Photography, War, Outrage

Author(s): Judith Butler

Reviewed work(s):
Source: PMLA, Vol. 120, No. 3 (May, 2005), pp. 822-827
Published by: Modern Language Association
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[
theories

PMLA

and

methodologies

Photography,
War, Outrage
THE PHENOMENON
OF "EMBEDDEDREPORTING"
SEEMEDTO EMERGE
JUDITH

BUTLER

WITHTHE INVASION
OF IRAQINMARCH
2003. ITISDEFINEDASTHESIT
uation

inwhich

agree to report only from the perspec

by military and governmental authorities. They
traveled only on certain trucks, looked only at certain scenes, and
relayed home only images and narratives of certain kinds of action.
tive established

journalists

Embedded

reporting implies that thismandated perspective would

not itself become the topic of reporters who were offered access to
thewar on the condition that their gaze remained restricted to the
established parameters of designated action. I want to suggest that
embedded reporting has taken place in less explicit ways as well: one

example is the agreement of themedia not to show pictures of the

war dead, our own or their own, on the
grounds that that would
be anti-American. Journalists and newspapers were denounced for
showing coffins of the American war dead shrouded in flags. Such
images should not be seen because theymight arouse certain kinds

of sentiments; themandating ofwhat could be seen?a concern with

regulating content?was
supplemented by control over theperspec
tive from which the action and destruction of war could be seen.
Another
Ghraib

implicit occurrence of embedded reporting is in the Abu

photographs. The camera angle, the frame, the posed sub

jects all suggest that those who took the photographs were actively
involved in the perspective of thewar, elaborating that perspective
and even giving it further validity.

JUDITH BUTLER isMaxine

In her final book, Regarding the Pain of Others (2003), Susan

Sontag remarks that this practice of embedded reporting begins
earlier, with the coverage of the British campaign in the Falklands

Elliot Profes

sor of Rhetoric and Comparative

in 1982, where only two photojournalists were permitted to enter

the region and no television broadcasts were allowed (65). Since that
time, journalists have increasingly agreed to comply with the exigen
cies of embedded reporting to secure access to the action. But what is

Lit

erature at the University of California,

Berkeley. Her recent books

include Pre

carious Life: Powers ofMourning and Vio

the action towhich access is then secured? In the two Iraq wars, the
visual perspective that the Department of Defense permitted to the

lence (Verso, 2003) and Undoing Gender

(Routledge, 2003).

822

2005

BY THE MODERN

LANGUAGE

ASSOCIATION

OF AMERICA

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i2o.3

actively structured the cognitive ap

prehension of the war. And though restrict
ing how any of us may see is not exactly the

media

same as dictating a story line, it is a way of

interpreting in advance what will and will not

be included in the field of perception.

itself provide an interpretation, thatwe need

captions and written analysis to supplement

the discrete and punctual image, which can

only affect us and never offer a full under

standing ofwhat we see. Although she is right

thatwe need such captions and analyses, she

nevertheless

leads us into another bind ifwe

agree that the photograph is not an interpre

tation. She writes thatwhereas both prose and

painting can be interpretive, photography is

merely "selective" (6), suggesting that itgives
us a partial
same

imprint of reality. Later

she

text,

elaborates:

"while

in the

painting,

even one that achieves photographic standards

of resemblance, is never more than the stating
is never
of an interpretation, a photograph
an
waves
less than
emanation (light
reflected

by objects)?a material vestige of its subject in

a way that no painting can be" (154).
can
Sontag argued that photographs

move

us momentarily but that they do not

have the power to build an interpretation. If
a photograph becomes effective in informing
or moving us politically, it is only because the
photograph
a relevant

is received within

political

consciousness.

the context of
For

Sontag,

render truths in a dissociated

photographs
moment and so offer us only fragmented or
dissociated truths.As a result, they are always
atomic, punctual, and discrete. Photographs
lack narrative

coherence,
such coherence can alone

consider that the photograph, in framing re

ality, is already interpreting what will count

the frame; this act of delimitation is

surely interpretive, as are the effects of angle,
focus, and light.

in her view, and

supply the needs

of the understanding. Narrative coherence

might be a standard for some sorts of inter

pretation, but surely not for all. Indeed, if the

notion of a "visual interpretation" is not to
become an oxymoron, it seems important to

823

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0

within

our

For

In my view, itwon't do to say, as Sontag

repeatedly does throughout her writings on
photography, that the photograph cannot by

Judith Butler

itmakes

purposes,

sider that the mandated

sense

to con

visual

image pro
duced by embedded reporting, the one that
complies with state and defense department
requirements, builds an interpretation. We
can even say that the political consciousness
thatmoves the photographer to accept those

restrictions and yield the compliant photo

in the frame itself.We
graph is embedded

do not have to have a caption or a narrative

at work to understand that a political back
ground is being explicitly formulated and

through the frame. In this sense,

the frame takes part in the interpretation of

renewed

thewar compelled by the state; it is not just a

image awaiting its interpretation; it is

visual

itself interpreting, actively, even forcibly.

The question that concerned Sontag

On Photography
(1977) and Regarding
Pain ofOthers was whether photographs

in
the
still

ever did have the power?

had the power?or

to communicate

the suffering of others in

such a way that viewers might be prompted
to alter their political assessment of the cur

rent war. For photographs to communicate

effectively, theymust have a transitive func
tion:

they

must

act

on

viewers

in ways

that

bear directly on the judgments that viewers

formulate about the world. Sontag concedes
that photographs are transitive. They do not

merely portray or represent?they relay affect.

In fact, in times of war, this transitive affec
tivity of the photograph may overwhelm and
she is less sure whether a
can
incite
and motivate its view
photograph
ers to
a
view or to assume a
of
point
change
numb

new

its readers;

course

of action.

In the late 1970s, Sontag argued that the

photographic image no longer had the power

to enrage, to incite. She claimed then that the

visual representation of suffering had become

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War,Outrage
Photography,

PMLA

cliched, thatwe had been bombarded by sen

sationalist photography and, as a result, our

capacity for ethical responsiveness had di

minished. In her reconsideration of that thesis
twenty-six years later inRegarding thePain of
Others, she ismore ambivalent about the sta
tus of the photograph, which, she concedes,
can and must represent human
suffering,
teach us how to feel across global distances,
establish through the visual frame a proximity

to suffering that keeps us alert to the human

cost ofwar, famine, and destruction in
places
that may be far from us geographically and
culturally. For photographs to invoke a moral

response, theymust not only maintain the ca

pacity to shock but also appeal to our sense of
moral obligation. She continues to fear that
photography has lost its capacity to shock,
that shock itself has become a kind of cliche,
and that photography tends to aestheticize
suffering to satisfy a consumer demand?this
last function of contemporary photography
it inimical to ethical responsiveness

makes

and political interpretation alike.

In her last book, Sontag still faults pho
tography for not being writing; it lacks narra

tive continuity and remains fatally linked to

themomentary. Photographs cannot produce
ethical pathos in us, she remarks, or if they do,

it is only for a moment: we see something atro

cious and move on a moment later. The pathos
conveyed by narrative forms, however, "does
not wear

out"

(83).

"Narratives

can make

us

understand:

photographs do something else.

haunt
us"
(89). Is she right? Is it correct
They
to say that narratives do not haunt and that
fail tomake us understand?

To

photographs
the extent that photographs
convey affect,
seem
a
to
invoke
kind
of
responsiveness
they
that threatens the only model of understand
ing that Sontag

overwhelming

trusts. Indeed, despite the

power of the photographs of

burning on the skins of crying and

running children during the Vietnam War
(an image whose power Sontag countenances),

napalm

Sontag

resolves

that

"a narrative

seems

more

likely to be effective than an image" to help

mobilize us against a war (122).
Interestingly, although narratives might
mobilize
us, suggesting that they have the
to
move
us in a
power
sustaining way and to
alter our interpretation of the conditions of
thewar, photographs are needed as evidence

of crimes of war.

In fact, Sontag argues that

the contemporary notion of atrocity requires
photographic evidence: if there is no photo
graphic evidence, there is no atrocity. The

only way to support the claim that an atroc

ityhas taken place is to supply photographic
evidence. But if this is true, then not only is
the photograph built into the notion of atroc

itybut the evidence works to establish a given

interpretation and judgment as true. Sontag
would doubtless rejoin that judgment is the
kind of interpretation, a verbal and narra
tive one, that seeks recourse to the photo
graph to substantiate its claims. But even the

most

transparent of documentary
images is
a
and
framed
for
framed,
purpose, carrying
that purpose within its frame and implement

ing that purpose through the frame. Ifwe

take such a purpose to be interpretive, then it
would appear that the photograph still inter
prets the reality that it registers, and this dual
function is preserved even when itworks as
evidence for another interpretation that takes

inwritten or verbal form. After all, the

photograph does not merely refer to the acts
place

of atrocity but also builds and confirms these

acts for those who might name them as such.
Something of a persistent split takes place

for Sontag between being affected and being

able to think and understand; this difference
is represented in the differing effects of pho
tography and prose. She writes, "[S]entiment
ismore likely to crystallize around a photo

graph

than around

a verbal

slogan." Crys
our
is not the
sentiment,
however,
tallizing
same as affecting our capacity to judge and
understand events of the world or to act to
sentiment crystallizes, it
seems to forestall thinking. Moreover, senti

ward

them. When

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12

ment crystallizes not around the event that is

photographed but around the photographic
image. Sontag voices her concern that the
photograph substitutes for the event to such

an extent that the photograph

structures
more
memory
effectively than reflection or

understanding (89). The problem is less with

the "loss of reality" this entails (the photo
graph still registers the real, ifobliquely) than

with

the triumph of a fixed sentiment over

more clearly cognitive capacities.

It seems tome, though, that the various
forms of embedded reporting suggest the op

If the photograph no longer has the

to
excite and enrage us in such a way
power
thatwe might change our political views and
posite.

then Donald

Rumsfeld's

conducts,
response
to the photos depicting the torture in theAbu
Ghraib prison does not make sense. When,

for instance, Rumsfeld claimed that to show

all the photos of torture and humiliation
and rape would allow them "to define us" as
he attributed to photography

Americans,
enormous

power

to construct

national

an

iden

tity.The photographs would not just commu

nicate something atrocious but also make our
capacity for atrocity into a defining concept

of Americanness.

It seems clear by the final essay of Regard

ing thePain ofOthers that Sontag has changed
her mind about at least two points. The first is
that photographs

stillmaintain

shock us. We

the power to

are not fully immune to their

effects. The second is that the affective transi
tivity of the photograph has its political uses.
Indeed, in the final chapter of the book, the
narrative

voice

is shaken.

In an

emotional,

nearly exasperated outcry, one distinctly dif

ferent from her usual measured rationalism,
Sontag remarks, "Let the atrocious images

haunt us" (115). Whereas

earlier she dimin
ishes the power of the photograph by saying
it only has the power to impress us with its
haunting effects (in contrast, narrative makes
us understand), now it seems that some un
derstanding

is to be wrought from this haunt

o.

Judith Butler

ing.We see the photograph and cannot let

go of the image that is transitively relayed to

us. It brings us close to an

understanding of
the fragility and mortality of human life, the
stakes of death in the scene of politics. She

to know this already in On Photog

raphywhen shewrote, "Photographs state the

seemed

innocence, the vulnerability of lives heading

toward their own destruction, and this link
between photography and death haunts all

photographs of people" (70).

As much as she disdained

those who are

always shocked anew by the atrocities ofwar

(what does one think war is?), she is surely
equally alarmed by coldness in the face of
such images. She writes that the photograph

can

be

an

"invitation

...

to pay

attention,

flect ... examine the rationalizations

re

formass

suffering offered by established powers" (Re

garding the Pain 117). In the increasing out
she expressed in her
rage and exasperation
in her articles on 9/11, and in her
on
Abu
Ghraib, "Regarding the Tor
essay
ture of Others," one can sense the vacillation
last book,

she

undergoes?perhaps

we

all

undergo?in

the face of the photograph. At times her rage

seems to be directed against the
photograph

not just formaking her feel outrage but also

for failing to show her how to transform that
affect into effectivepolitical action. She allows

that she has in the past turned against the

photograph with moralistic denunciation be
cause of its capacity to enrage without direct

ing the rage. Her complaint is that it arouses

our moral sentiments at the same time that it
confirms our political paralysis.
In "Regarding the Torture of Others,"
though, she is aware that Rumsfeld turns

as if the photo
against the photograph,
were
a
war
of
turned against
weapon
graph
and
there
she
America,
clearly exonerates the

photograph from fault: "The administration s

initial response was to say that the president
was shocked and
disgusted by the photo
if the fault or horror lay in the im
graphs?as
ages, not inwhat they depict."

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War,Outrage
Photography,

PMLA

She rages against the photograph as she

does for depicting an injustice that she does
not know how best to oppose. Justas she rages

times clearly beaten to death. Ifwe see as the

sees, then we consecrate and
photographer
consume the act. But Sontag asks us to notice

frustration with the photograph frustrates

her. To be, as itwere, a white liberal who wor
ries the question of what one can politically

This rebuff to our visual consumerism, which

comes from the shrouded head, the averted

against the photograph formaking her feel a

rage she does not know how to direct, so her

do is to be self-preoccupied,
guilty, intro
even
so once again
and
narcissistic,
spective,
to fail to find a way to respond effectively to

the suffering of others. What

she forgets is
that she iswriting about them and that her

writings become one of themost honest and

trenchant public criticisms of these wars. She
forgetswhat she offers.
At the end of Regarding

thePain ofOth
Wall
allows her to
Jeff
piece by
think through this issue. At thismoment, we
can see her turn both from the photograph
ers, a museum

and from the political exigencies of war to a

exhibition that gives her time and

museum

space for the kind of thinking and writing

she treasures. She confirms her position as

an intellectual while

showing us how Wall's

us
to reflect more care
piece might help
war.
In
this
about
context, Sontag asks
fully
whether the tortured can and do look back,

if they do, what do they see? She was

faulted for saying that the photographs taken
inAbu Ghraib were photographs of "us," and

and

some critics suggested that this was again a

that paradoxi
kind of self-preoccupation
took
the
and
place of a reflec
cally
painfully
tion on the suffering of others. But what she
asked was "whether the nature of the policies
prosecuted by this administration and the hi

erarchies deployed to carry them out makes

in
such acts [of torture] likely. Considered
this light, the photographs are us" ("Regard
ing the Torture").
Perhaps she means

photos,

we

see

ourselves

the photographers

within

that in seeing
seeing,

that we

the
are

to the extent that we live

the visual norms inwhich

the prison

ers are rendered destitute and abject, some

that the dead are "supremely uninterested in

the living" (125)?they do not seek our gaze.

indifference
glance, the glazed eyes?this
to us performs an autocritique
of the role
in media consumption.
of the photograph

Although we might want to see, the photo

graph tells us clearly that the dead do not care
whether we see. For Sontag, this is the ethical

force of the photograph, tomirror and to call

to a halt the final narcissism of our habits of

visual consumption.
She may be right, but perhaps our in
ability to see what we see is also of critical
concern. To learn to see the frame that blinds

us to what we

see is no easy matter. And if

there is a critical role for visual culture dur

ing times of war, it is to thematize the forc

ible frame agreeably and eagerly adopted by
journalists and photographers who under

stand themselves aligned with thewar effort.

What we see in theAbu Ghraib photographs
is that photographers
and subjects can me
morialize
this kind of seeing, inwhich there
is no moral outrage in the face of human suf
fering (in which there is no "human" there,

suffering), the clear belief that the subjects

deserve their torture and their death and
that those who
with

those who

deliver

this torture, along

the deed in

commemorate

the photograph, are doing justice the Ameri

can way. It is not that some stray people in
themilitary or security contractors failed to

a moral perception
see, to feel, tomaintain
of other persons as persons. This not seeing
in the midst of seeing reiterates the visual

norm that is itself a national norm. The Abu

photographs do not only represent

us; they also build an interpretation of who
we are?this Rumsfeld understood?which
Ghraib

iswhy those efforts to interpret their frame,

their purpose, the ethos they convey are criti

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12 o. 3
to this political battle that
is taking place in part through themedium
of the visual image. Sontag may think that
only written interpretations give meaning to
cal contributions

come

ence any more than there is reason to be in

favor of interpretation in the face of visual

experience. Grief, rage, and outrage may be

born precisely inwhat we see, since what we

is a frame,

an

interpretation

of

reality, that,with her, we refuse.

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photographs that enrage and haunt us, and

hers surely do; but for us to respond to those
images with outrage, to be haunted by the
torture depicted there, we must also read
the interpretation compelled and enacted by
the visual frame, coercive and consensually
established. There is no reason to be "against
interpretation" in the name of visual experi

to see

Butler
Judith

Works Cited
H. "Remarks." Defense Department
Donald
Town Hall Meeting.
11May
Pentagon, Washington.
13 May
2004.
2005 <http://www.defenselink.mil/

Rumsfeld,

speeches/2004/sp20040601-secdef0442.html>.
-.

Sontag, Susan. On Photography. New York: Picador, 1977.

Regarding the Pain of Others. New York: Picador,
2003.

-.

the Torture of Others." New York

"Regarding
Times Magazine
23 May 2004: 24+. New York State
Gale.
New York Public Lib. 17 June 2005
Newspapers.
<http://www.nypl.org/databases/>.

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

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