September 2017, in
the midst of the crisis in Rakhine State, through the parallel distribution of similar but
conflicting chain messages on Facebook Messenger to Muslim and Buddhist communities.
Each chain message stated that the other group was preparing for major violence on 11
September and encouraged the recipient to get ready to resist. Local civil society groups
reported that the messages had a countrywide reach, caused widespread fear and at least
three violent incidents.2984 Below is a screenshot of the messages, taken from the open letter
sent by Myanmar civil society organizations to the CEO of Facebook. 2985 The first was sent
to Buddhists and the second to Muslims.

1349. Facebook’s Community Standards, to which each user must agree, include sections
on hate speech and violence, and set out the company’s approach to fake accounts and false
news. According to these standards, Facebook will remove content that violates its policies.
Users can report such content to Facebook for review by its moderators. The company also
uses technology to identify certain types of content that violate its standards. In November
2015, Facebook launched an illustrated Myanmar-language version of its Community
Standards. Facebook also undertook a number of other initiatives to educate people in
Myanmar about these standards.2986
1350. However, in an open letter to Facebook, six local civil society organizations working
on the issue of hate speech highlighted the company’s ineffective content moderation. The
organizations argued that Facebook moderation revealed “an over-reliance on third parties,
a lack of a proper mechanism for emergency escalation, a reticence to engage local
stakeholders around systemic solutions and a lack of transparency”. 2987 Concerns were also
raised that Facebook does not have enough content moderators who understand Myanmar

2982 K-101; see also chapter V, section C.1: Violence in 2012 – Emblematic incidents.
2983 See above.
2984 Open letter from Myanmar civil society organizations to Mark Zuckerberg, CEO of Facebook (5
April 2018), available here: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4432469-Myanmar-Open-
Letter-to-Mark-Zuckerberg.html.
2985 Ibid. Facebook confirmed having removed these messages after they became aware of them.
2986 Submission from Facebook.
2987 Open letter from Myanmar civil society organizations to Mark Zuckerberg, CEO of Facebook (5
April 2018), available here: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4432469-Myanmar-Open-
Letter-to-Mark-Zuckerberg.html.

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language and its nuances, as well as the context within which comments are made; that
Facebook’s technology is not compatible with the different Myanmar language fonts; and
that Facebook has a strong, if not unique, focus on Myanmar language and Burman
culture.2988
1351. The Mission itself experienced a slow and ineffective response from Facebook when
it used the standard reporting mechanism to alert the company to a post targeting a human
rights defender for his alleged cooperation with the Mission. The post described the
individual as a “national traitor”, consistently adding the adjective “Muslim”. It was shared
and re-posted over 1,000 times. Numerous comments to the post explicitly called for the
person to be killed, in unequivocal terms: “Beggar-dog species. As long as we are feeling
sorry for them, our country is not at peace. These dogs need to be completely removed.” “If
this animal is still around, find him and kill him. There needs to be government officials in
NGOs.” “Wherever they are, Muslim animals don’t know to be faithful to the country.”
“He is a Muslim. Muslims are dogs and need to be shot.” “Don't leave him alive. Remove
his whole race. Time is ticking.” The Mission reported this post to Facebook on four
occasions; in each instance the response received was that the post was examined but
“doesn’t go against one of [Facebook’s] specific Community Standards”. The Mission
subsequently sent a message to an official Facebook email account about the matter but did
not receive a response. The post was finally removed several weeks later but only through
the support of a contact at Facebook, not through the official channel. 2989 Several months
later, however, the Mission found at least 16 re-posts of the original post still circulating on
Facebook.2990 In the weeks and months after the post went online, the human rights
defender received multiple death threats from Facebook users, warnings from neighbours,
friends, taxi drivers and other contacts that they had seen his photo and the posts on
Facebook, and strong suggestions that the post was an early warning. His family members
were also threatened. The Mission has seen many similar cases where individuals, usually
human rights defenders or journalists, become the target of an online hate campaign that
incites or threatens violence.
1352. Facebook has publicly acknowledged that the company had been “too slow” in
reacting to the concerns raised by civil society organizations. 2991 In June 2018, Facebook
informed the Mission that it was trying to solve two specific problems in Myanmar: hate
speech and misinformation as a tool for hate speech.2992 It stated that it was focusing on
overcoming technical challenges (such as the different fonts used in Myanmar language),
improving reporting flows (for example, the recent rollout of the ability to report content
shared on Facebook Messenger), automation (including exploring the use of artificial
intelligence to proactively identify content for review), and misinformation (acting on fake
accounts). Facebook also stated it had added more Myanmar language reviewers to handle
reports from users across all its services, increased the number of people across the
company on Myanmar-related issues, and put in place a special team working to better
understand the specific local challenges and build the right tools. 2993 Facebook further

2988 B-005, K-101.

2989 K-104.
2990 After these were brought to Facebook’s attention, they were subsequently also removed.
2991 See e.g. Facebook Newsroom, “Removing Myanmar Military Officials From Facebook”,
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/08/removing-myanmar-officials/). See also statements by Mark
Zuckerberg, before the United States Congress: “We’ve been too slow to deal with the hate and
violence in places like Myanmar […]. The challenges we face in a country that has fast come online
are very different than those in other parts of the world, and we are investing in people, technology,
and programs to help address them as effectively as possible.”
(https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF00/20180411/108090/HHRG-115-IF00-Wstate-ZuckerbergM-
20180411.pdf)
2992 Submission from Facebook.
2993 K. Roose, P. Mozur, “Zuckerberg Was Called Out Over Myanmar Violence. Here’s His Apology”
(The New York Times, 9 April 2018).

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announced that it will undertake a comprehensive human rights impact assessment in

Myanmar, the findings of which will be made public. 2994
1353. In 2018, Facebook designated MaBaTha and the monks Wirathu, Thuseitta and
Parmakkha as hate figures and organizations. 2995 They were no longer allowed a presence
on Facebook, and any other profile, page, group or piece of content that praises or supports
them would be removed. Since April 2018, the Mission noted increased efforts by
Facebook to remove hate speech from its platform faster, including following alerts by the
Mission. On 27 August 2018, Facebook further announced that it had removed a total of 18
Facebook accounts, one Instagram account and 52 Facebook pages, followed by almost 12
million people. It banned 20 individuals and organizations from Facebook in Myanmar,
including Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing. It further stated that it had removed “46 Pages
and 12 accounts for engaging in coordinated inauthentic behaviour on Facebook”, after
discovering that “they used seemingly independent news and opinion Pages to covertly
push the messages of the Myanmar military”. 2996 Importantly, Facebook stated that it had
preserved all data and content from these pages. 2997 The removed data and content should
be available to properly constituted international and national judicial authorities for
accountability purposes, including criminal prosecution of perpetrators of serious human
rights violations in Myanmar.
1354. The Mission has no doubt that the prevalence of hate speech in Myanmar
significantly contributed to increased tension and a climate in which individuals and groups
may become more receptive to incitement and calls for violence. This also applies to hate
speech on Facebook. The extent to which the spread of messages and rumours on Facebook
has increased discrimination and violence in Myanmar must be independently and
thoroughly researched, so that appropriate lessons can be drawn and similar scenarios
prevented. Similarly, the impact of the recent measures taken by Facebook to prevent and
remedy the abuse of its platform needs to be assessed. The Mission regrets that Facebook
has been unable to provide country-specific data about the spread of hate speech on its
platform, which is imperative to assess the problem and the adequacy of its response. 2998 It
considers it essential that Facebook develop and implement systems to enable this country-
specific data to be collected and made available publicly.

(e) Government response

1355. In a context where government officials and Buddhist leaders fail to denounce and
address pervasive discrimination and human rights violations that are often State-supported
and rooted in law, the haphazard efforts of some authorities to address the most extreme
and radical instances of hate speech propagated by MaBaTha and some of its affiliate
monks are grossly inadequate. 2999 What is required is a clear, decisive and official reaction.

2994 Submission from Facebook.

2995 Submission from Facebook.
2996 Facebook Newsroom, “Removing Myanmar Military Officials From Facebook”,
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/08/removing-myanmar-officials/).
2997 Earlier, in June 2018, Facebook had informed the Mission that its policies did not allow to do so.
2998 Submission from Facebook; BM-050.
2999 The Mission took note of some high-level officials occasionally speaking out about specific
statements, e.g. on 29 October 2014, when the Ministry of Information released a statement that an
article in the MaBaTha journal Aung Zeyathu (no. 44) had been reported by the Myanmar Islamic
Religious Organization for falsely portraying Islam, and had been found to be breaching sections
354(d), 362-364 of the Constitution as well as the News Media Act and the Print and Publication Act
[Notice No.1-6 (8)/ 2014 (7182)]. On 10 March 2017, Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee (MaHaNa),
the Government-appointed body that regulates the Myanmar Buddhist clergy, issued a statement
banning Wirathu from preaching countrywide for one year until March 2018, citing the latter’s spread
of religious hate-speech (see http://www.mahana.org.mm/?p=1351 for the statement.) On 23 May
2017, MaHaNa issued a statement declaring that MaBaTha was not formed in accordance with the
Sangha Organization Law and the Sangha Organizational Procedures, and that neither the group nor
individuals associated with it can use the full Burmese name it was using and that all of the
organization’s signboards across the country had to be taken down (see M. Walton,
“Misunderstanding Myanmar’s Ma Ba Tha” (Asia Times, 9 June 2017)). On 20 July 2018, MaHaNa

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A credible government response should begin with its own officials refraining from using
hateful and divisive rhetoric 3000, systematically condemning instances of hate speech,
countering the prevailing discriminatory narratives about Muslims and Rohingya in
particular, and actively promoting messages of tolerance and respect for the human rights
of all. The Mission has found no examples of such messages in its analysis of online
government posts in the context of the “clearance operations” in Rakhine State. Similarly,
while successive Myanmar governments have supported various interfaith gatherings aimed
at diffusing tensions between religious groups in Myanmar 3001, they have generally not
included dialogue with the Rohingya. To the contrary, some recent events appear to be
organized to show support for the current Government, including the Tatmadaw, in the face
of international condemnation of its handling of the crisis in Rakhine State. 3002 Such events,
while nominally promoting interfaith relations and tolerance, risk hardening negative
opinions of intolerance towards the Rohingya.
1356. There have been reports that the Government of Myanmar is preparing a Bill for
Protection against Hate Speech, which had earlier been called the Interfaith Harmonious
Coexistence Bill.3003 Although no official communications have been made with regard to
this proposed law, and its exact status is unknown to the Mission, a draft text is circulating
online. This draft focuses on the criminalisation of hate speech beyond what is required and
permissible under international law. In May 2018, the Government of Myanmar also
approved a budget of over 6.4 billion Kyat for the creation of a Social Media Monitoring
Team.3004 Details of the terms of reference of this team are unknown, but civil society
organizations are concerned that it may result in new forms of surveillance and censorship
of freedom of speech generally, not hate speech, further curtailing the enjoyment of human
rights.3005 The Mission encourages the Government of Myanmar to be transparent about
these initiatives and to involve all relevant stakeholders, in particular civil society and
media organizations, in the articulation of appropriate responses to the issue of hate speech.
Rather than narrowly focusing on the (overly) broad criminalisation of hate speech and
other measures that may result in censorship, the Mission urges the Government of
Myanmar to adopt an approach that combines positive policy measures centred around the
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of expression and the rights to equality
and non-discrimination of all.

appears to have banned the Dhamma Wunthanu Rakkhita Association, the successor of MaBaTha
(see The Irrawaddy, “Nationalists Rally in Yangon to Denounce New Ban on Ma Ba Tha”, 13 August
2018).
3000 On 13 August 2018, the International Organizations Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
sent an email to various United Nations agencies in Myanmar sharing the links to four videos about
Rakhine State and the August 2017 events. The videos contain anti-Muslim/anti-Rohingya messages.
It is highly significant that the Ministry headed by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi took the initiative of
sharing such videos with the United Nations (K-069-16).
3001 E.g. Myanmar News Agency, “Interfaith Dialogue for Peace, Harmony and Security held”
(The Global New Light of Myanmar, 6 August 2017).
3002 E.g. Su Myat Mon, “Thousands rally behind NLD at interfaith prayer for peace” (Frontier Myanmar,
11 October 2017).
3003 The Bill appears to have been initiated at the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture, but has
reportedly been transferred to the Ministry of Home Affairs. This is unconfirmed.
3004 At the 19 March 2018 session of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, Union Minister U Thant Sin Maung stated,
“according to the 2017 Union Budget Allocation Law, with the permission of the Union Government
organization no. (5/2018), the President Office spent the emergency funds for the work of the Social
Media Monitoring Team - SMMT, for the purchase of ‘Hardware and Devices, Software’ the total
budget of 6,426,000,000 Kyats.” (https://pyidaungsu.hluttaw.mm/second-meeting-
records/record19032018)
3005 E.g. Zaw Zaw Htwe, Aung Kyaw Nyunt, “Critics rail against govt budget for monitoring of
Facebook” (Myanmar Times, 22 March 2018).

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C. Conclusion

1357. The Mission has reasonable grounds to conclude that the Government of Myanmar
has routinely violated the fundamental freedoms of its people, including the interrelated
rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, particularly of those
who dissent, challenge the role of the military, and demand accountability. While these
violations particularly affect individuals belonging to ethnic and religious minorities, or
those defending their cause, they should be of concern to the entire country. These
violations have a profoundly negative impact on the democratic space in the country as a
whole and seriously risk bringing Myanmar’s slow democratic reform to a halt.
1358. The Myanmar authorities demonstrate a profound discomfort with scrutiny and
criticism, taking active measures to restrict independent media commentary, stifle
legitimate dissent and crack down on human rights defenders. At the same time, they have
created an enabling environment for radical individuals and associated organizations,
including 969 and MaBaTha, to openly disseminate hate speech and incite violence,
hostility and discrimination against certain groups. The authorities have condoned these
developments and, although generally using less inflammatory language, their rhetoric has
mirrored and promoted the radical narratives. The Myanmar authorities, including both the
Government and the Tatmadaw, have fostered a climate in which hate speech thrives,
human rights violations are legitimised, and incitement to discrimination and violence
facilitated. They have emboldened those who preach hatred and intolerance, and silenced
those who stand for tolerance and human rights.
1359. The combined effect of these two trends is that Myanmar is neither ensuring
freedom of speech for participation in proper political debate nor preventing speech that
incites hostility, violence and discrimination, and has been linked to the commission of
grave crimes. In both respects it is failing to comply with its obligations under international
law. It needs both to widen the scope for speech that promotes scrutiny and criticism of
government and military actions and to restrict the scope for hate speech.
1360. What is needed to address the situation are not initiatives that criminalise, censor or
silence legitimate speech. Instead, the Government of Myanmar should prioritise fostering a
legal and enabling environment for the full enjoyment of the rights to freedom of
expression, association and peaceful assembly in line with international human rights
norms and standards. This starts with repealing laws that criminalise the legitimate exercise
of fundamental freedoms, dismantling discriminatory laws and policies, putting in place a
robust anti-discrimination and equality law and acting to prevent speech that incites
hostility, violence or discrimination. Human Rights Council resolution 16/18 and the Rabat
Plan of Action provide a detailed framework for such policies.

VII. Hallmarks of Tatmadaw operations

1361. In the course of its in-depth fact-finding on the human rights situation in northern
Myanmar and in Rakhine State, and its assessment of the respect for fundamental freedoms
across Myanmar, the Mission was struck by how military operations and conduct – despite
the specific contexts and the differences of scale – are essentially similar. The Mission
identified at least four common characteristics of Tatmadaw operations, including
operations conducted jointly with other Myanmar security forces. These can be considered
as “hallmarks”. These common characteristics establish the Tatmadaw’s basic
methodology – its strategies and tactics – and enable conclusions to be made about its
performance, or rather its lack of performance, of its obligations under international law.

A. Targeting civilians

1362. As shown in the preceding chapters, Tatmadaw-led operations consistently fail to

respect international human rights law and the international humanitarian law principles of
distinction, proportionality and precaution. They not only primarily affect civilians; often
civilians are simply targeted.

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1363. In Kachin and Shan States, the Mission established that the Tatmadaw intentionally,
frequently and systematically directed attacks against the civilian population or individual
civilians. It has also systematically engaged in attacks that were indiscriminate, either
because they were not directed against a specific military objective, or because they
employed a method or means of combat that cannot be directed at a specific military
objective. Underlying these tactics is the assumption that everyone belonging to a specific
ethnic group necessarily supports or sympathises with the insurgent EAO from that ethnic
group, and therefore a deliberate assimilation between the civilian population and the EAO.
Attacks frequently occur in civilian-populated residential areas and in flagrant disregard of
life, property and the well-being of civilians. This modus operandi has been a catalyst for
the range of serious human rights violations outlined in this report, including extrajudicial
killings, torture and ill-treatment, rape and other forms of sexual violence, arbitrary arrest
and detention, and the large-scale destruction of villages and civilian property. Witnesses
gave consistent accounts of the Tatmadaw randomly shelling villages, dropping bombs into
civilian-populated areas, shooting at fleeing civilians, executing civilians in their custody
and burning villages.
1364. While at a different level of intensity, the Tatmadaw’s operations against the
Rohingya in Rakhine State have followed similar patterns. They have been marked by an
equation between an entire civilian population, the Rohingya, and the non-State armed
actor that was the perceived or stated threat. On the ground, this has facilitated a campaign
of mass destruction. The horrific patterns described in this report make clear that no
distinction whatsoever was made between civilians and civilian objects, on the one hand,
and fighters and military objectives, on the other. Everyone and everything was a target.
Large-scale massacres were carried out. Men, women and children were killed and
subjected to unimaginable abuse. Entire villages were wiped off the map. The operations
and use of force were not targeted at eliminating a specific and limited security threat posed
by ARSA; they were targeted at eliminating ARSA’s support base, if not the group, the
Rohingya, itself.
1365. The Tatmadaw’s disregard for civilians is further demonstrated by its treatment of
the ethnic Rakhine population. Just as other groups in Myanmar, they have been subjected
to forced labour, arbitrary confiscation of their possessions and other violations of their
rights. The level of arbitrariness and abuse of power on the part of the Tatmadaw is
astounding.
1366. The targeting of civilians is perhaps most noticeable in how children are not spared
by Tatmadaw operations; on the contrary, children are often specifically targeted. The
Mission has found all six grave violations affecting children in Myanmar, as set out by the
United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed
Conflict.3006 These are the recruitment and use of children; killing and maiming of children;
sexual violence against children; attacks on schools; abduction of children; and denial of
humanitarian access. The Mission is particularly concerned about what appears to be the
deliberate targeting of children for killing during the 2016 and 2017 “clearance operations”
in Rakhine State. Accounts of children and infants being shot, stabbed and deliberately
thrown into or trapped in burning houses are distressing in the extreme. Nearly 60 per cent
of the refugee population in southern Bangladesh are children, with approximately 500,000
children arriving in the camps following the 2016 and 2017 operations. The majority of
children, parents and relatives interviewed by the Mission gave consistent accounts of
children and infants being subject to or witnessing serious violations. The damage to this
generation of children cannot be understated. The consequences will be felt for generations
to come.
1367. This deliberate targeting of civilians has been part of Tatmadaw policies, tactics and
conduct for decades. The emergence and implementation of a “Four Cuts”
counterinsurgency policy since the 1960s has long been reported. The policy is aimed at
cutting off non-State armed groups from access to food, finances, intelligence and recruits

3006 A/RES/51/77.

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from the local civilian population.3007 The policy has been implemented through “clearance
operations”, essentially scorched earth campaigns in which large numbers of civilians are
killed and entire villages destroyed, leading to mass displacement. 3008 The Tatmadaw has
also been reported to categorise certain geographical areas based on the level of
government control, resulting in tiered rules of engagement, some of which condone or
even authorise targeting civilians including women and children. 3009 Reports indicate that
areas with the most Government control were considered “white”, disputed areas “brown”
and areas with little or no control “black”. ”Black” areas have been described as “free fire”
zones in which civilians are legitimate targets. In addition to the loss of civilian life,
“clearance operations” have consistently resulted in the displacement of large segments of
the affected population.3010 For example, in 2010, the then Special Rapporteur on the human
rights situation in Myanmar reported that humanitarian and human rights groups had
documented the destruction of over 3,500 villages and hiding sites and the forced relocation
of their populations in eastern Myanmar since 1996.3011
1368. The Mission is not in a position to confirm whether the “Four Cuts” policy was
formally in place in the period under review and whether any of the military campaigns
reviewed emanated from it. However, while there are indications that the Tatmadaw has
moved away from use of the term “Four Cuts”, the patterns of military operations clearly
suggest that the policy – or a variant thereof – remains in place.3012 In a number of
Facebook posts seen by the Mission, soldiers refer to its implementation in relation to
recent operations. For example, in a 6 June 2017 post, one soldier posted in relation to an
operation in Kachin State: “We are about to do area clearance operations. 15 June is the
deadline to leave the area. Anyone remaining after the deadline will be considered an
accomplice of the KIA. If we apply “Four Cuts” to the KIA, they don’t stand a chance.
Now, those daring KIA members mingling with the civilians will face a good game!” 3013
1369. The Mission concludes, on reasonable grounds, that the widespread and systematic
practice of targeting of civilians, including children, and the complete disregard for civilian
life and objects can only be a consequence of the implementation of policies and rules of
engagement that articulate such tactics. These policies and practices violate Myanmar’s
obligations under international law and amount to criminal conduct. They are also
unwarranted; military necessity can never justify killing indiscriminately, gang-raping
women, killing and assaulting children, and burning entire villages. The tactics used by the
Tatmadaw are consistently and grossly disproportionate to actual security threats, especially
in Rakhine State, but also in northern Myanmar.
1370. While the present report outlines violations against civilians from many ethnic
groups in Kachin, Rakhine and Shan States, the contempt shown by the Tatmadaw for
human life, integrity and freedom and for international law generally should be of concern
to the entire population of Myanmar. The number of refugees from areas outside these three
States attests to the existence of similar concerns elsewhere in the country.

B. Sexual violence

1371. In 2011, in a video statement on sexual violence in conflict, Daw Aung San Suu
Kyi, since 2016 State Counsellor, said, “Rape is used in my country as a weapon against

3007 XM-009, XM-010; Maung Aung Myoe, Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces since 1948
(Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2009); A. Selth, Burma’s Armed Forces: Power
Without Glory (EastBridge, 2002).
3008 XM-010, XM-009, XM-012; Also, International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School, Legal
Memorandum: War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity in Eastern Myanmar (2014). International
Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School, “Preventing Indiscriminate Attacks and Wilful Killings
of Civilians by the Myanmar Military” (2014).
3009 Ibid.
3010 Ibid.
3011 A/HRC/65/368, para. 49; for similar figures, see A/61/369, para. 44; A/HRC/4/14, para. 54.
3012 XM-009, XM-010, XM-011, XM-013.
3013 V-052, post on file with the Mission.

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those who only want to live in peace, who only want to assert their basic human rights. It is
used as a weapon by armed forces to intimidate the ethnic nationalities and to divide our
country.”3014 The Mission, based on all information gathered, has concluded that Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi’s views are correct. The use of rape and other sexual violence has continued
unabated in the years since her statement.
1372. As is apparent from this report, rape and other sexual violence have been a
particularly egregious and recurrent feature of the targeting of the civilian population in
Rakhine, Kachin and Shan States since 2011. In Kachin and Shan States, women and girls
have been subjected to abduction, rape, including gang rape, and other sexual violence.
Individual soldiers or groups of them have raped, gang raped or attempted to rape women
and girls in fields and forests, in military compounds and in their homes. In Rakhine State,
similar instances of rape and sexual violence have occurred throughout the reporting period.
However, during the “clearance operations” of 2016 and 2017, rape and other forms of
sexual violence were perpetrated on a massive scale. Hundreds of women and girls were
raped, frequently gang raped. Mass gang rape, involving multiple perpetrators and multiple
victims in the same incident, was a notable pattern. Eighty per cent of incidents of rape
corroborated by the Mission were of gang rape, and 82 per cent of these gang rapes were
perpetrated by the Tatmadaw. It occurred in at least 10 village tracts between 25 August
and mid-September 2017. In some incidents, up to 40 women and girls were raped or gang
raped together. Women and girls were more commonly gang raped than raped, sometimes
by as many as 10 perpetrators. The rapes of Rohingya women and girls were particularly
brutal, often accompanied by acts of sexual humiliation and physical and mental torture.
They were also often accompanied by the killing of their children. The operations involved
the systematic abduction of women and girls and in many cases their detention in military
and police compounds, where they were raped or gang raped. Rape, gang rape, sexual
slavery, forced nudity, sexual humiliation, mutilation and sexual assault have frequently
been followed by the killing of victims. The Tatmadaw was overwhelmingly the main
perpetrator.
1373. Similar patterns of rape and sexual violence in the context of military operations in
Myanmar have been reported for at least three decades, by the United Nations and by local
and international civil society organizations. In 1995, the Special Rapporteur on the human
rights situation in Myanmar, Yozo Yokota, reported indications that “soldiers view rape as
a right, and that sometimes it is encouraged by officers”. 3015 Both the United Nations
General Assembly and its Commission on Human Rights, in 2002 and 2005, expressed
grave concern at systematic human rights violations in Myanmar, including rape, and called
for them to be ended.3016 In the following years, rape and sexual violence were reported as
being widespread and systematic, 3017 especially in areas of conflict and increased
militarisation.3018 In 2008, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women expressed concern about the high prevalence of sexual
violence perpetrated by members of the armed forces and urged Myanmar to take
immediate steps to end those violations and prosecute and punish perpetrators.3019 More
recently, in 2015, the United Nations Secretary-General found that sexual violence
remained widespread in Kachin, northern Shan and Rakhine States and in areas subject to
ceasefire agreements in Chin State and the southeast of the country. 3020

3014 Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, video statement delivered at the Nobel Women’s Initiative “Women Forging
a New Security: Ending Sexual Violence in Conflict conference” (2011). Video can be found here:
https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/opendemocracy/aung-san-suu-kyi-on-sexual-violence-in-
conflict
3015 A/50/568, para. 37.
3016 E/CN.4/RES2002/67; A/RES/59/263.
3017 E.g. A/49/594, para. 14; A/61/369, para. 27; A/HRC/10/19, para. 56.
3018 E.g. A/HRC/22/58, para. 37; A/HRC/28/72, para. 35; A/HRC/31/71, para. 52; A/HRC/34/67, paras.
54-56.
3019 CEDAW/C/MMR/CO/3, paras. 24 and 25.
3020 E.g. S/2015/203, para. 41; S/2018/250, paras. 55-60.

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1374. The scale, brutality and systematic nature of these violations, over this period of
time, indicate that rape and sexual violence are part of a deliberate strategy to intimidate,
terrorise or punish a civilian population, and are used as a tactic of war. This level of
normalisation is only possible in a climate of long-standing impunity. When rapes and
sexual violence are committed by, or in the presence of, senior military officers, with no
sanction or consequence, it is easy to see how all Tatmadaw soldiers may consider
themselves similarly authorised. The Myanmar authorities’ failure to address the
widespread perpetration of sexual and gender-based violence by its security forces has
certainly contributed to women and girls, rather than being relegated to the side-lines of
conflict and protected from its effects, becoming its frontline victims. 3021

C. Exclusionary and discriminatory rhetoric

1375. The Tatmadaw has historically cast itself as the protector of the nation, preserving
“national unity in the face of ethnic diversity”, while prioritising Bamar-Buddhist identity
and interests. Discrimination against ethnic and religious minority groups has been well
documented for decades.
1376. Military operations on the ground are often accompanied by deeply insulting slurs
and outright threats linked to ethnicity and religion. In Kachin and Shan States, the Mission
received many accounts from victims and witnesses that the Tatmadaw used such
derogatory language when committing human rights violations. For example, the manner in
which torture and ill-treatment, including sexual violence, occurred often indicated the
dehumanisation of ethnic minorities in Kachin and Shan States, with Tatmadaw soldiers
verbally denigrating their religions and ethnicities. One Christian victim was made to
imitate Jesus on a cross like the crucifixion. 3022 Rape victims reported that the perpetrators
called them “Kachin bitch” or compared them to dogs. 3023 One witness of a gang rape of
two girls heard the perpetrators say, “We will torture you Kachin bitches until you are
extinct”.3024
1377. The situation of the Rohingya in Rakhine State has been aggravated by their
gradually increasing exclusion from the Myanmar nation since the 1960s, amid decades of
State-sponsored stigmatization, leading to their being de facto stateless and reviled by much
of the population. The members of the Mission were struck by the normality of deeply
exclusionary and dehumanizing rhetoric in Myanmar society, actively nurtured by the
Tatmadaw. While other ethnic and religious minorities are accepted, at least in theory, as
belonging to the nation under their “national race” status, the Rohingya’s lack of status has
dramatically increased their vulnerability and contributed to the extreme scale and intensity
of the violence against them.
1378. Many Rohingya interviewees described in considerable detail the derogatory and
dehumanizing language used against them by Tatmadaw soldiers. They described being
referred to as “Kalar” and “Mout Kalar” and by the Myanmar phrase for “unwanted
person” (Yay Myaw Kan Tin).3025 This frequently happened during beatings and arrests, and
during sexual violence. The language used was not only insulting; it often also revealed an
exclusionary vision. Many accounts described Rohingya being told that they should leave
Myanmar as they are “Bengali” or “illegal Bengali” and that Myanmar is not their
country.3026 Several victims stated that they were told by the perpetrators to “leave the

3021 The Government’s failure to undertake any meaningful, independent or impartial investigations into
allegations of widespread sexual violence also put it in breach of its obligations under arts. 2 and 15
of the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women, which it ratified
in 1997.
3022 PI-056.
3023 PI-004, PI-023.
3024 PI-069.
3025 See chapter VI, section B: The issue of “hate speech”.
3026 BI-001, BI-006, EI-017, LI-006; LI-041, QI-041, QI-059, QI-064, YI-030, WI-010.

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country and never come back, or be killed”.3027 Similarly, rape survivors stated that
perpetrators used insults like “Kalar” and told them, “We will rape and kill you” and “We
are going to kill you this way, by raping. We are going to kill Rohingya. This is not your
country”.3028 In Facebook posts seen by the Mission, Tatmadaw soldiers have used such
language. In a post of 26 August 2017, a soldier of the 99 th LID said that he could not wait
to be deployed to Rakhine State because, each passing second, the “Muslim dogs” are
posing a threat to the citizens.3029 The following day he said, “on the battlefield, whoever is
quick will get to eat you, Muslim dogs”.3030 On 27 August 2017, a police officer involved in
the Tatmadaw operations in Rakhine State posted, “Have been wanting to kill these ‘Kalar’
for so long. Only got to kill them just now.” 3031
1379. The use of such derogatory, discriminatory and exclusionary language on the ground
in the course of military operations is hardly surprising: it mirrors the statements made by
the Tatmadaw Commander-in-Chief, Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing. The public
statements of the Senior-General and his Office reveal a deeply exclusionary vision,
mirroring the hateful anti-Rohingya rhetoric promoted by influential, ultranationalist
Buddhist groups.3032 He has denied that a group called “Rohingya” exists, consistently
called this group “Bengali”, and associated them with illegal immigration, terrorism and
extremism. He has denied their suffering and – in the midst of a most brutal military
campaign – denied any wrongdoing by the military and praised its discipline. At the same
time, he has asked the Myanmar “ethnics”, in his terms the non-Rohingya population of
Myanmar, to be patriots in facing the threats to the nation. In doing so, he has effectively
made the entire Rohingya group the enemy. These statements are part of a broader
propaganda campaign, spreading demonstrably false information and inciting hatred,
discrimination and violence. One recent example is the publication by the Tatmadaw
Directorate of the Public Relations and Psychological Warfare of a document detailing the
history of Rakhine State and the actions of the Tatmadaw. To demonstrate the alleged
influx of “Bengali” into Rakhine State, it used photographs taken in Tanzania and
Bangladesh.3033 The same booklet points out, “Despite living among peacocks, crows
cannot become peacocks”.3034

D. Command climate and impunity

1380. The Tatmadaw acts with complete impunity and has never been held accountable for
the violations of international law it is consistently involved in. Although occasionally a
very small number of individual soldiers may be prosecuted for their actions, the Tatmadaw
leadership and the Tatmadaw as an institution enjoy complete impunity. 3035 The widespread
and systemic nature of the violations committed by the Tatmadaw, across the country, is
linked to the command climate within the Tatmadaw which, explicitly or implicitly,
authorises these violations. Impunity for offences is one element that contributes to such
command climate.
1381. The Mission considers that several factors have contributed to a particularly toxic
command climate in the Tatmadaw,, in which the widespread and systematic commission
of abuses has become the norm: policies that explicitly or implicitly require the targeting of
civilians; the institutionalised use of derogatory, dehumanising and exclusionary language;

3027 BI-001, CI-147, LI-048, LI-059, LI-099, QI-038, QI-041, QI-111, YI-030.
3028 EI-084, EI-090.
3029 V-10.
3030 V-11.
3031 V-01.
3032 See chapter VI, section B: The issue of “hate speech”.
3033 P. McPherson, “Exclusive: Fake photos in Myanmar army’s ‘True News’ book on the Rohingya
crisis” (Reuters, 30 August 2018); A. Slodkowski, S. Naing, “Myanmar army apologizes for mistaken
photos in book on Rohingya crisis” (Reuters, 3 September 2018).
3034 Tatmadaw, Directorate of the Public Relations and Psychological Warfare, “Myanmar Politics and the
Tatmadaw”, 2018, p. 115.
3035 See chapter X, section B: History and climate of impunity in Myanmar.

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and the praising of Tatmadaw performance, even where deeply marred by violations. The
Tatmadaw has a well-documented and long history of carrying out military operations
consistently resulting in allegations of serious human rights violations and violations of
international humanitarian law. When incoming commanders accept well-known and
documented past behaviour, without recommending or implementing legal, doctrinal or
operational changes, they accept past methodologies as the established norm and continue
them.
1382. Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing, appointed Commander-in-Chief in 2011, has
consistently denied any Tatmadaw wrongdoing, both in the context of specific operations,
such as in Rakhine State in 2016 and 2017, and more generally. For example, he has stated
that, “no sexual violence happened in the history of Myanmar Tatmadaw”. 3036 He regularly
publishes posts praising the behaviour and discipline of Tatmadaw troops. For example, an
official statement of 13 November 2017 noted, “Security forces took actions in accordance
with the law, and did not overstep the law” and that his men “strictly followed orders and
acted in accordance with the rules of engagement during the recent Rakhine crisis”. 3037
These kinds of statements not only indicate that the Tatmadaw’s most senior authority
supports the actions taken but that the troops acted “strictly” as expected by his orders.
There are no indications that any of the commanders responsible for the “clearance
operations” in Rakhine State or in northern Myanmar have been held accountable for any
wrongdoing on the part of their troops.
1383. A final factor contributing to this command climate is the role of the military justice
system. The official investigation into the August 2017 “clearance operations”, led by the
Tatmadaw Inspector-General Lieutenant-General Aye Win, concluded that, “all security
members abided by the orders and directions of superior bodies”. The security forces were
found to have “abided by the laws related to wars in conducting area clearance operations.
So it is found that those security forces did not perform the use of excessive force.” 3038
Statements absolving Tatmadaw troops, in the face of widespread, brutal and unjustifiable
attacks on civilians, signal to these perpetrators that they are immune from sanctions for
these crimes, and set the scene for their repetition.
1384. The Tatmadaw leadership has consistently failed to attribute responsibility for
serious human rights violations. It has reinforced its message to troops that they will face
no consequences. This explains the recurrence of such violations across the country, and
over such an extensive timeframe. The leadership refuses to accept responsibility itself. If,
as the Tatmadaw Inspector-General found, “all security members abided by the orders and
directions of superior bodies”, then those “superior bodies”, right up to the Commander-in-
Chief, are responsible for the gravest crimes under international law and should be held
accountable.

VIII. Crimes under international law

1385. The Mission was mandated to establish the facts and circumstances of alleged
human rights violations by military and security forces, and abuses, “with a view to
ensuring full accountability for perpetrators and justice for victims”. The Mission
understood this to mean that it should consider the extent to which the violations and abuses
may amount to crimes under international law entailing individual criminal responsibility.
It has principally examined whether war crimes, crimes against humanity and/or genocide
may have been committed.

3036 Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing, Facebook post of 30 April 2018 (on file with the Mission).
3037 Office of the Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing, Facebook post with the “findings of the Investigation
Team in connection with the performances of the security troops during the terrorist attacks in
Maungtaw region, Rakhine State” (Tatmadaw True News Information Team, 13 November 2017).
Post on file with the Mission.
3038 Ibid.

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1386. In doing so, the Mission was cognisant of the fact that it is neither a court of law nor
a prosecutorial body, and cannot make final determinations on individual criminal
responsibility. As such, where the Mission finds that there are reasonable grounds to
conclude that a crime under international law has been committed, this should be
understood as meaning that the Mission considers that a competent prosecutorial body
would have sufficient elements to proceed with a criminal investigation and prepare a case
for adjudication on such charges.
1387. The conduct referred to in this section appears in summarised form and draws on the
facts as described in detail in the preceding chapters.

A. Genocide

1388. The prohibition of genocide is a peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens)
from which no derogation is permitted. Genocide was first codified as a crime in the 1948
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which almost 150
States, including Myanmar in 1956, have now ratified.
1389. Article II of the Genocide Convention defines genocide as any of the following acts
committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or
mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing
measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly transferring children of
the group to another group. The definition requires consideration of whether there is a
protected group, whether acts in one or more of the specified categories have been
committed, and whether the acts were committed with genocidal intent.

1. Protected group
1390. Genocide can be committed against national, “ethnical”, racial or religious groups.
This list is exhaustive. Legal doctrine and jurisprudence is not consistent, but a practice has
emerged of making a case-by-case assessment that combines the objective particulars of a
given social or historical context, and the subjective perceptions of the perpetrator. 3039
1391. The Mission is satisfied that the Rohingya, who predominantly live in Myanmar’s
Rakhine State, constitute a protected group. The Rohingya can be seen as an ethnic
(“members share a common language or culture”), racial (“based on hereditary physical
traits often identified with a geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national
or religious factors”) or religious (“members share the same religion, denomination or
mode of worship”) group,3040 or a combination thereof. The Rohingya also consider
themselves as a distinct group, as do the Myanmar authorities and security forces. The
historic origins of the Rohingya in Myanmar, as well as their claim to “national race” status
under Myanmar law, are disputed in Myanmar. However, this does not call into question
that the Rohingya are a distinct group, nor does the fact that the Myanmar authorities do not
officially recognize them as a “national race” or refer to them as “Bengali”. If anything, the
differential treatment of the Rohingya, through the adoption of specific laws, policies and
practices, supports the conclusion that they are a protected group as defined by the
Genocide Convention.

2. Physical acts
1392. Genocide requires the commission of physical acts within any of the five prohibited
categories listed in its definition. The gross human rights violations detailed in this report,
suffered by Rohingya at the hands of the Tatmadaw and other security forces (often in
concert with civilians), include conduct that falls within four of these five categories of

3039 ICTR, Prosecutor v Bagilishema, ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgment, 7 June 2001, para. 65; ICTY,
Prosecutor v Brdjanin, IT-99-36-T, Judgment, 1 December 2004, para. 684.
3040 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, paras. 512-515.

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prohibited acts. Perpetrators have killed Rohingya, caused serious bodily and mental harm
to Rohingya, deliberately inflicted conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical
destruction of Rohingya, and imposed measures intended to prevent births of Rohingya.
1393. For prohibited physical acts, the ICC Elements of Crimes requires that the conduct
took place “in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against that
group or was conduct that could itself effect [the] destruction”. 3041 This precludes isolated
crimes from falling within the crime of genocide.3042 As is evident from the preceding
chapters and the discussion below, the physical acts in Myanmar were committed in the
context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct.

(a) Killing members of the group

1394. The Tatmadaw and other security forces (often in concert with civilians)
intentionally and unlawfully killed Rohingya men, women and children throughout the
period under review, that is, since 2011, but particularly since 25 August 2017. These
deaths were a direct or indirect result of the severe and systemic oppressive measures
imposed on the Rohingya and the “clearance operations” in 2016 and 2017 in which they
culminated. During these operations, killings occurred with horrifying intensity. The
security forces entered village after village, opening fire on villagers and burning their
houses. Villagers were killed both indiscriminately and in a targeted manner. They were
locked in or thrown into burning houses, and lined up and executed. Accompanying ethnic
Rakhine slit the throats of those too injured, young or old to escape.
1395. The exact number of casualties may never be known, either for those who perished
from years of oppression or those who died in the “clearance operations”. As outlined
above, the Mission has concluded on reasonable grounds that the “clearance operations”
that started on 25 August 2017 alone have directly resulted in more than 10,000 deaths.
This report details large-scale massacres in five locations, sometimes with hundreds of
villagers killed, with details of other incidents where dozens were killed. In Min Gyi and
Maung Nu, villagers were gathered together, before men and boys were separated and
killed. In Min Gyi, women and girls were taken to nearby houses, gang raped, then killed or
severely injured. Houses were locked and set on fire. Few survived. The Mission verified,
through multiple interviews and other information, “clearance operations” in 54 separate
locations, and it received first-hand accounts of additional “clearance operations” in a
further 22 locations. The killing was widespread, systematic and brutal.

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group

1396. Serious bodily harm refers to harm that involves serious injury to health,
disfigurement, or serious injury to the external or internal organs, or senses. 3043 It can be
caused by, but is not restricted to, conduct such as torture, rape, sexual violence or inhuman
or degrading treatment.3044 Serious mental harm must amount to more than a temporary
impairment of mental faculties3045 and is assessed on a case-by-case basis, with reference to
the immediate circumstances surrounding the incident.3046 The harm, either bodily or
mental, does not have to be permanent or irremediable, but must go beyond temporary
unhappiness, embarrassment or humiliation, and inflict “grave and long-term disadvantage
to a person’s ability to lead a normal and constructive life”. 3047 The term “serious” means

3041 International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes (The Hague, 2011), hereafter “ICC Elements of
Crimes”, art. 6(a), para. 4.
3042 The ICTY rejected this requirement, considering that it does not form part of customary international
law: ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, IT-98-33-A, Judgment, 19 April 2004, para. 224; ICTY, Prosecutor
v. Jelisic, IT-95-10-T, Judgment, 14 December 1999, para. 100.
3043 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kayishema, ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 21 May 1999, para. 109.
3044 ICC Elements of the Crimes, art. 6; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Karemera and Ngirumpatse, ICTR-98-44-T,
Judgment, 2 September 2012, para. 1609.
3045 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Ntagerura et al., ICTR-99-46-T, Judgment, 25 February 2004, para. 664.
3046 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Rukundo, ICTR-2001-70-T, Judgment, 27 February 2009, paras. 261-262.
3047 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Karadzic, IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, 24 March 2016, paras. 543-545.

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that the bodily or mental harm should be such that it threatens the destruction of the group,
in whole or in part.3048
1397. The physical injuries of large numbers who survived the October 2016 and August
2017 “clearance operations” rise to the level of serious bodily harm. The scale and brutality
of attacks, the close range of weapons, the widespread use of knives, and the practice of
burning people in their houses mean that many who survived the “clearance operations”
bear the after-effects of bullet, burn and knife wounds that cause not only disfigurement,
but long-term and serious injury. Women and girls who had their breasts cut off and those
who lost limbs or parts of limbs suffered “serious injury to external organs” rising to the
level of serious bodily harm. The rape, gang rape and other sexual violence inflicted on
Rohingya women and girls before and during the “clearance operations” was often
accompanied by the additional infliction of serious bodily harm; victims were severely
bitten or otherwise scarred on the face, breasts, thighs, and genitalia, and subjected to other
mutilation of their reproductive organs. The bite-marks and other mutilations have left
permanent scars and serve as a constant reminder to survivors, their families and
community of the crimes to which they have been subjected. Given the substantial number
of women and girls affected, it is difficult to believe that this was not an intentional act akin
to a form of branding. Even without such permanent and disturbing reminders, rape and
sexual violence are steps in the destruction of a group: “the destruction of the spirit, of the
will to live, and of life itself”. 3049 It has been recognized as demonstrating an intent to
destroy a group “while inflicting acute suffering on its members in the process”. 3050
1398. In addition to physical scars, the trauma suffered by those who manage to escape
situations of mass killing or large-scale sexual violence constitutes “serious mental harm”.
“[F]ear of being captured, and, at the moment of separation, the sense of utter helplessness
and extreme fear for their family and friends’ safety as well as for their own safety, is a
traumatic experience from which one will not quickly, if ever, recover.”3051 For those who
did not escape, the threat of death and knowledge of impending death also constitutes
serious mental harm as a separate genocidal act from the killing itself. 3052 Numerous victims
met by the Mission displayed signs of serious mental trauma. The Mission received
credible information and obtained an expert opinion indicating that many survivors of rape
and other forms of sexual violence currently residing in the refugee camps in southern
Bangladesh have become socially withdrawn, reluctant to eat and passive and fearful in
their behaviour. Reports of self-injurious behavior and attempted suicides were received. 3053
1399. The infliction of serious mental harm does not stop with the cessation of violent
acts. The survivors of the July 1995 Srebrenica killings in the former Yugoslavia, for
example, were found to have suffered serious mental harm from both witnessing the killing
operation, and the horrific circumstances of their escape. 3054 The International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia recognized that the painful separation process of family
members, the fear and uncertainty of their fate, as well as those of missing relatives, the
appalling conditions of the journey, the continuation of their profound trauma, as well as
the financial and emotional difficulties they faced in their drastically changed lives,
supported the conclusion that the women, children and elderly who were forcibly
transferred from Srebrenica suffered serious mental harm. 3055 There are clear parallels with
the experiences and situations of the Rohingya refugees. The Rohingya who survived the
“clearance operations” then faced a journey of significant risk, under appalling conditions,
many having just suffered the trauma of losing and witnessing the loss of family and
friends, their homes and villages. The Mission concludes on reasonable grounds that
serious bodily and mental harm, as an underlying genocidal act, is present.

3048 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, ICTR-98-44-T, Judgment, 1 December 2003, para. 814.
3049 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 732.
3050 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 733.
3051 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagojevic and Jokic, IT-02-60-T, Judgment, 17 January 2005, para. 647.
3052 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tolimir, IT-05-88/2-A, Judgment, 8 April 2015, para. 206.
3053 K-122, K-124.
3054 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tolimir, IT-05-88/2-A, Judgment, 8 April 2015, fn. 595.
3055 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tolimir, IT-05-88/2-A, Judgment, 8 April 2015, para. 210.

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(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part
1400. This category captures situations of so-called “measures of slow death”, meaning
situations where the perpetrator does not immediately kill the members of the group but
uses methods that seek to bring about their physical destruction in the end. It does not
require proof that the conditions led directly to death or serious bodily or mental harm. It is
enough that they were “calculated” to achieve that result.3056
1401. In other contexts, measures giving rise to liability have included: failing to provide
adequate medical care; systematically expelling members of the group from their homes;
and generally creating circumstances that would lead to a slow death, such as the lack of
proper food, water, shelter, clothing, sanitation, or subjecting members of the group to
excessive work or physical exertion.3057 Whether the measures constitute those calculated to
bring about physical destruction of the group depends on the actual nature of the conditions,
the length of time that members of the group were subjected to them, and the characteristics
of the group, such as its vulnerability. 3058
1402. The Rohingya are an objectively vulnerable group. Over a long period, they have
suffered oppressive and systemic restrictions on all aspects of their life, amounting to
persecution, which, on their face, appear calculated to bring about their physical
destruction. The purpose is apparent from the process of gradual marginalization, exclusion
and “othering” – in a context of hateful rhetoric targeting the Rohingya on ethnic or
religious grounds. A complex system of oppressive rules, policies and orders was
established to contain the group as a perceived “existential threat” to the nation, in an effort
to bring its so-called “incontrollable” birth rates under control, and to change the
demographic composition of Rakhine State. It has pushed the Rohingya population into
extreme vulnerability, weakening individuals, families and communities.
1403. The movement restrictions; the restrictions on access to food and livelihood; the
arbitrary and cumbersome procedures to access hospitals and health facilities; the
restrictions on education; the exorbitant bribes, fees and economic pressures; their
segregation from other communities; and the regular blocking of humanitarian assistance in
Rakhine State - collectively these measures have eroded the ability of the Rohingya to
support themselves and to survive as a community in Rakhine State. They have exposed
them to destitution, immediate and long-term health risks, and preventable deaths. The
acute levels of malnutrition in northern Rakhine State attest to that.
1404. The Rohingya have been systematically expelled from their homes and their lands.
The State-sanctioned oppression and persecution and the repeated cycles of mass violence
have forced unprecedented levels of Rohingya to flee Myanmar. Throughout the period
under review, thousands of Rohingya felt compelled to risk their lives leaving on boats into
the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. Tens of thousands were displaced by the violence
in 2012. Approximately 87,000 crossed into Bangladesh following the 2016 “clearance
operations”. Over 725,000 fled the 2017 “clearance operation” en masse, seeking protection
in refugee camps in Bangladesh. There they live in extremely difficult conditions, including
because of overcrowding and lack of privacy; lack of employment or livelihood or
educational opportunities; limited access to health care; etc. The Rohingya have been
pushed into these conditions through repeated cycles of forced displacement, causing grave
and long-term disadvantage to their ability to lead a normal and constructive life, and
contributing to their destruction as a group.

3056 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Karadzic, IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, 24 March 2016, para. 546.
3057 ICTY, Prosecutor v Brdjanin, IT-99-36-T, Judgment, 1 December 2004, para. 691; ICTY, Prosecutor
v. Stakic, IT-97-24-T, Judgment, 31 July 2003, para. 517; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR-96-13-
T, Judgment, 27 January 2000, para. 157; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR-95-
1-T, Judgment, 21 May 1999, paras. 115–116; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T,
Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 506.
3058 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Karadzic, IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, 24 March 2016, para. 548.

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1405. A group is comprised of “its individuals, but also of its history, tradition, the
relationship with other groups, and its relationship with the land”. 3059 It has been held that
“the physical or biological destruction of the group could therefore be considered the likely
outcome of a forcible transfer of the population when this transfer is conducted in such a
way that the group can no longer reconstitute itself”. 3060 The extensive burning that
destroyed Rohingya villages, followed by the bulldozing of lands to an unrecognizable state
in many locations, then completes the picture: the Rohingya fled for their lives from their
homes and their land, in circumstances in which they can likely never return. Their villages,
and the communities, as they once existed in the three townships of northern Rakhine, have
been erased forever.
1406. This pattern of severe oppression and repeated displacement must be considered
together with the pervasive sexual violence by Tatmadaw forces. Rape has been recognized
as a condition of life designed to bring about its destruction, and has been equated with “the
starving of a group of people, reducing required medical services below a minimum, and
withholding sufficient living accommodation for a reasonable period”.3061 As observed by a
scholar in the context of Rwanda, “the evidence illustrates that many rapists expected,
consequent to their attacks, that the psychological and physical assault on each Tutsi
woman would advance the cause of the destruction of the Tutsi people”.3062 The scale,
brutality and systematic nature of rape, gang rape, sexual slavery and other forms of sexual
violence against the Rohingya lead inevitably to the inference that these acts were, in fact,
aimed at destroying the very fabric of the community, particularly given the stigma
associated with rape within the Rohingya community.
1407. In combination, these factors, pervasive in their nature and many inflicted over a
period of long duration, against a group that had previously been made extremely
vulnerable, provide reasonable grounds to conclude the existence of the imposition of
conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the Rohingya group,
as an underlying genocidal act.

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group

1408. This category covers measures directed at inhibiting the capacity of group members
to procreate. The measures can be physical (measures which destroy the reproductive
capacity of a group by physical means) or psychological (measures setting up
insurmountable psychological obstacles to having children).
1409. The measures imposed on Rohingya women and girls, when considered both
individually and cumulatively, appear targeted at the capacity of the group to “live and
reproduce normally”.3063 The Myanmar authorities, including the Tatmadaw, have actively
propagated the narrative of “uncontrollable” Rohingya birthrates that constitute a threat to
the nation. This is despite the results of the 2014 Population and Housing Census, released
in 2016, indicating that the percentage of Muslims in the country had not meaningfully
increased in recent decades.3064 Concerns that Rohingya would soon be outnumbering the
“native” groups had nevertheless led to a 2015 package of national laws to “protect race
and religion”, which discriminate against women and girls. While the level of
implementation of these laws is unclear, for many years local orders in northern Rakhine
have imposed marriage restrictions on Rohingya, as well as restrictions on the permissible
number and spacing of children. As detailed above, these have led to long delays in
obtaining marriage permissions, in complex and humiliating procedures, often leading
couples to marry religiously only and risking penalties. It has also led to unsafe abortions.

3059 ICTY, Prosecutor v Blagojevic and Jokic, IT-02-60-T, Judgment, 17 January 2005, para. 666.
3060 Ibid.
3061 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 21 May 1999, para. 116.
3062 B. Nowrojee, Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath, 4
September 1996, p. 16.
3063 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Popovic et al., IT-05-88-T, Judgment, 10 June 2010, para. 855.
3064 See 2014 Population and Housing Census of Myanmar (available at
http://myanmar.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/UNION_2-C_religion_EN_0.pdf).

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1410. Within this context of obsession with the procreation of the Rohingya, and the
imperative of changing the demographic balance in Rakhine State, the high prevalence of
rape and other brutal forms of sexual violence against women and girls in Rakhine State, in
particular in the context of the “clearance operations”, may have been aimed at affecting
their reproductive capacity. The majority of victims were either of childbearing age or
younger, and the rapes were often accompanied by deliberate mutilation of genitalia. Eighty
per cent of rape survivors interviewed by the Mission were victims of gang rape. Apart
from the obvious physical destruction of the reproductive capacity in such cases, members
of the Rohingya community who have experienced sexual violence are less likely to be able
to procreate. Where Rohingya women or girls have been subjected to rape, gang rape or
other forms of sexual violence, this significantly reduces the possibility of marriage. In
some cases, Rohingya husbands have rejected spouses who have been subjected to sexual
violence. This is largely due to the cultural stigma surrounding sexual violence, victimhood
and perceived gender roles within the community. Rape “can be a measure intended to
prevent births when the person raped refuses subsequently to procreate, in the same way
that members of a group can be led, through threats or trauma, not to procreate”. 3065
Members of security forces perpetrating sexual violence, and certainly their commanders
who ordered or condoned it, would be aware of this dynamic.

3. Genocidal intent
1411. The crime of genocide is defined by its specific intent requirement. In addition to
demonstrating that the perpetrator had the intent to commit the underlying act, it must also
be shown that the act was committed with the specific intent (dolus specialis), being the
intent to destroy in whole or in part a protected group as such.

(a) Legal requirements

1412. Genocidal intent requires that the perpetrator intend to “destroy” the protected group
in whole or in part, as such. Destruction is understood to mean physical or biological
destruction, rather than the disbandment or expulsion of the group. Other forms of
destruction, such as social assimilation or attacks on cultural characteristics, do not
constitute genocide if they are not related to the physical or biological destruction of the
group.3066
1413. The words “in whole or in part” signify that it is not necessary that the perpetrator
intends the destruction of the entire group. The partial destruction of the group (for
example, destruction in a certain geographical location) suffices, when a substantial part of
the group has been targeted, being a part that is sufficiently large to impact the group as a
whole.3067 Factors relevant to whether the targeted part of the group meets this threshold
include its numeric size (both absolute and relative) and the prominence of the targeted
individuals within it.3068
1414. The words “as such” emphasize the intent to destroy the protected group “as a
separate and distinct entity”, rather than an individual. The victims are chosen by reason of
their membership of the group for which destruction is sought, as opposed to being targeted
as individuals.3069

3065 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 508.
3066 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 2 August 2001, para. 580; ICJ, Case Concerning
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Bosnia Herzegovina
v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 27 February 2007, para. 344.
3067 ICJ, Bosnia Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 27 February 2007, para.
198.
3068 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, IT-98-33-A, 19 April 2004, paras. 12-14.
3069 Ibid.

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(b) Establishing genocidal intent

1415. Direct evidence of genocidal intent will rarely exist.3070 In its absence, genocidal
intent can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, that is, “all of the evidence taken
together”.3071 For genocidal intent to be established to the criminal standard of “beyond
reasonable doubt”, any inference drawn from circumstantial evidence must be the only
inference that could reasonably follow from the acts in question. 3072 The factors relevant to
a determination of genocidal intent include:3073
• evidence emanating from or relating to an accused: including various forms of
communication to show the possible formation of intent, including discrete words
and utterances by the accused, and evidence tending to show that the accused
ordered attacks on the targeted group.3074
• evidence relating to others: the words and deeds of others acting with or at the
behest of the accused.3075
• contextual evidence in the form of plans, policies and preparation: the existence of a
genocidal plan or policy is not a legal requirement but proof of such plan has been
considered relevant to establishing intent.3076 The existence of such plan or policy
may be inferred from various indicia: government involvement in attacks; 3077 the
involvement of public officials or soldiers carrying out the attacks;3078 existence of
execution lists targeting the protected group; the dissemination of extremist
ideology; the screening and selection of victims on the basis of their membership in
the protected group.3079
• contextual evidence in the form of modus operandi: where acts of a consistent
character have been systematically directed against a protected group. 3080
• evidence of breadth and scale: the breadth and scale of attacks, as well as whether or
not the attacks were widespread, are relevant to an inference on the formation of

3070 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-A, Judgment, 1 June 2001, para. 159:
“explicit manifestations of criminal intent are, for obvious reasons, often rare in the context of
criminal trials”.
3071 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Karadzic, IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, 24 March 2016, paras. 550, 2592; ICTY,
Prosecutor v. Popovic et al., IT-05-88-A, Judgment, 30 January 2015, para. 468; Prosecutor v.
Hategekimana, ICTR-00-55A-A, Judgment, 8 May 2012, para. 133.
3072 ICJ, Bosnia Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 27 February 2007, para.
373. See also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Karadzic, IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, 24 March 2016, para. 2592;
ICTY, Prosecutor v Brdjanin, IT-99-36-T, Judgment, 1 December 2004, para. 970.
3073 ICC, Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Separate and Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Anita Usacka, 4 March 2009, pp. 17-29.
3074 ICTR, Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-A, Judgment, 1 June 2001, para. 148;
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jelisic, IT-95-10-T, Judgment, 14 December 1999, para. 75; ICTR, Prosecutor
v. Bagilishema, No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgment, 7 June 2001, para. 63; ICTR, Prosecutor v Akayesu,
No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 728; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, No.
ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment, 6 December 1999, para. 399; ICTR, Prosecutor v Gacumbitsi, ICTR-2001-
64-T, Judgment, 17 June 2004, para. 259.
3075 ICTR, Prosecutor v Niyitegeka, ICTR-96-14-T, Judgment, 16 May 2003, paras. 413, 419.
3076 ICTY, Prosecutor v Jelisic, IT-95-10-A, Judgment, 5 July 2001, para. 48; ICTR, Prosecutor v
Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 21 May 1999, para. 94.
3077 ICTY, Prosecutor v Krstic, IT-98-33-A, Judgment, 19 April 2004, para. 35 ICTR, Prosecutor v
Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 21 May 1999, paras. 309 - 312.
3078 ICTR, Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 21 May 1999, para. 536;
ICTR, Prosecutor v Niyitegeka, ICTR-96-14-T, Judgment, 16 May 2003, para. 414; ICTR,
Prosecutor v Kamuhanda, ICTR-95-54A-T, Judgment, 22 January 2005, para. 644.
3079 ICTR, Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-A, Judgment, 1 June 2001, para. 139.
3080 ICTY, Prosecutor v Jelisic, IT-95-10-A, Judgment, 5 July 2001, para. 47; ICTR, Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 523; ICTR, Prosecutor v Kayishema,
ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 21 May 1999, paras. 93, 289, 534-535, 537; ICTR, Prosecutor v Muhimana,
ICTR-95-1B-T, Judgment, 28 April 2005, para. 496.

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intent.3081 In some instances, one particularly brutal attack, targeting several

thousand members of a group, can indicate the existence of intent. 3082
• other factors: such as whether bodily injuries were extensive, whether property
belonging to members of the targeted group was targeted, whether derogatory
language was used by an accused or by others against members of the targeted
group.3083
1416. An inquiry into genocidal intent should not be compartmentalized by considering
separately whether there was specific intent to destroy a protected group through each of
the genocidal acts.3084 The existence of genocidal intent must be based on all of the
evidence, taken together.3085

(c) Consideration of genocidal intent in the case of the Rohingya

Scope of the present analysis

1417. With the legal elements of genocide in mind, a finding that “genocide” occurred
cannot be made in the abstract. The inclusion of “genocidal intent” as an element of the
crime means that an assessment of whether genocide occurs necessarily involves an
assessment of whether a particular perpetrator (or group of perpetrators) possessed the
specific intent to destroy a protected group, in whole or in part, at the relevant moment in
time. The determinative factor therefore is the acts and conduct of the accused persons
themselves, or the acts and conduct of others acting at their behest. Genocidal intent of an
accused “should be determined, above all, from his words and deeds, and should be evident
from patterns of purposeful action”.3086
1418. On the basis of information before it, and mindful of the limits of its mandate, the
Mission has not concluded that particular individuals committed the identified prohibited
acts with the requisite special intent, giving rise to individual criminal responsibility for
genocide. Instead, the Mission assessed the body of available information in light of the
jurisprudence of international tribunals, and considered whether the factors that have
allowed for the reasonable inference of genocidal intent in other contexts and cases, are
present in the case of the Rohingya in Rakhine State. This exercise has been undertaken to
assist in any subsequent determination of genocidal intent on the part of particular
perpetrators, properly identified, before a court of law.

Factors relevant to a finding of genocidal intent

1419. The factors identified by the Mission fall broadly into five categories. A first set of
factors relates to the broader context within which the acts occurred and the widely
prevalent rhetoric of hatred and contempt toward Rohingya. None of the prohibited
physical acts described in the preceding chapters occurred in a vacuum. They were
cultivated through an environment of long-standing, extreme and systemic discrimination
based on the ethnic, racial and/or religious identity of the Rohingya. As described in this
report, such discrimination is rooted in Myanmar’s laws, policies and practices. The
Rohingya community has long been persecuted. This oppression and targeting has been
accompanied and compounded by stigmatization of the group, a process in which

3081 ICTY, Prosecutor v Krstic, IT-98-33-A, Judgment, 19 April 2004, para. 35: ICTR, Prosecutor v.
Gacumbitsi, ICTR-2001-64-T, Judgment, 17 June 2004, para. 258; ICTR, Prosecutor v Kamuhanda,
ICTR-95-54A-T, Judgment, 22 January 2005, para. 629; ICTR, Prosecutor v Akayesu. ICTR-96-4-T,
Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 730; ICTR, Prosecutor v Muhimana, ICTR-95-1B-T, Judgment,
28 April 2005, paras. 496, 498, 516; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, ICTR-96-10 and ICTR-96-
17-T, Judgment, 21 February 2003, para. 785.
3082 ICTR, Prosecutor v Ndindabahizi, ICTR-2001-71-T, Judgment, 15 July 2004, para. 461.
3083 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Muhimana, ICTR-95-1B-T, Judgment, 28 April 2005, para. 496; ICTR,
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 728.
3084 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stakic, IT-97-24-A, Judgment, 22 March 2006, para. 55.
3085 Ibid.
3086 ICTR, Prosecutor v Bagilishema, ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgment, 7 June 2001, para. 63.

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Government officials, military and other security forces, and religious figures have had a
role.
1420. The Rohingya have not only been denied an identity; they have been systematically
referred to in derogatory and dehumanizing terms. 3087 The apparent intent and purpose of
such rhetoric have been to exclude them from the Myanmar nation to which they once
belonged, in pursuit of an exclusionary vision based on “national races”. This process of
“othering” the Rohingya has resulted in them systematically being called “Bengali” or
“illegal immigrants” who will overrun and Islamise the country. They are portrayed as an
existential threat both to the nation and to its Buddhist character. Such rhetoric, coming
from figures of authority, has fueled anti-Rohingya sentiment across the country for many
years. Following the 2012 violence, a shift in this rhetoric saw an increase in references to
Rohingya as “violent extremists” and “terrorists” and practicing “violent Islam”, further
fueling fear and deep resentment. The impact of derogatory language has been magnified
through social media platforms, on which hate speech, discriminatory narratives and
incitement to hostility and violence against Rohingya have been rampant.
1421. The use of derogatory language toward members of the targeted group is a relevant
indicator of genocidal intent.3088 It demonstrates a willingness to debase and humiliate a
group, in an attempt to strip it of its humanity in the eyes of the eventual direct perpetrators,
and as such it is often a precursor to acts of violence to come. “The general political
doctrine”3089 which gives rise to the prohibited genocidal acts has been an important factor
in determining the existence of genocidal intent in other contexts. In relation to the
Rohingya, the general political doctrine is one of State-sanctioned oppression and
persecution in all aspects of their life. This, in combination with past and present
Governments’ failure to condemn the pervasive rhetoric of hatred and contempt towards the
Rohingya, as well as the participation of high-level officials and figures of authority in it,
could constitute one set of indicators from which to reasonably infer that acts were
committed with genocidal intent.
1422. A second set of indicators is the specific utterances of government officials,
politicians, religious authorities and military commanders, as well as of direct perpetrators
prior, during and after the violence. Survivors of the “clearance operations” described the
derogatory language that regularly accompanied acts of violence. This language was not
only insulting, it often also revealed an exclusionary vision, with perpetrators using
expressions such as “go away”, “you don’t belong here”, “you are Bengali”, “we will kill
you all”.3090 A female survivor, gang raped with her sister, recounted a member of the
Tatmadaw saying, “We are going to kill you this way, by raping. We are going to kill
Rohingya. We will rape you. This is not your country.” 3091 In Facebook posts dated August
2017, a Tatmadaw soldier spoke of excitement in being deployed to Rakhine State because
“Muslim dogs” were posing a threat to the citizens 3092, while a police officer involved in
“clearance operations” posted “Have been wanting to kill these ‘Kalar’ for so long. Only
got to kill them just now.” 3093 In Rwanda, the fact that attackers were heard singing songs
referring to the extermination of the Tutsi was taken into account when finding genocidal
intent.3094 Phrases such as “exterminate them, look for them everywhere, kill them, and get
it over with” were relied upon to ascribe the specific intent to destroy the Tutsi population

3087 See chapter VI, section B: The issue of “hate speech”.

3088 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 21 May 1999, paras. 93,
527; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Popovic et al, IT-05-88-T, Judgment and Sentence, 10 June 2010, para.
1177; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Muhimana, ICTR-95-1B-T, Judgment, 28 April 2005, para. 496.
3089 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 524.
3090 BI-001, BI-006, CI-147, EI-017, LI-006; LI-041, LI-048, LI-059, LI-099, QI-038, QI-041, QI-059,
QI-064, QI-111, YI-030, WI-010.
3091 EI-084.
3092 V-10.
3093 V-01.
3094 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A, Judgment, 13 December
2004, paras. 360-364.

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to the attackers at a particular massacre site. 3095 In the context of the “clearance operations”,
similar utterances may demonstrate an intent on the part of direct perpetrators to destroy the
Rohingya as a group.
1423. Government officials, politicians, religious figures, and military and security force
commanders have also made deeply disturbing public statements or comments. As
highlighted in this report, the Mission found many statements that demonstrate utter
contempt towards the Rohingya community, some including direct threats of, or incitement
to, violence. In 2015, Nay Myo Wai, Chair of the Peace and Diversity Party, at a rally in Bo
Sein Menn football ground in Bahan Township, Yangon, declared to a crowd who can be
heard cheering in the video posted to YouTube: “I won’t say much, I will make it short and
direct. Number one, shoot and kill them! (the Rohingyas). Number two, kill and shoot
them! (the Rohingyas). Number three, shoot and bury them! (the Rohingyas). Number four,
bury and shoot them! (the Rohingyas). If we do not kill, shoot, and bury them, they will
keep sneaking into our country!” In combination with the official narrative of denying any
violations against the Rohingya, the near-total impunity for the instigators and perpetrators
of grave crimes against the Rohingya, and the lack of condemnation of violence against the
Rohingya, it is difficult to view such statements as anything other than an official approval
of discrimination and extreme violence against this group. 3096
1424. Statements have been made by some of the most authoritative figures in Myanmar
society. In July 2012, then President Thein Sein publicly stated, “the last resort to this issue
is to hand in the Rohingya who sneaked in to UNHCR to stay in the refugee camps”. In
October 2017, Sitagu Sayadaw, one of Myanmar’s most revered monks, made an address to
members of the military at a training school, apparently absolving the military of any guilt
or culpability for killing Rohingya. Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing, the Tatmadaw’s
Commander-in-Chief since 2011 and the most powerful person in Myanmar, has made
numerous public statements that deny the existence of Rohingya; label the group as illegal
immigrants, terrorists and extremists; deny any wrongdoing in Tatmadaw operations in
Rakhine State; ignore the suffering of Rohingya; and call on the Myanmar “ethnic people”
to take patriotic action. At the height of the “clearance operations”, he stated that the
“Bengali problem” was an “unfinished job” that the Government was taking great care to
solve. These statements were all made in a highly volatile and tense context. The fact that
figures of authority chose to mirror hateful narratives spread by ultranationalist movements,
rather than combat them, may be revealing of their own sentiments and intent.
1425. A third set of indicators of intent relates to the existence of discriminatory plans and
policies that seek to change the demographic and ethnic composition of Rakhine State, the
goal being to reduce the proportion of Rohingya. As highlighted above, the Government of
Myanmar and other figures of authority have been extremely preoccupied with the
demographic composition of Rakhine State, to the point of adopting specific legislation and
other measures to change it. Examples include the laws and orders restricting marriages and
births among the Rohingya population in northern Rakhine, but also the policy of building
NaTaLa “model villages” since the 1990s. This has required the appropriation of land and
the resettlement of ethnic Rakhine or other Buddhists into the area from elsewhere. The
development and reconstruction efforts of the Government in the aftermath of the
“clearance operations” in 2017 also indicate plans to relocate other ethnic groups on land
where Rohingya villages once stood. At a more general level, the arbitrary deprivation of
nationality of the Rohingya, their consequent and consistent labeling as “Bengali” or
“illegal immigrants”, and the protracted and unresolved nature of the “citizenship” issue
also indicate a desire to rid Myanmar of the Rohingya.
1426. Against this background and the pervasive rhetoric of “uncontrollable birthrates” of
Rohingya, the widespread rape and sexual violence against Rohingya women and girls,

3095 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A, Judgment, 13 December

2004, paras. 360-364; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Popovic et al., IT-05-88-T, Judgment, 10 June 2010, para.
1177.
3096 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Karemera and Ngirumpatse, ICTR-98-44-T, Judgment, 2 February 2012, para.
1597.

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particularly in the context of the “clearance operations”, may very well have been aimed at
affecting their reproductive capacity. In addition to the physical destruction of reproductive
capacity in cases where the genitalia were mutilated, for the reasons discussed above,
Rohingya women and girls who have been raped or gang raped are significantly less likely
to marry and reproduce.
1427. Although an intent to alter the demographic or ethnic composition of an area is not
conclusive of genocidal intent per se, these plans, policies and acts demonstrate an active
preoccupation on the part of government and military authorities with the Rohingya
presence in Rakhine State. The reduction of a protected group is also not synonymous with
its destruction. It is certainly possible to imagine situations in which a particular ethnic or
religious group could be encouraged or even forced to leave a defined geographical area,
without the instigators possessing genocidal intent. However, in the context of the former
Yugoslavia, the existence of a plan to create an ethnically homogenous state, along with
evidence of an intent to exclude non-members by violence, and evidence that the targeted
group could not lay claim to any specific territory, was found to support an inference that
this plan of exclusion contemplated the destruction of the non-member ethnic groups.3097 In
the case of the Rohingya, the manifest intention on the part of the authorities to reduce or
remove this targeted group from Rakhine State is relevant to the intention with which the
criminal acts themselves ultimately occurred.
1428. A fourth set of indicators of intent in the case of the Rohingya relates to evidence of
an organized plan of destruction. The existence of a plan or policy is not a legal element of
the crime of genocide. However, in the context of proving genocidal intent, the existence of
a plan or policy may become an important evidentiary factor.3098 Where it is demonstrated
that acts of a consistent character have been systematically directed against a protected
group, such acts may support the inference of genocidal intent. 3099 To this extent, the
“clearance operations” of 2016 and 2017, while perhaps unique in terms of their scope,
intensity and brutality, are only one piece of a larger picture. They are arguably the result of
a long-standing policy of oppression and persecution targeting the Rohingya, leading to the
extreme control and securitization of the area. They are also the most immediate cause of
the mass exodus of Rohingya from Myanmar.
1429. A level of organization evidencing a plan of destruction can also be demonstrated by
a number of facts: that the killings were perpetrated in a systematic manner; 3100 that types of
weapons and methods employed by the attackers were consistent across attacks; 3101 and that
the attackers employed a consistent modus operandi across those attacks.3102 The manner in
which the August 2017 operations (and to a certain extent the 2016 prelude) was carried out
is strikingly consistent. The operations covered a large geographic area and lasted for
weeks, but victims and witnesses from across the three townships and many village tracts
described the same patterns of conduct on the part of the security forces. There was a
remarkable similarity in the timing of the operations, the sequence of events, the types of
weapons used, the assistance received from other security forces or ethnic Rakhine, the
coordination and division of roles between perpetrators, the types of violations and the
manner in which they were committed. The modus operandi of these attacks was
recognisable and consistent throughout. This could not have occurred in the absence of
significant levels of forethought and organization.

3097 ICTY, Prosecutor v Karadzic, IT-95-5/IT-18-1-R-61, Review of the Indictments Pursuant to Rule 61
of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 11 July 1996, para. 94.
3098 ICTR Prosecutor v. Jelisic, IT-95-10-A. Judgment, 5 July 2001, para. 48; ICTY, Prosecutor v Krstic,
IT98-33-A, Judgment, 19 April 2004, para. 225.
3099 ICTY, Prosecutor v Jelisic, IT-95-10-A, Judgment, 5 July 2001, para. 47; ICTR, Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 523; ICTR, Prosecutor v Kayishema and
Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 21 May 1999, paras. 93, 289, 534-535, 537; ICTR, Prosecutor v
Muhimana, ICTR-95-1B-T, Judgment, 28 April 2005, para. 496.
3100 ICTY, Prosecutor v Krstic, IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 2 August 2001, para. 547.
3101 ICTR, Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 21 May 1999, para. 537.
3102 ICTY, Prosecutor v Jelisic, IT-95-10-T, Judgment, 14 December 1999, para. 88; ICTR, Prosecutor v
Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-T, Trial Judgment, 21 May 1999, para. 535.

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1430. The response of the security forces to the ARSA attacks of 25 August 2017 was
immediate – within hours. It had been preceded by a build-up of military capacity in the
area over the month beforehand, and a months-long campaign of oppression that involved
the removal of protective fences around Rohingya homes and the confiscation of any kind
of weapon or sharp implement from Rohingya. The disarming of Rohingya paralleled the
arming of ethnic Rakhine groups and militias. These elements suggest a level of pre-
planning and preparation to the operations. Also relevant is the involvement of all levels of
the Tatmadaw’s chain of command, from the Commander-in-Chief to the foot soldier. The
“clearance operations” were not planned and executed by an isolated cell of soldiers but the
army as a whole. The implication of multiple levels of military command in an operation
can evidence the systematic nature of the culpable acts and an organized plan of
destruction, supporting an inference of genocidal intent.3103
1431. Consistent targeting by the perpetrators is also indicative of a level of planning and
forethought.3104 Women and girls of reproductive age were targeted for brutal rape, gang
rape and sexual violence. Children were targeted for killing. There are indications that
educated, wealthy and influential men, that is, the Rohingya leaders in towns and villages,
were also specifically targeted. In addition to the subsequent impact on the Rohingya
community’s ability to rebuild itself, the specific targeting of these groups is also
demonstrative of a deliberate plan or a level of organization evidencing a plan of
destruction. No reasonable argument can be made that the attacks against the Rohingya
population were spontaneous or random, or that they evolved in an uncoordinated or
unplanned manner or that their brutality and destructiveness were aberrations. Given the
importance of the existence of a plan or policy for destruction in the context of proving
genocidal intent, proof of synchronized and deliberate attacks may support an ultimate
finding that the prohibited acts against the Rohingya were perpetrated with the intent to
destroy.
1432. A fifth set of indicators of intent revolves around the extreme brutality of the acts
and campaign against the Rohingya. 3105 The brutality of an attack is relevant to whether the
perpetrators acted with specific intent, given that “a brutal attack targeting several thousand
members of an ethnic group is itself indicative of the requisite intent to destroy an ethnic
group, in whole or in part.”3106 The fact that, for example, pregnant women and babies were
not spared has been found to show an intention to “wipe out a group in its entirety.” 3107 The
“extent of bodily injuries” is also a relevant factor.3108
1433. The killing of civilians is inherently brutal in any context. The perpetrators of the
“clearance operations” in Rakhine State introduced an additional dimension to this. There
was not the least effort on their part to make any distinction between ARSA fighters and
civilians, or to specifically target a military objective or identify and repel an immediate
threat. Everyone was a target and no one was spared: mothers, infants, pregnant women, the
old and infirmed all fell victim to the ruthless campaign. The targeting of women and girls
for rape, gang rape and other forms of sexual violence, as well as the targeting of and
impact on children in general, has been shocking. The brutality with which the underlying
acts were carried out provides further support for a conclusion that they were committed
with genocidal intent.

Other reasonable inferences from the available information

1434. The Mission has also considered whether the information and material collected
could lead to reasonable inferences other than that the specific prohibited acts were
motivated by the intent to destroy.

3103 ICTY, Prosecutor v Tolimir, IT-05-88/2-A, Judgment, 8 April 2015, para. 252.
3104 ICTY, Prosecutor v Tolimir, IT-05-88/2-A, Judgment, 8 April 2015, para. 263.
3105 ICTY, Prosecutor v Jelisic, IT-95-10-A, Judgment, 5 July 2001, para. 47.
3106 ICTR, Prosecutor v Ndindabahizi, ICTR-2001-71-T, Judgment, 15 July 2004, para. 461.
3107 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 121.
3108 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Muhimana, ICTR-95-1B-T, Judgment, 28 April 2005, para. 496.

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1435. First, it has considered the credibility of the Government and military authorities’
official explanation that the “clearance operations” were legitimately targeted at eliminating
a terrorist threat from ARSA. This official explanation appears to suggest that the
operations were aimed at restoring security in Rakhine State, including by creating the
conditions that would allow for even greater control and surveillance over the population.
This would occur through the creation of a new physical environment, with newly built
villages that are easier to control and in the vicinity of reinforced security posts. The
controlled repatriation of the entire Rohingya population would then allow for managed
resettlement, a rebalancing of ethnic groups, and the screening of all returnees to remove
“terrorist” elements. It would also allow for the systematic imposition of NVC cards, on
which a return is made conditional.
1436. This explanation is flawed. The manner in which the operations were conducted
would have required that all Rohingya were “terrorists” and a legitimate target,
necessitating the destruction of entire villages and communities. In reality, and as known to
the Tatmadaw, ARSA posed a limited threat. The Tatmadaw had been present in the region
for many years and was familiar with operational requirements. Enhanced security to
eliminate the threat from an emerging, but still very small, armed group could have been
implemented through far more limited, targeted and less pervasive means. Pursuing a
campaign of absolute terror and brutality through gang raping women, killing babies and
erasing entire villages, in the knowledge that such response is unlawful and
disproportionate, reveals an alternative intent. The explicit and frequent linkage made by
the Tatmadaw’s Commander-in-Chief, Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing, between the
operations and the “Bengali problem” the country has supposedly been facing “since 1942”
further indicates that the operations were not a response to the current and specific security
threat posed by ARSA.
1437. Similarly, the suggestion that the authorities may have been legitimately seeking
demographic change in Rakhine State (as opposed to the destruction of the Rohingya group
as such) cannot be reconciled with the scope of violence and brutality of the military, or the
serious bodily and mental harm inflicted on the civilian population. Demographic change
had been pursued for many years through non-violent means, albeit profoundly
discriminatory and oppressive. It would not have necessitated the killing of more than
10,000 civilians, the systematic and coordinated rape of women, the mass deportation of
over 725,000 people, and the destruction of entire villages.
1438. An argument that the intent may have been to displace the Rohingya population, but
not to seek its ultimate destruction, falls at the same hurdle. The scale and scope of violence
in its varied forms, the intensity and brutality of the attacks, and the physical destruction of
Rohingya life as it once was, through the mass demolition of their villages and homes,
make it difficult to consider any such inferences as reasonable. When considered against
the patterns of oppression and dehumanization spanning decades and a coordinated and
widely prevalent discriminatory rhetoric on the part of the very authorities entrusted with
ensuring the Rohingya’s safety, livelihood and protection, the picture becomes even more
complete.

(d) Conclusion
1439. The attack on the Rohingya population of Myanmar was horrendous in scope. The
images of an entire community fleeing from their homes across rivers and muddy banks,
carrying their babies and infants and elderly, their injured and dying, will and must remain
burned in the minds the international community. So will the “before and after” satellite
imagery, revealing whole villages literally wiped off the map. In much of northern Rakhine
State, every trace of the Rohingya, their life and community as it had existed for decades,
was removed. The situation in many areas now appears to match the official narrative:
“there is no group called Rohingya in Myanmar”. The “clearance operations” were indeed
successful.
1440. The question of whether genocidal intent exists can sometimes usefully be
approached in reverse, by examining what the relevant authorities and perpetrators would
have done, had they wished to destroy the target group in whole or in part. The actions of
those who orchestrated the attacks on the Rohingya read as a veritable check-list: the

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systematic stripping of human rights, the dehumanizing narratives and rhetoric, the
methodical planning, mass killing, mass displacement, mass fear, overwhelming levels of
brutality, combined with the physical destruction of the home of the targeted population, in
every sense and on every level.
1441. The Mission therefore concludes, on reasonable grounds, that the factors allowing
the inference of genocidal intent are present. It is now for a competent prosecutorial body
and court of law to investigate and adjudicate cases against specific individuals to
determine individual guilt or innocence.

B. Crimes against humanity

1442. Crimes against humanity are among the gravest crimes under international law.
They are particularly serious offences giving rise to grave humiliation or degradation,
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population. 3109 It
is this specific context, indicating a scale and level of organization that shocks the
conscience of humanity, which elevates “ordinary” criminal acts to those concerning the
international community as a whole. In its consideration of whether established facts may
amount to crimes against humanity, the Mission has relied on the definition contained in
Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the ICC.3110 Possible divergences from custom are noted
where relevant.
1443. The legal threshold for crimes against humanity is high. First, it must be
demonstrated that one of the prohibited acts took place, with the requisite criminal
intent.3111 Given that crimes against humanity are defined by their contextual element, it
must also be demonstrated that the act was committed “as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population”. An attack directed against any
civilian population means “a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of
[prohibited] acts against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or
organizational policy to commit such attack”.3112 An “attack” does not need to involve a
military attack or the use of armed force; it can, for example, encompass mistreatment of
the civilian population.3113 “Directed against” requires that a civilian population be the
intended primary target of the attack, rather than an incidental victim. 3114 The word “any”
indicates that “civilian population” is to be understood broadly, 3115 regardless of nationality,
ethnicity or any other distinguishing feature. 3116
1444. The attack must be widespread or systematic. Widespread generally connotes a
quantitative and geographic element, relating to the number of targeted persons, 3117 the

3109 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (3rd ed.), (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013), pp. 90-91.
3110 This definition enjoys wide support among states: A/CN.4/680, International Law Commission, First
report on crimes against humanity by Sean D. Murphy, Special Rapporteur, para. 122. See also
A/70/10, Report of the International Law Commission, 14 August 2015, at p. 59, para. 8.
3111 ICC Statute, art. 7(1).
3112 ICC Statute, art. 7(2)(a).
3113 ICC Elements of Crime, art. 7, para. 3; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1-
A, Judgment, 12 June 2002, para. 86.
3114 ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-tENG, Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the
Statute, 20 April 2015, para. 1104; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/ 1-
T, Judgment, 22 February 2001, para. 421.
3115 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mrksic et al., IT-95-13/1-T, Judgment, 27 September 2007, para. 442; ICTY,
Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-T, Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 643; ICTY Prosecutor v. Kupreskic,
IT-95-16-T, Judgment, 14 January 2000, para. 547.
3116 ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-717, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges, 30 September 2008, para. 399.
3117 ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-717, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges, 30 September 2008, para. 394; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, IT-95-14/2-A,
Judgment, 17 December 2004, para. 94; Prosecutor v. Blagojevic and Jokic, IT-02-60-T, Judgment,
17 January 2005, paras. 545-546.

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multiplicity of victims,3118 the frequency of acts,3119 and/or the attacks occurring in different
locations.3120 Systematic relates to the organized nature of the acts of violence and the
improbability of their random occurrence, 3121 or as organized conduct following a
consistent pattern or pursuant to a policy or plan. 3122 Patterns of crimes, or the “non-
accidental repetition of similar criminal conduct on a regular basis”, are seen as a common
expression of a systematic occurrence. 3123 An attack will be systematic when, for example,
“the perpetrators employed similar means and methods to attack the different locations”. 3124
Lastly, it must also be demonstrated that the perpetrator was aware of the broader context in
which the actions occurred.
1445. These contextual elements determine whether a set of prohibited acts amount to the
level of crimes against humanity. Such prohibited acts include: murder; extermination;
enslavement; deportation or forcible transfer of population; imprisonment or other severe
deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law;
torture; rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization,
or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; persecution against any
identifiable group or collectivity; enforced disappearance of persons; apartheid; other
inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury
to body or to mental or physical health.

1. Kachin and Shan States

(a) Underlying prohibited acts

Murder
1446. Murder is defined under international law as the unlawful and intentional killing of a
human being.3125 The death of the victim must result from an act or omission of the
perpetrator, who possessed the intent to kill, or the intent to cause serious bodily harm
which the perpetrator should reasonably have known might lead to death.3126
1447. This report details consistent and credible information establishing a pattern of
violations of the right to life, with numerous unlawful killings of civilians, in Kachin and
Shan States during the period under review. Many killings reported to the Mission were
murders or extrajudicial executions of persons in the custody of the Tatmadaw. Other

3118 A/51/10, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session, 6 May -
26 July 1996, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-first session, Supplement No.10, at p.
47 (using the phrase “on a large scale” instead of widespread); ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-
96-4-T, Judgment, 5 September 1998, para. 580; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana,
ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 21 May 1999, para. 123; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mrksic, IT-95-13/1-T,
Judgment, 27 September, 2007, para. 437.
3119 ICC, Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red, Decision on the confirmation of
charges, 16 December 2011, para. 265, where the crimes were insufficient because, inter alia, they
had been committed and scattered over a 6-month period.
3120 ICC, Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-373, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 23 January 2012, para. 177.
3121 ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-717, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges, 14 October 2008, para. 394; ICC, Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-373, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 23 January 2012,
para. 179; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mrksic, IT-95-13/1-T, Judgment, 27 September 2007, para. 437;
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/ 1-T, Judgment, 22 February 2001,
para. 429.
3122 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 5 September 1998, at, para. 580; Prosecutor
v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 21 May 1999, at para. 123.
3123 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, 12 June 2002, para. 94.
3124 ICC, The Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-36-Red, Decision on the Prosecutor's
Application under Article 58, 14 July 2012, para. 31.
3125 ICC Elements of Crime, art. 7(1)(a); ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 5
September 1998, para. 589.
3126 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., IT-98-30/1-A, Judgment, 28 February 2005, para. 259.

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unlawful killings occurred in the context of military operations, as a consequence of

indiscriminate attacks and attacks directed at civilians. Accounts were received of the
Tatmadaw shooting or aiming mortar shells directly at civilians, including women and
children, while they were fleeing or seeking shelter from the fighting. Victims and
witnesses consistently describe how the Tatmadaw repeatedly targets individual civilians of
the same ethnic background as their armed adversary, specifically affecting men between
the ages of 18 and 40 years old, considered of fighting age.
1448. The Mission accordingly considers that there are reasonable grounds to conclude
that murder as an underlying act of crimes against humanity was committed in Kachin and
northern Shan States.

Enslavement
1449. Enslavement is the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of
ownership over a person, 3127 meaning “the use, enjoyment and disposal of a person who is
regarded as property, by placing him or her in a situation of dependence which entails his or
her deprivation of any form of autonomy”. 3128 This includes the purchasing, selling, lending
or bartering of a person. 3129 Whether a situation amounts to enslavement depends on the
control of someone’s movement, control of physical environment, psychological control,
measures taken to prevent or deter escape, force, threat of force or coercion, duration,
assertion of exclusivity, subjection to cruel treatment and abuse, control of sexuality and
forced labour.3130 Forced labour can therefore rise to the level of enslavement, even without
any additional evidence of mistreatment. 3131 To determine if forced labour reaches the
threshold, the question is whether “the relevant persons had no choice as to whether they
would work”.3132 Moreover, the perpetrator must have intended to exercise power attaching
to the right of ownership.3133
1450. The extent to which forced labour has been part of the lives of ethnic minorities in
Kachin and Shan States is nowhere better illustrated than by a witness who told the Mission
that she was not aware that the practice was illegal until she left Myanmar. In the words of
another witness who had performed forced labour twice a month from the age of 12 or 13,
“we have done this for our whole lives”. 3134 Refusal to participate was impossible. Anything
other than compliance resulted in threats or violence, with reports of soldiers shooting at
individuals attempting to escape. The Mission is satisfied that none of the acts of labour
described in this report was carried out as a result of the labourer’s own free will, and that
the Tatmadaw and security forces who managed the forced labour in many cases
intentionally exercised the powers of ownership over the civilians whom they forced to
work. This is evidenced by the levels of coercion, the threats, the impossibility of escape,
the ill-treatment often associated with forced labour, and the fear experienced by the
victims. The victims described how their lives, their activities, their movements, even their
bodies were completely outside their control.

3127 ICC Statute, art. 7(2)(c).

3128 ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-tENG, Judgment, 7 March 2014, para. 975.
3129 ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(c), para. 1.
3130 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, para. 542; ICTY,
Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, 12 June 2002, para. 119; ICC,
Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 7
March 2014, para. 976; ECCC, Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav, 001/18-07-2007- ECCC/SC,
Judgment, 3 February 2012, paras. 117-162.
3131 ECCC, Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav, 001/18-07-2007- ECCC/SC, Appeal Judgment, 3 February
2012, para. 126; Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., IT-96-23/IT-96-23/1, Judgment, 22 February 2001,
para. 541.
3132 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-1-T, Judgment, 18 May 2012, para. 448; ICTY, Prosecutor v.
Krnojelac, IT-97-25-T, Judgment, 15 March 2002, para. 359; Trial of Major War Criminals before
the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946, Vol. 22
(1947), pp. 565-566; Trial of Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal,
Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946, Vol. 22 (1947), at p. 579.
3133 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, 12 June 2002, para. 122.
3134 DI-063.

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1451. As to the scale and scope of the forced labour, in enslavement cases in international
jurisprudence, victims were forced to carry loads, perform domestic chores, work in
diamond mines,3135 perform sexual services,3136 plant rice, build dams, and dig canals. 3137
There was no requirement that the labourers were subject to additional ill-treatment, beyond
the labour itself. The Mission considers that much of the forced labour to which the
populations of Kachin and Shan States were subjected is comparable, and notes, with
particular concern, those who were forced to act as “human mine sweepers”, and women
and girls subjected to rape and sexual violence by the military in this context.
1452. However, the practice was not permanent, even if indefinite. Although some
instances of forced labour went on for months, or even years, in some cases it lasted only a
day, with villagers returning home in the evenings. The duration of forced labour is relevant
to whether it rises to the level of enslavement, with courts considering whether the exercise
of ownership spanned a few months or only a matter of days. 3138 The importance of
duration in any given case, however “will depend on the existence of other indications of
enslavement”.3139 The Mission considers that, even in circumstances in which the individual
periods of forced labour may have been relatively short, its endemic and pervasive nature
affected entire communities. No family could expect to be safe from its grasp. The Mission
has also taken into account the fact that villagers were taken for forced labour on repeated
occasions and, for many, from childhood to adulthood. Further, they had no idea, neither
when they were seized nor during their captivity, how long they would be held. Their fate
was unknown to them and completely outside their hands. As such, it is satisfied that this
conduct gives rise to reasonable grounds to consider that enslavement as an underlying act
of crimes against humanity has occurred.

Forcible transfer of a population

1453. Forcible transfer is the “forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion
or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds
permitted under international law”.3140 It refers to displacement within national
boundaries.3141
1454. The displacement must occur as a consequence of “expulsion or other coercive
acts”. This includes the threat of coercion or force “such as that caused by fear of violence,
duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power against such person or
persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment”. 3142 The
determining factor is the absence of a genuine choice on the side of the victim.3143 Fleeing
to escape from violence and persecution is neither voluntary nor free choice. 3144 The crime
includes “the full range of coercive pressures on people to flee their homes, including death
threats, destruction of their homes, and other acts of persecution, such as depriving
members of a group of employment, or access to schools”. 3145 The perpetrator does not

3135 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-1-T, Judgment, 18 May 2012, para. 1738.
3136 Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., IT-96-23/IT-96-23/1, Judgment, 22 February 2001, paras. 741-742.
3137 ECCC, Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav, 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgment, 26 July 2010, paras.
225-235.
3138 In the case of Kunarac, for example, at the ICTY, the accused was convicted of enslavement on the
basis that he abducted two girls who were kept in a house and forced to perform domestic duties and
sexual services for a period of five to six months. He was not convicted in relation to a girl who had
left the house “after a few days”. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1-A,
Judgment, 12 June 2002, paras. 717-745.
3139 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, 22 February 2001, para.
542.
3140 ICC Statute, Art. 7(1)(d); ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(d).
3141 ICC, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under article 19(3) of the
Statute”, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-37, 6 September 2018, paras. 53-55.
3142 ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(d), fn. 12.
3143 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, IT-97-25-A, Judgment, 17 September 2003, para. 229.
3144 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 2 August 2001, para. 530.
3145 Christopher K. Hall in Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999), at p. 162.

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need to intend to displace the population permanently. 3146 The forced displacement must,
however, be unlawful under international law and not justified, for example, by reasons of
security or military necessity.3147 Moreover, the displaced population needs first to have
been lawfully present in the territory. 3148
1455. The Mission has described the Tatmadaw practice of forcing civilians from their
homes in Kachin and Shan States. The Mission collected consistent accounts of villagers
being ordered to leave their homes and villages, being ordered not to return, or being
physically prevented from doing so. The account of a former farmer from Loilen District,
Shan State, is illustrative. The Tatmadaw came to his village and told the villagers “you are
no longer allowed to farm and you all need to leave the village immediately, otherwise we
will burn your homes”.3149 The Tatmadaw soldiers later burned down his house, along with
others in the village. The Mission has identified a widespread practice of attacking,
destroying and looting civilian property, including intentional burning of civilian houses.
Some victims, who tried to return after attacks, found that their land had been confiscated.
1456. The civilians who were displaced were lawfully present in the territory. Having
reviewed the consistent accounts describing the displacement, the Mission considers that it
was not voluntary and that those who were displaced had no choice but to flee. Recalling
that “coercive acts” (and not just physical expulsion) can give rise to criminal liability, the
Mission also notes the corroborated accounts of the Tatmadaw arresting civilians,
confiscating food, harassing and intimidating, and generally “making it impossible to
survive in our village”.3150 Given the context in which these displacements occurred,
including during attacks on villages, it is difficult to see how they could have been justified
by any level of military necessity. In these circumstances, the Mission considers on
reasonable grounds that forcible transfer as an underlying act of crimes against humanity
has occurred in Kachin and Shan States during the period under review.

Rape, sexual slavery and sexual violence

1457. Rape is an act by which “the perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct
resulting in penetration of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a
sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other
part of the body”.3151 This invasion must be “committed by force, or by threat of force or
coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological
oppression or abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by taking
advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a person
incapable of giving genuine consent”.3152
1458. Sexual slavery is a particularly serious form of enslavement. As well as exercising
any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over the person(s), the
perpetrator must also cause the person to engage in one or more acts of a sexual nature. 3153
A commercial transaction is not required, as the notion of servitude relates primarily to “the
impossibility of the victim’s changing his or her condition”. 3154 Sexual slavery also
encompasses situations where women and girls are forced into “marriage”, domestic

3146 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stakic, IT-97-24-A, Judgment. 22 March 2006, paras. 278, 307; ICTY,
Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, IT-99-36-A, Judgment, 3 April 2007, at para. 206.
3147 Article 49 of Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilians; ICRC/Customary IHL,
rule 129.
3148 ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(d), para. 2.
3149 PI-082.
3150 PI-035.
3151 ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(g)-1, para. 1.
3152 ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(g)-1, para. 2.
3153 ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(g)-2, para. 2.
3154 ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-tENG, Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the
Statute, 7 March 2014, para. 976.

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servitude, or other forced labour involving compulsory sexual activity, including rape, by
their captors.3155
1459. The definition of crimes against humanity also lists “other sexual violence of
comparable gravity” as a prohibited underlying act. This covers cases where the perpetrator
committed an act of a sexual nature or caused such person or persons to engage in an act of
a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or coercion such as that caused by fear of
violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such
person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or
such person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent. 3156 The conduct must be of
comparable gravity to rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and
forced sterilisation.
1460. Sexual violence has been a feature of military presence and offensives in Kachin and
Shan States.3157 Despite presumed significant underreporting, the Mission has found a
significant number of corroborating accounts of the Tatmadaw targeting women and girls
for sexual violence in various forms. It notes that the prevalence of rape and sexual
violence committed by soldiers and groups of soldiers, including in the presence of (or by)
senior military officers, reflects a widespread culture of tolerance, if not an explicit policy,
of humiliation and denigration. Consistently, women who managed to fight or escape were
later looked for by their attackers, who came to their homes and threatened and physically
abused the victims’ family members and destroyed or confiscated property.
1461. The Mission also established a pattern of sexual violence perpetrated as torture or
ill-treatment against men. This report details accounts from victims who were forced to
undress and rape each other in front of SaYaPa agents who laughed as the victims begged
to stop.3158 SaYaPa agents rubbed the penis of one victim until the skin was torn and
bleeding.3159 The perpetrators took advantage of a coercive environment of detention, and
their position of power, to force the detainees to perform these acts.
1462. The penetration of the victims’ bodies was committed by force or threat of force or
coercion, detention, abuse of power, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment.
Forcing victims to perform sexual acts on one another and injuring sexual organs fall within
the scope of “other acts of sexual violence of comparable gravity”. The Mission considers
that there are reasonable grounds to conclude that rape and other forms of sexual violence
as underlying acts of crimes against humanity were committed in Kachin and Shan State.
1463. Further investigation is needed to determine the scale and nature of sexual slavery
and forced marriage as underlying acts of crimes against humanity. The Mission received a
limited amount of information on these practices, including two accounts from victims,
which are consistent with prior United Nations reports.
1464. Although rape and other forms of sexual violence are separately criminalised, the
Mission recalls that these acts have also been found to amount to torture. 3160 During the acts
of rape and sexual violence, the perpetrators undoubtedly inflicted severe physical or
mental pain or suffering on victims who were in their custody and control. The Mission
accordingly notes that the acts of rape and sexual violence by Tatmadaw forces and others
against civilians in Kachin and Shan States may also give rise to criminal liability for
torture.

3155 ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-717, Decision on the confirmation of
charges, 30 September 2008, para. 431.
3156 ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(g)-6, para. 1.
3157 A/HRC/31/71, p.11; A/66/365, p.11.
3158 PI-052.
3159 PI-055.
3160 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mucic et al., IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 16 November 1998, para. 496. See also
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 731.

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Imprisonment, torture and enforced disappearance

1465. Imprisonment as a crime against humanity occurs when the perpetrator imprisons
one or more persons or otherwise severely deprives them of their liberty. 3161 The
imprisonment must be arbitrary. 3162 Factors to be considered when determining whether
imprisonment has occurred are whether (i) there was a valid warrant of arrest; (ii) the
detainee was informed of the reason for his arrest; (iii) the detainee was formally charged;
and (iv) the detainee was informed of any procedural rights. 3163 The mere fact that civilians
had some freedom of movement does not necessarily mean that they were not deprived of
their liberty and thus unlawfully imprisoned or confined. 3164
1466. Torture is the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of a perpetrator. It does not
include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions.3165
A severe degree of pain and suffering has to be reached in order for a criminal act to
amount to an act of torture.3166 The perpetrator must have intended the conduct and that the
victim endured severe pain or suffering. 3167
1467. Enforced disappearance means the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization,
followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of liberty or to give information on
the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. 3168
1468. The Tatmadaw’s overarching assumption, that everyone of a given ethnicity
supports the associated “ethnic armed organization”, led to a widespread pattern of arbitrary
arrest and detention of civilians in Kachin and Shan States throughout the period under
review. Arbitrary detention for the purpose of forced labour occurred and the Mission
received accounts of mass arrests and detention. Victims have been held incommunicado in
unofficial places of detention for periods between a day and two years. Most victims of
arbitrary arrest were not informed of the reason of arrest, and they were not brought before
a judge. The Mission considers that there are reasonable grounds to conclude that
imprisonment without due process as an underlying act of crimes against humanity was
committed.
1469. Imprisonment and forced labour provided the backdrop against which civilians were
tortured or ill-treated. Demands for information about EAOs were accompanied by beatings
and other ill-treatment, through which the perpetrators intentionally inflicted severe pain
and suffering. None of these acts of violence was a lawful sanction, but severe physical and
mental abuse of detainees who were under custody and control, and thus in a position of
inferiority. Violence was also inflicted on civilians who were not otherwise detained, in
villages or towns, in houses, forest areas, monasteries, and military camps. The level of
pain and suffering inflicted is considered by the Mission to have consistently reached a
level justifying the legal qualification of torture, particularly when considering the
institutionalisation of the ill-treatment, the physical and mental impact on the victims, the
respective positions of the perpetrator and their victims, and the methods used which
include: beating with a bamboo stick or metal rod, using death threats and instilling a fear

3161 ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(e).

3162 ICTY, Prosecutor v Krajisnik, IT-00-39-T, Judgment and Sentence, 27 September 2006, para. 752.
3163 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Ntagerura et al., ICTR-99-46-T, Judgment, 25 February 2004, para. 702
3164 ICTY Prosecutor v Prlic et al., IT-04-74-A, Judgment, 29 November 2017, para. 473.
3165 ICC Statute, art. 7(2)(e).
3166 A/RES/39/46, United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Art. 1; ICC, Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, Decision
Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor, para. 193.
3167 ICC, Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the
Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor, para. 194.
3168 ICC Statute, art. 7(2)(i); United Nations General Assembly Resolution 47/133, United Nations
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, 18 December 1992,
preamble.

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of being killed, rape and sexual violence, burning skin with hot knives or cigarette butts,
pouring hot wax, jabbing the skin with needles or sharp knives, making victims dig their
“own” graves, and killing or raping or torturing other detainees in front of a victim. The
Mission considers that there are reasonable grounds to conclude that torture as an
underlying act of crimes against humanity was committed against civilians in Kachin and
Shan States.
1470. Many victims remain unaccounted for. The lack of compliance with procedural
safeguards for detention, which should protect against disappearance, meant that family
members were frequently unaware of the whereabouts of their detained relatives until they
escaped, were released, or were transferred to official places of detention. In some cases,
this was weeks or months later. In other cases, arrested individuals never returned and their
families still do not know their fate. The Mission received accounts of cases where
individuals were detained by the Tatmadaw and later found dead, often buried. It appears
that efforts are made to intentionally conceal the fate and remains of individuals who were
killed during detention. The victim’s effective removal from the protection of the law, and
the subsequent absence of information or real avenues for recourse for family members,
mean that in many of the cases the legal standard of enforced disappearance is met.
Accordingly, there are reasonable grounds to conclude that enforced disappearance as a
crime against humanity was committed against civilians in Kachin and Shan States.

Persecution
1471. Persecution as a crime against humanity is the intentional and severe deprivation of
fundamental rights contrary to international law, by reason of the identity of the group. 3169
Persecution requires (i) a gross or blatant denial (ii) on discriminatory grounds (iii) of a
fundamental right, laid down in international customary or treaty law, (iv) reaching the
same level of gravity as other crimes against humanity. 3170 Persecution is characterised by
discriminatory intent: the perpetrator must have acted with the intent to harm the victim
because he or she belongs to a particular community or group. 3171 The Statutes of the ICTY
and ICTR prohibited persecution on political, racial or religious grounds. 3172 The ICC
Statute expands the list to include national, ethnic, cultural, gender or other grounds
“universally recognised as impermissible under international law”. 3173
1472. Under the ICC Statute, persecution can only be prosecuted in connection with any
other crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.3174 For this reason, persecution is an
“umbrella” crime that requires that particular acts or omissions that already constitute
crimes in themselves amount to persecution (for example, persecution through rape or
persecution through torture).3175 In considering the gravity threshold, acts should not be
considered in isolation but examined in context and with consideration of cumulative
effect.3176 Evidence of discriminatory intent can be inferred contextually, with relevant
factors including “the general attitude of the alleged perpetrator as demonstrated by his
behaviour”, for example, the use of derogatory language in relation to a particular group
(even where such usage is commonplace) 3177 or the fact that the acts were only inflicted on
members of one group.3178
1473. The violent acts against ethnic and religious minorities in Kachin and Shan States
have occurred in a context of severe and long-standing discrimination on the basis of their

3169 ICC Statute, art. 7(2)(g).

3170 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., IT-95-16-T, Judgment, 14 January 2000, para. 621.
3171 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Karadzic, IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, 24 March 2016, para. 500.
3172 ICTY Statute, art. 5(h); ICTR Statute, art. 3(h).
3173 ICC Statute, art. 7(2)(g).
3174 ICC Statute, art. 7(1)(h).
3175 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stanisic and Zupljanin, IT-08-91-T, Judgment, 27 March 2013, para. 67; ICTY,
Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., IT-95-16-A, Judgment, para. 98.
3176 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., IT-95-16-A Judgment, 23 October 2001, para. 615; ICTY,
Prosecutor v. Popovic et al., IT-05-88-A, Judgment, 30 January 2015, para. 766.
3177 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Popovic et al., IT-05-88-A, Judgment, 30 January 2015, para. 713.
3178 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., IT-98-30/1-A, Judgment, 28 February 2005, para. 366.

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ethnicity and religion. Corroborated accounts reveal a pattern of use of derogatory language
against members of ethnic or religious minorities. As recounted by one witness, “Tatmadaw
soldiers don’t treat us like humans, they treat us like animals. They look at us like we
shouldn’t even exist. Even though the name is Kachin State, they don’t think Kachin should
be there and exist.”3179 Ethnic slurs during the commission of gross human rights violations
and the treatment of people as inferior or “sub-human” have been regularly reported.
1474. Acts of imprisonment and torture in Kachin and Shan States during the period under
review had an ethnic element. Victims were often met with the Tatmadaw’s verbal
denigration of religious identities during interrogations. Rapes and sexual violence were
regularly accompanied by derogatory behaviour such as insults, spitting and physical abuse.
One Christian victim of torture was made to imitate Jesus on a cross like the crucifixion. 3180
Rape victims reported that the perpetrators called them “Kachin bitch” or compared them to
dogs.3181 One witness of a gang rape of two girls heard the perpetrators say, “We will
torture you Kachin bitches until you are extinct”. 3182 The use of such derogatory language
and insults during the commission of rape and sexual abuse gives rise to an inference that
these acts were indeed committed with discriminatory intent, indicating that the victims
were at least in part targeted for their ethnic or religious backgrounds.
1475. The Mission received information indicating that the Tatmadaw has destroyed and
ransacked churches and religious objects. In some cases, they then erected pagodas.
Although the destruction of property is not listed a crime against humanity, “depending on
the nature and extent of destruction, and if committed with discriminatory intent, the
destruction of property can be of equal gravity” and as such may constitute persecution. 3183
The significance of targets such as churches and other religious objects would be known to
the Tatmadaw soldiers who targeted them. Their deliberate replacement with pagodas (the
symbolic replacement of one religion with another) demonstrates the discriminatory nature
of these acts. This warrants further investigation.
1476. The imposition and maintenance of restrictive measures, the destruction of property,
and the frequent occurrence of imprisonment, torture, rape and sexual violence infringed
upon and denied the fundamental rights of civilians in Kachin and Shan States, as laid
down in customary international law and treaty law. These acts were also discriminatory in
fact, selectively and systematically targeting ethnic and religious minorities within the
population.3184 On the basis of the overall pattern of conduct, the Mission considers there
are reasonable grounds to conclude that the perpetrators carried out these actions with the
intent to discriminate against these ethnic and religious minorities. As such, there are
reasonable grounds to conclude that persecution as an underlying act of crimes against
humanity was committed in Kachin and Shan States during the relevant period.

(b) Contextual elements of crimes against humanity

1477. Members of the civilian population of Kachin and Shan States have been the victims
of a campaign that not only resulted in the large-scale loss of life but also left no aspect of
ordinary life untouched. The acts perpetrated as part of this campaign will rise to the level
of crimes against humanity if they were committed “as part of a widespread and systematic
attack directed against any civilian population”. An “attack”, however, is not limited to the
exercise of armed force.3185 Rather than meaning a military operation, the term “attack” is
used to distinguish between a mere aggregate of random acts (which do not rise to the
requisite level) and a series or overall flow of events. 3186 An “attack” can be, for example, a

3179 QI-094.
3180 PI-056.
3181 PI-004, PI-023.
3182 PI-069.
3183 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, IT-95-14-A, Judgment, 29 July 2004, para. 146, 149; ICTY, Prosecutor
v. Karadzic, IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, 24 March 2016, para. 531.
3184 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stanisic and Zupljanin, IT-08-91-T, Judgment, 27 March 2013, paras. 226, 283.
3185 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, 17 December 2004, para. 666.
3186 ICC, Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-3343, Judgment, 21 March 2016, para. 149.

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campaign of mistreatment carried out against a civilian population and can precede, outlast
or run parallel to an armed conflict. 3187
1478. The Mission considers that the underlying acts outlined above were committed in
the context of an attack on the civilian population of Kachin and Shan States. At the core of
this attack was the overriding assumption on the part of the Tatmadaw that everyone of a
given ethnicity supported the associated “ethnic armed organization”. This coloured all the
Tatmadaw’s dealings with civilians and led to a widespread and systematic campaign of
abuses against them. Civilians were detained, interrogated, tortured and killed. Many
detained have disappeared with no trace, let alone official record, of their whereabouts.
Forced labour has been endemic for years, leaving victims exposed to ill-treatment and with
no possibility to escape. Rape and sexual violence against women and girls have been
prevalent. Forced displacement of families and entire villages resulted not only from direct
orders, threats and the destruction of houses, but from the Tatmadaw’s concerted efforts to
make the conditions of life so unbearable that these families would flee their houses, land
and community. The Mission is satisfied that these multiple acts constitute a course of
conduct and not merely isolated and random acts. This was a multi-faceted attack on a
civilian population and gave rise to crimes that should concern the international community
as a whole.
1479. The Mission further considers that the attack was widespread. This criterion relates
to the number of targeted persons, the multiplicity of victims, the frequency of acts, and/or
the attacks occurring in different locations. In the case of the attack on the civilian
population of Kachin and Shan States, the violence and mistreatment were not confined to a
particular location, over a limited period of time. Men, women and children, through many
village tracts across two states, were affected, over a period of years. Although the
widespread nature of the attack obviates the requirement that it be systematic, this second
criterion is also met. Systematic relates to the organized nature of the crimes and the
improbability of their random occurrence. 3188 Nothing about the Tatmadaw’s approach to
the civilian population was random or spontaneous. Nor were these abuses merely the acts
of isolated platoons on a crime spree. This was a consistent pattern of organized
conduct,3189 following a plan that had been decided by high-level commanders, and it was
being implemented steadily and methodically by a large body of physical perpetrators,
across the targeted villages.
1480. As concerns the requirement that the attack was committed “pursuant to or in
furtherance of a state or organizational policy”, this requirement was designed to ensure
that an attack, even if carried out over a large geographical area or directed at a large
number of victims, still be organized and following a regular pattern. In the present case,
there are reasonable grounds to consider that the underlying acts were committed in
furtherance to a Tatmadaw policy to attack the civilian population which it associated with
its military adversaries. The Mission recalls that the policy in question need not be formally
promulgated, and can be deduced from the repetition of acts. 3190 In this case, the repeated
killings, acts of rape and sexual violence, enslavement, enforced disappearances, torture,
forcible transfer, among others, perpetrated by the Tatmadaw and other security forces in
Kachin and Shan States strongly support an inference that such a policy exists. Moreover,
they suggest the continued implementation of the Tatmadaw’s long-standing “four cuts”
counterinsurgency policy, which has the deliberate targeting of civilians at its heart. The
policy may be made “either by groups of persons who govern a specific territory or by any

3187 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagojevic and Jokic, IT-02-60-T, Judgment, 17 January 2005, para. 543.
3188 ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-717, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges, 14 October 2008, para. 394; ICC, Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-373, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 23 January 2012,
para. 179; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mrksic, IT-95-13/1-T, Judgment, 27 September 2007, para. 437;
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/ 1-T, Judgment, 22 February 2001,
para. 429.
3189 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 5 September 1998, para. 580.
3190 ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-tENG, Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the
Statute, 7 March 2014, para. 1109.

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organization with the capability to commit a widespread or systematic attack against a

civilian operation”.3191 The Tatmadaw had this capacity and acted upon it.
1481. The Mission is satisfied that the contextual elements of crimes against humanity are
present and, therefore, that the serious human rights violations in northern Myanmar
outlined in this report will in many instances amount to crimes against humanity.

2. Rakhine State

(a) Underlying prohibited acts

Murder and extermination

1482. As outlined above, including in the section discussing killings as an underlying act
of genocide, the killings carried out in the context of the “clearance operations” in Rakhine
State were horrific in scale, scope, brutality and intensity. The Mission has concluded that
the estimated number of more than 10,000 deaths during the August-September 2017
“clearance operations” alone is likely to be conservative. There is no doubt that the
perpetrators acted with the intent to kill or with the intent to cause serious bodily harm
which they should reasonably have known might lead to death, thus amounting to murder
as an underlying act of crimes against humanity.
1483. The question then becomes whether there are reasonable grounds to consider that
extermination has also occurred. Extermination differs from murder, in that killings must
occur on a “mass” or “large” scale.3192 Each situation necessarily turns on its facts and there
is no “numerically significant” threshold which satisfies the underlying act of
extermination.3193 However, a review of comparable cases is instructive. In Syria, the
United Nations found reasonable grounds to believe that detention killings which occurred
“with high frequency over a long period of time and in multiple locations” amounted to
extermination as a crime against humanity. The report refers to “thousands” of detained
people missing.3194 The mass killing of Rwandan Tutsi was repeatedly found to have met
the threshold for extermination. 3195 In the former Yugoslavia, the killing of at least 1,699
victims was found to satisfy the “element of massiveness” required for extermination. 3196
With this high threshold in mind, the Mission finds that there are reasonable grounds to
conclude that the deliberate and unlawful killings of Rohingya civilians in the Rakhine
State in August-September 2017 amount to the underlying act of extermination as a crime
against humanity.

Enslavement
1484. Recalling that forced labour can amount to enslavement in certain circumstances, the
Mission notes that it was a feature of Rohingya life, as it was for many other groups in
Myanmar. Forced to porter, cultivate and harvest farmland, build roads and buildings, and
maintain the security forces’ camps, the civilian population was an unpaid labour source for
the Tatmadaw in Rakhine State.

3191 ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngjudolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-717, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges, 14 October 2008, para. 396.
3192 ICC Elements of Crime, art. 7(1)(b); ICTR, Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al., ICTR-98-41-A, Judgment,
14 December 2011, para. 394; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Rukundo, ICTR-2001-76-A, Judgment, 20
October 2010, para. 185; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Seromba, ICTR-2001-66-A, Judgment, 12 March 2008,
para. 189.
3193 ICTY, Prosecutor v Brdjanin, IT-99-36-T, Judgment, 1 December 2004, para. 391; ICTY Prosecutor
v. Stakic, IT-97-24-T, Judgment, para. 640.
3194 A/HRC/31/CRP.1, para. 4.
3195 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A, Judgment, 13 December
2004, para. 516; ICTR, ICTR, Prosecutor v. Seromba, ICTR-2001-66-A, Judgment, 12 March 2008,
para. 190; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Judgment, ICTR-97-36A-A, 28 September 2011, para.
142.
3196 ICTY, Prosecutor v Brdjanin, IT-99-36-T, Judgment, 1 December 2004, para. 465.

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1485. The labour was mandatory, with usually Tatmadaw soldiers showing up and
demanding villagers to follow. Victims’ accounts of labourers being beaten for working
slowly or inefficiently indicate that there was no opportunity to refuse to work or to control
working conditions. The Mission is satisfied that none of these acts were carried out as a
result of the labourer’s own free will and that the Tatmadaw and security forces who
managed the forced labour intentionally exercised the powers of ownership over the
civilians whom they forced to work. The fact that, in some cases, there was an option of
paying a bribe to avoid forced labour does not undermine its involuntariness, even for the
few who could afford to pay.
1486. Forced labour was also imposed on ethnic Rakhine, who have suffered similar
violations. The accounts collected by the Mission point to the practice being widespread,
particularly in more remote, rural areas. It is apparent that the Tatmadaw have consistently
used men, women and children to perform forced labour, often accompanied by ill-
treatment, throughout the period under review. For those ethnic Rakhine forced to perform
labour, there was no escape. A former porter explained “If we ran, we would be shot”. 3197
The Mission is accordingly satisfied that the Tatmadaw and security forces who managed
the forced labour intentionally exercised the powers of ownership over the civilians whom
they forced to work.
1487. The Mission therefore considers on reasonable grounds that certain acts of forced
labour against both the Rohingya and the ethnic Rakhine have amounted to enslavement as
an underlying act of crimes against humanity.

Deportation and forcible transfer of a population

1488. Deportation and forcible transfer are separate crimes 3198 that arise in situations of
“forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the
area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international
law”.3199 Deportation refers to displacement across an international border, and forcible
transfer refers to displacement within national boundaries. 3200
1489. The 2017 “clearance operations” resulted in the displacement of over 725,000
Rohingya, principally across the border into Bangladesh. This mirrored the exodus of 2016,
then comprising approximately 87,000 Rohingya, but on an even more shocking scale. An
entire population was effectively displaced en masse. The Rohingya left their homes and
land behind following express orders from the Tatmadaw, or fled mass violence, killings,
and the destruction of property. The determinative factor for the crime is the absence of a
genuine choice on the part of the victim,3201 when assessed in the light of the surrounding
circumstances.3202 No reasonable suggestion can be made that the displacement of the
Rohingya from their homes and villages was a result of a genuine choice. The choice to flee
violence and persecution is neither voluntary nor free. 3203 On its face, the appalling
conditions awaiting in the Bangladesh camps, as well as the circumstances of the journey
itself, undermine any such argument. Nor is there any indication that this mass
displacement of an entire geographical region was justified under international law by, for
example, security or military necessity.3204

3197 DI-028. Also CI-153.

3198 ICC, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the
Statute”, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-37, 6 September 2018, para. 53.
3199 ICC Rome Statute, art. 7(2)(d).
3200 ICC, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the
Statute”, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-37, 6 September 2018, paras. 53-55.
3201 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, IT-97-25-A, Judgment, 17 September 2003, para. 229.
3202 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stakic, IT-97-24-A, Judgment, 22 March 2006, para. 279; Prosecutor v. Martic,
IT-95-11-T, Judgment, 12 June 2007, para. 108.
3203 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 2 August 2001, at para. 530.
3204 Article 49 of Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilians. See also
ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 129.

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1490. The Mission notes that the displaced population needs to first have been lawfully
present in the territory.3205 The words “lawfully present” should not be equated to the legal
concept of lawful residence. Whether the person meets the formal requirements for
residency or whether he or she has been accorded such status is irrelevant. The protection is
provided for those who have, for whatever reason, come to “live” in a community whether
long term or temporarily. 3206 The Rohingya in Rakhine State “lived” in their respective
homes and villages, in accordance with this definition. While in principle national law
determines the lawfulness of the presence of the persons concerned, national law must also
be measured against the yardstick of international law. National law cannot terminate
lawful presence in violation of applicable rules of international law. 3207 The Rohingya’s
arbitrary deprivation of nationality cannot be invoked by the State to argue that the
Rohingya’s presence in Rakhine State would be unlawful or would have become unlawful.
Their labelling by the State as “Bengali” or “illegal immigrants” is irrelevant. As such, the
Mission finds reasonable grounds to conclude that deportation as an underlying act of
crimes against humanity have occurred.
1491. The Mission further considers that the forcible transfer of Rohingya communities
into displacement camps and sites in central Rakhine may also rise to an underlying act of
crimes against humanity. Following the violence in 2012, approximately 128,000 Rohingya
have been kept in tightly controlled “IDP camps” for over six years, where they are still
being kept today, surrounded and controlled by security forces. The Rohingya (and Kaman)
who are residing in these camps and sites have been coerced into them and are not allowed
to leave and return to their homes.

Imprisonment, torture, and enforced disappearance

1492. The present report details widespread and systematic arbitrary arrest and detention
of the Rohingya community in Rakhine State by various law enforcement agencies,
including the BGP, previously NaSaKa, and the Tatmadaw. The practice was particularly
prevalent in northern Rakhine State. Arrests generally occurred during night raids on
villages, in houses or shops, at checkpoints or during house searches or household list
verifications. While arbitrary arrest and detention occurred throughout the period, there
have been significant spikes during periods of heightened tension, such as the 2012
violence and the post-October 2016 security operations.
1493. The report further outlines numerous incidents of arbitrary arrest and detention in
the context of the “clearance operations”, often amounting to enforced disappearances –
with information suggesting that mostly young men, together with respected or influential
individuals, were targeted. Frequently men and boys have not been seen again, and their
whereabouts are unknown. In most cases, there is no indication of any valid justification for
arrest, basic procedural safeguards or due process. Often men were just taken away, often in
large groups. These detainees still missing have been effectively removed from the
protection of the law, and have no recourse to applicable legal remedies or procedural
guarantees. Their whereabouts have been concealed, with their families having no recourse
to seek clarification.
1494. Accounts of arrest and detention were frequently associated with violence, beating
and ill-treatment. The Mission established patterns of severe ill-treatment of prisoners at
Buthidaung prison following the 2012 violence. It considers the level of pain and suffering
inflicted on the detainees to have consistently reached a level justifying the legal
qualification of torture, particularly when considering the physical and mental impact on
the victims, the respective positions of the perpetrator and their victims, and the methods
used.

3205 ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(d), para. 2.

3206 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Popovic et al., IT-05-88-T, Judgment, 10 June 2010, para. 900.
3207 G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law (TMC Asser Press, 2009), p. 241.

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1495. As such, the Mission considers that there are reasonable grounds to conclude that the
underlying acts of imprisonment, enforced disappearance and torture have been committed
in Rakhine State during the period under review.

Rape, sexual slavery and sexual violence

1496. The rape and gang rape of Rohingya women and girls was a gruesome feature of all
“major” incidents described in this report, in at least 10 village tracts across three
townships. The pervasiveness of rape and gang rape, the similarity in its occurrence across
the region, and the attitude of the perpetrators towards their Rohingya victims demonstrate
the pre-planned nature of these acts of sexual violence. The Mission was particularly struck
by the frequency of large-scale gang rape involving multiple perpetrators and victims, often
in locations specifically chosen such as houses, military or police compounds. These were
not the random acts of a few criminal soldiers; this was an orchestrated attack by the
Tatmadaw on Rohingya mothers, wives, sisters and daughters. At the same time, rape and
sexual violence in Rakhine State was not born out of the 2017 “clearance operations”. The
Tatmadaw, police, NaSaKa (and later the BGP) had perpetrated rapes and gang rapes
throughout the reporting period. The Mission considers that rape as an underlying act of
crimes against humanity has been committed.
1497. The Mission also recalls that, in the weeks before and during the “clearance
operations” in 2017, young Rohingya women and girls were routinely “selected” by
members of the Tatmadaw or police, or were summoned to present themselves at military
or police compounds under threat of punishment of the entire village. These women and
girls were detained and subjected to rape, gang rape, sexual assault and other forms of
sexual violence while in captivity. Some of these instances of abduction, detention and
sexual abuse amount to acts of sexual slavery. During these periods, the victims were
deprived of their liberty by armed personnel, who used threats, force and other forms of
physical and mental coercion to demand compliance and prevent escape. Those abducted
were forced to engage in acts of a sexual nature and were physically under the control of
the perpetrators. The Mission is satisfied that it was impossible for these women and girls
to control or change their situation.
1498. Tatmadaw soldiers also mutilated the breasts or sexual organs of Rohingya women
and girls and subjected them to forced nudity. In some circumstances, incidents of forced
nudity and sexual assault have taken place during invasive body searches by the security
forces. Such conduct falls within the legal definition of “other forms of sexual violence of a
comparable gravity”. The Mission also recalls that acts of rape and sexual violence have
also been found to amount to torture.3208 During the acts of rape and sexual violence
perpetrated in Rakhine State detailed in this report, the perpetrators inflicted severe physical
or mental pain or suffering on one or more persons, who were in their custody and control.
The Mission accordingly notes that the acts of rape and sexual violence by Tatmadaw
forces against members of the Rohingya community detailed in this report may also give
rise to criminal liability for torture.

Persecution
1499. The Rohingya in Rakhine State have faced, and continue to face, endemic
discrimination on the basis of their ethnicity and religion. Discrimination is embedded in
the policies and practices that have marginalised Rohingya, to the point of amounting to a
situation of severe, systemic and State-sanctioned oppression. The Tatmadaw and other
security forces have played an active role in this system of oppression by adopting or
implementing discriminatory restrictions on movement, managing checkpoints, and
overseeing the implementation of the discriminatory policies and practices of the State. At
the level of the direct perpetrators, the Mission has received consistent accounts of criminal
acts being perpetrated with discriminatory intent, often accompanied with deeply offensive

3208 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mucic et al., IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 16 November 1998, para. 496; ICTR,
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 731.

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and derogatory slurs. The question is whether these discriminatory acts are of such a gravity
and severity as to constitute persecution as a crime against humanity.
1500. The imposition and maintenance of restrictive measures can amount to persecution
either when considered in isolation or together with other acts.3209 In the case of the
Rohingya in Rakhine State, the scope of discriminatory policies and their arbitrary and
inequitable implementation amount to a gross denial of a large number of fundamental
rights recognized in customary and treaty law. The imposition and maintenance of these
measures, particularly when considered collectively, served to strip the Rohingya of both
their essence as a group and their individual humanity. They are, in the view of the Mission,
of equal gravity to other crimes against humanity, are discriminatory in fact, and were
carried out with the requisite discriminatory intent by the perpetrators on ethnic and
religious grounds.
1501. The Mission also considers that there are reasonable grounds to conclude that many
of the acts of murder, rape, and torture committed against the Rohingya meet the requisite
criteria for the crime of persecution, given the discriminatory elements underpinning their
perpetration. They were committed in a context of a pervasive climate of hatred and
contempt toward the Rohingya, who were consistently called “illegal immigrants” and
associated with “violent Islam” or “terrorism”. The Mission has received numerous
accounts of specific utterances of direct perpetrators that reveal a deeply discriminatory
intent, including the offering to spare a victim from rape if she renounced Islam 3210,
repeated statements that “this is not your country” while calling victims “kalar”, and similar
comments. Religious clothing and symbols were targeted; men had their beards forcibly
removed.
1502. These discriminatory statements, utterances and abuse indicate that the perpetrators
of these attacks intended to target the victims precisely because of their inclusion in the
Rohingya group and, as such, acted with the requisite discriminatory intent on ethnic and
religious grounds. The Mission also considers that the acts of rape and sexual violence
against the Rohingya in Rakhine State may amount to persecution on the grounds of
gender. The ubiquity of rape, gang rape and other forms of sexual violence by the
Tatmadaw in northern Rakhine State suggests that women were specifically targeted based
on gender. The argument that rape and sexual violence is inherently discriminatory is
particularly significant in this context; sexual violence is used as a means of undermining
traditional gender roles and breaking down familial bonds by leveraging the cultural stigma
around sexual violence.

Apartheid
1503. The Rome Statute includes the crime of apartheid as a crime against humanity.3211
Apartheid occurs when the underlying acts listed in the definition of crimes against
humanity, or other inhumane acts of a “similar nature and gravity”, are “committed in the
context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one
racial group over any other racial group or groups”. The perpetrator must commit the
inhumane act with the specific intent of maintaining the institutionalized regime. 3212
1504. These concepts have not yet been judicially considered and uncertainty surrounds
the definition, delineation and interpretation of the crime of apartheid. Whether apartheid as
a crime against humanity is a customary norm is also unsettled. 3213 Guidance, however, on
its intended scope can be drawn from the International Convention on the Suppression and
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973), ratified by 109 States, which also

3209 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, IT-99-36-A, Judgment, 3 April 2007, paras. 295, 297; ICTY,
Proseutor v. Karadzic, IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, 24 March 2016, paras. 535-536.
3210 EI-072.
3211 ICC Statute, art. 7(2)(h).
3212 ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(j)
3213 C. Lingaas, “The Crime against Humanity of Apartheid in a Post-Apartheid World”, Oslo Law
Review (2015), nr. 2, 86-115; A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (2nd ed.), (Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 2008), p. 13.

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criminalizes apartheid as a crime against humanity. The Mission considers it appropriate to

examine the possible commission of the crime of apartheid in the context of the Rohingya,
particularly given the deeply discriminatory dimension of the facts as established in this
report.
1505. Turning firstly to the contextual elements, an “institutionalized regime” of
systematic domination and oppression has been thought to mean “an established law or
practice by a government or prevailing order”.3214 For the reasons discussed elsewhere, the
Mission considers that the Myanmar authorities have imposed an established practice of
oppression on the Rohingya who, for the reasons discussed above, may be considered a
racial group. The regime against the Rohingya is not a series of random occurrences but an
overarching regimen of restrictions and abuses, that operate to cumulatively remove rights
and erode the community’s dignity. The removal of legal status, combined with the
inability to move, work, access medical care, support families, or even own knives or live
behind fences, is part of a considered and deliberate system. When combined with hateful
rhetoric and propaganda, the Rohingya have been marginalised, impoverished, excluded,
and placed firmly in the camp of the “other”. The “domination by one racial group over
another” has been accomplished.
1506. The underlying acts giving rise to the crime of apartheid are those listed in the
definition of crimes against humanity, as well as other acts of “similar nature and
gravity”.3215 In the absence of jurisprudence it is difficult to ascertain whether the collection
of discriminatory and oppressive laws, regulations, orders, rules and practices would
themselves amount to an “inhumane act”. Certainly, these measures would be criminalized
under the Apartheid Convention, which prohibits “legislative measures and other measures
calculated to prevent a racial group or groups from participation in the political, social,
economic and cultural life of the country and the deliberate creation of conditions
preventing the full development of such a group”. 3216 In any event, the Mission finds that
the underlying acts set out in this report (murder, extermination, rape, torture, enslavement
and others) may be considered as having been committed in the context of an
institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over
another, indicating the commission of the crime of apartheid.
1507. As for the requirement that the perpetrators committed the inhumane act with the
specific intent of maintaining the institutionalized regime, again the Mission is not in a
position to make a finding as to the intention (mens rea) of particular perpetrators, their
superiors or those who ordered (or otherwise aided and abetted) their crimes. What is
apparent, however, is that the crimes committed against the Rohingya served to maintain
the oppressive regime in place and were, in fact, a central component of it. At a minimum,
it appears that those who designed and implemented the discriminatory policies and
practices were aware of their manifest impact on the welfare and quality of life of the
Rohingya. In this context, a finding that the perpetrators who went on to imprison, rape and
kill on a mass scale were intending to maintain the institutionalized regime is not a
significant leap.

(b) Contextual elements of crimes against humanity

1508. There is no doubt that the 2016 and 2017 “clearance operations” in Rakhine State
each constituted an attack on the Rohingya population, for the purposes of the contextual
elements of crimes against humanity. The Tatmadaw, together with other security forces
and groups of civilians, engaged in a “course of conduct involving the multiple commission
of acts” listed in the definition of crimes against humanity. In both 2016 and 2017, the
crimes were not a mere aggregate of random acts but were part of the same flow of

3214 Christine Byron, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2009), p. 242.
3215 ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(j), para. 2, fn. 29.
3216 Apartheid Convention, art. 11.

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events.3217 In both 2016 and 2017 these attacks were widespread in terms of their
geographical reach and the large numbers of targeted persons and victims. They were also
organized and implemented in a manner as to rule out the probability of their random
occurrence, and thus they were systematic. As noted above, the Mission verified, through
multiple interviews and other information, “clearance operations” in 54 separate locations,
and it received first-hand accounts of additional “clearance operations” in a further 22
locations, across the three townships of northern Rakhine State. There is no doubt that the
attack was widespread and systematic. Although the modus operandi differed slightly
between 2016 and 2017 (the use of helicopter gunships distinguishing the 2016 attacks, for
example), the big picture was the same. Horrifying in scope and scale, these operations
provided a context that elevates the crimes committed from “ordinary” crimes to those
which concern the international community as a whole.
1509. An “attack”, for the purposes of the definition of crimes against humanity, can be a
campaign of mistreatment carried out against a civilian population that can precede, outlast
or run parallel to an armed conflict.3218 The Mission considers that the relevant context is
not limited to the days and weeks of the Tatmadaw’s “clearance operations”. Rather, the
“attack” also encompassed the regime of State-sanctioned discrimination and oppression,
that gradually eroded the human dignity of this group of civilians within Myanmar’s
borders. At least since their expansion following the 2016 violence, these measures
amounted to a campaign of mistreatment constituting an attack on the Rohingya population.
As such, the Mission considers that all underlying acts committed since the 2016 violence
should fall within crimes against humanity. Considered together, the system of
institutionalized oppression and the 2016 and 2017 violence perpetrated by the Tatmadaw
leave little room for any other inference than the attack being committed “pursuant to or in
furtherance of a State or organizational policy” as required by the definition.
1510. As noted above, the Mission considers that acts of forced labour against the ethnic
Rakhine have also reached the threshold of enslavement as an underlying act of crimes
against humanity. The question then is whether the contextual elements that would elevate
such acts to crimes against humanity are present too. It may be possible to make the
argument that much of the forced labour inflicted on the ethnic Rakhine forms part of a
widespread and systematic attack directed against the civilian population in Rakhine State,
regardless of their ethnicity. This warrants further investigation.

3. Conclusion
1511. The Mission finds that crimes against humanity have been committed in Kachin,
Rakhine and Shan States, principally by the Tatmadaw. For Kachin and Shan States, these
include crimes against humanity of murder; imprisonment: enforced disappearance; torture;
rape, sexual slavery and other forms of sexual violence; persecution; and enslavement. In
Rakhine State, these and additional crimes against humanity were committed. The elements
of extermination and deportation are also present, and the systematic oppression and
discrimination not only supports a finding of persecution, but may also amount to the crime
of apartheid.

C. War crimes

1512. War crimes are serious violations of international humanitarian law that give rise to
individual criminal responsibility. To amount to war crimes, the offences in question must
have a link to an armed conflict.3219
1513. The Mission considers that non-international armed conflicts existed in Kachin and
Shan States (for the entire period under review) and in Rakhine State since August 2017.

3217 ICC, Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11-656-Red, Decision on the confirmation of charges

against Laurent Gbagbo, 12 June 2014, para. 209.
3218 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagojevic and Jokic, IT-02-60-T, Judgment, 17 January 2005, para. 543.
3219 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-T, Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 573.

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As such, much of the conduct that gives rise to crimes against humanity on the part of the
Tatmadaw and other security forces will also satisfy the war crime elements of murder; 3220
torture;3221 cruel treatment;3222 outrages upon personal dignity;3223 attacking civilians; 3224
displacing civilians;3225 pillaging;3226 attacking protected objects;3227 taking hostages;3228
sentencing or execution without due process; 3229 as well as rape, sexual slavery and sexual
violence.3230 Certain acts committed by “ethnic armed organizations” and ARSA may also
constitute war crimes.
1514. In Kachin and northern Shan States, the Tatmadaw intentionally, frequently and
systematically directed attacks against the civilian population or individual civilians.
Tatmadaw soldiers regularly attacked villages in Kachin and Shan States for no other
apparent reason than that the residents belong to the same ethnic group as an adversary.
Indiscriminate attacks, not directed against a specific military objective, or which employ a
means or method of combat that cannot be so directed, have killed and wounded many.
Even where information indicates that a Tatmadaw attack may have been in pursuit of a
specific military objective, it often still failed to respect the principle of precaution,
particularly when operating in densely populated civilian areas. The Mission has concluded
on reasonable grounds that these acts are serious violations of international humanitarian
law amounting to war crimes, giving rise to individual criminal liability on the part of the
perpetrators, culpable superiors and others who ordered, planned, instigated or otherwise
aided and abetted the violations.
1515. Ethnic armed organizations are also exposed. The Mission has obtained a limited,
but reliable, body of information suggesting that several ethnic armed organizations
fighting in Kachin and Shan States have, to varying degrees, committed human rights
abuses and violations of international humanitarian law. Information suggests, for example,
that in several instances ethnic armed organizations have failed to avoid or minimize
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. Of
particular concern to the Mission is the apparent pattern of ethnic armed organizations
forcibly recruiting both adults and children into combat roles. Instances of destruction and
appropriation of civilian property, arbitrary deprivation of liberty, torture, ill-treatment and
other alleged abuses have been examined in the report. Some of these acts, where they were
committed in connection to the non-international armed conflicts, may give rise to
individual criminal liability for war crimes. This warrants further investigation.

3220 ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 8(2)(c)(i)-1; ICC, Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-3343,
Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 21 March 2016, paras. 91-94.
3221 ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 8(2)(c)(i)-4 ICC, Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, Decision
Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 15 June 2009, paras. 195, 289-295.
3222 ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 8(2)(c)(i)-3, para. 1; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mucic et al, IT-96-21-T,
Judgment, 16 November 1998, para. 552.
3223 ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 8(2)(c)(ii).
3224 ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 8(2)(e)(i), para. 2; ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-
tENG, Judgment, 20 April 2015, paras. 800-801.
3225 ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 8(2)(e)(viii), para. 2; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Gotovina, IT-06-90-T,
Judgment, 15 April 2011, paras. 1738-1740.
3226 ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 8(2)(e)(v), paras. 1-3: ICC, Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-424,
Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor
against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 15 June 2009, para. 317; ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-
01/07-3436-tENG, Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, 7 March 2015, para. 909.
3227 ICC, Statute, art. 8(2)(e)(iv); ICC, Prosecutor v. Al-Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-171, Judgment, 27
September 2016, at para. 15.
3228 ICC, Elements of Crimes, art. 8 (2)(c)(iii); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, IT-95-14-A, Judgment, 29
July 2004, paras. 638-639.
3229 ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 8 (2)(c)(iv).
3230 ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 8(2)(e)(vi)-1; ICC Elements of Crimes art. 8(2)(e)(vi)-2; art. 8(2)(e)(vi)-
6; ICC Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-1707, Second Decision on the Defence’s Challenge
to the Jurisdiction of the Court in respect to Counts 6 and 9, 4 January 2017, para. 52.

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1516. In Rakhine State, during the “clearance operations” of 2017, Tatmadaw soldiers
were utterly unconstrained by the laws of war. The principles of distinction, proportionality
and precautions were wholly ignored. The civilian population itself, the very beneficiary of
international humanitarian law protection, was put directly in the firing line and mercilessly
attacked. The Mission has concluded on reasonable grounds that the attacks on protected
people and property, destruction of villages, pillaging of objects, and the widespread use of
rape and sexual violence in this context constitute serious violations of international
humanitarian law amounting to war crimes.
1517. In addition to crimes committed by the Tatmadaw, ARSA has also been accused by
both the Government, and credible third parties, of committing abuses in Rakhine State
both against members of the Rohingya population and against other ethnic groups. As noted
in this report, the Mission has not had comparable access to victims of these alleged abuses
and so further investigation is warranted. Many alleged ARSA crimes, such as the murders
of suspected informers, pre-date August 2017, the date from which the Mission considered
a non-international armed conflict to exist. Those actions would constitute crimes but not
war crimes. Some allegations, however, relate to the relevant period of armed conflict and
appear to be linked to it. This includes the burning of the Rakhine village of Ah Htet Pyu
Ma, which may as such constitute a war crime and give rise to individual criminal
responsibility. As noted above, it has been alleged that ARSA is responsible for the killing
of up to 100 Hindu men and women from Kha Maung Seik village tract. The Mission was
able to confirm the killing, but its information on the perpetrator is inconclusive. The
Mission recommends further investigation, and prosecution, of those responsible for these
killings – which may amount to a war crime.

IX. Responsibility
1518. The human rights violations and abuses, as well as crimes under international law,
outlined in this report give rise both to State responsibility and to individual criminal
responsibility.
1519. A State is responsible for all acts that are attributable to it and constitute a breach of
an international obligation.3231 There is no question that the acts and conduct outlined in this
report are in breach of Myanmar’s international obligations under international treaty and
customary law. As for the second criterion, under international customary law, acts are
attributable to the State when they are committed by a State organ or persons or entities
exercising elements of governmental authority. 3232 In the case of conduct of non-State
individuals or groups, the State still incurs responsibility where these persons or groups act
on the instruction of or under the direction or control of the State, or when State agents
acknowledge and adopt the conduct of non-State groups.3233 The State is also responsible
when it fails to take all reasonable, necessary measures to prevent the non-State actor
committing the acts and to protect its population from the conduct of non-State actors.
1520. Additionally, the violations and abuses outlined in this report will undoubtedly give
rise to individual criminal responsibility, either under domestic criminal law or
international criminal law. As stated in the Nuremberg judgment, “crimes against
international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be
enforced”.3234

3231 See article 2 of the International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility (General
Assembly resolution 56/83), hereinafter “ILC Articles”.
3232 See ILC Articles, arts. 4 and 5.
3233 See ILC Articles, arts. 8 and 11.
3234 International Military Tribunal, France and others v. Göring and others, Judgment and Sentence,
(1946) 22 IMT 2013, (1947).

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A. Tatmadaw and other security forces

1521. In the period under review, the Tatmadaw was the main perpetrator of serious
human rights violations and crimes under international law in Kachin, Rakhine and Shan
States. Additionally, in Rakhine State, the Myanmar Police Force, NaSaKa and Border
Guard Police were also perpetrators. Militias and militant “civilian” groups participated or
assisted in the commission of some violations and crimes.

1. Tatmadaw and its conmand structure

1522. According to the Myanmar Constitution, the Tatmadaw is the “main armed force for
the Defence of the Union”, with complete autonomy in all matters related to defence,
security and its internal running. The Constitution also stipulates that “all the armed forces
in the Union shall be under the command of the [Tatmadaw]”. 3235 The Tatmadaw consists
of three branches: Army, Navy and Air Force. Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing has been
its Commander-in-Chief since 2011, the entire period under review. He is the Supreme
Commander of all armed forces in Myanmar.3236 He can order all units of the Tatmadaw
into combat and oversees the deployment and subordination of auxiliary forces (including
the Myanmar Police Force, Border Guard Police, and militias) to combat units as necessary.
1523. The Commander-in-Chief commands all subordinate units through the General
Staff, at times referred to as the War Office. Overall military strategy and policy is decided
within the General Staff. All subsequent orders are based on this overall strategy. Each
branch of the Tatmadaw has its own structure. The Army, for example, has its own
Commander-in-Chief (“Commander-in-Chief Army”, currently Vice Senior-General Soe
Win, who is also concurrently the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Tatmadaw) and an
Army General Staff. The Army General Staff has various subordinate departments,
including the Directorate of People’s Militia and Border Forces (the entity responsible for
the organization and training of people’s militias).
1524. The Army is comprised of six Bureaus of Special Operations (BSO), which are
considered the first level of operational-level command. Each BSO is responsible for a
particular geographic region. Each geographic region is then divided among Regional
Military Commands (RMCs). For example, BSO-3 is comprised of three RMCs, the
Western Regional Command, Southern Regional Command, and the South-western
Military Command. Each Regional Military Command will have between one and three
“Combat Divisions” subordinated to it, usually called Military Operational Commands
(MOCs), which are comprised of as many as ten infantry battalions. For example, the
Western Regional Command, responsible for Rakhine State, had MOC-5, MOC-9 and
MOC-15 under its command as well as other infantry battalions. It may also have auxiliary
forces subordinated to it for specific operations.
1525. Light Infantry Divisions (LIDs) are not permanently deployed to a geographical area
but are directly subordinated to the Commander-in-Chief Army as “mobile” units
deployable according to need. As such, their deployment is ordered at minimum from the
Commander-in-Chief Army within the chain of command, likely with knowledge of the
Commander-in-Chief. As already noted, the Commander-in-Chief Army is also Deputy
Commander-in-Chief of the whole Tatmadaw. The LIDs, along with air and artillery units,
are strategic-level assets that would normally only be deployed with the authorization of the
Commander-in-Chief.3237 The LIDs are also considered the most battle-hardened and
experienced units within the Tatmadaw. They are often deployed as the main strike force of
an operation, and directed for use in counter-insurgency operations against non-State armed
groups. Once deployed, LIDs fall under daily operational command of the relevant

3235 Constitution of Myanmar, s. 337-338.

3236 Constitution of Myanmar, s. 20(c).
3237 XM-009, XM-010, XM-011, XM-012, XM-013.

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Regional Military Command. However, any subsequent re-deployment, such as back to

their base or to another front, will be ordered by the Commander-in-Chief Army.3238
1526. The information collected by the Mission indicates that the Tatmadaw is a
functioning, organized military force, with an identifiable chain of command, operating
under the principle of “unity of command”. All levels of leadership are able to assert
effective control over their subordinate units, orders are issued and obeyed, and strict
reporting requirements are adhered to.3239 The Tatmadaw’s operational sophistication is
demonstrated by its ability to carry our joint operations on a large scale across broad
geographical areas.3240 This indicates not only that it has the relevant structures in place
(intelligence, logistics, communications, and so on), but that it has an effective chain of
operational command, led by the General Staff, that can relay and receive information in
real-time and effectively direct the activities of its forces. 3241
1527. The Tatmadaw is a tightly controlled armed force, meaning that subordinate units
will generally operate only pursuant to direct orders, deviation from which is unlikely given
the risk of immediate sanction.3242 There are reports that the Tatmadaw has, at times,
suffered from low recruitment, low morale, poor training, high desertion and other factors
that can affect its effectiveness and efficiency. 3243 However, these obstacles have not
affected the existence of a very strong and centralised command structure. 3244 The Mission
is satisfied that the Tatmadaw is a functioning and organized national army, with the ability
to direct, order, and control its subordinates and with access to information relating to its
operations throughout the country. 3245

2. Command responsibility for security forces’ crimes

1528. Acts of the Tatmadaw and other State security forces of Myanmar, as well as acts of
their subordinate units during security operations, are attributable to the State and incur
State responsibility.
1529. When members of an armed force (or those acting within its effective control)
commit crimes against civilians, both the direct perpetrator and the commander can incur
criminal liability. The Mission has concluded on reasonable grounds that the Commander-
in-Chief of the Tatmadaw, members of the General Staff of the Tatmadaw, senior
commanders and Tatmadaw commanders on the ground during the events in question
incurred criminal liability for the actions of perpetrators who committed crimes in Kachin,
Rakhine and Shan States during the period under review.
1530. A commander can be held criminally liable for the crimes committed by
subordinates, if he or she is (a) a military commander or person effectively acting as a
military commander; (b) who has effective command and control over troops; (c) who
knew (or owing to the circumstances at the time should have known) that the forces were
committing or about to commit such crimes; (d) who failed to take all necessary and
reasonable measures to prevent or repress the commission; and (e) the crimes occurred as a
result of the commander’s failures. 3246 Each of these requirements has been met in the
circumstances in Myanmar.

3238 XM-009, XM-010, XM-011, XM-013.

3239 XM-009, XM-010, XM-011, XM-012, XM-013, K-015.
3240 XM-010, XM-011, XM-012.
3241 XM-009, XM-010, XM-011, XM-012, XM-013.
3242 XM-009, XM-010, XM-012.
3243 XM-009, XM-010.
3244 XM-009, XM-010, XM-012.
3245 XM-009, XM-010, XM-011, XM-012, XM-013.
3246 ICC Statute, art. 28(a). At the ICTY and ICTR, the Prosecution was not required to establish that the
crimes occurred “as a result of” the commander’s failings (the causal nexus). See ICTY, Prosecutor v.
Hadzihasanovic, IT-01-47-T, Judgment, 15 March 2006, at para. 191. The question of whether
Article 28(a) of the Rome Statute includes a causal nexus remains open. See ICC, Prosecutor v.
Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Anx2, Separate opinion Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert and Judge
Howard Morrison, 8 June 2018, para. 51. It is included in the present analysis for completeness.

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(a) Military commander

1531. As outlined above, the Tatmadaw exhibits the key components of an armed force,
including a command structure that controls subordinate units through orders and
directives. There is no question that those within this command structure, including the
Commander-in-Chief, Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing, members of the General Staff and
commanders directing operations on the ground are military commanders for the purpose of
assessing criminal liability.

(b) Effective control

1532. The crimes discussed in the present report were conducted by the Tatmadaw either
acting alone, or together with subordinated units such as the Myanmar Police Force, Border
Guard Forces and elements of militia forces. Whether a commander has “effective control”
over particular subordinates is a question of fact. Factors indicating the existence of
effective control include the commander’s official position, the power to issue orders, to
ensure compliance with orders, to promote, replace, remove or discipline any member of
the forces, and the authority to send forces to certain areas and withdraw them at any given
moment.3247
1533. There is no doubt that the troops who participated in operations in Kachin, Rakhine
and Shan States in the period under review were under the effective control of their
commanders and under the leadership of the Commander-in-Chief, Senior-General Min
Aung Hlaing.3248 The Commander-in-Chief led the Tatmadaw General Staff and the
General Staff was responsible for formulating the objectives and limits of military
operations, the role and composition of the forces involved, the rules of engagement, and
the necessary logistics. The systematic, sustained and repeated nature of the operations
demonstrates the existence and implementation of a high-level plan to carry out the
operations in Kachin, Rakhine and Shan States. Large-scale military operations, during
which the movement of multiple units are coordinated, often with air support, can only be
planned, ordered and supervised at the level of the Commander-in-Chief.3249 This is further
demonstrated by the close involvement of the Commander-in-Chief in the operations, as
apparent from his Facebook page, and the removal or transfer of some senior commanders
following the operations in Rakhine State. 3250 In a military as tightly controlled as the
Tatmadaw, lower echelon units will only operate under direct orders, and deviation from
orders is unacceptable.3251 The Tatmadaw’s senior commanders could have halted the
operations at any time, or could have withdrawn the units and troops involved in reported
abuses. Effective control was continuous and absolute at all relevant times.
1534. Members of the Myanmar Police Force, including the Border Guard Police, who
were engaged alongside Tatmadaw troops during military operations also fell within the
effective control of the Tatmadaw. 3252 The Police Force is a separate organization from the
Tatmadaw, with its own chain of command. 3253 However, once deployed in joint operations
with the Tatmadaw, police units are subordinated to the relevant Tatmadaw unit with
responsibility over the area. Operational control over the police units is then assumed by the
Tatmadaw.3254

3247 ICC, Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-3343, Judgment, 21 March 2016, at para. 188.
3248 XM-009, XM-010, XM-011, XM-012, XM-013.
3249 XM-011, XM-009, XM-010, XM-012.
3250 Htet Naing Zaw, “Myanmar Army Replaces Rakhine Commander” (The Irrawaddy, 14 November
2017); Lun Min Mang, “Tatmadaw sacks top general included in EU sanction list” (Myanmar Times,
26 June 2018).
3251 XM-009, XM-010, XM-012.
3252 XM-009, XM-010, XM-011.
3253 However, many senior officers of the Police Force are former military officers. The Minister for
Home Affairs, to whom the Police Force reports, is a military officer appointed by the President on
the nomination of the Commander-in-Chief: Constitution of Myanmar, s. 232(b)(ii).
3254 XM-009, XM-010.

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1535. Similarly, the Border Guard Forces in northern Myanmar, being a former non-State
armed group or “ethnic armed organization”, are integrated and subordinate to the
Tatmadaw. They are armed, supplied and trained by the Tatmadaw, and the Tatmadaw
assumes control over their actions during operations. 3255 Other militias, although not
integrated into the army itself, were often at least partially supplied, armed and trained by
the Tatmadaw.3256 In Rakhine State, the recurrent and organized involvement of “civilian”
groups in the operations, and the consistent way in which they were equipped, tasked and
executed their roles across northern Rakhine State, demonstrate orchestration and control
by the Tatmadaw. There is no doubt that these groups followed the Tatmadaw’s operational
orders and fell under its effective control.
1536. The modus operandi of Tatmadaw attacks lends further support to a reasonable
conclusion that its General Staff, led by the Commander-in-Chief, exercised effective
control over all units and personnel participating in the military and security operations
under review. A consistent pattern of conduct was adopted, demonstrating a tactical
formula that is not only indicative of a significant level of pre-planning, but a level of
coordination in its execution only possible when all troops are acting under the effective
control of a single unified command.

(c) Knowledge of crimes

1537. Whether a commander knew (or had reason to know) of the criminal conduct of
subordinates is normally assessed in the context of crimes committed by a rogue or isolated
platoon or company of troops, and whether the acts of these “rotten apples” were known to
operational level commanders. In the case of the Tatmadaw, not only were crimes known to
the highest levels of operational command, they form a part of the Tatmadaw’s overall
military strategy. The “Four Cuts” strategy, discussed above, was the operational
framework for a policy of clearing an area of any conceivable support from the civilian
population, including the population itself. In line with such policies, Tatmadaw troops
have targeted civilians, killed and raped as part of an over-arching plan. Against this
backdrop, no sensible suggestion can be made that military commanders within the
Tatmadaw did not know or have reason to know that their subordinates were committing
crimes. It was being done everywhere, in every operation, and pursuant to a policy of their
own making and implementation. Tatmadaw commanders knowingly accepted the high
probability of unlawful civilian casualties and destruction of civilian property. They
accepted that the commission of grave crimes as an essential ingredient in the military
strategy they approved and ordered.
1538. Even in the absence of an articulated policy to attack civilians, concerns about
crimes against civilians in the context of Tatmadaw military operations have been raised
with the military hierarchy for decades, including by all five United Nations Special
Rapporteurs on the human rights situation in Myanmar. Members of the Tatmadaw have
responded to these allegations. On rare occasions, they claim that some perpetrators of a
small number of infractions have been severely punished. More frequently, they issue
strident denials of any criminal conduct. Regardless, no credible claim can be made that
hierarchical commanders within the Tatmadaw neither knew nor had reason to know of
allegations of criminal conduct by subordinates. In the case of Rakhine State, this
conclusion is only strengthened by the fact that the “clearance operations” and allegations
of serious human rights violations were contemporaneously reported, almost in real-time,
by the international press, and known throughout the world. Ignorance was effectively
impossible.
1539. Knowledge of crimes can be ascribed to the Tatmadaw hierarchy in general, and to
specific individuals within it. For example, Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing appeared
well-informed of real-time developments on the ground. On 19 September 2017, the
Commander-in-Chief visited the Regional Operational Command in Sittwe where he was

3255 BM-038, XM-009; J. Buchanon, Militias in Myanmar (The Asia Foundation, July 2016).
3256 XM-090, XM-010.

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given a detailed brief on the situation and reviewed operational maps. 3257 The next day, he
visited Taung Baza, Buthidaung Township, and held meetings at the local Tatmadaw
battalion headquarters where he exhibited detailed knowledge on how events on the ground
transpired.3258 It was reported that the Commander-in-Chief “gave instructions on getting
timely information, close supervision by officials as there could not be any more mistakes
with security affairs, cooperation in ensuring regional peace and stability, secure and firm
border fencing… then instructed the continued citizenship verification process for issuing
NVCs to those living in the region”. This was a commander with a full picture of what was
transpiring, both on his orders and on his watch. This is further demonstrated by the daily
updates on the “clearance operations” on the Tatmadaw’s and the Commander-in-Chief’s
Facebook pages, as well as the State Counsellor’s Information Committee Facebook page
throughout the operations.

(d) Failure to take all necessary and reasonable measures

1540. There is no check-list in international law of the measures which a commander must
have taken to ensure responsible command and comply with the duty to “prevent and
repress” crimes. The adequacy of a commander’s measures is a fact-specific inquiry3259 and
will depend on the measures within his or her “material ability”.3260 What is clear, however,
is that a commander must take measures to prevent crimes (through, for example, adequate
training and instruction on the laws of war, ensuring a disciplined fighting force,
distribution and popularisation of a code of conduct, and issuing standing orders aimed at
ensuring that crimes are not committed during operations). 3261 Then, if allegations of crimes
are made, a commander has a duty to investigate, and, where appropriate, initiate
disciplinary or penal action against the troops involved. 3262 A commander who knowingly
starts or takes part in a sham investigation will not comply with his duty to punish. 3263
1541. Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing has described the discipline of troops as the
“backbone of the Tatmadaw”. With reference to the military code of conduct in force, he
has claimed, “Our Tatmadaw is strong because it stands on the firm ground of good
military discipline and obedience. Each and every serviceman must strictly follow rules and
regulations, orders and instructions.” 3264 Such public statements, however, cannot be
reconciled with the reality of Tatmadaw actions on the ground. The Tatmadaw has a well-
documented history of military operations that consistently result in allegations of war
crimes and crimes against humanity. Widespread criminal conduct and attacks on civilians
are not the hallmarks of a disciplined force, whose commanders have taken all necessary
and reasonable measures to prevent crimes. There is no indication that the Tatmadaw troops
or those fighting alongside them were acting pursuant to orders not to harm civilians, or
even basic tenets of international humanitarian law. The duty to prevent or repress crimes
has been consistently violated.
1542. There are no indications that any of the top Tatmadaw commanders took any
substantial steps to mitigate the unlawful character of the operations and their devastating
consequences on human life and dignity. Allegations of criminal conduct, which should
prompt genuine investigation and appropriate sanction, result only in public denials and
obstruction. Alleged perpetrators are praised and promoted. When undeniable evidence of
crimes and outside pressure reaches a tipping point, superficial investigations are launched
and followed by fervent public statements that “severe” punishments have been meted out.
The nature of these measures only serves to reinforce to troops that they face no

3257 Facebook post on file with the Mission.

3258 Facebook post on file with the Mission.
3259 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, IT-95-14-A, Judgment, 29 July 2004, at paras. 72, 417.
3260 ICTY, Prosecutor v Halilovic, IT-01-48-A, Judgment, 16 October 2007, at para. 63, fn. 163
3261 ICC, Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-3343, Judgment, 21 March 2016, at paras. 203-204;
3262 See, for example, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, IT-95-14-A, Judgment, 29 July 2004, at para. 93;
Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic and Kubura, IT-01-47-A, Judgment, 22 April 2008, at para. 260.
3263 E.g. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Strugar, IT-02-42-T, Judgment, 30 January 2005, at paras 435-436, 439.
3264 The Irrawaddy, “Highlights of Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing’s Armed Forces Day Speech” (28 March
2018).

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consequences for attacking civilians but only for being discovered and reported in the
international media. While publicly lauding the discipline of its troops, the Tatmadaw’s
documented history of atrocities demonstrates a complete absence of responsible command,
or of measures to prevent or repress crimes.

(e) Causal link

1543. For a commander to incur liability for the actions of perpetrator subordinates, the
crimes must be “as a result of” his failures to prevent and punish crimes. In the present
case, there is a clear causal link between the historic failure of the Tatmadaw hierarchy to
prevent and punish abuses, and the crimes committed during the operations in question. The
widespread failure to punish crimes, firstly, creates a culture of impunity in which civilian
casualties and brutality are inevitable components of military operations. Violence against
civilians becomes normalised, and perpetrators act in the knowledge that there will be no
repercussions for their conduct. Inconsistent messages (public assertions of severe
sentences but almost complete impunity for crimes) reinforce the permissive culture.
Subordinate commanders and troops are made aware that their crimes will be tolerated and
justified. Together, these failings create a command climate that at best accepts and excuses
criminal behaviour, and at worst encourages it.
1544. A concrete example of how the dereliction of the duty to prevent and punish can act
as a causal nexus to crimes involves the Light Infantry Divisions in Rakhine State. The 33rd
and 99th Light Infantry Divisions have been accused of committing crimes against civilians
in Kachin and Shan States prior to August 2017. Rather than initiating credible and genuine
investigations into these allegations, Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing escalated the
situation in Rakhine State by deploying the 33 rd and 99th Light Infantry Divisions into this
zone earlier in August 2017, before the ARSA attacks of 25 August. It should come as no
surprise that some of the most egregious violations during the “clearance operations” were
committed by these troops.
1545. Further contributing to this command climate is the Tatmadaw leadership’s praise
and promotion of commanders and soldiers who were known to have been involved in
crimes or were suspected of involvement. Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing, for example,
hailed the Tatmadaw’s handling of the crisis in Rakhine State. An official statement noted
that “security forces took actions in accordance with the law, and did not overstep the law”,
and that his men “strictly followed orders and acted in accordance with the rules of
engagement during the recent Rakhine crisis”. 3265 When military operations that encompass
widespread attacks on civilians are celebrated as an example of soldiers acting in
accordance with the law, and when those who direct them are praised and promoted, the
scene is set for cycles of violence. That is what has happened in Myanmar throughout the
period under review.

B. Civilian authorities

1546. The constitutional powers of the civilian authorities afford little scope for controlling
the actions of the Tatmadaw. Nor is there any indication that they directly participated in
planning or implementing security operations or were part of the command structure, either
in relation to operations in Rakhine State or in northern Myanmar. As outlined above,
security matters fall entirely within the purview of the Tatmadaw, without civilian
oversight. The Commander-in-Chief, Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing, is the Supreme
Commander of all armed forces in Myanmar, which deviates from most modern
constitutional frameworks where the Head of State is usually the Supreme Commander to
whom the highest ranking military officers and institutions are subordinated. The key
Ministers of Defence, Home Affairs and Border Affairs are appointed by the Tatmadaw.
Through these appointments, the Commander-in-Chief also controls the majority of votes
in the National Defence and Security Council.

3265 Facebook post on file with the Mission.

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1547. The Commander-in-Chief recently asserted, in the context of the United Nations
Security Council visit to Myanmar, that, “though I am the head of the Tatmadaw, our
country has the President. And we Tatmadaw take actions under the leadership of the
President” and “Our Tatmadaw is under the guidance of the Myanmar government. We
only take action according to the mandate given by the law and we are not authorized to do
anything beyond the boundaries of law.” 3266 Nonetheless, the Mission has found no
indication that the Tatmadaw has operated under orders from outside its own chain of
command, specifically the Commander-in-Chief and his subordinates.
1548. Nevertheless, nothing indicates that civilian authorities at Union and State level used
their limited powers to influence the situation on the ground in the country, in Rakhine
State in particular, where the gravest crimes under international law were being perpetrated.
The State Counsellor, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, has not used her de facto position as Head
of Government, nor her moral authority, to stem or prevent the unfolding events, or seek
alternative avenues to meet the Government’s responsibility to protect the civilian
population or even to reveal and condemn what was happening. On the contrary, the
civilian authorities have spread false and hateful narratives; denied the Tatmadaw’s
wrongdoing; blocked independent investigations, including of the Fact-Finding Mission;
and overseen the bulldozing of burned Rohingya villages and the destruction of crime sites
and evidence. Ignorance on the part of the Myanmar civilian authorities was effectively
impossible. The allegations of widespread human rights violations were widely covered in
the media during the “clearance operations” in Rakhine State, and the military and civilian
authorities were themselves providing live updates on developments, including on
Facebook.
1549. As such, through their acts and omissions, the civilian authorities have tacitly
accepted and approved the Tatmadaw’s brutal, criminal and grossly disproportionate
actions. Moreover, in the period under review, the civilian authorities supported and
publicly defended the severe, systemic and institutionalised oppression of the Rohingya;
they have condoned, mirrored and promoted the false, hateful and divisive narratives
espoused by ultranationalist Buddhist groups; through silencing activists and critical voices,
they have fostered a climate in which hate speech thrives and incitement to discrimination
and violence is facilitated; through their obstinate denials of credible allegations of human
rights violations and abuses, they emboldened perpetrators. Such conduct is not only in
violation of Myanmar’s obligations under international human rights law; it has also been
profoundly damaging to the country and its democratic transition. Silence in the face of
unfolding atrocity crimes amounts to a severe dereliction of duty.
1550. Through these acts and omissions, the civilian authorities have contributed to the
commission of atrocity crimes. For such conduct to incur individual criminal responsibility,
as a form of aiding and abetting the commission of crimes 3267, it would have to be proven,
first, that the practical assistance, encouragement or support to the commission of crimes
had a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime, and, second, that the practical
assistance, encouragement or support was provided with knowledge that the acts or
omissions assist the principal perpetrator.3268 The information presently available to the
Mission does not allow such conclusion on reasonable grounds. The Mission notes,
however, that, in other contexts, liability for aiding and abetting has arisen when civilian

3266 https://www.facebook.com/seniorgeneralminaunghlaing/posts/1963383073696171 (on file with the

Mission).
3267 See ICTY Statute, Article 7(1), ICTR Statute, Article 6(1). See also, ICC Statute, Article 25(3)(c),
which provides that “a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person:… (c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission
of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission,
including providing the means for its commission”. Under Article 25(3)(c), the assistance “must have
furthered, advanced, or facilitated the commission of such offence”. See ICC, Prosecutor v. Bemba et
al., ICC-01/05-01/13-1989-Red, Judgment, 19 October 2016, para. 94.
3268 See, for example, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Popovic et al., IT-05-88-A, Judgment, 20 January 2015, at
para. 1732; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko et al., IT-98-42-A, Judgment, 14 December 2015, at
para. 2083.

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authorities assisted in the commission of crimes through, inter alia, demanding

disarmament of adversaries,3269 through providing encouragement and moral support to the
perpetrators3270 (which need not be explicit),3271 and through failing to meet a legal duty to
ensure the tranquillity, public order, and security of people, amid violent attacks on
refugees.3272 On the basis of these past findings by international criminal tribunals, the
Mission considers that further investigation is warranted.

C. Non-State armed groups and individuals

1551. Non-State armed groups in Kachin, Rakhine and Shan States have committed human
rights abuses and crimes against civilians, in some cases amounting to war crimes. Fighters
within these non-State armed groups who participated in crimes will incur criminal
responsibility. The doctrine of command responsibility also extends to non-State armed
groups. As such, where commanders exercising effective control over troops have failed to
take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent and punish crimes about which they had
knowledge (or should have had knowledge), individual criminal responsibility for the acts
of these troops may attach.
1552. Local authorities, politicians and monks participated or assisted in the commission
of violations and crimes, to varying degrees. To this end, the Mission recalls for example
the apparent link between virulent anti-Rohingya and anti-Muslim hate speech, rhetoric and
propaganda, and outbreaks of violence. Those whose acts or omissions had a substantial
effect on the commission of crimes, can be liable for aiding and abetting in their
commission. This contribution need not have been physical, liability can also arise for
individuals who provide moral support, or who fail to act in the face of a clear legal duty.
The degree of individual culpability of these local authorities, politicians, and monks,
warrants further examination.

D. Non-exhaustive list of alleged perpetrators

1553. The Mission has drawn up a non-exhaustive list of persons it considers warrant
individual investigation and prosecution as possible perpetrators of crimes under
international law, indicating priority subjects. It includes all persons concerning whom the
Mission has received information indicating their involvement in the serious human rights
violations and abuses, as well as possible crimes under international law, outlined in this
report. The list includes individuals belonging to the Tatmadaw and other security forces in
Myanmar, non-State armed actors and certain civilian individuals. While the list includes
names of alleged direct perpetrators, it focuses on those exercising effective control over
them.
1554. The majority of violations and crimes found by the Mission were committed by the
Tatmadaw or by forces under its control. Considering the analysis on command and control
within that institution, making it clear that the Tatmadaw commanders exercise effective
control over their own soldiers, as well as over other armed actors deployed in military
operations, the Mission decided to publicly release the names of six senior commanders
within the Tatmadaw. While the top commanders have responsibility over the entire
country, including Kachin and Shan State, others are specifically in relation to the
“clearance operations” in Rakhine State (as per the pictured chart). In naming the highest
levels of command, the Mission seeks to underscore their responsibility for crimes
committed. Responsibility starts at the top.

3269 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, IT-00-36-T, Judgment, 1 September 2004, at para. 367.
3270 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-A, Judgment, 26 September 2013, at paras. 523-524.
3271 ICC, Prosecutor v. Bemba et al., ICC-01/05-01/13-1989-Red, Judgment, 19 October 2016, at
para. 94.
3272 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko et al., ICTR-98-42-A, Judgment, 14 December 2015, at
paras. 2189-2222.

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1555. The list includes:

• Tatmadaw Commander-in-Chief, Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing;
• Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Vice Senior-General Soe Win;
• Commander, Bureau of Special Operations-3, Lieutenant-General Aung Kyaw Zaw;
• Commander, Western Regional Military Command, Major-General Maung Maung
Soe;
• Commander, 33rd Light Infantry Division, Brigadier-General Aung Aung;
• Commander, 99th Light Infantry Division, Brigadier-General Than Oo.

Chart providing an overview of the Tatmadaw chain of command during

the “clearance operations” as of 25 August 2017

1556. The full list will form part of the Mission’s archives, kept in the custody of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. It can be shared with any competent
and credible body pursuing accountability in line with recognized international norms and
standards, including with regard to fair trial.

E. International community

1557. Considering the nature and scale of the gross human rights violations and abuses
committed in Myanmar since 2011, amounting to the gravest crimes under international
law, the question arises whether the international community has met its responsibility to
protect civilian populations from the commission of atrocity crimes, including possibly
genocide. The international community, through the United Nations, has the responsibility
to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means and, through the

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Security Council, other collective measures to help to protect populations from atrocity
crimes.3273
1558. The role of the United Nations and humanitarian community in relation to the issues
set out in this report has not been specifically investigated by the Mission. At the same
time, the Mission is concerned that these events, particularly in Rakhine State, occurred
with a large active international presence on the ground and – significantly – while the
United Nations was rolling out its Human Rights Up Front Action Plan.3274
1559. Throughout the period under review, Myanmar was repeatedly identified as a
situation that required the “whole of UN”, human rights driven, response to crises set out in
the Action Plan. This approach was rarely, if ever, pursued. Rather, it was largely “business
as usual”, with development goals and humanitarian access prioritised only. Information
received by the Mission indicates that a number of individuals within the United Nations
system in Myanmar tried to pursue the Human Rights Up Front approach. The Mission is
concerned to note allegations that these individuals were ignored, criticised, side-lined or
blocked in these efforts.
1560. The United Nations leadership in-country engaged on human rights issues through a
“quiet diplomacy” approach to raise concerns with the Government. This included letters to
the Myanmar authorities and meetings with senior officials. However, public advocacy was
left to the “usual suspects”, primarily the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in
Myanmar. This is exemplified by the fact that, even after the events following 25 August
2017, the only statement made by the Resident Coordinator’s Office was to condemn the
ARSA attacks and losses suffered by the Myanmar security forces. 3275 Leaving human
rights to the specialized entities rather than addressing them collectively as the United
Nations system, undermined the effectiveness of the United Nations in Myanmar. One
detailed study of the approach of the international community in Myanmar concluded:
UN leaders inside Myanmar consistently left the public advocacy role to a few
externally based human rights mandate-holders, without visibly supporting or
backing them up. […] The deeply ingrained and well-practiced habit of self-
censorship remained too powerful, even when the worst of violence struck in 2016
and 2017.3276
1561. Even now, the approach displays few signs of any lessons having been learned.
There has been no review of what happened, of where the approach taken had some
positive effect and where it did not, and of how the UN’s approach could be improved in
future crises. A review of this kind is the very least that would be expected in any
organization dealing with a catastrophe such as this. Human rights remain missing from
agreements recently signed between the Government and United Nations agencies and
international donors. Integration of a coherent human rights approach throughout the work
of the United Nations and international community, including advocacy from the most
senior levels, remains essential if the fundamental challenges outlined in this report are to
be addressed. As the detailed study also highlighted:
The international community in Myanmar has boxed itself in to a very small space,
pressured and manipulated into silent complicity with ethnic cleansing, and it
remains to be seen whether the UN and its humanitarian partners will find the

3273 A/RES/60/1 (2005 World Summit Outcome), para. 139.

3274 The Human Rights Up Front Action Plan was put in place in 2013, to draw appropriate lessons from a
2012 report of the Secretary-General Internal Review Panel on United Nations action in Sri Lanka,
which had identified a “systemic failure” in how the United Nations had dealt with the crisis in Sri
Lanka. The principal aim of this Action Plan was to strengthen “the UN system’s ability to effectively
prevent and respond to serious human rights violations and complex crises” and to provide a
framework for a timelier and more predictable UN-wide response to such situations.
3275 Statement of the Resident Coordinator of the United Nations in Myanmar Renata Lok-Dessallien on
attacks in Rakhine State (25 August 2017).
3276 L. Mahoney (Fieldview Solutions), “Time to break old habits: Shifting from Complicity to Protecting
the Rohingya” (July 2018).

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courage and creativity to try to push that space open. In situations like this,
international actors tend to bemoan how little political space and manoeuvrability
they believe they have, and paradoxically use this as an excuse for not trying to
expand it. But political space is often self-constrained: the Myanmar government
has learned that it can count on UN and humanitarian self-censorship.3277
1562. The Mission is extremely grateful to United Nations entities and individuals who
provided valuable assistance and information to it in its work. However, it also regrets the
lack of cooperation from others. The Mission is concerned that a number of interlocutors
within the United Nations system took a defensive attitude towards its work and appeared
to view it as a threat, rather than a means to address the most deep rooted human rights
challenges facing Myanmar. This attitude and approach must change.

X. Impunity and accountability

I do not see any justice for us. Justice was never there in Myanmar. It is just that
now the situation is more in focus because of the extreme levels of the violence.3278
1563. In 2012, United Nations Member States explicitly agreed to end impunity for
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, violations of international humanitarian
law and gross violations of human rights law. They committed to the proper investigation
and appropriate sanction of violations, including by bringing the perpetrators of crimes to
justice through national mechanisms or, where appropriate, regional or international
mechanisms, in accordance with international law.3279 The United Nations Security Council
has also emphasized the responsibility of States to comply with their obligations to end
impunity and thoroughly investigate and prosecute “in order to prevent violations, avoid
their recurrence and seek sustainable peace, justice, truth and reconciliation”. 3280
1564. Myanmar has a legal obligation to ensure accountability for the violations and
crimes outlined in this report. To date, no significant steps have been taken. At the Human
Rights Council session in February 2018, the representative of Myanmar stated that his
government would not condone impunity and that action would be taken against
perpetrators “where there is concrete evidence”.3281 The Mission welcomes this statement of
principle but highlights its insufficiency. The statement illustrates a misunderstanding of
Myanmar’s legal obligations. Its duty is not linked to the presentation of “concrete
evidence” by others. It is to ensure that all allegations of human rights violations and abuses
are promptly, thoroughly, independently and impartially investigated – and that concrete
evidence is gathered, rather than lost or destroyed. It must act, not take a passive stance.
1565. Ensuring accountability for crimes is not only a legal obligation. In Myanmar, it is
also the key to disrupting patterns of oppression and cycles of violence in which the country
has remained trapped for half a century. Impunity for gross human rights violations has
significantly and demonstrably contributed to the validation of deeply oppressive and
discriminatory conduct, enabled recurrence of human rights violations and atrocity crimes,
and emboldened perpetrators and silenced victims. It has undermined the legitimacy of the
State and exacerbated ethnic and racial divisions. It has prevented Myanmar’s development
as a modern democratic State. Accountability is the key to re-establishing the population’s
trust in the State and in its capacity to ensure a secure and equitable society in which all
people can prosper. As stated in the preamble of the United Nations Principles to Combat
Impunity, “there can be no just and lasting reconciliation unless the need for justice is

3277 Ibid.
3278 DI-048.
3279 A/RES/67/1, Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at
the National and International Levels.
3280 E.g. S/PRST/2010/11 (Statement by the President of the Security Council, Promotion and
strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security 29 June 2010).
3281 H.E. Mr. Kyaw Tin, “Statement at the High-Level Segment - 4th Meeting, 37th Regular Session of the
Human Rights Council” (27 February 2018).

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effectively satisfied”.3282 The transformation of South Africa after apartheid and of South
American States after the end of military dictatorships and civil wars stand as concrete
examples of this principle.

A. Legal framework and international standards on accountability

1566. Impunity means the impossibility, de jure or de facto, to bring perpetrators of

violations to account, whether in criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings.
Perpetrators are shielded from any inquiry that might lead to their being accused, arrested,
tried and - if found guilty - sentenced to appropriate penalties and required to provide
reparations to victims.3283 The Mission adheres to a broad understanding of the concept of
accountability. As highlighted by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion
of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, “criminal justice alone would
not be enough to satisfy the justice claims of victims of massive or systematic human rights
abuse”.3284 In addition, accountability also encompasses measures to realize the right to
know the truth, the right to an effective remedy and to reparation, and guarantees of non-
recurrence.3285
1567. This broad understanding of accountability stems from States’ obligations under
international law. States have a duty to ensure that individuals have accessible and effective
remedies to enforce their rights, including through redress for violations. 3286 This includes a
duty to investigate, prosecute and punish gross human rights violations and serious
violations of international humanitarian law, in particular where they amount to crimes
under international law.3287 For example, under the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, States parties like Myanmar have a due diligence
obligation to prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish acts of gender based violence. A
failure to investigate and prosecute could, in itself, constitute a human rights violation. 3288
Investigations into allegations of violations and crimes must be prompt, thorough and

3282 Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to
Combat Impunity (E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1), hereafter “Principles to Combat Impunity”.
3283 Principles to Combat Impunity, definitions.
3284 A/HRC/36/50/Add.1, para. 25.
3285 Principles to Combat Impunity, principle 1.
3286 B. Ramcharan, “The Law-Making Process: From Declaration to Treaty to Custom to Prevention”, in
The Oxford Handbook on International Human Rights Law, D. Shelton ed. (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2013), p. 512. The right of victims to an effective and enforceable remedy for
violations of their human rights is proclaimed in numerous international instruments, including the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (art. 8), the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (art. 5), and
several international treaties (e.g. art. 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
article 6 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;
art. 14 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment; art. 39 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; art. 3 of the Hague Convention
respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 18 October 1907; art. 91 of the Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) of 8 June 1977; and arts. 68 and 75 of the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court). It is also further developed in the United Nations Basic Principles
and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, adopted
and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005, hereafter “Basic
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation”.
3287 E.g. A/HRC/27/56, para. 27. See also e.g. Genocide Convention, art. 1; U.N. Human Rights
Committee, General Comment No. 31 (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13); J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-
Beck, “Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume I: Rules” (Cambridge, ICRC/Cambridge
University Press, 2005), rules 150, 158 (hereinafter “ICRC/Customary IHL”); Basic Principles and
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation (principles 1-5); and the Principles to Combat
Impunity.
3288 E.g. United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31
(CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13), para. 15.

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effective, independent and impartial, and transparent.3289 International and domestic courts
have recognised this obligation on governments to prevent, investigate and, if necessary,
prosecute.3290
1568. Considering the specific context in Myanmar, it is important to briefly recall what is
meant by prompt, thorough and effective, independent and impartial, and transparent
investigations, according to international standards:
• Prompt: the State must initiate and conduct an investigation into an alleged human
rights violation as soon as possible and proceed without unreasonable delays. A
reasonable allegation is sufficient to trigger an investigation; a formal complaint or
concrete evidence is not required.
• Thorough and effective: investigations must be conducted in a manner that can
lead to the identification, prosecution and punishment of those responsible for
violations, including, for example, members of the military or government. In
relation to unlawful deaths, this would include collecting eyewitness testimony and
forensic evidence, as well as carrying out an autopsy. 3291 As well as seeking to
identify individual perpetrators, the investigation should seek to identify policies and
systemic failures that may have contributed to unlawful deaths and to identify
patterns, where they exist.3292 The investigation must be conducted by a mechanism
that is appropriately empowered and resourced, with capacity to ensure the security
of witnesses.
• Independent and impartial: the persons or mechanism responsible for and carrying
out the investigation must be independent from those implicated in the events under
investigation. This, at the very least, implies no hierarchical or institutional link
between the alleged perpetrator and the investigators. 3293 Investigators must be
impartial and without bias, analysing evidence objectively.
• Transparent: investigative processes and their outcomes must be transparent, and
open to the scrutiny of the general public and of victims’ families. Limitations on
transparency must be strictly necessary for a legitimate purpose (e.g. protecting the
privacy and safety of affected individuals, ensuring the integrity of continuing
investigations, or securing sensitive information about military or police
operations).3294
1569. In addition to establishing individual criminal responsibility, measures also need to
be taken to realize the right of victims to know the truth about violations.3295 The U.N.
Principles on Combating Impunity describe the full and effective exercise of the right to the
truth as “a vital safeguard against the recurrence of violations”. Victims and societies have
the right to know the truth about the perpetration of heinous crimes and the circumstances

3289 Ibid. Also Principles to Combat Impunity, principle 19; Minnesota Protocol on the Investigation of
Potentially Unlawful Death (2016), The Revised United Nations Manual on the Effective Prevention
and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions (New York and Geneva, United
Nations, 2017) (hereafter “Minnesota Protocol”).
3290 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment of 29 July
1988, Ser. C, No. 4, which held that States had an obligation, as a corollary to their obligation to
ensure rights, to investigate and, if warranted, prosecute and punish violations and to provide
remedies to victims. Other regional human rights bodies, as well as United Nations treaty bodies,
have all reaffirmed this principle. E.g. European Court of Human Rights, Case of Benzer and others
v. Turkey, App no. 23502/06, 24 March 2014; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe, Communication no. 245/2002 (2006); U.N.
Human Rights Committee, Observations on Algeria, CCPR/C/109/D/1874/2009, 7 January 2014,
para. 7.10.
3291 Minnesota Protocol, paras. 24-25.
3292 Minnesota Protocol, para. 26.
3293 For unlawful deaths, see Minnesota Protocol, para. 28.
3294 Minnesota Protocol, paras. 32-33.
3295 On the right to the truth, see E/CN.4/2006/91, A/HRC/5/7, A/HRC/12/19 and A/HRC/15/33.

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that led to their commission.3296 The right to the truth appears in several international
instruments;3297 is recognized by the Human Rights Council; 3298 and is protected in
international law concerning enforced disappearances.3299 Additionally, in the event of
death or disappearance, victims’ families have the right to know the truth about the
circumstances in which violations took place and the victims’ fate. 3300 Governments are
obliged to establish mechanisms to facilitate the revelation of the truth about gross human
rights violations.3301
1570. Remedies further include adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm
suffered.3302 Victims are entitled to full and effective reparations, which entail restitution,
compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.3303 Restitution
aims to restore the victim to the situation existing before the violation. It may include
restoration of liberty, enjoyment of human rights, identity, family life and citizenship,
return to one’s place of residence, restoration of employment and return of property.
Compensation should be provided for any economically assessable damage (e.g. physical or
mental harm, lost opportunities, material damage). Rehabilitation includes medical and
psychological care as well as legal and social services.3304 Satisfaction may include
effective measures aimed at the cessation of continuing violations; verification of the facts
and full and public disclosure of the truth; search for the whereabouts of the disappeared;
search for, identification and burial of bodies; public apology and acknowledgment of the
facts and acceptance of responsibility; commemorations and tributes to victims. 3305
Reparations should be proportional to the gravity of the violation and the circumstances of
each case.
1571. A critical element of the right to an effective remedy is the provision of guarantees
of non-recurrence.3306 Examples include ensuring effective civilian control of military and
security forces; ensuring that all civilian and military proceedings abide by international
standards of due process; strengthening the independence of the judiciary; protecting
journalists and human rights defenders; providing human rights and international
humanitarian law education to all sectors of society and training for law enforcement
officials as well as military and security forces; promoting public servants’ observance of
codes of conduct and ethical norms, in particular international standards; promoting
mechanisms for preventing and monitoring social conflicts and their resolution; reviewing
and reforming laws contributing to or allowing human rights violations. 3307
1572. These legal obligations and international norms provide a roadmap for genuine and
comprehensive accountability in Myanmar. That road is long, with no quick fixes. A

3296 Principles to Combat Impunity, principle 2.

3297 E.g. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy, principle 24; Principles to Combat
Impunity, principles 2-5.
3298 In 2005, the Commission on Human Rights adopted resolution 2005/66 on the right to truth,
requesting OHCHR to prepare a study on the right to the truth (E/CN.4/2006/91). Human Rights
Council resolutions 9/11, 12/12 and 21/7 also support the right to the truth. In 2014, the General
Assembly adopted a resolution on the right to the truth (A/RES/68/165), recognizing “the importance
of respecting and ensuring the right to the truth so as to contribute to ending impunity and to promote
and protect human rights”.
3299 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, art. 24(2).
3300 Principles to Combat Impunity, principle 4. This right finds its roots in international humanitarian
law, see ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 117.
3301 E.g. A/HRC/24/42, para. 20; D. Groome, “The Inalienable Right to the Truth”, in The United Nations
Principles to Combat Impunity – A Commentary, F. Haldemann, T. Unger, eds. (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2018), pp. 59-70.
3302 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy, principles 11, 14-15; Principles to Combat
Impunity, principle 4 and 31. See also ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06,
Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, 7 August 2012.
3303 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy, principle 18.
3304 Ibid., principle 21.
3305 Ibid., principle 22.
3306 Also A/HRC/30/42 for an in-depth exploration of the concept of guarantees of non-recurrence.
3307 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy, principle 23.

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response amounting to “show us the evidence and then we will investigate”, however, is
manifestly insufficient.

B. History and climate of impunity in Myanmar

1573. Justice has remained elusive for victims in Myanmar for decades, with the
authorities systematically failing to condemn, investigate and prosecute perpetrators. Thirty
years of United Nations resolutions and reports, as well as those from civil society, have
identified impunity as a root cause of continued human rights violations in Myanmar. The
United Nations General Assembly, Commission on Human Rights and Human Rights
Council have highlighted the negative impact of impunity since at least 1994, calling on
Myanmar to bring perpetrators to account. 3308
1574. All five United Nations Special Rapporteurs on the human rights situation in
Myanmar have identified systemic impunity as a critical obstacle to the realization of
human rights in Myanmar. In 1994, the first Special Rapporteur, Yozo Yokota,
recommended that, “given the magnitude of the abuses, official condemnation should be
made by the Government of all acts by authorities involving human rights violations. Such
acts, including all acts of intimidation, threat or reprisal, should not benefit from the present
system of complete denial by, and impunity under, the Government.” 3309
1575. Twelve years later, in a 2006 report, Special Rapporteur Paulo Sergio Pinheiro
demonstrated how impunity had exacerbated a range of human rights concerns and
contributed to a deterioration of the socio-economic situation of villagers in Myanmar. 3310
He found that violations were “indulged with impunity” by the regime, authorized and
sanctioned by law. He identified the misuse of the legal system and a lack of judicial
independence as providing a legal basis for abuse of power and exoneration of
perpetrators.3311 Another decade later, the current Special Rapporteur, Yanghee Lee,
identified the impunity enjoyed by the military and other security forces, and their
dominant position in the government, as the two main causes for recurrent human rights
issues in the country. She noted that, where violations and abuses were alleged, the
Government appeared “quick to resort to its standard position of ‘defend, deny and
dismiss’”,3312 the antithesis of accountability.
1576. The Myanmar authorities, both civilian and military, still adhere to this established
policy of denial of mass violations and impunity for their perpetrators.

1. Key obstacles to accountability in Myanmar

1577. Beyond the question of unwillingness, impunity for human rights violations in
Myanmar – especially where committed by security forces – is largely structural. It is built
into the legal framework and the system of governance.

(a) Structural obstacles to criminal accountability

1578. Impunity for human rights violations is enshrined in the 2008 Constitution and other
domestic laws. Article 445 of the Constitution provides that no proceedings can be
instituted against military officials or government members for “any act done in the
execution of their respective mandate”. This blanket amnesty appears intended to shield the

3308 See e.g. E/CN.4/1994/132, op. 8, reminding “the Government of Myanmar of its obligation to put an
end to the impunity of perpetrators of violations of human rights, including members of the military,
and its responsibility to investigate alleged cases of human rights violations committed by its agents
on its territory, to bring them to justice, prosecute them and punish those found guilty, in all
circumstances.” For General Assembly, see e.g. A/RES/52/137, A/RES/53/162, A/RES/56/231,
A/RES/59/263.
3309 E/CN.4/1994/57, para. 74(g).
3310 A/61/369, paras. 27-33. See also E/CN.4/1999/35, para. 78.
3311 A/61/369, para. 34; A/62/233, para. 30.
3312 A/HRC/34/67, para. 83. Also A/HRC/28/72, para. 57.

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former military regimes, the SLORC and the SPDC, from prosecution for acts committed
prior to March 2011, although the clause could be interpreted as also providing immunity
for later conduct. In 2016, the outgoing government of Thein Sein also adopted the Former
Presidents’ Security Act, providing presidents with legal immunity from prosecution for
crimes committed during their term of office. 3313
1579. Furthermore, article 20(b) of the Constitution gives the Tatmadaw the right to
“independently administer and adjudicate all affairs of the armed forces”. Articles 293(b)
and 319 establish permanent military tribunals. The 1959 Defence Services Act provides
that military personnel on active service who commit serious crimes against a civilian
(murder, culpable homicide, rape) shall be tried by military tribunals (article 72). The Act
defines “active service” in such broad manner that military personnel would effectively
always fall under military courts’ jurisdiction. 3314 Article 343(b) of the Constitution further
makes decisions of the Commander-in-Chief concerning military justice matters “final and
conclusive”, with no right of appeal. This effectively means that the Commander-in-Chief
can also pardon anyone convicted by a military tribunal. The Mission has been unable to
ascertain whether the rare soldiers convicted of serious crimes actually serve their
sentences.
1580. These legal provisions provide broad immunities and make the Tatmadaw
accountable only to itself. This is incompatible with the duty of States to ensure
independent and impartial investigations for alleged human rights violations. It is
inconsistent with international standards requiring that human rights violations fall within
the jurisdiction of ordinary domestic courts.3315 Military courts are inappropriate venues to
adjudicate human rights violations. 3316 In Myanmar in particular, military courts lack the
independence and impartiality required to judge military officers for serious human rights
violations. Additionally, trials in military courts are generally not open to the public;
victims generally remain unaware or uninformed of any action taken against alleged
perpetrators.
1581. In short, under the current constitutional and legal framework, the civilian
authorities cannot hold the military or its members accountable for human rights violations.
Amending the Constitution requires more than 75 per cent of the votes in Parliament. Given
that the Constitution also guarantees that 25 per cent of parliamentary seats are held by the
military, any amendments would require their consent. 3317
1582. As for the police, the 1995 Myanmar Police Force Maintenance of Discipline Law
also assists in shielding police officers from prosecution for crimes committed in the course
of their service. The Law lists a range of “offences” for which police officers may be tried
before a Police Court, such as threatening a witness (article 13(c)), unlawful detention
(article 17(a)), beating or ill-treatment of prisoners (article 17(c)), or corruption (article
17(h)). As such, even for acts which may constitute serious human rights violations and
crimes under the Penal Code, police officers are shielded from prosecution in the domestic
criminal system. In addition to concerns over its independence and impartiality, an accused
before a Police Court faces lesser sentences (e.g. “threatening a witness” is punishable by a
maximum prison term of one year, whereas “criminal intimidation” under the Penal Code is

3313 Former Presidents’ Security Law (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law No. 25/2016, 28 January 2016).
3314 The provision reads: “The time during which [the person] (1) is attached to, or forms part of, a force
which is engaged in military operations against an enemy, or (2) is engaged in military operations in,
or is on the line of march to, a country or place wholly or partly occupied by an enemy, or (3) is
attached to or forms part of a force which is in military occupation of a foreign country”.
3315 See Principles to Combat Impunity, principle 29; United Nations Commission on Human Rights,
Draft Principles Governing the Administration of Justice Through Military Tribunals
(E/CN.4/2006/58).
3316 See e.g. F. Ni Aolain, “Principle 29. Restrictions on the Jurisdiction of Military Courts”, in F.
Haldemann and T. Unger (eds.), The United Nations Principles to Combat Impunity – A Commentary
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 322: “When military courts are deployed in fragile,
transitional, and post-conflict states there is a clear and present danger that the modality of trial may
compound rather than address serious human rights violations and the deficiencies of the rule of law.”
3317 Constitution of Myanmar, s. 436.

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punishable by a maximum prison term of seven years3318). The police and its administration
fall under the Ministry of Home Affairs, which is ultimately answerable to the Tatmadaw
Commander-in-Chief.

(b) Inadequate substantive legal framework

1583. As Myanmar has ratified the Genocide Convention, it must criminalise and punish
genocide in its domestic laws. This has not been done. Nor have crimes against humanity or
war crimes been specifically criminalised. While other serious crimes are included in the
Penal Code, the definitions do not consistently comply with international norms and
standards. For instance, while torture is criminalised in the Penal Code (articles 330 and
331), the definition only extends to acts undertaken with a view to compelling the victim’s
response (e.g. confession), while the international definition is broader. There is no specific
provision for ill-treatment. The Penal Code provisions for rape and sexual violence are
restrictive.3319
1584. The Constitution is particularly problematic in that generally it only extends human
rights protections to “citizens”. In a context where the citizenship rules are fundamentally
discriminatory and have rendered a large segment of the population de facto stateless, this
effectively excludes non-citizens from seeking protection for their rights and an effective
remedy for violations. Furthermore, Myanmar’s legal framework includes laws, regulations
and orders that oppress the Rohingya specifically, and more generally curtail freedom of
expression, association and peaceful assembly.

(c) Lack of effective complaint mechanisms and avenues for justice

1585. There are no effective avenues for justice within the civilian administration. Neither
the justice system nor the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission is a realistic
option for pursuing accountability for gross human rights violations. Myanmar has not
recognized the competence of any of the individual complaints mechanisms under the
international human rights framework either.
1586. The Myanmar judiciary has been systematically undermined, weakened and
neglected during the long period of military dictatorship. Despite some progress reported
since 20113320, it is consistently assessed as lacking independence, poorly trained and
resourced, inefficient, and prone to corrupt practices. 3321 These factors impact on its ability
to guarantee fair trial rights.

3318 Penal Code of Myanmar, s. 503, 506.

3319 See CEDAW/C/MMR/CO/4-5, para. 27(a).
3320 The Judicial Strategic Plan 2018-2022 (“Towards improving justice for all”) of the Supreme Court of
Myanmar lists “enhance judicial independence and administrative capacity” and “promote and ensure
the professionalism, accountability and integrity of the judiciary” as key strategic action areas. Recent
positive developments include the launch of the Codes of Ethics of the Union Supreme Court and the
Union Attorney General’s Office. A Manual of Fair Trial Standards for Law Officers (prosecutors)
was also recently launched by the Union Attorney General, to raise awareness about the rights of the
accused and the proper conduct of criminal proceedings.
3321 See e.g. International Bar Association, The Rule of Law in Myanmar: Challenges and Prospects
(London, December 2012); Kyaw Min San, “Critical Issues for the Rule of Law in Myanmar”, in
Myanmar's Transition: Openings, Obstacles and Opportunities, N. Cheesman, M. Skidmore, T.
Wilson, eds. (Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 2012), pp. 217-229; N. Cheesman,
“Myanmar’s Courts and the Sound Money Makes”, in Myanmar's Transition: Openings, Obstacles
and Opportunities, N. Cheesman, M. Skidmore, T. Wilson, eds. (Singapore, Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies 2012), pp. 231-248; N. Cheesman, Opposing the Rule of Law – How Myanmar’s
Courts Make Law and Order, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015; Justice Base,
Monitoring in Myanmar – An Analysis of Myanmar’s Compliance with Fair Trial Rights (Yangon,
2017); International Commission of Jurists, Achieving Justice for Gross Human Rights Violations in
Myanmar – Baseline Study (Geneva, January 2018); M. Crouch, “Judiciary”, in Routledge Handbook
of Contemporary Myanmar, A. Simpson, N. Farrelly and I. Holliday, eds. (Routledge, London and
New York, 2018), pp. 248-256.

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1587. The judiciary’s lack of independence is generally acknowledged. The President

appoints judges to the Supreme Court and the Chief Justices of the High Courts, with a very
limited role for review by the Union Parliament.3322 It suffices that the President is of the
opinion that the person is “an eminent jurist”; a law degree or legal practice is not required.
Most judges on the Supreme Court are military appointees and several have military
backgrounds, including the current Chief Justice, Htun Htun Oo, who was appointed in
2011. These structural factors may explain the level of undue influence from State
authorities, in particular the executive and the military, particularly in politically sensitive
cases, including those regarding human rights violations.
1588. Other challenges include insufficient legal expertise and judicial experience. A
general lack of adequate resources results in low remuneration, understaffing and limited
training options. Many experts, observers and practitioners consider corruption
widespread.3323 In March 2018, at the “Conference on the Justice Sector Coordinating for
Rule of Law” in Naypyidaw, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi said, “the public trust in
people who are working in the justice sector has eroded. It is because of corruption,
exercising the law for their own interests, failing the principle of upholding justice without
favour, and not performing their work efficiently and lacking expertise.” 3324 This sentiment
was echoed by many of the Mission’s interviewees, who invariably stated that they had no
trust in the Myanmar justice system.
1589. Similar problems plague the investigation of cases. The Myanmar Police Force is
poorly regarded by the public, has limited institutional independence and high levels of
corruption.3325 The head of the Myanmar Police Force has a military background and the
Police Force falls under the Ministry of Home Affairs, one of the military controlled
ministries. During joint security operations, the police fall under the command of the
Tatmadaw.3326 Its technical capacity to undertake complex investigations, including in
terms of crime scene investigations and forensic analysis in line with international
standards, is also limited.3327 There can be no expectation that the police will conduct
credible, independent investigations into alleged gross human rights violations by the
military or other security forces.
1590. Similarly, the Union Attorney-General is a member of the executive branch of the
government. The Attorney-General plays a critical role in upholding the rule of law and
respect for human rights, as his Office supervises the country’s prosecutors and can select
cases and initiate criminal proceedings. However, the Office of the Attorney-General
enjoys low public confidence, largely due to its history of defending the interests of the
military and its poor track record regarding sensitive matters such as human rights
violations – including the prosecution of journalists, human rights defenders and activists
on spurious grounds. Legal officers and prosecutors are generally not considered to have
the independence and capacity to prosecute acts constituting human rights violations. 3328

3322 Constitution of Myanmar, s. 299.

3323 See same references as for preceding paragraphs.
3324 The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Ministry of Information, “Rule of law for all - Judiciary,
legal institutions urged to work honestly for reforms” (7 March 2018), available at:
http://www.moi.gov.mm/moi:eng/?q=news/8/03/2018/id-12933 (accessed August 2018).
3325 E.g. A. Selth, Police reform in Burma (Myanmar): aims, obstacles and outcomes, Regional Outlook
Paper: No. 44, 2013 (Griffith Asia Institute)
3326 For more detail, see chapter IX, A: Responsibility - Tatmadaw and other security forces.
3327 Recent cooperation projects have focused on supporting the Myanmar Police Force in its
modernisation, focusing on areas such as community policing, crowd management and crime
investigation. See for example the European Union funded project “MYPOL”
(http://www.mypol.eu/).
3328 See e.g. International Commission of Jurists, Achieving Justice for Gross Human Rights Violations in
Myanmar – Baseline Study (Geneva, January 2018); D. Aguirre, V. Sathisan, “Rule of law depends
on reform of Union Attorney General’s Office” (Myanmar Times, 27 January 2016). See also Union
Attorney General’s Office, Moving Forward to the Rule of Law – Strategic Plan 2015-2019,
(Naypyidaw, 2015).

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1591. The Myanmar National Human Rights Commission (MNHRC), which was created
in 20113329 and reconstituted in 2014,3330 in principle has a broad mandate to promote and
protect human rights. The MNHRC has the power to investigate human rights violations,
including the power to summon witnesses and to visit detention centres (although only with
prior notification). It may initiate an inquiry when it becomes aware of “widespread,
systemic or entrenched situations or practices that violate human rights”, and can also
receive complaints from individuals, although it cannot investigate cases pending before a
court or in which a court has already taken a final decision. Following its restructuring in
2014, the MNHRC received a “B status” accreditation from the International Coordinating
Committee of National Human Rights Institutions, 3331 meaning that it is partially compliant
with the United Nations Paris Principles providing the benchmarks for accreditation.
1592. The main obstacles to an “A status” accreditation were insufficient diversity among
its membership (in particular a lack of women), issues with its independence and funding,
and being insufficiently rigorous in the implementation of its mandate. 3332 For example, the
MNHRC was encouraged to be more active in addressing the rights of the Rohingya and
other minorities.3333 Civil society organizations have previously criticised the MNHRC for
being insufficiently proactive (or invisible) regarding the protection of human rights in the
context of armed conflicts and for not addressing human rights violations committed by
security forces.3334

(d) Intimidation, fear of reprisal and lack of protection for victims and witnesses
1593. Impunity for human rights violations is compounded by a pattern of harassment and
legal action against those who bring complaints. The Tatmadaw and Police have brought
legal charges against victims and their family members, under a range of problematic legal
provisions.3335 One victim interviewed by the Mission about the offensives in Tanai
Township (Kachin State) in January 2018 encapsulated the inevitability of repercussions,
stating: “I want to give my testimony to you and I am ready to be arrested for it.” 3336
Victims, including survivors of sexual violence, have also been publicly shamed and
ridiculed by the authorities.3337

2. Two illustrative case studies: sexual violence and violence in Rakhine

(a) Case study 1: the use of rape and other forms of sexual violence by the military
1594. As highlighted above, the Mission considers rape and other forms of sexual violence
one of the hallmarks of Tatmadaw operations. Sexual violence has been a recurring feature
of military operations in Kachin, Shan and Rakhine States between 2011 and 2018,
consistent with similar allegations for at least 30 years. Its systematic occurrence indicates
that sexual violence forms part of a larger strategy to intimidate, terrorise or punish a
civilian population. Such level of normalisation is only possible in a climate of long-
standing tolerance and impunity, where military personnel have no reason to fear
punishment or disciplinary action.

3329 The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Presidential Ordinance No. 34/2011.
3330 Myanmar National Human Rights Commission Law, Law No. 21/2014.
3331 Now “Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions”.
3332 For a full analysis of the MNHRC and its challenges, see J. Liljeblad, “The Efficacy of National
Human Rights Institutions Seen in Context: Lessons from the Myanmar National Human Rights
Commission”, Yale Human Rights and Development Journal, Vol. 19(1) 2017, pp. 95-132.
3333 For an overview of the MNHRC’s response to the crisis in Rakhine State, see this chapter, section
B.2.b: Case study 2 – Violence and oppression in Rakhine State.
3334 E.g. Asian NGOs Network on National Human Rights Institutions, Progressive Voice, Smile
Education and Development Foundation, Action Committee for Democracy Development, Suspicious
Minds: The Myanmar National Human Rights Commission’s Trust Deficit (2017).
3335 See chapter VI, section A.1: Legal toolbox for restricting fundamental freedoms.
3336 PI-043.
3337 See following paragraphs.

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1595. The impunity for sexual violence has for 30 years been raised as a key issue
requiring urgent remedy. 3338 In 2006, for example, Special Rapporteur Pinheiro highlighted
the high number of allegations of sexual violence against women and girls committed by
members of the military as “another noteworthy illustration of the consistent and continuing
pattern of impunity”. He listed hundreds of cases brought to his attention. 3339 He found this
trend “particularly alarming” bearing in mind likely underreporting because of trauma and
social stigma. He reported not being aware of “any initiatives by the Government of
Myanmar to look into these serious human rights abuses with a view to identifying the
perpetrators and bring them to justice”. He concluded that “the failure to investigate,
prosecute and punish those responsible for rape and sexual violence has contributed to an
environment conducive to the perpetuation of violence against women and girls in
Myanmar”.3340
1596. The standard response of the Myanmar authorities has been categorical denial and
the intimidation of victims and witnesses. Occasionally, often in response to sustained
international pressure, a superficial investigation has been undertaken. For example, in
2003, the Special Rapporteur closely followed the authorities’ response to allegations that
Shan women had been systematically raped by Myanmar military personnel. He received
detailed briefings from the authorities on three investigations, which had found that the
allegations were unfounded, exaggerated, and made with the purpose of “hurting the
prestige of Myanmar and the Myanmar armed forces”.3341 The investigations were
conducted by a “special team of security personnel”, the Deputy Minister for Home Affairs
under the guidance of General Khin Nyunt (then First Secretary of the State Peace and
Development Council) and a team of the Myanmar National Working Committee on
Women’s Affairs led by Daw Khin Win Shwe (General Khin Nyunt’s wife). The
investigations concluded that there were “no rape cases committed by military personnel
between 1996 and 1999 and in 2002” but there were “three cases in 2000 and 2001”, the
perpetrators of which had reportedly been sentenced.
1597. The Special Rapporteur considered that these investigations “lacked the
independence required to be convincing and credible”, having been undertaken by military
and other government personnel. He concluded that investigations had not been conducted
in line with international human rights standards and methodologies and had not, for
example, been conducted in an environment in which victims and witnesses could testify
without fear of reprisals.3342 He proposed several options for credibly investigating these
and numerous other alleged human rights violations. 3343 None was taken up.
1598. Impunity has continued since 2011. Sporadic convictions of a small number of
soldiers for acts of sexual violence do nothing to suggest a significant effort to address the
scope of the problem or its root causes. 3344 In 2016, the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights reported that he had no information that allegations of sexual and
gender-based violence against women and girls in Rakhine State, “which have been
reported for decades”, had been investigated or that perpetrators had been held
accountable.3345 The same year, the Special Rapporteur welcomed the convictions of two
military personnel for rape in 2014 but noted that “these examples do not reflect the general
trend nor the structural challenges involved, which often result in impunity”. 3346 In 2016,

3338 E.g. A/HRC/7/18, para. 87; E/CN.4/2006/34, para. 79.

3339 For an overview of civil society organizations’ reports detailing instances of sexual violence in
Myanmar between 1988-2007, see International Center for Transitional Justice, Impunity Prolonged:
Burma and its 2008 Constitution (New York, 2009), p. 14.
3340 A/61/369, para. 30.
3341 E/CN.4/2003/41, paras. 38-46.
3342 Ibid., para. 42.
3343 Ibid., para. 43.
3344 E.g., in 2016, the Special Rapporteur reported that the Ministry of Defence had informed her that
61 members of the military had been prosecuted for acts of sexual and gender-based violence between
2011 and 2015. Of these, 31 were reportedly tried before a military tribunal (A/HRC/31/71, para. 49).
3345 A/HRC/32/18, para. 36.
3346 A/HRC/31/71, para. 49.

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the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women recommended that Myanmar “repeal all laws that perpetuate impunity for sexual
violence committed during and after conflict and expedite the investigation and prosecution
of crimes of sexual violence perpetrated by the military and armed groups”. 3347
1599. The lack of genuine effort to hold perpetrators of sexual violence to account is best
illustrated by a number of publicly reported incidents and statements in relation to the
recent government investigations into events in Rakhine State:
• On 7 November 2016, U Aung Win, a Rakhine parliamentarian and the chairperson
of a State-level committee established to investigate allegations of human rights
violations during the “clearance operations” in October 2016, gave an interview.
When questioned about rape allegations, he said that rape was inconceivable,
explaining, “They are very dirty. The Bengali/Rohingya women have a very low
standard of living and poor hygiene. They are not attractive. So neither the local
Buddhist men nor the soldiers are interested in them.”3348 The investigative
committee had not made any findings yet.
• On 26 December 2016, the State Counsellor’s Office released a statement to refute
“rumours of rape” in the context of the October 2016 “clearance operations”. 3349 It
explained that the government’s Investigation Commission had interviewed a
Rohingya woman, who reportedly told the commissioners that she had not been
raped and had not witnessed rape. The statement then claims that the same woman
was later interviewed by journalists, to whom she said that she had been raped. The
statement included several photos of the woman being interviewed and a banner
with the words “fake rape”. A few days earlier, the President’s Office had posted a
video clip showing the same woman being interviewed about the rape allegations. 3350
A review of the footage shows:
• The woman was publicly interviewed by the commissioners, recorded and
filmed, while surrounded by a group of mainly men. This breaches basic
rules of human rights investigation regarding informed consent, privacy,
confidentiality and security.
• The manner in which questions were asked deprived the woman of an
opportunity to freely share her experience. She was questioned in a hostile
tone. The male interpreter can be heard telling her, “Don’t say that”. The
interpreter also did not correctly convey the detail of her account. When the
woman said that she had witnessed other women bleeding between their legs,
the interpreter interrupted to ask, “But did you see them getting raped?”
When she said, “No, I didn’t, but…”, he translated the entire exchange as
“She did not see rape”.
• The statements prompted public ridiculing of the woman, as demonstrated by
the comments under the Government’s Facebook posts. As of August 2018,
the “most relevant” comment, with 119 likes and 25 replies, reads, “Whore,
no one wants to rape you with your fucking face. We don’t even want to be
within 10 feet vicinity from you, because you stink like a fucking Kalar.”3351
Other comments included insults that Rohingya women are liars,
unattractive, have bad hygiene, and are “disgusting”. Over a year and a half

3347 CEDAW/C/MMR/CO/4-5, para. 27.

3348 J. Fisher, “Muslim civilians ‘killed by Burmese army’” (BBC News, 7 November 2016), including a
video of the conversation.
3349 The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, State Counsellor Office, “Information Committee refutes
rumours of rapes” (26 December 2016, http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/545).
3350 Myanmar President Office (Facebook post, 23 December 2016)
(https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1181529845228083&id=813476528700085&tra=1&r
efid=52&__tn__=%2As%2As-R) (accessed August 2018).
3351 https://www.facebook.com/myanmarpresidentoffice.gov.mm/videos/1181529845228083/
?comment_id=1181606718553729&comment_tracking=%7B%22tn%22%3A%22R9%22%7D
(accessed August 2018).

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later, these posts and comments still feature on the President’s Facebook
page.
• The statements from the President’s and State Counsellor’s Offices were
released before the Investigation Commission had released its interim or final
report, i.e. while the investigation was still underway.
• On 30 April 2018, the Tatmadaw Commander-in-Chief, Senior-General Min Aung
Hlaing, posted on his Facebook page a read-out of his meeting with a delegation of
the United Nations Security Council. After stating that “sexual violence is
abominable on the ground of culture and religion of Myanmar” and that “severe
action is taken against the offenders”, he added, “No sexual violence happened in
the history of Myanmar Tatmadaw”. 3352
1600. Against a backdrop of decades of denial of credible allegations of rape and other
forms of sexual violence, and when public officials have participated in the cover-up of
such crimes and the ridiculing of alleged victims and witnesses, it is unsurprising that rape
and sexual violence have become a widespread, systematic and institutionalised tactic of
the security forces’ operations.

(b) Case study 2: violence and oppression in Rakhine State

1601. Soon after the violence in Rakhine State in 2012, the then Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in Myanmar expressed concern about “widely divergent”
information regarding the events.3353 He stressed that truth and accountability would be
critical to ensure reconciliation in Rakhine State and that, “if the facts are not established,
exaggerations and distortions will fill the vacuum to further fuel distrust and tensions
between communities”.3354 The facts were never established. There was no accountability.
Relationships between communities in Rakhine State significantly deteriorated – amid an
intense disinformation campaign vilifying the Rohingya, whose rights were further
restricted to unbearable levels. As explained above, this led to increased tensions, to a
deterioration of the security situation and ultimately to the ARSA attacks and Tatmadaw
“clearance operations”.
1602. Since 2012, the Myanmar authorities have conducted several official investigations
and inquiries into the situation in Rakhine State and the episodes of violence. However,
none was a credible investigation into the allegations of human rights violations and abuses,
in line with international standards (prompt, thorough and effective, independent and
impartial, and transparent). None contributed to accountability.
1603. Following the 2012 violence in Rakhine State, President Thein Sein created the
Inquiry Commission on Sectarian Violence in Rakhine State. The commission had a
relatively broad mandate. The initial 27 commissioners comprised only four women and six
Muslims. Two of the Muslims were later dismissed. None of the commissioners was
Rohingya but several had demonstrated public anti-Rohingya views. In addition to the
general anti-Rohingya bias that permeates the report,3355 the work undertaken by the Inquiry
Commission was flawed. It did not critically examine the alleged human rights violations or
the opposing perceptions of the respective communities on the events and its underlying
causes. It did not establish the role of the security forces, attribute responsibility, or include

3352 Post on file with the Mission.

3353 A/67/383, para. 58.
3354 Ibid.
3355 The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Final Report of Inquiry Commission on Sectarian Violence
in Rakhine State (8 July 2013). The Mission acknowledges that the report contains some important
recommendations. For example, it clearly states that, to ensure peaceful coexistence in Rakhine State,
the “government and all responsible entities” should “start by ensuring protection of human rights for
all parties involved in the conflict” (see para. 12.13). Many of its recommended actions are also
conditional on compliance with international human rights standards.

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robust calls for accountability. 3356 The commission did not tackle the opposing viewpoints it
had identified among the communities, but reinforced the narrative of a longstanding
“intercommunal conflict” and “security threat”, validating prejudices, discriminatory acts
and policy options.3357 Its recommendations generally emphasized the need for heightened
security and rule of law.3358 The question of how stricter law enforcement and increased
presence of security forces would contribute to better protection for the Rohingya, in a
context of prevailing impunity and where existing laws were unjust and discriminatory, was
not considered.
1604. When in January 2014 fresh allegations of serious human rights violations emerged
in the context of a police operation in Du Chee Yar Tan village in Rakhine State, including
of killing, sexual violence and destruction of properties through arson, 3359 the Special
Rapporteur expressed concern that domestic investigations into the incident were
unsatisfactory.3360 A Rakhine Investigation Commission and the Myanmar National Human
Rights Commission visited the village, concluding that allegations of Rohingya killings and
anti-Rohingya violence were false or “unverifiable and unconfirmed”. 3361 The President
subsequently appointed a 10-member Investigation Commission. This commission released
a summary report of its findings, with similar conclusions. 3362 The Mission takes note of
concerns raised by civil society organizations that the initial visit of the Rakhine
Investigation Commission was preceded by intimidation of and warnings to villagers not to
talk about killings.3363 While the Mission cannot confirm this, it would be consistent with
patterns established elsewhere. The report itself also raises questions. For example, it states
that Rohingya properties were not set on fire by the police (as many Rohingya had
reported), but by “a group opposed to the Government with political motivations for
starting the fire and subsequent unrest”. This finding was not explained and the alleged
group was not identified.
1605. Tensions in the region increased, leading to the first ARSA attacks in October 2016
and the Tatmadaw “clearance operations”. Credible allegations of serious human rights
violations by the Myanmar security forces were rife and included acts that could constitute
crimes against humanity. The authorities undertook at least four inquiries: at the Union-
level, by the police, by the Tatmadaw and at State-level.3364

3356 The recommendations contain general statements of principle, e.g. “the security and emergency
response personnel must carry out their duties lawfully and those who break the law must be held
accountable under existing laws”.
3357 Interestingly, the commission recommended that the Government form a “Truth-Finding Committee
to determine the root causes of sectarian violence between the Buddhist and Islamic communities”.
3358 The government subsequently established a Central Committee for Implementation of Stability and
Development in Rakhine State, chaired by then Vice-President Dr. Sai Mauk Kham. This Committee
had six subcommittees, tasked to implement the policies adopted by the Central Committee and the
recommendations of the Inquiry Commission. These followed the course set out by the Inquiry
Commission and the President. They were not focused on human rights or accountability.
3359 See OHCHR, “Pillay calls for killings in northern Rakhine State to be investigated” (23 January
2014).
3360 A/HRC/25/64, paras. 47-48.
3361 A/HRC/25/64/Add.1, paras. 20-22.
3362 Summary Report of the Investigation Commission for the Du-Chee-Yar-Tan incident of January 2014
and related events, February 2014
(https://drive.google.com/file/d/0Bwd1WXitJ5PHdVJxWGtSdVlSX0U/view, accessed August 2018).
3363 International Coordinating Committee Sub-Committee on Accreditation - Accreditation of the
National Human Rights Commission of Myanmar, Stakeholder submission by The Asian NGO
Network on National Human Rights Institutions and Burma Partnership (16 July 2015).
3364 In August 2016, President Htin Kyaw established a nine-member Advisory Commission on Rakhine
State, chaired by former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan and composed of six national
and three international experts. Its mandate was focused on proposing concrete measures for
improving the welfare of all people in Rakhine State. It was not mandated to investigate specific cases
of alleged human rights violations. The Government subsequently formed a Committee for
Implementation of the Recommendations on Rakhine State, led by Union Minister for Social Welfare,
Relief and Resettlement Dr. Win Myat Aye; as well as an Advisory Board for the Implementation of

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1606. On 1 December 2016, President Htin Kyaw established a 13-member Investigation

Commission for Maungdaw in Rakhine State. 3365 The commission was chaired by Vice-
President Senior General Myint Swe (the military appointed Vice-President) and included
another former Tatmadaw general (Aung Kyi) and the Chief of the Myanmar Police Force
(Major-General Zaw Win). There were no Rohingya on the commission and only two
women. In early January 2017, the commission issued an interim report,3366 finding “no
cases of genocide and religious persecution in the region”. This was purportedly proven by
the continued presence of Rohingya and the presence of mosques and religious edifices in
Maungdaw. The commission found no sufficient evidence of rape, arson, illegal arrests or
torture.
1607. On 6 August 2017, the commission released a summary of its final report.3367 It
concluded that, while the security forces generally followed applicable rules and
regulations, there may have been cases of violations “in areas of weak command”. It stated
that action was being taken in relation to these violations, with no further detail. In relation
to specific allegations of human rights violations, including killings, torture, rape and arson,
the commission indicated that there had been cases where action was taken but that it was
difficult to gather evidence or to “identify who set fire to buildings with any level of
certainty, whether it was security forces or villagers or members of terrorist organizations”.
It noted that, in February and March 2017, 21 cases were filed for “murder, rape, arson,
destruction of evidence, loss of money/property and deaths”, but that for some cases there
were “mismatches between the complaint and the results of the investigations” and in other
cases “the complaints were fabricated”. Its methodology and skills regarding sensitive
human rights investigations have been called into question.3368 The commission made no
specific findings regarding the role and responsibility of the security forces.
1608. At the request of the Investigation Commission, the Tatmadaw and police formed
teams to investigate allegations of their own wrongdoing. On 9 February 2017, the
Tatmadaw stated it had formed a five-member Inquiry Board, led by Lieutenant-General
Aye Win (Inspector-General of the Defence Services). This Inquiry Board was tasked with
investigating the findings of the OHCHR Flash Report “Interviews with Rohingyas fleeing
from Myanmar since 9 October 2016”, which was on 3 February 2017. The OHCHR report
concluded, inter alia, that “the attacks against the Rohingya population in the area (killings,
enforced disappearances, torture and inhuman treatment, rape and other forms of sexual
violence, arbitrary detention, deportation and forced transfer as a result of violence and
persecution) seems to have been widespread as well as systematic, indicating the very
likely commission of crimes against humanity”. 3369 On 23 May 2017, the Tatmadaw True
News Information Team released the results of Lieutenant-General Aye Win’s
investigation. It found that 12 out of 18 “accusations” made in the Flash Report were
“totally wrong” and the remaining six were “untrue due to false accusations and
exaggerations”. No further detail was provided. Instead, the Tatmadaw investigation noted
that one soldier had “used a motorbike without permission from its owner” and three

Recommendations on Rakhine State, led by Dr. Surakiart Sathirathai, former Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand.
3365 The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, President Office, “Formation of Investigation Commission”
(Notification 89/2016, 1 December 2016).
3366 The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, President Office, “Interim Report of the Investigation
Commission on Maungtaw” (3 January 2017).
3367 Summary of the Report of the Investigation Commission for Maungdaw in Rakhine State (6 August
2017), available here: http://www.myanmarembassydhaka.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/Summary-Report-of-the-Investigation-Com.-8.8.17.pdf (accessed August
2018).
3368 One example regarding the public interviewing and shaming of an alleged victim of sexual violence
has been discussed in detail above.
3369 OHCHR, Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh – Interviews with Rohingyas fleeing from
Myanmar since 9 October 2016 – Flash Report (3 February 2017).

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individuals had been involved in the beating of a village administrator and villagers. These
offences were reportedly punished. 3370
1609. In February 2017, the Ministry of Home Affairs reportedly established a five-
member investigation committee, led by Police Brigadier-General Win Tun, to investigate
the allegations of human right violations by the police forces during the clearance
operations in 2016.3371 The Mission has not seen a final report of this inquiry. Media reports
suggest that five policemen seen beating a group of Rohingya in Koe Tan Kauk village in
Rakhine State on a (widely viewed) video were sentenced to two months imprisonment 3372
and that three border guard officers were sentenced to imprisonment for negligence during
the 2016 operations.3373 The latter conviction was reportedly not for excessive use of force
or ill-treatment of Rohingya but for failing to protect the security post against the attack in
the first place. It is unclear whether these convictions are related to the Police’s
investigation committee. Earlier the State Counsellor’s Information Committee had already
issued a statement that action was being undertaken against those identified in the video. 3374
1610. Meanwhile, another 11-member State-level committee, formed by the Rakhine State
Parliament and headed by Rakhine politician Aung Win, conducted its own investigation.
The bias of Aung Win has been highlighted above. The committee submitted interim and
final reports to the Rakhine State Parliament in December 2016 and March 2017
respectively. The Mission saw a copy of the interim report 3375, but only news reports about
the final report.3376 These suggest that the committee did not find any wrongdoing on the
part of the security forces, nor made any recommendations regarding accountability. It
detailed the “terrorist attacks” by the “Mujahideen” operating in Maungdaw and
Rathedaung Townships.
1611. The Union-level Investigation Commission for Maungdaw in Rakhine State
presented its final report, which also concluded that most, if not all, accusations levelled
against the security forces were false. Less than three weeks later, the Tatmadaw launched
further “clearance operations” following a new ARSA attacks on 25 August 2017.
1612. In the year since the “clearance operation” began, there have been no credible
initiatives for a prompt, independent and impartial, thorough and effective, and transparent
investigation into the allegations of human rights violations. On 13 November 2017, the
Tatmadaw True News Information Team released the “findings of the Investigation Team
in connection with the performances of the security troops during the terrorist attacks in
Maungtaw region, Rakhine State”.3377 The Investigation Team was again led by Lieutenant-

3370 The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Ministry of Information,

http://www.moi.gov.mm/moi:zg/?q=news/3/01/2017/id-10311
3371 See Htoo Thant, “Military to punish unlawful acts in Rakhine” (Myanmar Times, 2 March 2017); see
also The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, President Office, “Tatmataw ends area clearance
operations in northern Rakhine” (undated, available here http://www.president-
office.gov.mm/en/?q=issues/rakhine-state-affairs/id-7288).
3372 Reuters, “Myanmar to probe police over allegations of crimes against Rohingya” (13 February 2017).
3373 Frontier Myanmar, “Senior police jailed over Rakhine guard post raids” (25 February 2017); Htet
Naing Zaw, “Govt Jails Maungdaw Border Guard Police for Negligence” (The Irrawaddy, 24
February 2017).
3374 Information Committee, “Press Release on a video clip which members of Police Forces took during
area clearance operation in Kotankauk Village, Maungdaw” (Facebook post, 2 January 2017),
available at https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/663761827130260.
3375 The interim report was published on the Rakhine Hluttaw’s official Facebook page:
https://www.facebook.com/rakhinestatenews/photos/a.321754331295753.1073741828.319947374809
782/771298783007970/?type=3 (accessed July 2018).
3376 Release of the full report was reported in the media, but the Mission was unable to trace a copy of the
actual report. See e.g. Yee Ywal Myint, “Maungtaw-Rathedaung probe committee submits final
report” (Myanmar Times, 22 March 2017); and in Myanmar language media:
https://www.facebook.com/rakhinestatenews/posts/816665458471302;
https://www.facebook.com/rfaburmese/videos/10155660569523128/;
https://www.facebook.com/themyanmartimes/photos/a.269945775975.153936.269917285975/10154
340883955976/?type=3.
3377 Hard copy and Facebook post on file with the Mission.

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General Aye Win and reportedly toured northern Rakhine State for 26 days, between 13
October and 7 November 2017, interviewing 3,217 villagers in 58 villages and collecting
the accounts of 804 witnesses. The team did not seek the views of the 700,000 Rohingya
who had fled to Bangladesh. The Team categorically concluded:
The findings of the investigation have proved that all security members up from the
leaders to the privates were aware of and strictly abided by the orders and
directives of superior bodies, especially the rules of engagement-ROE in connection
with the rights of self-defence and in discharging duties during the armed conflicts
and anti-terrorist operations. […] There was no death of innocent people. Although
the Bengali villages where the engagements took place were burning and women
and children were fleeing their homes, not a single shot was fired on them. The
security forces were only fighting against the ARSA Bengali terrorists. They never
shot at the innocent Bengalis. […] As such, the security forces abided by laws
related to the wars in conducting area clearance operations. So, it is found that
those security forces did not perform the use of excessive force.
1613. In relation to the arrest and detention of Rohingya, the Team found:
In discharging duty of peace and stability of the regions, the security forces exposed
and arrested ARSA Bengali terrorists and their supporters. […] In arresting, only
members of Border Guard Police Force who were attached to the Tatmadaw
columns arrested those Bengalis, and Tatmadawmen took security measures. After
arresting, those Bengalis were systematically handed over in good situations to the
local police stations. Members of security forces did not commit persecution against
those persons in arresting. It was found that those Bengalis were exposed and
arrested under provisions of the Geneva Conventions and the laws of wars.
1614. However, two months later, on 11 January 2018, the Tatmadaw released a statement
from the same Investigation Team, still headed by Lieutenant-General Aye Win, that it had
conducted an additional 12-day investigation in the village of Inn Din, after receiving
reports of a mass grave.3378 The investigation purportedly revealed that the security forces
had arrested 10 men and that:
Although it needed to hand over 10 Bengali terrorists to the police station under the
procedures, it was found that decision was made to kill them at the cemetery.
1615. According to the statement, two police vehicles had been burned in the attack and
the security forces had been busy carrying out “peace and stability of the region”, and so
there “was no situation to send 10 Bengali terrorists to the police station”. In other words, it
was inconvenient to follow the rules and easier to kill. The statement further claims that the
10 men had been brought to the cemetery the following morning, where the security forces,
together with villagers, killed them. The Investigation Team found that the incident “was
not submitted to superior levels” but that “the officials who needed to control subordinates
despite no direct relation to the incident will be necessarily exposed and taken action”. The
Tatmadaw later stated that legal action was being taken against members of the Myanmar
Police Force and civilians under their respective laws and that seven “officials and other
ranks of the Tatmadaw” were convicted and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment under
military law. The Mission has been unable to confirm whether the convicted men are
serving these sentences.3379
1616. The Government hailed this development as a sign that the Tatmadaw took
responsibility. However, this additional statement raises more questions as to the credibility
of the investigation, given the same Team’s initial claim that no violations had been
committed. The additional investigation and admission of responsibility was in all

3378 Facebook post on file with the Mission.

3379 State media reported that these prisoners had been released in the context of the Presidential pardon
upon the inauguration of President Win Myint. The same day the Government denied these reports.
See H. Beech, “Did Soldiers Jailed for Killings Go Free? Myanmar TV Says Yes (Briefly)” (The New
York Times, 18 April 2018).

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likelihood triggered by the imminent publication by Reuters of an investigative piece on the

mass grave in Inn Din.3380
1617. Meanwhile, the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission (MNHRC) has
undertaken no meaningful action in relation to the events in Rakhine State.3381 In July 2012,
it called for measures to build trust between communities and strict law enforcement. In
May 2013, it endorsed the Government’s approach to the situation in Rakhine State. In
2014, the MNHRC informed that it had undertaken a field visit to Du Chee Yar Tan, but
that the serious allegations of human rights violations in that village were “unverifiable and
unconfirmed”. It recommended increased security measures and better ammunition for the
police. In 2015, the MNHRC visited Buthidaung and Sittwe prisons, making some
recommendations regarding prison conditions. In relation to the 2016 ARSA attacks and
“clearance operation”, the MNHRC remained silent. Following the August 2017 “clearance
operations, in October 2017 it recommended additional police stations, police outposts and
Border Guard Force outposts “as necessary”. In December 2017, it urged the authorities to
ensure that the two arrested Reuters journalists could enjoy their human rights in prison by
not torturing them, giving access to healthcare and family visits. It did not address whether
the detention itself was arbitrary. In January 2018, the MNHRC condemned an ARSA
attack. At no point during these six years, however, did the MNHRC call for or conduct a
full, independent investigation of the alleged human rights violations committed by the
security forces. Nor did it address the systemic discrimination against Rohingya, despite
this falling within its mandate.3382
1618. The Government took no steps to ensure a prompt, effective and thorough,
independent and impartial investigation as required by international law. It refused to
cooperate with or give access to the Mission, which was operational throughout this period.
It permitted the demolition and bulldozing of Rohingya villages, and subsequent
reconstruction efforts, without prior investigation or collection of evidence from the crime
scenes.
1619. On 30 July 2018, nearly one year after the events, the Government announced the
establishment of an “Independent Commission of Enquiry”,3383 comprised of two national
and two international “personalities”. None appears to have a background in complex
human rights or criminal investigations. Information about the commission’s legal
framework, terms of reference, or scope and power to investigate is scarce. However,
several public statements from the Myanmar authorities and the selected commissioners
suggest prejudice, compromising its impartiality from the outset. For example, the
spokesperson of the Office of the President said that, “We have formed the Independent
Commission of Enquiry to respond to false allegations made by the UN agencies and other
international communities”.3384 During a press conference, the Chairperson of the
Commission said that, “there will be no blaming of anybody, no finger-pointing of anybody
because we don’t achieve anything by that procedure”. 3385 She considered that
accountability was unhelpful and amounted to “quarrelling”. One of the national
commissioners, Dr. Aung Tun Thet, is the chief coordinator of the Government’s “Union

3380 Regarding the arrest of the Reuters journalists, see chapter VI, section A.1: Legal toolbox for
restricting fundamental freedoms.
3381 All statements are available online: http://www.mnhrc.org.mm/en/statements-2/
3382 The MNHRC is explicitly mandated to initiate an inquiry “where it becomes aware of widespread,
systematic or entrenched situations or practices that violate human rights”. See art. 28 of the
Myanmar National Human Rights Commission Law (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law No. 21/2014 of 28
March 2014).
3383 The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Office of the President (Press Release 8/2018), “Government
of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar Establishes the Independent Commission of Enquiry” (30
July 2018).
3384 Global New Light of Myanmar, “U Zaw Htay, Spokesman of the Office of the President: the
questions have been raised as to the reasons for the removal of the Facebook accounts and pages
associated with Tatmadaw” (29 August 2018).
3385 International Commission of Enquiry, Press Conference of 16 August 2018 in Naypyidaw, video
available at: https://www.facebook.com/theirrawaddyburmese/videos/218544952337657/.

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Enterprise for Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement and Development in Rakhine”, which

is mandated to implement development projects in Rakhine State. This has involved the
overseeing of the bulldozing of burned Rohingya villages, which is likely to have destroyed
criminal evidence.3386 Dr. Aung Tun Thet is also extensively quoted in the media denying
that any ethnic cleansing or genocide took place and that the Government’s position on this
question must be heard.3387 The Mission has therefore concluded on reasonable grounds that
this newly-created commission will not and cannot provide a real avenue for accountability,
even with some international involvement.

3. Conclusion
1620. The authorities of Myanmar, both military and civilian, have failed to condemn,
investigate or punish perpetrators of gross human rights violations. Rather, they have
categorically denied violations, created legal obstacles to accountability, destroyed
evidence of crimes and actively nurtured and perpetuated a climate of impunity that has
emboldened perpetrators. These acts are in violation of the international human rights
norms and standards highlighted at the outset of this chapter.
1621. Impunity is deeply entrenched in Myanmar’s political and legal system, effectively
placing the Tatmadaw above the law. The Constitution and other laws provide for
immunities and place the Tatmadaw beyond civilian oversight. The Tatmadaw can
independently adjudicate its own matters, with the Commander-in-Chief having the final
word. The rare cases, brought mostly before military courts without transparency, are
wholly insufficient to counter the overall trend of impunity. Additionally, military courts
are inadequate forums to deal with large-scale human rights violations perpetrated by the
military. Nor are civilian courts the answer; the domestic justice system is not independent
and lacks capacity to respect fair trial standards. Nor does it have the capacity to deal with
the breadth and gravity of the violations perpetrated by high-level officials, especially
crimes under international law. Those who file complaints often face intimidation and
reprisals. In short, there is no rule of law in Myanmar and accountability at the domestic
level is currently unattainable
1622. Impunity acts as an obstacle to the rule of law, sustainable peace and stability, and
Myanmar’s transition to democracy. In the Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes,
developed by the United Nations Offices of the Special Advisers on the Prevention of
Genocide and on the Responsibility to Protect, a history of atrocity crimes, in combination
with a record of impunity and weak State institutions, is listed among the core risk factors
for further violations.3388

C. Way forward

1623. Myanmar’s transformation into a democratic State has barely begun. The near-total
impunity for the most serious and shocking violations of human rights, and the apparent
unwillingness to change this, are major red flags. Myanmar must vigorously pursue its
transformation into a fully democratic State based on equality, accountability and respect
for human rights. The alternative is a continuation of the same cycles of violence and
repression, at risk of ultimately jeopardizing the little progress made.
1624. The Mission considers that three, interrelated, fundamental shifts are required to
avoid the repetition of the kind of violence and atrocity crimes outlined in this report.
• Democracy: the security forces, and the Tatmadaw in particular, must be brought
under civilian oversight. All State institutions must be answerable to the people.
This may require a complete reconstitution and vetting of the Tatmadaw.

3386 Dr Aung Tun Thet reportedly denied this. See S. Naing, “Bulldozing Rohingya villages was not
'demolition of evidence', Myanmar official says” (Reuters, 26 February 2018).
3387 E.g. Global New Light of Myanmar, “Myanmar’s perspectives should be voiced at Berlin Conference
on Myanmar Genocide: Dr Aung Tun Thet” (27 February 2018).
3388 A/70/741-S/2016/71 (annex).

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• Inclusivity: a reconciliation process can only be driven by a concept of the State and
Nation that is inclusive, based on equality and respect for human rights. Citizenship
should not be conditional on the belonging to a “national race”, and human rights
should not be conditional on being a “citizen”.
• Accountability: The climate of impunity must be ended. Unless the Myanmar
military and other security forces are held accountable for past, current and future
crimes, violence and associated atrocity crimes will happen again.
1625. Realizing these shifts requires a constitutional reform process and will take time.
However, significant steps can be taken immediately, both at the domestic level and
internationally.

1. Steps towards a system of accountability at national level

1626. The Mission encourages the Myanmar authorities to convene – as a matter of
urgency – all relevant stakeholders, with support from international partners, to adopt a
comprehensive national road map and action plan towards a system that ensures
accountability for human rights violations in Myanmar. The road map and action plan
should contribute to the three key transformative shifts highlighted above.
1627. The Government of Myanmar, in close consultation with all stakeholders, including
civil society, has the responsibility to formulate the most appropriate and feasible actions,
as well as timelines for implementation. The Mission recommends it includes steps in the
following areas:

(a) Acknowledgement
1628. Change starts with acknowledgement. The Government and other authorities of
Myanmar should immediately condemn all human rights violations and abuses (past,
present and future), without exception and without discrimination. The condemnation
should be specific: it should explicitly acknowledge the serious violations that have
occurred in Kachin, Rakhine, and Shan States and elsewhere. It should explicitly
acknowledge specific groups that have borne the brunt of the military and other security
forces’ repression. This includes ethnic and religious minorities, but also human rights
defenders, journalists, students, farmers and monks. Allegations and complaints should be
taken seriously, and the pain and suffering of all victims must be acknowledged.
1629. The Mission is concerned that neither the current peace process nor the
Government’s initiatives to resolve the crisis in Rakhine State include discussions on how
to ensure accountability for violations of international law. Any political process aimed at
resolving these conflicts and crises must include the issue of accountability in its agenda,
with the goal to bring about reconciliation and sustainable peace.

(b) Security sector reform

1630. Without significant reform of the security sector, serious human rights violations
and atrocity crimes will occur again, with certainty. The Framework of Analysis for
Atrocity Crimes highlights several factors associated with security institutions that increase
the risk of atrocity crimes, including the “lack of effective civilian control of security
forces” and “absence of or inadequate external or internal mechanisms of oversight and
accountability”.3389
1631. Through a political, constitutional and legislative reform process, the Myanmar
authorities must reconsider the place, role and power of the military and other security
forces in society. Steps would be required in at least five areas:
• Review, repeal and revision of all military and other security forces’ policies, tactics,
rules of engagement and training manuals to ensure full compliance with

3389 A/70/741-S/206/71, annex, risk factors 5 and 7.

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international law, in particular the principle of non-discrimination and equal

protection of all civilians regardless of race, religion or nationality.
• Clear articulation of the roles and responsibilities of the respective security forces,
for example avoiding the use of the military in situations that essentially require a
law enforcement or crowd control response. This requires a clear distinction
between the “external” defence (military), “internal” public safety (police) and
intelligence functions; the removal of the police and intelligence functions from the
Tatmadaw command structures; and the disbanding of militias and border guards,
and an overall review of policies around their use. The reform of the police, to
transform it into a police service completely independent of military control and
operations, is especially urgent. International support and assistance can contribute
to this.
• Enhanced civilian oversight to ensure a democratic framework within which the
military and other security services are at the service of the population, under the
oversight of elected officials representing the population (e.g. parliamentary
oversight committee; executive oversight; judicial review). 3390 This should include
creation of an external, independent body to receive reports from within the security
forces, as well as from the public, of wrongdoing by the security forces, to ensure
prompt, independent, impartial, effective and thorough investigations.
• A vetting or screening process to remove officials responsible for serious violations
of international law from positions of authority and to prevent their promotion.
Enhanced inclusion of personnel from diverse population groups.
• Removal of military prerogatives including in politics and the economy.

(c) Narrowing the scope of military justice

1632. The jurisdiction of military courts should be limited to military personnel
committing military disciplinary offenses, excluding human rights violations and serious
violations of international humanitarian law. 3391 Especially where cases involve civilians, as
perpetrators or as victims, these should be brought before the civilian justice system. The
rationale is twofold: the commission of human rights violations is necessarily outside the
scope of the duties performed by military personnel, and military courts cannot be trusted to
try such serious offenses properly as they may be tempted to shield military perpetrators, in
particular senior ones.3392 In the context of Myanmar in particular, there can be no prospect
for justice should human rights violations committed by the military continue to fall within
the jurisdiction of military tribunals.
1633. In parallel to the restriction of the jurisdiction of military courts, efforts should be
taken to ensure that trials under the military justice system are fully compliant with
international fair trial norms and standards. In particular, military courts should be
independent of the military chain of command in their determination of cases and should
meet the standards of due process and procedural fairness.

(d) Accelerated rule of law reform

1634. Rule of law reform at domestic level should have high priority. The Mission is
aware of several projects in this area and encourages States to redouble their support to
Myanmar. Rule of law reform must, however, be based on an understanding of rule of law
that is consistent with international standards, which is different from the concepts of “law
and order” or “rule by law”:

3390 For a discussion of how security sector reform contributes to the prevention of atrocity crimes, see
A/HRC/37/65, para. 39-57.
3391 See e.g. Principles to Combat Impunity, principle 29; also Draft Principles Governing the
Administration of Justice Through Military Tribunals (E/CN.4/2006/58), principle 9. These principles
are increasingly considered as reflective of international law. See e.g. A/70/438, para. 51.
3392 See A/68/285, para. 67.

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Rule of law is a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and

entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that
are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and
which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It
requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of
law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of
the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty,
avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency. 3393
1635. The law reform process must be accelerated, thoroughly revising all laws to ensure
that they are just, fair, and fully compliant with international human rights norms and
standards. This includes a repeal of all discriminatory laws as well as pieces of legislation
that unduly restrict the exercise of fundamental freedoms. It also includes the adoption of
legislation incorporating crimes under international law within domestic criminal law,
removing all existing immunities and amnesties for such crimes and other serious human
rights violations and then ensuring implementation of the law through independent civilian
courts. It would also include ratification of all international human rights conventions not
yet ratified by Myanmar, as well as their individual complaints mechanisms.
1636. An enhanced focus is also required on judicial reform. This includes measures to
strengthen the independence of the judiciary and build their legal and judicial expertise. No
civilian justice personnel should be under the control or influence of the military or the
other branches of government. All judges in superior and appellate courts should be legally
qualified. Additionally, programmes are required to build capacity to adequately
investigate, prosecute and bring to trial cases of serious human rights violations. Such
cases, in particular where they amount to crimes under international law, require specialised
knowledge and expertise.
1637. The Mission further encourages the Government of Myanmar to consider
establishing a cross-sectoral and cross-institutional National Mechanism for the Prevention
of Atrocity Crimes, with the role of conducting periodic risk assessments, establishing an
early warning system, developing training programmes, recommending and creating
policies, and working with civil society, as well as regional and international organizations
towards the prevention of atrocity crimes.

(e) Truth-seeking
1638. The Mission is particularly concerned about the prevailing narratives of hate,
exclusion and intolerance in Myanmar. It is also concerned about the radically divergent
and often incompatible understandings, among segments of the population, of history and
the circumstances of the commission of gross human rights violations and abuses.
Exaggerations, distortions and misunderstandings only serve to fuel tension and distrust. It
is of the utmost importance that the Government, with appropriate support from the
international community, takes credible initiatives to satisfy the right of victims and society
to the truth about alleged human rights violations and abuses. While there is an urgent need
for credible truth-seeking initiatives for Rakhine State specifically, it is also required for
northern Myanmar and the rest of the country. It would contribute to the formation of a
common national narrative based on inclusion, tolerance and respect for the human rights
of all.
1639. This requires the establishment of mechanisms and procedures empowered to seek
information, ascertain facts and effectively reveal the truth about what happened.
Importantly, such mechanisms can give voice to victims and affirm their status as rights
holders and contribute to social integration. 3394 However, such mechanisms must be
appropriately designed and led by independently minded commissioners or experts who

3393 Report of the Secretary-General: The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict
societies (S/2004/616).
3394 A/HRC/24/42, paras. 90-91.

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meet the highest standards of professionalism, integrity and expertise. They must be free
from political or military influence.

(f) Empowering victims and civil society

1640. There is an immediate need to provide victims of serious human rights violations
with the care, support and assistance they need. While communities have shown remarkable
resilience, little social support has been possible when living in fear of the next attack or
arrest. Most such support for victims has been aimed at coping rather than healing. The
Government of Myanmar should ensure that psychosocial support and trauma counselling
are provided as core components of a strategy to empower victims and provide redress, and
to avoid recurrence of violations.
1641. The people of Myanmar have suffered at the hands of the military and other security
forces. This is evidently so for all ethnic and religious minority groups, including the
Rohingya, but also for the Bamar or Buddhists in general. They have never had access to
truth, justice or reparations. This must change. Any accountability process or measure must
be human rights based, ensuring that the rights and needs of victims are placed at the centre
of their design and implementation. This requires a fully participatory process. Victims of
human rights violations, and civil society generally, must be consulted at every step of the
accountability process, giving them a voice and restoring their dignity.
1642. A first step in enabling and empowering victims of human rights violations is to
recognize the legal status and identity of each person, and to ensure that each person has
proof of that. In Myanmar, where large numbers of the population have not been registered
at birth and/or have been arbitrarily deprived of their nationality and identity documents,
proof of legal status and identity is a challenge for many victims of human rights violations.
Legal identity is important to have rights respected, for claiming them and for obtaining
redress when they are violated.3395 The Government should take immediate steps to ensure
that all individuals in or from Myanmar have appropriate recognition and documentation of
their legal status and identity.
1643. Equally important is to ensure an enabling environment where individuals can file
complaints and seek redress. This requires immediate steps to halt the intimidation,
harassment and reprisals against those who speak out. Victims of human rights violations,
but also human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists and civil society actors more broadly,
must have the space to enjoy their human rights and seek justice for abuses. It is critical that
the full enjoyment of fundamental freedoms, including the rights to freedom of opinion and
expression, association and peaceful assembly, is actively promoted.
1644. Closely linked is the need to ensure the presence of an organized, knowledgeable,
strong and representative civil society, and a free, diverse and independent media sector
that is able to operate freely. 3396 In the Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes, the lack
of such civil society and media sector is listed as an indicator for increased risk of atrocity
crimes.3397
1645. Steps should also be considered to improve and transform the education system to
ensure that it is based on principles of inclusivity, tolerance, equality and the respect for
human rights of all, actively combating exclusionary rhetoric and divisive narratives.
Human rights should be part of the standard curriculum in all schools. The teaching of
history should be carefully reviewed to avoid the perpetuation of divisions. Teaching
should be focused on stimulating children’s capacity to analyse and think critically.

(g) Reparations
1646. The Government of Myanmar should, as a matter of priority, take steps to realize
victims’ right to full and effective reparation for the harm suffered. As outlined at the

3395 A/HRC/30/42, para. 41.

3396 A/HRC/37/65, para. 20.
3397 A/70/741-S/206/71, annex, risk factor 6.

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beginning of this chapter, this entails restitution, compensation, rehabilitation and

satisfaction. Particularly relevant for Myanmar are measures to restore liberty, identity,
family life and citizenship, as well as the return to one’s place of residence; return of
property and rebuilding of homes; compensation for damages; medical and psychological
care; legal and social services; search for whereabouts of the missing or disappeared; search
for, identification and burial of bodies; as well as commemorations and tributes to victims.
1647. Reparation is the legal duty of the State. It is particularly important as a symbol of
acknowledgement of responsibility. 3398 It promotes trust in the State and its institutions, and
a sense of belonging of those whose rights were previously trampled upon. In Myanmar,
the harm is of tremendous proportions, requiring a wide range of coherently organized
reparatory measures. Restitution and compensation are especially important. The violence
has resulted in significant economic loss, mostly for the victims. It must be met by the
perpetrators and the State, which is directly responsible.

2. Criminal accountability at international level

1648. The primary responsibility for investigating and prosecuting crimes under
international law lies with the national authorities of Myanmar. While any domestic system
would have difficulties addressing the scale of violations committed in Myanmar, the
Myanmar authorities have demonstrated that they are unable and unwilling to meaningfully
engage in this process. The military’s involvement in all levels of government and the legal
and judicial deficiencies outlined above mean that criminal accountability at the domestic
level, in particular for those who bear the greatest responsibility, is unattainable and will
remain so for the foreseeable future. As such, the impetus for accountability must come
from the international community.
1649. While two of the fundamental shifts outlined above (democracy and inclusivity) will
largely have to be driven domestically, the international community has an important role
in achieving the third shift (accountability). By initiating an accountability process, the
international community can put a first crack in the massive impunity wall. To ensure its
legitimacy, such process must be driven by the following principles:
• Be transformative: designed to address patterns of impunity and their underlying
structural causes. It must assist in addressing the root causes of the recurrent
violations and in further transforming society into one based on the rule of law, non-
discrimination, equality and respect for human rights.
• Be victim-centred: driven by the interests of victims and designed to empower
them, restore their dignity, and build their confidence in the State. Their views must
be sought and they must be encouraged to participate in the process.
• Be comprehensive: including measures to realize the right of victims to know the
truth and their right to reparations, in addition to establishing individual criminal
accountability for serious crimes under international law.
• Be inclusive: allowing all victims to seek justice and an effective remedy on equal
footing, regardless of their ethnic or religious background, and avoiding the
exacerbation of tensions. An accountability process must not be focused only on the
situation in Rakhine State.
1650. The Mission recommends that the international community takes the following
steps:

(a) An international justice mechanism

1651. There must be an international judicial mechanism with jurisdiction to deal with
serious crimes under international law in Myanmar. The International Criminal Court (ICC)
is the most appropriate venue. As a permanent institution, it has the capacity to investigate
immediately upon its jurisdiction being triggered. Although Myanmar is not a party to the

3398 A/69/518, para. 83.

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Rome Statute, it is able to file a declaration of acceptance of ICC jurisdiction under article
12(3) of the Rome Statute. In the alternative, the Mission urges the Security Council to
refer the situation in Myanmar to the ICC under article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, without
delay. This referral should cover the entire territory of Myanmar, with a temporal scope
starting from 1 July 2002 (the date of entry into force of the Rome Statute).
1652. The Mission welcomes the ICC Prosecutor’s application of 9 April 2018 for a ruling
on jurisdiction under article 19(3) of the Rome Statute 3399, and the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s
decision of 6 September 2018 on the matter.3400 The Pre-Trial Chamber decided that the
ICC has jurisdiction over the alleged deportation of Rohingya from Myanmar to
Bangladesh on the basis that an essential element of the crime – crossing an international
border – occurred on the territory of a State Party (Bangladesh). It emphasized that the
same rationale may apply to other crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, e.g. the crime
against humanity of persecution. While welcoming this decision, the Mission urges the
Security Council to refer the situation in Myanmar to the ICC in the terms outlined above,
to avoid partial accountability and ensure that all victims in Myanmar benefit from an
avenue for justice.
1653. The ICC can only exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed after 1 July 2002,
being the date of entry into force of the Rome Statute. Given its resources and mandate, the
ICC is only in a position to prosecute those most responsible for the crimes in question; it
should not be expected to prosecute a large number of lower-level perpetrators. Moreover,
its ability to prosecute higher-level perpetrators necessarily depends on the will of
Myanmar or other States to arrest and transfer suspects to the Court. As such, and
considering the number of crimes and possible perpetrators, other additional and
complementary accountability mechanisms should be considered.
1654. The creation of an ad hoc international criminal tribunal for Myanmar is an
alternative to (or could complement) a Security Council referral to the ICC. Such tribunal
would not be without its challenges, particularly in the absence of cooperation from
Myanmar. Again, it would rely on the cooperation of States in arresting and transferring
accused persons to the court. However, it would be free from the jurisdictional constraints
of the ICC or domestic courts, and its temporal, territorial, personal and subject matter
jurisdiction could be shaped to meet the specific context and requirements, including the
needs of victims. An international criminal tribunal could also serve as a repository of
information and evidence and facilitate other justice initiatives, including domestically. It
could be specifically mandated to engage actively in outreach to communities across
Myanmar, enabling much-needed awareness raising, participation and education around
human rights and justice issues. An ad hoc international criminal tribunal for Myanmar
would involve a long-term commitment from the international community, including
sustained financial and political support.
1655. In the absence of ICC jurisdiction, the Mission therefore strongly encourages the
Government of Myanmar to consent to and cooperate in the creation of an ad hoc tribunal,
to assist in overcoming domestic challenges in ensuring accountability for serious crimes
under international law. Should the Myanmar authorities not cooperate, the Mission
considers that the Security Council should adopt a Chapter VII resolution to create an ad
hoc tribunal without delay.3401
1656. Justice mechanisms that mix national and international elements have been created
in a number of States. These mechanisms either form part of the country’s justice system
(e.g. specialised chambers) or constitute a separate legal entity. The creation of such
mechanism would ordinarily be initiated by the country concerned, with the assistance of

3399 ICC, Application under Regulation 46(3), ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-1, Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling
on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute, 9 April 2018.
3400 ICC, Request under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-37,
Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the
Statute”, 6 September 2018.
3401 The Mission notes that it has been argued that the General Assembly has the power to create an ad
hoc international criminal tribunal, should the Security Council fail to act.

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the United Nations or another intergovernmental organization. A formal agreement would

then be negotiated, articulating the mechanism’s jurisdictional parameters, mandate and
authority. Hybrid justice mechanisms benefit from proximity to victims and witnesses, as
well as domestic ownership. Operating as part of the national judicial system, yet applying
international fair trial standards, they have been credited with capacity building of the local
justice sector. At present, however, the Mission considers that the prevailing conditions in
Myanmar would serve to undermine the effectiveness of this model. Lack of independence
and experience among domestic judges and practitioners would be unlikely to be rectified
through exposure to a hybrid environment, at least within a necessarily short period of time.
Nor does it currently appear possible to ensure the protection and security of victims and
witnesses, officials and staff, against any form of intimidation or reprisal.
1657. In addition to an ICC referral and/or the creation of an ad hoc international criminal
tribunal for Myanmar, the Mission encourages States to actively pursue investigating and
prosecuting crimes committed in Myanmar before their respective domestic courts, under
the principle of universal jurisdiction for serious crimes under international law. Many
countries require the presence in their territory of the accused or the victim to activate
jurisdiction, and complex investigation and prosecution of crimes under international law
are costly. Cases before domestic courts of third States are therefore likely to lead to a
fragmented or partial form of accountability at best. However, their importance should not
be underestimated, especially in a context where there is no international tribunal with
jurisdiction to handle cases. Domestic courts exercising universal jurisdiction may also
encourage victim communities and serve as an incentive for legal reforms within the
country concerned.
1658. States could also explore the creation of an international criminal tribunal through a
specific negotiated treaty. Under this model, a number of committed States would pool
resources and create a treaty-based mechanism to which they delegate their respective
powers based on the principle of universal jurisdiction. This could present a more
comprehensive approach to accountability for the crimes in question, should Myanmar not
cooperate and should the Security Council decline to act. However, the success and
effectiveness of such mechanism would greatly depend on the participation of a large and
geographically diverse group of States with a genuine interest in ensuring accountability for
victims.

(b) Collection and preservation of evidence; preparation of files for prosecution

1659. Pending the conferral of jurisdiction on the ICC or the establishment of an
alternative international accountability mechanism, it will be imperative to immediately
collect and preserve evidence and other documentation pertaining to the relevant crimes in
compliance with international criminal standards. This will minimise the risk of loss,
contamination or destruction of evidence. This should be done through a dedicated interim
mechanism, empowered to act until an international tribunal with appropriate jurisdiction is
seized of the matter. This mechanism could also be mandated to compile and analyse the
information collected and prepare files with a view to support, facilitate and expedite future
trials before an international court or any other credible criminal proceedings before
domestic courts and tribunals that comply with international fair trial standards.
1660. Such interim mechanism could resemble the “International, Impartial and
Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian
Arab Republic since March 2011”, created by United Nations General Assembly resolution
71/248.3402 The mechanism could be established by the General Assembly or, alternatively,

3402 Its mandate is: “to collect, consolidate, preserve and analyse evidence of violations of international
humanitarian law and human rights violations and abuses and to prepare files in order to facilitate and
expedite fair and independent criminal proceedings, in accordance with international law standards, in
national, regional or international courts or tribunals that have or may in the future have jurisdiction
over these crimes, in accordance with international law” (A/RES/71/248, op. 4). Its terms of reference
can be found in A/71/755.

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by the Human Rights Council. It would be critical, however, that it be done quickly and
effectively, and with appropriate and sustainable funding. While an interim mechanism for
Myanmar would require its own dedicated resources, States could explore the benefits of
association with the Syria mechanism to allow for speedy operationalisation and the sharing
of administrative and other common facilities.

(c) Enhanced capacity for continued monitoring, advocacy and technical cooperation
1661. Broader human rights monitoring, advocacy and technical cooperation are essential
to maintaining a high level of international engagement and pressure for change in a
situation of serious human rights violations and abuses. The Human Rights Council (and its
predecessor the Commission on Human Rights) recognised this in decisions to establish
and renew the mandate of a Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
Myanmar. Judicial and prosecutorial mechanisms are mechanisms for individual criminal
responsibility in line with criminal law standards. They do not undertake comprehensive
monitoring or public advocacy. The Mission recommends that the mandate of the Special
Rapporteur and the monitoring and reporting role of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights in relation to Myanmar be continued. The establishment
of an OHCHR country office in Myanmar, with a comprehensive mandate, should continue
to be pursued.
1662. At the same time, the Mission sees significant need for enhanced capacity to support
monitoring, reporting, advocacy and technical cooperation. Enhanced capacity could take
the form of an OHCHR centre or office that gathers and analyses information, at least
partly located close to the victims and witnesses and therefore more accessible to them. It
could also engage in technical cooperation for the building of national capacity to protect
and promote human rights, including in the area of combating impunity, so that eventually
monitoring, advocacy and accountability could be increasingly assumed by national
institutions when circumstances permit.
1663. The Mission welcomes the enormous interest from a wide range of actors, including
States, intergovernmental organizations, United Nations agencies, international and national
civil society organizations, academics, journalists and other media professionals, in the
situation of the Rohingya and their plight. Countless visits have been made to the refugee
camps around Cox’s Bazar, often with the explicit goal of documenting the events in
Rakhine State and taking statements from refugees for accountability purposes. The need
for documentation remains critical. However, the Mission considers that there is also a need
for better coordination and a deeper awareness of established methodologies for human
rights monitoring and criminal investigations. The repeated interviewing of individual
victims, particularly when interviewers lack sufficient training and experience, not only
risks duplicating efforts and potentially re-traumatising victims; it may also increase
confusion and negatively affect evidence in criminal proceedings.

(d) Increased support for victims

1664. International agencies, national governments and international and national non-
governmental organizations are providing victims of human rights violations and abuses in
Myanmar with assistance in meeting their physical and medical needs but many needs
remain unmet, especially in relation to psychosocial support, in particular for trauma and
post-traumatic stress disorder, access to justice, remedies and other advice.
1665. The Mission recommends that a trust fund be established, and generously supported,
to meet such needs of victims, including through psychosocial support, livelihood support,
legal aid and other services, including to enable them to participate in accountability
processes. The trust fund should require all service providers that receive funding to
conceive and implement their projects in close consultation with the beneficiaries, and be
used to improve coordination to maximize the collective impact of funded projects.

(e) Individual sanctions and an arms embargo

1666. The Mission considers that targeted individual sanctions, including travel bans and
asset freezes, could support a reduction in violations of international law, particularly acts

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amounting to gross human rights violations and serious crimes under international law.
They should send a strong message to Myanmar officials who appear most responsible for
the violations and crimes outlined in this report. Such targeted individual sanctions should
be designed so as to have no effect on the broader Myanmar population. The Mission
encourages the Security Council to adopt such sanctions.
1667. Similarly, the Mission is of the view that the Security Council should impose an
arms embargo on Myanmar. Regardless of the imposition of a global arms embargo, States
should not authorize the transfer of arms to Myanmar, considering the high and overriding
risk that such arms would be used to undermine peace and security and in the commission
of serious violations of international human rights law and/or serious violations of
international humanitarian law, including crimes under international law.
1668. The Mission does not support general economic sanctions on Myanmar. It is
concerned that such sanctions in the past may have contributed to the impoverishment of
the Myanmar people generally while having little impact on those most responsible for
serious human rights violations. The Mission supports continuing efforts to reduce the
poverty in which most people in Myanmar live, through increased economic engagement
and development assistance, provided that the engagement and assistance is carefully
targeted to avoid any benefit to the Tatmadaw generally or to its leaders individually or to
others responsible for serious human rights violations.

(f) A short-term mechanism for continuity

1669. The report of the Mission will require immediate follow-up; there must be no gap.
Implementation of the various recommendations will take time. Some type of short-term
mechanism will be needed to continue gathering, analysing, organizing and archiving
evidentiary material, monitoring and reporting on developments, maintaining the networks
established by the Mission and ensuring that the international interest and momentum
continue.
1670. The Mission has established channels of communication, in a most challenging
security context and without access to the country, allowing it to gather and verify
information. Through its work and its network of sources, it can immediately follow-up on
leads and new allegations. This would be critical in a context of an evolving situation and in
preparation of a future accountability mechanism, to ensure that compelling information
that could serve in such proceedings is not lost. Until such time as the recommended new
interim mechanism is created, a further fact-finding mission should focus on the
documentation of, and the collecting and receiving of information regarding continuing
human rights violations and abuses, including crimes under international law; the
identification of individual and institutional perpetrators and linkages between direct
perpetrators and their commanders; and the examination of discriminatory and/or criminal
systems underlying patterns of human rights violations and abuses.

XI. Conclusions and recommendations

A. Conclusions

1671. The Mission concluded on reasonable grounds that gross human rights
violations and serious violations of international humanitarian law have been
committed in Myanmar since 2011 and that many of these violations undoubtedly
amount to the gravest crimes under international law.
1672. The gross human rights violations and abuses committed in Kachin, Rakhine
and Shan States are shocking for their horrifying nature and ubiquity. They are also
shocking because they stem from deep fractures in society and structural problems
that have been apparent and unaddressed for decades. They are shocking for the level
of denial, normalcy and impunity that is attached to them. The Mission concludes that
these abusive patterns are reflective of the situation in Myanmar as a whole.

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1673. Myanmar has a heavy responsibility to remedy the situation as a matter of the
utmost urgency, or risk destroying its democratic reform process. The international
community also bears responsibility and must take a united stand to both condemn
the violations and assist Myanmar in addressing the root causes of its recurrent
problems. This begins by ensuring that the perpetrators of crimes are held to account,
and by giving hope to victims of a future without the fear and insecurity that have
characterized their existence.
1674. The steps required to address the human rights crises in Myanmar are well
known. For nearly three decades, five consecutive Special Rapporteurs on the
situation of human rights in Myanmar have presented annual reports to the General
Assembly and the Human Rights Council, with detailed recommendations to all
stakeholders. Similarly, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has
formulated concrete recommendations, as have many international and national civil
society organizations. The Advisory Commission on Rakhine State also presented a
detailed report. These recommendations should be implemented immediately.
1675. The actions of the Tatmadaw in Kachin, Rakhine and Shan States, in particular
in the context of the “clearance operations” in northern Rakhine State in 2016 and
2017, have so seriously violated international law that any engagement in any form
with the Tatmadaw, its current leadership, and its businesses, is indefensible.
Engagement should only be considered when (1) a complete restructuring of the
Tatmadaw is commenced, (2) its current leadership is replaced, and (3) extensive
reform is undertaken to place the Tatmadaw under full elected civilian control and
oversight and to remove the Tatmadaw from Myanmar’s political and economic life.
1676. The half century of continuous conflict between the Tatmadaw and Myanmar’s
ethnic minorities, with its serious violations of international law, has made it
abundantly clear that peace is impossible without a negotiated national political
settlement that recognises the legitimate aspirations of all Myanmar’s ethnic
minorities. Without such a settlement, Myanmar is destined to repeat its cycles of
violence and serious human rights violations. The future of Myanmar as a nation can
only be assured through peace, justice, true democracy and sustainable development.
The international community has an obligation to support Myanmar in achieving
that.
1677. Considering the unwillingness of the Government of Myanmar to cooperate
with the Mission, it requests the United Nations Secretary-General to transmit the
Mission’s report to the President of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, drawing
the attention of the President and the Government, including the civilian authorities
and the Tatmadaw, to the report’s recommendations. It requests the Secretary-
General to seek a formal response from the President to the report’s conclusions and
recommendations.

B. Recommendations

1. To the Government of Myanmar

1678. The Government of Myanmar, including the civilian authorities and the
Tatmadaw as relevant, should act without delay to re-structure the Tatmadaw and
transform its role. That should begin with replacing the current leadership of the
Tatmadaw. Through a constitutional amendment process, the Government should
further pursue the removal of the Tatmadaw from Myanmar’s political life
1679. The Government of Myanmar, including the civilian authorities and the
Tatmadaw as relevant, should further act with the greatest sense of urgency to:
(a) halt all current military and security operations that are unlawful,
unnecessary or disproportionate, especially where they target civilians or take
insufficient precaution to safeguard their wellbeing;
(b) cease the perpetration of sexual and gender-based violence by Myanmar
security forces against women, girls, men and boys, as well as the unlawful or

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arbitrary detention of women and children, and release them; put in place and
effectively enforce a zero-tolerance policy on sexual and gender-based violence;
(c) acknowledge the role of the Tatmadaw and other security forces in the
perpetration of gross human rights violations, including sexual and gender-based
violence and grave violations against children;
(d) issue clear, public and unequivocal instructions to all branches of the
Tatmadaw and other security forces that torture, rape, sexual violence, grave
violations against children and other human rights violations are prohibited
absolutely; order all security forces to comply with international human rights law
and international humanitarian law, as applicable;
(e) permit and facilitate free and unfettered access to all parts of Myanmar,
especially Kachin, Rakhine and Shan States and all other conflict or crisis areas, for
national and international humanitarian actors to provide relief and for journalists
and national and international human rights monitors to investigate and report on
human rights compliance;
(f) cooperate with the international community, in particular the United
Nations, in the establishment of an international accountability mechanism to pursue
justice for the victims of serious crimes under international law in Myanmar;
(g) end all harassment and prosecution of human rights defenders, lawyers,
journalists, peace campaigners, democracy activists and other members of civil
society, for the peaceful exercise of their rights to freedom of expression, association
and assembly, including by releasing and pardoning all political prisoners; pardon
and release the Reuters journalists Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo;
(h) unequivocally condemn and end intolerant, divisive and discriminatory
rhetoric based on ethnic, racial or religious grounds, both from State actors and non-
State actors, and actively promote an inclusive national vision based on the equal
respect and protection of human rights;
(i) suspend the citizenship verification process based on the 1982
Citizenship Law; acknowledge the arbitrary deprivation of nationality of the
Rohingya community and restore their citizenship rights through a speedy
administrative process developed through meaningful consultation with the Rohingya
community;
(j) ensure that the repatriation of Rohingya and other refugees is safe,
dignified and voluntary, in accordance with international standards; that adequate
human rights protections are in place; that Rohingya refugees are expressly permitted
to return to their places of origin, providing reparation for losses sustained and
support in rebuilding their lives; that Rohingya are consulted on decisions about their
future; and that the best interests of the child are the primary consideration with
respect to children, particularly unaccompanied minors;
(k) remove from Rakhine State all divisions, battalions and units of security
forces responsible for perpetrating violations of international law before starting the
repatriation of refugees, not allowing them any role in the repatriation process or the
provision of security to returnees;
(l) allow for international human rights monitors on the ground, to observe
and advise on ways to ensure the human rights compliance of the repatriation process,
including the resettlement and reintegration of the Rohingya, and to respect, protect
and fulfil the human rights of all communities in Rakhine State;
(m) ensure that any infrastructure plans for Rakhine State do not frustrate
the safe and sustainable return of Rohingya to their places of origin; accordingly,
suspend all terrain clearance in and around villages formerly occupied by Rohingya;
only resume activities after (1) consultation with and approval of the original
residents; and (2) prior examination by forensic, human rights and criminal experts.

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1680. In parallel, the Government of Myanmar, including the civilian authorities and
the Tatmadaw as relevant, should immediately commence a coordinated and genuine
effort to address the root causes of the recurrent cycles of violence and associated
human rights violations and atrocity crimes. Doing so will require action in the
following areas:

Human rights compliance

1681. The Government of Myanmar, including the civilian authorities and the
Tatmadaw as relevant, should act immediately to ensure full compliance with
international human rights law and international humanitarian law where applicable.
It should:
(a) ensure the enjoyment of human rights for all, based on full equality and
regardless of citizenship or “national race” status; to that effect, replace the concept of
citizenship based on “national race” with a citizenship regime based on objective, non-
discriminatory criteria; ensure that all individuals in Myanmar have appropriate
documentation of their legal identity, including birth registration and proof of
citizenship; allow all individuals, including Rohingya, to self-identify in line with
international human rights standards;
(b) dismantle the systems of oppression and discrimination of ethnic and
religious minorities, with an urgent focus on the situation of the Rohingya; review,
amend or repeal all laws, orders, policies and practices, at all levels of government,
that are discriminatory in nature or effect, including for example the Protection of
Race and Religion Laws; consequently, immediately lift all restrictions on movement,
access to livelihood, food, humanitarian assistance, education and health services for
the Rohingya in Rakhine State; ensure that announcement 88/2018 issued by the
Union Government on 13 August 2018 and the abolishment of eight local orders
targeting the Rohingya is immediately and consistently implemented;
(c) review, repeal or revise all policies, tactics, rules of engagement and
training of the Tatmadaw and other security forces to ensure their full compliance
with international human rights law and international humanitarian law, in
particular the principle of non-discrimination and equal protection of all civilians
regardless of race, religion or nationality; ensure that security forces receive regular,
repeated and mandatory training on human rights, the protection of civilians, the
prohibition of torture and sexual and gender-based violence, underscoring the
principles of command responsibility for such acts;
(d) comply as a matter of priority with its obligations, under both national
and international law, to promote and protect the rights of children, with particular
regard to its obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child; address all
six grave violations against children in armed conflict, seeking cooperation with non-
State armed groups operating within Myanmar to ensure full protection of children;
(e) strengthen the independence, powers and capacity of the Myanmar
National Human Rights Commission, in accordance with the Paris Principles on
national human rights institutions;
(f) ratify all international human rights treaties not yet ratified, including
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and
their optional complaints procedures;
(g) engage and fully cooperate with international human rights mechanisms,
including the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
Myanmar, who should be permitted to resume regular monitoring visits, with free and
unfettered access to all parts of Myanmar and with guarantees of non-reprisal; seek
advice and support from the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for
Human rights, including through the establishment of a country office in Myanmar
with a comprehensive mandate.

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Accountability
1682. The Government of Myanmar, including the civilian authorities and the
Tatmadaw as relevant, should act, without delay, to end impunity and ensure full
accountability for violations of international human rights law, international
humanitarian law, and serious crimes under international law. It should:
(a) pursue all credible allegations of human rights violations and abuses and
crimes under international law through prompt, effective and thorough, independent
and impartial investigations, bringing perpetrators to account in line with
international human rights norms and standards; include a specific focus on the
investigation, prosecution and punishment of direct perpetrators and their superiors
for acts of sexual and gender-based violence and grave violations against children;
(b) ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and accept
the jurisdiction of the Court as of its entry into force (1 July 2002);
(c) reform the domestic judicial sector by strengthening the independence of
judges and the qualifications and expertise of judges, prosecutors and lawyers;
(d) transfer to civilian courts jurisdiction over all military and other security
personnel alleged to have violated international human rights law, international
humanitarian law, or committed crimes under international law, in particular
violations against civilians;
(e) incorporate into domestic law criminal sanctions for serious crimes
under international law, as well as other serious human rights violations or violations
of international humanitarian law;
(f) develop and implement a comprehensive action plan towards
accountability for human rights violations in Myanmar, including redress for victims;
(g) prohibit amnesties and pardons for alleged perpetrators of serious
crimes under international law and other serious human rights violations;
(h) report publicly on the status of all military personnel convicted of
offences against civilians, providing details about the offence, the sentence received,
the sentence implemented, and any pardon that may have been given.
(i) adopt a comprehensive policy and package of measures regarding the
fulfilment of the right to reparation of victims of serious human rights violations.

Access to medical and psychosocial support and other services

1683. The Government of Myanmar, including the civilian authorities and the
Tatmadaw as relevant, should act, without delay, to ensure that victims of serious
human rights violations and abuses have adequate access to medical, psychosocial and
other support and services. It should:
(a) ensure that survivors of sexual violence have unrestricted access to free,
confidential medical support, including psychological and psychosocial support or
mental healthcare as needed; integrate such support into broader long-term social
care and support provided by the State to vulnerable persons;
(b) ensure effective access of all children, including associate, naturalised
and non-citizen children, to all essential public services, including education and
healthcare; have particular regard for those children who have lost their primary
carers in conflict and those children who are born as a result of rape by Myanmar
security forces; provide psychological support and mental health assistance to
children affected by conflict as a priority.

Search for the missing and disappeared

1684. The Government of Myanmar, in collaboration with the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and with the assistance of the Government of
Bangladesh, should seek to identify persons killed or missing as a result of the events

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in northern Rakhine State since October 2016 and to assist persons, especially
children, separated from family members to locate relatives. The Government of
Myanmar, including the Tatmadaw, should make household registration photographs
and data available to the ICRC for these purposes. Other organizations, including
Rohingya community-based organizations, should be supported to develop a
comprehensive, accurate and reliable assessment of casualties, in line with a clearly
established methodology, for use by any future accountability mechanisms.
1685. The Government of Myanmar should immediately establish a procedure
whereby individuals can report disappearances, ensuring that reports are investigated
independently from the Tatmadaw, the victim is traced, and any perpetrators held to
account.

Combating hate speech

1686. The Government of Myanmar, including the civilian authorities and the
Tatmadaw as relevant, should immediately take credible action to combat hate
speech, in particular where it amounts to advocacy of national, racial or religious
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. It must:
(a) act swiftly to end all intolerant, divisive or discriminatory public
commentary that reinforces hate speech and false narratives, especially those
targeting Rohingya and Muslims in general;
(b) develop and implement a public communication strategy focused on
countering hate speech and false narratives and the fostering of an enabling, inclusive
and tolerant environment in which the human rights of all are respected; involve all
relevant stakeholders in its development, including Rohingya and other Muslim
groups;
(c) dismiss and otherwise hold accountable public officials, whether serving
in the Government or military, found to be spreading hate speech or false narratives,
in particular where it amounts to the incitement to violence, hostility or
discrimination;
(d) develop a comprehensive policy and action plan, in line with Human
Rights Council resolution 16/18, on combating intolerance, negative stereotyping and
stigmatization of, and discrimination, incitement to violence and violence against,
persons based on religion or belief, and also based on race, ethnicity and nationality;
ensure that the policy and action plan are developed through a transparent and
inclusive consultation with all relevant civil society organizations and other
stakeholders, including Rohingya and other Muslim groups; ensure that the policy
and plan include implementation of the Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence;
(e) design and implement a curriculum for nationwide human rights
education at all levels, especially in schools; ensure that such curriculum promotes
tolerance and respect among Myanmar’s ethnic and religious communities, including
the Rohingya; and teaches about the dangers of hate speech and incitement to
hostility, discrimination and violence;
(f) ensure that all relevant legislation to combat hate speech including the
proposed Bill for Protection against Hate Speech, is consistent with the narrow
conditions for restrictions on freedom of expression under international human rights
law;

Democratisation
1687. The Government of Myanmar, including its executive and legislative arms,
should undertake full democratic reform of the Myanmar constitutional and political
system. It should:

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(a) revise the constitution to ensure consistency with democratic rights and
freedoms and the protection of all human rights for all people of Myanmar; fully
protect and respect the rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful
assembly; widen the space for civil society activity and respect and protect the work of
human rights defenders;
(b) encourage and accept public scrutiny and criticism of Government
action; legislate for freedom of access to government information to enable greater
scrutiny of government activity, in line with international standards; establish
independent State institutions to monitor and oversee the government, to ensure
accountability to the public and to deal with the grievances of people in Myanmar in
relation to administrative decision making and actions;
(c) allow free and unfettered access to all parts of Myanmar for journalists,
national and international human rights monitors, diplomats and United Nations
officials.
1688. In view of the great fragility of Myanmar’s transition to democracy, the
Government of Myanmar should take urgent action to support the basic means of
democratic activity and the work of democratic actors. It should:
(a) repeal or amend provisions in laws unduly restricting the interrelated
rights to freedom of opinion and expression, association, and peaceful assembly,
including sections 143-147, 499-502 and 505(b) of the Penal Code, the Official Secrets
Act, section 66(d) of the Telecommunications Act, and section 17(1) of the Unlawful
Associations Act;
(b) pending legislative amendments to end criminal defamation, stop
government officials from making criminal defamation complaints, including under
section 66(d) of the Telecommunications Act;
(c) issue clear public statements welcoming public scrutiny of government
performance and, in particular, publicly recognising the important role of
independent media and journalists in holding the government to account for its
actions, including in conflict areas.
1689. The Government of Myanmar should provide that all persons eligible to vote in
the 2010 general election, and their children who have turned 18 since then, are
eligible to vote in the 2020 general election. Member States and organizations,
including the United Nations, should make this a key consideration in, and integral to,
the provision of support to the Government of Myanmar in the organization of
elections.

Security sector reform

1690. The Government of Myanmar, including the civilian authorities and the
Tatmadaw as relevant, should immediately undertake significant security sector
reform. It should:
(a) abolish the quota for military seats in the legislature, the authority of the
Tatmadaw to appoint vice-presidents and ministers and the military’s control over
certain ministries;
(b) place the security sector, including the Tatmadaw, fully under civilian
control and oversight;
(c) abolish the Commander-in-Chief’s role in relation to military justice;
(d) require parliamentary approval for the appointment of the Commander-
in-Chief;
(e) require the National Defence and Security Council to have a clear
majority of members who are not and have not been military officers and specify the
functions and responsibilities of the National Defence and Security Council;

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(f) require parliamentary approval of all funding for the Tatmadaw and
prohibit any income for the Tatmadaw that is not under parliamentary control;
consequently, remove the Tatmadaw from Myanmar’s economic life, prohibiting it by
law from engaging in any form of economic activity and prohibiting serving
Tatmadaw officers from having a controlling interest in any economic ventures.
1691. An independent and impartial system of military justice should be established
by law to deal with disciplinary matters. Conduct amounting to alleged violations of
international human rights law, international humanitarian law, or international
crimes should be tried in the civilian judicial system. This system of military justice
should be independent from the Commander-in-Chief. There should be a process of
appeal from the military courts to a civilian appeals court.
1692. An independent, external body should be established to receive, investigate and
determine complaints and allegations, from civilians or from members of the
Tatmadaw or other security forces, of wrongdoing by them without fear of reprisals.
1693. The Police should be re-established as a professional civilian entity independent
of the Tatmadaw with responsibility for the maintenance of law and order internally
in Myanmar. The Directorate of People’s Militia and Border Forces should similarly
be removed from the Tatmadaw structure and placed under civilian authority. The
law should clearly define and distinguish between military responsibilities and police
responsibilities and prescribe the conditions under which the Tatmadaw may take
action instead of or alongside the police.
1694. The Tatmadaw should adopt rules of engagement that require it to protect and
safeguard civilian life and property and ensure the humane treatment of opponents, in
line with international law. Military strategies that entail the targeting of civilians or
their property, should be prohibited. All military and other security forces’ policies,
rules of engagement and training should be reviewed and revised to ensure full
consistency with international human rights law and international humanitarian law
obligations. They should be published and disseminated widely.
1695. Military and police personnel should be subject to stringent human rights
vetting. All current security sector personnel should be vetted to ensure that anyone
who is subject of credible allegations of serious human rights violations is, at
minimum, removed from positions of authority and is not eligible for promotion or for
appointment to a civil service position or to an international representative role. All
prospective security sector personnel should be subject to human rights vetting as
part of the recruitment process.
1696. No Tatmadaw or other security forces personnel should be eligible for a United
Nations peacekeeping or policing role until and unless the Tatmadaw and other
security forces are re-structured, vetted and transformed in accordance with these
recommendations.
1697. Military and police personnel should be trained in international human rights
law and international humanitarian law, in particular in relation to the treatment and
protection of civilians; police training should focus on civilian police functions,
including community policing and crime prevention and investigation. It should
include specific training modules on the use of force in compliance with international
human rights norms and standards, including in the context of the management of
protests and demonstrations. All military and police training manuals should be
public documents to promote accountability and transparency.
1698. The Tatmadaw must end the systemic practice of forced labour. Any persons
currently held for forced labour should be released immediately and returned safely
to their homes.

2. To the United Nations and the international community

1699. The international community, through the United Nations, should use all
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to assist Myanmar in meeting its
responsibility to protect its people from genocide, crimes against humanity and war

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crimes. It should take collective action in accordance with the United Nations Charter,
as necessary.
1700. The Security Council should ensure accountability for crimes under
international law committed in Myanmar, preferably by referring the situation to the
International Criminal Court or alternatively by creating an ad hoc international
criminal tribunal. Further, the Security Council should adopt targeted individual
sanctions, including travel bans and asset freezes, against those who appear most
responsible for serious crimes under international law. It should also impose an arms
embargo on Myanmar.
1701. Until the Security Council acts, the General Assembly, or alternatively the
Human Rights Council, should create an independent, impartial mechanism to collect,
consolidate, preserve and analyse evidence of violations of international humanitarian
law and human rights violations and abuses and to prepare files to facilitate and
expedite fair and independent criminal proceedings in national, regional or
international courts or tribunals.
1702. The Human Rights Council should continue to support the mandates of the
Special Rapporteur on Myanmar and the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and
ensure they have adequate resources to maintain a strong focus on the human rights
crisis in Myanmar.
1703. The Human Rights Council should specifically request OHCHR to focus on
ensuring accountability for human rights violations and abuses in Myanmar,
including by enhanced monitoring, documentation, analysis and public reporting on
the human rights situation; raising awareness among civil society and other actors
engaged in documenting human rights violations about relevant international
standards; working with victim communities to raise awareness about justice options;
and supporting comprehensive rule of law and security sector reform in Myanmar in
line with international human rights norms and standards. Appropriate resources
must be allocated.
1704. The Human Rights Council should establish a second fact-finding mission for a
limited period to build on the work undertaken by the Mission, until either one of the
mechanisms outlined in paragraph 1700 or 1701 are operational, or the reinforced
work of OHCHR set out in paragraph 1703, is in place.
1705. The United Nations should urgently adopt a common strategy to ensure that all
engagement with Myanmar takes into account, and addresses, human rights concerns,
in line with the Human Rights Up Front Action Plan. This should guide all United
Nations engagement in Myanmar, particularly in relation to Rakhine State, and
include policies and public advocacy stances. All United Nations support to Myanmar
authorities should undergo a full Human Rights Due Diligence analysis.
1706. As a matter of urgency, there must be a comprehensive, independent inquiry
into the United Nation’s involvement in Myanmar since 2011, with a view to
establishing whether everything possible to prevent or mitigate the unfolding crises
was done; identifying lessons learned and good practice; making recommendations as
appropriate, including on accountability; and enabling more effective work in future.
1707. The United Nations and international community must ensure that the
repatriation of refugees and return of internally displaced persons only occurs when
safe, voluntary and dignified, with explicit human rights protections in place,
including citizenship. In the current circumstances, returns are not possible.
1708. All Member States should ensure that engagement with Myanmar, and support
for aid, development and reform projects, take into account and address human rights
concerns, and explicitly conform to the principles of non-discrimination and equality.
They should ensure that humanitarian organizations working on Myanmar are
appropriately funded. States should cease operational support to the Tatmadaw and
other security forces until there is (1) demonstrable commitment to genuine reform,
(2) international assistance in implementing reform and (3) acceptance of and

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cooperation with international mechanisms to hold those responsible accountable for

crimes under international law.
1709. Regardless of the imposition of an arms embargo by the Security Council,
States should not authorize the transfer of arms to Myanmar, considering the
overriding risk that they would be used to undermine peace and security and in the
commission of serious crimes under international law.
1710. Relevant regional organizations, including the European Union and ASEAN,
should develop strategies to ensure accountability for perpetrators of crimes under
international law in Myanmar, including through sustained engagement with
Myanmar and support for an international justice mechanism.
1711. Member States should exercise jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute alleged
perpetrators of serious crimes under international law committed in Myanmar.
1712. The United Nations should establish a trust fund for victim support, through
which victims can receive psychosocial support, legal aid, livelihood support, and
others means of assistance. All trust fund projects should be designed in consultation
with victims.

3. To non-State armed groups in Myanmar

1713. All non-State armed groups active in Myanmar, including “ethnic armed
organizations” and the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, should:
(a) order their members to comply fully with international humanitarian
law, in particular to protect civilians and to respect the human rights of all individuals
within their control or areas of operation;
(b) fully cooperate with any credible effort to hold perpetrators of serious
human rights violations and abuses, as well as crimes under international law,
accountable, including by non-State actors;
(c) respond positively and speedily to any initiative by the Government of
Myanmar, including the Tatmadaw, to halt military operations, either temporarily or
permanently, with a view to declaring a full ceasefire;
(d) participate in good faith in negotiations with the Government of
Myanmar to develop a comprehensive resolution of conflict within the framework of
an inclusive, pluralistic, democratic nation that respects the human rights of all
people.

4. To Myanmar civil society, including religious leaders and organizations

1714. Myanmar civil society organizations should play a leadership role in promoting
an inclusive, pluralistic, democratic Myanmar in which the human rights of all are
fully respected, protected and fulfilled. They should work jointly and with the
Government to present a positive vision of Myanmar’s future and to address and
oppose action and speech that incites hatred, violence and discrimination. They should
participate in Government initiatives, such as the development and implementation of
a policy and action plan on combating intolerance, negative stereotyping and
stigmatization of, and discrimination, incitement to violence and violence against,
persons based on ethnicity, race, nationality or religion or belief.
1715. Religious leaders and organizations should lead initiatives for interfaith and
intercommunal dialogue and confidence-building. Buddhist, Muslim and Christian
leaders and communities, including the Rohingya, should all be involved in interfaith
dialogue initiatives with respect for each other. They should model and demonstrate
good interfaith and intercommunal relations based on mutual respect and acceptance.

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5. To businesses enterprises operating in Myanmar

Business and human rights

1716. All business enterprises active in Myanmar or trading with or investing in
businesses in Myanmar should demonstrably ensure that their operations are
compliant with the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.
They should respect human rights, avoiding infringing on the human rights of others
and addressing the adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved. They
should have:
(a) a policy commitment to meet their responsibility to respect human
rights;
(b) a human rights due diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and
account for how they address their impacts on human rights;
(c) processes to enable the remediation of any adverse human rights impacts
they cause or to which they contribute.
1717. No business enterprise active in Myanmar or trading with or investing in
businesses in Myanmar should enter into an economic or financial relationship with
the security forces of Myanmar, in particular the Tatmadaw, or any enterprise owned
or controlled by them or their individual members, until and unless they are re-
structured and transformed as recommended by the Mission.

Facebook and other social media

1718. All social media platforms active in Myanmar, including messenger systems,
should apply international human rights law as basis for content moderation on their
platforms. In doing so, they should respect the rights of their users to freedom of
expression and to privacy. The Basic Principles on Business and Human Rights
provides a baseline approach that companies should adopt. They should engage with
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and existing
human rights mechanisms, in particular the United Nations Special Rapporteur on
the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression.
1719. Facebook and other social media platforms, including messenger systems,
should support the existing research of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression on online
content moderation. The Mission encourages the Special Rapporteur to explore
further the responsibilities of social media companies as carriers of expression that
incites violence or discrimination based on race, ethnicity, nationality or religion.
1720. Facebook and other social media platforms, including messenger systems,
should allow for an independent and thorough examination of the use of their
platform to spread messages inciting to violence and discrimination in Myanmar. The
extent to which posts and messages on its platform have led to real-world
discrimination and violence should be part of such examination. Their experience in
Myanmar should be examined as a situation of great concern in itself and as a case
study for their global operations.
1721. All social media platforms active in Myanmar, including messenger systems,
should open themselves up to public accountability and transparency. They should
actively track the use of their platform in Myanmar for the spread and promotion of
threats and the incitement to violence, hostility and discrimination. They should be
transparent about their policies and practices to identify and remove objectionable
content. They should publicly release disaggregated data regularly, including the
number and type of content violations, the platform used, number of complaints
received and average processing time, number of content removals, number of
accounts or pages taken down or suspended.
1722. All social media platforms active in Myanmar, including messenger systems,
should enhance their capacity to combat the use of their platforms for the spread and

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promotion of threats and the incitement to violence, hostility and discrimination. This
includes hiring sufficient content moderators who are familiar with the context,
background and nuances of Myanmar language and the issue of hate speech in the
country, and providing them with training on human rights standards.
1723. All social media platforms active in Myanmar, including messenger systems,
should retain indefinitely copies of material removed for use by judicial bodies and
other credible accountability mechanisms addressing serious human rights violations
committed in Myanmar in line with international human rights norms and standards,
including where such violations amounted to crimes under international law.
1724. All social media platforms active in Myanmar, including messenger systems,
should establish early warning systems for emergency escalation, involving all
relevant stakeholders. All death threats and threats of harm in Myanmar should be
treated as serious and immediately removed when detected. The early warning
systems should be developed and operated transparently and in consultation with key
stakeholders, including civil society organizations. It should be supported by a formal
stakeholder group to provide advice and to monitor performance.
1725. All social media platforms active in Myanmar, including messenger systems,
should actively assist efforts to promote tolerance, peace and the human rights of all
the Myanmar people. They should ensure access of all Myanmar users to credible
sources of information and alternative views, including by reviewing their advertising
models to ensure that they do not adversely affect diversity of opinion and ideas. They
should assist users to distinguish verified, credible news from disinformation,
particularly on matters of high public interest or carrying a high risk of violence,
including by cooperating with initiatives that offer fact-checking services to users.
1726. Before entering any new market, particularly those with volatile ethnic,
religious or other social tensions, Facebook and other social media platforms,
including messenger systems, should conduct in-depth human rights impact
assessments for their products, policies and operations, based on the national context
and take mitigating measures to reduce risks as much as possible.

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Annexes

I. Map of Myanmar

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II. Correspondence with the Government of the Republic of the

Union of Myanmar
1. Letter sent to the Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar on
4 September 2017

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2. Letter sent to the Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar on
17 November 2017

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3. Letter sent to the Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar on
29 January 2018

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4. Letter and questions sent to the Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Union of
Myanmar on 27 March 2018

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5. Letter sent to the Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar on
16 August 2018

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