019. US VS.

AH CHONG
March 19, 1910
CARSON, J.
Mica Maurinne M. Adao

SUMMARY: Ah Chong, was employed as a cook and the deceased Pascual Gualberto was employed as a house boy at
"Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province. It is a detached house located some 40 meters from the nearest
building. One evening, after having gone to bed, Ah Chong was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out
twice, Who is there, but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed & called out
again, If you enter the room I will kill you. But at that precise moment, he was struck by the chair that had been placed
against the door (as support to the lock)& believing that he was being attacked he seized a kitchen knife and struck the
intruder who turned out to be his roommate Pscual. He asked for help immediately after seeing Pascual wounded. Pascual
died the day after. He admitted having stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that Pascual was a
ladron (burglar). They had an agreement that when either returned at night he should knowck and acquaint the other of his
identity. Trial Court found Ah Chong guilty of the crime of assassination. SC reversed the conviction and acquitted Ah Chong
because of the mistake of fact and absence of negligence on his part given the circumstances of the case. There is no criminal
intent which is a requite of the crime committed
FACTS: The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook and the deceased Pascual Gualberto was employed as a house boy
or muchacho at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province. It is a detached house located some 40 meters from
the nearest building, and in August 1908, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the
two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow
porch running along the side of the building.. This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and
height. The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had
attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of
fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but one small window, which, like the door, opened on
the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other openings of any kind in the room.

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, Ah Chong, who had received for the night, was suddenly awakened by
someone trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer
and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the
room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and Ah Chong, fearing that the
intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was
struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the
defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a
burglar Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, Ah Chong struck out wildly at the intruder who, it
afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately
wounded condition, followed by Ah Chong, who immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was
wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind
up Pascual's wounds. Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on the
following day.

There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just described, one of which took
place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as Ah Chong alleges, it was because of these repeated
robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection. Ah Chong also claims that they had an understanding
that when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with his identity.
Ah Chong was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with
extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.At
the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he struck
the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.

ISSUE: Whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an
act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would
constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he
committed the act?

RULING: No. There is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due
to negligence or bad faith.

In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent
which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in
crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances
demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of
article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act
committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to commit.

Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Under these provisions there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete exception from criminal liability for
the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief
or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to
resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated
warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in
the darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings
defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in
striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.

Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though the wrongful act
committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.

Spanish jurist Pacheco: A voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention
(intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words
"con malicia," which were expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code
of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and included in the word
"voluntary."

The author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the various crimes and
misdemeanors.

Legal maxims.:
Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;
Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;"

Moral science and moral sentiment: no one deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind,
destitute of every form of evil.

Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of abstract justice result
from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), However
Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). Since
evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have
proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no
fault or negligence on his part; The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him.

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal
blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief,
from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge;
that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good
faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-
defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on
account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling
into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe
threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the
crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio.