WEF Africa Competitiveness Report 2013

Africa
The
Competitiveness
Report 2013
Insight Report
The Africa
Competitiveness
Report 2013
@ 2013 World Economic Forum
The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013 is the result of

collaboration among the World Economic Forum, the
World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.
Published by the World Economic Forum, Geneva.
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed
herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the Executive Directors of The World
Bank, The African Development Bank, or the governments
they represent.
The World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the
World Economic Forum do not guarantee accuracy of
the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors,
denominations, and other information shown on any map
in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of
The World Bank, the African Development Bank, or the
World Economic Forum concerning the legal status of
any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such
boundaries.
Copyright 2013
by the World Economic Forum, the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, the
African Development Bank, and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Denmark
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted,
in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, or otherwise without the prior permission of
the World Economic Forum.
ISBN-10: 92-95044-44-4
ISBN-13: 978-92-95044-44-9
AT THE WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM
AT THE WORLD BANK
Professor Klaus Schwab

Executive Chairman
Jim Yong Kim

President
Brge Brende
Managing Director, Government Relations and Constituent
Engagement
Shantayanan Devarajan
Chief Economist, Africa Region
Jennifer Blanke
Chief Economist and Head of the Global Competitiveness
and Benchmarking Network
Margareta Drzeniek Hanouz
Lead Economist and Head of Competitiveness Research,
Global Competitiveness and Benchmarking Network
Ciara Browne
Associate Director, Global Competitiveness and
Benchmarking Network
Gaiv Tata
Sector Director, Finance & Private Sector Development,
Africa Region
Paul Noumba Um
Sector Manager, Finance & Private Sector Development,
Africa Region
Irina Astrakhan
Sector Manager, Finance & Private Sector Development,
Africa Region
Elsie Kanza
Director, Head of Africa
John Speakman
Lead Private Sector Development Specialist, Private
Sector Development, Africa Region
Caroline Ko
Junior Economist, Global Competitiveness and
Benchmarking Network
Marjo Koivisto
Private Sector Development Specialist, Private Sector
Development, Africa Region
AT THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF DENMARK
Donald Kaberuka
President
Christian Friis Bach

Minister for Development Cooperation
Mthuli Ncube
Chief Economist & Vice President, ECON Complex
Steve Kayizzi-Mugerwa
Director, Development Research Department
Issa Faye
Manager (EDRE1), Development Research Department
Peter Ondiege
Chief Research Economist, Development Research
Department
We thank Hope Steele for her superb editing work and

Neil Weinberg for his excellent graphic design and layout.
The terms country and nation as used in this report do
not in all cases refer to a territorial entity that is a state
as understood by international law and practice. The
terms cover well-defined, geographically self-contained
economic areas that may not be states but for which
statistical data are maintained on a separate and
independent basis.
Jennifer Mbabazi Moyo

Senior Research Economist, Development Research
Department
Audrey Verdier-Chouchane
Chief Research Economist, Development Research
Department
Contents
Preface v
Part 3: Competitiveness Profiles
by Donald Kaberuka (African Development Bank
How to Read the Competitiveness Profiles....................................109
Group), Christian Friis Bach (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
107
List of Countries............................................................................123
Denmark), Klaus Schwab (World Economic Forum), Jim
Competitiveness Profiles...............................................................124
Yong Kim (World Bank Group)
Acknowledgments vii
Partner Institutes of the World Economic Forum
About the Authors
201
ix
Overview xi
Part 1: Assessing Africas Competitiveness
1.1: Assessing Africas Competitiveness

in an International Context
by Jennifer Blanke and Caroline Ko (World

Economic Forum), Marjo Koivisto (World Bank),
Jennifer Mbabazi Moyo and Peter Ondiege (African
Development Bank), John Speakman (World
Bank), and Audrey Verdier-Chouchane (African
Development Bank)
Part 2: Connecting Africas Markets in

a Sustainable Way
39
2.1: Enabling African Trade: Findings from

the Enabling Trade Index
41
by Margareta Drzeniek Hanouz and Caroline Ko

(World Economic Forum)
2.2: Developing Africas Infrastructure

for Enhanced Competitiveness
69
by Peter Ondiege, Jennifer Mbabazi Moyo, and

Audrey Verdier-Chouchane (African Development
Bank)
2.3: Growth Poles: Raising Competitiveness

and Deepening Regional Integration
93
by John Speakman and Marjo Koivisto (World Bank)
The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013 | iii
Preface
DONALD KABERUKA, President, African Development Bank Group
CHRISTIAN FRIIS BACH, Danish Minister for Development Cooperation
KLAUS SCHWAB, Executive Chairman, World Economic Forum
JIM YONG KIM, President, World Bank Group
The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013, the fourth

report jointly published by our organizations, comes
out at a time when international interest in Africa is
surging and the continent is seen both as an investment
destination of choice and as a region marked by greater
prosperity and development.
Talk of an African economic renaissance
continues to grow: the continent has experienced an
average growth rate of more than 5 percent over the
past decade, when much of the developed world still
struggles to recover from crisis. However, Africa will
need to translate this impressive economic growth into
rapidly improving living standards for all Africans, as
has happened in other regions with a similar growth
performance. This is imperative if the continent is to take
advantage of its historic opportunity to end poverty and
embrace shared prosperity. Decisions and actions today
will have a strong bearing on whether Africa places itself
on an inclusive and sustainable growth path.
On a biennial basis, The Africa Competitiveness
Report highlights areas requiring policy action and
investment to ensure Africa lays the foundation for
inclusive and sustained growth. The Report leverages
the knowledge and expertise of the African Development
Bank, the World Bank Group, and the World Economic
Forum to present a policy vision that can help Africa
connect its markets and communities through increased
regional integration.
Through a comprehensive analysis of Africas
most pressing competitiveness challenges, the Report
discusses the barriers to increased trade, including the
state of Africas infrastructure and its legal and regulatory
environment. It similarly considers how innovative
public-private partnerships, often anchored to potential
growth poles, can serve as incubators for self-sustaining
industrialization, more jobs, greater opportunities, and
more dynamic regional integration. The Report also
delivers detailed competitiveness profiles for 38 African
countries, providing a comprehensive summary of the
drivers of productivity and competitiveness within the
continent.
We hope that this years Report will stimulate
enthusiastic discussion among government, business,
and community leaders about what we can all do
together to better connect Africas markets, to advance
regional integration within the continent, and to ensure

that the benefits of growth are equitably shared. For
regional integration, a vibrant private sectoras the
producer of tradable goods and serviceswill play a key
role. Businesses can advocate for reforms that enhance
competitiveness at the national level and lend their
support to initiatives that facilitate trade beyond national
borders. Governments can lay the foundations for the
sound business climate required for firms to prosper, and
can provide the legal and regulatory frameworks required
for regional integration.
Africa is at an auspicious moment in history, when
the successes of past decades and an increasingly
favorable economic outlook combine to give the
continent an unprecedented opportunity to boost
investments and spur regional integration to end poverty
within a generation.
The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013 | v
Acknowledgments
The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013 was prepared

by a joint team comprised of Jennifer Blanke, Margareta
Drzeniek Hanouz, and Caroline Ko from the World
Economic Forum; John Speakman and Marjo Koivisto
from the World Bank, and Peter Ondiege, Jennifer
Mbabazi Moyo, and Audrey Verdier-Chouchane from
the African Development Bank. The work was carried
out under the general direction of Shantayanan
Devarajan, Chief Economist for the Africa Region, and
Gaiv Tata, Sector Director, Finance and Private Sector
Development, Africa Region, The World Bank; Brge
Brende, Managing Director, the World Economic Forum;
and Mthuli Ncube, Chief Economist and Vice President,
and Steve Kayizzi-Mugerva, Director, Development
Research Department, the African Development Bank.
We are similarly grateful to all staff from our
institutions who have worked so hard to make this joint
report possible and who have provided comments at
different stages of the report preparation. In particular,
from the African Development Bank, we thank Steve
Kayizzi-Mugerwa, Issa Faye, Gilbert Galibaka, Thierry
Kangoye, Succs Assyongar Masra, Ralf Kruger, Daniel
Isooba, Jacqueline Odula, Emlio A.F. Dava, Emelly
Mutambatsere, Anthony Simpasa, Stefan Atchia,
Ishmael Abeyie (Consultant), John Luiz (Consultant),
Thierry Urbain Yogo (Consultant), and Lazreg Said
(Statistical Assistant); assistance was also provided
by Rhoda Bangurah, Nana Cobbina, Abiana Nelson,
Ines Hajri, and Imen Rabai. From the World Bank, we
thank Richard Damania, Jos Guilherme Reis, Parth
S. Tewari, and Jyoti Bisbey (peer reviewers and the
other staff who participated in reviewing the drafts); and
contributors from the World Bank on trade issues: Ian
Gillson, Olivier Hartmann, Charles Kunaka, and Jos
Guilherme Reis from the International Trade Department;
and Tadatsugu Matsudaira from Africa Transport. From
the World Economic Forum, we thank Guido Battaglia,
Beat Bilbao-Osorio, Ciara Browne, Sophie BussmannKemdjo, Oliver Cann, Gemma Corrigan, Reuben Coulter,
Roberto Crotti, Thierry Geiger, Tania Gutknecht, Marius
Hugo, Elsie Kanza, Dimitri Kaskoutas, Patrick McGee,
Pedro Rodrigues De Almeida, and Cecilia Serin. We also
thank the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.
The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013 | vii
Partner Institutes
The World Economic Forums Global Competitiveness

and Benchmarking Network is pleased to acknowledge
and thank the following organizations as its valued
Partner Institutes, without which the realization of The
Africa Competitiveness Report 2013 would not have
been feasible:
Algeria
Centre de Recherche en Economie Applique pour le
Dveloppement (CREAD)
Youcef Benabdallah, Assistant Professor
Yassine Ferfera, Director
Egypt
The Egyptian Center for Economic Studies
Iman Al-Ayouty, Senior Economist
Omneia Helmy, Acting Executive Director and Director of
Research
Ethiopia
African Institute of Management, Development and
Governance
Zebenay Kifle, General Manager
Tegenge Teka, Senior Expert
Gabon
Confdration Patronale Gabonaise
Regis Loussou Kiki, General Secretary
Gina Eyama Ondo, Assistant General Secretary
Henri Claude Oyima, President
Benin
CAPODConception et Analyse de Politiques de
Dveloppement
Epiphane Adjovi, Director
Maria-Odile Attanasso, Deputy Coordinator
Fructueux Deguenonvo, Researcher
Botswana
Botswana National Productivity Centre
Letsogile Batsetswe, Research Consultant and Statistician
Baeti Molake, Executive Director
Phumzile Thobokwe, Manager, Information and Research
Services Department
Burkina Faso
lnstitut Suprieure des Sciences de la Population (ISSP),
University of Ouagadougou
Baya Banza, Director
Burundi
University Research Centre for Economic and Social
Development (CURDES), National University of Burundi
Banderembako Deo, Director
Gilbert Niyongabo, Dean, Faculty of Economics &
Management
Gambia, The
Gambia Economic and Social Development Research Institute
(GESDRI)
Makaireh A. Njie, Director
Ghana
Association of Ghana Industries (AGI)
Patricia Addy, Projects Officer
Nana Owusu-Afari, President
Seth Twum-Akwaboah, Executive Director
Guinea
Confdration Patronale des Entreprises de Guine
Mohamed Bnogo Conde, Secretary-General
Kenya
Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi
Mohamud Jama, Director and Associate Research Professor
Paul Kamau, Senior Research Fellow
Dorothy McCormick, Research Professor
Cameroon
Comit de Comptitivit (Competitiveness Committee)
Lucien Sanzouango, Permanent Secretary
Lesotho
Private Sector Foundation of Lesotho
O.S.M. Moosa, President
Thabo Qhesi, Chief Executive Officer
Nteboheleng Thaele, Researcher
Cape Verde
INOVE RESEARCHInvestigao e Desenvolvimento, Lda
Jlio Delgado, Partner and Senior Researcher
Jos Mendes, Chief Executive Officer
Sara Frana Silva, Project Manager
Libya
Libya Development Policy Center
Yusser Al-Gayed, Project Director
Ahmed Jehani, Chairman
Mohamed Wefati, Director
Chad
Groupe de Recherches Alternatives et de Monitoring du Projet
Ptrole-Tchad-Cameroun (GRAMP-TC)
Antoine Doudjidingao, Researcher
Gilbert Maoundonodji, Director
Celine Nnodji Mbaipeur, Programme Officer
Madagascar
Centre of Economic Studies, University of Antananarivo
Ravelomanana Mamy Raoul, Director
Razato Rarijaona Simon, Executive Secretary
Cte dIvoire
Chambre de Commerce et dIndustrie de Cte dIvoire
Jean-Louis Billon, President
Mamadou Sarr, Director General
Malawi
Malawi Confederation of Chambers of Commerce and
Industry
Hope Chavula, Public Private Dialogue Manager
Chancellor L. Kaferapanjira, Chief Executive Officer
The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013 | ix
Partner Institutes
Mali
Groupe de Recherche en Economie Applique et Thorique
(GREAT)
Massa Coulibaly, Executive Director
Mauritania
Centre dInformation Mauritanien pour le Dveloppement
Economique et Technique (CIMDET/CCIAM)
L Abdoul, Consultant and Analyst
Mehla Mint Ahmed, Director
Habib Sy, Administrative Agent and Analyst
Mauritius
Board of Investment of Mauritius
Nirmala Jeetah, Director, Planning and Policy
Ken Poonoosamy, Managing Director
Joint Economic Council
Raj Makoond, Director
Morocco
Comit National de lEnvironnement des Affaires
Seloua Benmbarek, Head of Mission
Uganda
Kabano Research and Development Centre
Robert Apunyo, Program Manager
Delius Asiimwe, Executive Director
Francis Mukuya, Research Associate
Zambia
Institute of Economic and Social Research (INESOR),
University of Zambia
Patricia Funjika, Research Fellow
Jolly Kamwanga, Senior Research Fellow and Project
Coordinator
Mubiana Macwangi, Director and Professor
Zimbabwe
Graduate School of Management, University of Zimbabwe
A. M. Hawkins, Professor
Liberia and Sierra Leone
FJP Development and Management Consultants
Omodele R. N. Jones, Chief Executive Officer
Mozambique
EconPolicy Research Group, Lda.
Peter Coughlin, Director
Donaldo Miguel Soares, Researcher
Ema Marta Soares, Assistant
Namibia
Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR)
Graham Hopwood, Executive Director
Nigeria
Nigerian Economic Summit Group (NESG)
Frank Nweke Jr., Director General
Chris Okpoko, Associate Director, Research
Foluso Phillips, Chairman
Rwanda
Private Sector Federation (PSF)
Hannington Namara, Chief Executive Officer
Andrew O. Rwigyema, Head of Research and Policy
Senegal
Centre de Recherches Economiques Appliques (CREA),
University of Dakar
Diop Ibrahima Thione, Director
Seychelles
Plutus Auditing & Accounting Services
Nicolas Boulle, Partner
Marco L. Francis, Partner
South Africa
Business Leadership South Africa
Friede Dowie, Director
Thero Setiloane, Chief Executive Officer
Business Unity South Africa
Nomaxabiso Majokweni, Chief Executive Officer
Joan Stott, Executive Director, Economic Policy
Swaziland
Federation of Swaziland Employers and Chamber of
Commerce
Mduduzi Lokotfwako, Research Analyst
Zodwa Mabuza, Chief Executive Officer
Nyakwesi Motsa, Administration & Finance Manager
Tanzania
Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA)
Cornel Jahari, Assistant Researcher
Johansein Rutaihwa, Commissioned Researcher
Samuel Wangwe, Professor and Executive Director
x | The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013
Overview
The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013 comes out

at a time of growing international attention focused on
Africa as an investment destination and mounting talk
of an African economic renaissance. This increased
optimism is being spurred on by a decade of historically
strong growth, with many countries in Africa relatively
unscathed by the global economic crisis, thanks to
prudent macroeconomic management.1 However,
growth remains unevenly spread across the region
and has not yet translated to a rise in living standards
comparable to those observed in other rapidly growing
developing regions. Further, the turbulence in North
Africa has slowed growth in some of those countries.
More generally, the question of how sustainable and
inclusive Africas growth will be going forward remains.
Many efforts are still needed for African economies to
diversify and enhance their competitiveness so that they
can absorb the 10 million new entrants to the labor force
every year.2 Indeed, the African Economic Outlook (AEO)
report in 2012 highlights the fast but jobless growth
pattern on the continent: as a result of the youngest
population in the world200 million young people
between the ages of 15 and 24coupled with improved
levels of education, Africa faces the challengeand
opportunityof a youth bulge.
Africa is at a crossroads, and decisions and actions
taken today will have a strong bearing on whether it
places itself on a path similar to that of other regions
such as developing Asia, allowing it to transition from
resource-driven to higher-value-added growth. In this
context, this Report will assess the extent to which
African economies have laid the foundations and made
the necessary investments for sustained growth.
The 2011 Africa Competitiveness Report examined
Africas human resources and services industries
and looked at the efforts required to improve higher
education, strengthen womens entrepreneurship, and
capitalize on the emerging Travel & Tourism industry.
Building on this work, this years Africa Competitiveness
Report focuses on the potential of regional integration
as a stepping stone for building economies of scale,
increasing competition, and fostering economic
diversification. Information on the key data sources
used in this Report can be found in Boxes 1 and 2.
Although human capital development continues to be
critical for developing competitiveness in Africa, this

years Report leverages the research, expertise, and
substantial amount of work on regional integration that
has been carried out by its partner organizationsthe
World Economic Forum, the World Bank, and the African
Development Bank. The aim is to provide a better
understanding of the benefits of regional integration
for higher-value-added growth and to discuss current
constraints and the policy environment required to
develop the necessary infrastructure for connecting
Africas markets in a sustainable way. It is based on
the assumption that regional integration could be an
important way to reinforce competitiveness across the
continent. Such integration is, however, not an end in
itself, but a reinforcing process. Both regional integration
and competitiveness challenges must be addressed
at the same time within a country to lay the basis for a
strong and thriving private sector, and hence, increased
productivity. Against this backdrop, the Report begins
with an assessment of the different factors that affect
Africas economic competitiveness. Chapter 1.1 of the
Report outlines the competitiveness challenges faced by
the continent.
ASSESSING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF AFRICAN
COUNTRIES
Many African countries continue to feature among
the least competitive economies in the world. By
competitiveness we mean all of the factors, institutions,
and policies that determine a countrys level of
productivity. Productivity, in turn, sets the sustainable
level and path of prosperity that a country can achieve.
In other words, more competitive economies tend to be
able to produce higher levels of income for their citizens.
Competitiveness also determines the rates of return
obtained by investment. Because the rates of return
are the fundamental drivers of growth rates, a more
competitive economy is one that is likely to grow faster
over the medium to long term.
Chapter 1.1 of the Report analyzes competitiveness
across the continent and looks at a broad range of
factors that impact productivity in African countries. The
Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) identifies the majority
of African countries as among the least competitive in
the world, and notes that Africa must make headway
The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013 | xi
Overview
Box 1: Data used in this Report

The Executive Opinion Survey
The Executive Opinion Survey (the Survey) conducted
annually by the World Economic Forum captures the
perceptions of leading business executives on numerous
dimensions of the economy from a cross-section of firms
representing its main sectors. The Survey compiles data
in the following areas: infrastructure, financial environment,
innovation and technology, foreign trade and investment,
domestic competition, company operations and strategy,
government and public institutions, education and human
capital, corruption, ethics and social responsibility, Travel
& Tourism, environment, and health. All these areas feed
into the 12 pillars of the Global Competitiveness Index. In
the Survey, business leaders are asked to assess specific
aspects of the business environment in the country in which
they operate. For each question, respondents are asked
to give their opinion about the situation in their country of
residence, compared with a global norm.
The Survey gauges the current condition of a given
economys business climate. The data generated from
the Survey comprise the core qualitative ingredient of the
Global Competitiveness Index as well as a number of other
development-related studies and indexes carried out by
the Forum and other institutions. The most recent Survey
data cover a record 144 economies, with responses of
over 14,000 business executives worldwide, almost 3,000
of whom are from 38 African countries. To conduct the
Survey in each country, the World Economic Forum relies
on a network of over 160 Partner Institutes. Typically, the
Partner Institutes are recognized economics departments
of national universities, independent research institutes, or
business organizations. More information on the Executive
Opinion Survey can be found in Chapter 1.3 of The Global
Competitiveness Report 20122013.
Doing Business Indicators
The World Banks Doing Business Indicators are updated
on an annual basis, providing a quantitative measure of
a particular aspect relevant to competitiveness: business
regulations relevant to the operation of domestic small- to
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) throughout their life
cycle. Specifically, they cover the following topics: Starting
in many areas in order to set itself on a sustainable

growth trajectory going forward. It shows that the gap
with comparable regionssuch as Southeast Asia
and Latin America and the Caribbeanis particularly
large in the basic building blocks for a competitive
economy: governance and institutions, infrastructure,
and education. Beyond these gaps, countries (with the
exception of South Africa, Egypt, and the oil-exporting
economies) suffer from small market sizes. Moreover,
despite the rapid rise in mobile telephone subscriptions,
Africa trails other regions significantly in its use of
information and communication technologies (ICTs).
Furthermore, the chapter finds wide regional differences
in competitiveness across the continent, as captured in
findings such as the placement of South Africa in the top
xii | The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013
a Business, Dealing with Construction Permits, Registering

Property, Getting Credit, Protecting Investors, Paying
Taxes, Trading Across Borders, Enforcing Contracts, and
Closing a Business. The indicators are built on the basis of
standardized scenarios that permit consistency of approach
and straightforward comparisons across countries. They
also enable the tracking of reform efforts over time. Ease of
use makes this a useful tool for policy analysis. The Doing
Business data are updated annually; the most recent report
(published in September 2012) covers 185 economies, over
50 of them in Africa. Subnational Doing Business Rankings
are now also available for some African countries, including
Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, and Nigeria. Some of these
indicators are included in the Global Competitiveness Index.
For more information, visit www.doingbusiness.org.
Enterprise Surveys
The World Banks Enterprise Surveys provide another
important point of reference, collecting both perception and
objective indicators of the business environment in each
country. Although not carried out in every country in every
year, the Enterprise Surveys are made up of larger sample
sizes that allow for a nuanced analysis of the resultsfor
example, by economic sector and gender of respondent.
The data are collected through face-to-face interviews with
hundreds of entrepreneurs; hence responses reflect the
managers actual experiences. The data collected span all
major investment climate topics, ranging from infrastructure
to access to finance and from corruption to crime. Detailed
productivity information includes firm finances, costs such as
labor and materials, sales, and investment.
The breadth and depth of data allow for cross-country
analysis by firm attributes (size, ownership, industry, etc.),
and can probe the relationship between investment climate
characteristics and firm productivity. Every year, 1530
Enterprise Surveys are implemented, with updates planned
for each country every three to five years. This reflects the
intense nature of administering firm surveys, given that firms
are required to respond to many detailed questions. So
far, over 135 countries have been surveyed, including over
130,000 entrepreneurs, senior managers, and CEOs all over
the world.
half of the rankings at 52nd, while Burundi is the lowest

ranked country out of all assessed at 144th.
Recognizing the continents heterogeneity,
the chapter explores in greater detail the main
competitiveness challenges by classifying Africas
economies into oil and gas exporters, middle-income
economies, non-fragile low-income economies, and
fragile economies.3 We see that oil- and gas-exporting
economies perform as poorly as fragile economies in 9
out of the 12 competitiveness pillars, calling into question
whether these countries high economic growth rates
are sustainable. We further observe that non-fragile
low-income economies do particularly well in the areas
of financial, goods, and labor market efficiency. Middleincome economies, while generally faring better, face
Overview
many of the same competitiveness challenges as their

peers.
These competitiveness figures bring to the fore the
important question of whether, while enjoying high rates
of growth, African countries have been making the types
of investments and implementing policies that can put
their economies on sustainable growth paths so that
they can create enough jobs to benefit from, rather than
suffer from, Africas youth bulge. Given the importance
of social and environmental sustainability for growth and
development going forward, Africas economies are also
assessed according to these criteria, demonstrating that
all eight African economies in the sample do worse when
social and environmental variables are taken into account.
REGIONAL INTEGRATION
Efforts to foster trade through regional integration will be
critical for Africa to diversify its economies and increase
the regions competitiveness. Participating in both intraAfrica and international trade and investment flows can
fuel competitiveness in a number of ways. Increased
cross-border trade can lead to a virtuous cycle of more
competition in domestic markets thatcoupled with the
exploitation of economies of scalelowers the costs
of goods and services while increasing their variety,
thereby generating more economic activity, such as the
development of the manufacturing or services sectors.
This, in turn, has the potential to create strong backward
and forward linkages within the economy. For African
countries, two inter-related challenges are critical:
to diversify the export base to reduce vulnerability
stemming from commodity price swings, and to tighten
regional integration. A recent World Bank report shows
that countries are losing out on billions of dollars in
potential trade every year because of the regions
fragmented regional market,4 and because cross-border
production networks that have spurred economic
dynamism in other regions, especially East Asia, have yet
to materialize in Africa.
TRADE LIBERALIZATION
Africa has failed to benefit from trade liberalization to the
same extent as other regions, such as Asia and some
countries in Latin America. Chapter 2.1, therefore, looks
at how to strengthen the trade performance of African
economies. The Enabling Trade Index (ETI) points to a
number of strengths and many challenges to developing
trade on the African continent. Access to African markets
has been significantly liberalized in most countries, and
the business environment is often more conducive to
corporate activity than it is in other regions, although
regional differences between East, Southern, and West
Africa remain. However, inefficient border administration
reduces the price competitiveness of African exports
in global markets and adds to the cost of imports. The
transport and communications infrastructure is far less
developed than in other regions, which also significantly
Box 2: The African Development Bank:

Knowledge to improve investment climate and
competitiveness
The African Economic Outlook (AEO) is jointly produced
by the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Development Centre, the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), and the United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa (UNECA). It reviews recent
economic developments in Africa by adopting a
comparative approach and a common analytical
framework. It provides forecasts for key macroeconomic
variables. The AEO surveys and analyzes the current
socioeconomic performance of African economies and
provides information on a country-by-country basis on
their socioeconomic progress as well as on the short- to
medium-term prospects of these countries. It also provides
an overview of specific international developments that
may impact African economies.
Each year, the AEO addresses a specific theme
that focuses on a critical area of Africas socioeconomic
development. The 2012 theme was Promoting Youth
Employment. The 2013 edition of the AEO, with the theme
of Structural Transformation and Natural Management,
covers 53 African countries and is currently being
prepared. The key objectives of the AEO are to broaden
the knowledge base of African economies and to offer
valuable support for policymaking, investment decisions,
and donors interventions. Another important objective is
to assist in capacity building. Through the involvement of
African experts and institutions in its preparation, the AEO
increases research capacity and reinforces the ownership
of local African experts in that research. For more
information, visit www.africaneconomicoutlook.org.
raises the cost of trading, particularly for landlocked

economies. The chapter also corroborates that access
to finance and identifying potential markets and buyers
are considered the most important bottlenecks to
exporting across Africa. This suggests that further
developing the financial services sector, as outlined in
Chapter 1.1, would be beneficial for trade; there is also
a need and a demand for accessible business services
that could help exporters identify markets and buyers.
AFRICAS DEEP AND PERSISTENT
INFRASTRUCTURE DEFICIT
Together with border administration, the insufficient
amount and quality of infrastructure is one of the major
impediments to developing trade in Africa and improving
competitiveness; closing this deficit is part of the solution
(see Chapters 2.1 and 2.2). While over half of Africas
improved growth performance can be attributed to
improvements in infrastructure, US$93 billion annually
until 2020 is still needed for infrastructure development.5
And increased urbanization, growing consumer markets,
The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013 | xiii
Overview
and broader ties to the global economy are putting

additional pressure on the need for African economies
to invest more in infrastructure. Developing adequate
and efficient infrastructure will assist African economies
to increase productivity, especially in manufacturing
and service delivery. This in turn will create more jobs
and increase attractive investment opportunities as well
as encourage the efficient use of natural resources.
Improved and efficient infrastructure will also contribute
to social development in the areas of health and
education and reduce societal inequalities through a
more equitable distribution of national wealth.
Chapter 2.2 therefore looks at infrastructure
development in the sectors of energy, transportation,
and ICTs. The chapter shows that, in general, progress
has been very slow or even negative in terms of
electricity generation and the provision of paved roads,
while the uptake of mobile telephone subscriptions
has been impressively rapid during the last decade.
The chapter argues that, at the regional level, urgent
attention should be given to the development of regional
infrastructure to achieve economies of scale. Africa
needs well-structured networks linking production
centers and distribution hubs across the continent to
deepen regional trade and integration. Reducing this
significant infrastructure deficit will help to increase
Africas competitiveness. Very important for building the
necessary infrastructure will be (1) planning for adequate
maintenance in all sectors, including the new ICT sector;
(2) removing regulatory and institutional bottlenecks; and
(3) interconnecting infrastructure so as to maximize the
benefits from regional integration.
COMPREHENSIVE POLICY MIX NEEDED
Infrastructure development needs to be supported by
a comprehensive policy mix to reinforce the backward
and forward linkages of infrastructure investments in the
economy. In this context, Chapter 2.3 discusses growth
poles as a successful and innovative approach that
links infrastructure investments to the development of
industries and that can set into motion a reinforcing cycle
of forward and backward linkages. Growth poles are
multi-year, generally public-private investments aiming to
accelerate growth in the industries that engage in export
and to support infrastructure around already-existing
opportunities in the economy, such as a natural resource
(such as a mine) or an agglomeration economy (such as
a boom city). Growth poles are built on the assumption
that there is a need for simultaneous, coordinated
investments in many sectors to encourage self-sustaining
industrialization that could increase market size,
thereby attracting more investment and employment.
By bringing together investors from both the public
and private sectors to share risks, growth poles can
reduce the costs of infrastructure projects and especially
incentivize the local private sectors participation in
these projects. Growth pole projects can be a boost
xiv | The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013
to regional integration, as they often attract foreign

direct investment, are built across borders, and have
spillovers beyond national economies. Growth poles can
thus be important spurs for national competitiveness,
and can be especially effective by reinforcing the
capacity for regional integration and increasing business
sophistication.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Several policy recommendations flow from the analysis
in this Report. Individually each recommendation could
facilitate trade and regional integration, and jointly
they could be important drivers for more regional
integration across Africa and for improving the regions
competitiveness.
Simplifying import-export procedures: Chapter 2.1
shows that reducing import-export procedures lends
itself to relatively rapid gains from trade facilitation,
while countries are putting in place the necessary
infrastructure that proves critical to more regional
integration in the medium to long run. More specifically,
streamlining border administration to reduce the cost
of procedures and delays during clearance, along with
improving the coordination of the clearance process,
could be instrumental in providing these rapid gains.
An example of this approach is seen in the UgandaKenya revenue authorities digital exchange platform (see
Chapter 2.1, Box3).
Developing and leveraging ICTs: Chapter 2.1 shows
that improvements in ICTs could also further support
and help make more transparent the administrative
processes in regard to trade facilitation. Furthering this,
Chapter 2.2 highlights the urgent need (1) to liberalize
the subsector in countries still dominated by government
monopolies, as well as to avoid policy reversals,
which create uncertainty; (2) to improve private-sector
participation, particularly in the backbone infrastructure,
so as to enhance terrestrial connectivity; (3) to create
an open, dynamic, and responsive legal and regulatory
framework that responds to new advances such as
mobile money; and (4) to anticipate plans for adequate
maintenance.
Improving energy: From an in-depth analysis of
Africas energy sector, Chapter 2.2 recommends that
policymakers should (1) reconsider subsidies and tariffs
that are not cost-reflective and that prevent crucial
investments; (2) invest in the diversification of the energy
mix to reduce vulnerability of one source of energy and
ensure sustainability; (3) promote energy efficiency and
pursue green energy, which will address the energy
deficit at no further cost to the environment; and (4)
build competitive regional power pools coupled with the
requisite legal and regulatory framework.
Improving transportation: In the transportation
sector, outdated infrastructure and limited maintenance
call for a pressing rehabilitation in all subsectors.
Transport infrastructure is particularly important for
Overview
landlocked countries that face prohibitive costs in

getting their goods to market, thereby undermining their
competitiveness. Policymakers should encourage and
facilitate investment in (1) upgrading rail transport links
to ensure cost-effective transportation of bulky exports;
(2) increasing capacity storage in the port sector; and
(3) improving feeder and rural roads, thereby enhancing
inclusiveness.
Building growth poles: Linked to but going beyond
improving infrastructure, growth poles are an innovative
means to link regional integration and develop productive
capacity. Chapter 2.3 highlights policy lessons for
building growth poles. It shows that growth poles can
be an important means of creating dialogue among
stakeholders, but they require a thorough upfront
analysis and need to incorporate clear leadership on
the implementation side. In dialogue with the private
sector and other stakeholders, policymakers will then
need to deal with three kinds of challenges: (1) policy
coordination is key. Consideration must be given to how
growth poles get picked and how specific transactions
get selected. Responding to these challenges requires
both institutional (horizontal) coordination, and effective
coordination of implementation arrangements. (2) A
monitoring and evaluation framework for growth pole
investments must be established from the outset
of the projects as a key measure for increasing the
accountability and transparency of these investments.
(3) Successful risk management of growth poles needs
to recognize the specific risks associated with them
(including risk-sharing and risk-management challenges,
payment challenges, and demand and construction risk
challenges).
A coordinated effort by several African countries
is needed for the full positive impact of these
recommendations, each building the necessary policy
environments and building the required infrastructure
that will facilitate regional integration. However, regional
integration is not an end in itself. Efforts to close
Africas competitiveness gapparticularly in the areas
of institutions, education and skills, and technological
adoptionwill be critical for African economies to
build their productive capacities: putting in place the
necessary factors to move up the value chain will lay the
basis for a transformative manufacturing and services
sector that will provide the goods and services that
will be traded. Efforts are underway in some parts of
the continent, but in order to truly improve Africas
productivity and competitiveness and see a rapid rise
in living standards, such efforts must be scaled up and
accelerated.
The final section of the Report provides detailed
competitiveness profiles for the 38 African countries
included in the World Economic Forums Global
Competitiveness Index. These profiles present the
detailed rankings that underlie the broader global
competitiveness rankings.
NOTES
1 See, for example, IMF 2008. Furthermore, a recent IMF Working
Paper (IMF 2013) shows that economic growth in sub-Saharan
Africa was less volatile between 1995 and 2010 than it was
between 1980 and 1994.
2 AfDB et al. 2012.
3 We follow the IMFs country classification applied in the Regional
Economic Outlooks on sub-Saharan Africa based on the most
recent data on per capita gross national income (averaged over
three years) and the 2010 World Banks (IDA) Resource Allocation
Index (IRAI). Oil-exporting countries are those where oil exports
make up for more than 30 percent of total exports. Middle-income
countries not classified as oil exporter or fragile countries are
those that had an average income per capital gross national
income in the years 200810 of more than US$992.7 and an
IRAI score higher than 3.2; low-income countries not classified
as fragile or oil exporters had average income per capital gross
national income in the years 200810 of less than US$992.7; and
fragile countries not classified as oil exporters had IRAI scores
of 3.2 or less (see IMF 2012). The criteria are extended to North
African economies.
4 World Bank 2012.
5 AfDB Group 2010.
REFERENCES
AfDB Group (African Development Bank Group). 2010. Infrastructure
Deficit and Opportunities in Africa. Economic Brief 1 (September).
Available at http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/
Documents/Publications/ECON%20Brief_Infrastructure%20
Deficit%20and%20Opportunities%20in%20Africa_Vol%201%20
Issue%202.pdf.
AfDB (African Development Bank), OECD (Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development), UNDP (United Nations
Development Programme), and UNECA (United Nations
Economic Commission for Africa). 2012. African Economic
Outlook 2012. Paris: OECD Publishing. Available at http://www.
africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/.
IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2008. The Great Sub-Saharan
African Growth Takeoff: Lessons and Prospects. Sub-Saharan
Africa Regional Economic Outlook, Fall. Washington, DC: IMF.
. 2012. Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa:
Sustaining Growth amid Global Uncertainty, April. Available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2012/afr/eng/sreo0412.pdf.
. 2013. The Quality of the Recent High-Growth Episode in SubSaharan Africa. IMF Working Paper No. WP/13/53. Washington,
DC: IMF.
World Bank. 2012. De-Fragmenting Africa: Deepening Regional
Integration in Goods and Services. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/05/03/000333038_2012050
3000714/Rendered/PDF/684900ESW0Whit00Box367921B00PU
BLIC0.pdf.
World Economic Forum. 2012. The Global Competitiveness Report
20122013. Geneva: World Economic Forum.
The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013 | xv
Part 1
Assessing Africa's
Competitiveness
CHAPTER 1.1
Assessing Africas
Competitiveness in an
International Context
JENNIFER BLANKE, World Economic Forum
CAROLINE KO, World Economic Forum
MARJO KOIVISTO, World Bank
JENNIFER MBABAZI MOYO, African
Development Bank
PETER ONDIEGE, African Development Bank
JOHN SPEAKMAN, World Bank
AUDREY VERDIER-CHOUCHANE, African
Development Bank
After two difficult decades, Africa has enjoyed a period

of high, sustained economic growth. Since the early
2000s, African countries have registered consistent
growth rates well above 5 percent on average, a rate
that has been only temporarily interrupted by the
global economic downturn. Indeed, Africa has weathered
the crisis remarkably well: since our last Report, the
region has bounced back rapidly and seen slow but
steady upward growth at a time when much of the rest
of the world is struggling and many countries are actually
experiencing a double-dip recession. But two recent
developments will be of critical importance for Africas
future path: the continents population has reached the
1 billion markor 15 percent of the worlds totaland
is projected to increase to 20 percent by 2030.1 In
this context, events such as the Arab Spring highlight
the tensions that can arise from a growing population
without accompanying economic and social progress
that will ensure decent living standards, employment,
and fair opportunities to better peoples lives.
Thus, although this period of growth has given
rise to increased optimism about Africas economic
prospects, supported by advances in information and
communication technologies (ICT) development and
auspicious projections about Africas rapidly growing
new consumer base on the one hand, on the other
hand, many African economies continue to figure among
the least competitive in the Global Competitiveness
Index (GCI)14 out of the 20 lowest-ranked economies
are African. They underperform by a wide margin on
human development indicators,2 and armed conflict and
recurrent food crises continue to make headline news.
Indeed, for many African economies, sources of growth
are insufficiently diversified. Mineral exports make up
over half of the regions total exports, rendering them
vulnerable to commodity shocks. The share of gross
domestic product (GDP) held by the manufacturing
sector has remained largely unchanged since the
1970s,3 and more than two-thirds of the labor force
is employed in the agricultural sector, implying limited
structural transformation.4
In view of these evident concerns, the pertinent
question is one of countries competitiveness: are
policymakers putting into place the fundamentals that
will keep them growing rapidly, placing them on the
higher growth trajectories needed to ensure rapid
increases in living standards? In this chapter we hope
to shed further light on Africas potential for sustained
and inclusive growth. We will also explore the extent to
which growth in the region can be maintained over the
longer term while ensuring environmental and social
sustainability. As the chapter will show, Africa still must
make headway in a number of areas in order to set itself
on a sustainable growth trajectory going forward.
The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013 | 3
1.1: Assessing Africas Competitiveness in an International Context
Figure 1: Prosperity and economic growth
GDP PPP per capita, current international dollars
15,000
Sub-Saharan Africa
Developing Asia
Latin America and the Caribbean
12,000
9,000
6,000
3,000
0
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
Source: IMF, 2012c.
AFRICAS COMPETITIVENESS CHALLENGE

Overall, high economic growth rates have not yet
translated into the rapidly improving living standards
that have been seen in other regions with a similar
growth performance. Africa's growth rates have
averaged well above 5 percent in the past decade,
after 20 difficult years of flat and often negative growth
in several countries. The question going forward is
whether Africa will be able to maintain these impressive
growth rates, and whether future growth will be built
on the types of productivity enhancements that are
associated with rising living standards. To date, given
the low starting point and the comparatively shorter
period of above-average growth, and despite the
continents impressive resilience to the recent financial
and economic crisis, economic growth has not yet led
to the same magnitude of rising living standards that
has been observed in other regions with similar growth
performance (see Figure1).
Low and falling productivity figures are at the
core of these differences in living standards. Figure2
compares labor productivityas a proxy for overall
productivityfor Africa with that of other regions for the
past 50 years. Although Africa and developing
Asia started from similar, very low levels, labor in
developing Asia has since become more productive,
effectively converging with the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
average. Figure2 further shows that Africa, in contrast,
has not only been trailing Southeast Asia, but in fact the
productivity gap deepened between 1960 and 2000.
4 | The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013
However, the slight recovery in productivity seen since

the early 2000s provides something of a silver lining,
indicating that economic growth is increasingly driven
by rising productivity in some African countries.
Indeed, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
examines productivity figures at a disaggregate level
for 19952010, analyzing the extent to which structural
transformationdefined as the shift of workers from
low to high-average productivity activitiesoccurred in
sub-Saharan Africa. The findings show that structural
transformation has seen some countries (Ethiopia,
Kenya, Mozambique, and Tanzania) developing a
manufacturing sector, and Kenya and Mauritius
developing a service sector, although the report notes
that the remaining African economies have registered
only slow growth in labor productivity.5
Identifying the drivers of productivity needed to
ensure rapid and sustained increases in living standards
is the goal of the GCI, which defines competitiveness
as the set of institutions, policies, and factors that
determine the level of productivity of a country. The
current and future levels of productivity, in turn, set the
sustainable level of prosperity that can be earned by an
economy. In other words, more competitive economies
tend to be able to produce higher levels of income for
their citizens. The measurement of competitiveness is
a complex undertaking. To address this complexity,
the idea that many different factors matter for
competitiveness is reflected by the 12 distinct pillars of
the Index:6 institutions (public and private), infrastructure,
the macroeconomic environment, health and primary
Figure 2: Africas falling productivity
GDP per hour worked, Geary/Khamis $
120
OECD = 100
100
Sub-Saharan Africa
Developing Asia
80
60
40
20
2012
2010
2008
2006
2004
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
1980
1978
1976
1968
1972
1970
1968
1966
1964
1962
1960
1958
1956
1954
1952
1950
Sources: The Conference Board Total Economy Database, January 2013, http://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase; authors calculation.
Note: The database begins in 1960 for Africa and Developing Southeast Asia.
Figure 3: The Global Competitiveness Index framework
GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS INDEX
Basic requirements
subindex
Pillar 1. Institutions
Pillar 2. Infrastructure
Pillar 3. Macroeconomic environment
Pillar 4. Health and primary education
Efficiency enhancers
subindex
Pillar 5. Higher education and
training
Innovation and sophistication

factors subindex
Pillar 11. Business sophistication
Pillar 12. Innovation
Pillar 6. Goods market efficiency

Pillar 7. Labor market efficiency
Pillar 8. Financial market
development
Pillar 9. Technological readiness
Pillar 10. Market size
Key for
Key for
Key for
factor-driven
efficiency-driven
innovation-driven
economies
economies
economies
Source: World Economic Forum, 2012.
Table 1: African economies by stages of development

Stage
African countries
Other countries in this stage
Important areas for competitiveness
Stage 1 (factor-driven)
GDP per capita < US$2,000
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi,

Cameroon, Chad, Cte dIvoire,
Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia,
Zimbabwe
Bangladesh, Nicaragua, Pakistan,

Vietnam, Yemen
Basic requirements (60 percent),

efficiency enhancers (35 percent), and
innovation factors (5 percent)
Transition from 1 to 2
GDP per capita US$2,000 to US$3,000
Algeria, Botswana, Egypt, Gabon, Libya
Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam,

Iran, Islamic Rep., Venezuela
Basic requirements (between 40

percent and 60 percent), efficiency
enhancers (between 35 percent and
50 percent), and innovation factors
(between 5 percent and 10 percent)*
Stage 2 (efficiency-driven)
GDP per capita US$3,000 to US$9,000
Cape Verde, Mauritius, Morocco,

Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland
Albania, Belize, China, Costa Rica,

Indonesia, Jordan, Mexico

innovation factors (10 percent)
Transition from 2 to 3
GDP per capita US$9,000 to
US$17,000
Seychelles
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Croatia,

Malaysia, Mexico, Russian Federation,
Turkey
Basic requirements (between 20

percent and 40 percent), efficiency
enhancers (50 percent), and innovation
factors (between 10 percent and 30
percent)*
Germany, Republic of Korea, Norway,

Spain, United Kingdom, United States

innovation factors (30 percent)*
Stage 3 (innovation-driven)
GDP per capita > US$17,000

Note: Countries with a share of mineral exports in their total exports greater than 70 percent are moved toward a lower stage of development.
education, higher education and training, goods market

efficiency, labor market efficiency, financial market
development, technological readiness, market size,
business sophistication, and innovation (see Figure3).
Improving competitiveness across the 12 GCI pillars
would be important for meeting Africas sustainable
growth challenge.
The GCI takes into account the fact that countries
around the world are at different stages of economic
development and offers guidance on the priority areas
for reforms. Specifically, the GCI distinguishes three
stages of development. In their first stage, economies
are factor-driven and countries compete based on their
factor endowmentsprimarily unskilled labor and natural
resources. Maintaining competitiveness in this stage
depends primarily on well-functioning public and private
institutions (pillar 1), well-developed infrastructure (pillar
2), a stable macroeconomic environment (pillar 3), and
a healthy and literate workforce (pillar 4). As wages rise
with advancing development, countries move into the
second, efficiency-driven stage of development, when
they must begin to develop more efficient production
processes and increase product quality. At this stage,
competitiveness is driven by higher education and
training (pillar 5), an efficient goods and services market
(pillar 6), frictionless labor markets (pillar 7), developed
financial markets (pillar 8), the ability to make use of
latest technological developments (pillar 9), and the size
of the domestic and foreign markets available to the
countrys companies (pillar 10). Finally, as countries move

into the third, innovation-driven stage, they are able to
sustain higher wages and the associated standard of
living only if their businesses are able to compete with
new and unique products. At this stage, companies
must compete through producing new and different
goods using the most sophisticated production and
business processes (pillar 11) and innovation (pillar 12).
Table1 provides a detailed overview of the
stages of development of African economies and
places these into context with other regions.7 It
suggests that a competitiveness agenda for most
African countries, classified as factor-driven economies,
should make putting into place the basic fundamentals
as their first critical step toward improving productivity
and competitiveness. That is, these economies
should prioritize providing sound institutions and
macroeconomic policies, adequate infrastructure,
and the means for ensuring a healthy and literate
workforce before moving on to the next stages. This
is particularly important for the five countries (Algeria,
Botswana, Egypt, Gabon, and Libya) that are currently
transitioning to the secondefficiency-drivenstage
of development, which will require them to move into
more efficient production processes and increase
product quality to maintain growth. Six other African
economies are currently in the efficiency-driven stage
of the GCI, where higher education and market
efficiencies (goods, labor, financial) take a more
Figure 4: The GCI heat map
GCI score*
n [5.39,5.72]
n [5.00,5.39[
n [4.60,5.00[
n [4.20,4.60[
n [3.80,4.20[
n [2.78,3.80[
n Not covered

* The interval [x,y[ is inclusive of x but exclusive of y. Highest value; lowest value.
prominent role. Only one African economySeychelles

is currently transitioning to the innovation-driven stage.
For Seychelles to increase its competitiveness,
therefore, more needs to be done to put into place a
skilled workforce and a business environment that is
supportive for innovation. However, it is important to
bear in mind that the sequencing proposed by the
GCI serves as a guideline rather than carved-in-stone
policies, and a holistic competitiveness agenda needs
to consider the country-specific context and unique
challenges.
The next section will assess the overall
competitiveness of Africa. To get a sense of how the
regions performance stands in international comparison,
we also show the results of relevant regions and
countries (Southeast Asia, Latin America and the
Caribbean, and the BRIC economies).8
COUNTRY COVERAGE
This years Report features 38 African economies.
The newly covered countries are Gabon, Guinea, Liberia,
Seychelles, and Sierra Leone. Two previously covered
countriesAngola and Tunisiahave not been included
this year. For Angola, sufficient Executive Opinion
Survey data could not be collected.9 In the case of
Tunisia, results are not reported because of an important
structural break in the data, which does not allow for
comparison with previous years.
AFRICAS PERFORMANCE IN AN INTERNATIONAL

CONTEXT
On average, African economies trail the rest of the
world in competitiveness: 14 out of the 20 least
competitive economies are from Africa. Figure4
identifies competitiveness hotspots and the regions
or countries with weak performance according to the
GCI. The 10 best-performing countries are shaded
in dark red. The remaining countries are shaded in
increasingly cooler tones moving from orange (the
second-best-performing group) through yellow, light
blue, medium blue, and dark blue; this last color
identifies the least-competitive economies according
to the GCI. As shown on the map, a vast majority of
African countries covered in this Report fall into the
group of least-competitive economies (dark blue).
Outside of Africa, only eight Latin American countries
(Bolivia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guyana, Haiti,
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Suriname), four Asian economies
(Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, Timor-Leste), and one
country each from the Middle East and Central Asian
regions (Yemen, Kyrgyz Republic) perform similarly.
However, within Africa, Botswana, Gabon, Morocco,
Namibia, Seychelles (medium blue), and Mauritius,
Rwanda, and South Africa (light blue) are somewhat
more competitive.
Africas competitiveness as a whole trails
Southeast Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean;
the biggest gaps are seen in the quality of institutions,
Figure 5: Africas performance in regional comparison
Innovation
Institutions
7
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
Health and
primary
education
Market size
Technological
readiness
Africa
Southeast Asia
Higher education
and training
Financial market
development
Goods market
efficiency
Labor market efficiency

Note: The sample includes Africa: Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Cte dIvoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho,
Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; Southeast Asia: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam; Latin America and the
Caribbean: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, education,

and ICTs. Comparing Africas performance with other,
more advanced regions helps to identify the regions
overall strengths and weaknesses. Southeast Asia
provides an insightful benchmark for a large number of
African economies: although both regions registered
approximately the same levels of GDP per capita in the
1960s, developing Asia has since risen considerably
more rapidly than sub-Saharan Africa (see Figure1).
Figure5 shows that African economies consistently
underperform the Southeast Asian average across
all competitiveness pillars. Although Africas financial,
goods, and labor markets are well developed (on a
par, or nearly on a par, with Latin America) these
economies feature wide deficits in the areas of basic
requirements.
A particular point of concern is the continents weak
institutions: although Africa on average does as well as
Latin America in this pillar, both regions have institutions
that receive scores below the middle value of 4 (on a
scale of 17). This suggests that more must be done
to increase the capacity of the public sector to set the
framework for the economy to run efficiently, which
could generate critical spillovers into other dimensions of
competitiveness.
Figure5 also points out Africas pronounced
infrastructure deficit, which will be explored further in
Chapter 2.2 of this Report. The region also needs to
remain vigilant with regard to its macroeconomic stability

as defined by the GCI,10 although this is improving. The
regions savings rate (on average, 17 percent of GDP)
and government budget balance (on average, 4 percent
of GDP) is worse than that of other regions. However,
following debt cancellation for a number of countries,
overall its government debt is now in line with that of
other regions. In fact, improvements in macroeconomic
performance, coupled with its limited integration into the
global economy, have helped to mitigate the effects of
the global economic crisis. More generally, it should be
noted that sub-Saharan Africa has made considerable
progress in ensuring sounder macroeconomic policies
over the past 15 years and has reached levels of
macroeconomic performance similar to that of other
developing countries.11
However, the region is trailing significantly in
technological readiness, which measures the agility
with which an economy adopts existing technologies to
enhance the productivity of its industries, with a specific
emphasis on its capacity to fully leverage ICTs. This is
important in view of the changing role of ICTs. Indeed,
they have become critical tools in todays economy,
accounting for a significant share of value-added and
employment in advanced economies and supporting
efficiency gain and enabling transformative innovation.
Although Africa has registered rapid improvement
in ICT use, particularly in terms of mobile telephone
Figure 6: Trends in GCI scores, 200612
5.0
GCI score (17)
4.5
4.0
3.5
Africa
Southeast Asia
OECD
3.0
20062007
20072008
20082009
20092010
20102011
20112012
20122013
GCI edition
Sources: World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report (various editions); authors calculations.
Notes: All data refer to the 2005 constant sample. The constant sample includes Africa: Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius,
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe; Southeast Asia: Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam; Latin
America and the Caribbean: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
subscriptions, it started from a low base. Going forward,

African economies need not only to make the types of
investment necessary to build out the ICT infrastructure,
but also to create an enabling environment to fully
leverage ICT uptake to boost economic and social
impacts.12 The M-PESA mobile payment system in
Kenya (see Chapter 2.2) and improved e-government
services are examples of important steps in the right
direction.
Finally, the region is neglecting its talent pool,
underperforming significantly in educating and providing
a healthy environment for its citizens. This is a pressing
concern in view of the regions youth unemployment
challenge and the large number of people who will
enter the labor market in the coming years. In the
short term, absorbing the enormous number of new
labor-market entrants will require the development of
job-intensive sectors. In the longer term, moving up the
value chain into more-advanced manufacturing and
services sectors will require significant and immediate
investment in education in order to provide a workforce
that can move beyond simple production processes. In
this context, education will play an even more prominent
role in ensuring knowledge spillovers from the natural
resource sector to the domestic economy. This will
happen only through skills and training, particularly in
the context of facilitating the adoption of new technology
and strengthening a science agenda and innovation,
which is becoming ever more important to ensure

that the continent can compete with other emerging
regions.
Africa has not remained stagnant, however, but
has been improving its competitiveness, although
change has been gradual and modest. Reducing the
competitiveness divide between African economies
and other, more advanced regions will be critical for
placing the region on a firmly sustainable growth and
development path. To complement the static analysis,
Figure6 shows the trends in average GCI scores based
on the constant sample of the 20 African economies
that have been included since the Index was introduced
in 2006. Their performance is benchmarked against
that of the OECD average, providing a sense of how
these regions compare with a group of the worlds
more advanced economies. It is also measured against
the performance of Southeast Asia and Latin America,
which are more comparable benchmarks in terms of
stage of development. Although Africa has increased its
score from 3.6 points seven years ago up to 3.7 (on a
scale of 17), converging gradually with the performance
of the OECD countries until last year, the region has
not managed to close the gap with developing Asia
and Latin America. Overall, Africa remains the lowestperforming region in the GCI sample.
To gain a better understanding of the drivers
of the regions competitiveness and future trends,
Figure 7: Trends in factor-driven and efficiency scores: Africa
5.0
South Africa
4.5
Namibia
South Africa
GCI score (17)
4.0
Mauritius
3.5
South Africa
3.0
Efficiency
enhancers
Namibia
South Africa
Infrastructure
2.5
2005-2006
2006-2007 Botswana
2007-2008
Namibia
South Africa
Botswana
Namibia
Mauritius
Namibia
Morocco
Mauritius
Botswana
Health and
primary eduction
Mauritius
Egypt
Institutions
Macroeconomic
Botswanaenvironment
Basic requirements
Morocco
Botswana
Mauritius
Namibia
2.0
South Africa
Egypt
Morocco
2008-2009
Morocco 2009-2010
Mauritius
Egypt
GCI edition
Morocco
Botswana
Egypt
2010-2011
2011-2012
2012-2013
Sources: World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report (various editions); authors calculations.
Note: The constant sample includes Algeria, Benin, Botswana,
Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, South
Egypt
Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
Morocco
Egypt
Figure7 presents the evolution of scores in basic

requirements and the respective pillars that make up
that subindex for 200512. The figure also presents the
average performance of the six pillars making up the
efficiency-enhancers subindex. The reason for focusing
on these two areas is thatas described abovethe
GCI classifies most African economies into the factordriven and efficiency-driven stages of development (see
Table1), meaning that these two subindexes capture
those elements that are currently the most critical for the
competitiveness of these countries.
Overall, the trend confirms Africas steady and
continuous but gradual improvement in those areas
that make up the efficiency pillars of the GCI. The
graph also reveals that until 200910, gains in African
competitiveness from 2005 levels stemmed from
improvements in institutional quality, infrastructure
developmentwhich showed a promising upward
trend between 2006 and 2010 from very low levels
and improved macroeconomic conditions. However,
improving the quality of institutions and strengthening
infrastructure have, since 2010, come to a near
standstill or even deteriorated across a number of
African economies. Likewise, initial improvements in
macroeconomic stability in the pre-crisis years
entered a period of decline in 200810 on the back
of concerns about deteriorating public finances,
increased food prices, and double-digit inflation in
many countries. A notable improvement was also

registered in the regions health and primary education
assessments, reflecting improved health outcomes
and gradually higher primary enrollment rates. This
improvement was especially strong in 200910, but
it leveled off in 201011 and this year has seen a
slight decline.
On a less positive note, the figure confirms the
continents persistent and worrisome infrastructure
deficit (see Chapters 2.2 and 2.3 for a more detailed
analysis). Despite gradual improvements in the run-up
to the global financial crisis, the quality and quantity of
infrastructure has largely stagnated at low levels since.
This stagnation is partially the consequence of a decline
in investment following the crisis. This infrastructure
deficit is particularly striking given gradual improvements
across the various efficiency enhancers (e.g., market
efficiency, technological readiness) in recent years. It is
even more urgent in view of Africas rapid population
growth and increased urbanization: with 41 percent of
the African population living in cities, and a foreseen 1
percent increase every two years, the need to ramp up
infrastructure to cope with these demographic pressures
is critical.13 Removing the infrastructure bottleneck
wouldamong other measures explored further in
Chapter 2.2help to boost intra-regional trade and
diversify external trade, thereby making Africa more
resilient to external shocks.
AFRICAS COMPETITIVENESS DIVIDE

Aggregate competitiveness figures do not point to
a uniform condition, but instead they mask wide
differences among African economies themselves,
suggesting a competitiveness divide across the
continent. This is reflected in the wide range of results
among African economies in the GCI, ranking from 52nd
(South Africa) to 144th, or last of all countries (Burundi).
Table2 matches the GCI score of Figure4 with the rank
performance of all African economies and comparator
regions and countries. South Africa and Mauritius are
the continents top performers, ranked 52nd and 54th,
respectively, just below the Southeast Asian average
and above emerging market economies of India and
Russia. They are followed by a second cluster of
countriesRwanda (63rd), Morocco (70th), Seychelles
(76th), and Botswana (79th)which are more competitive
than Latin America on average. A third group of African
economiesNamibia, Gambia, Gabon, Zambia, Ghana,
Kenya, and Egyptcluster between the Latin American
and North African averages. Algeria (110th) and Libya
(113th) do worse than the North African average, while
Liberia, Cameroon, Senegal, Benin, and Tanzania do
better than the sub-Saharan average. The countries at
the bottom of the table are outperformed by all other
countries and regions.
Against this backdrop, regional integration could be
an important way to reinforce competitiveness across the
continent. Increased cross-border trade would enlarge
market size (an area where the region is significantly
lagging behind) and boost competition (as measured in
the GCI's goods market efficiency pillar), and thereby
increase the variety of products and services. This in turn
would facilitate the creation of new manufacturing and
services industries. Regional integration, however, is not
an end in itself, but a reinforcing process that requires
addressing competitiveness challenges within the
country to lay the basis for a strong and striving private
sector and, hence, increased productivity.
These wide differences in the overall performance of
African countries demonstrate that challenges faced by
individual countries and country groups are diverse, and
that there is no one-size-fits-all blueprint for improving
competitiveness. African middle-income economies,
such as South Africa, face very different challenges than
lower-income economies, such as Burundi; those natural
resourceabundant economies face yet another set of
competitiveness challenges, quite different from those of
largely agrarian economies. Naturally, priorities for fragile
economies are to restore stability. Against this backdrop,
following the IMFs classification, the next section
looks at four distinct groups of African economies: oil
exporters, middle-income economies, non-fragile lowincome economies, and fragile economies.14 The aim
of this classification is to facilitate discussion and draw
out some general conclusions on the strengths and
weaknesses of these country groups. Yet it is important
Table 2: The Global Competitiveness Index 20122013:

Africa and selected comparator economies
GCI 20122013
Economy
China
Rank/144
Direction
GCI 201112
Score
Rank
4.8
26
29
Brazil
48
4.4
53
South Africa
52
4.4
50
Mauritius
54
4.4
54
India
59
4.3
56
Rwanda
63
4.2
70
Russian Federation
67
4.2
66
Morocco
70
4.1
73
Seychelles
76
4.1
n/a
Botswana
79
4.1
80
Namibia
92
3.9
83
Gambia, The
98
3.8
99
Southeast Asian
average
4.5
Latin America and

the Caribbean average
4.0
Gabon
99
3.8
n/a
Zambia
102
3.8
113
Ghana
103
3.8
114
Kenya
106
3.7
102
Egypt
107
3.7
94
Algeria
110
Liberia
111
Cameroon
112
Libya
113
Senegal
117
Benin
Tanzania
North African
average
3.8
3.7
87
3.7
n/a
3.7
116
3.7
n/a
3.7
111
119
3.6
104
120
3.6
120
Sub-Saharan
African average
3.6
Ethiopia
121
3.6
106
Cape Verde
122
3.5
119
Uganda
123
3.5
121
Nigeria
115
3.5
127
Mali
128
3.4
128
Malawi
129
3.4
117
Madagascar
130
3.4
130
Cte dIvoire
131
3.4
129
Zimbabwe
132
3.3
132
Burkina Faso
133
3.3
136
Mauritania
134
3.3
137
Swaziland
135
3.3
134
Lesotho
137
3.2
135
Mozambique
138
3.2
133
Chad
139
3.1
142
Guinea
141
2.9
n/a
Sierra Leone
143
Burundi
144
2.8
n/a
2.8
140
Sources: World Economic Forum 2011, 2012.
Figure 8: GCI score dispersion among groups of African economies, OECD comparison
African average
Fragile countries
Non-fragile low-income countries
Oil exporters
OECD
Middle-income countries
GCI score (17)
Innovation
Business
sophistication
Market size
Technological
readiness
Financial market
development
Labor market
efficiency
Goods market
efficiency
Higher education
and training
Health and
primary education
Macroeconomic
environment
Infrastructure
Institutions
Sources: World Economic Forum, 2012; authors calculations.

Note: The sample includes oil exporters: Algeria, Cameroon, Chad, Gabon, Libya, and Nigeria; middle-income countries: Botswana, Cape Verde, Egypt, Ghana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Morocco,
Namibia, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, and Zambia; non-fragile, low-income economies: Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Gambia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Uganda; fragile economies: Burundi, Cte dIvoire, Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, and Zimbabwe.
to note the limitations of such a general analysis, which

restricts us to formulating generalities. These of course
would need to be confirmed by an in-depth country
analysis of the specific challenges and priorities of
individual countries.15
Figure8 breaks down the performance of these four
country groups across all 12 competitiveness pillars. In
addition, it shows the average performance of the OECD
as an international benchmark (shown by a white dot)
and the African average (shown by a black bar).
There would appear to be a tale of two Africas in
the areas of education, infrastructure, macroeconomic
and financial stability, and market size. To start with,
Figure8 provides a sense of divergence in score of the
38 African economies covered in this years GCI. This is
complemented by Table3, which shows the three bestand worst-performing economies in the sample. The
figure shows that divergences in Africa are particularly
large in the areas mentioned above.
With regard to the depth of financial markets, we
see, for example, that Africa hosts some countries that
perform very well on the one hand, and a cluster of
countries that exhibit below-average performances on
the other, indicating that Africas good performance at
the aggregate level is skewed by a few extremely well
performing economies in this pillar. South Africa ranks
3rd in global comparison, registering a score of close
to 6 and thereby leading any other African economy
by a wide margin. Indeed, Kenya, the second-bestperforming economycomes in only at 24th place,
scoring a full point lower on the GCI scale of 17. These
two accomplishments stand in stark contrast to the
large number of African economies with rudimentary
financial markets, including two North African economies
(Libya at 140th and Algeria at 142nd) and Burundi
(144th), which closes the global rankings. The degree of
natural resource abundance and exploitation adds to the
divergence, with the oil-exporting economies of Gabon
(9th), Algeria (23rd), and Nigeria (39th) leading in the
areas of macroeconomic stabilitylargely attributable to
a better fiscal position that results from strong resource
revenuesand market size by a wide margin.16 The fact
that resource-abundant countries register considerably
stronger fiscal positions suggests that these economies
need to ensure that windfall revenues are managed and
re-invested wisely and take into account the longer term,
as discussed later.
The same holds true for infrastructure and
educational performance. In the context of Africas large
infrastructure deficit (noted earlier in the chapter), the bar
chart of Figure8 provides some additional information
on the divergence in performance. Although Seychelles
receives the regions best assessment (42nd), followed
by Mauritius (54th), Namibia (59th), and South Africa
(63rd), the majority of countries in the sample score
lower than 3 (out of 7), with, for example, Burundi scoring
Table 3: Three best- and worst-performing African countries, by pillar (out of 144)
1st pillar: Institutions
2nd pillar: Infrastructure
3rd pillar: Macroeconomic environment
Country
Rank Score
Country
Rank Score
Country
Rank Score
Rwanda
Botswana
Gambia, The

Chad
Algeria
Burundi
20 5.2
33 4.8
35
4.7

140 2.7
141 2.7
142 2.6
Seychelles
Mauritius
Namibia

Chad
Burundi
Guinea
42 4.7
54 4.3
59 4.2

140 1.9
141 1.9
142 1.9
Gabon
Algeria
Nigeria

Egypt
Guinea
Sierra Leone
9 6.2
23 5.7
39 5.2

138 3.1
142 2.6
143
2.5
4th pillar: Health and primary education
5th pillar: Higher education and training
6th pillar: Goods market efficiency
Country
Rank Score
Country
Rank Score
Country
Rank Score
Seychelles
Mauritius
Cape Verde

Nigeria
Sierra Leone
Chad
47 5.9
54 5.9
71
5.7

142 3.2
143
3.0
144 2.9
Seychelles
Mauritius
South Africa

Sierra Leone
Mauritania
Burundi
31 5.0
65 4.3
84
4.0

141
2.3
142 2.2
143 2.0
Mauritius
South Africa
Rwanda

Burundi
Chad
Algeria
27 4.8
32
4.7
39 4.5

139 3.3
141 3.1
143 3.0
7th pillar: Labor market efficiency
8th pillar: Financial market development
9th pillar: Technological readiness
Country
Rank Score
Country
Rank Score
Country
Rank Score
Rwanda
Uganda
Gambia, The

Zimbabwe
Egypt
Algeria
11 5.1
23 4.8
31
4.7

139 3.4
142 3.1
144 2.8
South Africa
Kenya
Mauritius

Libya
Algeria
Burundi
3
5.7
24 4.7
35 4.6

140 2.7
142 2.4
144 2.3
South Africa
Mauritius
Seychelles

Guinea
Chad
Burundi
62
4.0
63 4.0
66 3.9

142 2.5
143 2.2
144 2.2
10th pillar: Market size
11th pillar: Business sophistication
12th pillar: Innovation
Country
Rank Score
Country
Rank Score
Country
Rank Score
South Africa
Egypt
Nigeria

Seychelles
Cape Verde
Liberia
25
4.8
29 4.8
33 4.6

142 1.4
143
1.2
144 1.2
South Africa
Mauritius
Gambia, The

Gabon
Burundi
Algeria
38
4.3
41 4.3
59
4.1

141 2.9
143 2.7
144 2.5
South Africa
Kenya
Rwanda

Sierra Leone
Burundi
Algeria
42
3.5
50 3.4
51 3.4

139
2.3
140 2.2
141 2.1
less than 2, further illustrating the immense infrastructure

challenge on the continent. A similar case pertains to
higher education and trainingwhile Seychelles is again
Africas best-performing country at 31st globally, it is
followed by Mauritius, which comes in at only 65th place.
All other economies score worse than the mid-point of 4,
with Burundi near rock bottom at 143rd place.
Oil- and gas-exporting economies perform as poorly
as fragile economies in 9 out of the 12 competitiveness
pillars. In view of Africas high growth rates and natural
resource abundance, there has been much debate as to
whether or not commodity-led growth will be sustainable
moving forward. Figure8 informs this debate by
comparing the performance of oil-exporting economies
with that of the other three groups. In terms of putting
into place the fundamentals for a competitive economy,
oil-exporting economies perform similarlythat is to say,
as poorlyas fragile economies across most pillars of
competitiveness. Jointly, the quality of their institutions,
goods, labor, and financial market efficiencies trails that

of Africas low-income economies.
While the poor quality of institutions is endogenous
in clustering fragile economies, it reveals important
insights into the functioning of oil-exporting economies.
Although Gabon fares comparatively better (67th), its
peers mostly populate the lower end of the rankings
(Nigeria comes in at 117th, Chad at 140th, and Algeria
at 141st) together with the fragile economies of Guinea
(128th), Cte dIvoire (129th), and Burundi (142nd).
Sound public and private institutions are a prerequisite
for a stable and efficiently run economy, and they have
a strong bearing on competitiveness and growth.17
For oil-exporting economies, the poor performance of
institutions raises doubts about the efficient management
of resource revenues and their ability to re-allocate
revenue proceeds elsewhere in the economy to lay the
foundations for more diversified growth, while avoiding
boom-bust cycles that could jeopardize macroeconomic
South Africa
Namibia
South Africa
Figure 9: Trends in two GCI institutions subpillars, oil-exporting economies
Mauritius
9a: Government efficiency subpillar
South Africa
Namibia
South Africa
Botswana
Namibia
Mauritius
Namibia
Morocco
Mauritius
Botswana
Nigeria Mauritius
Algeria Egypt
Chad Botswana
Cameroon
Morocco
Botswana
Morocco
GCI score (17)
Egypt
Morocco
Egypt
Egypt
1
20052006
20062007
20072008
20082009
20092010
20102011
20112012
20122013
20102011
20112012
20122013
GCI edition
9b: Ethics and corruption subpillar

7
GCI score (17)
1
20052006
20062007
20072008
20082009
20092010
GCI edition
Source: World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report, (various editions).
Note: See Appendix A for a detailed breakdown of variables.
stability. The need to boost the efficiency of revenue

management is particularly important when considering
that many oil-exporting economies are fiscally resourcedependent: more than half of total public revenues in
Chad, Gabon, and Nigeria are resource revenues.18
A closer look at two of the seven pillars that make up
the institutional pillar of the GCI shows, however, that
modest improvements have been made in the areas of
ethics and corruption (which, among other indicators,

gauges the extent to which public funds are being
diverted) and government efficiency (measuring, among
other variables, the effectiveness or wastefulness
of government spending) (Figure9). Improvements,
however, come from a very low base and major efforts
to strengthen public institutions will be essential going
forward.
Table 4: Selected indicators of the GCI 20122013 for oil-exporting, fragile, and non-fragile low-income African countries
SELECTED PILLARS OF THE GCI 20122013: BASIC REQUIREMENTS
Overall GCI 20122013
Country
Rank
Score
Institutions
Rank
Infrastructure
Score
Rank
Health and primary education
Score
Rank
Score
Oil exporters
Gabon
99
3.8
67
3.9
117
2.7
128
4.1
Algeria
110
3.7
141
2.7
100
Cameroon
112
3.7
107
3.4
125
3.2
93
5.4
2.5
118
4.5
Libya
113
3.7
81
3.7
88
3.6
121
4.4
Nigeria
115
3.7
117
3.3
130
2.3
142
3.2
Chad
139
3.1
140
2.7
140
1.9
144
2.9
Liberia
111
3.7
45
4.3
115
2.8
130
4.1
Cte dIvoire
131
3.4
129
3.2
102
3.1
140
3.4
Zimbabwe
132
3.3
101
3.5
128
2.4
119
4.5
Mauritania
134
3.3
122
3.3
113
2.8
133
3.9
Guinea
141
2.9
128
3.2
142
1.9
138
3.5
Burundi
144
2.8
142
2.6
141
1.9
127
4.2
Rwanda
63
4.2
20
5.2
96
3.2
100
5.3
Gambia, The
98
3.8
35
4.7
82
3.6
126
4.2
Kenya
106
3.7
106
3.4
103
3.1
115
4.6
Benin
119
3.6
99
3.5
122
2.6
111
4.7
Tanzania
120
3.6
86
3.6
132
2.3
113
4.6
Ethiopia
121
3.6
74
3.8
119
2.6
116
4.6
Uganda
123
3.5
102
3.5
133
2.3
123
4.4
Mali
128
3.4
120
3.3
107
3.0
141
3.4
Malawi
129
3.4
76
3.8
135
2.2
124
4.3
Madagascar
130
3.4
136
2.9
137
2.1
110
4.7
Burkina Faso
133
3.3
83
3.7
136
2.2
139
3.5
Mozambique
138
3.2
112
3.4
129
2.4
137
3.5
Sierra Leone
143
2.8
95
3.6
138
2.1
143
3.0
Fragile countries
Non-fragile low-income countries
In addition, infrastructure is inadequate in all six oil

exporters, with all countries in this group except for Libya
ranking lower than 100. While there is no clear answer
to whether or not commodity prices will accommodate
growth in the longer term, economic growth as it stands
now has not been inclusive. The majority of oil-exporting
economies are very poorly assessed on the United
Nations Human Development Index (see individual
competitiveness profiles in Part 3). This is worrisome
because these economies will need to diversify growth
to ensure that resource wealth is evenly distributed so
as to make growth overall more sustainable in the long
run. In order to diversify, a skilled workforce is needed.
However, the rankings show that all oil exporters
perform very poorly in providing education and skills

indeed, Chad ranks last (144th) on health and primary
education and 140th on the higher education pillar.
Finally, inefficiencies in goods and labor markets are
rife. Overall, this is also reflected in this years rankings,
where first-time entrant Gabon leads the African oil
exporters at 99th place, followed by Algeria, Cameroon,
Nigeria, and finally Chad at 139th. Thus, despite relatively
strong growth in recent years, these economies remain
vulnerable to oil price shocks and will need to reinforce
the drivers of productivity and competitiveness and
encourage greater market diversification if they are to
place their economies on more sustainable and inclusive
development paths.
Table 5: Selected indicators of the GCI 20122013 for African middle-income economies
SELECTED PILLARS OF THE GCI 20122013
Overall GCI 20122013
Country
Health and
primary education
Higher education
Goods market efficiency
Rank
Score
Rank
Score
Rank
Score
Rank
Score
Rank
Score
South Africa
52
4.4
132
3.9
84
4.0
32
4.7
113
3.9
Mauritius
54
4.4
54
5.9
65
4.3
27
4.8
70
4.4
Morocco
70
4.1
81
5.5
101
3.6
69
4.3
122
3.8
Seychelles
76
4.1
47
5.9
31
5.0
70
4.3
48
4.5
Botswana
79
4.1
114
4.6
95
3.7
78
4.2
60
4.5
Namibia
92
3.9
120
4.4
119
3.1
87
4.2
74
4.3
Zambia
102
3.8
129
4.1
121
3.1
42
4.5
111
4.0
Ghana
103
3.8
112
4.7
107
3.4
76
4.2
97
4.1
Egypt
107
3.7
94
5.3
109
3.3
125
3.8
142
3.1
Senegal
117
3.7
125
4.2
116
3.2
77
4.2
80
4.3
Cape Verde
122
3.5
71
5.7
99
3.6
105
3.9
126
3.7
Swaziland
135
3.3
135
3.6
125
2.9
107
3.9
119
3.9
Lesotho
137
3.2
136
3.5
135
2.7
102
4.0
116
3.9
Non-fragile low-income economies are dispersed

throughout the middle to the bottom of the rankings, with
Rwanda leading at 63rd and Sierra Leone at 143rd place
(Table4). This is a diverse group of countries, presenting
all low-income countries that are not classified as oilexporting or fragile, and where economic development
can be explained by reference to more conventional
economic factors.19 Mirroring the statements above,
overall this group performs better than both oilexporting and fragile economies across most pillars.
The difference is particularly pronounced in the areas
of institutions and labor and financial market efficiency.
Kenya (ranked 24th, as discussed previously), Rwanda
(ranked 49th), and Uganda (62nd) boast a deeper
financial market than their peers. Similarly, Rwanda and
Gambia perform well in the institutional pillar at 20th
and 35th rank, respectively, pulling up the average for
this group, which closes with Madagascar at 136th.
Conversely, a majority in this group do comparatively
well when it comes to labor market efficiency. As shown
in Table3, Rwanda, Uganda, and Gambia lead African
economies in this pillar, and overall more than two-thirds
of these economies are in the upper half of the global
rankings. On the other hand, as for a majority of African
economies, low-income economies perform poorly in
the areas of infrastructure, education, and technological
readiness, all placing in the bottom third of the global
rankings.20
Africas middle-income economies face a more
complex and diverse set of competitiveness challenges.
Having entered a middle-income stage, these countries
will need to put into place the fundamentals that will
allow them to transition to higher-value-added activities.

In this light, we see some important variations in
performance, ranging from South Africa at 52nd overall
to Lesotho at just 137th place (Table5). Although middleincome economies outperform their regional peers in
institutional quality, they barely reach the median of this
pillar (4 on a scale of 17). As described earlier, these
countries generally have already put into place better
infrastructure than their peers and they fare particularly
well in the efficiency pillars of the GCI. Yet infrastructure
remains inefficient and pooling financing for large-scale
projects will be more difficult going forward because
their middle-income status makes them ineligible for
soft loans from multilateral donors. Moving on, many
have relatively well-developed financial markets and, as
Figure10 suggests, have made important improvements
in the areas of domestic and foreign competition that
make up the goods market pillar. Stronger foreign
competition stems primarily from a country lowering
trade tariffs and increasing imports, which ushers in new
foreign entrants, thus encouraging greater efficiency.
The domestic competition pillar considers the overall
business environment, taking into account the intensity
of local competition, which is affected, for example, by
the number of days and documents required to start
up a business. Notably, Mauritius and Namibia have
improved in this area over the last several years, as have
Morocco and South Africa since 2011. A strong business
environment is critical, as it will set the operating
framework for a strong private sector and, hence,
employment creation (see Box1).
Namibia
South Africa 1.1: Assessing Africas Competitiveness in an International Context
Mauritius
Figure 10: Trends in the GCI goods market efficiency

competition
Namibiasubpillars, middle-income countries
South Africa
10a: Domestic competition

South Africa
South Africa
Botswana
Namibia
Mauritius
Namibia
Morocco
Mauritius
Botswana
Namibia
Namibia Mauritius
Mauritius Egypt Egypt
South AfricaBotswana
South Africa
BotswanaMoroccoMorocco
GCI score (17)
Mauritius
Namibia
Botswana
Botswana
Mauritius
Morocco
Morocco
Botswana
Egypt
Morocco
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Morocco
Egypt
3
20052006
20062007
20072008
20082009
20092010
20102011
20112012
20122013
20102011
20112012
20122013
GCI edition
10b: Foreign competition
6
GCI score (17)
3
20052006
20062007
20072008
20082009
20092010
GCI edition
Source: World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report, (various editions).
Note: See Appendix A for a detailed breakdown of variables.
There has been important progress. Yet, moving

forward, the business environment will require a talent
pool on which businesses can draw, and this is an
area where most middle-income economies have
reached a bottleneck. With the exception of Mauritius
and Seychelles, all middle-income countries navigate
somewhere in the lower half of the rankings of those
pillars that gauge the countrys ability to fully leverage
its human resource potential. South Africa, for example,
ranks just 113th in the labor market efficiency pillar
and has a university enrollment rate of just 15 percent,

compared with 82 percent in the United States and 95
percent in the Republic of Korea. With the exception of
Morocco, gains in labor market efficiency have largely
stalled in recent years. Going forward, improving basic
requirements, increasing educational attainment rates,
and improving education to match the skills needed by
the private sector as well as making the labor market
more flexible will be critical for the required structural
transformation (see Box2).
Box 1: Evolution of key emergent competitive industries and jobs in Africa

revenues of more than US$1,380 billion by 2020, effectively
overtaking the resource sector (Figure B).
Thus, Africas consumer sector presents a major
opportunity for growth. Other labor-intensive sectors, such as
agri-business and infrastructure, are also projected to offer
opportunities for further growth and employment creation.
A number of emergent sectors of African economies show

ample growth potential, as indicated by the widespread
growth across various sectors in 200207. Figure A shows
that the resource sector has been the main driver of
economic growth in these years. This is followed closely by
the wholesale and retail sector, which is projected to generate
Figure A: Africas growth widespread across sectors

Sector share of change in real GDP, 200207
100 percent = US$235 billion1
Compound annual growth rate, %
Resources
7.1
Wholesale and retail
6.8
Agriculture
5.5
Transport, telecommunications
7.8
Manufacturing
4.6
Financial intermediation
8.0
Public administration
3.9
Construction
7.5
Real estate, business services
5.9
Tourism
8.7
Utilities
7.3
Other services2
6.9
0
10
15
20
25
Source: McKinsey Global Institute, 2010.

1 In 2005 dollars. The total is the sum of 15 countries for which data were available, and that together account for 80 percent of Africas GDP: Algeria, Angola, Cameron,
Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe.
2 Education, Health, Social Services, Household Services.
Figure B: Four groups of industries: Potential combined revenue of US$2.6 trillion by 2020
Growth
200820,
US$ billions
Compound annual
growth rate,
200820, %
Consumer
520
Resources
110
Agriculture1
220
Infrastructure2
130
Total
~980
Estimated annual revenue, 2020

US$ billions
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000

1 We took the 2030 value of $880 billion and calculated straight-line equivalent for 2020.
2 Represents investment; assumes needs remain the same share of GDP through 2020.
Box 2: Africas youth unemployment challenge

Despite commendable annual economic growth rates of 5
percent annual average and notable progress achieved in
the area of education, including higher education, Africa has
been unable to expand employment opportunities for young
people, especially the most educated ones. The mismatch
between high rates of economic growth and job creation is
widening income inequalities and fueling social and political
tensions.
The current youth employment challenges in Africa
are caused by a combination of the remarkable growth of
an increasingly educated youth population, the slow pace
of job creation in the formal economy, and persistent low
productivity and underemployment in the informal sector.
The continents youth population is not only growing rapidly,
it is also getting better educated. Africa has the most young
people (1524 years) in the world, totaling about 200 million,
and it is projected to double by 2045. Projections show that
59 percent of youth (2024 years) will have had a secondary
education in 2030, compared with 42 percent today. This
translates into 137million people with a secondary education
and 12million with a tertiary education in 2030.
Unemployment of graduates and underemployment in
the informal economy (where most the young people work
in low-productive jobs) are factors of instability, especially
among the youth in post-conflict settings and fragile states.
The recent wave of discontent in North Africa illustrates the
disruptive consequences of youth unemployment in general,
and unemployed graduates in particular.
The public sector has been significantly downsized in
many African countries over the last two decades. According
to Gallup World Poll data, only 21 percent of those under
30 years of age with at least a secondary education work
for the government, compared with 37 percent of adults
aged 30 and over. In Egypt, Morocco, and Uganda, for
example, the proportion of government workers among
young people is only one-third that of adults. In South
THE MOST PROBLEMATIC FACTORS FOR DOING

BUSINESS IN AFRICA
The results of the GCI provide a good sense of the many
factors that are holding back Africas competitiveness.
To complement this analysis, each year the World
Economic Forum collects the perspective of top
executives about the main bottlenecks to doing business
in their countries. From a list of 16 factors, respondents
are asked to select the five most problematic among
them and rank them from 1 (most problematic) to 5. The
Executive Opinion Survey carried out in 2012 shows that
access to financing, inefficient government bureaucracy,
and corruption present the most important hindrances
to doing business in Africa. However, Figure 11 shows
the degree to which these impede business varies
according to the region. In sub-Saharan Africa, access
to finance represents business leaders biggest concern
by a wide margin, confirming the lack of depth of the
financial market in a majority of African economies, as
previously discussed. In contrast, inefficient government
Africa, Nigeria, and Tanzania, it is around 40 percent, and

in Kenya and Tunisia around 50 percent. To put this in
context, in Egypt, government work accounts for over 50
percent of employment among those over 30; in Tunisia this
is 35 percent; in South Africa, 25 percent; and in Kenya, 16
percent.
High vacancy rates in the presence of large-scale
unemployment confirm the existence of skills mismatches
and are especially substantial in middle-income countries.
Although there are large numbers of unemployed young
people and a constantly growing labor supply, many
enterprises in Africa struggle to fill open positions. In Egypt,
for example, about 1.5 million young people are unemployed,
while at the same time private-sector firms cannot fill 600,000
vacancies. In South Africa the situation is even more extreme,
with 3 million young people not in employment, education, or
training and 600,000 unemployed university graduates versus
800,000 vacancies.
The youth employment challenge in Africa is primarily
structural and therefore needs structural solutions. Given
the size of the employment problem, any youth employment
policy in Africa must place job creation at its center.
Governments must focus on removing obstacles to the
many small firms in the informal sector, helping them to grow
and create decent jobs. At the same time, existing large
firms must be supported to grow further and become more
competitive. The middle-income countries are facing a great
challenge because their employment base is very small and
will need solid growth. The adverse business environment
in Africa has disproportionate effects on small firms and
prevents them from growing. Large firms can cope more
easily, but are struggling to be competitive at the international
level. Informal entrepreneurs must cope with very high levels
of risk in addition to access to finance issues.
Source: Adapted from AfDB et al. 2012.
bureaucracy presents the biggest concern in North

Africa. Likewise, business leaders in both regions point
out the lack of a sufficiently skilled workforce.
However, business in both regions faces different
challenges concerning all other factors. The Executive
Opinion Survey confirms that the inadequate supply
of infrastructure presents a significant obstacle for
businesses in sub-Saharan Africa in contrast to North
Africa, where it receives a middle ranking. Sub-Saharan
business leaders are also more concerned with high tax
rates than their North African peers. On the other hand,
government instability and coups coupled with policy
uncertainty have become serious concerns for business
leaders in North African countries in stark contrast to
the last Report, where those factors were ranked at the
bottom.
Inflation in sub-Saharan Africa also continues to
receive attention from business leaders. This is most
likely the result of rising inflation (particularly in East
Africa) and the increased inflationary pressurescaused
Figure 11: The most problematic factors for doing business, sub-Saharan and North African averages
Access to financing
Corruption
Inadequate supply of infrastructure
Inefficient government bureaucracy
Tax rates
Inadequately educated workforce
Inflation
Policy instability
Poor work ethic in national labor force
Tax regulations
Restrictive labor regulations
Crime and theft
n Sub-Saharan Africa
n North Africa
Foreign currency regulations

Insufficient capacity to innovate
Government instability/coups
Poor public health
0
10
15
20
Percent of responses
Source: World Economic Forum, Executive Opinion Survey 2012.

Note: The sample includes sub-Saharan Africa: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Cte dIvoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho,
Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe; North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Morocco.
by rising food and fuel pricesexperienced during

201112 in many sub-Saharan economies. It has to be
noted that, in 2012, more prudent macroeconomic policy
has contained inflation more successfully, although this
will be reflected only in next years Survey results. It
is interesting to note that, similar to our findings in the
2011 Report, public health receives little attention from
business leaders. This is somewhat counterintuitive given
the continents major health challenges.
TOWARD SUSTAINABLE AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH
Improving competitiveness across the 12 GCI pillars is
a solid foundation for measuring a countrys capacity
to raise living standards and increase productivity.
Yet, although the GCI gauges a countrys capacity to
generate prosperity, it does not tell us everything about
the extent to which prosperity is being generated in
a sustainable way, taking into account environmental
stewardship and social sustainability. Events such as
the Arab Spring, increased income inequalities, and
pressure on natural resources have called into question
the received wisdom, accepted throughout the second
half of the 20th century, that increasing productivity
and economic growth for rising prosperity should
be the end goal. Instead, concerns about social and
environmental sustainability have taken center stage in
discussions about economic development. The question

of sustainable and inclusive growth is an important one
for Africa in view of its rapid population growth and youth
unemployment challenge, and also the continents vast
natural resources, which require sound natural resource
management as an integral part of prudent economic
policy. Against this backdrop, the World Economic
Forum has been developing a sustainability-adjusted
Global Competitiveness Index with the aim of assessing
the set of institutions, policies, and factors that make
a nation remain productive over the longer term while
ensuring social and environmental sustainability (see
Box3).
Figures 12 and 13 show Africas performance
across specific indicators of the social and environmental
sustainability pillars. Africa is compared with OECD
economiesas a stringent international benchmarkas
well as with Southeast Asia, which provides a sense
of the continents performance compared with another
developing region. These figures are further informed
by Tables 6 and 7, which report the data for each of the
eight African economies and the three best-performing
economies in the sustainability-adjusted GCI.
As Figure12 shows, Africa trails advanced
economies in providing access to basic necessities,
such as sanitation and access to improved drinking
Figure 12: Africas performance in the social sustainability pillar in regional comparison
Access to sanitation
7
Youth
unemployment
Access to improved
drinking water
6
5
4
3
Social
mobility
Accessibility of
healthcare services
2
1
OECD
Southeast Asia
Africa
Income Gini
coefficient
Vulnerable employment
Social safety net protection
Extent of informal economy

Note: The sample includes Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, South Africa, and Tanzania; Southeast Asia: Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Vietnam;
OECD: all OECD economies except for Luxembourg and Puerto Rico; Latin America and the Caribbean: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Figure 13: Africas performance in the environmental sustainability pillar in regional comparison
Stringency of environmental regulation

Quality of
natural environment
Enforcement of
enviromental regulations
6
5
4
Particulate matter
(2.5) concentration
Terrestrial
biome protection
2
1
OECD
Southeast Asia
CO intensity
No. of ratified international

environmental treaties
Africa
Agricultural water
intensity
Forest depletion
aggregate
Fish stocks overexploited

Note: The sample includes Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, South Africa, and Tanzania; Southeast Asia: Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam;
OECD: all OECD economies except for Luxembourg and Puerto Rico; Latin America and the Caribbean: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Box 3: The sustainability-adjusted Global Competitiveness Index

The World Economic Forum has been developing a
sustainability-adjusted Global Competitiveness Index with
the aim of assessing the set of institutions, policies, and
factors that make a nation remain productive over the longer
term while ensuring social and environmental sustainability.
The adjusted index can thus be considered as an extension
of the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI)that is, while
the GCI gauges a countrys capacity to generate prosperity,
the adjusted Index captures the extent to which prosperity
is being generated in a sustainable way, taking into account
environmental stewardship and social sustainability. More
specifically, environmental sustainability is defined as the
set of institutions, policies, and factors that ensure an
efficient management of resources to enable prosperity for
future generations. The Forums current definition of social
sustainability is the set of institutions, policies, and factors
that enable all members of society to experience the best

possible health, participation, and security; and that maximize
their potential to contribute to and benefit from the economic
prosperity of the country in which they live. Figure A presents
the conceptual framework of this effort, where the GCI is
adjusted by factors that drive social and environmental
sustainability.
Figures B and C present the indicators that enter the
sustainability-adjusted GCI. The environmental sustainability
pillar focuses on the regulatory environmental framework, the
extent to which economies manage renewable resources, as
well as the level of pollution. The pillar has been developed
in close collaboration with experts from the Center for
Environmental Law and Policy (YCLEP) and the Center for
International Earth Sciences Information Network (CIESIN) to
identify the factors that have an impact on competitiveness.
Figure A: The structure of the sustainability-adjusted GCI
GLOBAL
COMPETITIVENESS
INDEX (GCI)
Social
sustainability
pillar
Environmental
sustainability
pillar
Social
sustainability
adjusted GCI
Environmental
sustainability
adjusted GCI
(GCI) (social
sustainability coefficient)
(GCI) (environmental
sustainability coefficient)
Sustainabilityadjusted GCI

Note: Please refer to Bilbao-Osorio et al. 2012 for a more detailed presentation of the rationale and methodology.
(Contd)
water and healthcare services. However, there are

wide cross-country divergences. As Table6 shows,
only half of the Tanzanian population has access to
drinking water, in contrast to almost complete coverage
in Mauritius and Egypt. In a similar fashion, only one
in ten Tanzanians has access to sanitation, compared
with almost everyone in Algeria and Egypt. Furthermore,
healthcare accessibility is considered good in Mauritius,
comparable with that of advanced economies,

whereas it is considered inadequate in all other African
economies.
The second subpillar evaluates the vulnerability
of the population to economic exclusion. Overall, the
region fares better in terms of vulnerable employment
conditions than Southeast Asia, and does slightly worse
in the areas of an informal economy and the extent to
Box 3: The sustainability-adjusted Global Competitiveness Index (contd)

It therefore complements the broader analysis of the
Environmental Performance Index (EPI) carried out by these
two organizations. The social sustainability pillar aims to
capture the extent to which physiological needs, such as
access to drinking water and decent healthcare, are being
met, as well as the need for economic security (job security,
presence of a social safety net). It also aims to measure the
extent of social cohesion and opportunity (income inequality,
social mobility). It is worth noting that the indicators are
by no means exhaustive, and that there are a number of
areas that should be covered but that are not yet included
because of a lack of relevant data (inclusion of minorities,
working conditions, water pollution, recycling, and waste
management). Also, based on current data limitations, only a
subset of 79 of the 144 countries covered by the GCI could
be included in the latest edition in 2012.

Defining a functional relationship between
competitiveness and sustainability and identifying and
measuring the pillars and variables that are driving
environmental sustainability is not a trivial task, and there
is not yet sufficient evidence to suggest what shape this
takes. In view of the lack of methodological guidance, the
sustainability-adjusted GCI assigns equal weights to each
individual element in each of the three subpillars. Each pillar
measuring social and environmental sustainability is then
converted into an adjustment coefficient with a range of
0.8 to 1.2, and these weights are then used to adjust the GCI
upward or downward. This results in an adjusted score of a
maximum of 20 percent lower or 20 percent higher than the
underlying GCI score.
Figure B: Summary of indicators for environmental sustainability
Environmental policy
Use of renewable resources
Degradation of the environment
Environmental regulations
(stringency and enforcement)
Agricultural water intensity
Level of particulate matter

concentration
Number of ratified international

environmental treaties
Forest depletion
(change in forest cover and forest
loss)
Terrestrial biome protection
Fish stocks overexploitation
CO2 intensity
Quality of the natural environment
Figure C: Summary of indicators for social sustainability
Access to basic necessities
Vulnerability to shocks
Social cohesion
Access to sanitation
Vulnerable employment
Income Gini index
Access to improved
drinking water
Social mobility
Youth unemployment
Access to healthcare
which the social safety net in these countries fails to

provide protection from economic insecurity caused
by job loss or disability. Again, we find a wide disparity
across Africa. Vulnerable employment is less relevant
in the middle-income economies of South Africa and
Mauritius, and a smaller portion of these countries
workforces operate in the informal economy. However,
Executive Opinion Survey data indicate that there is little
opportunity in any African economy to improve ones

economic situation through personal efforts regardless of
the socioeconomic status of ones parents.
Figure12 also highlights Africas profound
youth employment challenge: the continents youth
unemployment rates are significantly higher than those in
Southeast Asia. This is particularly worrisome in view of
its long-term consequences, as most recently witnessed
Table 6: Social sustainability pillar by indicator
Social safety
net protection
(17, best)
Income Gini
coefficient
[0 = perfect
equality; 100
= perfect
inequality]
Social mobility
(17, best)
Youth
unemployment
(total
unemployed
youth to total
labor force
aged 1524)
4.1
3.1
42.5
3.6
n/a
5.3
3.7
n/a
4.8
21.4
Access to
sanitation
(percent
of total
population)
Access to
improved
drinking water
(percent of total
population)
Accessibility
of healthcare
services
(17, best)
Vulnerable
employment
(percent in total
employment)
Extent of
informal
economy
(17, best)
Kenya
32
59
3.5
63.4
Mauritius
89
99
5.7
16.0
Country
Namibia
32
93
4.0
21.1
4.3
3.5
63.9
4.2
58.9
South Africa
79
91
3.9
10.1
4.6
3.3
63.1
4.1
49.8
Tanzania
10
53
3.3
87.7
3.4
3.6
37.6
3.4
n/a
Algeria
95
83
3.9
34.4
2.8
3.2
35.3
3.0
n/a
Egypt
95
99
2.7
27.3
3.7
3.0
30.8
3.9
n/a
Morocco
70
83
3.5
50.5
3.6
2.9
40.9
4.1
21.9
100
6.7
9.1
6.1
6.2
29.5
6.3
7.2
Three best-performing countries

Switzerland
100
Finland
100
100
6.7
9.2
6.2
6.2
25.4
6.5
20.3
Sweden
100
100
6.5
7.0
5.7
5.8
24.1
5.4
25.2
Table 7: Environmental sustainability pillar by indicator
Country
No. of ratified
international
environmental
treaties (no.
treaties)
Agricultural
water intensity
(agricultural
water
withdrawal,
percent of total
renewable water
resources )
Fish stocks
overexploited
(fraction of
countrys
exclusive
economic
zone with
overexploited
and collapsed
stocks)
Forest depletion
aggregate (17,
best)
CO2 intensity
(kilograms
of CO2 per
kilogram of
oil equivalent
energy use)
11.4
22
7.1
0.6
4.4
0.6
Stringency of Enforcement of
environmental
environmental
Terrestrial
regulation (17,
regulations
biome protection
best)
(17, best)
(117, best)
Particulate
matter (2.5)
concentration
(populationweighted
exposure
Quality of natural
to PM2.5
micrograms per
environment
cubic meter)
(17, best)
Kenya
3.9
3.8
4.9
4.3
Mauritius
4.0
3.6
4.8
20
17.9
0.8
5.0
Namibia
4.6
4.3
14.1
19
1.2
0.5
3.6
3.3
n/a
4.6
2.2
8.8
5.9
South Africa
4.7
3.8
6.5
21
15.7
0.8
2.5
2.9
8.1
5.3
Tanzania
3.8
3.7
17.0
21
4.8
0.7
2.9
0.3
5.8
4.5
Algeria
2.0
2.0
6.3
18
33.8
0.4
2.9
3.0
5.6
2.8
Egypt
2.8
2.7
5.9
21
103.0
0.6
6.8
3.0
15.9
4.0
Morocco
3.6
3.4
1.5
19
38.0
0.4
4.4
3.2
6.2
4.0
Three best-performing countries

Switzerland
6.3
6.2
16.7
22
0.1
n/a
5.9
1.5
6.2
6.5
Finland
6.4
6.4
8.4
23
0.0
0.5
4.2
1.6
0.4
6.6
Sweden
6.1
6.1
7.9
24
0.1
0.7
3.8
1.0
2.6
6.3
Table 8: Adjustment to the GCI scores by sustainability indicators

SUBINDEXES
GCI 20122013
Country
Switzerland
Finland
Rank*
1
3
Sustainability-adjusted GCI
Score
Direction
Score
Direction
Score
Direction
5.72
6.85
6.83
6.87
5.55
6.36
6.45
6.26
6.17
6.15
6.54
5.88
6.37
5.92
Sweden
5.53
6.16
Netherlands
5.50
6.21
China
6
29
5.48
4.83
6.14
4.44
4.61
4.27
4.22
4.69
3.83
3.77
4.40
3.66
Brazil
48
4.40
4.46
South Africa
52
4.37
3.80
Mauritius
India
54
59
4.35
4.32
4.03
3.73
3.70
3.75
4.09
3.87
3.55
3.52
3.22
3.84
Russian Federation
67
4.20
3.98
Morocco
70
4.15
3.53
Namibia
Kenya
92
106
3.88
3.75
3.53
3.38
3.01
3.76
3.56
3.20
3.31
3.01
2.88
3.6
Egypt
107
3.73
3.38
Algeria
110
3.72
3.16
Tanzania
120
Environmental
sustainabilityadjusted GCI
Score
Germany
Social
sustainabilityadjusted GCI**
3.60
3.24

Note: Please refer to Appendix B to understand how the coefficients are calculated.
* This is the GCI rank, as presented in Chapter 1.1 of The Global Competitiveness Report 20122013. Only the 79 countries covered by this exercise are included in the table.
** This is the score obtained by multiplying the GCI score by the social sustainability coefficient.
This is the score obtained by multiplying the GCI score by the environmental sustainability coefficient.
This is the average of the social and environmental sustainability scores.
Key
= GCI score changes by > +15% to +20%
= GCI score changes by +5% to +15%
= GCI score remains stable between +5% and 5%
= GCI score changes by 5% to 15%
= GCI score changes by < 15% to 20%
in the North African region. The pillar looks at the income

Gini coefficient as the most widely used measure of
inequality, where South Africa and Namibia in particular
report the highest inequality levels in the sample.21
Figure13 breaks down Africas performance in
the environmental sustainability dimension. As the
spider chart shows, Africa has ratified roughly as many
environmental treaties as advanced economies, and it
rates the protection of its natural habitats in a similar
way. Regarding habitat protection, Table7 shows
that Tanzania, Namibia, and Kenya are starkly more
successful in protecting their biomes than the remaining
countries in the sample. Furthermore, environmental
regulation and enforcement in Africa is as stringent as
they are in other regions, although the middle score of
4 out of 7 indicates that more should be done across all
countries. Again, there are wide divergences: Namibia is
the best performer overall; all North African economies
receive considerably lower scores.
Wide divergences can also be seen in the use

of renewable resources and the degradation of the
natural environment: North African economies, perhaps
unsurprisingly, have higher agriculture water intensity
than sub-Saharan economies. In terms of forest
depletion, Mauritius does comparatively well, in contrast
to Tanzania and Algeria. Finally, we see that the quality
of the natural environment is considered better in subSaharan Africa than the one in North African economies,
with Algeria ranking last. Going forward, efforts should
be made to ensure environmental sustainability in Africa
through economic diversification and development.22
Table8 presents the country-level results of
the sustainability-adjusted GCI for the eight African
economies out of a total sample of 79 economies that
were covered in the most recent Global Competitiveness
Report. As a reference, the table also shows the five
best-performing economies, as well as the bottom two
performers. Switzerlandthe number one performer
in the GCIwould actually receive a higher score if

adjusted for its social and environmental sustainability.
Indeed, although the effect is less pronounced, this
is the case for the other top five best-performing
economies. In contrast, the BRIC economies of China,
India, and Russia do less well once sustainability
indicators are taken into account.
Looking at the African continent, Table8 shows that
the sustainability-adjusted GCI score is more than 0.5
percentage points lower than the GCI score for Algeria,
Morocco, and South Africa. Reflecting findings from the
international comparison above, the table reveals that
Algeria, Mauritius, and Morocco are largely affected by
their poor performance in the environmental dimension,
while the scores of Kenya, Namibia, and Tanzania are
negatively affected by their performance in the social
sustainability measures.
Sustainable competitiveness is a nascent area
of research. The initial work presented in this chapter
has shown the challenges in assessing sustainability,
which range from data availability and quality to data
interpretation and meaningful analysis.23 Yet the extent to
which economies can grow in a sustained and inclusive
manner will be critical moving forward. Africas high
economic growth rates in recent years, coupled with
its still largely agriculture-based economy, provide a
unique opportunity to set the continent on a course for
sustained and inclusive growth.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has analyzed the results of 38 African
economies of the Global Competitiveness Index
20122013 and discussed Africas potential for
sustained and inclusive growth. It concludes that,
despite the high economic growth of the past decade,
Africa continues to be the least competitive region on
average worldwide, trailing more advanced economies
across all competitiveness indicators. African countries
find themselves in a development stage where
basic requirements, such as sound institutions and
macroeconomic policies, adequate infrastructure, and
a healthy and literate workforce are key to establishing
a solid basis for higher-value-added sources of growth.
Yet these are the areas that constitute some of the
biggest gaps with other regions. Africa's profound and
persistent infrastructure deficit and poor performance
on education constitute important barriers to increased
competitiveness. Changes over time have overall been
only gradual.
A more detailed look at the performance of
individual country groups reveals a competitiveness
divide across the continent, as evidenced by wide
divergences in performance. As in the past, South Africa
and Mauritius continue to perform as well as, or better
than, other emerging markets such as Brazil, India,
and Russia, indicating that these countries have been
relatively successful in putting in place the fundamentals
for improved competitiveness. A second cluster of

countries, including Rwanda, Botswana, Seychelles,
and Morocco, performs better than the Latin American
average, while a third and wider set of countries,
including Namibia, Gambia, Gabon, Zambia, Ghana,
Kenya, and Egypt, outperform the sub-Saharan African
average and even the North African average.
In view of these divergences, this years chapter
further classified African economies into four specific
groups of oil-exporting economies, fragile economies,
non-fragile low-income economies, and middle-income
economies following the IMFs Regional Economic
Outlook classification. An interesting insight from this
analysis reveals that those economies heavily focused on
natural resource extraction perform on a par with fragile
economies to a large extent, particularly registering
an equally weak performance in the quality of their
institutions. This finding has important implications for
resource management and how best to use oil revenues
to set their economies on a sustained and more
diversified growth path. Furthermore, middle-income
countries have registered improvements in the areas of
domestic and foreign competition, but still have a long
way to go to lay the basis for more diversified growth.
Last but not least, the chapter has looked beyond
the basic drivers of productivity, presenting the World
Economic Forums work on sustainable competitiveness,
and integrating the social and environmental factors
that are critical for sustained growth. We see that all
eight African economies that were covered in this
years sustainability-adjusted GCI are shown to be
less competitive when taking into account factors of
environmental and/or social sustainability.
This chapter has identified the main competitiveness
challenges. Chapter 2.1 will examine regional integration
in more depth by looking at trade constraints. This will be
followed by chapters that explore Africas infrastructure
deficit and that offer an innovative solution through
growth poles as unique public-private partnerships
to boost self-industrialization while simultaneously
addressing the need for infrastructure.
NOTES
1 AfDB 2012.
2 Only one countryLibya (64th)ranks in the upper half of the
Human Development Index 2011 (out of 187 economies).
3 Devajaran and Fengler 2012. This has been 10 percent of Africas
GDP compared with 35 percent in East Asia and the Pacific and
16 percent for Latin America and the Caribbean.
4 ILO 2013.
5 IMF 2012b.
6 The 12 pillars are measured using both quantitative data from
public sources (such as inflation, Internet penetration, life
expectancy, and school enrollment rates) as well as data from the
World Economic Forums Executive Opinion Survey (the Survey),
conducted annually among top executives in all of the countries
assessed. The Survey provides crucial data on a number of
qualitative issues (e.g., corruption, confidence in the public sector,
quality of schools) for which no hard data exist.
7 In order to capture the resource intensity of the economy, we use

as a proxy the exports of mineral products as a share of overall
exports according to the sector classification developed by the
International Trade Centre in their Trade Performance Index.
In addition to crude oil and gas, this category also contains all
metal ores and other minerals as well as petroleum products,
liquefied gas, coal, and precious stones. The data used cover the
years 2006 through 2010 or most recent year available. Further
information on these data can be found at http://www.intracen.
org/menus/countries.htm. All countries that export more than 70
percent of mineral products are considered to be to some extent
factor driven. The stage of development for these countries is
adjusted downward smoothly depending on the exact primary
export share. The higher the mineral export share, the stronger
the adjustment and the closer the country will move to stage 1.
For example, a country that exports 95 percent of mineral exports
and that, based on the income criteria, would be in stage 3 will
be in transition between stages 1 and 2. The income and primary
exports criteria are weighted identically. Stages of development
are dictated solely by income for countries that export less than
70 percent minerals. Countries that export only primary products
would automatically fall into the factor-driven stage (stage 1).
8 The BRIC economies are Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, and
China; they exclude South Africa.
9 For a detailed description of the Executive Opinions Survey, see
Browne et al. 2012.
10 This pillar consists of quantitative data: (1) government budget
balance, (2) gross national savings, (3) inflation, (4) government
debt and qualitative data on (5) country credit rating. It is important
to note that this pillar evaluates the stability of the macroeconomic
environment, so it does not directly take into account the way
in which public accounts are managed by the government. This
qualitative dimension is captured in the institutions pillar of the
GCI.
21 As we have shown in The Global Competitiveness Report 2012

2013, a number of elements need to be carefully considered when
comparing economies based on this indicator. To start with, the
Gini index is not revealing of absolute levels of wealththat is,
hypothetically, even in the case of low inequality, a large part of
the population may still be able to cover only basic necessities. In
addition, it is difficult to say what the desirable level of inequality
should beto what extent, for example, should differences in
skills be reflected in higher income for certain members of society.
Finally, although the Gini index measures income inequality on a
scale of 0 ( perfect equality) to 100 (perfect inequality), practically
the range in the sample of 79 economies ranges from 24 to 64,
indicating that a value of over 60 already reflects strong inequality.
22 It is important to note that the sustainability-adjusted GCI is
a work in progress, heavily depending on and limited by data
quality and availability. The environmental sustainability pillar,
as it stands, for example, may be better designed to capture
environmental degradation in countries in more advanced
stages of development, where the manufacturing sector plays
a more prominent role, rather than those at the lower stages of
development that have a higher agricultural sector and/or are
reliant on natural resources. Here, the loss of soil fertility and
the availability of ground water play a more prominent role. In a
similar fashion, measuring environmental sustainability necessarily
needs to strike a compromise in terms of indicators included
deforestation is important for countries whose habitat consists of
forest, but is irrelevant in countries with arid or semi-arid habitat
(North Africa). Going forward, the World Economic Forum hopes
to include a wider set of African countries in its sustainabilityadjusted GCI and analysis in order to support such efforts in the
future.
23 See World Economic Forum 2012, Chapter 1.2, for a more detailed
description.
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11 Devajaran and Fengler 2012.

12 See The Global Information Technology Report 2013 (World
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13 World Bank 2012a.
14 We follow the IMFs country classification applied in the Regional
Economic Outlooks on sub-Saharan Africa based on the most
recent data on per capita gross national income (averaged over
three years) and the 2010 World Banks (IDA) Resource Allocation
Index (IRAI). Oil-exporting countries are those where oil exports
make up for more than 30 percent of total exports. Middle-income
countries not classified as oil exporter or fragile countries are
those that had an average income per capital gross national
income in the years 200810 of more than US$992.7 and IRAI
scores higher than 3.2; low-income countries not classified as
fragile or oil exporters had average income per capital gross
national income in the years 200810 of less than US$992.7 and
IRAI scores higher than 3.2; and fragile countries not classified as
oil exporters had IRAI scores of 3.2 or less (see IMF 2012a). The
criteria are extended to North African economies.
15 See Appendix D for more detailed country-level information.
16 This pillar evaluates the stability of the macroeconomic
environment, so it does not directly take into account the way
in which public accounts are managed by the government. This
qualitative dimension is captured in the institutional pillar of the
GCI.
17 See Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002; Easterly and Levine 1997; Rodrik
et al. 2002; and Sala-i-Martn and Subramanian 2003.
18 Resource revenue as a percent of total revenue make up for more
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19 IMF 2012a.
20 Technically speaking, Gambia ranks 94th in the higher education
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Appendix A:
Computation and structure of the Global Competitiveness Index 20122013
This appendix presents the structure of the Global

Competitiveness Index 20122013 (GCI). The numbering
of the variables matches the numbering in the
Competitiveness Profiles. The number preceding the
period indicates to which pillar the variable belongs (e.g.,
variable 1.11 belongs to the 1st pillar and variable 9.04
belongs to the 9th pillar).
The computation of the GCI is based on successive
aggregations of scores from the indicator level (i.e., the
most disaggregated level) all the way up to the overall
GCI score. Unless mentioned otherwise, we use an
arithmetic mean to aggregate individual variables within
a category.a For the higher aggregation levels, we use
the percentage shown next to each category. This
percentage represents the categorys weight within
its immediate parent category. Reported percentages
are rounded to the nearest integer, but exact figures
are used in the calculation of the GCI. For example,
the score a country achieves in the 9th pillar accounts
for 17 percent of this countrys score in the efficiency
enhancers subindex, irrespective of the countrys stage
of development. Similarly, the score achieved on the
subpillar transport infrastructure accounts for 50 percent
of the score of the infrastructure pillar.
Unlike the case for the lower levels of aggregation,
the weight put on each of the three subindexes (basic
requirements, efficiency enhancers, and innovation and
sophistication factors) is not fixed. Instead, it depends
on each countrys stage of development, as discussed
in the chapter.b For instance, in the case of Burundia
country in the first stage of developmentthe score
in the basic requirements subindex accounts for 60
percent of its overall GCI score, while it represents just
20 percent of the overall GCI score of Sweden, a country
in the third stage of development. For countries in
transition between stages, the weighting applied to each
subindex is reported in the corresponding profile at the
end of this volume. For instance, in the case of Algeria,
currently in transition from stage 1 to stage 2, the
weight on each subindex is 59.1 percent, 35.7 percent,
and 5.2 percent, respectively, as reported in Algeria's
competitiveness profile on page 124.
Variables that are not derived from the Executive
Opinion Survey (the Survey) are identified by an asterisk
(*) in the following pages. The Technical Notes and
Sources section at the end of the How to Read the

Competitiveness Profiles section provides detailed
information about these indicators. To make the
aggregation possible, these variables are transformed
onto a 1-to-7 scale in order to align them with the
Survey results. We apply a min-max transformation,
which preserves the order of, and the relative distance
between, country scores.c
Indicators that are followed by the designation 1/2
enter the GCI in two different pillars. In order to avoid
double counting, we assign a half-weight to each
instance.d

Weight (%) within

immediate parent category
BASIC REQUIREMENTS
1st pillar: Institutions................................................25%

A. Public institutions..................................................... 75%
1. Property rights........................................................................20%
1.01 Property rights
1.02 Intellectual property protection1/2
2. Ethics and corruption..............................................................20%
1.03 Diversion of public funds
1.04 Public trust in politicians
1.05 Irregular payments and bribes
3. Undue influence.....................................................................20%
1.06 Judicial independence
1.07 Favoritism in decisions of government officials
4. Government efficiency.............................................................20%
1.08 Wastefulness of government spending
1.09 Burden of government regulation
1.10 Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes
1.11 Efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations
1.12 Transparency of government policymaking
1.13 Provision of government services for improved business
performance
5. Security..................................................................................20%
1.14 Business costs of terrorism
1.15 Business costs of crime and violence
1.16 Organized crime
1.17 Reliability of police services
B. Private institutions.................................................... 25%
1. Corporate ethics.....................................................................50%
1.18 Ethical behavior of firms
2. Accountability.........................................................................50%
1.19 Strength of auditing and reporting standards
1.20 Efficacy of corporate boards
1.21 Protection of minority shareholders interests
1.22 Strength of investor protection*
2nd pillar: Infrastructure...........................................25%
6th pillar: Goods market efficiency..........................17%
A. Transport infrastructure............................................ 50%

2.01 Quality of overall infrastructure
2.02 Quality of roads
2.03 Quality of railroad infrastructuree
2.04 Quality of port infrastructure
2.05 Quality of air transport infrastructure
2.06 Available airline seat kilometers*
A. Competition............................................................... 67%
B. Electricity and telephony infrastructure.................. 50%

2.07 Quality of electricity supply
2.08 Mobile telephone subscriptions1/2
2.09 Fixed telephone lines1/2
3rd pillar: Macroeconomic environment..................25%

3.01 Government budget balance*
3.02 Gross national savings*
3.03 Inflation*f
3.04 Government debt*
3.05 Country credit rating*
4th pillar: Health and primary education..................25%

A. Health........................................................................ 50%
4.01 Business impact of malariag
4.02 Malaria incidence*g
4.03 Business impact of tuberculosisg
4.04 Tuberculosis incidence*g
4.05 Business impact of HIV/AIDSg
4.06 HIV prevalence*g
4.07 Infant mortality*
4.08 Life expectancy*
1. Domestic competition.......................................................variableh
6.01 Intensity of local competition
6.02 Extent of market dominance
6.03 Effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy
6.04 Extent and effect of taxation1/2
6.05 Total tax rate*
6.06 Number of procedures required to start a business*i
6.07 Time required to start a business*i
6.08 Agricultural policy costs
2. Foreign competition..........................................................variableh
6.09 Prevalence of trade barriers
6.10 Trade tariffs*
6.11 Prevalence of foreign ownership
6.12 Business impact of rules on FDI
6.13 Burden of customs procedures
6.14 Imports as a percentage of GDP*j
B. Quality of demand conditions.................................. 33%
6.15 Degree of customer orientation
6.16 Buyer sophistication
7th pillar: Labor market efficiency...........................17%

A. Flexibility................................................................... 50%
7.01 Cooperation in labor-employer relations
7.02 Flexibility of wage determination
7.03 Hiring and firing practices
7.04 Redundancy costs*
6.04 Extent and effect of taxation1/2
EFFICIENCY ENHANCERS
B. Efficient use of talent................................................ 50%

7.05 Pay and productivity
7.06 Reliance on professional management1/2
7.07 Brain drain
7.08 Female participation in labor force*
5th pillar: Higher education and training..................17%
8th pillar: Financial market development.................17%
A. Quantity of education............................................... 33%

5.01 Secondary education enrollment rate*
5.02 Tertiary education enrollment rate*
A. Efficiency................................................................... 50%
8.01 Availability of financial services
8.02 Affordability of financial services
8.03 Financing through local equity market
8.04 Ease of access to loans
8.05 Venture capital availability
B. Primary education.................................................... 50%

4.09 Quality of primary education
4.10 Primary education enrollment rate*
B. Quality of education................................................. 33%

5.03 Quality of the educational system
5.04 Quality of math and science education
5.05 Quality of management schools
5.06 Internet access in schools
C. On-the-job training................................................... 33%
5.07 Local availability of specialized research and
training services
5.08 Extent of staff training
B. Trustworthiness and confidence.............................. 50%

8.06 Soundness of banks
8.07 Regulation of securities exchanges
8.08 Legal rights index*
9th pillar: Technological readiness...........................17%

A. Technological adoption............................................ 50%
9.01 Availability of latest technologies
9.02 Firm-level technology absorption
9.03 FDI and technology transfer
B. ICT use...................................................................... 50%
9.04 Internet users*
9.05 Broadband Internet subscriptions*
9.06 Internet bandwidth*
9.07 Mobile broadband subscriptions*
2.08 Mobile telephone subscriptions*1/2
2.09 Fixed telephone lines1/2
10th pillar: Market size.............................................17%
higher value indicates a worse outcome (e.g., disease incidence,

government debt), the transformation formula takes the following
form, thus ensuring that 1 and 7 still corresponds to the worst and
best possible outcomes, respectively:
A. Domestic market size............................................... 75%

10.01 Domestic market size index*k
B. Foreign market size.................................................. 25%
10.02 Foreign market size index*l
INNOVATION AND SOPHISTICATION FACTORS
11th pillar: Business sophistication.........................50%

11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09
7.06
Local supplier quantity

Local supplier quality
State of cluster development
Nature of competitive advantage
Value chain breadth
Control of international distribution
Production process sophistication
Extent of marketing
Willingness to delegate authority
Reliance on professional management1/2
a Formally, for a category i composed of K indicators, we have:

K
indicatork
k=1
b As described in the chapter, the weights are as specified below.

Refer to Table2 of the chapter for country classification according
to stage of development:
Stage of development
Factor-driven Transition
stage (1)
from stage 1
to stage 2
Efficiencydriven
stage (2)
Transition
from stage 2
to stage 3
Innovationdriven
stage (3)
GDP per capita (US$) thresholds*

<2,000
2,0002,999 3,0008,999 9,00017,000
>17,000
Weight for basic requirements subindex

60%
4060%
40%
2040%
20%
50%
50%
50%
1030%
30%
Weight for efficiency enhancers subindex

35%
3550%
Weight for innovation and sophistication factors subindex

5%

510%
10%
* For economies with a high dependency on mineral resources, GDP per capita is
not the sole criterion for the determination of the stage of development. See text
for details.
c Formally, we have:

6 x
+ 7
(count of full-weight variables) 1
3 (sum of scores on half-weight variables)

3 (count of half-weight variables)
e n/appl. is used for economies where the railroad network totals

less than 50 kilometers.
NOTES
country score sample minimum

sample maximum sample minimum
d For those categories that contain one or several half-weight

variables, country scores are computed as follows:
Capacity for innovation

Quality of scientific research institutions
Company spending on R&D
University-industry collaboration in R&D
Government procurement of advanced technology products
Availability of scientists and engineers
PCT patent applications
Intellectual property protection1/2
categoryi
(sum of scores on full-weight variables) 1
12th pillar: R&D Innovation.......................................50%

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07
1.02

6 x

+ 1
f In order to capture the idea that both high inflation and deflation
are detrimental, inflation enters the model in a U-shaped manner
as follows: for values of inflation between 0.5 and 2.9 percent,
a country receives the highest possible score of 7. Outside this
range, scores decrease linearly as they move away from these
values.
g The impact of malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS on
competitiveness depends not only on their respective incidence
rates but also on how costly they are for business. Therefore,
in order to estimate the impact of each of the three diseases,
we combine its incidence rate with the Survey question on its
perceived cost to businesses. To combine these data we first
take the ratio of each countrys disease incidence rate relative to
the highest incidence rate in the whole sample. The inverse of
this ratio is then multiplied by each countrys score on the related
Survey question. This product is then normalized to a 1-to-7
scale. Note that countries with zero reported incidence receive a
7, regardless of their scores on the related Survey question. In the
case of malaria, countries receive a 7 if they have been classified
as non-endemic by the World Health Organization (WHO).
h The competition subpillar is the weighted average of two
components: domestic competition and foreign competition. In
both components, the included variables provide an indication
of the extent to which competition is distorted. The relative
importance of these distortions depends on the relative size of
domestic versus foreign competition. This interaction between
the domestic market and the foreign market is captured by
the way we determine the weights of the two components.
Domestic competition is the sum of consumption (C), investment
(I), government spending (G), and exports (X), while foreign
competition is equal to imports (M). Thus we assign a weight of
(C + I + G + X)/(C + I + G + X + M) to domestic competition and a
weight of M/(C + I + G + X + M) to foreign competition.
i Variables 6.06 and 6.07 combine to form one single variable.
j For variable 6.14, imports as a percentage of GDP, we first
apply a log-transformation and then a min-max transformation.
This indicator was formerly numbered 10.04. It still enters the
computation of the market size indexes (see note k).
k The size of the domestic market is constructed by taking the
natural log of the sum of the gross domestic product valued at
purchased power parity (PPP) plus the total value (PPP estimates)
of imports of goods and services, minus the total value (PPP
estimates) of exports of goods and services. Data are then
normalized on a 1-to-7 scale. PPP estimates of imports and exports
are obtained by taking the product of exports as a percentage of
GDP and GDP valued at PPP. The underlying data are reported in
the data tables section of The Global Competitiveness Report
20122013.
l The size of the foreign market is estimated as the natural log of
the total value (PPP estimates) of exports of goods and services,
normalized on a 1-to-7 scale. PPP estimates of exports are
obtained by taking the product of exports as a percentage of GDP
and GDP valued at PPP. The underlying data are reported in the
data tables of The Global Competitiveness Report 20122013.
The sample minimum and sample maximum are, respectively, the

lowest and highest country scores in the sample of economies
covered by the GCI. In some instances, adjustments were made
to account for extreme outliers. For those indicators for which a
Appendix B:
Computation and structure of the sustainability-adjusted GCI
As described in the text, the two areas of sustainability

social and environmentalare treated as independent
adjustments to each countrys performance in the
Global Competitiveness Index (GCI). The adjustment is
calculated according to the following steps.
AGGREGATION
In the first step, the individual indicators in each area
are normalized on a 1-to-7 scale and aggregated by
averaging the normalized scores, such that a social
sustainability score and an environmental sustainability
score are calculated for each country.
In the second step, these scores are normalized
again on a 0.8-to-1.2 scale,a which is based on the
distribution of each of the two sustainability components.
The purpose of this methodology is to reward the
countries attaining a relatively good performance on
the two sustainability components while penalizing
those that register a poor performance. Applying this
methodology corresponds to transforming actual
averages into coefficients ranging from 0.8 to 1.2. For
example, the worst performer on the social sustainability
pillar obtains a score of 0.8 and the best performer a 1.2.
The same calculation is conducted for the environmental
sustainability pillar.
Normalizing on a 0.8-to-1.2 scale and using the
actual sample maximum and minimum are corroborated
by the statistical distribution of the data, so as to ensure
that the final data are not skewed. In the absence of
empirical evidence, the selection of the impact limits
(0.81.2) relies on the best judgment of the authors
and is based on the assumption that countries can
experience either an opportunity if they manage their
resources well or a weakness if they do not.
The selection of this methodology is not intended
to be scientific, but it represents a normative approach
aimed at stimulating discussions on policy priorities and
possibly stimulating scientific research in this field.
In the third step, the GCI score of each country
is multiplied twice: once by its social sustainability
coefficient and once by its environmental sustainability
coefficient, to obtain two separate sustainabilityadjusted GCI scores. Finally, an average of the two
scores provides an overall measure of the sustainability
adjustment.
STRUCTURE OF THE SUSTAINABILITY PILLARS

The computation of the sustainability components is
based on an arithmetic mean aggregation of scores from
the indicator level.b
Variables that are not derived from the Executive
Opinion Survey (the Survey) are identified by an asterisk
(*) in the following pages. To make the aggregation
possible, these variables are transformed into a 1-to-7
scale in order to align them with the Survey results. We
apply a min-max transformation, which preserves the
order of, and the relative distance between, country
scores.c
Indicators marked with a (log) subscript are
transformed applying the logarithm (base 10) to the raw
score.
Social sustainability pillar
S01
Income Gini index*
S02
Youth unemployment*
S03.01 Access to sanitation*d(log)
S03.02 Access to improved drinking water*d
S03.03 Access to healthcared
S04
S05
S06
Social mobility
S07
Vulnerable employment*
Environmental sustainability pillar
S08.01 Stringency of environmental regulatione
S08.02 Enforcement of environmental regulatione
S09
Terrestrial biome protection*
S10 No. of ratified international environmental treaties*
S11
Agricultural water intensity*
S12
CO2 intensity*(log)
S13
Fish stocks overexploited*(log)
S14.01 Forest cover change*f
S14.02 Forest loss* f(log)
S15
Particulate matter (2.5) concentration*(log)
S16
Quality of the natural environment
NOTES
a Formally we have

0.4 x

+ 0.8

covered by the sustainability-adjusted GCI in each pillar.
b Formally, for a category i composed of K indicators, we have:

K
categoryi
indicatork
k=1
c Formally, we have:

6 x

+ 1

covered by the sustainability-adjusted GCI. In some instances,
adjustments were made to account for extreme outliers. For those
indicators for which a higher value indicates a worse outcome
(e.g., CO2 emission, income Gini index), the transformation
formula takes the following form, thus ensuring that 1 and 7
still corresponds to the worst and best possible outcomes,
respectively:

6 x

+ 7
d Variables S03.01, S03.02, and S03.03 are combined to form one

single variable.
e Variables S08.01 and S08.02 are combined to form one single
variable.
f Variables S14.01 and S14.02 are combined to form one single
variable.
Appendix C:
The Global Competitiveness Index 20122013: Africa and comparator
economies, by subindex
SUBINDEXES
GCI 20122013
Country/region
Basic requirements
Rank
Score
Rank
Score
Efficiency enhancers
Innovation and
sophistication factors
Rank
Score
Rank
Score
NORTH AFRICA
Morocco
70
4.15
68
4.60
79
3.94
84
3.38
Egypt
107
3.73
110
3.91
101
3.67
96
3.31
Algeria
110
3.72
89
4.22
136
3.08
144
2.31
Libya
113
3.68
102
4.06
131
3.19
127
2.92
North African
average
3.82
4.20
3.47
2.98
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
South Africa
52
4.37
84
4.28
37
4.53
42
3.94
Mauritius
54
4.35
52
4.80
62
4.14
63
3.63
Rwanda
63
4.24
70
4.56
94
3.77
60
3.66
Seychelles
76
4.10
46
4.86
91
3.81
87
3.36
Botswana
79
4.06
78
4.38
89
3.82
82
3.40
Namibia
92
3.88
82
4.33
105
3.64
103
3.25
Gambia, The
98
3.83
103
4.01
114
3.54
54
3.74
Gabon
99
3.82
86
4.25
116
3.52
139
2.64
Zambia
102
3.80
108
3.92
108
3.61
67
3.57
Ghana
103
3.79
112
3.85
95
3.77
102
3.27
Kenya
106
3.75
123
3.62
76
3.97
56
3.68
Liberia
111
3.71
109
3.92
121
3.36
59
3.67
Cameroon
112
3.69
115
3.80
111
3.57
95
3.31
Nigeria
115
3.67
130
3.52
78
3.96
73
3.53
Senegal
117
3.66
120
3.68
106
3.63
65
3.59
Benin
119
3.61
113
3.83
125
3.31
111
3.12
Tanzania
120
3.60
122
3.65
113
3.55
92
3.32
Ethiopia
121
3.56
118
3.74
123
3.33
125
2.96
Cape Verde
122
3.55
100
4.08
128
3.22
119
3.01
Uganda
123
3.53
132
3.48
104
3.66
101
3.27
Mali
128
3.43
125
3.55
127
3.26
114
3.11
Malawi
129
3.38
135
3.40
120
3.37
109
3.16
Madagascar
130
3.38
129
3.52
132
3.18
115
3.08
Cte dIvoire
131
3.36
137
3.29
115
3.53
121
2.99
Zimbabwe
132
3.34
127
3.53
135
3.08
128
2.90
Burkina Faso
133
3.34
133
3.45
129
3.22
126
2.94
Mauritania
134
3.32
124
3.60
142
2.88
118
3.01
Swaziland
135
3.28
131
3.49
130
3.21
134
2.80
Lesotho
137
3.19
136
3.32
137
3.05
137
2.72
Mozambique
138
3.17
138
3.22
133
3.10
130
2.89
Chad
139
3.05
139
3.15
141
2.91
129
2.89
Guinea
141
2.90
143
2.80
134
3.10
132
2.82
Sierra Leone
143
2.82
144
2.77
140
2.94
138
2.69
Burundi
144
2.78
142
2.94
144
2.56
142
2.42
Sub-Saharan
African Average
3.57
3.72
3.44
3.19
BRICs
China
29
4.83
31
5.25
30
4.64
34
4.05
Brazil
48
4.40
73
4.49
38
4.52
39
3.97
India
59
4.32
85
4.26
39
4.48
43
3.94
Russian Federation
67
4.20
53
4.79
54
4.26
108
3.16
BRICs average
4.44
4.70
4.48
3.78
Latin America and

3.97
4.31
3.86
3.39
Southeast Asian average
4.46
4.82
4.24
3.83
Appendix D:
The Global Competitiveness Index 20122013: Africa and comparator
economies, by pillar
SUBINDEXES (1st5th pillars)
OVERALL INDEX
Country/Region
Rank
Score
1st pillar:
Institutions
Rank
Score
2nd pillar:
Infrastructure
Rank
Score
3rd pillar:
Macroeconomic
environment
Rank
Score
4th pillar:
Health and
primary education
Rank
Score
5th pillar:
Higher education
and training
Rank
Score
NORTH AFRICA
Morocco
70
4.15
54
4.12
61
4.14
70
4.62
81
5.53
101
3.58
Egypt
107
3.73
96
3.56
83
3.61
138
3.12
94
5.35
109
3.32
Algeria
110
3.72
141
2.66
100
3.16
23
5.71
93
5.37
108
3.38
Libya
113
3.68
81
3.69
88
3.56
73
4.60
121
4.40
103
3.56
North African average
3.82
3.51
3.62
4.51
5.16
3.46
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
South Africa
52
4.37
43
4.42
63
4.13
69
4.63
132
3.93
84
3.98
Mauritius
54
4.35
39
4.59
54
4.32
87
4.41
54
5.85
65
4.29
Rwanda
63
4.24
20
5.20
96
3.22
78
4.56
100
5.27
117
3.21
Seychelles
76
4.10
47
4.25
42
4.71
79
4.55
47
5.95
31
4.98
Botswana
79
4.06
33
4.82
87
3.58
81
4.52
114
4.60
95
3.74
Namibia
92
3.88
52
4.19
59
4.18
84
4.50
120
4.44
119
3.13
Gambia, The
98
3.83
35
4.67
82
3.61
129
3.58
126
4.17
94
3.77
Gabon
99
3.82
67
3.94
117
2.71
6.25
128
4.11
122
3.05
Zambia
102
3.80
56
4.09
111
2.85
67
4.65
129
4.11
121
3.07
Ghana
103
3.79
75
3.82
110
2.87
108
4.07
112
4.65
107
3.40
Kenya
106
3.75
106
3.43
103
3.09
133
3.39
115
4.58
100
3.59
Liberia
111
3.71
45
4.31
115
2.77
82
4.51
130
4.10
114
3.30
Cameroon
112
3.69
107
3.40
125
2.51
59
4.79
118
4.49
115
3.25
Nigeria
115
3.67
117
3.33
130
2.28
39
5.25
142
3.20
113
3.31
Senegal
117
3.66
90
3.60
124
2.51
92
4.37
125
4.23
116
3.23
Benin
119
3.61
99
3.51
122
2.56
76
4.57
111
4.68
120
3.07
Tanzania
120
3.60
86
3.62
132
2.27
107
4.12
113
4.60
132
2.71
Ethiopia
121
3.56
74
3.83
119
2.65
114
3.92
116
4.56
134
2.67
Cape Verde
122
3.55
57
4.07
114
2.80
121
3.80
71
5.66
99
3.65
Uganda
123
3.53
102
3.49
133
2.27
119
3.83
123
4.35
127
2.86
Mali
128
3.43
120
3.31
107
2.96
74
4.59
141
3.36
130
2.77
Malawi
129
3.38
76
3.82
135
2.19
136
3.30
124
4.30
129
2.81
Madagascar
130
3.38
136
2.94
137
2.13
95
4.33
110
4.68
133
2.67
Cte d'Ivoire
131
3.36
129
3.16
102
3.10
130
3.48
140
3.40
123
2.99
Zimbabwe
132
3.34
101
3.50
128
2.40
122
3.77
119
4.47
118
3.14
Burkina Faso
133
3.34
83
3.66
136
2.18
85
4.48
139
3.48
137
2.50
Mauritania
134
3.32
122
3.29
113
2.82
89
4.40
133
3.88
142
2.23
Swaziland
135
3.28
88
3.61
99
3.17
128
3.60
135
3.57
125
2.95
Lesotho
137
3.19
121
3.30
126
2.50
113
3.93
136
3.54
135
2.65
Mozambique
138
3.17
112
3.35
129
2.36
125
3.66
137
3.52
138
2.39
Chad
139
3.05
140
2.73
140
1.89
45
5.12
144
2.85
140
2.34
Guinea
141
2.90
128
3.18
142
1.86
142
2.63
138
3.52
136
2.60
Sierra Leone
143
2.82
95
3.56
138
2.09
143
2.47
143
2.95
141
2.30
Burundi
144
2.78
142
2.59
141
1.87
137
3.15
127
4.16
143
1.98
Sub-Saharan
African average
3.57
3.72
2.81
4.15
4.21
3.08
BRICs
China
29
4.83
50
4.22
48
4.46
11
6.22
35
6.11
62
4.32
Brazil
48
4.40
79
3.78
70
4.00
62
4.73
88
5.43
66
4.27
India
59
4.32
70
3.91
84
3.60
99
4.25
101
5.27
86
3.97
Russian Federation
67
4.20
133
3.09
47
4.52
22
5.80
65
5.75
52
4.59
BRICs average
4.44
3.75
4.15
5.25
5.64
4.29
Latin America and

3.97
3.52
3.60
4.66
5.45
3.98
4.46
4.22
4.00
5.42
5.64
4.19
SUBINDEXES (6th12th pillars)
Country/Region
6th pillar:
Goods market
efficiency
7th pillar:
Labor market
efficiency
Rank
Score
Rank
Score
8th pillar:
Financial market
development
Rank
Score
9th pillar:
Technological
readiness
Rank
Score
10th pillar:
Market size
11th pillar:
Business
sophistication
Rank
Score
Rank
Score
12th pillar:
Innovation
Rank
Score
NORTH AFRICA
Morocco
69
4.27
122
3.84
63
4.12
75
3.71
57
4.11
81
3.80
97
2.95
Egypt
125
3.76
142
3.06
102
3.67
91
3.43
29
4.77
83
3.77
109
2.84
Algeria
143
2.99
144
2.79
142
2.39
133
2.59
49
4.34
144
2.54
141
2.09
Libya
137
3.45
137
3.46
140
2.68
110
3.11
102
2.86
116
3.35
129
2.50
3.62
3.29
3.22
3.21
4.02
3.37
2.98
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
South Africa
32
4.68
113
3.94
5.72
62
4.01
25
4.85
38
4.34
42
3.55
Mauritius
27
4.80
70
4.38
35
4.65
63
3.98
109
2.74
41
4.30
98
2.95
Rwanda
39
4.54
11
5.10
49
4.44
113
3.04
128
2.28
70
3.91
51
3.40
Seychelles
70
4.27
48
4.54
94
3.79
66
3.88
142
1.38
87
3.74
93
2.98
Botswana
78
4.20
60
4.46
53
4.39
106
3.17
97
2.94
95
3.66
73
3.13
Namibia
87
4.16
74
4.33
47
4.45
104
3.23
120
2.57
102
3.57
101
2.93
Gambia, The
94
4.10
31
4.72
69
4.07
109
3.13
141
1.42
59
4.09
52
3.38
Gabon
126
3.73
63
4.43
106
3.62
86
3.53
110
2.74
141
2.93
136
2.35
Zambia
42
4.53
111
3.97
50
4.43
115
2.96
111
2.71
75
3.84
61
3.30
Ghana
76
4.20
97
4.08
59
4.21
108
3.13
70
3.57
101
3.57
95
2.96
Kenya
93
4.10
39
4.62
24
4.74
101
3.27
75
3.52
67
3.96
50
3.41
Liberia
40
4.54
61
4.45
74
4.03
132
2.62
144
1.24
62
3.99
54
3.34
Cameroon
89
4.15
58
4.48
105
3.64
126
2.73
87
3.18
104
3.52
79
3.09
Nigeria
88
4.16
55
4.50
68
4.07
112
3.08
33
4.63
66
3.96
78
3.10
Senegal
77
4.20
80
4.27
84
3.89
95
3.37
105
2.83
72
3.89
62
3.29
Benin
132
3.66
67
4.40
112
3.55
124
2.75
122
2.45
125
3.23
84
3.01
Tanzania
110
3.89
47
4.55
85
3.87
122
2.77
77
3.50
106
3.51
75
3.12
Ethiopia
120
3.79
87
4.18
129
3.24
140
2.48
66
3.64
129
3.18
114
2.73
Cape Verde
105
3.93
126
3.72
121
3.37
90
3.43
143
1.25
118
3.34
120
2.68
Uganda
103
3.95
23
4.83
62
4.14
117
2.93
85
3.22
105
3.52
82
3.02
Mali
111
3.87
118
3.89
113
3.53
119
2.90
118
2.57
126
3.22
88
2.99
Malawi
112
3.86
43
4.58
75
4.00
134
2.54
123
2.41
115
3.38
99
2.94
Madagascar
115
3.84
54
4.50
138
2.88
135
2.54
113
2.66
122
3.28
106
2.88
Cte d'Ivoire
122
3.78
71
4.38
103
3.65
99
3.32
94
3.05
123
3.28
115
2.71
Zimbabwe
133
3.63
139
3.40
109
3.60
120
2.83
135
1.90
128
3.21
127
2.59
Burkina Faso
118
3.80
64
4.42
117
3.43
137
2.52
114
2.64
140
3.01
107
2.87
Mauritania
135
3.58
131
3.60
136
3.04
123
2.75
131
2.07
117
3.35
121
2.68
Swaziland
107
3.92
119
3.87
89
3.82
128
2.69
133
2.00
124
3.26
137
2.33
Lesotho
102
3.97
116
3.92
122
3.36
136
2.53
136
1.86
135
3.11
138
2.33
Mozambique
124
3.77
128
3.72
134
3.09
121
2.80
101
2.86
131
3.14
122
2.63
Chad
141
3.08
95
4.12
137
3.01
143
2.23
112
2.70
138
3.04
113
2.74
Guinea
127
3.71
56
4.49
135
3.07
142
2.45
129
2.27
139
3.03
125
2.62
Sierra Leone
116
3.84
114
3.92
125
3.34
141
2.46
138
1.76
136
3.10
139
2.27
Burundi
139
3.28
112
3.97
144
2.31
144
2.22
140
1.57
143
2.67
140
2.17
Sub-Saharan
African average
3.98
4.26
3.78
2.95
2.62
3.47
2.90
BRICs
China
59
4.31
41
4.60
54
4.31
88
3.50
6.82
45
4.25
33
Brazil
104
3.94
69
4.39
46
4.45
48
4.43
5.63
33
4.51
49
3.42
India
75
4.21
82
4.24
21
4.90
96
3.36
6.24
40
4.31
41
3.56
134
3.62
84
4.23
130
3.19
57
4.13
5.76
119
3.31
85
3.01
Russian Federation
3.85
BRICs average
4.02
4.37
4.21
3.86
6.11
4.10
3.46
Latin America and

3.98
4.01
3.94
3.71
3.52
3.83
2.96
4.47
4.61
4.33
3.82
4.03
4.16
3.50
Part 2
Connecting Africas Markets
in a Sustainable Way
CHAPTER 2.1
Enabling African Trade:

Findings from the Enabling
Trade Index
MARGARETA DRZENIEK HANOUZ
CAROLINE KO
World Economic Forum
African countries have registered high growth rates in the

past 10 years and have weathered the global economic
crisis rather favorably compared with other emerging
economies. Yet, as discussed in Chapter 1.1, the level of
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and the pace
of GDP growth have not reached levels found in other
regions, such as developing Asia. From 2002 to 2012,
GDP growth in developing Asia was on average 8.5
percent, while sub-Saharan Africa experienced growth
rates of 5.7 percent.1 A key difference between these
two regions is their participation in global trade and
investment flows. While trade in developing Asia more
than doubled between 1995 and 2010, trade in subSaharan Africa over the same period remained at below
2 percent of total world trade.2 Two distinct observations
are of particular importance when discussing Africas
trade performance: the export base of most countries is
undiversified, and regional integration is extremely low.
THE STATE OF AFRICAN EXPORTS
Despite efforts aimed at diversifying the export base,
African exports remain highly focused on commodities.
Fuels and mining products account for over half of subSaharan exports, compared with only about 10 percent
for developing Asia and advanced economies. Indeed,
when broken down to the country level, the share of
mineral products accounts for more than 30 percent of
total exports in more than half of all African economies,
and for over 90 percent in a few cases (see Figure1).3
High dependence on commodity exports means that
terms of trade fluctuate with commodity prices, which
may have a negative effect on the countrys growth.
Government finances also fluctuate with commodity
prices, possibly jeopardizing governments fiscal stability
and leeway. In sub-Saharan Africa alone, for example, 10
economies are fiscally dependent on natural resources.4
In contrast, another set of countriesincluding
Burundi, Cte dIvoire, Ethiopia, and Malawiare highly
dependent on agricultural exports (see Figure2). Against
this backdrop, export diversificationboth in goods and
services and also across geographiesis key to raising
Africas resilience to external shocks.
Many regional trading initiatives have been launched
on the continent over the last several decades, yet
Africas markets remain poorly connected with each
other. The share of Africas intra-regional goods trade in
total goods exports is just 12 percent, compared with 25
percent in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,
65 percent in the European Union, and 49 percent
in the North American Free Trade Agreement bloc in
2011,5 although these estimates probably underreport
the actual volume of trade because of the high levels
of unregistered cross-border activity. Survey results
suggest that informal border flows may comprise up to
90 percent of trade.6
Finally, regional integration is closely linked to
food security and poverty reduction. Because of their
2.1: Enabling African Trade
Figure 1: Exports of mineral products as a share of total exports, 200610 average
Angola
Algeria
Libya
Equatorial Guinea
Chad
Nigeria
Rep. Congo
Sudan
Gabon
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Guinea
Mauritania
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Cameroon
Sierra Leone
Niger
Central African Rep.
Gambia, The
Egypt
Benin
Rwanda
Seychelles
Namibia
Cte d'Ivoire
Senegal
Zimbabwe
Lesotho
South Africa
Liberia
Tanzania
Mozambique
Togo
Morocco
Madagascar
Djibouti
Kenya
Uganda
Burundi
Cape Verde
Swaziland
Ghana
Mauritius
Somalia
Mali
Ethiopia
Malawi
0
20
40
60
Percent
Source: ITC, April 2012.
80
100
Figure 2: Export share in total exports by category, 2010
Angola
Libya
Algeria
Botswana
Lesotho
Nigeria
Guinea
Gabon
Tunisia
Zambia
Cape Verde
South Africa
Mali
Morocco
Mozambique
Mauritania
Ghana
Madagascar
Mauritius
Tanzania
Namibia
Senegal
Togo
Rwanda
Seychelles
Benin
Gambia, The
Swaziland
Burkina Faso
Zimbabwe
Cameroon
Kenya
Uganda
Ethiopia
Cte d'Ivoire
Malawi
Burundi
0
20
40
60
80
100
Percent
nAgriculturen Fuels and mining nManufacturesnServices
Source: Authors calculations, based on data from the World Trade Organizations Statistical Database, Time Series on Merchandise and Commercial Services 20002011.
Notes: Chad, Liberia, and Sierra Leone do not report data on their merchandise breakdown. Note that the sum of shares does not necessarily add up to 100 because the world total merchandise
trade includes other commodities and transactions that are not part of the three main commodity groupsagriculture, fuels and mining, and manufacturing. These commodities are gold, arms
and ammunition, and commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere (following the United Nations Statistics Division standard international trade classification (SITC) Rev.3, section 9).
Chad, Liberia, and Sierra Leone do not report data on their merchandise breakdown. Data in Figure 2 may not exactly match Figure 1. For example, more than two-thirds of exports in Botswana
are pearls and precious stones, classified as mineral exports in Figure 1 and manufactures in Figure 2.
Box 1: Priorities for deepening regional trade

integration in Africa
Although Africas exports have grown significantly over
the past decade and its trade has started to recover
from the global financial crisis, the impact of this growth
on unemployment and poverty has been disappointing
for many African countries. This situation reflects export
growth that is typically fueled by a limited number of
mineral and primary commodities that have only narrow
impacts on the wider economy, and formal sectors that
remain small.
The key trade objectives for Africa, therefore, are to
diversify the export base and to implement policies that
allow more people to benefit from trade. Increasing and
more youthful populations heighten the need for more
inclusive and employment-intensive trade and offer a real
opportunity for Africa to harness a significant potential
comparative advantage that can drive productivity growth
over a sustained period.
Effective regional integration in Africa would play
a key role in delivering more diverse, inclusive, and
sustained trade growth. With African leaders now calling
for a continental free trade area by 2017 to boost trade
and investment, a recent World Bank report shows that
countries are losing out on billions of dollars in potential
trade every year because of high trade barriers with their
own neighbors, and that it is often easier for Africa to trade
with the rest of the world than with itself.1 According to the
report De-Fragmenting Africa: Deepening Regional Trade
Integration in Goods and Services, there are enormous
opportunities for increased cross-border trade in food
products, basic manufactures, and services and for a
larger regional market to provide a springboard to global
competitiveness in a wider range of products to reach a
larger number of markets. However, these benefits are not
being realized because the regional market is fragmented
and cross-border production networks that have spurred
economic dynamism in other regions, especially East Asia,
have yet to materialize in Africa.
To reduce fragmentation, three main changes are
needed:
Improve conditions for cross-border trade, especially
those faced by small tradersmany of whom are
womenby simplifying border procedures, limiting the
number of agencies at the border, and increasing the
professionalism of officials.
Remove non-tariff barriers to trade such as restrictive
rules of origin, import and export bans, and onerous
and costly trade-licensing procedures.
Streamline regulations and immigration rules that limit
the potential for cross-border trade and investment in
both goods and services.
Regional integration is a core element in both the
World Banks Africa Strategy and its Trade Strategy, which
are designed to help countries create trade opportunities
for their transformation and sustained growth. The World
Bank doubled its support for regional integration from
US$2.1 billion in 2008 to US$4.2 billion in 2011, and
increased it further to US$5.7 billion in 2012.
Source: Contributed by the World Bank, International Trade
Department.
Note
1 World Bank 2012.
high transaction costs and consequent low regional

integration, African economies import agricultural
products from global markets instead of from within their
own regions. Indeed, according to a recent World Bank
report, African farmers produce a mere 5 percent of
Africas cereal imports.7 With the market of food staples
and production estimated at US$50 billion per year, or
three-quarters of the total agricultural output, this means
that enormous growth opportunities remain unexploited.8
This large share of non-African staple imports exposes
African economies to volatile food prices. This exposure
not only affects the income of the poor, who need to
spend a higher income share on basic food supply, but
also adversely affects macroeconomic stability through
rising inflation, as was seen in East Africa in 2011 and
early 2012. Furthermore, because they are small buyers,
most African economies have only limited bargaining
power to negotiate prices on a global scale. Regional
integration is, thus, key to feeding Africas growing
population in a sustained fashion by facilitating trade
from food-abundant areas to areas with a food deficit.
AFRICAS POOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION: CAUSES
AND PRIORITIES
In view of the benefits to be had, why is Africas regional
integration so poor? The reasons are complex and many.
Historically, most countries have been geared toward
trade with developed economies. Policies, measures,
and investments were often focused on improving
access to developed-country markets because of the
high demand in those countries. At the same time,
regional integration efforts on the continent were usually
not fully implemented, so many barriers between regional
markets remain in place.9 One factor, as discussed
in subsequent chapters in this Report, is Africas
pronounced infrastructure deficit, which is particularly
pertinent for connecting markets within Africa (see
Chapter 2.2 for a more detailed discussion).
Trade policies, as well as the institutional and
regulatory environment, also need to be taken into
account. World Bank data show that in sub-Saharan
Africa it takes an average of 37 days to import goods
and 31 days to export, compared with less than 20
days to export and to import in North Africa, Latin
America, and Southeast Asia. The problem is even
more pronounced for landlocked Africa, where it takes
an average of almost 50 days to import and 40 days
to export.10 Other factors, such as border corruption
and multiple road blocks, are a further impediment. For
example, a truck driver on the KoutialaDakar corridor
between Mali and Senegal has to pass through almost
100 checkpoints and border posts and is required
to pay about US$437 in bribes along the route.11 In
Mali, on the BamakoOuagadougou route, every 100
kilometers drivers have to face about 4.5 checkpoints
and have to pay about US$25 in bribes.12 Furthermore,
non-tariff measures (NTMs) in the form of quotas,
charges, discriminatory labeling, and health and sanitary

regulations play an important role in undermining trade
the region. Although data on NTMs are generally scarce,
a recent study by the World Bank puts a price tag to
their costs and shows that NTMs affected one-fifth of
regional exports, or US$3.3 billion of regional trade in
2008 in Southern African Development Community
(SADC) countries. Assuming that NTMs are equivalent
to a 40 percent ad valorem tariff, this amounts to an
estimated cost of US$1.3 billion per year.13 Finally,
crossing borders does not affect only goods and
services, but also people. The lack of physical security
when crossing borders, for instance, plays a critical role,
particularly for women traders in the Great Lake region.
The following analysis of the results of the Enabling
Trade Index (ETI) sheds additional light on the key
barriers that prevent Africa from reaping the full benefits
of international trade. Although the ETI does not permit
an analysis of barriers to regional integration, it does
indicate the barriers and enablers that exporters and
importers in each country face, and thereby informs
policy choices. Box1 complements the analysis by
identifying priority action areas that have been identified
by the World Bank for enhancing regional integration.
Maersk, the Panama Canal Authority, Royal Vopak,

Stena AB, Swiss International Air Lines, Transnet, UPS,
Volkswagen, and AB Volvo.
The ETI measures the extent to which individual
economies have developed institutions, policies, and
services facilitating the free flow of goods over borders
and to destination.14 The structure of the Index reflects
the main enablers of trade, breaking them into four
overall issue areas, captured in the subindexes:
USE OF THE GLOBAL ENABLING TRADE REPORT

The Global Enabling Trade Report (GETR) has become
a widely used reference since its introduction in 2008.
It forms part of the toolbox of many countries in their
efforts to increase trade, and it helps companies with
their investment decisions. The Report is also the basis
for many high-level public-private dialogues facilitated
around the world each year by the World Economic
Forum. These dialogues focus on practical steps that
can be taken by both governments and the private
sector to overcome particular trade barriers in a country
or region. In building a coalition for change, it has
become evident that establishing an open borders
mindset in a joint and holistic effort to tackle obstacles
to the movement of both goods and people is often the
most effective approach.
4. The business environment subindex looks at

the quality of governance as well as at the
overarching regulatory and security environment
impacting the business of importers and
exporters active in the country.
THE ENABLING TRADE INDEX

The ETI was developed within the context of the World
Economic Forums Industry Partnership Programme
for the Supply Chain and Transport Industry, and
was first published in the 2008 GETR. A number of
Data Partners have collaborated in this effort: the
Global Express Association (GEA), the International Air
Transport Association (IATA), the International Trade
Centre (ITC), the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD), The World Bank, the World
Customs Organization (WCO), and the World Trade
Organization (WTO). We have also received significant
input from companies that are part of this industry
partnership program, namely Agility, Brightstar, Deutsche
Post DHL, DNB Bank ASA, FedEx Corp., A.P. Mller
1. The market access subindex measures the

extent to which the policy framework of the
country allows foreign goods into the economy
and enables access to foreign markets for its
exporters.
2. The border administration subindex assesses the
extent to which the administration at the border
facilitates the entry and exit of goods.
3. The transport and communications infrastructure
subindex takes into account whether the country
has in place the transport and communications
infrastructure necessary to facilitate the movement
of goods within the country and across the
border.
Each of these four subindexes is composed in turn

of a number of pillars of enabling trade, of which there
are nine in all. These are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Domestic and foreign market access

Efficiency of customs administration
Efficiency of import-export procedures
Transparency of border administration
Availability and quality of transport infrastructure
Availability and quality of transport services
Availability and use of ICTs
Regulatory environment
Physical security
Each of these pillars is made up of a number

of individual variables. The dataset includes both
hard data and survey data from the World Economic
Forums Executive Opinion Survey (the Survey). The
hard data were obtained from publicly available
sources and international organizations active in the
area of trade (such as IATA, the ITC, the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU), UNCTAD, the UN, and
the World Bank). The Survey is carried out annually by
the World Economic Forum in all economies covered
by our research.15 It captures the views of top business
executives on the business environment and provides
unique data on many qualitative aspects of the broader
Figure 3: Composition of the four subindexes of the ETI
Transport and
communications
infrastructure
Border
administration
Border
Domestic and foreign

market access
Efficiency of customs
administration
Availability and quality of

transport infrastructure
Efficiency of importexport procedures
Availability and quality of

transport services
Transparency of
border administration
Availability and
use of ICTs
Destination
Market
access
Business
environment
Subindex
Pillar
Regulatory
environment
Physical
security
Source: World Economic Forum, 2012b.
business environment, including a number of specific

issues related to trade. For detailed descriptions of all the
indicators included in the ETI, please see Appendix C.
The nine pillars are grouped into the four
subindexes described above,16 as shown in Figure3,
and the overall score for each country is derived as an
unweighted average of the subindexes.17 The details
of the composition of the ETI are shown in Appendix
A. It is important to note that, although the pillars are
separated out in the Index for presentational purposes,
they are intrinsically linked. For example, the regulatory
environment is linked to transparency at the border and
the availability of transport services, as it contains data
on the level of competition in a country. Furthermore, the
use of ICTs has an impact on the efficiency of border
administration, as ICTs have proven instrumental for
making border clearance more efficient.
As econometric tests of the ETI 2009 demonstrated,
the ETI has explanatory power with respect to a
countrys trade performance.18 The analysis has shown
that a 1 percent increase in the ETI score in an exporting
country is associated with an increase of 1.7 percent in
that countrys exports. This effect is even higher with
respect to an importing country: the model predicts
that a 1 percent improvement in an importers ETI
score would lead to a 2.3 percent rise in imports. Taken
together, these two effects predict that a 1 percent
increase in the average ETI score of any given country
pair would be associated with a 4 percent increase in

bilateral trade, all else being equal.
Country coverage
Overall, the 2012 edition of the GETR covers 132
economies and 31 African countries, of which three are
in North Africa. In an effort to expand country coverage,
two new African countries were added to the Index
(Angola and Rwanda) as new data became available.
Although Tunisia was covered in the GETR 2012, it was
excluded from The Global Competitiveness Report
20122013 because of a structural break in the data. To
remain consistent with this decision, we do not report
or discuss data on Tunisia in this chapter. As Libya was
not covered in the ETI 2012 because of lack of data, the
North Africa average reported below is composed of
three countries out of the five that make up the region.
The selected North African countries account for 60
percent of total merchandise trade in the subregion.
Results by subregion and selected countries
Figure4 shows the ETI results for Africa on a map of
the continent. It illustrates the varying ability of countries
across the African continent to enable trade, and shows
the results for some European and Middle Eastern
countries for comparison.
Table1 shows the ETI resultsboth ranks and
scoresfor the 2012 and 2010 editions. The middle
column further shows the 2012 rank based on the
Figure 4: The ETI framework: Map of Africa
Cyprus
Syria
Iran,
Islamic Rep.
Lebanon
Morocco
Algeria
Egypt
Mauritania
United Arab Emirates
Mali
Chad
Senegal
Gambia
Yemen
Nigeria
Burkina Faso
Cte dIvoire
Ghana
Uganda
Cameroon
Rwanda
Benin
ETI 2012 score*

n [5.00,6.14]
n [4.00,4.50[
n [3.50,4.00[
Ethiopia
Kenya
Mauritius
Burundi
n [4.50,5.00[
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Angola
Zambia
Tanzania
Malawi
Namibia
Botswana
Madagascar
n [3.16,3.50[
Mozambique
n [Min,3.16[
n Not covered
South Africa
Zimbabwe
Lesotho

* The interval [x,y[ is inclusive of x but exclusive of y. Highest value; lowest value.
2010 constant sample. In the 2012 edition of the GETR,

Mauritius (36th), Rwanda (51st), Botswana (54th), South
Africa (63rd), and Morocco (64th) emerge as the best
performers within the region out of 132 economies
covered by the Report (see Table1). However, Mauritius
declines by three places in 2012, following slight falls
across all four subindexes. Botswana stays constant,
whereas South Africa and Morocco move up by 10
and 12 positions, respectively, considering the constant
sample. In South Africa, the improvement is mainly
attributable to better transport services and a higher
level of physical security.19 Furthermore, Morocco
improves by 12 places, based on more efficient handling
of import-export procedures than in previous years,
as well as more transparent border administration and
improvements in the availability and quality of transport
infrastructure and in the regulatory environment.20
Overall, these three countries have made great
strides toward enabling trade, and their results on the
aggregate ETI indicator reach levels close to those
found in European countries, above the majority of BRIC
economies.
However, Africa is also home to some of the
weakest performers in terms of enabling trade, such as
Chad or Burundi, which occupy the last two positions
in the ETI sample. A comparison of the trends shows
that, for the majority of African countries covered,
the performance in the ETI has deteriorated. Overall,
although the three North African countries perform

on average somewhat better than their sub-Saharan
neighbors (with a score of 3.7, versus 3.5 for the latter),
the spread in performance is as important in North Africa
as it is in sub-Saharan Africa (ranging from Morocco at
64th to Algeria at 120th). North Africa performs in line
with the average of the BRIC economies and those in the
Latin American region in terms of enabling trade, but has
not yet achieved the level of Southeast Asia. Southeast
Asia has been very successful in facilitating trade and
promoting regional integration, which is reflected in the
good ETI results achieved by this region.
The comparison of Africa with Southeast Asia and
Latin America and the Caribbean in Figure5 shows that,
although the region underperforms both comparators
on the majority of the ETI pillars, it is doing relatively well
in terms of physical security, where it reaches the level
found in Southeast Asia, and the regulatory environment,
where it performs at the level of Latin America and the
Caribbean. A number of African countries achieve good
scores on this indicator: for example, Senegal ranks
38th, Botswana 39th, and Rwanda 15th. At the same
time, the gaps are the largest in the efficiency of importexport procedures and the availability and use of ICTs,
where Africa performs significantly less well than the
other regions.
Figure6 offers yet another view of Africas
performance in the ETI by comparing the regions
Figure 5: Africas performance in regional comparison
Domestic and foreign market access

7
6
Physical security
Efficiency of
customs administration
4
3
Regulatory
environment
Efficiency of importexport procedures
2
1
Southeast Asia
Latin American and the Caribbean
Africa
BRICs
Availability and
use of ICTs
Transparency of
border administration
Availability and quality

of transport services
Availability and quality

of transport infrastructure

Notes: Performance on the ETI is measured by scores on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 being best. BRIC countries are Brazil, Russian Federation, India, and China.
Figure 6: Africas performance over time
ETI score (17, best)
n2009n2012
1
Domestic and
foreign
market access
Efficiency
Efficiency of Transparency
of
import-export
of border
customs
procedures administration
administration
Availability
and
quality of
transport
infrastructure
Availability
and
quality of
transport
services
Availability
and use
of ICTs
Regulatory
environment
Physical
security

Note: The constant sample includes the following economies: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Cte dIvoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Table 1: The Enabling Trade Index 2012 rankings and 2010 comparison
ETI 2012
Country/Economy or region
ETI 2010
Rank/132
Score
Constant sample rank 2012
Rank*
Score
Mauritius
36
4.6
36
33
4.7
Rwanda
51
4.3
n/a
n/a
n/a
Botswana
54
4.3
53
53
4.2
South Africa
63
4.1
62
72
3.9
Morocco
64
4.1
63
75
3.9
Namibia
75
3.9
74
70
4.0
Malawi
85
3.8
83
83
3.8
Zambia
88
3.8
86
85
3.8
Egypt
90
3.8
88
76
3.9
Gambia, The
91
3.7
89
82
3.8
Senegal
92
3.7
90
90
3.7
Tanzania
94
3.7
91
97
3.6
Mozambique
97
3.7
94
93
3.7
Uganda
98
3.6
95
94
3.7
Ghana
99
3.6
96
96
3.6
Kenya
103
3.5
100
105
3.5
Ethiopia
106
3.5
103
107
3.5
Madagascar
107
3.5
104
86
3.8
Lesotho
113
3.4
110
101
3.6
Benin
115
3.4
112
106
3.5
Cameroon
118
3.3
114
115
3.3
Algeria
120
3.2
115
119
3.1
Mali
121
3.2
116
111
3.4
Burkina Faso
122
3.1
117
110
3.4
Nigeria
123
3.1
118
120
3.1
Mauritania
125
3.1
120
117
3.3
Cte d'Ivoire
126
3.0
121
123
2.9
Angola
127
3.0
n/a
n/a
n/a
Zimbabwe
129
3.0
122
122
3.0
Burundi
131
2.9
124
125
2.8
Chad
132
2.6
125
124
2.9
African average
3.5
North Africa
3.7
Sub-Saharan Africa
3.5
3.9
Southeast Asia
4.4
Sources: World Economic Forum, 2010, 2012b.

Notes: Latin America and the Caribbean countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela; North African countries: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco; Southeast Asian countries: Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam; sub-Saharan African countries: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Cte dIvoire, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
* The 2010 rank is out of 125 countries. Seven new countries were added to the 2012 Index: Angola, Haiti, Iran, Lebanon, Moldova, Rwanda, and Yemen.
performance between 2009 and 2012. Here it is

noteworthy that Africas overall performance in the
market access pillar has slightly deteriorated, whereas
improvements have been made in the efficiency of
customs administration, transport infrastructure,
and ICTs, albeit the latter from a very low base. The
comparison over time further reveals that, when it
comes to border administration, the efficiency of
customs administration has improved but progress in the
efficiency of import-export procedures and transparency
of border administration has stalleddespite Africas

fairly low score on these two pillars.
Analysis by subindex and pillar
Figure7 shows the spread in performance across
African countries on all nine pillars of the ETI and
details the performance of comparators as well as the
subregional groups of sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa,
and landlocked countries from the region.
Box 2: Customs reform through increased visibility: Individual performance contracts in Cameroon
Outdated and bureaucratic border clearance processes
imposed by customs and other agencies are increasingly
seen as posing greater barriers to trade than tariffs do.
Cumbersome systems and procedures and poor infrastructure
both increase transaction costs and lengthen delays for
the clearance of imports, exports, and transit goods, with
negative impacts on competitiveness. This is especially true
in poor countries, and in Africa the difficulties are particularly
severe, with excessive physical inspections being a major
source of delays. Countries confront a deep dilemma between
facilitating trade and securing control, particularly because
their need for customs revenue is still significant.
This scenario has been changing recently, with many
African governments adopting major reforms in their border
management systems. Among these efforts, the case of
Cameroon Customs is one of the most interesting: the agency
has undertaken a challenging strategy that relies on technology
and improvements in visibility, ensuring a double continuity
through visualized performance measurement and human
resource management based on the measured performance.
Cameroons customs administration has suffered from
corruption and struggled to identify options for improving
governance. A customs reform program was introduced that
sought to reduce corruption while simultaneously raising
revenue collection and facilitating trade. The reform included
the installation of ASYCUDA++ (an automated customs
clearance system) that would enable the administration not
only to track the processing of each consignment, but also to
measure performance against a number of criteria relevant to
the reform.
With the support of the Trade Facilitation Facility,1
these efforts have continued with the introduction in 2009
of individual performance contracts, making Cameroon
the first country in the world to adopt such an approach.
These performance contracts use objective and quantifiable
performance data from the automated computer system.
The objectives of customs administration (facilitation and
enforcement) are complemented by specific objectives
that aim at abolishing bad practices. With this mechanism,
individual customs officers as well as their managers have
become aware of their performance data vis--vis those of
other colleagues, and they receive rewards or sanctions as a
result of their performance.
The activity has far achieved several significant
outcomes since the start of its implementation:
Processing time for customs declaration at Douala Port I
by customs officers dropped from about 11 hours in 2010
to 2 hours in the third trimester of 2011.
Customs revenues increased by 22 percent from the
first trimester of 2010 to the first trimester of 2011, while
growth of activity during the same period was 17 percent.
In terms of market access, which captures both

access to domestic markets and access to foreign
markets for the countrys exporters, the region is
characterized by a relatively large spread in performance.
Although some African countries perform better than
comparators in Southeast Asia and Latin America and
the Caribbean, in the majority of African countries,
An increase in the average revenues per customs

declaration was recorded: revenues increased by more
than 6.9 billion CFA francs (about US$17.25 million) in
2011, all other things being equal.
Possibly suspicious practices have been drastically
reduced: notably, reroutings (manually changing the
control channel from the one selected by the automated
system to the otherfor example, document verification
to physical inspection) fell from 5 percent of the total
number of declarations in 2009 to 1.6 percent in 2010
(in Douala Port I).
The activity catalyzes the following positive initiatives:
The concept of performance-linked treatment is being
applied to declarants/economic operators. Performancecontracted importers enjoy a trade facilitation
environment: for example, a shorter port dwell time
that is 4 days shorter than the average 19 days.
Performance contracts have had a major impact on
importers and are creating the start of a virtuous circle
between customs brokers and importers. For successful
importers (those who reached the agreed performance
targets), performance contracts have been the starting
point of revising internal procedures for the clearing
processes.
The culture of collecting and monitoring performance
indicators is increasingly accepted. Institutional
performance data are becoming publicly available.
Stakeholder dialogues are being based on objective data,
and the progress and achievements of efforts become
publically accountable.
Several countries, such as Benin and Togo, are following
Cameroons successful approach to customs reform.
Department.
Note
1 The Trade Facilitation Facility (TFF) is a rapid-response trust fund
with the objective of helping developing countries reduce trade
costs and enhance their ability to move goods and services
across borders rapidly, cheaply, and predictably. It is designed to
finance activities that will make immediate, direct, and effective
improvements in trade facilitation systems by modernizing
infrastructure, institutions, and policies and improving regulations.
The TFF finances activities at country, regional, and global levels
including projects and project-preparation activities, advisory work,
and technical assistance.
access to markets is relatively constrained. For North

African markets, this constraint to access is more severe,
while landlocked African countries enjoy levels of market
access similar to those of Africa and sub-Saharan Africa
overall and perform far better than North Africa.
Interestingly, significant differences can be observed
across African countries in this respect. A number of
Figure 7: Enabling Trade Index score dispersion among African economies
African average
Landlocked Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
North Africa
Latin America and Carribean
Southeast Asia
ETI score (17)
1
Domestic
and
foreign
market
access
Efficiency
Efficiency Transparency
of
of
of
customs
import-export
border
administration procedures administration
Availability
and
quality
of
transport
infrastructure
Availability
and
quality
of
transport
services
Availability
and
use
of
ICTs
Regulatory
environment
Physical
security

Notes: The sample includes the following economies: landlocked Africa: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; Latin
America and the Caribbean: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela; North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco; Southeast Asia: Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam; subSaharan Africa: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Cte dIvoire, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The blue bars reflect the dispersion in performance across African economies in the
nine dimensions analyzed in the Enabling Trade Index, the end points presenting the highest and the lowest score in the sample, respectively.
countries have liberalized their domestic markets and

have fairly free access to key developed-country markets
as a result of trade preference schemes such as those
under the African Growth and Opportunity Act put in
place by the United States or Economic Partnership
Agreements with the European Union. The foreign
market access component of the Index takes into
account the trade preferences countries enjoy abroad
by capturing the margin of preference to which countries
are entitled. Because of the preferential schemes in
place, two African countriesMalawi and Mauritius
enjoy the highest margin of preference in target markets
within the entire ETI sample.
In the case of North Africa, the results show that
the regions trade performance is negatively affected
by limited domestic and foreign market access. Further
reduction of domestic tariffs and tariffs in key export
markets would enable trade in the region. This may be
a reflection of the still fairly high tariffs in the region, the
low number of regional trading agreements into which
countries have entered, and the fact that the region does
not benefit from as many trade preferences as subSaharan Africa.
Border administration takes into account the
efficiency of customs and the transparency and
efficiency of the entire clearance process. The results
show that, in a number of African countries, customs are
more efficient than they are in Southeast Asia or in Latin

America and the Caribbean (see Appendix B). However,
on average, there is some room for improvement in
Africa. The benefits of customs reform are considerable:
in addition to speeding up the clearance process at the
border, more efficient customs contribute to a better
collection of tariff and tax revenues, more formal crossborder trading activity, and lower levels of corruption.
Important efforts have been undertaken in recent years
toward reforming customs administrations in African
countries (see Box2 for customs reform efforts in
Cameroon).
In most countries, however, customs performs
only one part of the border clearance process, and
other agencies are tasked with the import or export
procedure components. These agencies include entities
that enforce sanitary and phytosanitary standards as
well as technical requirements and entities that grant
import licenses. It is therefore crucial for reforms in this
field to take a holistic view and consider the import
and export procedures as a whole, ensuring that the
linkages between the different agencies involved in the
import-export process present a minimum of friction and
delays. In many cases, information technology (IT)-based
systems have proven successful in facilitating procedures
across different agencies. For example, the Automated
System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) was implemented
Box 3: Overcoming landlockedness: Faster border management through customs data sharing
across countries
Delays at border crossings across sub-Saharan Africa have
long been identified as one of the largest non-tariff barriers to
trade. Some contributing factors include inefficient paperwork
and processes, lack of advance notification of goods, poor
and fraudulent declarations, lack of cross-border information
exchange between customs, and out-of-date or nonexistent
transit and trade statistics. One solution to this problem lies
in developing a platform for efficient customs and transit
data exchange, management, and reporting and, even
more importantly, ensuring that the information exchanged
is actually used to improve daily operations. For example,
in addition to improving connectivity through infrastructure,
documents, and procedures, countries in East Africa have
also recently electronically interconnected their customs
systems to facilitate trade.
Traders typically lose a great deal of time because
agencies in each country re-enter trade-related information
in their computer systems for customs and other bordercontrol purposes. Re-entering data also makes the process
vulnerable to the risk of input errors and fraud; border
management measures to combat this risk can further
delay the clearance process. Starting from a document
that has already been verified by one customs authority

ensures data integrity and, more importantly, traceability
of the declarations across borders, which is critical for
reconciliation and risk management. Uganda and Kenya have
been at the forefront of an initiative to share data between
their customs administrations. In 2009, the two countries
worked with USAID in developing a system to interconnect
their customs systems. The interconnecting system, known
as the Revenue Authorities Digital Data Exchange (RADDEx),
transmits customs transit declaration data in near-real time
from a point of initial lodging (seaport, border post, etc.)
through all relevant transit points to final destination. RADDEx
was first installed at the Malaba border post between the
two countries, and enabled the sharing of data between the
border-crossing point and the main transit port of Mombasa
in Kenya. The border management requirements of the two
countries already had in common several data elements. For
example, for Uganda transit declarations in Kenya 38 data
elements were already captured in Kenya with the declarant
adding or modifying only three elements (including declarants
name) in Uganda. RADDex has led to significant time
reductions in preparation and processing the declarations by:
Figure A: Change in border-crossing time at Malaba, November 2011March 2012

30
24
Hours
18
Average outbound
Standard deviation, average outbound
Average inbound
Standard deviation, average inbound
12
0
November
December
January
February
March
(Contd)
in 42 African countries, including Botswana, Ethiopia,

Ghana, and Rwanda.21
Despite rising awareness of this issue and progress
achieved on the customs administration front, many
African countries still lag behind international standards
in terms of the efficiency, cost, and timeliness of
the overall clearance process, mainly because the
process is still burdened with red tape and insufficient
communication between the agencies. Within the African

continent, the efficiency of import-export procedures is
the area where we see the largest differences across
countries and across the three subregional country
groupings we present in this Report. While Mauritius, the
best-performing country in Africa on this pillar, performs
better than Southeast Asia on average and comes in at
Box 3: Overcoming landlockedness: Faster border management through customs data sharing
across countries (contd)
avoiding duplicate data entry by declarants at different
border posts,
enabling pre-arrival declaration and data processing,
sending advance notice for document preparation, and
facilitating the verification.
However, for maximum benefit, the system has been
complemented by and been part of other reforms that include
improved risk management and better coordination between
agencies when required, vetting clearing agents, streamlining
traffic flow, and imposing strict parking rules for truck drivers
to decongest the customs control zone. The system for
managing the physical movement of traffic through the border
post is called the Customs Reconciliation System (CURES). It
was developed in-house by the Uganda Revenue Authority to
capture information on the physical movement of trucks and
containers. Using the CURES system, the authorities are able
to keep track of trucks and cargo entering and leaving the
control zone.
The Malaba border is one of the busiest in sub-Sahara

Africa, with a daily average of 650 heavy commercial
trucks crossing from Kenya to Uganda. The border post
was congested and border management agencies were
operating near capacity. The reforms adopted at the end of
2011 promoted a change in the behavior and operational
arrangements of the logistics service providers that could be
made possible only through IT developments. Together, the
reforms at the border post between Kenya and Uganda have
resulted in some of the shortest border crossing times in subSaharan Africa (Figure A). The figure shows the dramatic fall in
border dwell times when the cocktail of measures took effect
in late 2011 into early 2012. Average border dwell times per
truck fell from over 12 hours to about 3 hours.
IT can certainly help to improve transit for landlocked
countries, but it is by no means a panacea. Several
complementary measures are also needed, and IT is often
the last to be put into place so as not to substitute for real
reforms. Done properly, reforms and judicious automation can
significantly reduce the resources required for infrastructure
improvements.
Department.
a solid 29th out of 132 countries (see Appendix B), Chad

represents the weakest performer in the entire sample.
Landlocked African countries do not have in place
the necessary attributes to facilitate the administrative
processes related to importing and exporting goods.
According to 2012 World Bank data,22 it costs almost
US$5,000 to import a container to Rwanda, and it takes
29 days and 8 documents. Interestingly, countries that
have the least efficient border administration on the
continent are the landlocked countries, which face many
disadvantages because of their geographical situation.
Many efforts have been made to establish access to port
infrastructure in neighboring countries through corridors,
infrastructure projects, and international agreements.
However, our data show that, on average, the inefficient
import-export procedures in these countries constitute a
much more important trade barrier than limited access
to ports. Indeed, on a scale of 1 to 7, these landlocked
countries achieve a score of 2.47 for efficiency of
border administration, while access to a port receives a
significantly higher value of 3.59. Although the ETI is not
a tool designed to identify the binding constraints to a
countrys trade performance, it provides an indication of
the order of magnitude and importance of the different
problems. The results of the ETI support the finding that
improving the efficiency of border agencies and their
collaboration may provide higher payoffs than improving
access to international maritime networks for landlocked
countries in Africa. Both areas present serious obstacles,
however, and overcoming them has great potential for

significantly bettering the situation (see Box3).23
In terms of transparency at the border, the results
are fairly even across the subregions, although significant
differences exist across countries, with Mauritius
occupying a good 46th position and Chad ranking a
low 131st. Corruption at the border favors illegal or illicit
trade and is a key impediment to participation in global
trade, as it contributes to making border clearance time
unpredictable and may represent a prohibitive trade
barrier for businesses that are committed not to pay
bribes. Corruption at the border is a trade barrier that is
particularly damaging to the domestic economy because
it often reflects illegal or illicit trade activities and because
the benefits accrue to a small group of well-connected
public officials who abuse their power for private
gain. The goals of African countries in terms of trade
development cannot be achieved without major efforts to
tackle corruption at domestic borders.
Transport and ICT infrastructure is another key
element that contributes to the cost of trading in Africa.
Relevant elements include not only the availability and
quality of transport infrastructure (see Chapter 2.2), but
also whether logistics and transportation services are
available. This availability is increasingly becoming a key
factor for exporters, as it determines a significant share
of the trade cost. For landlocked countries, access to
ports in neighboring countries is also crucial. The ETI
results show that landlocked countries do lag behind
the African average as well as the sub-Saharan African
Figure 8: The most problematic factors for exporting in Africa
Access to trade finance

Identifying potential markets and buyers
Difficulties in meeting quality/quantity requirements of buyers
Inappropriate production technology and skills
Burdensome procedures and corruption at foreign borders
High cost or delays caused by domestic transportation
Access to imported inputs at competitive prices
High cost or delays caused by international transportation
l Landlocked sub-Saharan Africa
l North Africa
Tariff barriers abroad

Technical requirements and standards abroad
Rules of origin requirements abroad
0
10
15
20
25
Percent
Source: World Economic Forum, Executive Opinion Survey 2012; authors calculations.
Notes: From a list of ten factors, respondents were asked to select the five most problematic for exporting in their country and rank them between 1 (most problematic) and 5. The bars in the figure
show the responses weighted according to their rankings. The most problematic factors sample includes all African countries that were covered in the Executive Opinion Survey 2012. The
sample includes the following groups of economies: landlocked: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; North
Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Morocco; sub-Saharan Africa: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Cte dIvoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
average in terms of availability and quality of transport

infrastructure. On the other hand, transport infrastructure
appears to be well developed across North Africa, which
has reached levels that are on a par with those found
in Southeast Asia. The three North African economies
tend to perform better in terms of availability of transport
infrastructure (with a score of 5.1 out of 7), while the
quality of infrastructure is still insufficient (a score of
3.8). Although Morocco and Egypt are well connected
to global maritime routes (16th and 17th, respectively,
on the transshipment connectivity index), port quality in
Algeria is poor, ranked 113th.
Although North African economies perform
well on the infrastructure component of the ETI, the
assessment of logistics services does not keep up with
these good results. Most African countries show room
for improvement in the various indicators of logistics
quality, such as logistics competence and how easy and
affordable it is to arrange international shipments. Maritime
services are widely available in countries of the subregion,
as shown in the good results achieved on the Liner
Shipping Connectivity Index in Algeria (33rd), Morocco
(18th), and Egypt (19th). Improving the logistics services in
sub-Saharan Africa, including in the landlocked countries,
would further reduce the cost of trade from and to this
region. The World Bank estimates that reform leading to a
more competitive transport sector could halve the cost of
moving staples in West Africa over 10 years.24 Although
the best performer from the region, South Africa, reaches

the level found in Southeast Asia and ranks 26th, logistics
services are underdeveloped in the vast majority of subSaharan countries.
The rising importance of global value chains has
raised the importance of ICT connectivity for goods
trade because producing parts of a good requires more
exchange on product specification, production-related
data, delivery times, and, in some cases, also training.
Furthermore, ICTs have become key for business-tobusiness and business-to-consumer customer relations
as well as for identifying buyers, which remains the
second most important barrier to exporting, according to
data on the most problematic factors for trade obtained
from the World Economic Forums Executive Opinion
Survey (the Survey) (analyzed in detail in the next section).
None of the countries from the region reaches the level
of ICT connectivity found in Southeast Asia or Latin
America. The best-performing African country, Mauritius,
ranks a low 79th. Although North Africa is relatively well
connected in international comparison, trade in landlocked
countries on the continentand in sub-Saharan Africa
as a wholewould benefit from better connectivity. This
could be achieved through improvements to mobile and
broadband penetration and a greater use of the Internet
and other ICTs by business and government. The use of
ICTs is important for the degree to which administrative
processes related to importing and exporting can be IT
Figure 9: The most problematic factors for importing in Africa
Burdensome import procedures
Tariffs and non-tariff barriers
High cost or delays caused by international transportation
Corruption at the border
Domestic technical requirements and standards
High cost or delays caused by domestic transportation

l Landlocked sub-Saharan Africa
l North Africa
Crime and theft
Inappropriate telecommunications infrastructure
10
15
20
25
Percent
Source: World Economic Forum, Executive Opinion Survey 2012; authors calculations.
Notes: From a list of eight factors, respondents were asked to select the five most problematic for importing in their country and rank them between 1 (most problematic) and 5. The bars in the
figure show the responses weighted according to their rankings. The most problematic factors sample includes all African countries that were covered in the Executive Opinion Survey 2012.
The sample includes the following groups of economies: landlocked: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; North
Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Morocco; sub-Saharan Africa: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Cte dIvoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
based, which in turn is key to making them more efficient

and more transparent. More importantly, ICTs could
contribute to overcoming the particular challenges related
to being landlocked by developing the export of business
or tourism services, for example.
The overall business environment is the 4th
subindex of the ETI. It consists of the regulatory
environment for trade-related activities, which includes
factors such as general governance indicators,
openness to investment, ease of hiring foreign labor,
and the availability of trade finance. A number of
African countries have made great strides in improving
their regulatory environment. For example, Botswana,
Rwanda, and Mauritiusdespite many differences in
their regulatory environmentshave all made significant
improvements in this respect and come in within the top
40 on this pillar. Their governments are considered by
the business community to be more efficient than those
of other countries in the region, and their relevant rules
and regulations are supportive of foreign investment.
At the same time, a number of African countries still
suffer from very poor institutions that affect their trade
performance. Chad (126th), Angola (129th), and Burundi
(130th) are the weakest performers in the region on
this pillar. Key issues across the continent include the
insufficient definition and protection of property rights for
physical and intellectual property, widespread corruption,
and undue influence. At the same time, countries
regulations are fairly open to welcoming foreign labor

and investment.
Last but not least, the fairly high levels of physical
security are an advantage for the African continent, in
particular when compared with Latin American countries,
which perform significantly less well on this dimension.
The best-performing country, Rwanda, occupies an
excellent 15th position and is followed by Senegal at
38th and Botswana at 39th. Not surprisingly, very low
levels of security are found in some countries, such as
Nigeria (119th), Kenya (120th), and Burundi (124th).
THE MOST PROBLEMATIC FACTORS FOR TRADE IN
AFRICA
The World Economic Forums Survey asks top
executives to rate the main bottlenecks for exporting and
importing in their countries. Respondents were asked
to choose and rank in order of importance from a list
of factors (ten factors for exports and eight for imports)
those five that they believe have the highest impact on
the ease of exporting and importing in the country in
which they operate. For exports we included a wide
range of factors that may inhibit export development,
such as supply-side constraints, technical requirements,
rules of origin, and administrative procedures. The import
factors mirror the structure of the ETI to the extent
possible, providing an indication of the importance of
the pillars of the ETI for the trading environment of these

countries.
These two questions concerning exports and
imports identify the most important bottlenecks to trade
and supply-chain connectivity across the economies
covered in the Survey. In addition, the results can
provide insight about the most important bottlenecks to
trade globally and inform multilateral trade negotiations
about priority areas for liberalization. Figures 8 and 9
show that the most important impediments to trade are
largely the same across the three African subregions.
Overall, insufficient access to trade finance is the most
important bottleneck to increased exports (although the
importance of this factor is less pronounced for North
Africa than for the rest of the continent), followed by the
difficulty in identifying potential markets and buyers. The
limitations in access to trade finance are probably linked
to the underdeveloped financial markets in most of the
countries, as discussed in Chapter 1.1.25 Other factors
such as difficulties in meeting quality and quantity
requirements of buyers and inappropriate production
technology and skillsare cited by at least 10 percent of
respondents among more than one subregion.
The data thus corroborate findings from the
ETI analysis above: burdensome border procedures
and corruption, for example, are considered a more
important barrier than tariff barriers or NTMs in the
narrow sense (compliance with technical and quality
standards certificates, etc.). Furthermore, the data
confirm the need for more regional integration: high
costs or delays caused by poor domestic transportation
are considered a higher burden than those incurred
by international transportation. This may point to
bottlenecks at border crossings to neighboring countries,
for example, or inappropriately connected infrastructure.
The most problematic factors for exporting yield a slightly
different priority in North Africa: similar to sub-Saharan
Africa, identifying potential markets and buyers is listed
as the second most important impediment. However,
difficulties in meeting quality/quantity requirements
of buyers, inappropriate production technology and
skills, and foreign technical requirements play a more
prominent role for North African countries, whereas
access to trade finance is considered less problematic.
On the import side, Figure9 confirms the results
from the ETI analysis: from the perception of business
leaders, burdensome import procedures emerge as
the most important impediment to trade across the
continent, nearly on a par with tariffs and non-tariff
barriers in the narrow sense. The cost of international
transportation is the third most important factor,
followed by corruption at the border. However, the
figure also reveals that border corruption is much
more pronounced in landlocked Africa and North
Africa than in sub-Saharan Africa. Crime and theft and
poor telecommunications play a much smaller role
throughout the continent. This result underlines not only
the importance of trade facilitation at multilateral and

bilateral levels, but also the potential of countries for
facilitating trade through practical measures within their
governments purview.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has analyzed how African countries perform
in terms of enabling trade by using the World Economic
Forums Enabling Trade Index. The 31 countries covered
in the 2012 edition of The Global Enabling Trade Report
were included in the analysis, which covered the four
main categories of the Index: market access, border
administration, infrastructure, and business environment.
The analysis differentiated among three categories of
countries within the continent: North Africa, sub-Saharan
Africa, and a subgroup of landlocked countries.
The results show that, although a number of African
countries have facilitated market access domestically
and for their exporters abroad and have achieved high
levels of physical security, they lag behind across a
number of areas assessed by the Index. There is room
for improvement in terms of the efficiency of import
and export procedures, the transparency of border
administration, and the use of ICTs. Furthermore,
logistics services and insufficient infrastructure add to
the cost of trading and act as a barrier to higher levels of
By improving their performance across the
dimensions of the ETI, African countries could better
prepare their economies to benefit from international
trade. For landlocked countries, the two challenges that
need to be tackled are streamlining border administration
to reduce the cost of procedures and delays during
clearance and improving the coordination of the
clearance process. Equally important is the promotion
of access and use of ICTs, which is poor not only in
landlocked countries but also across all of sub-Saharan
Africa. As pointed out in other chapters of this Report,
countries in the region could benefit from increased
infrastructure investment in the area of ICTs.
In the case of North Africa, transparency of border
administration appears to be the most important
factor limiting trade in goods in the three North African
countries assessedAlgeria, Egypt, and Morocco.
These countries could also benefit from more open
access to domestic and foreign markets.
These improvements are necessary for countries
to more fully participate in global value chains, which
account for a significant and rising share of trade flows,
and to advance toward a higher degree of regional
integration. More trade integration within the region
would also contribute to higher food security across
the continent. This chapter provides information on
one specific set of measures that could enable African
countries to further benefit from trade. It is intended to
be a motivator for change and a foundation for dialogue,
by providing a yardstick of the extent to which countries
have in place the factors that facilitate the free flow of

goods and by identifying areas where improvements are
most needed.
23 Although the ETI elements provide an indication of the potential

challenges to be addressed, it has to be noted that these
elements are highly interrelated. For example, delays in port
clearance may result from issues related to administrative
procedures that are captured under border administration.
NOTES
24 Bromley et al. 2011.
1 IMF 2012a.
25 Access to trade finance and access to finance overall are most

likely strongly correlated for two reasons. First, the availability of
trade finance depends on the development of the financial system.
Second, respondents are likely to judge the overall availability of
finance for their needs and may not clearly distinguish between
the different instruments.
2 Authors calculations, based on World Trade Organization timeseries data.

3 The definition of minerals follows the sector classification
developed by the International Trade Centre in their Trade
Performance Index. In addition to crude oil and gas, this category
also contains all metal ores and other minerals as well as
petroleum products, liquefied gas, coal, and precious stones. The
data used cover the years 2006 through 2010 or the most recent
year available. Further information on these data can be found at
http://www.intracen.org/menus/countries.htm.
4 One-fifth of total government revenues stem from natural resource
extraction in Equatorial Guinea, the Republic of Congo, Angola,
Nigeria, Chad, Gabon, Botswana, Cameroon, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, and Guinea (IMF 2012b).
5 These data are from UNCTAD Stats, Intra-trade of regional
and trade groups by product, annual, 19952011, available
at http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.
aspx?ReportId=24397.
6 World Bank 2012b.
7 World Bank 2012a.
8 World Bank 2008.
9 One of the reasons that the barriers remain in place may be that
the complementarity of production structures in many neighboring
African countries probably makes it more difficult from a political
economy standpoint to pursue regional free trade.
REFERENCES
Ben Barka, H. 2012. Border Posts, Checkpoints, and Intra-African
Trade: Challenges and Solutions. African Development Bank,
January. Available at http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/
afdb/Documents/Publications/INTRA%20AFRICAN%20TRADE_
INTRA%20AFRICAN%20TRADE.pdf.
Bromley, D. W., A. Cook, S. Singh, and N. Van Dusen. 2011. Regional
Agricultural Transport and Trade Policy Study. USAID West Africa
Trade Hub Technical Report No. 42, March. Available at http://
www.watradehub.com/resources/resourcefiles/jun11/regionalagricultural-trade-policy-and-transport-study.
Browne, C., T. Geiger, and T. Gutknecht. 2012. The Executive Opinion
Survey: The Voice of the Business Community. In The Global
Competitiveness Report 20122013. Geneva: World Economic
Forum. 6978.
Fitzmaurice, M. and O. Hartmann. 2013. Border Crossing Monitoring
along the Northern Corridor. Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy
Program, Working Paper No. 96. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Available at http://www4.worldbank.org/afr/ssatp/Resources/
SSATPWP96-border-crossing.pdf.
10 Authors calculations, based on World Bank Doing Business 2013

data.
IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2012a. World Economic Outlook

database, October. Available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/weo/2012/02/weodata/index.aspx.
11 See Ben Barka 2012, which also contains more examples and
a more thorough discussion of the importance of administrative
barriers for regional trade in Africa.
. 2012b. Sub-Saharan Africa: Sustaining Growth amid Global

Uncertainty, April. Regional Economic Outlook. Available at http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2012/afr/eng/sreo0412.pdf.
12 Bromley et al. 2011.
ITC (International Trade Centre). Trade Performance Index, April 2012.

Available at http://www.intracen. org/menus/countries.htm.
13 World Bank 2012b.

14 We have focused on the flow of trade in goods in the Index for
expository purposes, although we recognize that enabling in
services is also important. By circumscribing the issue clearly, the
Index provides a useful vehicle for analyzing policy on a clearly
defined part of the issue. Trade in goods accounts for upwards of
80 percent of all trade, and is therefore highly relevant.
15 See Browne et al. 2012.
16 The score of each subindex is derived as an unweighted average
of the pillars that constitute it.
17 The choice of an unweighted average results from the recognition
that no current research can provide guidance on the importance
of the different factors. At the country level, the most problematic
factors for importing shown in Figure9 provide some indication
of the importance of the different factors because they mirror the
categories of the ETI to the extent possible.
18 Tests were carried out using regression analysis in a gravity model
of trade. See World Economic Forum 2009.
19 Both South Africa and Morocco have benefitted from the removal
and revision of the data on non-tariff measures, respectively.
20 A more detailed analysis of country performances can be found in
World Economic Forum 2012b.
21 See www.asycuda.org for implementation status of ASYCUDA in
African countries.
22 World Bank 2011.
UNCTAD. ASYCUDA (AUtomated SYstem for CUstoms Data). Available

at http://www.asycuda.org/.
World Bank. 2008. Regional Trade in Food Staples: Prospects for
Stimulating Agricultural Growth and Moderating Short-Term
Food Security Crises in Eastern and Southern Africa. Report No.
46929-AFR. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at https://
openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/7829.
. 2011. Doing Business 2012: Doing Business in a More
Transparent World. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at
http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doingbusiness-2012.
. 2012a. Africa Can Help Feed Africa: Removing Barriers to
Regional Trade in Food Staples. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Resources/Africa-Can-Feed-Africa-Report.pdf.
. 2012b. De-Fragmenting Africa: Deepening Regional Integration
in Goods and Services. Washington, DC: World Bank.
BLIC0.pdf.
World Economic Forum. 2009. The Global Enabling Trade Report 2009.
Geneva: World Economic Forum.
. 2010. The Global Enabling Trade Report 2010. Geneva: World
Economic Forum.
. 2012a. The Global Competitiveness Report 20122013. Geneva:
. 2012b. The Global Enabling Trade Report 2012: Reducing Supply
Chain Barriers. Geneva: World Economic Forum.
Appendix A:
Composition of the Enabling Trade Index 2012
This appendix provides details about the construction of

the Enabling Trade Index (ETI).
The ETI is composed of four subindexes: the market
access subindex; the border administration subindex; the
transport and communications infrastructure subindex;
and the business environment subindex. These
subindexes are, in turn, composed of the nine pillars of
the ETI: domestic and foreign market access, efficiency
of customs administration, efficiency of import-export
procedures, transparency of border administration,
availability and quality of transport infrastructure,
availability and quality of transport services, availability
and use of ICTs, regulatory environment, and physical
security. These pillars are calculated on the basis of both
hard data and survey data.
The survey data are mainly derived from the responses
to the World Economic Forums Executive Opinion Survey
and range from 1 to 7. In addition, survey data from the
World Banks Logistics Performance Index (LPI) have also
been included. The hard data were collected from various
recognized sources, such as the World Bank, the World
Trade Organization (WTO), the International Trade Centre
(ITC), and the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD). The data are described in detail
in Appendix C. All of the data used in the calculation of the
ETI can be found in the data tables on the website of The
Global Enabling Trade Report 2012 (www.weforum.org/
getr).
The hard data indicators used in the ETI, as well as
the results from the LPI survey, are normalized to a 1-to-7
scale in order to align them with the Executive Opinion
Survey results.1 Each of the pillars has been calculated
as an unweighted average of the individual component
variables. The subindexes are then compounded as
unweighted averages of the included pillars.
In the case of the domestic and foreign market
access pillar, the score in the domestic market subpillar
accounts for two-thirds and the score in foreign market
access accounts for one-third of the overall pillar. In
the case of the availability and quality of transport
infrastructure pillar, which is itself composed of two
subpillars (availability of transport infrastructure and
quality of transport infrastructure), the overall pillar is the
unweighted average of the two subpillars. The overall ETI
is then calculated as the unweighted average of the four
subindexes.
The variables and the composition of pillars are
described below. If a variable is one of hard data, this is
indicated in parentheses after the description.
SUBINDEX A: MARKET ACCESS

Pillar 1: Domestic and foreign market access
A. Domestic market access

1.01 Tariff rate (hard data)

1.02 Non-tariff measures (hard data)2

1.03 Complexity of tariffs (hard data)3

Tariff dispersion (hard data)

Tariff peaks (hard data)

Specific tariffs (hard data)

Distinct tariffs (hard data)

1.04 Share of duty-free imports (hard data)

B. Foreign market access

1.05 Tariffs faced (hard data)
1.06 Margin of preference in destination markets

(hard data)
SUBINDEX B: BORDER ADMINISTRATION

Pillar 2: Efficiency of customs administration


2.02 Customs services index (hard data)
Pillar

3: Efficiency of import-export procedures

3.01 Efficiency of the clearance process4
3.02 Time to import (hard data)
3.03 Documents to import (hard data)
3.04 Cost to import (hard data)
3.05 Time to export (hard data)
3.06 Documents to export (hard data)
3.07 Cost to export (hard data)
Pillar 4: Transparency of border administration

4.01 Irregular payments in exports and imports

4.02 Corruption Perceptions Index (hard data)
SUBINDEX C: TRANSPORT AND

COMMUNICATIONS
INFRASTRUCTURE
NOTES
1 The standard formula for converting each hard data variable to the
1-to-7 scale is
Pillar 5: Availability and quality of transport infrastructure

A. Availability of transport infrastructure

5.01 Airport density (hard data)

5.02 Transshipment connectivity index (hard data)

5.03 Paved roads (hard data)

Pillar


+1
The sample minimum and sample maximum are the lowest and
highest scores of the overall sample, respectively. For those hard
data variables for which a higher value indicates a worse outcome
B. Quality of transport infrastructure

5.05 Quality of railroad infrastructure
Pillar

6x
(e.g., tariff barriers, road congestion), we rely on a normalization

formula that, in addition to converting the series to a 1-to-7 scale,
reverses it, so that 1 and 7 still correspond to the worst and best
possible outcomes, respectively:
6: Availability and quality of transport services

6.01 Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (hard data)
6.02 Ease and affordability of shipment4
6.03 Logistics competence4
6.04 Tracking and tracing ability4
6.05 Timeliness of shipments in reaching
4
destination
6.06 Postal services efficiency
6.07 GATS commitments in the transport

sector (hard data)
7: Availability and use of ICTs
7.01 Extent of business Internet use
7.02 Mobile telephone subscriptions (hard data)
7.03 Broadband Internet subscribers (hard data)
7.04 Government Online Service Index (hard data)
7.05 Internet users (hard data)
6 x

+7
In some instances, adjustments were made to account for

extreme outliers in the data.
2 This indicator is not included in the pillar calculation.
3 Complexity of tariffs is the average of the other four variables.
4 The LPI data are derived from the World Banks Logistics
Performance Index Survey, which is based on a 1-to-5 scale. LPI
data were normalized to a 1-to-7 scale using the above formula in
order to align it with the Executive Opinion Survey results.
5 These variables are composite indicators comprising multiple
variables used in the World Economic Forums Global
Competitiveness Index. For details, see The Global
6 Openness to foreign participation is the average of the other four
variables.
SUBINDEX D: BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT

Pillar 8: Regulatory environment

8.01 Property rights5

8.02 Ethics and corruption5

8.03 Undue influence5

8.04 Government efficiency5

8.05 Domestic competition5

8.06 Efficiency of the financial market5

8.07 Openness to foreign participation6

Ease of hiring foreign labor

Prevalence of foreign ownership

Business impact of rules on FDI

Openness to multilateral trade rules

(hard data)

8.08 Availability of trade finance
Pillar

9: Physical security
Appendix B:
The Enabling Trade Index 2012: Africa and comparator economies, by pillar
PILLARS
OVERALL INDEX
Country/Region
Rank
Domestic market access, Foreign market access,

17 (best)
17 (best)
Score
Rank
Score
2nd pillar:
Efficiency of customs
administration,
17 (best)
Rank
Score
Rank
Score
3rd pillar:
Efficiency of importexport procedures,
17 (best)
Rank
Score
4th pillar:
Transparency of border
administration,
17 (best)
Rank
Score
NORTH AFRICA
Morocco
64
4.08
120
3.44
31
3.80
39
4.64
41
5.09
65
3.39
Egypt
90
3.78
123
3.34
34
3.75
80
3.85
55
4.88
94
2.83
Algeria
120
3.22
117
3.55
123
1.90
116
2.92
93
4.00
120
2.41
3.69
3.45
3.15
3.81
4.66
2.88
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Mauritius
36
4.62
5.95
24
4.02
55
4.41
29
5.35
46
4.04
Rwanda
51
4.35
20
5.37
35
3.69
22
5.26
115
2.79
37
4.66
Botswana
54
4.31
19
5.41
85
2.36
34
4.74
112
3.01
35
4.75
South Africa
63
4.10
49
4.83
90
2.18
33
4.92
100
3.69
47
3.97
Namibia
75
3.92
45
4.87
59
2.96
106
3.12
103
3.49
50
3.84
Malawi
85
3.79
78
4.79
5.42
83
3.79
120
2.45
83
3.00
Zambia
88
3.78
33
5.11
29
3.81
63
4.24
122
2.38
85
2.98
Gambia, The
91
3.74
127
3.10
62
2.92
79
3.86
67
4.69
62
3.51
Senegal
92
3.72
111
3.63
60
2.95
88
3.70
61
4.79
74
3.10
Tanzania
94
3.69
85
4.65
12
4.64
119
2.85
78
4.40
96
2.80
Mozambique
97
3.65
79
4.77
15
4.34
87
3.71
98
3.82
81
3.03
Uganda
98
3.64
47
4.85
4.88
51
4.44
116
2.75
112
2.54
Ghana
99
3.59
104
4.01
80
2.50
108
3.06
75
4.44
71
3.13
Kenya
103
3.52
41
4.99
42
3.49
129
2.59
110
3.27
121
2.41
Ethiopia
106
3.49
122
3.40
18
4.08
60
4.30
119
2.63
90
2.92
Madagascar
107
3.48
87
4.58
4.81
130
2.57
77
4.40
110
2.56
Lesotho
113
3.41
91
4.51
27
3.93
123
2.81
108
3.31
86
2.98
Benin
115
3.39
118
3.55
84
2.39
113
2.96
94
3.99
103
2.65
Cameroon
118
3.28
116
3.56
57
3.02
92
3.50
111
3.04
109
2.56
Mali
121
3.18
105
3.97
83
2.44
117
2.90
113
2.93
119
2.43
Burkina Faso
122
3.15
107
3.94
74
2.67
102
3.29
126
1.96
98
2.78
Nigeria
123
3.13
108
3.82
127
1.55
115
2.93
106
3.41
116
2.48
Mauritania
125
3.06
115
3.58
63
2.92
127
2.78
104
3.42
118
2.43
Cte dIvoire
126
3.02
113
3.59
120
2.03
109
3.05
117
2.74
124
2.39
Angola
127
3.01
109
3.72
52
3.21
128
2.69
124
2.21
122
2.40
Zimbabwe
129
2.96
132
2.18
48
3.37
98
3.44
129
1.82
91
2.91
Burundi
131
2.95
36
5.06
49
3.35
125
2.79
125
2.01
128
2.21
Chad
132
2.63
124
3.28
79
2.56
120
2.84
132
1.56
131
2.01
Sub-Saharan African average
3.52
4.25
3.30
3.48
3.24
2.98
BRICs
China
56
4.22
97
4.26
92
2.13
45
4.50
37
5.17
59
Brazil
84
3.79
101
4.05
68
2.82
99
3.41
101
3.69
57
3.59
3.69
India
100
3.55
130
2.77
88
2.27
70
4.10
79
4.38
84
2.99
Russian Federation
112
3.41
125
3.19
82
2.45
89
3.66
114
2.90
113
2.53
BRICs average
3.74
3.57
2.42
3.92
4.04
3.20
Latin America and the

Caribbean average
3.88
4.99
3.66
3.86
4.27
3.22
4.42
4.84
4.44
4.37
5.24
3.43
PILLARS
5th pillar:
6th pillar: Availability
Availability and
and quality of transport
quality of transport
services,
infrastructure, 17 (best)
17 (best)
Country/Region
Rank
Score
Rank
Score
7th pillar:
Availability and use of
ICTs,
17 (best)
8th pillar:
Regulatory
environment,
17 (best)
Rank
Score
Rank
9th pillar:
Physical security,
17 (best)
Score
Rank
Score
NORTH AFRICA
Morocco
52
4.59
49
3.93
84
3.38
48
3.99
66
4.87
Egypt
55
4.48
51
3.91
81
3.43
58
3.78
104
3.88
Algeria
65
4.24
96
3.27
105
2.63
123
2.88
106
3.86
4.44
3.71
3.14
3.55
4.20
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Mauritius
40
4.86
89
3.36
79
3.49
37
4.36
56
5.02
Rwanda
124
2.95
78
3.48
111
2.46
24
4.79
15
5.97
Botswana
69
4.16
45
4.04
90
3.13
33
4.43
39
5.35
South Africa
63
4.32
26
4.45
85
3.34
36
4.36
100
4.08
Namibia
46
4.71
113
2.96
104
2.64
43
4.17
63
4.91
Malawi
107
3.26
88
3.36
130
1.93
68
3.68
71
4.79
Zambia
101
3.36
115
2.92
113
2.44
57
3.81
67
4.86
78
3.85
117
2.90
100
2.81
39
4.29
50
5.17
Senegal
104
3.34
87
3.38
98
2.91
94
3.47
38
5.37
Tanzania
110
3.18
105
3.07
114
2.35
87
3.53
93
4.22
99
3.38
126
2.64
118
2.29
107
3.30
101
4.07
Uganda
128
2.63
95
3.30
115
2.35
73
3.62
108
3.81
Ghana
100
3.37
111
2.98
102
2.66
61
3.73
65
4.88
Kenya
87
3.71
109
3.00
95
3.00
75
3.61
120
3.57
Ethiopia
121
2.99
93
3.33
128
2.10
90
3.50
61
4.97
Madagascar
105
3.29
114
2.95
126
2.14
121
3.01
116
3.62
Lesotho
125
2.74
123
2.74
119
2.25
111
3.19
92
4.23
Benin
115
3.08
63
3.75
109
2.47
88
3.51
76
4.70
Cameroon
122
2.97
121
2.83
117
2.34
103
3.33
79
4.63
Mali
123
2.96
120
2.84
121
2.24
106
3.30
89
4.35
Burkina Faso
131
2.24
119
2.89
127
2.11
108
3.30
77
4.68
Nigeria
114
3.08
97
3.27
106
2.62
91
3.49
119
3.57
Mauritania
120
3.04
125
2.71
122
2.19
122
2.91
110
3.79
Cte dIvoire
113
3.11
100
3.19
107
2.53
120
3.01
113
3.68
Angola
129
2.50
127
2.52
120
2.25
129
2.60
78
4.66
Zimbabwe
116
3.07
108
3.02
123
2.16
119
3.03
83
4.59
Burundi
132
2.24
132
2.05
131
1.74
130
2.58
124
3.31
Chad
130
2.31
130
2.47
132
1.55
126
2.72
112
3.75
Gambia, The
Mozambique
Sub-Saharan African average
3.24
3.08
2.45
3.52
4.45
BRICs
China
53
4.49
21
4.73
72
3.60
38
4.31
62
Brazil
109
3.19
48
3.98
53
4.23
70
3.66
81
4.95
4.62
India
76
3.96
59
3.82
97
2.97
50
3.95
87
4.45
Russian Federation
56
4.46
72
3.57
42
4.64
117
3.07
107
3.84
BRICs average
4.03
4.02
3.86
3.74
4.47
Latin America and the

Caribbean average
3.76
3.24
3.59
3.49
3.85
4.42
4.38
3.88
4.17
4.63
Appendix C:
Technical notes and sources for the Enabling Trade Index 2012
This appendix provides detailed information, including

computation methods and sources, on all the indicators
that enter the Enabling Trade Index (ETI). For each
indicator, the title appears on the first line, preceded by
its number to allow for quick reference. The numbering
matches the one used in Appendix A.
Below is a description of the indicator or, in the case
of the Executive Opinion Survey data, the full question
and associated responses.
1.03b Tariff peaks

Share of tariff lines with domestic peaks (percentage) | 2011 or
most recent year available
This indicator is the ratio of the number of tariff lines exceeding
three times the average domestic tariff (across all products) to
the most favored nation (MFN) tariff schedule. The tariff schedule
is equal to the total number of tariff lines for each country. These
tariffs are revised on a yearly basis.
Source: International Trade Centre
1.03c Specific tariffs

Share of tariff lines with specific tariffs (percentage] | 2011 or
Pillar 1: Domestic and foreign market access

1.01 Tariff rate
Trade-weighted average tariff rate | 2011, 2010 or most recent
year available
This indicator is calculated as a weighted average of all the
applied tariff rates, including preferential rates that a country
applies to the rest of the world. The weights are the trade
patterns of the importing countrys reference group (2010 data).
An applied tariff is a customs duty that is levied on imports of
merchandise goods.
This indicator is the ratio of the number of Harmonized System

(HS) tariff lines with at least one specific tariff to the total number
of HS tariff lines. A specific tariff is a tariff rate charged on a fixed
amount per quantity (as opposed to ad valorem taxes, which are
based on the assessed value of the property).
1.03d Number of distinct tariffs

Number of distinct tariffs for all sectors | 2011 or most recent
year available
This indicator reflects the number of distinct tariff rates applied by
a country on its imports across all sectors.
1.02 Non-tariff measures (included yet not part of the index)

Index of non-tariff measures (NTMs] | 2011 or most recent year
available
This index is constructed as the average of two NTM-related
variables. NTMs may take the form of quotas, charges,
discriminatory labeling, or health standards and other restrictive
conditions. The variables included are the percentage of trade
affected by NTMs and the average number of notifications for
products affected by NTMs, for products with imports larger than
0. A notification is a transparency obligation requiring member
governments to report trade measures to the relevant World
Trade Organization (WTO) body if the measures might have an
effect on other members. NTMs that apply to all products are
excluded from the calculations because they do not represent
discrimination on particular goods. Also, politically motivated
NTMs, such as embargos, have been excluded.
Source: Authors calculations based on International Trade Centre
data
1.04 Share of duty-free imports

Duty-free imports as a share of total imports | 2011, 2010 or
Share of trade, excluding petroleum, that is imported free of
tariff duties, taking into account most-favored nation tariffs and
preferential agreements. Tariff data are from 2011 or most recent
year available and imports data are from 2010.
1.05 Tariffs faced

Trade-weighted average tariff faced in destination markets |
2011, 2010 or most recent year available
This indicator is calculated as the average of the applied tariff
rates, including preferential rates that the rest of the world applies
to each country.
1.03 Complexity of tariffs

Index of the complexity of tariffs | 2011 or most recent year
available
This variable is calculated as the average of the following
indicators: tariff dispersion (1.03a), tariff peaks (1.03b), specific
tariffs (1.03c), and number of distinct tariffs (1.03d). See below for
the description of the single underlying indicators.
1.03a Tariff dispersion

Standard deviation of tariff rates | 2011 or most recent year
available
This indicator reflects differences in tariffs across product
categories in a countrys tariff structure. The variance is calculated
across all the tariffs on imported merchandise goods, at the
6-digit level of the Harmonized Schedule.
1.06 Margin of preference in destination markets

Index of margin of preference in destination markets | 2010
This indicator measures the percentage by which particular
imports from one country are subject to lower tariffs than the
most-favored nation (MFN) rate. It is calculated as the average
of two components: (1) the trade-weighted average difference
between the MFN tariff and the most advantageous preferential
duty (advantage score), and (2) the trade-weighted average of the
ratios of the advantageous score to the tariff level. This allows the
indicator to capture both the absolute and the relative margin of
preference.
Pillar 2: Efficiency of customs administration
3.03 Documents to import

Number of all documents required to import goods | 2011
This variable takes into account all documents required to import

the goods that are recorded. It is assumed that the contract
has already been agreed upon and signed by both parties.
Documents include bank documents, customs declaration and
clearance documents, port filing documents, import licenses,
and other official documents exchanged between the concerned
parties. Documents filed simultaneously are considered different
documents but with the same time frame for completion.
How would you rate the level of efficiency of customs

procedures (related to the entry and exit of merchandise) in
your country? [1 = extremely inefficient; 7 = extremely efficient]
| 2010, 2011
Source: World Economic Forum, Executive Opinion Survey 2010,
2011
Source: The World Bank, Doing Business 2012
2.02 Customs services index

Extent of services provided by customs authorities and related
agencies | 2009 or most recent year
This variable is based on 15 Global Express Association
customs barriers survey questions capturing different aspects
of the services offered by customs and related agencies. The
services included are the following: clearance of shipments
via electronic data interchange; separation of physical release
of goods from the fiscal control; full-time (24 hours/7 days a
week) automated processing; customs working hours adapted
to commercial needs; fee for services in normal service hours;
inspection and release of goods arriving by air by the operators
facility; automated risk assessment as primary basis for physical
examination of shipments; multiple inspections (inspections
by agencies other than customs), and the promptness of
those inspections; exemptions from full customs formalities for
shipments of minimal value; exemptions from a duties and taxes
for shipments of minimal value; clearance of shipments by a
third party; appeal of customs decisions to a higher level or an
independent tribunal; and use of reference prices or arbitrary
uplifts to invoice values. The maximum score an economy can
obtain is 12.
3.04 Cost to import

Cost (US$ per container) associated with all the procedures
required to import goods | 2011
This variable measures the fees levied on a 20-foot container in
US dollars. All the fees associated with completing the procedures
to export or import the goods are included. These include costs
for documents, administrative fees for customs clearance and
technical control, terminal handling charges, and inland transport.
The cost measure does not include tariffs or trade taxes. Only
official costs are recorded.
3.05 Time to export

Number of days necessary to comply with all procedures
required to export goods | 2011
The time calculation for a procedure starts from the moment it
is initiated and runs until it is completed. If a procedure can be
accelerated for an additional cost, the fastest legal procedure is
chosen. It is assumed that neither the exporter nor the importer
wastes time and that each commits to completing each remaining
procedure without delay. Procedures that can be completed in
parallel are measured as simultaneous. The waiting time between
proceduresfor example, during unloading of the cargois
included in the measure.
Source: Global Express Association
Pillar 3: Efficiency of import-export procedures

3.01 Efficiency of the clearance process
Efficiency of the clearance process by customs and border

control agencies [1 = very low; 5 = very high] | 2012
3.06 Documents to export
This variable assesses the effectiveness and efficiency of the

clearance process by customs and other border control agencies
in the eight major trading partners of each country. Respondents
to the Logistics Performance Index (LPI) survey were asked
to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of clearance in
the country in which they work, based on their experience in
international logistics, on a 1-to-5 scale compared with generally
accepted industry standards or practices.
Number of documents required to export goods | 2011

This variable takes into account all documents required to
export the goods are recorded. It is assumed that the contract
has already been agreed upon and signed by both parties.
Documents include bank documents, customs declaration and
clearance documents, port filing documents, import licenses,
and other official documents exchanged between the concerned
parties. Documents filed simultaneously are considered different
documents but with the same time frame for completion.
Source: The World Bank, Logistics Performance Index 2012
3.02 Time to import

Number of days necessary to comply with all procedures
required to import goods | 2011
3.07 Cost to export

Cost (US$ per container) associated with all the procedures
required to export goods | 2011
The time calculation for a procedure starts from the moment it

is initiated and runs until it is completed. If a procedure can be
accelerated for an additional cost, the fastest legal procedure is
chosen. It is assumed that neither the exporter nor the importer
wastes time and that each commits to completing each remaining
procedure without delay. Procedures that can be completed in
parallel are measured as simultaneous. The waiting time between
proceduresfor example, during unloading of the cargois
included in the measure.
This variable measures the fees levied on a 20-foot container in

US dollars. All the fees associated with completing the procedures
to export or import the goods are included. These include costs
for documents, administrative fees for customs clearance and
technical control, terminal handling charges, and inland transport.
The cost measure does not include tariffs or trade taxes. Only
official costs are recorded.
Pillar 4: Transparency of border administration

4.01 Irregular payments in exports and imports
In your country, how common is it for firms to make
undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with
imports and exports? [1 = common; 7 = never occurs] | 2010,
2011
2011
4.02 Corruption Perceptions Index
Index of the perceived level of public-sector corruption [0 =

very high; 10 = very low] | 2011 (Note that the information used
is based on survey data gathered between December 2009 and
September 2011)
The Corruption Perceptions Index score relates to perceptions
of the degree of public-sector corruption as seen by business
people and country analysts and ranges between 0 (high) and 10
(low).
How would you assess roads in your country? [1 = extremely

underdeveloped; 7 = extensive and efficient by international
standards] | 2010, 2011
2011

How would you assess port facilities in your country? [1 =
extremely underdeveloped; 7 = well-developed and efficient
by international standards]. For landlocked countries, this
measures the ease of access to port facilities and inland
waterways | 2010, 2011
Source: Transparency International
Pillar 5: Availability and quality of transport

infrastructure

2011
5.01 Airport density

Number of airports per million population | 2010
Number of airports with at least one scheduled flight in 2010 per
million population
Pillar 6: Availability and quality of transport services
Source: International Air Transport Association, SRS Analyser
6.01 Liner Shipping Connectivity Index

Quantity of services provided by liner companies (maximum
value in 2004 = 100) | 2011 or most recent
5.02 Transshipment connectivity index

Type of transshipment connections available to shippers from
each country/economy on bilateral routes [0 = low connectivity;
100 = high connectivity] | 2011
This index aims at reflecting the geographical aspects of the
liner service supply. In the absence of direct liner shipping
between two countries, the cargo will have to be transshipped
in a port of a third or even fourth country in order to reach the
destination country. The index score is the weighted sum of the
four connection types: the number of first-order connections
(connection without transshipment) multiplied by 1, the number
of second-order connection (connection with one transshipment)
multiplied by 0.5, the number of third-order connections
(connections with two transshipments) multiplied by 0.33, and
the number of fourth-order connections (connection with three
transshipments) multiplied by 0.25. Where the weights represent
the efficacy of the connections, Landlocked countries are
excluded from the index calculation.
Source: United Nations Conference and Trade and Development
5.03 Paved roads

Paved roads as a percentage of total roads | 2008 or most
recent year available
Paved roads are those surfaced with crushed stone (macadam)
and hydrocarbon binder or bituminized agents, with concrete,
or with cobblestones. This indicator shows paved roads as a
percentage of all the country/economys roads, measured in
length.
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators Online
(retrieved on December 23, 2011); national sources

How would you assess passenger air transport infrastructure
in your country? [1 = extremely underdeveloped; 7 = extensive
and efficient by international standards] | 2010, 2011
2011

How would you assess the railroad system in your country?
[1 = extremely underdeveloped; 7 = extensive and efficient by
international standards] | 2010, 2011
This indicator captures how well countries are connected to

global shipping networks. It is based on five components of
the maritime transport sector: number of ships, their containercarrying capacity, maximum vessel size, number of services, and
number of companies that deploy container ships in a countrys
ports. For each component, a countrys value is divided by the
maximum value of each component in 2004, the five components
are averaged for each country, and the average is divided by the
maximum average for 2004 and multiplied by 100. The index
generates a value of 100 for the country, with the highest average
index achieved in 2004.
Source: United Nations Conference and Trade and Development
6.02 Ease and affordability of shipment

Ease of arranging competitively priced international shipments
[1 = very low; 5 = very high] | 2012
This variable assesses the ease and affordability associated with
arranging international shipments. Respondents to the Logistics
Performance Index (LPI) survey were asked to evaluate the ease
and affordability associated with arranging international shipments
to or from eight countries (major trading partners) with which
they conduct business. Performance was evaluated using a
5-point scale (1 for the lowest score, 5 for the highest), based on
their experience in international logistics and in accordance with
generally accepted industry standards or practices.
6.03 Logistics competence

Competence and quality of logistics services (e.g., transport
operators, customs brokers) [1 = very low; 5 = very high] | 2012
This variable evaluates the competence of the local logistics
industry. Respondents to the Logistics Performance Index
(LPI) survey were asked to evaluate the competence of the
local logistics industry in the eight countries (major trading
partners) with which they conduct business. Performance was
evaluated using a 5-point scale (1 for the lowest score, 5 for the
highest), based on their experience in international logistics and
in accordance with generally accepted industry standards or
practices.

2011
6.04 Tracking and tracing ability
7.02 Mobile telephone subscriptions
Ability to track and trace consignments [1 = very low; 5 = very

high] | 2012
Mobile telephone subscriptions per 100 population | 2010 or

This variable assesses the ability to track and trace international

shipments (consignments). Respondents to the Logistics
Performance Index (LPI) survey were asked to evaluate the ability
to track and trace international shipments (consignments) when
shipping to or from eight countries (major trading partners) with
which they conduct business. Performance was evaluated using a
According to the World Bank, mobile cellular telephone

subscriptions are subscriptions to a public mobile telephone
service using cellular technology, which provides access
to switched telephone technology. Postpaid and prepaid
subscriptions are included. This can also include analogue
and digital cellular systems but should not include non-cellular
systems. Subscribers to fixed wireless, public mobile data
services, or radio paging services are not included.
Source: International Telecommunication Union, ITU World
Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database 2011 (December
2011 edition)
6.05 Timeliness of shipments in reaching destination

Frequency of shipments reaching the consignee within the
scheduled delivery [1 = very low; 5 = very high] | 2012
7.03 Broadband Internet subscribers

Total broadband Internet subscribers per 100 population | 2010
or most recent year available
This variable assesses how often shipments reach the consignee

within the scheduled delivery time. Respondents to the Logistics
Performance Index (LPI) survey were asked to evaluate the
timeliness of shipments in reaching destination when arranging
shipments to eight countries (major trading partners) with which
they conduct business. Performance was evaluated using a
The International Telecommunication Union considers broadband

to be any dedicated connection to the Internet of 256 kilobits
per second or faster, in both directions. Broadband subscribers
refers to the sum of DSL, cable modem, and other broadband
(for example, fiber optic, fixed wireless, apartment LANs, satellite
connections) subscribers.
2011 edition)
6.06 Postal service efficiency
7.04 Government Online Service Index
To what extent do you trust your countrys postal system to

have a friend mail a small package worth US$100 to you? [1 =
do not trust at all; 7 = trust completely] | 2010, 2011
The Government Online Service Index assesses the quality of

governments delivery of online services [0 = low; 1 = high] |
2012
This index captures a governments performance in delivering
online services to the citizens. There are four stages of service
delivery (Emerging, Enhanced, Transactional, and Connected).
Online services are assigned to each stage according to
their degree of sophistication, from the more basic to the
more sophisticated. In each country, the performance of the
government in each of the four stages is measured as the number
of services provided as a percentage of the maximum services
in the corresponding stage. Examples of services include online
presence, deployment of multimedia content, governments
solicitation of citizen input, widespread data sharing, and use
of social networking. For more details about the methodology
employed and the assumptions made to compute this indicator,
please consult the UNs Global E-Government Survey 2012s
dedicated page at http://www2.unpan.org/egovkb/global_
reports/12report.htm

2011
6.07 GATS commitments in the transport sector

Index of commitments in the transport sector under the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) | 2010 or most
recent year available
This indicator measures the extent of commitments for traderelated services in the transportation sector under the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). It covers the following
sectors: air transport services, maritime transport services
(only for non-landlocked countries), rail transport services, road
transport services, and services auxiliary to all modes of transport.
Passenger transport has been excluded across all sectors. Only
subsectors where commitments to opening up completely have
been taken into account, and the results have been weighted by
2010 global trade data.
Source: United Nations, UN E-Government Survey 2012:

E-Government for the People
Source: International Trade Centre and authors calculations
7.05 Internet users
Pillar 7: Availability and use of ICTs
Percentage of individuals using the Internet | 2010
7.01 Extent of business Internet use

2011 edition)
Internet users are people with access to the worldwide network.
To what extent do companies within your country use the

Internet in their business activities (e.g., buying and selling
goods, interacting with customers and suppliers)? [1 = not at
all; 7 = extensively] | 2010, 2011
2011
Pillar 8: Regulatory environment
8.05 Domestic competition

Composite indicator capturing the degree of protection of
property rights and intellectual property from the Global
Competitiveness Index 20112012
This indicator is the average of two variables: Property rights: How
would you rate the protection of property rights, including financial
assets, in your country? (1 = very weak, 7 = very strong) and
Intellectual property protection: How would you rate intellectual
property protection, including anti-counterfeiting measures, in
your country? (1 = very weak, 7 = very strong).This composite
variable corresponds to composite indicator 1.A.1 from the Global
Competitiveness Index 20112012.
Source: World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness
Report 20112012
8.02 Ethics and corruption

Composite indicator assessing the level of ethical standards
and corruption from the Global Competitiveness Index 2011
2012.
This indicator is the average of two variables: Diversion of public
funds: In your country, how common is diversion of public funds
to companies, individuals, or groups due to corruption? (1 = very
common; 7 = never occurs) and Public trust of politicians: How
would you rate the level of public trust in the ethical standards
of politicians in your country? (1 = very low; 7 = very high). This
composite variable corresponds to composite indicator 1.A.2 from
the Global Competitiveness Index 20112012.
Report 20112012
8.03 Undue influence

Composite indicator capturing the degree of undue influence
in the judicial system and among government officials from the
Global Competitiveness Index 20112012.
This indicator is the average of two variables: Judicial
independence: To what extent is the judiciary in your country
independent from influences of members of government, citizens
or firms? (1 = heavily influenced; 7 = entirely independent) and
Favoritism in decisions of government officials: To what extent
do government officials in your country show favoritism to wellconnected firms and individuals when deciding upon policies
and contracts? (1 = always show favoritism; 7 = never show
favoritism). This composite variable corresponds to composite
indicator 1.A.3 from the Global Competitiveness Index 2011
2012.
Report 20112012
8.04 Government efficiency

Composite indicator capturing the efficiency of the government
from the Global Competitiveness Index 20112012.
This indicator is the average of five variables: Wastefulness of
government spending: How would you rate the composition of
public spending in your country? (1 = extremely wasteful; 7 =
highly efficient in providing necessary goods and services); Burden
of government regulation: How burdensome is it for businesses
in your country to comply with governmental administrative
requirements (e.g., permits, regulations, reporting)? (1 = extremely
burdensome; 7 = not burdensome at all); Efficiency of legal
framework in setting disputes: How efficient is the legal framework
in your country for private businesses to settle disputes? (1
= extremely inefficient; 7 = highly efficient); Efficiency of legal
framework in challenging regulations: How efficient is the legal
framework in your country for private businesses to challenge the
legality of government actions and/or regulations? (1 = extremely
inefficient; 7 = highly efficient); and Transparency of government
policymaking: How easy is it for businesses in your country to
obtain information about changes in government policies and
regulations affecting your industry? (1 = impossible; 7 = extremely
easy). This composite variable corresponds to composite indicator
1.A.4 from the Global Competitiveness Index 20112012.
Composite indicator measuring the intensity of domestic

competition and the quality of related policies from the Global
Competitiveness Index 20112012.
This indicator is the average of eight variables: Intensity of local
competition: How would you assess the intensity of competition in
the local markets in your country? (1 = limited in most industries;
7 = intense in most industries); Extent of market dominance: How
would you characterize corporate activity in your country? (1 =
dominated by a few business groups; 7 = spread among many
firms); Effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy: To what extent
does anti-monopoly policy promote competition in your country?
(1 = does not promote competition; 7 = effectively promotes
competition); Extent and effect of taxation: What impact does the
level of taxes in your country have on incentives to work or invest?
(1 = significantly limits incentives to work or invest; 7 = has no
impact on incentives to work or invest); Total tax rate, defined as a
combination of profit tax (% of profits), labor tax and contribution
(% of profits), and other taxes (% of profits); Number of
procedures to start a business; Time required to start a business,
defined as number of days required to start a business; and
Agricultural policy costs: How would you assess the agricultural
policy in your country? (1 = it is excessively burdensome for the
economy; 7 = it balances the interests of taxpayers, consumers,
and producers). This composite variable corresponds to indicator
6.A.1 from the Global Competitiveness Index 20112012.
Report 20112012
8.06 Efficiency of the financial market

Composite indicator measuring the efficiency of the domestic
financial sector from the Global Competitiveness Index 2011
2012
This indicator is the average of five variables: Financial market
sophistication: How would you assess the level of sophistication
of financial markets in your country? (1 = poor by international
standards; 7 = excellent by international standards); Financing
through local equity market: How easy is it to raise money by
issuing shares on the stock market in your country? (1 = very
difficult; 7 = very easy); Ease of access to loans: How easy is it
to obtain a bank loan in your country with only a good business
plan and no collateral? (1 = very difficult; 7 = very easy); Venture
capital availability: In your country, how easy is it for entrepreneurs
with innovative but risky projects to find venture capital? (1 = very
difficult; 7 = very easy); and Strength of investor protection index
on a scale of 010 (best), defined as a combination of the extent
of disclosure index (transparency of transactions), the extent of
director liability index (liability for self-dealing), and the ease of
shareholder suit index (shareholders ability to sue officers and
directors for misconduct). This composite variable corresponds to
indicator 8.A from the Global Competitiveness Index 20112012.
Report 20112012
8.07 Openness to foreign participation

This variable is calculated as the average of four variables:
Ease of hiring foreign labor, Prevalence of foreign ownership,
Business impact of rules on FDI and Openness to multilateral
trade rules.
8.07a Ease of hiring foreign labor

To what extent does labor regulation in your country limit the
ability to hire foreign labor? [1 = very much limits hiring foreign
labor; 7 = does not limit hiring foreign labor at all] | 2011, 2012.
2011
8.07b Prevalence of foreign ownership

How prevalent is foreign ownership of companies in your
country? [1 = very rare; 7 = highly prevalent] | 2010, 2011
2011

Report 20112012
8.07c Business impact of rules on FDI
To what extent do rules governing foreign direct investment

(FDI) encourage or discourage it? [1 = strongly discourage FDI;
7 = strongly encourage FDI] | 2010, 2011
Does the incidence of crime and violence impose costs on

businesses in your country? [1 = significant costs; 7 = no costs]
| 2010, 2011

2011

2011
8.07d Openness to multilateral trade rules
Openness to multilateral trade rules index [0 = lowest; 100 =

highest] | 2011
This index evaluates the overall participation of countries in
multilateral trade rules or instruments (MTRs). These rules are all
internationally elaborated legal standards currently regulating trade
in specific areas. MTRs are primarily comprised of conventions
and treaties that countries ratify or accede to, and international
model laws that are incorporated into national law. The index is
based on ITCs Trade Treaties mapLegaCarta system, which
analyzes the position of each country (in terms of accession/
nonaccession and incorporation/nonincorporation) regarding
some 280 MTRs as well as 450 protocols or amendments
overseen by 28 different international organizations. For the
purposes of this index, 40 core MTRs were selected, and
each was rated with a score depending on its importance and
relevance to trade. The 40 core instruments belong to seven
categories (contracts, customs, dispute resolution, governance,
intellectual property, investment, and air transport). Each
category is given an equal weight in the calculation of the index.
Selection of the core instruments is based on their importance
and relevance to trade and their universality. The importance and
relevance to trade of an instrument is determined by taking into
account several criteria including: the impact of its provisions
on international trade (reduction of transactional costs, trade
facilitation, harmonization, transparency, predictability, creation
of a business-friendly business climate, support of private-sector
activities, and encouragement of foreign direct investment),
the opinion of international legal experts, and the views of the
international bodies administering these instruments. Universality
means that the selected MTRs can potentially be applied by
all countries, notwithstanding their geographical position or
economic level. For example, maritime transport conventions,
however important, were not taken into account because of their
weak relevance for landlocked countries; treaties dealing with
securities and insider trading were not included because they
do not represent a priority in countries that have not developed
sophisticated financial markets. Accession to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreements is not taken into account in this
index because WTO accession does not depend exclusively on
the will of a non-member state to join the WTO.
Does the threat of terrorism impose costs on businesses in

your country? [1 = significant costs; 7 = no costs] | 2010, 2011
2011
Source: International Trade Centre, based on data from the Trade

Treaties mapLegaCarta database
8.08 Availability of trade finance

In your country, how easy is it to obtain trade finance at
affordable cost (trade credit insurance and trade credit such as
letters of credit, bank acceptances, advanced payments, open
account arrangements) [1 = common; 7 = never occurs] | 2010,
2011
2011
Pillar 9: Physical security

To what extent can police services be relied upon to enforce
law and order in your country? [1 = cannot be relied upon at all;
7 = can always be relied upon] | 2010, 2011
2011
CHAPTER 2.2
Developing Africas
Infrastructure for Enhanced
Competitiveness
PETER ONDIEGE
JENNIFER MBABAZI MOYO
AUDREY VERDIER-CHOUCHANE
African Development Bank
As seen in the previous chapters of this Report, Africa

suffers from a pronounced infrastructure deficit.
Compared with countries in other regions, African
countries have a low stock of infrastructure, particularly
in energy and transportation, and the potential for
information and communication technologies (ICTs) has
not been fully harnessed. Coupled with burdensome
trade regulations (as noted in Chapter 2.1), these
deficiencies have constrained gains in domestic
productivity and present a critical bottleneck to more
Against this backdrop, this chapter examines the link
between infrastructure development and competitiveness
in Africa in greater detail. This connection is analyzed
while remembering that competitiveness is determined
by a number of interrelated factors, policies, and
institutional capabilities, as well as the initial conditions
as discussed in Chapter 1.1. This chapter focuses on
energy, transportation, and ICTs. It examines the state
of infrastructure in these sectors and the challenges
to infrastructure development in Africa, including its
regulatory environment. It also analyzes the impact of
infrastructure development on Africas competitiveness
and provides the way forward. The chapter draws on 16
country studies undertaken by the African Development
Bank (AfDB), the results of which inform the analysis,
conclusions, and recommendations presented here.
Inadequate infrastructure has raised the transaction
costs of business in most African economies. Today
African countries exhibit the lowest levels of productivity
of all low-income countries and are among the least
competitive economies in the world (see Chapter 1.1).
Inadequate infrastructure has been estimated to shave
off at least 2 percent of Africas annual growth.1 With
adequate infrastructure, African firms could achieve
productivity gains of up to 40 percent.2
Infrastructure that is sufficient and works properly
is crucial for Africas economic integration. African
economies can begin the process of deep integration
if their infrastructure networks are designed in such a
way as to link production centers and distribution hubs
across the continent, as the networks of developed
economies do. Such infrastructure will enable Africa
to compete effectively, tap into regional markets, and
This chapter focuses on three sectorsenergy, transportation (including

roads, railways, air transport, and ports), and ICTsand is based on 16
infrastructure country studies undertaken by the African Development
Bank (AfDB): Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco (North Africa); Cameroon
and Chad (Central Africa); Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal
(West Africa); Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda (East Africa); and
Mozambique, South Africa, and Zambia (Southern Africa). The individual country studies were prepared by the following AfDB staff: Gilbert
Galibaka, Thierry Kangoye, Succs Assyongar Masra, Ralf Kruger, Audrey
Verdier-Chouchane, Jennifer Mbabazi Moyo, Daniel Isooba, Jacqueline
Odula, Peter Ondiege, Emlio A. F. Dava; and the following consultants:
Ishmael Abeyie, John Luiz, and Thierry Urbain Yogo. The authors also
gratefully acknowledge the very useful comments provided by Steve
Kayizzi-Mugerwa, Director, AfDB Development Research Department;
Issa Faye, Manager, AfDB Research Division; Emelly Mutambatsere and
Anthony Simpasa, AfDB Development Research Department; and the
above-mentioned individual country study authors.
2.2: Developing Africas Infrastructure for Enhanced Competitiveness
benefit from globalization through investment and

trade. To achieve this calls for the construction of an
efficient and secure national and cross-border physical
infrastructure as well as a coherent system of regulation
for business transactions.3
Infrastructure is also critical for the promotion of
inclusive and sustainable growth. Rural infrastructure
notably feeder roads and transmission lines that connect
rural communities to national gridsenable individuals,
households, communities, and small businesses to
embark on income-generating activities thanks to
improved access to electricity and links to markets. The
use of renewable energy or environment-friendly sources
of energyincluding solar, wind, geothermal, and
hydropower, with all of which Africa is well endowed
would contribute to making growth sustainable.
A considerable investment in infrastructure that
uses innovative sources of funding is needed to address
Africas low level of competitiveness (see Chapter 1.1).
Indeed, the Programme for Infrastructure Development
in Africa (PIDA) estimates that Africa will need to invest
up to US$93 billion annually until 2020 for both capital
investment and maintenance.4 Given the substantial
amounts involved, governments will need to be
innovative in the search for sustainable approaches to
infrastructure development as well as financing. The
private sector will need to play an increasingly important
role. Governments will do well to create conditions where
private-sector engagement is encouraged, probably
through public-private partnerships (PPPs). Efficiency
gains from performance improvements in infrastructure
provision are themselves a significant source of finance,5
and the development of infrastructure bonds as a
financing vehicle will need to be encouraged.
Adequate maintenance plans are prerequisites
for sustainable infrastructure. Maintenance is not only
corrective but also preventative because it inspects
assets and reduces the risk of failure. Costs associated
with statutory maintenance can be substantialeven
considerably larger than the value of the assetyet
providing for these maintenance costs is crucial. Without
adequate maintenance, infrastructure deteriorates
quickly and is unsustainable.
Indeed, the longer-term performance of the ICT
sector should be reviewed in light of the adequacy of
maintenance plans. Thus far, ICT sector performance
has been good, albeit from a low base. It is noteworthy,
however, that although ICT infrastructure is relatively new,
it could rapidly become obsolete and downgraded if
maintenance plans are not in place and implemented. It is
therefore critically important to make adequate provisions
to ensure maintenance is undertaken in a timely manner,
thereby making gains from ICTs sustainable.
The rest of this chapter will elaborate on issues of
African infrastructure and competitiveness, focusing on
the energy, transportation, and ICT sectors. The next
section considers the impact of infrastructure on country
competitiveness; the following section focuses on the

state of Africas infrastructure and the challenges this
presents, and on its regulatory environment in these
three sectors. The final section provides the conclusion
and way forward.
THE IMPACT OF INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
ON AFRICAS COMPETITIVENESS
Well-developed energy, transportation, and
communication infrastructure networks are a prerequisite
for linking less-developed communities to markets in a
sustainable way. Effective modes of transportincluding
quality roads, railroads, air transport, and portsenable
entrepreneurs to get their goods and services to markets
in a secure and timely manner, facilitate the movement
of workers to the workplace, and encourage foreign
direct investment. Economies also depend on electricity
supplies that are free from interruptions and shortages
so that businesses and factories can work unimpeded. In
addition, a solid and extensive telecommunication network
allows for a rapid and free flow of information, which
increases overall economic efficiency by ensuring that
businesses can communicate and make timely decisions,
taking into account all available relevant information.
Infrastructure, competitiveness, and the cost of
doing business
Empirical research has shown that there is a positive
relationship between infrastructure investment and
economic growth. Several researchers demonstrate
the beneficial impact of infrastructure investments on
growth in African economies; this occurs because solid
infrastructure accelerates annual growth convergence
rates by as much as 13 percent and also increases
per capita annual growth by almost 1 percent.6 In fact,
some of this work argues that the strongest impact
comes from telecommunications, followed by roads
and electricity. For example, it has been estimated that
investing an additional 1 percent of gross domestic
product (GDP) in transportation and communications on
a sustained basis increases the GDP per capita growth
rate by 0.6 percent.7
Productivity growthand thus increasing
competitivenessis higher in countries with an adequate
supply of infrastructure services.8 Infrastructure
therefore plays a critical role in enhancing a countrys
competitiveness and in easing the cost of doing
business,9 as discussed in Chapter 1.1. The flipside of
this relationship is that, in countries with inadequate
infrastructure, firms are burdened with high costs as
they try to provide infrastructure themselves, suffer
potentially huge inefficiencies, or are simply unable to
conduct activities for which infrastructure services are
a prerequisite. The beneficial effects of infrastructure on
competitiveness are captured in Box1.
Box 1: Infrastructure development indicators and competitiveness, selected countries (201213)

infrastructure scores were obtained by averaging the
scores of the two subpillars of the infrastructure pillar of
the Global Competitivenes Index (GCI): Transport
infrastructure (encompassing the quality of overall
infrastructure, the quality of roads, the quality of railroad
infrastructure, the quality of port infrastructure, the quality
of air transport infrastructure and the available airline seat
kilometers) and Electricity and telephony infrastructure
(encompassing the quality of electricity supply, mobile
telephone subscriptions and fixed telephone lines). The
scores range from 1 to 7, with 7 being the best outcome.
As shown in Figures A1 and A2, weak general
Infrastructure, through improved connectivity, changes

the incentive structure and impacts market prices, thereby
improving consumer welfare and reducing the cost of
doing business. It is well documented in the literature that
infrastructure development reduces the asymmetry of
information and agricultural market efficiencies in Africa.
Improved access to price information through better transport
or ICT networks reduces marketing costs, improves farm-gate
prices and lessens their volatility, and enhances productive
efficiency.1
This box illustrates the reciprocal relationship that
competitiveness in countries has with infrastructure. Overall
Figure A1: Cost to export
6,000
TCD
Cost to export (US$ per container)
5,000
4,000
UGA
3,000
ZMB
BFA
TZA
SEN
BRA
ZAF
CMR
NGA
1,000
KEN
ETH
2,000
DZA
GHA
USA
IND
DEU
EGY
MOZ
MAR
HKG
0
1
Overall GCI infrastructure score
Figure A2: Cost to import

9,000
Cost to import (US$ per container)
TCD
7,500
6,000
4,500
BFA
ZMB
UGA
3,000
ETH
CMR
KEN
SEN
1,500
NGA
TZA
MOZ
GHA
DZA
BRA
ZAF
IND
EGY
USA
MAR
DEU
HKG
0
1

Sources: World Economic Forum, 2012; World Bank Doing Business Database 2012/13.
Notes: GCI = Global Competitiveness Index. Country labels are as follows: DZA (Algeria), BRA (Brazil), BFA (Burkina Faso), CMR (Cameroon), TCD (Chad), EGY (Egypt), ETH (Ethiopia), DEU
(Germany), GHA (Ghana), HKG (Honk Kong SAR), IND (India), KEN (Kenya), MAR (Morocco), MOZ (Mozambique), NGA (Nigeria), SEN (Senegal), ZAF (South Africa), Tanzania (TZA),
Uganda (UGA), USA (United States), and ZMB (Zambia).
(Contd)
Box 1: Infrastructure development indicators and competitiveness, selected countries (201213) (contd)
efficient customs procedures (Figure B1). Access to energy
is substantially improved in countries with a higher quality of
electricity supply (Figure B2).
infrastructure impedes trade because it results in increased

costs.
Countries with better infrastructure tend to have more
Figure B1: Impact of customs procedures
Burden of customs procedures (17, best)
HKG
5
SEN
BFA
EGY
ZMB
CMR
MOZ
NGA
TZA
DEU
MAR
UGA
USA
ZAF
IND
GHA
ETH
KEN
BRA
3
DZA
TCD
2
1

Sources: World Economic Forum, Executive Opinion Survey 20102011 weighted average; World Bank data, available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.ELC.TIME.
Notes: The burden of customs procedures measures business executives perceptions of their countrys efficiency of customs procedures, and is computed using answers to the following
question: How would you rate the level of efficiency of customs procedures (related to the entry and exit of merchandise) in your country? [1 = extremely inefficient; 7 = extremely
efficient].
GCI = Global Competitiveness Index. For country labels, see the notes to Figures A1 and A2.
Figure B2: Impact of access to electricity
Time to get electricity (days to get a connection)
300
NGA
250
ZAF
200
DZA
BFA
150
KEN
MOZ
SEN
ZMB
TZA
100
UGA
TCD
50
ETH
GHA
CMR
IND
EGY
BRA
USA
MAR
HKG
DEU
0
1
Quality of electricity supply

Sources: World Economic Forum, Executive Opinion Survey 20112012 weighted average; World Bank data, available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.ELC.TIME.
Notes: Quality of electricity supply measures business executives perceptions of their countrys efficiency of electricity supply in answer to the Executive Opinion Survey question How would
you assess the quality of the electricity supply in your country (lack of interruptions and lack of voltage fluctuations)? [1 = insufficient and suffers frequent interruptions; 7 = sufficient
and reliable].
(Contd)
Box 1: Infrastructure development indicators and competitiveness, selected countries (201213) (contd)
The availability of the latest technologies has a positive
impact on both the use of mobile cellular phones and on
Internet use in developing countries (Figures C1 and C2).
Figure C1: Impact of the latest technology: Access to mobile phones
Mobile phone subscriptions/100 population
250
HKG
200
150
ZAF
MAR
EGY
DZA
100
GHA
TZA
50
TCD
BFA
CMR
MOZ
USA
SEN
IND
KEN
ZMB
NGA
DEU
BRA
UGA
ETH
0
3
Availability of latest technologies
Internet subscribers/100 population (fixed broadband)
Figure C2: Impact of the latest technology: Access to the Internet

35
DEU
30
HKG
USA
25
20
15
10
BFA
ETH
TZA
BRA
CMR
DZA
TCD
0
3
EGY
MOZ NGA
ZMB
GHA
UGA
IND
MAR
KEN
SEN
ZAF
Availability of latest technologies

Sources: World Economic Forums Executive Opinion Survey 20112012 weighted average; ITU 2012.
Notes: Availability of latest technology is assessed through a score (positively ranged) that is computed from answers to the Executive Opinion Survey question To what extent are the latest
technologies available in your country? [1 = not available; 7 = widely available].
Sources: Adapted from the World Economic Forum data platform

(http://www.weforum.org) and World Development Indicators
online statistics (http://databank.worldbank.org).
Note
1 Aker, 2008; Aker and Mbiti, 2010; Muto and Yamano, 2009.
Box 2: Planned infrastructure projects and

expenditures in selected African countries
Kenya: Under Vision 2030 priorities, infrastructure
sector financial requirements are estimated to rise
from 398.2 billion Kenya shillings (KES) in 2012/13
to KES 486 billion in 2014/15. The government has
prioritized the development of high-quality energy
and ICT infrastructure, and established the National
Construction Authority in 2012 to enhance the
efficiency and effectiveness of government service
delivery.
Projects include the construction of over 600
kilometers of roads, the expansion of two international
airports, the development and expansion of Mombasa
Port, the construction of the new Lamu Port, and new
railway lines. Energy projects emphasize renewable
energy to increase generation capacity and access to
energy. The ICT projects will include the development
of Konza Techno City, which is expected to contribute
2.8 percent of GDP through ICT projects. They also
include the creation of 30 ICT centers, called digital
village projects or PASHA centers.
South Africa: Infrastructure plans are estimated at 3.2
trillion South African rand (R), of which about a quarter
are being financed and implemented; the remaining
three-quarters are under assessment. Sixty percent
of funding for infrastructure is allocated to electricity
projects, and the cost of providing energy and
transportation for these planned electricity projects is
18 percent of the development costs.
Tanzania: The 2012/13 budget for infrastructure
includes (1) 498.9 billion Tanzania shillings (T Sh) for
electricity; (2) T Sh 1,382.9 billion for transportation,
and (3) T Sh 4 billion for ICTs. Moreover, the
government will implement the construction of a gas
pipeline from Mtwara to Dar es Salaam with a Chinese
loan of US$1,225.3 million.
Zambia: The 2013 Zambian budget prioritizes roads,
rail, and power generation. The government is making
efforts to enhance domestic resource mobilization and
create the fiscal space needed to support investment
in infrastructure and human capital development, and
to improve public service delivery. Domestic revenue
is expected to increase from 19.0 percent of GDP in
2012 to 20.1 percent by 2015. Zambia has also issued
a US$750 million Eurobond to raise development
finance at one of the lowest prices for a debut issue in
sub-Saharan Africa. The funds will be used for energy
infrastructure (US$255 million, or 34.0 percent) and
road and rail transport infrastructure (US$430 million,
or 57.3 percent).
Source: AfDB, forthcoming.
The energy sector

Infrastructure constraints, particularly in transport and
energy, are a significant productivity handicap that
undermines competitiveness. In East African countries,
such as Kenya, infrastructure shortcomingsmainly
in energy and transportare estimated to account for

about 30 percent of the productivity handicap faced
by Kenyan firms,10 which are burdened with high costs
as they attempt to provide the missing infrastructure or
have to forego the activities that require infrastructure.
In Central African countries, such as Cameroon,
infrastructure constraints account for about 42 percent
of the productivity gap faced by firms.11
The transportation sector
Reliable transport infrastructure, in all of its four
subsectorsroads, railways, air transport, and
portsis an essential component of all countries
competitiveness. It is particularly crucial for landlocked
countries, for which it is a prerequisite to opening up
production zones. Reliable transport must be in place
for companies to import and export goods, to fill orders,
and to obtain supplies. For example, 78 percent of
Burkina Fasos trade is carried by four main roads and
rail corridors linking the country to the gateway ports in
Benin, Cte dIvoire, Ghana, and Togo.12 Eighty percent
of the economic activity in Senegal is concentrated in
Dakar.13 And in South and East Africa, port congestion
and shipment delays undermine the ability to acquire
imported production inputs, with resulting production
losses and higher production costs.14
Improvements in infrastructure therefore have the
potential to open up production zones and facilitate
product delivery while reducing their costs. The lack
of a good road network linking the Casamance region
to the other economic zones is hampering the regions
enormous agricultural and horticultural production
potential. Accordingly, Senegal has embarked on an
ambitious program of infrastructure development to
foster competitiveness. The program includes the current
flagship road infrastructure project, which involves the
construction of a 32-kilometer toll highway that will link
Dakar to Diamnadio in the western part of the country.
This road is part of the DakarNjamnaDjibouti corridor,
and will serve the Blaise Diagne International Airport,
currently under construction.
The list that follows looks at each of the subsectors
of transportation in more detail:
Roads: Infrastructure, particularly roads, facilitates
the entry of new firms into the formal sector. Recent
research shows a positive correlation between
better road infrastructure and the number and
size of startups.15 Firm-level evidence suggests
that more companies offering the same product
in one location leads to lower prices and higher
productivity. Good roads increase both the
number of new firms entering a given location and
the geographic size of the relevant market.16 An
assessment of the impact of the new rural road
from Daleti to Oda Bildingulu in Ethiopia showed
how incentives for farmers changed and resulted in
a sixfold increase in the production of sesame over
the 2003/04 to 2007/08 period.17

Rail transport: Inefficiencies and an inadequate
railroad network contribute to high costs of
doing business in the continent. This area is
being addressed by several African countries.
For instance, Zambias focus is to improve the
operational efficiency of the Zambia Railways
and the TAZARA Railway (which connects Dar
es Salaam in Tanzania with Kapiri Mposhi in
Zambia), and promote new railway developments
using the PPP framework. The government also
intends to extend the Zambia Railways network to
the Botswana Railways network via the planned
Kazungula Bridge, which will facilitate the flow of
goods and labor. In South Africa, problems with
rail transport have resulted in an overuse of road
transport. As a result, the World Banks Doing
Business Database indicates a drop in the countrys
overall ranking from 35 to 39 between 2008 and
2013.18
Air transport: The importance of air transport,
particularly for landlocked countries, cannot be
overemphasized. It is imperative that countries
enhance this sectors development to improve
connectivity and safety and to reduce costs in
order to promote intra-African and global trade.
Air transport has to be enhanced not only by
the amount and quality of physical infrastructure
but also, even more importantly, by the way it
is operated with regard to air-traffic control and
ground-air communications, which are inadequate in
much of the region and need to be boosted.19
Ports: Enhancing port infrastructure substantially
reduces the cost of production for enterprises.
Accordingly, in West Africa, for instance, as a result
of the recent Dakar Port Container Development
Project, Senegal has been able to expand its
exposure to international markets. Indeed, recent
statistics indicate that the volume of the port traffic
has increased by 13.37 percent over the period
200711. The average waiting time for ships is
estimated to have dropped from 15 hours to 2
hours, and for trucks from several hours to less
than 30 minutes, significantly reducing the cost of
production for enterprises.20 The port enhancement
project will increase berth capacity by 50 percent
and vessel productivity from 20 moves per hour to
61 moves per hour. Moreover, the port will operate
the terminal continuously, on a 24-hour-a-day
basis. Costs have also been reduced by improving
soft port infrastructures because the country
has implemented an electronic customs clearance
system and liberalized the container shipping
market.21
The ICT sector

Development of an adequate-quality ICT infrastructure
network will enhance productivity, reduce
communication costs, and promote financial inclusion
and regional integration. To this end, AfDB-supported
projects such as the Eastern Africa Submarine System
(EASSy) cable project (a submarine system of fiberoptic cables connecting Africa to the rest of the world)
and the Central African Backbone Program (a system
of fiber-optic cables linking African countries to each
other) are meant to enhance quality and reduce
communication prices in mobile backhaul and mobile
telephony. Such projects facilitate regional integration
and improve outreach to peri-urban and rural areas.
An assessment of the impact of EASSy, for example,
suggests a reduction of wholesale bandwidth prices by
at least 60 percent in Tanzania and up to 90 percent
in Kenya; an increase of 150 percent to 200 percent in
international bandwidth utilization within less than six
months of submarine cable availability in these countries,
including penetration in rural and un-served areas; and
high mobile phone penetration rates, which have also
improved access to banking services for the unbanked,
as evidenced by the deployment of the mobile payment
system M-PESA in Kenya (see Box7). The projects may
also contribute to the use of ICT applications such as
e-government, e-education, and e-health.
Improving infrastructure development and
competiveness: Evidence from selected
African countries
To address the infrastructure gap, governmentsin
collaboration with the private sector and development
partnershave put in place policy reforms, programs,
projects, and the necessary financial resources to
improve on the quantity and quality of infrastructure
(see Box2). This section highlights a few ongoing and
planned infrastructure projects and committed resources
in selected African countries. It is expected that the
combination of these efforts will contribute to improving
countries productivity and hence their competitiveness
in the coming years.
Regional infrastructure development:
Lessons learned
In the transportation sector, the AfDB emphasizes the
expansion of regional corridors, trunk and rural roads,
railways, and urban programs that support or open up
economic hubs. In the energy sector, the AfDB focuses
on energy efficiency, clean and renewable energy,
and the support of regional power pools. In the ICT
sector, priority is given to broadband and backbone
infrastructure that connect countries to one another
and to the rest of the world (see Appendix A for some
of the projects in which the AfDB is involved). The AfDB
also finances infrastructure development geared toward
promoting competitiveness in African countries through
regional integration. The lessons learned from the
Box 3: Regional integration as a catalyst to Africas economic transformation and competitiveness

Regional integration is essential to achieving structural
transformation in African economies, which can boost both
productivity per worker and living standards. The regional
integration agenda incorporates a range of objectives, which
include improving African producers access to regional
markets and integrating them into more productive regional
value chains; integrating financial markets to enable capital to
flow more readily among national economies; and ensuring
the free movement of goods, services, labor, and capital. All
these objectives require investments at a number of levels.
The African Development Bank (AfDB)s Regional
Integration Strategy (RIS) for 20092012 focuses on regional
infrastructure, trade, and regional public goods. Lessons
learned in implementing the AfDBs regional program include:
Regional projects are complex but transformational. For
example, the EthiopiaKenya Power Interconnector and the
ZambiaTanzaniaKenya Power Interconnector will link the
Southern Africa Power Pool and the Eastern Africa Power
Pool, resulting in a large regional market for electricity.
Political buy-in is critical. An example of problems
exacerbated by a lack of political buy-in is seen in
the protracted negotiations around the Trans-Gambia
Bridgethe bridge linking Gambia and Senegalwith the
latter complaining about delays on the Gambian side in
finalizing the negotiations.
A holistic and inclusive approach is necessary. Political,
economic, and social considerations must all be
implementation of these regional integration projects are

highlighted in Box3.
The importance of collaboration
In May 2012, in line with ongoing efforts to enhance
infrastructure development, Africas development
partnersincluding the AfDB and the World Economic
Forumformed a Business Working Group (BWG)
that draws on partners from multilateral and regional
development banks. The aim is to accelerate Africas
infrastructure delivery through private-sector involvement
with an emphasis on regional integration projects
(see Box4). This approach was endorsed by the
African Union in January 2013.22 The 20th Ordinary
Session of the Assembly of the African Union restated
the need for active collaboration among the African
Union Commission, the New Partnership for Africas
Development (NEPAD) Planning and Coordinating
Agency (NPCA), and the AfDB, in conjunction with
the World Economic Forum, in revamping the NEPAD
Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility through
domestic funding and concerted efforts to increase
private-sector involvement in infrastructure development.
The implementation of BWG projects will bring in muchneeded private-sector infrastructure development finance
as well as contribute to improving the productivity and
competitiveness of African economies.
considered in project design. One example where this

approach has been successful is the Kazungula Bridge,
a multinational project linking Botswana and Zambia over
the Zambezi River.
Capacity and skills are critical. At the government and
regional economic community levels, staff who have the
necessary skills to negotiate and deliver projects are
essential. Examples of projects that have had access to
the necessary capacity and skills include the Tripartite
Capacity Building Program, as well as financial and
monetary integration programs in the member countries
of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
and the Economic Community of Central African States.
Hard and soft infrastructure must be blended. For
example, cross-border road projects must be supported
by trade facilitation measures such as the One Stop
Border Post and customs modernization, among other
measures.
The private sector can deliver. It is important to get the
private sector involved in regional integration programs.
The private sector has played an essential role in the Rift
Valley Railways project that connects Kenya and Uganda,
for example, as well as in the EASSy cable project that
connects Africa to the rest of the world.
Source: AfDB: NEPAD, Regional Integration and Trade Department,
Regional Integration Strategy (RIS) for 20092012.
AFRICAS INFRASTRUCTURE AND REGULATORY

ENVIRONMENT: CURRENT STATE AND
CHALLENGES
Africa has a considerable infrastructure deficit: it lags
behind other developing regions, particularly in the area
of energy and transportation but also in ICTs. According
to the World Bank Enterprises Survey, 26.9 percent of
sub-Saharan enterprises identified transportation and
49.2 percent identified electricity as major constraints
for their business in 2009.23 In fact, only 30 percent of
the population is estimated to have access to electricity
in Africa, compared with 70 percent to 90 percent in
other developing regions. Furthermore, road access in
Africa is limited to about 34 percent of the population,
compared with 50 percent in other parts of the
developing world. Although considerable progress has
been made in ICTs, as evidenced by the tremendous
increase in mobile telephone connections over the last
10 years, Africa started from a low base and its Internet
penetration rate is only about 6 percent, compared with
an average of 40 percent elsewhere in the developing
world.24 Moreover, as shown in Chapter 1.1, results from
the World Economic Forums Executive Opinion Survey
for 20122013 point to substantial gaps that remain in
technological readiness (pillar 9).25
Nonetheless, the state of infrastructure development
varies between and within regions and countries.
Box 4: AfDBWorld Economic Forum partnership: The African Strategic Infrastructure Initiative as a
platform for private-sector involvement
The Business Working Group (BWG)a multi-stakeholder
group currently composed of 35 companies and
organizationswas conceived in 2012 as a way of getting
international and African business leaders involved in
accelerating the delivery of Africas infrastructure by
accelerating the implementation of the PIDA (Program for
Infrastructure Development in Africa) Priority Action Plan
programs and projects. PIDAwhich was developed by
the African Union Commission (AUC) in partnership with the
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the
African Development Bank (AfDB), and the NEPAD Planning
and Coordinating Agency (NPCA)provides a strategic longterm framework to enable African stakeholders to build the
infrastructure necessary to boost trade, spark growth, and
create jobs. The private-sector role in Africas infrastructure

is critical. This partnership was endorsed by African heads of
state, who recognize that effective public-private partnerships
(PPPs) in the delivery of Africas infrastructure are part of the
key to unlocking Africas huge economic and development
potential.
In this context, the BWG has defined a methodology
for identifying programs that could be accelerated based
on criteria that the private sector considers to comprise
minimum requirements for them to become involved in
Africas infrastructure projects, including PIDA. These BWG
criteria focus on the projects attractiveness and bankability,
its technical feasibility, and its potential economic impact from
the private-sector perspective (see Figure A). In particular,
Figure A: BWG methodology for identifying infrastructure programs to be accelerated

THRESHOLD-BASED
GROUPING
TWO-LENS
PROJECT CLUSTERING
FINE-TUNE
PROJECT CLUSTERING
Immediate
Project A
Project B
Project C
Project D
Project E
Project F
Project G
Project H
Mid-term
Project A
Project B
Project C
Project D
Project E
Project F
Project G
Project H
Long-term
Project A
Project B
Project C
Project D
Project E
Project F
Project G
Project H
Three key thresholds applied:

Data quality/availability
Program environment
Program complexity
Projects grouped as:
Potential immediate
private-sector acceleration
Potential mid-term
private-sector acceleration
Long-term project acceleration
Project realization readiness/capacity:

Project readiness
Regional/country readiness & capacity
Project value/impact:
Direct project value
Impact & secondary value creation
Project A
Project B
Project C
Project D
Project E
Project F
Project G
Project H
Consider projects wellpositioned in matrices

Further assess public and
BWG support
Aim for diverse pilots:
Sector, region, etc.
Next step: Identify 12 pilots
in project round tables
Source: World Economic Forum, in collaboration with The Boston Consulting Group, 2013, forthcoming.
the criteria stress the need for quantitative financial return

metrics, a good legal and regulatory framework, sufficient
funding for project preparation, the establishment of a
project-implementing authority, and demonstrated positive
economic impacts as well as strong stakeholder consultation
and involvement and political will, particularly for cross-border
projects.
Within PIDA, the Priority Action Plan (PAP) focuses on
short-term programs expected to be initiated by 2020. PAP
presents 51 immediately actionable programs across the
four sectors of energy, transport, water access and food
security, and ICTs, all promoting regional integration. Through
this methodology, the private sector has identified an initial
list of 10 priority projects from PAP for possible acceleration.
As a next step, the public-sector support and privatesector interest for each program will be confirmed at several
regional roundtables to be held during 2013 and at the World
Economic Forum on Africa in May 2013 in Cape Town, which
will include a major pillar on Boosting Strategic Infrastructure.
The BWG also enables the public sector to benefit from
objective, transparent, and informed input from the private
sector on the key issues impacting on Africas infrastructure
delivery. If properly addressed through results-driven
dialogue, this could create immense opportunities for privatesector participation in driving infrastructure in Africa.
Source: AfDB: NEPAD, Regional Integration and Trade Department,
2012, World Economic Forum: African Strategic Infrastructure
initiative, 2013, forthcoming.
Box 5: Infrastructure in selected African countries, 200010

Considering the infrastructure development by region, as
the figures in this box show, North African countries have,
on average, better infrastructure than sub-Saharan African
economies, with the exception of South Africa.1 This can
be seen with regard to electricity generation and telephone
subscribers and also, to a large extent, paved roads.
These figures also illustrate the varied level of infrastructure
development across and within the regions. In fact, within
sub-Saharan Africa, West Africa appears to have the
strongest infrastructure, while Central Africa appears to
have the weakest. Within West Africa, however, the
infrastructure development of countries such as Burkina
Faso still trails that of others. Even within countries,
infrastructure development is highly uneven, with the
urban areas benefitting considerably more than the rural

areas.
African countries generally exhibit unimpressive progress
in electricity generation, with South Africa outperforming the
rest and Central African countries lagging even further behind
(Figure A).
However, telephone subscriptions in North Africa in the
last decade have seen phenomenal growth, and West African
countries are performing better than other sub-Saharan
African countries in that area (Figure B).
Relatively stagnating performances have been typical in
road infrastructure improvementin most sub-Saharan African
countries, which are clearly outperformed by North African
countries (Figure C).
Figure A: Net electricity generation
Kilowatt hours per capita (millions)
6,000
5,000
4,000
Algeria
Burkina Faso
Cameroon
3,000
Chad
2,000
1,000
Algeria
0
Burkina Faso
2000
Source: AfDB Statistics Department.
2001
2002
2003
2004
Cameroon
Algeria
Egypt
Burkina Faso
Ethiopia
Cameroon
Ghana
Chad
Kenya
Egypt
Morocco
Ethiopia
2005 Ghana2006
Mozambique
2007 Nigeria2008
Chad
Kenya
Senegal
Algeria
Egypt
Morocco
South Africa
Burkina Faso
Ethiopia
Mozambique
Tanzania
Cameroon
Ghana
Nigeria
Uganda
Chad
Kenya
Senegal
Zambia
Egypt
Morocco
South Africa
Ethiopia
Mozambique
Tanzania
Ghana
Nigeria
Uganda
Kenya
Senegal
Zambia
Morocco
South Africa
Mozambique
Tanzania
Nigeria
Uganda
Senegal
Zambia
2009
2010
(Contd)
South Africa
Tanzania
Uganda
Chapter 1.1 shows that all AfricanZambia

countries improved
their Global Competitiveness Index scores at varying
rates from 2006 to 2012. However, Box5 indicates that
the picture varies according to indicators and countries.
In general, progress has been very slow or even negative
regarding electricity generation and roads paved, while
improvement in telephone subscriptions has been fast
and impressive during the last decade.
Landlocked countries in Africa face particular
challenges arising from the lack of multimodal
infrastructure. The continents 15 landlocked countries

are constrained in getting their goods to markets and
in importing goods because of the lack of multimodal
infrastructure that can accommodate their particular
requirements. The role of a network of infrastructure
linking producers to markets through a connected
platform including feeder roads, national roads,
airports, and ports in connecting markets, particularly in
landlocked countries, cannot be overemphasized.
Box 5: Infrastructure in selected African countries, 200010 (contd)

Figure B: Mobile and fixed line telephone subscribers
120
Subscribers (% total population)
100
80
Algeria
Burkina Faso
Cameroon
60
Chad
Algeria
Egypt
Burkina Faso
Ethiopia
Cameroon
Ghana
Chad
Kenya
Algeria
Egypt
Morocco
Burkina Faso
Ethiopia
40
20
0
2000
2001
Figure C: Paved roads

100
2002
2003
2004
Cameroon
2005
2006
Ghana
Mozambique
2007 Nigeria
2008
Chad
Kenya
Senegal
Algeria
Egypt
Morocco
South Africa
Burkina Faso
Ethiopia
Mozambique
Tanzania
Cameroon
Ghana
Nigeria
Uganda
Chad
Kenya
Senegal
Zambia
Egypt
Morocco
South Africa
Ethiopia
Mozambique
Tanzania
Ghana
Nigeria
Uganda
Kenya
Senegal
Zambia
Morocco
South Africa
Mozambique
Tanzania
Nigeria
Uganda
Senegal
Zambia
2009
2010
South Africa
80
Paved roads (% total)
Tanzania
60
Uganda
Algeria
Zambia
Burkina Faso
Cameroon
Chad
40
Algeria
Egypt
Burkina Faso
Ethiopia
Cameroon
Ghana
Chad
Kenya
Algeria
Egypt
Morocco
Burkina Faso
Ethiopia
20
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Cameroon
2005 Ghana2006
Mozambique
2007 Nigeria2008
Chad
Kenya
Senegal
Algeria
Egypt
Morocco
South Africa
Burkina Faso
Ethiopia
Mozambique
Tanzania
Cameroon
Ghana
Nigeria
Uganda
Chad
Kenya
Senegal
Zambia
Egypt
Morocco
South Africa
Ethiopia
Mozambique
Tanzania
Ghana
Nigeria
Uganda
Kenya
Senegal
Zambia
Note
Morocco
South Africa
1 South Africa performs better than North Africa, notably in terms
Mozambique
Tanzania
of electricity generation per capita and
telephone subscribers
in
Nigeria
Uganda
Senegal
Zambia
2009
2010
percentage of the population (see Figures A and B).
South Africa
Tanzania
Uganda
Energy
Africa faces a huge energy deficit: the 48 countries
of sub-Saharan Africa, with a combined population
of 800 million, are estimated to generate roughly the
same power output as Spain, a country of 45 million.26
This energy deficit is the result of the regions limited
generation capacitythe result, in turn, of a lack of
long-term financing to cater for the sectors needs. The
lack of large-scale investment is a consequence of the
limited participation of private players and the difficulties
in mobilizing long-term financing from African financial
systems to fund big-ticket items such as infrastructure.
Furthermore, electrification is weak and largely
uneven, and tariffs make it unaffordable for the poor.
The household electrification rate is 42.7 percent, on
average, for Africa, and 28.3 percent for low-income
African countries. North African countries, with
electrification rates of 94 percent in 2009, fare better
than sub-Saharan African economies, with rates of 32
percent.27 Within sub-Saharan Africa, the rate often
falls to just 10 percent, on average, in rural areas. For
example, in Ethiopia, electricity access is very good in
urban areas (86 percent) but very limited in rural ones
(2 percent). In Zambia, access to electricity is only 20
percentless than half the African average, with much
of that power going to the mining sector, crowding out
domestic consumption. In Chad, access is less than 3
percent, with the capital city of Ndjamena accounting
for 80 percent of the total electricity consumption in
the entire country. In Kenya, 31 percent of households
have access to electricity in the best-served province,
five times more than the least-connected province at
6 percent. Although Africas power tariffs vary widely,
they are all largely unaffordable for the poor, thus limiting
access or connectivity for the poor in both urban and
rural areas.
System losses compound the energy deficit in
Africa. On average, electric power transmission and
distribution losses in Africa were estimated at 12
percent of output in 2010, equivalent to the average
losses in other low-income developing countries.28
This estimate largely masks differences across Africa.
This problem seems especially pronounced in Central
Africa, particularly the Democratic Republic of Congo,
where the losses were estimated at 83 percent in 2010.
In Southern Africa, the losses were lower but still high,
at 56 percent in Botswana and 25 percent in Namibia.
In East, West, and North Africa, system losses have in
general declined, although they remained high at the end
of 2011: 26 percent in Uganda, 24 percent in Ghana, 21
percent in Tanzania, 20 percent in Algeria (2010), and 18
percent in Senegal.
Energy sector infrastructure
In addition, aging infrastructure and rising demand have
led to intermittent blackouts across all regions of Africa,
undermining competitiveness. The blackouts largely
started in the 1990s in East and West Africa, in 2007
in South Africa, and later (2010) in North Africa, notably

in Egypt. Although these blackouts are declining, they
continue to cause considerable production disruptions
and losses that damage competitiveness in both lowand middle-income African economies.
Consequently, there is a critical need for innovative
investments in the energy sector, including investment
from domestically mobilized resources. However, the
attractiveness of this investment is undermined by non
cost reflective tariffs as well as subsidies that distort
relative prices and profitability. Energy facilities across
Africa are in urgent need of new and innovative sources
of investment, particularly for generation, transmission
lines, and distribution. This much-needed investment
is held back because across Africaespecially subSaharan Africaeven though tariffs are very high, they
do not reflect actual cost because they account for
only about 50 percent of the historical production costs
(about 44 percent in Zambia, Niger, and Nigeria and
52 percent in Tanzania).29 In addition, in North African
countries, such as Egypt, indirect subsidies from the
government also undermine investment in energy. In
Mozambique, the single-buyer model (a government
monopoly) currently in place utilizes unattractive fixed
electricity tariffs that have been unchanged since 1997,
discouraging investment in the sector.
Even beyond the much-needed physical investment,
there is an urgent need to invest in the diversification
of the energy mix so as to make the infrastructure
sustainable. In East and Southern Africa, overreliance
on hydropower energy makes the economies vulnerable
to hydrological conditions. The major drought in the
mid-2000s caused substantial economic lossesas
high as 4 percent of GDP in Tanzaniaand increased
the demand for expensive emergency diesel power
generation. In Northern and Western African countries,
the energy mix depends largely on gas and oil reserves
(thermal energy), which is more reliable than hydropower
but more costly. Box6 presents a snapshot of the
AfDBs green energy initiatives.
At the regional level, urgent attention should
be given to the development of regional energy
infrastructure to achieve economies of scale. In the
power sector, only Southern Africa has made the
transition to a competitive regional power market. Only
a few major investments have been made in regional
energy infrastructure on the continent; these include
the EthiopiaDjibouti and EthiopiaKenya connections,
as well as the 300 kilovolt (kV) NigeriaBenin coastal
transmission backbone. Other planned regional initiatives
include the NorthSouth power transmission corridor
of 8,000 kilometers covering 11 countries from Egypt
to South Africa, and the North Africa transmission
line that will run from Morocco to Egypt. The NELSAP
project, funded by the AfDB together with other donors,
is another major regional initiative that interconnects
the electric grids of the Nile Equatorial Lakes countries
of Burundi, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo,

Rwanda, and Uganda. Indeed, developing additional
cross-border power pools will help countries achieve
economies of scale and provide significant savings.
For example, plans to extend the Inga hydropower site
could lead to a large expansion in low-cost hydropower
for the Democratic Republic of Congo, resulting in
energy available for export to countries such as Zambia.
Adopting a regional approach could save Zambia
US$160 million annually. Tanzania also has the potential
to play a significant role in regional power trade within
the framework of both the East African Power Pool and
the Southern Africa Power Pool.30
Energy sector regulatory challenges
At the national level, legislation is generally adequate to
regulate the industry in countries that have electricity
regulators, but its enforcement should be strengthened
and the roles of energy administrators clarified. This
will serve to support the principles of regulatory
independence. For example, Kapika and Ebehard
state that, in Zambia, although the Energy Regulation
Board determines all retail electricity tariffs and has the
authority to carry out general administrative functions,
the principles of regulatory independence for the
regulator are undermined by its lack of final authority
in decision making.31 In several other countries, such
as Senegal, the duplication of efforts with several
agencies and institutions involved in the administration of
energy issues should be addressed. The administration
should be streamlined and the involvement of different
stakeholders clarified.
Moreover, the mandate for planning has to be
clarified within the sector, particularly in hybrid power
markets, to coordinate the planning and procurement
functions. Kapika and Ebehard argue that planning
is crucial for ensuring orderly market entry and the
adequacy and reliability of power supplies.32 In hybrid
power markets such as Zambias, where there is a
dominant, vertically integrated state-owned utility and
also private companies that operate on the margins of
the sector, the planning issue can easily become hazy.
Those responsible for planning should work closely with
those responsible for procurement processes, so that
the planning of new capacity is coordinated with the
initiation of new bids.
In addition, the renewable energy potential has
not been fully harnessed in Africa because of high
installation costs as well as gaps in renewable energy
policies, strategies, and regulatory mechanisms. Indeed,
renewable energy represents an interesting alternative
that could potentially help reduce the cost of access
to energy for enterprises, though the installation and
operating costs of some renewable energybased power
plants are still high because the related technologies
are not fully mastered in most of the countries. Not only
have these technical considerations been impeding
the development of the sector, but renewable energy
Box 6: Green energy and the AfDBs initiatives

Africas huge gaps in conventional energy infrastructure
make it well placed to pursue low-carbon solutions.
Africa has more than half of the worlds renewable energy
potential: its wind, geothermal, and hydropower potential
has barely been tapped. For example, the Grand Inga Dam
in the Democratic Republic of Congo has the potential
to produce 100,000 megawatts (MW) of electricity, but
currently yields a mere 650 MW to 750 MW. The potential
to generate 7,000 MW of geothermal electric power exists
in the Great Rift Valley in Eastern Africa. However, to date,
only 130 MW has been exploited in Kenya and less than
8 MW in Ethiopia because of high upfront engineering
costs and lack of local expertise. Regarding solar energy,
many countries have favorable daily radiation levels. Some
encouraging initiatives to extend access to lower-income
households and public institutions are under way in
several countries, including Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritius,
Seychelles, and South Africa. For wind energy, countries
with good potential include Cape Verde, Eritrea, Kenya,
Madagascar, Mauritania, Morocco, South Africa, and
Tunisia. In fact, the Cabeolica wind farm in Cape Verde,
a project that received debt financing from the African
Development Bank (AfDB), won the African renewable
energy project of the year award in 2011.
The AfDB has recognized the green energy potential
on the continent and has taken the lead with US$57
million in establishing a fund, with some other contributors,
for renewable energy projects across the continent.
Accordingly, it has developed energy policy with two
priority areas: ensuring access to modern energy and
fostering clean energy investments. Going forward, its
pipeline embraces several green energy projects, including
support to a 2,000 MW solar-thermal power project to
export energy from Tunisia to Europe; the Turkana Wind
Project (which has received US$870 million from the joint
fund) in Kenya; and, in partnership with other donors, the
Menengai Geothermal Plant, also in Kenya, to provide
clean energy to 500,000 households.
Sources: AfDB: NEPAD Regional Integration and Trade
Department, Regional Integration Strategy (RIS) for 2009
2012; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renewable_energy_in_
Africa.
policies, strategies, and regulatory gaps also hamper

investments. Although increasing investments is key for
closing the energy infrastructure gap, very few countries
in Africa have managed to implement appropriate
public policies and regulatory mechanisms that provide
investors with predictable tariffs, secured off-take
agreements, access to national grids, and businesseasing measures. In some countries, such as Burkina
Faso, the regulatory framework for renewable energy
resources is simply nonexistent, keeping potential
investors risk perception of the sector relatively high.
At the regional level, it is imperative that planning
for regional infrastructure projects be coupled with the
requisite regional legal and regulatory framework. For
example, in the power sector, regional power pools
need to harmonize with national power regulations and
Figure 1: Africas main road corridors
Source: ICA, 2009.
develop dispute resolution mechanisms, which to date

has been slow.
Transportation
The ensuing discussion of the transportation sector
considers the state of the infrastructure and the
challenges confronting the road, rail, air, and port
subsectors, as well as the regulatory framework of the
entire transportation sector.
Africas prolonged underinvestment in transportation
has resulted in a dilapidated transport infrastructure.
Indeed, compared with other developing countries
excluding the provision for maintenanceAfrican
countries invested 15 percent to 25 percent of GDP
in transport infrastructure over the period 200512,
on average, while India and China invested about 32
percent and 42 percent of GDP, respectively, in the same
period.33 This underinvestment has resulted in a decrepit
infrastructure and considerably higher transport costs
(by as much as 100 percent) in Africa than experienced
by other low-income developing countries. This poses a
fundamental constraint to Africas global competitiveness
and economic growth.
Road infrastructure
Although roads are the predominant mode of transport
for freight and passengers in Africa, major deficits exist in
road infrastructure throughout the continent. A significant
percentage of Africas road network is unpaved (52.8
percent in 2011), isolating people from basic education,
health services, transport corridors, trade hubs, and
economic opportunities. In Tanzania, more than 92
percent of the road network is unpaved and is therefore
unusable during the rainy season. In South Africa, about
80 percent of the road network is unpaved and about 78
percent of the national road network is older than the 20
years for which it was originally designed.34
Moreover, access to the road network is uneven,
with rural areas largely underserved. This unequal
access makes the flow of goods and services to and
from rural areas difficult and expensive. The urban-rural
disparity in the road network is a concern across all
regions of Africa. In Ethiopia, only 10.5 percent of the
rural population lives within two kilometers of an allweather road. In Zambia, Tanzania, and Burkina Faso,
the comparable figures are 17 percent, 24 percent, and
Figure 2: Railways in Africa
Source: AfDB, 2010.
less than 25 percent, respectively, which are still very

low.
Poor road maintenance is prevalent across Africa.
Recognizing that there are several sources of road
funding, including loans and tolling, several African
countries now have road funds supported by fuel levies;
others have autonomous road agencies that contract
out to specialist maintenance agencies. However, more
needs to be done. Fuel levies are often too low and road
funds and agencies do not meet international bestdesign criteria. For example, fuel levies vary considerably
across countries, ranging from US$0.16 to US$0.30 per
liter, with the latter considered the minimum for adequate
road maintenance. Unofficial fees or bribes and delays
contribute to low collection rates. In addition, toll roads
operate in only a negligible portion of the regions
classified road network, and almost all of them are in
South Africa.35
Further complicating the issue, roads do not
last for their planned construction life span because
the overloading of vehicles causes the roads to age
prematurely, resulting in high maintenance costs. The
road network in several African countries continues to
suffer from very high overloading rates (e.g., in Uganda,

overloading rates are close to 55 percent) as determined
at some major static weigh-station locations, pointing to
the need for more weigh stations to be constructed. A
harmonized regional axle load control actsuch as the
East Africa Axle Load Control Act, which will soon be
adoptedis also needed.
A high incidence of road fatalities, a consequence of
the continents poor infrastructure, is prevalent in Africa,
resulting in sizeable losses to the economy. The World
Bank estimates that road crashes cost approximately 1
percent to 3 percent of a countrys annual GDP (US$100
billion every year in developing countries).36 For example,
Uganda has one of the worst road safety records in
sub-Saharan Africa, with an average rate of 45 fatalities
per 10,000 vehicles. The country is estimated to lose
about 2.7 percent of its GDP through losses of life and
property. This is equivalent to the proportion of GDP
spent on the road sector.
The underdevelopment of the road network has also
resulted in severe traffic congestion in several African
capitals, causing direct loss of time and productivity.
Urban traffic congestion is common across the main
Figure 3: Ports in Africa
Source: AfDB, 2010.
cities of Africa. Indeed, traffic congestion is estimated to

cause direct loss of time and productivity at an annual
cost of roughly 4 percent of GDP (US$8 billion) in Cairo,
US$19 billion in Lagos, US$0.89 billion in Dar es Salaam,
and US$0.57 billion in Nairobi.37 Poor air quality and
road accidents may actually double the direct cost of
congestion.
The large number of landlocked countries in Africa
(15) and those with a vast hinterland, such as the
Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and
Sudan, underlines the importance of the cross-border
corridors. These transport corridors link markets
particularly important for landlocked countriesand
enhance intra-African trade. The map in Figure1 shows
Africas main corridors. The Trans-Africa Highway
(CairoDakar) is the most ambitious road network on
the continent: it comprises nine interlinked highways
with a total length of 56,683 kilometers.38 Other planned
or ongoing regional projects include the Abidjan
OuagadougouBamako Transport corridor, connecting
Cte dIvoire, Burkina Faso, and Mali. However, the
effectiveness of the cross-border links is undermined by
border inefficiencies, which are discussed in Chapter 2.1.
Road regulatory challenges

At the national level, several legal and legislative issues
regarding roads need to be addressed. Legislation
relating to axle overload is needed to tackle overloading
on roads as well the related costing/funding for road
maintenance. In addition, in some countries (such as
Uganda), although a PPP policy is in place, the relevant
law has not yet been enacted. With the exception of a
few countries (including Senegal and South Africa), toll
roads are not yet completed. Going forward, however,
several countries (including Uganda) are planning
expressways, so it is imperative that, in addition to a
tolling policy, a tolling law be enacted.
Rail infrastructure
Outdated infrastructure and limited maintenance
have undermined the effectiveness of railways across
Africa. The result has been a significant reduction
in useable track. North Africa, particularly Egypt,
boasts the oldest railway network in Africa, but it has
had only a few upgrades since its inception. In West
Africa, as evidenced by Senegal, the rail network has
deteriorated substantially in recent years because of
Table 1: Air travel cost per passenger, selected cities

Origin
Destination
Johannesburg
Accra
Nairobi Lagos
Accra London
Dubai Singapore
London Moscow
Dubai London
Distance (km)
Average cost (US$)
4,670
3,811
5,116
5,841
2,498
5,475
Average cost per 1,000 km (US$)
1,000
800
1,000
500
400
800
214.13
209.92
195.47
85.60
160.13
146.12
Sources: Travel websites Opodo.com, tripadvisor.com, and expedia.com, and authors calculations.
administrative difficulties, locomotive breakdown, and

lack of investment and maintenance. In Southern Africa,
the Chinese-built TanzaniaZambia railway has suffered
from underinvestment for the past 30 years. Overall,
the amount of useable track has declined across Africa
between 2005 and 2011, dropping from 58,000 to
50,000 kilometers, underscoring the pressing need for
rehabilitation and maintenance in the sector (Figure2).39
Differences in rail gauges (which specify the spacing
between the tracks in a railway) undermine the regional
integration of rail networks. When rail improvements are
undertaken, the need for a uniform rail gauge among
countries cannot be overemphasized. This complication
highlights the need for a regional approach; addressing it
effectively will enable trains to cross boundaries. Indeed,
the variation in the rail gauges is currently a serious
constraint for rail network development, especially
between East and Southern Africa.
Rail regulatory challenges
At the regional level, several legal and legislative issues
regarding the harmonization of rail gauges in railroads
across countries need to be addressed. Customs
regulatory framework for the cross-border movement of
goods and services will also need to be put in place to
facilitate railroad transportation across Africa.
Air transport infrastructure
Air transport in Africa, while crucial, is expensive by
international standards. By providing a quick link to
export markets, air transport enables the trade of
time-sensitive, perishable exports such as cut flowers,
vegetables, fruits, meat, and fish, which are becoming
increasingly important foreign-exchange earners for
African countries. The International Airline Transport
Association (IATA) reports that traveling by air is more
costly in Africa than anywhere else. This is mainly
because of lower passenger traffic, limited liberalization
of air space, high passenger and airport taxes, safety
issues, and limited infrastructure (airports, runways, and
safety systems). Africa still records the lowest safety
standards in air transport of any region in the world.
Table1 illustrates the high cost of travel in Africa.
African airlines have also lagged behind in terms of
technological upgrades, notably surveillance equipment
and fleet modernization. Although Africa boasts some
strong airlinesincluding Royal Air Maroc, South African

Airways, Kenya Airways, Egypt Air, and Ethiopian
Airlinesthe lack of modern air traffic surveillance
technology poses critical challenges for the industry
in several countries. For example, in Ethiopia, extra
distance and time separation between aircraft are
necessary to compensate for the lack of civilian radar.
In terms of fleet modernization, Africas demand for new
airplanes represents only 3 percent of the world demand
and is concentrated in three or four companies.40
Progress in several countries is hampered by
poor basic airport infrastructure and inadequate air
connections. Although the continent boasts some worldclass airportssuch as the Johannesburg International
Airportin general, basic airport infrastructure is lacking
in most airports across Africa. For example, because
of poor airport infrastructure in Tanzania, safe, reliable,
and comfortable air transport services are assured only
during the dry season. In addition, there are insufficient
air connections within Africa. Indeed, Eastern Africa and
Southern African subregions are more connected than
the West African subregion.41 The three major hubs in
sub-Saharan Africa are Addis Ababa, Johannesburg,
and Nairobi. Most international carriers fly from Southern
Africa and Eastern Africa, which have more-established
national and regional carriers than other regions.
Air transport regulatory challenges
Regulatory challenges in the air sector relate mainly to
the liberalization of air space. Despite some countries
having liberalized their airspace after the Yamoussoukro
Declaration of 1988, several countries in Africasuch as
Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congohave
not. This limits competition from foreign-owned airlines,
resulting in higher prices for international air travel of both
passengers and freight.
Port infrastructure
Many African ports have serious capacity problems
that are accentuated by an ineffective inland transport
system. Figure3 is a map showing Africas major ports,
which include Abidjan (Cte dIvoire), Dar es Salaam
(Tanzania), Durban (South Africa), Mombasa (Kenya),
Port Said (Egypt), and Tangier (Morocco). In North Africa,
ports are more developed and have adequate containerhandling equipment and faster turnaround times than
ports in sub-Saharan Africa. In East Africa, Dar es

Salaam and Mombasa have reached their containerstorage limits. New capacity needs to be introduced,
not only in the ports themselves but also in downstream
linkages, to ensure that cargo can be efficiently moved
onto road and rail infrastructure.42 Similar constraints are
evident in other regions of Africa, such as the ports of
Lagos (Nigeria) and Tema (Ghana).
Inefficiencies at African ports lead to slow
processing times and result in higher charges than
those of comparators. Tariffs in South African ports
tend toward the high end of the global spectrum, yet
performance is well below international benchmarks. In
East Africa, there are also significant cost differences
within the region. For example, Mombasa charges
considerably more than Dar es Salaam in East Africa,
primarily because Mombasas volume of trade is
considerably higher.
In the port subsector, although private-sector
involvement has provided some additional financing,
it has not achieved the same gains in Africa as it
has elsewhere and volumes fall substantially short
of requirements. However, the private sector has
contributed significantly to improving operational
performance, leading to the recovery of funds lost
through inefficiency in a variety of areas.43 Nonetheless,
the gains have been undermined by the limited clarity
of the public sectors objectives; the lack of close
coordination among the different institutions involved
(port institutions, customs, transport ministries, and
labor unions); and the absence of other efficiencyenhancing factors, such as pro-competitive policies and
arrangements in the sector.44
Port regulatory challenges
In the port subsector, ensuring regulatory independence
will be crucial to maximize gains from previous reforms.
Evidence suggests that reform packages that include
regulatory reform and independence of the regulator
from government interference will allow other ongoing
policy reforms a greater chance of success.45
ICTs
The ensuing section considers developments in the
ICT sector, notably in mobile telephony, Internet,
and undersea and terrestrial cables. It begins with a
discussion of the state and challenges of infrastructure
in the ICT sector and then proceeds with a discussion of
the regulatory framework.
ICT infrastructure
Africa has made progress in ICTs, particularly with regard
to laying out the infrastructure using undersea cables
and mobile technologies. Indeed, in 2011, 19 undersea
cables connected Africa to the rest of the worldup
from only 3 in 2005.46 As a consequence, cumulative
capacity increased from 2,900 gigabytes to 102
terabytes over the period. Africa is leapfrogging fixed-line
networks and moving directly to mobile technologies.
The mobile telephony subsector has been the most

vibrant of all, with the share of population receiving
mobile signals increasing by a factor of 10 in five years.47
Some African countries, such as Ghana and Nigeria,
have gone further and are expanding into satellite
communication technology. Investment in ICTs, unlike
investment in the transport subsector, is largely privatesector driven. However, major differences in the levels of
financing available exist between coastal and landlocked
countries.48
Nonetheless, access to the Internet is still low
throughout the continent, and it is expensive and
skewed in favor of urban areas. The penetration rate is
much higher in North Africa (where 27 percent of the
population have Internet access, on average) than in
Southern Africa (13 percent), East Africa (12 percent),
West Africa (9.5 percent), and Central Africa (4.5
percent).49 The situation in Central Africa is illustrated
by Chad, where 80 percent of Internet users complain
about the slow connection speeds and the very high
cost of bandwidth, which ranges between US$1,600
and US$2,000 per monthastronomically higher than in
Kenya, where it is US$100US$150, and Burkina Faso,
where it is about US$600. Across Africa, unequal access
is particularly prevalent in rural areas, indicating the need
for continuing public investment to create incentives to
extend services to these areas.
One of the most outstanding innovations in the use
of ICTs in Africa has been the mobile money sector. This
has seen phenomenal growth in East Africa, primarily
in Kenya. Box7 presents the case of the successful
M-PESA mobile-payments system in Kenya.
ICT regulatory challenges
Although the ICT subsector has been the most vibrant of
the infrastructure subsectors, progress in some countries
has been limited by government monopoly, which has
resulted in excess costs and undermined the access to
and quality of ICT services. Consequently, the price of
broadband and international calls is excessive, and the
absence of competition has a negative impact on both
revenue and productivity of public and private firms,
thus undermining investment. This is evident across all
regions of Africa, including Ethiopia and South Africa.
The central challenge for those countries that
have not liberalized their ICT sectors is to introduce
competition through a modernized institutional and
regulatory framework. These marketssuch as
Ethiopiacould potentially benefit from licensing
additional mobile operators, which would accelerate
the expansion of the global system for mobile
communications (GSM) coverage to improve access.
While Zambias GSM coverage is comparatively low
by regional standards, simulations indicate that more
than 95 percent of Zambias population could be
reached by a GSM signal if measures were taken to
dismantle behavior that is counter to competition. In
addition, establishing a coherent policy framework that
is not weakened by policy reversals is crucial. Such

a framework does not always exist. For example, in
Zambia, progress in the ICT sector was undermined by
the privatization and subsequent renationalization of the
telecommunication and Internet provider Zamtel.
For the countries that have liberalized, there is
an urgent need to improve private participation in the
information technology backbone infrastructure. In
several countries, including Uganda, because of its
public nature, the backbone project is undertaken by
the government. Nonetheless, the introduction of more
competition on the backbone side, as advocated for in
Zambia, will go a long way toward reducing prices and
broadening access.
Reforms to address fragmentation and overlap
of regulatory authorities and mandates are necessary
to tackle current market challenges arising from the
convergence of ICT technologies. Rapid technological
advances in the sector, along with their convergence,
underline the need to create and operate in an open,
dynamic, and responsive legal and regulatory framework
that supports the development of ICTs. The situation
is exemplified in Uganda, where there is considerable
overlap between the National Information Technology
Authority Ugandawhich plays a dual role as an
operator of the backbone infrastructure and the regulator
in charge of government information infrastructure
(including e-government and the governments master
plan)and the Uganda Communications Commission,
which regulates telecommunications, broadcasting,
and postal services. Clearly, there is a strong case for
regulatory convergence that would result in one regulator
for the ICT sector that deals with the issuance of licenses
as well as planning and managing ICT developments.
A periodic review of the operations, provisions, and
directives making up the legal and regulatory system
is key for ICT sector reforms, including convergence in
the industry.
While mobile money has seen phenomenal growth,
the requisite regulatory guidelines and oversight have not
kept in step. As mentioned in Box7, in several regions
of Africa, particularly in East Africa, mobile money has
become increasingly important: annual transactions
are estimated to be worth over US$8 billion in Kenya;
monthly transactions were estimated at over US$200
million in Uganda in 2012. However, regulatory guidelines
and clarity are needed to guide the mobile money
industry. For example, establishing whether mobile
money is considered to be an information technology
service or a financial service will determine the requisite
regulatory infrastructure.
CONCLUSION AND THE WAY FORWARD
This chapter has demonstrated that, although Africa has
made some improvements in increasing its infrastructure
stock in recent years, it remains underdeveloped relative
to other emerging regions. Improved infrastructure will
Box 7: The success of Safaricoms M-PESA

The mobile money sector in Kenya consists of M-PESA,
Airtel Money, Essar yuCash, and Orange Money. M-PESA,
a mobile payments system operated by Safaricom, was
launched in March 2007. It was the first mobile money
system to appear in Kenya and is now the most developed
and successful mobile money payment system in the
world. M-PESA allows people to transfer funds on a
person-to-person basis, pay bills, purchase goods, and
buy airtime. In addition, people can use M-PESA to remit
funds from the United Kingdom to Kenya. Safaricom also
launched M-KESHO in March 2010, which allows for
the movement of funds to and from an interest-bearing
account with Equity Bank.
M-PESA had 15.2 million subscribers out of the
more than 19 million mobile money subscribers in the
country as of the end of October 2012, up from a mere
19,071 subscribers in 2007. M-PESA uses over 45,540
M-PESA agents across the country. The remaining three
mobile money service providers have 9,000 agents, of
whom 6,000 work for Airtel. Of the total estimated mobile
transfers of US$10 billion in 2012, most (90 percent)
are undertaken by Safaricom operating on the M-PESA
money platform. It has four bank partners for deposits:
Commercial Bank of Africa, Standard Chartered Kenya,
CFC Stanbic, and Equity Bank Kenya.
Source: Ncube and Ondiege, 2012.
increase Africas competitiveness and productivity,

lower the cost of doing business, and facilitate trade
and foreign direct investment as well as deepen
economic and social integration and create employment
opportunities. We must address Africas infrastructure
gap to further boost economic growth and foster
integration, not only across the region, but also with
the rest of the world. However, Africa needs colossal
financial investments and support to close the regions
infrastructure gap and set itself on a par with the rest of
the developing world.
African countries must therefore undertake
infrastructure sector reforms and innovation to generate
more resources for the sector, because traditional
sources of finance will not be enough. A regional
approach to infrastructure development is key, and
interconnecting infrastructure across country boundaries
is the best way to promote trade and regional integration,
and thus connect markets in Africa. Possible reforms
and innovative solutions are outlined below:
Energy sector: Given its high unexploited potential
in terms of wind, solar, and hydropower, Africa
could easily satisfy its energy needs at no cost to
the environment. Promoting green energy could
leverage more funds from development partners
and private players than investment in non-green
energy. Furthermore, given the prevalence of non
cost reflective tariffs that undermine investments
in several African countries, governments should

commit to having cost-recovery tariffs that will, in
turn, spur much-needed investment. A regional
approach should be pursued, with urgent attention
given to the development of regional energy
infrastructure.
Transportation sectorRoads: Feeder roads are of
great importance for poverty reduction, especially
in rural areas. Together with the development
of corridors, rural roads provide economic
opportunities and access to markets. Accordingly,
emphasis should be given to developing rural roads
so as to enhance access, and also upgrading
urban roads, with a focus on those with crossborder connections. Making provisions for adequate
maintenance (both corrective and preventative)
for roads is vital, as this ensures sustainability.
In addition, it will be essential to address the
overloading of vehicles by means that include
harmonized legislation in the form of regional
axle load control acts. Furthermore, to stem the
incidence of road fatalities that result in sizeable
losses to the economy, road safety programs need
to be enhanced and adequately funded.
The need for more investment in backbone (fiber

optic) to improve connectivity across countries is
urgent. Countries also need to put in place carefully
planned maintenance measures to address the
anticipated obsoleteness of ICT infrastructure and
technology, because this is a fast-growing and
evolving industry.
The importance of infrastructure development to
enhance the continents productivity is discussed further
in Chapter 2.3. That chapter focuses on infrastructure
investment policy reform processes in the context of
developing growth pole projects that would enhance
Africas competitiveness.
NOTES
1 Caldern 2008.
2 AfDB et al. 2010.
3 Blank and Lee 2009.
4 Mayaki 2012.
5 Foster and Briceo-Garmendia 2010.
6 See Estache and Goicoechea 2005; Boopen 2006; Caldern
2008; Estache and Woodon 2011; Briceo-Garmendia and
Domnguez-Torres 2011.
7 Easterly and Rebelo 1993.
Transportation sectorRailroads: Outdated

infrastructure and limited maintenance programs
have resulted in a significant reduction in useable
track and undermine the effectiveness of railways
across Africa. Addressing these needs will both
require further investments in the sector and ease
pressure on African roads. A regional approach
should be taken, with an emphasis on establishing
uniform rail gauges to enable trains to cross country
boundaries.
8 Caldern and Servn 2004.
Transportation sectorAir transport: The

importance of air transport, particularly for
landlocked countries, cannot be overemphasized.
It is imperative that countries enhance this sectors
development to improve connectivity and safety and
to reduce costs in order to promote intra-African
and global trade.
17 ERA 2011.
Transportation sectorPorts: Countries should

put in place measures to address the serious port
capacity problems that, coupled with an ineffective
inland transport system, abound in Africa. They also
need to deal with inefficiencies that slow processing
times and result in higher charges than those of
comparators. This calls for encouraging private
involvement, which can also provide much-needed
additional financing.
ICT sector: Although the ICT sector has made
impressive gains, such as the now well-known
M-PESA mobile money payment system in Kenya,
overall, the potential of ICTs for example, to
support e-governmenthas not been fully exploited.
9 Estache and Goicoechea 2005; Caldern 2008.

10 Escribano et al. 2009.
11 Dominguez-Torres and Foster 2011.
12 World Bank 2009.
13 APIX 2011.
14 USITC 2009.
15 Shiferaw et al. 2012.
16 Siba et al. 2012.
18 World Banks Doing Business Database.

19 AfDB 2011.
20 AfDB 2010.
21 AfDB 2010.
22 The 20th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union
(Heads of State and Government), which met in Addis Ababa
on January 2728, 2013, in their Decision on the Report of the
Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee (HSGOC)
on the NEPAD Doc. Assembly/AU/4(XX)and recalling their
earlier approval of PIDA, re-stated the need for active collaboration
among the Commission, the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating
Agency, and the AfDB in revamping the NEPAD Infrastructure
Project Preparation Fund through domestic funding by Member
States and concerted efforts to increase private-sector
involvement in infrastructure development in conjunction with the
23 See the Enterprise Surveys of the World Bank, available at http://
www.enterprisesurveys.org.
24 SOFRECO-led Consortium 2011.
25 See World Economic Forum 2012.
26 AfDB 2012.
27 AfDB 2012.
28 See the World DataBank, available at http://databank.worldbank.

org/.
29 See the African Development Bank Groups AICD Database for
the power sector, available at http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/
sectors/power.
30 Shkaratan 2012.
Blank, S. and E. Lee. 2009. Transportation Infrastructure and

Competitiveness. Report prepared for the Woodrow Wilson
Center Mexico Institute and El Colegio de la Frontera Norte
research project, The U.S.-Mexico Border: A Discussion on
Sub-National Policy Options. Available at http://stage-wilson.
p2technology.com/sites/default/files/BLANK%20LEE%20
INFRASTRUCTURE.pdf.
Boeing. Current Market Outlook 20122031. Available at http://www.
boeing.com/boeing/commercial/cmo/. Accessed April 5, 2013.
31 Kapika and Ebehard 2013b, pp. 9293.

32 Kapika and Ebehard 2013b, p. 101.
Boopen, S. 2006. Transport Infrastructure and Economic Growth:

Evidence from Africa Using Dynamic Panel Estimates. The
Empirical Economics Letters 5 (1): 3752.
33 UNCTAD 2011.
34 DBSA 2012.
35 AfDB 2010.
36 See http://www.worldbank.org/transport/roads/safety.htm.
37 Estimates were produced by Hammer 2012; Dina 2012; see also
Kanyabwoya 2010 and IMB 2012, respectively.
38 AfDB 2010.
39 AfDB 2012.
Briceo-Garmendia, C. and C. Domnguez-Torres. 2011 Burkina

Fasos Infrastructure: A Continental Perspective. Policy Research
Working Paper No. 5818. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Caldern, C. 2008. Infrastructure and Growth in Africa. Africa
Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) Working Paper No. 3.
Africas Infrastructure: A Time for Transformation. World Bank:
Washington DC. Available at http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/
system/files/library/2009/10/WP03_Infra_growth.pdf.
Caldern, C. and L. Servn. 2004. The Effects of Infrastructure
Development on Growth and Income Distribution. Policy
Research Working Paper No. 3400. Washington, DC: World Bank.
40 See Boeings Current Market Outlook 20122031.

41 AfDB 2011.
42 An example is the One Stop Border at Chirundufunded by the
Japan International Cooperation Agency, the Department for
International Development, and World Bankwhich is between
Zimbabwe and Zambia.
43 World Bank 2009.
44 AfDB 2010.
DBSA (Development Bank of Southern Africa). 2012. The State of South

Africas Economic Infrastructure: Opportunities and Challenges.
Midrand: DBSA.
Dina, S. 2012. Cairos Chronic Traffic Jams: The Price of Bad Public
Planning. Ahramonline, October 24. Available at http://english.
ahram.org.eg/News/56444.aspx.
Dominguez-Torres, C. and V. Foster. 2011. Cameroons Infrastructure: A
Continental Perspective. Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic
(AICD) Country Report. Africas Infrastructure: A Time for
Transformation. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at http://
www.ppiaf.org/sites/ppiaf.org/files/publication/AICD-CameroonCountry-Report.pdf.
45 AfDB 2010.
46 AfDB 2012.
47 Foster and Briceo-Garmedia 2010.
48 AfDB 2012.
49 Authors calculations, based on the Miniwatts Marketing
Groups Internet Worlds Stats database, available at http://www.
internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm#africa.
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Appendix A:
AfDB infrastructure development projects, selected countries, 201214
The African Development Bank (AfDB) has been involved

in projects to develop infrastructure on the continent for
several years. It focuses on projects in areas of need but
where there is an enabling environment. Some of the
main infrastructure development projects currently being
implemented are listed below.
ENERGY
The Menengai Geothermal Development Project
(Kenya): This project is a Scaling-Up Renewable Energy
Program (SREP) under the Climate Investment Funds
for which AfDB Group is an implementing agency. The
project will set the stage for investments that will help
meet Kenyas rapidly increasing demand for power and
transform the country into a competitive clean energy
economy; it will also help diversify the countrys sources
of power supply by developing its substantial geothermal
potential. The Menengai field alone has a potential of up
to 1,600 megawatts (MW). The AfDB group support will
help develop the steam field for a generation capacity of
up to 400 MW in a first phase, representing a 20 percent
increase in Kenyas installed capacity.
The project will result in substantial increase in
the provision of reliable, clean, and affordable energy
equivalent to the current consumption needs of 500,000
Kenyan households (of which 70,000 will be in rural
areas) and 300,000 small businesses, with some 1,000
gigawatt hours (GWh) available for other businesses and
industries. The project will also help reduce emissions by
some 2 million tons of carbon dioxide per annum.
Senegal Coal Power Plant Project: The project
will generate 925 GWh of electricity, which represents 40
percent of 2008 national consumption; reduce annual
power shortages from the 176 days reported in 2008 to
40 days by 2014; improve national electrification coverage
(with a target of increasing from 46 percent in 2008 to 66
percent in 2015); and contribute to meeting the projected
7.8 percent annual growth in energy demand.
TRANSPORTATION: ROADS
The MombasaNairobiAddis Ababa Road Corridor
Project, Phase III (Kenya and Ethiopia): The objective
of the multinational project is to enhance trade,
strengthen regional integration, and contribute to poverty
reduction in both countries. This third phase covers
the TurbiMoyale section, which is part of the TransAfrica Highway network. It involves the construction
of 320 kilometers of the road corridor, including the
122-kilometer TurbiMoyale road section in Kenya and
the 198-kilometer HawassaAgeremariam road section
in Ethiopia. The project includes transport and trade
facilitation consultancy services to harmonize crossborder procedures. It will contribute a minimum increase
of 25 percent in intra-COMESA (Common Market
for Eastern and Southern Africa) and increase trade
between Kenya and Ethiopia by at least 200 percent
by 2017; it will also increase household incomes by an
average of at least 10 percent by 2020.
Nacala transport corridor (Mozambique, Malawi,
and Zambia): The project will upgrade a major regional
corridor and convey significant benefits, including
reduced user costs, increased access to social services,
and responses to projected traffic increases. It will
increase the capacity to handle cargo at Nacala port from
0.9 million tons in 2009 to 1.6 million tons in 2015, and
reduce transport and transit costs by 25 percent in 2015.
TRANSPORTATION: RAILROADS
The Tangiers Marrakech Railroad project (Morocco):
The project has the potential of connecting the country
to its North African neighbors. When completed in
2016, it is expected to significantly boost rail travel,
with an improvement in rail traffic fluidity and increased
frequency of shuttle, mainline, and freight trains; increase
population mobility in the project area; and create direct
and indirect jobs during project implementation and
operational phases.
TRANSPORTATION: AIR
Blaise Diagne International Airport project
(Senegal): This airport will have an annual capacity
of 3 million passengers, 80,000 flights, and 53,000
tons of cargo freight (a 3 percent capacity increase).
Subsequent expansions will increase capacity to 10
million passengers annually and eliminate over-capacity
operation at existing airports. It will be served by the new
toll highway (DakarDiamnadio), which will facilitate air
cargo transportation in reduced time, contributing to the
reduction of production costs and the improvement of
business productivity.
ICTS
Other 3 billion Networks (O3b) multinational project:
The O3b project will have a constellation of eight
medium-orbit satellites in nine countries. The project will
deliver affordable, high-bandwidth, high-quality Internet
and cellular access to inland markets in developing
countries and island economies. O3b is dedicating onethird of its capacity to Africas needs. It will reach white
spaces (unused channels of the wireless spectrum) and
fragile states with high-quality ICT infrastructure; it will
connect 18 million households (in nine Africa countries)
to cellular backhaul, 1.6 million broadband users to
global backbone, and 4,000 firms to corporate voice/
data networks. The total cost savings over the equivalent
capacity from high-orbit satellites is estimated at US$1.3
billion net present value.
The project will promote private-sector development
with growth in revenues of the nine African off-takers
(those who buy Internet services from the O3b investors)
and Internet and telecommunication operators, projected
at US$490 million net present value. It will promote
regional integration by expanding broadband Internet
and cellular access across several Africa countries:
Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana,
Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Zambia.
Source: AfDB: various infrastructure project reports.
CHAPTER 2.3
Growth Poles: Raising

Competitiveness and
Deepening Regional
Integration
JOHN SPEAKMAN
MARJO KOIVISTO
World Bank
Although some of Africas improved economic

performance in the past decade has already been driven
by improvements in infrastructure, critical investment and
policy coordination challenges remain. As the previous
chapters have highlighted, the balance for growth and
competitiveness is likely to come from structural changes
such as (1) reducing costs for building infrastructure; (2)
locking in investors from both public and private sectors
as risk sharers; and (3) incentivizing the participation,
particularly of the local private sector, in these projects.1
Furthermore, Africas competitive industriessuch as
agriculture, mining, and tourismcarry vast potential,
and they require sustained support if they are to deliver
on the promise of comprehensive competitiveness and
economic diversification.
Despite the efforts of regional organizations to
overcome barriers to trade in products and services,
competitiveness continues to be constrained by
infrastructure deficits, red tape and slow decision
making, difficulty in securing and accessing serviced
industrial land, and information failures that prevent the
private sector from coordinating investment activity.
Growth poles, typically multi-year, public-private
investments, are emerging as a key instrument to
overcome barriers to investment and to support the
agglomeration of economic activity.
Growth poles are simultaneous, coordinated
investments in many sectors to support self-sustaining
industrialization in a country. They bear resemblance to,
but are not the same as, special economic zones (SEZs),
which are spatially delimited areas within an economy.
Examples include export processing zones, economic
processing zones, free zones, and foreign trade zones.2
SEZs, as supply-side competitiveness measures, are
aimed at overcoming barriers that hinder investment in
the wider economy, including restrictive policies, poor
governance, inadequate infrastructure, and problematic
access to land. Growth poles, on the other hand,
usually combine public and private investments and are
specifically built around an already-existing resource at a
specific location in an economy.
Central to the growth pole is a group of dynamic
industries connected around a particular resource.
These industries are, by virtue of their dimension or
negotiation strength, anticipated to have the capacity to
innovate and adapt to market conditions. The growth
of dynamic industries is anticipated to generate further
investment, employment, and distribution of factor
payments, including profits that may be reinvested. The
growth of dominant industries, in turn, generates external
effects that stimulate the growth of other industries due
to inter-industry linkages.
The contribution of Julien Szabla to the preparation of materials for this

chapter is gratefully acknowledged.
2.3: Growth Poles
This chapter will draw from the World Banks quite

significant experience in supporting the development of
growth poles in Africa in recent decades. Good-practice
lessons also emerge from Asia, where, for example, the
growth poles in Malaysia and Indonesia benefited from
investments made through ASEAN regional integration
policies.3 This chapter explains the idea behind growth
poles in more detail and outlines how they interact
with infrastructure investments, trade, and regional
integration. It also discusses particular examples of
growth poles in Africa and the benefits, challenges, and
potential pitfalls of making growth pole investments. The
chapter then outlines the key policy challenges involved
with growth poles and, finally, addresses growth pole
financing.
As the first part of the chapter explains, the
underlying assumption about the benefits of growth
poles is that they increase market size so that it becomes
profitable for firms to invest. Private-sector investments,
in turn, lead to more jobs, higher wages, and economies
of scale. Growth pole projects also often attract foreign
direct investment (FDI), are built across borders, and have
spillover effects beyond national economies. Thus they
can also be a boon to regional integration.
A number of challenges characterize growth pole
projects. To set a framework for policymakers to plot the
course for growth poles to enhance competitiveness, the
chapter next discusses three key policy challenges:
Growth pole coordination challenges concern the
setting up and sustaining of both the spatial and the
political economy linkages that are required to make
these poles happen. Tradeoffs and the strategic
vision are both required in multi-stakeholder
investments and projects such as infrastructure
ones, and both need be focused on ensuring that
participation is balanced and sustained throughout
the process.
Accountability questions concern the push and pull
of rewards embedded in the contracts stakeholders
make to design and deliver growth pole projects.
The key accountability challenges regarding
growth poles in Africa today concern the returns
of these investments to landlocked countries and
coastal countries, as well as to rural and urban
populations. Accountability questions also concern
the socioeconomic sustainability that growth pole
investments can promote across the investment
area and industries.
Risk management and risk sharing concern the
endeavors that are put in place to make risks and
rewards commensurate with each other to drive
good performance as the growth pole is built,
managed, and maintained.4
Finally, the chapter discusses the specific type of
investment arrangements that can significantly improve
benefits to be realized from growth poles. Experience

in growth pole engagements shows that both public
and private participation is required to realize results.
For example, public-private partnerships (PPPs) for
constructing and maintaining infrastructure will broaden
the possibilities for private-sector job creation around
growth pole projects. Although there is no fixed list of
best-practice policies to realize private-sector development
objectives from growth poles, and specific related reforms
will vary by sector, growth poles show why effective
investment and particularly policy-process coordination will
make infrastructure projects more productive.
GROWTH POLES FOR SHARING PROSPERITY IN
AFRICAS MARKETS
The growth pole approach to economic development
looks at how infrastructure that will be developed for an
existing private investment in mining, agriculture, and
so on can be used to encourage spillovers into other
sectors. This could manifest itself through a development
corridor or a special economic zone, or even an
agglomeration economy in a booming city.A growth pole
will have an existing resource that serves as an inherent
revenue producer.
What are growth poles?
Growth poles, as noted earlier, are comprised of multiple
simultaneous investments coordinated throughout many
sectors with the purpose of supporting self-sustaining
industrialization in a country. Growth pole projects are
not oriented around addressing identified market failures,
but around capitalizing on and augmenting opportunities
that already exist in an economy, as Figure1, illustrating
the dynamics of building growth poles, suggests.
Figure1 shows how growth poles enhance alreadyexisting opportunities and can multiply them over time,
delivering both quick wins and generating mediumand long-term investments. Indeed, the underlying
assumption about the benefits of growth poles is that
they increase market size so that it becomes profitable
for firms to invest, with the resulting higher wages and
economies of scale. If an investment in a project induces
investment in the following stages of production, it
is called forward linkage and has outcomes such as
diversification in value chains. A backward linkage is
a creation of investment in the stages of production
leading up to the final product, such as investment into
logistics or the storing of goods. Investment should be
pushed into a project that maintains the highest number
of total linkage investments.
Furthermore, growth poles, as economic initiatives,
are spatially targeted investment instruments and sets of
policy for accelerating economic growth in developing
countries. As a concept, growth poles are based on
Perrouxs assumption that, for an economy to attain
higher income levels, that economy should first develop
within itself one or several regional centers for economic
strength.5 Growth poles, as a spatial planning tool, draw
2.3: Growth Poles
Figure 1: Characteristics of growth pole projects: Quick wins and medium-term investment for long-term development
Current
Quick wins
Medium term
Long term
National border
Main sector
Investment
Sourcing (direction of money flow)
Secondary sector
Exports
Growth pole area
Local suppliers and entrepreneurs
Internal market
Source: Authors.
Note: Levels of investment are nonexistent for current, low for quick wins, medium for medium term, and significant for long term.
on the following concepts: (1) economies of scale, (2)

the nurturing of backward and forward economic supply
linkages and also fiscal and final demand linkages, and
(3) economies of agglomeration, which are associated
with spatial clusters and the geographic concentration of
economic activities.
Figure2 illustrates how to identify potential growth
poles and shows the specificity of this investment and
project development process.
As the steps needed to identify growth poles
illustrate, the growth pole model of economic
development is distinct from the development corridor
of SEZ investments. Growth poles, considered as
investments, often consist of infrastructure projects,
with associated investments and capacity-building
efforts directed at the private sector. Indeed, although
development corridors and SEZs can be component
parts of growth poles, growth pole projects are built on
the assumption that there is a need for simultaneous,
coordinated investments in many sectors to get selfsustaining industrialization. As such, growth poles are
broader than SEZs or development corridors.6
Central to the growth pole is a group of dynamic
industries that are connected around a particular
resource. These constellated industries areby virtue
of their dimension or negotiation strengthexpected
to have the capacity to innovate and adapt to market
conditions. The growth of these dynamic industries is
expected to generate further investment, employment,
and distribution of factor payments, including profits that
may be reinvested. The growth of dominant industries

generates external effects that stimulate the growth of
other industries because of inter-industry linkages.
As developing countries advance from largely
agriculture-based economies, the assumption is that it is
most likely that investments into industry will create the
most linkages. It follows that the focus in growth pole
projects is on externalities and doing many things at the
same time to achieve critical mass. Most growth pole
projects that are focused on infrastructure, regulation,
capacity-building, and finance for early investors are a
mix of policies and investments, but the investment and
policy mix varies depending on perceived constraints
to private investment and growth (see Box1 for an
example).
Because of the big pushstyle simultaneous
commitment of multiple investments for growth
poles, the process of identifying key constraints, their
relationships, and the underlying political economy of
these constraints is critical for achieving outcomes.
Growth poles typically bring about large changes in
particular locationsthey distinctly do not effect marginal
changes. This fact has attracted quite an amount of
academic critique of the growth pole and SEZ types
of intervention as concepts for economic development
(see Box2).
Indeed, as other surrounding competitiveness
challenges are addressed, the typical outcomes of
growth pole and SEZ types of spatial investments can
include increased output and/or exports; measurable
2.3: Growth Poles
Figure 2: Growth pole development process elements
DIALOGUE
ANALYSIS
Consultation with key stakeholders

Developing a growth pole successfully necessitates
developing a dialogue with stakeholders in order to:
Diagnostics focused on competitive industries

Several different types of diagnostics should be utilized:
Understand the current context for development and

growth, as well as ongoing and future investment potential
Share best practices and African success stories
Spatial analytics analyze, from a locational perspective,

some of the key economic drivers in play, such as
agribusiness, natural resources, logistics, infrastructure,
and existing manufacturing capabilities
Test existing ideas
Sector and subsector analytics, complemented by

product space analysis, identify emergent competitive
advantages
Identify key champions for change and develop

partnerships
Trade competitiveness and services sector diagnostics

identify spillovers between sectors
Define the role of international finance in encouraging

localized and inclusive growth
Enterprise surveys include firm-level surveys of

a representative sample of an economys private
sector. The surveys cover a broad range of business
environment topics including access to finance,
corruption, infrastructure, crime, competition, and
performance measures
Generate new ideas for specific growth pole interventions
Take key ideas and develop interventions in concert with

local partners or champions
Identify projects for funding
Coordinate among all strategically important initiatives
Business schoolstyle case studies of the top five

gazelles (dynamic, fast-growing companies) are
co-produced with local research institutions to illustrate
the methods used by local dynamic enterprises
INSTITUTIONS
FINANCIAL MODEL
Coordination with institutions

Dynamic interaction among institutions needs to be
coordinated both horizontally and vertically to produce the
desired outcomes:
Combination of financial instruments

Each growth pole is a sum of its parts, and any growth
pole would have financing from some combination of the
following:
Public financing (including donor resources applied
through the budget)
Horizontal coordination
Streamlining institutional arrangements to coordinate
competitiveness, investment, and other issues between
central and local government, and between public and
private sectors
Donor grants and financing at the sovereign and subsovereign level that lie outside the budget
Public-private partnerships to build and operate/
renovate service delivery in the infrastructure and social
and economic development spaces (industrial estates)
A council or team in a ministry could play an important

strategic role in horizontal coordination and temporal
coherence
Corporate social responsibilitylike intervention
Vertical coordination
Because of the dynamic nature of a growth pole project,
implementation arrangements in particular should be
attended to in detail
An effective results-based monitoring and evaluation
framework, based on multi-stakeholder participation, iterative
learning, and peer group studies of other growth poles
should be constructed
productivity gains in the enclave from combined

components; and, possibly, spillovers to the rest of the
economy. These must be considered in the context
of the overall location-based development impact of
embarking on such projects. Therefore, an emphasis
on employment generation emerging out of growth pole
projects is a significant focus.
Regional integration and the need for the creation
of growth pole linkages
Growth poles emerge as a policy response to the need
to create better spatial and political economy linkages
in the new African regional markets. As this Report has
Asset sales/leases (typically using the value of the land

created by the initiative)
Privatization of existing state-owned enterprises with
redundant but useful assets
Private financing with some risk mitigation
Private financing where all risk is with the private sector
discussed, the challenges to commerce and trade in

these new markets no longer arise predominantly from
high tariffs, but rather from barriers behind the borders
(see Chapter 2.1). Indeed, to trade beyond their countries
borders, African exporters will benefit not only from
additional hard infrastructure and technical assistance from
their governments and other actors, but also from equally
ambitious policy reforms to support the agglomerations of
competitive industries and to facilitate trade.
Successful reforms will result from the efforts of
both the public and private sectors, and will take into
account spatial constraints a country faces, targeting
landlocked countries in Africa with specific insights.
2.3: Growth Poles
Box 1: What is a growth pole? The case of Madagascar

The Madagascar Integrated Growth Poles Project aimed
at stimulating the growth of three geographical regions of
Madagascar centered around the growth poles of Nosy Be,
Fort Dauphin, and Antananarivo-Antsirabe (Figure A). The
objective of the poles was to address key constraints to
investment, including infrastructure, business environment,
institutional capacity, skills and access to finance. The poles
are multi-sector projects with particular focus on tourism-led
growth in Nosy Be, mining- and tourism-led growth in Fort
Dauphin, and export-led growth in Antananarivo-Antsirabe.
In Nosy Be, the pole focuses on building support
infrastructure (rehabilitating roads and improving water
supply); strengthening municipal capacity for administration,
fiscal management, and service delivery; and supporting
business environment reforms. The project supports a new
hotel training school in partnership with other donors and the
private sector, and the establishment of a marine reserve to
protect rare ecological resources vital to the sustainability of
the tourism industry.
Figure A: Madagascars growth pole sites
Nosy Be
Antananarivo-Antsirabe
Fort Dauphin
In Fort Dauphin, the pole is jointly invested in by the

government and the mining company Rio Tinto to ensure
that large mining investments benefit the local population.
They co-financed the construction of a new public multiuser
port managed by a private consortium and in operation since

2009. Investments were also made in road construction to
support tourism and to facilitate market access for local
production.
In addition, the project is supporting innovative publicprivate partnerships (PPPs) with Rio Tinto in power generation
and transmissionwith a guarantee from the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agencyand in improving access
to water supply. A partnership with the United Nations
Development Programme, Rio Tinto, and other private firms
has led to the establishment of a vocational training center
to bridge local skills gaps. The emphasis on ensuring that
mining projects have a positive impact on local populations
and on the economy more broadly serves as an example of
what can be done for other mining investments.
In Antananarivo-Antsirabe, PPPs have been
established in skills development for the garments, tourism,
and information technology industries. For example, the
growth pole includes a private university and firms in the
garments industry, which have collaborated to offer the first
textile engineering diploma program in Madagascar.
The growth poles in Madagascar are showing positive
results, and the main objectives of these investments have
not been revised. Until the onset of the political crisis of
2009, the poles were on track to achieve their development
objectives and results in terms of private investments and job
creation. Private investment increased from US$84 million
in 2005 to US$1,045 million in 2007. In 200608, some
5,000 new businesses were registered in the three poles.
During the same period, an estimated 10,000 formal jobs
were created in the three poles, and the number of new
hotel rooms in Fort Dauphin and Nosy Be increased by 40
percent and 27 percent, respectively. Regional development
plans were adopted and most of the main infrastructure
works were completed, leading to major improvements in
local infrastructure. Since 2009, Fort Dauphin and Nosy Be
continue to show progress, and by 2013, have added over
13,000 formal jobs.
The overall business environment in Madagascar has
been improved: it is now easier to register a business, trade,
pay taxes, and obtain a license. In Fort Dauphin, it now takes
four days to register a new business; before the project was
initiated, this took two months. The Economic Development
Board of Madagascar regional offices in Nosy Be and Fort
Dauphin can now register individually owned enterprises,
which has significantly reduced the cost and time required
for small business startups. By 2013, following results
assessments on the poles, the Antananarivo-Antsirabe pole
was deemed less successful and discontinued.
Overall, indicators from the poles suggest promising
private-sector response to the investments made in
infrastructure, the improvement in the business environment,
and job creation.
Source: The World Banks Integrated Growth Poles Project, available
at http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P083351/integratedgrowth-poles?lang=en.
2.3: Growth Poles
Box 2: Debating the spatial approach to

economic development
Although there is a long, challenged history around the
world in using instruments such as SEZs to promote
investment in remote regions, the evidence suggests they
can be highly effective when targeting regions that already
have natural or economic geography advantages.1 And
although SEZs are unlikely to trigger agglomeration in
lagging regions with low population densities, in places
such as China, where SEZs targeted coastal trade
gateways, they have proven to be powerful catalysts for
growth. Thus, while the World Banks World Development
Report 2009 suggested SEZs be approached cautiously,
it supported the use of such hard and soft infrastructure to
reinforce existing geographical advantages.2
Concerns have also been raised that zones, by
and large, have failed to extend benefits outside their
enclaves or to contribute to the upgrading of skills and the
production base.3 First, however, it is important to separate
political support from political objectives in zone projects.
Although strong commitment from the government is
needed, projects must be designed carefully on the basis
of clear strategic plans. The zones must be commercially
viable, and the case for their construction must be based
on sustainable sources of competitiveness, not solely on
fiscal incentives. Second, despite the concept of zones as
enclaves, in practice, their success is almost fully entwined
with the competitiveness of the national economy and the
national investment environment.
Source: Farole, 2011.
Notes
1 World Bank 2008.
2 World Bank 2008.
3 See Kaplinsky 1993.
Indeed, success casessuch as that of Malis innovation

in the mango production value chain (see Box3)show
how a country can gain from intra-African trade and
innovate in infrastructure and private-sector development
policy to realize areas of comparative advantage and
diversify its economy.
In addition to national measures, policies promoted
and adopted by African regional organizations can also
provide an enabling environment for the expansion
of markets for African goods. Regional integration
is a powerful tool that governments can use to spur
growth and competitiveness through additional trade
facilitation measures, such as the harmonization of
safety and quality standards for products and the mutual
recognition of educational degrees. The development
of cross-border financial services is also important,
especially for small- and medium-sized enterprises
and traders, which often work in the informal sector
and have limited access to credit, banking, and other
financial services. Cross-border financial services might
encourage trade expansion for producers and traders
not already well connected to cross-border trading
networks.
To fully realize benefits from efforts at regional

integration, a number of spatial and political economy
linkages need to be established, and need to operate
well, to deliver competitiveness and sustainable growth
in Africa. This Report has discussed the prospects of
specific sectors of infrastructure, including energy and the
ICT sectors, of doing so. The attempt to create regional
and national spatial linkages by building infrastructure
needs to be mindful of the unequal distribution of
resources between the coastal and landlocked countries
of the continent, and to consider the challenge of
spurring equitable growth in both rural and urban areas.
One recent example of such efforts is the Lamu Port
South SudanEthiopia Transport (LAPSSET) economic
and transport corridor, planned to connect the east and
west coasts of Africa and to establish reliable access to
the sea for northern and eastern parts of Kenya, South
Sudan, and Ethiopia (see Box4).
GROWTH POLE POLICY CHALLENGES
A number of lessons can be distilled from the growth
poles that have been planned and built in Africa over
the past decade. To start with, growth pole projects
have revealed three kinds of challenges: coordination,
accountability, and risk management and sharing issues.
Coordination
Infrastructure and competitiveness projects such as
growth poles bring about a number of coordination
challenges. First, not unlike other infrastructure and
private-sector development initiatives, growth pole
coordination challenges concern the setting up and
sustaining of both the spatial and the political economy
linkages that are required to make the poles happen.
More specifically, policy coordination challenges
include the question of strategy: how do growth poles
get chosen, and how do specific transactions get
chosen? Responding to these challenges requires
both institutional (horizontal) coordination and effective
(vertical) coordination of implementation arrangements.
Horizontal coordination of growth pole projects
entails streamlining institutional arrangements to
coordinate competitiveness diagnostics and planning,
as well as investment issues, both between central and
local government and between the public and private
sectors. It is often the case that a council or a team
in a ministry could play an important strategic role in
horizontal coordination and strategic sequencing and
timing of efforts, including the monitoring and evaluation
of activities. These projects usually also benefit from
an administrative unit dedicated to growth poles in
government.
Vertical coordination requires that special attention
be paid to the implementation arrangements. A common
challenge is that, even when the right policies and
regulations are in place, they may not be consistently
implemented across individual cases (this situation is
captured by the term policy implementation uncertainty).
2.3: Growth Poles
Box 3. Malis mangos: Linking farmers to markets through innovations in the value chain
Moreover, agriculture is a major pillar of Malis economy.
It accounts for 45 percent of the countrys GDP and employs
80 percent of its workforce. Industry represents 17 percent
of the countrys GDP, with food processing, construction,
and phosphate and gold mining as the principal industrial
activities. Malis main exports, since the 1970s, have been
gold, cotton, and livestock. However, as a landlocked country,
Mali wasand still ishighly dependent on the transport
infrastructure and other logistical arrangements of its
neighbors for market access and trade.
The mango fruit was traditionally collected and sold
mainly for the domestic market. During the 1970s, Mali was
the first country in West Africa to focus on opportunities
to export fresh mangoes. However, these exports were
exclusively via air freight, reaching a volume of between 1,000
and 1,500 tons per year and targeting the niche market of
the expensive retail shops selling tropical fruits in France. In
the early 1990s, the government of Mali recognized the need
to design policies to diversify exports and foreign exchange
earnings, which had been heavily concentrated for years on
only three export products: gold, cotton, and livestock.
The lack of direct access to a port meant that Mali had
to rely on its neighbors surface infrastructure as well as
its own. Until the 1990s, the only rail line with international
linkages was run inefficiently, leading to uncompetitive
prices and chronically severe delays: the development
Mali, a landlocked country of West Africa, has experienced

a spectacular growth in its exports of fresh mangoes, which
increased sixfold in volume between 1993 and 2008. As
one of the poorest countries in the world, and with over 80
percent of the workforce engaged in agriculture, Mali had to
overcome a number of very serious challenges to achieve
such a result. Over a decade, Mali has been able to build on
its comparative advantage and secure access to the fastgrowing fresh fruit market in the European Union, generating
increasing revenues for its producers and exporters.
The key innovation that allowed Mali to overcome
obstacles arising from its situation as a landlocked country
and to secure access to this market was the testing
and implementationthrough a partnership with private
operatorsof a multimodal transportation system for the
export of fresh produce that would provide an alternative
to air freight. Thanks to an intervention, the feasibility and
profitability of using refrigerated containers all the way to
the destination market in Europe, using a combination of
road, rail, and sea freight rather than shipping by air, was
demonstrated (Figure A). This innovation basically opened
the way to accessing the large and growing market of
sea-freighted export of perishables. This new multimodal
approach to transport is also good from an environmental
point of view because it drastically reduces the carbon
footprint of this trade.
MULTIMODAL: 12 days
Lowest cost, low volume
Low cost, high volume
Farm
Farm
Farm
Smallholder mango
producers
Smallholder mango
producers
Smallholder mango
producers
Mail
Cte dIvoire
Exporters
Truck
Exporters
Pack houses/exporters
Exporters
Ferke train station
Exporters
Importers
Retailers
Importers
Sea
Wholesalers
Europe
Sea
Retailers
Europe
Wholesalers
Cte dIvoire
Importers
Packers/exporters
Train
Packers/exporters
Traders
Small traders (pisteurs)
Truck
Mail
Packers/exporters
Air
Europe
Traders
Air
Mail
Traders
Truck
TRUCK/SEA: 25 days
Air
AIR: 2 days
High cost, low volume
Truck
Figure A: Transport modes for fresh mangoes from Mali to Europe
Wholesalers
Retailers
Source: Adapted from Sangho et al., 2010.
(Contd)
2.3: Growth Poles
Box 3. Malis mangos: Linking farmers to markets through innovations in the value chain (contd)
of an alternative supply chain was of critical importance.
However, such development faced three crucial challenges:
infrastructure, management, and finance. The paucity
of market information for growers and exporters was
exacerbated by poor harvesting practices and post-harvest
handling techniques, little or no investment at production
level, and an extremely challenged domestic finance market.
Malis mango export value chain improvement
(resulting in the transport innovation) was achieved through
a combination of innovation, in-time deployment of the
right financing mechanisms, private-sector leadership, and
In order to avoid the costs that delays or unpredictable

policy environment can cause to growth pole projects,
policymakers will do well to pay attention to the
formulation of results-based monitoring and evaluation
frameworks for growth poles.7
Accountability
Accountability questions concern the push and pull of
rewards embedded in the contracts that stakeholders
make to design and deliver the infrastructure of growth
poles. Indeed, the political economy of a growth
pole project is complex because, if the projects are
successful, they will induce large local (or regional)
changes, and local effects may vary among different
sites.
Growth pole projects, and other infrastructure
investments, can be at once national and regional,
public and private. They are by definition large and risky,
and entail a large number of players. In this context,
the accountability of the set of institutional tools that
reward organizations that consistently perform well for
their stakeholders and penalize those that do not is
significant. Infrastructure projects often not only connect
rural regions with urban ones, but regional infrastructure
projects also often connect more naturally advantaged
countries (e.g., those with a coastline and ports) with
less-advantaged countries (landlocked ones). How then,
for example, are spillover benefits to local farmers in
rural-urban road projects balanced with benefits accrued
from a road built to retailers in the city?
In the case of a road connecting rural and urban
areas, land will become much more valuable, which
will attract outside investors and job seekers. For this
reason, an entire ecosystem of checks and balances
is needed, including competition commissions,
infrastructure sector regulators, and concession
regulators. Furthermore, when infrastructure is developed
to facilitate trade and productive sectors, accountabilities
to the key stakeholders are also produced. Communities
that are affected want to participate in the economic
benefits that flow from the project. The local private
sector wants to participate in the relevant markets
created by the trade of the underlying resource. When
high-quality technical and economic work in areas such as

market research, value chain cost analysis, benchmarking,
and assessment of constraints. Even if, as in the case of
the mango sector of Mali, the private sector is weak in the
beginning, it is necessary to start working with existing
private operators and eventually bring in new ones, such
as the company from Cte dIvoire that ran the pilot export
test for the mangos. There was also a unique public-private
partnership sharing of risks for all partners involved.
Source: Sangho et al., 2010.
intra-regional corridors are developed, fair sharing of

benefits is needed.
Accountability issues then also pertain to
possibilities for the local private sector entailed in a
situation where large, private-sector anchor investors
internalize the coordination costs of rebuilding
value chains that include smaller industry players.
The development of export horticulture production
in Northern Senegal provides a good example of
competitiveness enhancement through trade and
standardization that have also raised the incomes of the
rural poor.8
Risk management and risk sharing
The challenge of risk management and risk sharing
concerns attempts to make risks and rewards
commensurate with each other to drive the needed
private-sector participation. These risks include
contingent risks(the risk to income when the income
is largely dependent on others), political predictability
risks (the risk that contracts will not be violated), and the
whole raft of technical and market risks that exist in any
PPP.
Of particular importance in Africa is how PPPs can
help in managing life cycle risks. Often governments
do not account for life cycle costs, including regular
maintenance and replacement of assets. These costs
can be higher than the initial capital costs of the
investments. PPPs are designed to provide services to
the users over a longer-term period than the traditional
procurement methods presented by a construction
contract. Consequently, it becomes critical to plan and
allocate resources appropriately to ensure inclusive and
shared growth over 2030 years.
Indeed, the question of financing growth poles
needs special attention in Africa, as access to finance
is a particular challenge on the continent. This area is
discussed in detail in the next section of this chapter.
FINANCING GROWTH POLES
Growth pole projects are usually large-scale investments
that require considerable upfront expenditure. As
such, growth poles present a vast financing challenge.
2.3: Growth Poles
Box 4: The Lamu PortSouth SudanEthiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor Project

The aim of the LAPSSET corridor is to facilitate trade, regional
economic integration, and interconnectivity among a number
of African countries by easing movement from Ethiopia, South
Sudan, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
up to Douala in Cameroon (Figure A). Foreseen combined
investments from the governments of Kenya, South Sudan,
and Ethiopia, along with private investment, are intended to
allow the construction of a port, a railway line, an oil refinery,
an oil pipeline, airports, a highway, and resort cities. In
addition to benefits for the economy in particular locations,
the LAPSSET project is expected to spur economic growth in
participating countries by increasing annual growth rate from
around 6 percent to around 10 percent and to fuel sustained
competitiveness by creating tens of thousands of jobs over an

investment period of up to 40 years.
The LAPSSET project is indicative of ways regional
integration can fuel economic growth. The project design
required to meet the competitiveness challenge for African
countries specifically boils down to focusing infrastructure
investments spatially on comparative advantages, together
with appropriate governance. For projects such as LAPSSET,
such a required combined strategy is often described as the
development of growth poles.
Source: Government of Kenya, 2011.
Figure A: The Lamu PortSouth SudanEthiopia Transport (LAPSSET) corridor
Bangui
Yaunde
Douala
Juba
Bambari
Nairobi
Lamu
Mombasa
Source: Government of Kenya, 2011.
Moreover, ensuring the availability of private financing

for the longer term, which is needed to match the life
of the assets at a reasonable cost, is a formidable
task in todays market conditions. Most investors and
lenders are receding from new and untested investments
because they are too risky to ensure a reasonable
return on their investment. In the case of many growth
polerelated investments, the composite projects may
not be individually creditworthy and may need additional
enhancements, such as government guarantees,
extra reserves, and liquidity support, especially during
construction. This is why high-quality PPPs play an
integral role in growth pole projects.
Growth pole finance differs somewhat from finance

models specific to infrastructure and to SEZs. The latter,
as indicated at the outset, have commonly been supplyside competitiveness measures. Their finance models
have largely been public. See Table1, which describes
revenues for building these zones.
Infrastructure finance includes both public and
PPP models. Public finance models can include
accruing user fees, property value capture (such as the
acquisition and later sale or lease of excess land), tax
incremental financing, and so on. Still, growth poles, like
infrastructure projects, increasingly see PPPs as their key
financing model.
2.3: Growth Poles
Table 1: Funding SEZs: Revenue streams in typical SEZ arrangements

Revenue stream
Description
Typical recipient in SEZ regimes
Customs revenue
Revenues received from charging duties on imports/

exports
National government; note in the case of existing

regional agreements (such as the East African
Community) there may already be a revenue sharing
model
Corporate tax
Taxes of firm profits
National and sometimes state/provincial governments

(often waived or reduced as fiscal incentive)
Municipal taxes
Taxes charged on profits, assets, and so on from local

governments
Local government (often waived or reduced as fiscal

incentive and to simplify tax administration for investors)
VAT/sales taxes
Taxes on production and sales
National government and sometimes state/provincial

government (often zero-rated or reduced as fiscal
incentive)
Personal income taxes
Taxes on incomes of individuals living in the zone
National government
Service fees
Fees for provision of licenses for operating or carrying

out specific activities
SEZ developers; SEZ Authority; individual government

agencies
Land/facilities sales and lease
Leases for land plots or rents for prebuilt facilities in

the zone
SEZ developers
Source: Dobronogov and Farole, 2012.
A number of questions need to be answered during

the course of planning any PPP project. In infrastructure
projects, for example, the specific challenge concerns
whether development for the infrastructure to be
built should be bid out competitively or should be
sole sourced. What measures should be taken for
proactive investment generation? Can regional deals for
infrastructure investments and development be made,
and are local investment banks involved? How can
funding be scaled up to engage a more diverse group
of actors? To what extent can the regulatory capacity of
infrastructure investments be harmonized regionally, to
attract and sustain investment and political will? World
Banksupported PPPs, especially on the west coast of
Africa, have had success in balancing the coordination
of public-private participation and risk sharing in the
projects (see Box5). An example of such a successful
PPP from the telecommunication sector accounts for
approximately 90 percent of the value of PPPs set up in
sub-Saharan Africa.9
In PPPs such as those on the west coast of
Africa, public investment through the PPP mechanism
undoubtedly helped to unlock the projects that were
held in fragile states or those that were too large or
risky to have the private sector involved on its own. To
ensure private-sector involvement, governments created
enabling legal and regulatory frameworks and built
pro-competition policies. Overall, to ensure the success
of the PPPs, deeper reforms are needed to eradicate
monopolies, and regulations have to be adjusted to meet
rapid technological changes.
Growth pole PPPs
The risk profile of growth poles will be different from
that of other types of PPP projects. Indeed, certain
areas would be better suited for public funding and
some would be better suited for private development.

Therefore, the final set of challenges and opportunities
to be discussed in this chapter pertains to risk
management and risk sharing around growth pole and
infrastructure projects.
Risk management concerns the question of how
growth pole projects can be made commercially viable.
Risk sharing questions concern how infrastructure
projects and their construction and maintenance risks
can be distributed and leveraged for shared gain.
Risk management and risk sharing are ongoing
and continuous parts of growth pole investments.
Once the main economic drivers of growth poles
are identifiedwhether these are agglomerations of
economic activity, such as cities, or the discovery of a
new natural resource, for examplethe types of risks
involved must be identified. The types of risks that
usually need managing in growth pole projects have to
do with payment and demand risks, market risks, and
construction risks. The recent guarantee and credit
support in Nigeria for the gas sector provides a good
example of innovative solutions to these problems
(Box6).
Risk-sharing and risk management challenges of
growth poles
Whether the economic driver of a growth pole is a
natural resource or a particularly buoyant agglomeration
of industrial activity, this economic driver could
translate, first and foremost, into a commercial risk to
be managed. Such a commercial risk will include both
the payment and the demand risks involved in setting
up the project. Such risks determine a projects ability to
produce enough cash to be able to cover the projects
daily expenses (incurred in providing the services), pay
back its debt, and achieve a reasonable profit. The
2.3: Growth Poles
Box 5: Success in PPP coordination

Each recent submarine cable project supported by the
World Bank has resulted in a unique model according to the
level of involvement of private partners and the objectives of
policy makers (Table A).
The models for PPP developed in the telecommunication
sector provide important lessons for emerging services
sectors such as infrastructure and construction in Africa.
Since 2007, the World Bank has provided technical

assistance and financial support to more than 30 developing
countries to connect them to international networks through
optic fiber. Many of these projects were public-private
partnerships (PPPs) on the west coast of Africa that linked
national networks to Europe through submarine cables.
The PPP structure has been tailored to each projects level
of public ownership, risk, and scope of service offered,
ranging from business processing outsourcing to privatization
(FigureA).
Wide scope
Management
contract
Privatization
Concession contract
BOO
BOT
Network leasing
PPP landing station
Limited scope
Scope of enterprise functionality

and service offering
Figure A: Matrix of selected PPP approaches and models
BPO
Public
Private
Ownership and risk

Source: Gallegos, 2012.
Note: BOO = build-own-operate; BOT = build-operate-transfer; BPO = business processing outsourcing; IPO = initial public offering; PPP = public-private partnership.
(Contd on next page)
investments in the growth pole, for example, might be

technically and economically sound, but not necessarily
financially viable. Additionally, managing construction risk
is particularly important because the risk precludes many
sources of patient long-term capital, such as pension
funds and sovereign wealth funds, from investing in
PPPs.
Another set of risk management questions concerns
cost recovery from the growth poles. If the investment
generates revenues, are these enough to cover the
costs? If the revenues are not sufficient, is there potential
for increasing these revenues, or can the public entity
involved complement the revenues generated directly
by either driving down the capital costs or providing
supplementary revenues during implementation? This
is a big decision for the governments involved because
it becomes an affordability issue both for the users and
for the public budget. How much of the costs would (or
should) the government pass on to the users?
Finally, governments often do not pay enough
attention to the overall costing and the cost-benefit
analysis of the whole project cycle at the outset. This is
an important point because life cycle costs, including

regular maintenance and replacements of the assets, are
at stake. These life cycle costs can be higher than the
initial capital costs of the investments.
One way to address overall costing issues is to
set up high-quality PPPs that are designed to provide
services to the users over a longer-term period rather
than using the traditional procurement method of a
construction contract. Therefore, planning and allocating
resources appropriately is vital to ensure that access is
inclusive and that growth is shared over 2030 years.
To achieve shared growth, risk-sharing instruments
must be thought through. Cost recovery concerns how
well the public partner is able estimate its investment
costs and price them into a periodic payment plan, either
via users or another source. In this process, risk will be
shared. On the other hand, the private sector would not
enter into a transaction unless there is a certainty for
cost recovery during the operation period.
In the current markets, the potentially shared risk
concerning cost recovery is translated into construction
risk, which would mean cost overruns and time delays
2.3: Growth Poles
Box 5: Success in PPP coordination (contd)
Table A: Recent World Banksupported PPPs, approaches, and models

Model
Description
Examples
Cooperative
All sector operators (MNOs, ISPs) unite to form a private company (special-purpose
vehicle) for the purpose of building, owning, and operating the national backbone as a
wholesale operator. The government contributes a subsidy with no related ownership to
ensure national coverage, including rural access points, open access, nondiscrimination,
and low-cost pricing.
Burundi national
backbone project, 2007
Equity
The equity model is similar to the cooperative model except that the government obtains
equity and shareholding ownership rights in exchange for its contribution. Generally,
government divestiture mechanisms are built in.
The Gambia, Guinea,

Liberia, So Tom and
Prncipe, Sierra Leone
Concession
This is a traditional build-operate-transfer approach, whereby the government issues

a public tender to select a private-sector operator to build and operate the national
backbone or specific national and cross-border links. The agreement is in the form of a
long-term concession (1525 years) that requires the transfer of the networks back to the
government at the end of the concession.
Republic of Congo, in
process
Bulk capacity
purchase
The government, acting as an anchor client, issues a public tender for the long-term
(1015 years) supply of bulk capacity (+ 1 gigabit) bandwidth. This model stimulates
investment by the private sector through the aggregation of demand. In this case, the
partnership is governed by a PPP agreement or supplier contract that establishes the
rights and obligation of each party.
Rwanda, 2011; Malawi,

in process
Management
contract
This is a standard management contract agreement whereby the government issues a

public tender to select a private operator to build, operate, and commercialize the national
backbone (or specific national or cross-border links) for a fee during a short-term period
(35 years). Core assets remain the property of the government.
Gabon, in process*
Source: World Bank, ICT Unit analysis.

Notes: ISP = Internet service provider; MNO = mobile network operator.
* The initial PPP structure allows for conversion to an equity approach at a later stage.
Source: Gallegos, 2012.
in the construction aspects of a project. The longer the

construction period, the longer it takes the project to
begin operation and therefore the longer it takes to begin
generating revenues. Traditionally, this risk was covered
by monoliners,10 but after their demise in the aftermath of
the 2008 financial markets problems, very few financiers
are able to accept this risk. The other big risk comes
from the government itself as a co-financier of the
project. In the case where the government is providing
financing either with a capital grant toward investment
costs or an availability payment during the operational
phase, the availability of public budget funds over the
life of the concession remains risky. This risk, in turn,
is one of the reasons why there are such vast benefits
to be gained from policymakers addressing the aboveoutlined coordination, accountability, and risk challenges
associated with growth poles.
CONCLUSIONS
The present time is fortuitous for Africa. The continent is
enjoying solid growth, and much international attention
is focused on Africa as an investment destination, with

a specific emphasis on the continents infrastructure.
Unfortunately, this growth is uneven and highly reliant
on natural resources, with a number of resource-rich
countries enjoying very strong growthin some cases
over 10 percentand other countries not doing very
well. These competitiveness figures bring to the fore
the important question of how, while enjoying a high
rate of growth, African countries can make the types of
investments and policies that can put their economies
on sustainable growth paths and create jobs for the long
term.
This chapter has argued that, for Africa to maintain
and accelerate its growth performance, it needs to find
ways to develop its areas of key comparative advantages
in its competitive industries (for example, agriculture,
mining, and tourism). This means improving productivity
and connections to and among markets and reaping
the benefits of recent trends toward regional integration.
The key ingredients to this success are governance
and infrastructure, and the deployment of a combined
2.3: Growth Poles
Box 6: The Nigeria electricity and gas

improvement project
Poor infrastructure in the energy sector has been a key
constraint to economic growth in Nigeria. Shortfalls in the
availability of energy have meant that around 60 million
people continue to live in the dark, and average annual
per capita energy consumption is among the lowest in the
world. Poor access to energy has forced companies to
invest in self-generation, diverting substantial resources
away from other, more productive uses.
Furthermore, power generation has been constrained
by inadequate gas supplies to power plants. So far, low
gas prices have inhibited domestic and international oil
companies from investing in gas-gathering and gasprocessing equipment to supply the domestic market.
To address this problem, Nigeria has announced a
phased price increase to domestic gas suppliers. At the
same time, it has introduced a domestic supply obligation
and bilateral contracting between gas suppliers and
consumers. These steps are expected to bring commercial
discipline to the gas sector. Additionally, through extensive
multi-stakeholder consultations and communication
activities, the Nigerian government established the Nigeria
Electricity and Gas Improvement Project, with World Bank
guarantee assistance, to mobilize gas supplies for power
generation. The Power Holding Company of Nigerias gas
supply payment obligations to international and domestic
oil companies (Shell, Chevron, Exxon-Mobil, Total, Addax,
Agip, and Pan-Ocean) will help mobilize gas supplies for
power generation and, moreover, will support the private
sectorled development of the gas sector.
These risk-sharing actions are expected to boost
domestic gas supply for power generation, thus helping
to create an enabling environment for private investment
in the energy, gas, and industrial sectors. Moreover, this
innovative risk-sharing credit aims to strengthen the value
chain for power generation by eliminating the bottlenecks
in the supply chain for power generationpreviously a
fundamental constraint to economic growth in the country.
Source: World Bank, 2009.
challenges. Decision makers will want to ask

themselves a selection of important questions when
seeking to resolve the economically and technically
complex challenges of infrastructure and growth pole
investments. Among these questions are those regarding
coordination: how can infrastructure services best be
provided competitively? And what instrumentsfinancial,
regulatory, and participatorycan governments deploy
to involve the private sector and the broader society
most effectively and efficiently in the construction and
maintenance of this backbone of growth? Accountability
issues must simultaneously be addressed from this
angle. An ecosystem of checks and balancesincluding
competition commissions, infrastructure sector
regulators, and concession regulatorsis required to
deliver on accountabilities to the key stakeholders. As
growth poles in Madagascar and elsewhere have shown,
supporting the growth of competitive industries and jobs
to make most of the infrastructure built requires both a
large and a long-term investment for a government.
Governments must continuously probe best-practice
financial and regulatory mechanisms to attract private
financing and servicing for growth pole projects that
will advance a countrys export industries to Africas
regional and global markets. Taking a strategic approach
to handling the coordination, accountability, and risk
challenges involved in growth poles presents a promising
way forward.
NOTES
1 World Bank 2009.
2 SEZs are usually designed as supply-side competitiveness
measures, and are meant to establish an agglomeration of firms
through the provision of superior infrastructure and operating
conditions. Another often-used concept is development corridors.
These are usually feeder infrastructures, achieving outcomes by
deepening project linkages and by encouraging densification.
3 For comparable experiences and successes in Asia, see World
Bank 2005.
4 World Bank 2005.
5 Perroux 1955.
strategy of spatial and economic development called

growth poles.
Because huge infrastructure needs remain and
because capacity in both financial and implementation
terms is limited, the question of how to use these scarce
resources best is a crucial one. The development of a
more sustainable policy process around infrastructure
investments will enable African countries to enhance the
competitiveness of their private sectors. This chapter
has highlighted this message in the context of growth
pole projects on the continent, focusing on paths
forward regarding coordination, accountability, and risk
challenges.
Because infrastructure provides the basic services
in a country, it both offers great opportunities for
business, employment, and the general competitiveness
of an economy, and also presents intensely political
6 SEZs can be high-tech parks, science parks, industrial zones, and

export processing zones. Moroccos SEZ has been an African
success casesee http://specialeconomiczone.org/category/
africa-sez/morocco/.
7 Hallward-Driemeier et al. 2010.
8 See the World Banks Senegal Sustainable and Inclusive
Agribusiness Project, available at http://www.worldbank.
org/projects/P124018/senegal-agribusiness-developmentproject?lang=en.
9 See the World Banks Private Participation in Infrastructure
Database, available at http://ppi.worldbank.org/.
10 A monoliner is an insurance company that provides guarantees to
issuers, often in the form of credit wraps, that enhance the credit
of the issuer.
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Part 3
Competitiveness Profiles
3: Competitiveness Profiles
How to Read the Competitiveness Profiles
The Competitiveness Profiles section of The Africa

Competitiveness Report 2013 presents a two-page
profile of the performance in the Global Competitiveness
Index (GCI) discussed in Chapter 1.1 of each of
the 38 African economies covered in The Global
Algeria
Key indicators, 2011
Population (millions) ..............................................36.2
GDP (US$ billions)* .............................................197.9
GDP per capita (US$) ......................................5,503.2
GDP (PPP) as share (%) of world total ..................0.33
Sectoral value-added (% GDP), 2010
Agriculture ..............................................................6.9
Industry ................................................................62.1
Services ...............................................................31.0
Human Development Index, 2011
Score, (01) best ..................................................0.70
Rank (out of 187 economies)...................................96
GDP (PPP) per capita (intl $), 19902011

10,000
Algeria
MIddle East and North Africa
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Sources: IMF; UNFPA; UNDP; World Bank
The Global Competitiveness Index
PAGE 1
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 110 ..... 3.7
Factor
driven
Basic requirements (59.1%) ......................................... 89 ...... 4.2

Institutions .................................................................... 141 ...... 2.7
Infrastructure ................................................................ 100 ...... 3.2
Macroeconomic environment ......................................... 23 ...... 5.7
Health and primary education ......................................... 93 ...... 5.4
Key indicators
The first section presents a selection of key indicators for
the economy under review:
Transition
23
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication
Efficiency enhancers (35.7%) .................................... 136 ...... 3.1

Higher education and training ....................................... 108 ...... 3.4
Goods market efficiency .............................................. 143 ...... 3.0
Labor market efficiency ................................................ 144 ...... 2.8
Financial market development ...................................... 142 ...... 2.4
Technological readiness ................................................ 133 ...... 2.6
Market size ..................................................................... 49 ...... 4.3
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Financial market
development
Goods market
efficiency
Innovation and sophistication factors (5.2%) ........... 144 ...... 2.3

Business sophistication ............................................... 144 ...... 2.5
Innovation ..................................................................... 141 ...... 2.1
Population figures are from the World Population

Prospects: The 2010 Revision, (CD-ROM edition)
published by the United Nations Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division.
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ........................................... 87 ...... 4.0

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ........................................... 86 ...... 4.0
Algeria
Economies in transition from 1 to 2
The most problematic factors for doing business

Inefficient government bureaucracy ......................................... 20.5
Access to financing ................................................................. 15.7
Corruption ............................................................................... 14.0
Inadequate supply of infrastructure ............................................ 8.1
Inadequately educated workforce .............................................. 8.1
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 6.3
Policy instability ......................................................................... 4.9
Inflation ...................................................................................... 4.5
Restrictive labor regulations ....................................................... 4.3
Poor work ethic in national labor force....................................... 3.5
Foreign currency regulations ...................................................... 3.0
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 2.4
Tax rates.................................................................................... 2.4
Insufficient capacity to innovate ................................................. 1.4
Poor public health ..................................................................... 0.8
Government instability/coups .................................................... 0.0
Gross domestic product (GDP) data come from the

October 2012 edition of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF)s World Economic Outlook (WEO)
Database. Reported GDP and GDP per capita are
valued at current prices.
10
15
20
25
30
Note:
From the list of factors above, respondents were asked to select the five most problematic for doing business in their country and to rank them between
1 (most problematic) and 5. The bars in the figure show the responses weighted according to their rankings.
The sectoral value-added (% of GDP) data are from

the World Banks World Development Indicators
Online Database (retrieved on November 20, 2012).
The Human Development Index (HDI) ranking is
computed by the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), available from the Human
Development Indices: Statistical Update 2011.
The graph on the upper right-hand side displays the
evolution of GDP per capita at purchasing power
parity (PPP) from 1990 through 2011 (or the period
for which data are available) for the economy under
review (blue line). The black line plots the GDPweighted average of GDP per capita of the group
of economies to which the economy under review
belongs. We draw on the IMF country classification,
which divides the world into six regions: Central and
Eastern Europe; Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS), which includes Georgia and Mongolia
although they are not members; Developing Asia;
the Middle East and North Africa; sub-Saharan
Africa; and Latin America and the Caribbean. The
last group comprises advanced economies. GDP
figures come from the WEO database. For more

information regarding the classification and the data,
see www.imf.org/weo.
This section of the profile details the economys
performance on the various components of the GCI.
The first column shows the countrys rank among the
144 economies covered by the GCI, while the second
column presents the score. The percentage contribution
to the overall GCI score of each subindex is reported
next to the subindex name. These weights vary
depending on the countrys stage of development. For
more information on the methodology of the GCI, refer
to Chapter 1.1. On the right-hand side, a spider chart
shows the countrys performance on the 12 pillars of
the GCI (blue line) measured against the average scores
across all the economies in the GCI sample at the same
stage of development (black line).

The bar chart at the bottom of the page summarizes
those factors seen by business executives as the most
problematic for doing business in their economy. The
information is drawn from the 2012 edition of the World
Economic Forums Executive Opinion Survey (the
Survey). From a list of 16 factors, respondents were
asked to select the five most problematic and rank
them from 1 (most problematic) to 5. The results were
then tabulated and weighted according to the ranking
assigned by respondents. For Rwanda, we use data
from the 2011 edition of the Survey, so for that country
the list comprises only 15 factorsone less than in the
2012 edition.1
Algeria
The Global Competitiveness Index in detail
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144

1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 2.5 ..........140

Intellectual property protection ............................... 1.8 ..........142
Diversion of public funds ........................................ 2.2 ..........131
Public trust in politicians ......................................... 1.8 ..........129
Irregular payments and bribes ................................ 2.6 ..........135
Judicial independence............................................ 2.5 ..........123
Favoritism in decisions of government officials ....... 2.2 ..........134
Wastefulness of government spending ................... 2.4 ..........116
Burden of government regulation ........................... 2.3 ..........140
Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes .... 2.6 ..........132
Efficiency of legal framework in challenging regs. ... 2.5 ..........137
Transparency of government policymaking............. 2.6 ..........144
Govt services for improved business performance... 2.8 ..........124
Business costs of terrorism .................................... 3.5 ..........140
Business costs of crime and violence..................... 3.6 ..........119
Organized crime ..................................................... 3.3 ..........137
Reliability of police services .................................... 3.0 ..........121
Ethical behavior of firms ......................................... 2.6 ..........143
Strength of auditing and reporting standards ......... 2.8 ..........143
Efficacy of corporate boards .................................. 3.1 ..........143
Protection of minority shareholders interests ......... 3.1 ..........136
Strength of investor protection, 010 (best)* .......... 5.3 ............65
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09
Quality of overall infrastructure ............................... 3.5 ..........102

Quality of roads ...................................................... 3.4 ............88
Quality of railroad infrastructure .............................. 2.0 ............90
Quality of port infrastructure ................................... 2.7 ..........131
Quality of air transport infrastructure....................... 3.3 ..........125
Available airline seat kms/week, millions* ........... 146.0 ............72
Quality of electricity supply ..................................... 4.5 ............80
Mobile telephone subscriptions/100 pop.* ........... 99.0 ............87
Fixed telephone lines/100 pop.* ............................. 8.5 ............98
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05
Government budget balance, % GDP* ..................-3.6 ............82

Gross national savings, % GDP* .......................... 50.1 ..............6
Inflation, annual % change* .................................... 4.5 ............68
General government debt, % GDP* ....................... 9.9 ............11
Country credit rating, 0100 (best)* ...................... 53.7 ............59

4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10
Business impact of malaria .................................... 5.5 ............91

Malaria cases/100,000 pop.* ................................. 0.0 ............72
Business impact of tuberculosis ............................. 5.2 ............80
Tuberculosis cases/100,000 pop.* ....................... 90.0 ............88
Business impact of HIV/AIDS ................................. 5.3 ............69
HIV prevalence, % adult pop.* ............................... 0.1 ............12
Infant mortality, deaths/1,000 live births* .............. 30.5 ..........102
Life expectancy, years*......................................... 72.9 ............83
Quality of primary education ................................... 2.4 ..........129
Primary education enrollment, net %* .................. 95.6 ............49
5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08
Secondary education enrollment, gross %* .......... 94.9 ............52

Tertiary education enrollment, gross %*................ 30.8 ............74
Quality of the educational system ........................... 2.5 ..........131
Quality of math and science education .................. 2.7 ..........129
Quality of management schools ............................. 3.0 ..........131
Internet access in schools ...................................... 2.4 ..........132
Availability of research and training services ........... 2.8 ..........138
Extent of staff training ............................................ 2.6 ..........142
PAGE 2
This page details the countrys performance on each
of the indicators entering the composition of the Global
Competitiveness Index 20122013 (GCI). Indicators are
organized by pillar. For indicators entering at the GCI in
two different pillars, only the first instance is shown on
this page.
INDICATOR, UNITS: This column contains the
title of each indicator and, where relevant, the units
in which it is measuredfor example, days or
% GDP. Indicators that are not derived from the
Survey are identified by an asterisk (*). Indicators
derived from the Survey are always expressed
as scores on a 17 scale, with 7 being the most
desirable outcome.
VALUE: This column reports the countrys score on
each of the variables that compose the GCI.
RANK/144: This column reports the countrys
position among the 144 economies covered by the
GCI 20122013.
The following sections provide additional information
and definitions on each of these indicators.
VALUE RANK/144

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16
Intensity of local competition .................................. 3.1 ..........144

Extent of market dominance .................................. 2.8 ..........137
Effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy ..................... 2.9 ..........140
Extent and effect of taxation................................... 3.2 ..........101
Total tax rate, % profits* ....................................... 72.0 ..........135
No. procedures to start a business* ........................ 14 ..........134
No. days to start a business* .................................. 25 ............92
Agricultural policy costs.......................................... 3.2 ..........124
Prevalence of trade barriers ................................... 3.0 ..........141
Trade tariffs, % duty* ............................................ 14.0 ..........132
Prevalence of foreign ownership............................. 3.3 ..........136
Business impact of rules on FDI ............................. 3.2 ..........138
Burden of customs procedures .............................. 2.5 ..........141
Imports as a percentage of GDP* ........................ 32.4 ..........111
Degree of customer orientation .............................. 3.0 ..........144
Buyer sophistication ............................................... 2.4 ..........131
7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08
Cooperation in labor-employer relations ................. 2.9 ..........143

Flexibility of wage determination ............................. 4.0 ..........125
Hiring and firing practices ....................................... 3.3 ..........112
Redundancy costs, weeks of salary* ....................... 17 ............81
Pay and productivity............................................... 2.4 ..........144
Reliance on professional management ................... 2.3 ..........144
Brain drain ............................................................. 1.5 ..........144
Women in labor force, ratio to men* ..................... 0.21 ..........144
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08
Availability of financial services ............................... 2.6 ..........143

Affordability of financial services ............................. 2.0 ..........144
Financing through local equity market .................... 2.2 ..........131
Ease of access to loans ......................................... 2.0 ..........128
Venture capital availability ....................................... 1.8 ..........138
Soundness of banks .............................................. 2.9 ..........143
Regulation of securities exchanges ........................ 2.3 ..........140
Legal rights index, 010 (best)* ................................. 3 ..........118
9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07
Availability of latest technologies ............................ 3.4 ..........142

Firm-level technology absorption ............................ 3.2 ..........144
FDI and technology transfer ................................... 3.4 ..........140
Individuals using Internet, %* ............................... 14.0 ..........110
Broadband Internet subscriptions/100 pop.* .......... 2.8 ............87
Intl Internet bandwidth, kb/s per user* .................. 8.9 ............89
Mobile broadband subscriptions/100 pop.*............ 0.0 ..........128

10.01 Domestic market size index, 17 (best)*................. 4.2 ............47
10.02 Foreign market size index, 17 (best)* .................... 4.9 ............49

11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09
Local supplier quantity ........................................... 4.0 ..........124

Local supplier quality.............................................. 3.4 ..........137
State of cluster development.................................. 2.4 ..........139
Nature of competitive advantage ............................ 2.0 ..........144
Value chain breadth................................................ 2.2 ..........143
Control of international distribution ......................... 2.5 ..........144
Production process sophistication.......................... 2.3 ..........141
Extent of marketing ................................................ 2.3 ..........143
Willingness to delegate authority ............................ 1.9 ..........144
12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07
Capacity for innovation........................................... 1.9 ..........143

Quality of scientific research institutions ................. 2.1 ..........141
Company spending on R&D................................... 1.8 ..........143
University-industry collaboration in R&D ................. 1.9 ..........144
Govt procurement of advanced tech products ...... 2.2 ..........142
Availability of scientists and engineers .................... 4.0 ............72
PCT patents, applications/million pop.* .................. 0.2 ............91
Notes: Values are on a 1-to-7 scale unless otherwise annotated with an asterisk (*). For further details and explanation, please refer to the section How to Read
the Competitiveness Profiles on page 109.
TECHNICAL NOTES AND SOURCES FOR THE

GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS INDEX
This section provides detailed definitions and sources for
all the indicators that enter the Global Competitiveness
Index 20122013 (GCI); the next section provides
details for the indicators of the sustainability-adjusted
GCI (the SCI). For further information, see The Global
Two types of data are used in the GCI: Executive
Opinion Survey data and data from sources other
than the World Economic Forum (national authorities,
international agencies, and private sources). The latter
were updated at the time The Global Competitiveness
Report 20122013 was prepared.
For each indicator, the title appears on the first line,
preceded by its number to allow for quick reference.
The numbering refers to the data tables section in The
Global Competitiveness Report 20122013. Underneath
is a description of the indicator or, in the case of the
Executive Opinion Survey data, the full question and
the associated response. The data used represent
the best available estimates at the time The Global
Competitiveness Report 20122013 was prepared. It
is possible that some data will have been updated or
revised after publication.
For more information regarding the Executive Opinion Survey, see

World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2012
INDICATOR
1st Pillar: Institutions
1.09 Burden of government regulation

How burdensome is it for businesses in your country to comply
with governmental administrative requirements (e.g., permits,
regulations, reporting)? [1 = extremely burdensome; 7 = not
burdensome at all] | 201112 weighted average

How would you rate the protection of property rights, including
financial assets, in your country? [1 = very weak; 7 = very
strong] | 201112 weighted average
Source: World Economic Forum, Executive Opinion Survey
2011, 2012

2011, 2012
1.10 Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes
1.02 Intellectual property protection
How efficient is the legal framework in your country for private

businesses in settling disputes? [1 = extremely inefficient; 7 =
highly efficient] | 201112 weighted average
How would you rate intellectual property protection, including

anti-counterfeiting measures, in your country? [1 = very weak; 7
= very strong] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012

2011, 2012
1.11 Efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations
1.03 Diversion of public funds

In your country, how common is diversion of public funds to
companies, individuals, or groups due to corruption? [1 = very
common; 7 = never occurs] | 201112 weighted average
How efficient is the legal framework in your country for private

businesses in challenging the legality of government actions
and/or regulations? [1 = extremely inefficient; 7 = highly
efficient] | 201112 weighted average

2011, 2012

2011, 2012
1.12 Transparency of government policymaking
1.04 Public trust in politicians
How easy is it for businesses in your country to obtain

information about changes in government policies and
regulations affecting their activities? [1 = impossible; 7 =
extremely easy] | 201112 weighted average
How would you rate the level of public trust in the ethical
standards of politicians in your country? [1 = very low; 7 = very
high] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
1.05 Irregular payments and bribes

Average score across the five components of the following
Executive Opinion Survey question: In your country, how
common is it for firms to make undocumented extra
payments or bribes connected with (a) imports and exports;
(b) public utilities; (c) annual tax payments; (d) awarding of
public contracts and licenses; (e) obtaining favorable judicial
decisions. In each case, the answer ranges from 1 (very
common) to 7 (never occurs). | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012

2011, 2012
1.13 Government provision of services for improved business

performance
To what extent does the government in your country
continuously improve its provision of services to help
businesses in your country boost their economic performance?
[1 = not at all; 7 = extensively] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012

To what extent does the threat of terrorism impose costs on
businesses in your country? [1 = to a great extent; 7 = not at
all] | 201112 weighted average
1.06 Judicial independence

To what extent is the judiciary in your country independent
from influences of members of government, citizens, or firms?
[1 = heavily influenced; 7 = entirely independent] | 201112
weighted average
2011, 2012

2011, 2012

To what extent does the incidence of crime and violence
impose costs on businesses in your country? [1 = to a great
extent; 7 = not at all] | 201112 weighted average
1.07 Favoritism in decisions of government officials

To what extent do government officials in your country show
favoritism to well-connected firms and individuals when
deciding upon policies and contracts? [1 = always show
favoritism; 7 = never show favoritism] | 201112 weighted
average

2011, 2012
1.16 Organized crime

2011, 2012
1.08 Wastefulness of government spending

How would you rate the composition of public spending in
your country? [1 = extremely wasteful; 7 = highly efficient in
providing necessary goods and services] | 201112 weighted
average
To what extent does organized crime (mafia-oriented

racketeering, extortion) impose costs on businesses in your
country? [1 = to a great extent; 7 = not at all] | 201112
weighted average
2011, 2012

2011, 2012
To what extent can police services be relied upon to enforce

law and order in your country? [1 = cannot be relied upon at all;
7 = can be completely relied upon] | 201112 weighted average
How would you assess the railroad system in your country?

[1 = extremely underdeveloped; 7 = extensive and efficient by
international standards] | 201112 weighted average

2011, 2012

2011, 2012
1.18 Ethical behavior of firms

How would you compare the corporate ethics (ethical
behavior in interactions with public officials, politicians, and
other enterprises) of firms in your country with those of other
countries in the world? [1 = among the worst in the world; 7 =
among the best in the world] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
1.19 Strength of auditing and reporting standards

In your country, how would you assess financial auditing and
reporting standards regarding company financial performance?
[1 = extremely weak; 7 = extremely strong] | 201112 weighted
average
2011, 2012
1.20 Efficacy of corporate boards

How would you characterize corporate governance by investors
and boards of directors in your country? [1 = management has
little accountability to investors and boards; 7 = investors and
boards exert strong supervision of management decisions] |
201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
1.21 Protection of minority shareholders interests

In your country, to what extent are the interests of minority
shareholders protected by the legal system? [1 = not protected
at all; 7 = fully protected] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
1.22 Strength of investor protection

Strength of Investor Protection Index on a 010 (best) scale |
2011
This variable is a combination of the Extent of disclosure index
(transparency of transactions), the Extent of director liability index
(liability for self-dealing), and the Ease of shareholder suit index
(shareholders ability to sue officers and directors for misconduct).
For more details about the methodology employed and the
assumptions made to compute this indicator, visit http://www.
doingbusiness.org/methodologysurveys/.
Source: World Bank/International Finance Corporation, Doing
Business 2012: Doing Business in a More Transparent World
2nd Pillar: Infrastructure

2.01 Quality of overall infrastructure
How would you assess general infrastructure (e.g., transport,
telephony, and energy) in your country? [1 = extremely
underdeveloped; 7 = extensive and efficient by international
standards] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
Note: N/Appl. is used for economies where the railroad network

totals less than 50 km.

How would you assess the port facilities in your country? [1 =
extremely underdeveloped; 7 = well developed and efficient by
international standards] For landlocked countries, the question
is as follows: How accessible are port facilities? [1 = extremely
inaccessible; 7 = extremely accessible] | 201112 weighted
average
2011, 2012

How would you assess passenger air transport infrastructure
in your country? [1 = extremely underdeveloped; 7 = extensive
and efficient by international standards] | 201112 weighted
average
2011, 2012
2.06 Available airline seat kilometers

Scheduled available airline seat kilometers per week originating
in country (in millions) | Jan2012-Jul2012
This variable measures the total passenger-carrying capacity of
all scheduled flights, including domestic flights, originating in a
country. It is computed by taking the number of seats available on
each flight multiplied by the flight distance in kilometers, summing
the result across all scheduled flights in a week during January
(winter schedule) and July (summer schedule) 2012, and taking
the average capacity of the two weeks.
Source: International Air Transport Association, SRS Analyser
2.07 Quality of electricity supply

How would you assess the quality of the electricity supply
in your country (lack of interruptions and lack of voltage
fluctuations)? [1 = insufficient and suffers frequent interruptions;
7 = sufficient and reliable] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
2.08 Mobile telephone subscriptions

Number of mobile telephone subscriptions per 100 population
| 2011
A mobile telephone subscription refers to a subscription to a
public mobile telephone service that provides access to the public
switched telephone network (PSTN) using cellular technology,
including the number of pre-paid SIM cards active during the
past three months. This includes both analog and digital cellular
systems (IMT-2000, Third Generation, 3G) and 4G subscriptions,
but excludes mobile broadband subscriptions via data cards
or USB modems. Subscriptions to public mobile data services,
private trunked mobile radio, telepoint or radio paging, and
telemetry services are also excluded. It includes all mobile cellular
subscriptions that offer voice communications.
Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database 2012 (June 2012
edition)

How would you assess the roads in your country? [1 =
extremely underdeveloped; 7 = extensive and efficient by
international standards] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
2.09 Fixed telephone lines
3.05 Country credit rating
Number of active fixed telephone lines per 100 population |

2011
Expert assessment of the probability of sovereign debt default

on a 0100 (lowest probability) scale | March 2012
A fixed telephone line is an active line connecting the subscribers

terminal equipment to the public switched telephone network
(PSTN) and that has a dedicated port in the telephone exchange
equipment. Active lines are those that have registered an activity
in the past three months.
Institutional Investors Country Credit ratings developed by

Institutional Investor are based on information provided by senior
economists and sovereign-debt analysts at leading global banks
and money management and security firms. Twice a year, the
respondents grade each country on a scale of 0 to 100, with 100
representing the least chance of default. For more information,
visit http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Research/3633/GlobalRankings.html.

edition)
Source: Institutional Investor
3rd Pillar: Macroeconomic environment
4th Pillar: Health and primary education
3.01 Government budget balance

General government budget balance as a percentage of GDP
| 2011
Net lending (+)/ borrowing () is calculated as general government
revenue minus total expenditure. This is a core Government
Finance Statistics (GFS) balance that measures the extent to
which the general government is either putting financial resources
at the disposal of other sectors in the economy and nonresidents
(net lending), or utilizing the financial resources generated by
other sectors and nonresidents (net borrowing). This balance
may be viewed as an indicator of the financial impact of general
government activity on the rest of the economy and nonresidents.
Revenue consists of taxes, social contributions, grants receivable,
and other revenue. Revenue increases a governments net worth,
which is the difference between its assets and liabilities. General
government total expenditure consists of total expenses and the
net acquisition of nonfinancial assets.
4.01 Business impact of malaria

How serious an impact do you consider malaria will have on
your company in the next five years (e.g., death, disability,
medical and funeral expenses, productivity and absenteeism,
recruitment and training expenses, revenues)? [1 = a serious
impact; 7 = no impact at all] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
Note: This indicator does not apply to economies where malaria is
not endemic (n/appl.).
4.02 Malaria incidence

Number of malaria cases per 100,000 population | 2009
Data are estimates and are provided only for economies in which
malaria is considered to be endemic. In the corresponding data
table, NE denotes an economy where malaria is not endemic.
Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook

Database (April 2012 edition) and Public Information Notices
(various issues); national sources
Source: Cibulskis, R.E., M. Aregawi, R. Williams, M. Otten, and C.

Dye. 2011. Worldwide Incidence of Malaria in 2009: Estimates,
Time Trends, and a Critique of Methods. PLoS Med 8 (12):
e1001142. doi: 10.1271/journal/pmed.1001142.
3.02 Gross national savings

Gross national savings as a percentage of GDP | 2011
Aggregate national savings is defined as public- and privatesector savings as a percentage of nominal GDP. National savings
equals gross domestic investment plus the current-account
balance.
4.03 Business impact of tuberculosis

How serious an impact do you consider tuberculosis will have
on your company in the next five years (e.g., death, disability,


2011, 2012
3.03 Inflation
Annual percent change in consumer price index (year average)
| 2011
4.04 Tuberculosis incidence

Number of tuberculosis cases per 100,000 population | 2010
Annual percent change in year average consumer price index.
Incidence of tuberculosis is the estimated number of new

pulmonary, smear positive, and extra-pulmonary tuberculosis
cases.

Database (April 2012 edition); national sources
Sources: The World Bank, World Development Indicators &

Global Development Finance Catalog (April 2012 edition); national
sources
Note: For inflation rates between 0.5 and 2.9 percent, a country
received the highest possible score of 7. Outside this range,
scores decrease linearly as they move away from these values.
4.05 Business impact of HIV/AIDS
3.04 Government debt

Gross general government debt as a percentage of GDP | 2011
Gross debt consists of all liabilities that require payment or
payments of interest and/or principal by the debtor to the creditor
at a date or dates in the future. This includes debt liabilities in
the form of special drawing rights, currency and deposits, debt
securities, loans, insurance, pensions and standardized guarantee
schemes, and other accounts payable. Thus, all liabilities in the
Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001 system are debt,
except for equity and investment fund shares and financial
derivatives and employee stock options.
How serious an impact do you consider HIV/AIDS will have

on your company in the next five years (e.g., death, disability,
2011, 2012

4.06 HIV prevalence
5.02 Tertiary education enrollment rate
HIV prevalence as a percentage of adults aged 1549 years |

2009
HIV prevalence refers to the number of infections at a particular
point in time, no matter when infection occurred.
Sources: The World Bank, World Development Indicators & Global
Development Finance Catalog (April 2012 edition); UNAIDS,
Global Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic (2008 edition);
national sources
The reported value corresponds to the ratio of total tertiary

enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group
that officially corresponds to the tertiary education level. Tertiary
education (ISCED levels 5 and 6), whether or not leading to an
advanced research qualification, normally requires, as a minimum
condition of admission, the successful completion of education at
the secondary level.
Sources: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (accessed May 10,
2012); national sources
4.07 Infant mortality

Infant (children aged 012 months) mortality per 1,000 live
births | 2010
Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before reaching
one year of age per 1,000 live births in a given year.
sources
4.08 Life expectancy
5.03 Quality of the educational system

How well does the educational system in your country meet the
needs of a competitive economy? [1 = not well at all; 7 = very
well] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
5.04 Quality of math and science education
Life expectancy at birth (years) | 2010

Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn
infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its
birth were to stay the same throughout its life.
sources
4.09 Quality of primary education

How would you assess the quality of primary schools in your
country? [1 = poor; 7 = excellent among the best in the world]
| 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
How would you assess the quality of math and science

education in your countrys schools? [1 = poor; 7 = excellent
among the best in the world] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
5.05 Quality of management schools

How would you assess the quality of management or business
schools in your country? [1 = poor; 7 = excellent among the
best in the world] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
5.06 Internet access in schools

How would you rate the level of access to the Internet in
schools in your country? [1 = very limited; 7 = extensive] |
4.10 Primary education enrollment rate

Net primary education enrollment rate | 2010
The reported value corresponds to the ratio of children of official
school age (as defined by the national education system) who are
enrolled in school to the population of the corresponding official
school age. Primary education (ISCED level 1) provides children
with basic reading, writing, and mathematics skills along with an
elementary understanding of such subjects as history, geography,
natural science, social science, art, and music.
2012); The World Bank, EdStats Database (accessed June 27,
2012); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), Education at a Glance 2011; national sources

2011, 2012
5.07 Local availability of specialized research and training

services
In your country, to what extent are high-quality, specialized
training services available? [1 = not available; 7 = widely
available] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
5.08 Extent of staff training
5th Pillar: Higher education and training
To what extent do companies in your country invest in training

and employee development? [1 = hardly at all; 7 = to a great
extent] | 201112 weighted average
5.01 Secondary education enrollment rate

Gross secondary education enrollment rate | 2010
The reported value corresponds to the ratio of total secondary
enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age
group that officially corresponds to the secondary education
level. Secondary education (ISCED levels 2 and 3) completes
the provision of basic education that began at the primary
level, and aims to lay the foundations for lifelong learning and
human development by offering more subject- or skills-oriented
instruction using more specialized teachers.
2012); UNICEF ChildInfo.org Country Profiles; The World Bank,
EdStats Database (accessed June 25, 2012); national sources
Gross tertiary education enrollment rate | 2010

2011, 2012
6th Pillar: Goods market efficiency

6.01 Intensity of local competition
How would you assess the intensity of competition in the local
markets in your country? [1 = limited in most industries; 7 =
intense in most industries] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
6.02 Extent of market dominance
6.09 Prevalence of trade barriers
How would you characterize corporate activity in your country?

[1 = dominated by a few business groups; 7 = spread among
many firms] | 201112 weighted average
In your country, to what extent do tariff and non-tariff barriers

limit the ability of imported goods to compete in the domestic
market? [1 = strongly limit; 7 = do not limit] | 201112 weighted
average

2011, 2012

2011, 2012
6.03 Effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy

To what extent does anti-monopoly policy promote competition
in your country? [1 = does not promote competition; 7 =
effectively promotes competition] | 201112 weighted average
6.10 Trade tariffs

Trade-weighted average tariff rate | 2011
This indicator is calculated as a weighted average of all the
applied tariff rates, including preferential rates that a country
applies to the rest of the world. The weights are the trade
patterns of the importing countrys reference group (2010 data).
An applied tariff is a customs duty that is levied on imports of
merchandise goods.

2011, 2012
6.04 Extent and effect of taxation

What impact does the level of taxes in your country have on
incentives to work or invest? [1 = significantly limits incentives
to work or invest; 7 = has no impact on incentives to work or
invest] | 201112 weighted average
6.11 Prevalence of foreign ownership

How prevalent is foreign ownership of companies in your
country? [1 = very rare; 7 = highly prevalent] | 201112
weighted average

2011, 2012

2011, 2012
6.05 Total tax rate

This variable is a combination of profit tax (% of profits), labor
tax and contribution (% of profits), and other taxes (% of
profits) | 2011
The total tax rate measures the amount of taxes and mandatory
contributions payable by a business in the second year of
operation, expressed as a share of commercial profits. The
total amount of taxes is the sum of five different types of taxes
and contributions payable after accounting for deductions and
exemptions: profit or corporate income tax, social contributions
and labor taxes paid by the employer, property taxes, turnover
taxes, and other small taxes. For more details about the
methodology employed and the assumptions made to compute
this indicator, please visit http://www.doingbusiness.org/
methodologysurveys/.
6.12 Business impact of rules on FDI

To what extent do rules governing foreign direct investment
(FDI) encourage or discourage it? [1 = strongly discourage FDI;
7 = strongly encourage FDI] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012

How would you rate the level of efficiency of customs
procedures (related to the entry and exit of merchandise) in
your country? [1 = extremely inefficient; 7 = extremely efficient]


2011, 2012
6.06 Number of procedures required to start a business

Number of procedures required to start a business | 2011
6.14 Imports as a percentage of GDP

Imports of goods and services as a percentage of gross
domestic product | 2011
For details about the methodology employed and the

Total imports is the sum of total imports of merchandise and

commercial services.

Sources: World Trade Organization, Statistical Database: Time

Series on merchandise and commercial services (accessed June
4, 2012); International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook
6.07 Time required to start a business

Number of days required to start a business | 2011
For details about the methodology employed and the
6.15 Degree of customer orientation

How do companies in your country treat customers? [1 =
generally treat their customers badly; 7 = are highly responsive
to customers and customer retention] | 201112 weighted
average


2011, 2012
6.08 Agricultural policy costs

How would you assess the agricultural policy in your country?
[1 = excessively burdensome for the economy; 7 = balances
the interests of taxpayers, consumers, and producers] | 2011
12 weighted average
6.16 Buyer sophistication

2011, 2012
In your country, how do buyers make purchasing decisions?

[1 = based solely on the lowest price; 7 = based on a
sophisticated analysis of performance attributes] | 201112
weighted average
2011, 2012
7th Pillar: Labor market efficiency
8th Pillar: Financial market development
7.01 Cooperation in labor-employer relations
8.01 Availability of financial services
How would you characterize labor-employer relations in

your country? [1 = generally confrontational; 7 = generally
cooperative] | 201112 weighted average
Does the financial sector in your country provide a wide variety

of financial products and services to businesses? [1 = not at
all; 7 = provides a wide variety] | 201112 weighted average

2011, 2012

2011, 2012
7.02 Flexibility of wage determination
8.02 Affordability of financial services
How are wages generally set in your country? [1 = by a

centralized bargaining process; 7 = up to each individual
company] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
To what extent does competition among providers of financial

services in your country ensure the provision of financial
services at affordable prices? [1 = not at all; 7 = extremely well]
2011, 2012
7.03 Hiring and firing practices

How would you characterize the hiring and firing of workers
in your country? [1 = impeded by regulations; 7 = flexibly
determined by employers] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
8.03 Financing through local equity market

How easy is it to raise money by issuing shares on the stock
market in your country? [1 = very difficult; 7 = very easy] |
2011, 2012
7.04 Redundancy costs

8.04 Ease of access to loans
Redundancy costs in weeks of salary | 2011

This variable estimates the cost of advance notice requirements,
severance payments, and penalties due when terminating a
redundant worker, expressed in weekly wages. For more details
about the methodology employed and the assumptions made
to compute this indicator, visit http://www.doingbusiness.org/
methodologysurveys/.
Sources: World Bank/International Finance Corporation, Doing
Business 2012: Doing Business in a More Transparent World;
authors calculations
7.05 Pay and productivity

To what extent is pay in your country related to productivity?
[1 = not related to worker productivity; 7 = strongly related to
worker productivity] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
7.06 Reliance on professional management

In your country, who holds senior management positions? [1 =
usually relatives or friends without regard to merit; 7 = mostly
professional managers chosen for merit and qualifications] |
2011, 2012
7.07 Brain drain

Does your country retain and attract talented people? [1 = no,
the best and brightest normally leave to pursue opportunities
in other countries; 7 = yes, there are many opportunities for
talented people within the country] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
7.08 Female participation in labor force

Ratio of women to men in the labor force | 2010
This measure is the percentage of women aged 1564
participating in the labor force divided by the percentage of men
aged 1564 participating in the labor force.
How easy is it to obtain a bank loan in your country with only

a good business plan and no collateral? [1 = very difficult; 7 =
very easy] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
8.05 Venture capital availability

In your country, how easy is it for entrepreneurs with innovative
but risky projects to find venture capital? [1 = very difficult; 7 =
very easy] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
8.06 Soundness of banks

How would you assess the soundness of banks in your
country? [1 = insolvent and may require a government bailout;
7 = generally healthy with sound balance sheets] | 201112
weighted average
2011, 2012
8.07 Regulation of securities exchanges

How would you assess the regulation and supervision of
securities exchanges in your country? [1 = ineffective; 7 =
effective] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
8.08 Legal rights index

Degree of legal protection of borrowers and lenders rights on a
010 (best) scale | 2011
This index measures the degree to which collateral and
bankruptcy laws protect borrowers and lenders rights and
thus facilitate lending. For more details about the methodology
employed and the assumptions made to compute this indicator,
visit http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodologysurveys/.
Sources: International Labour Organization, Key Indicators of the

Labor Markets Net (accessed June 5, 2012); national sources
9th Pillar: Technological readiness
10th Pillar: Market size
9.01 Availability of latest technologies
10.01 Domestic market size index
To what extent are the latest technologies available in your

country? [1 = not available; 7 = widely available] | 201112
weighted average
Sum of gross domestic product plus value of imports of goods

and services, minus value of exports of goods and services,
normalized on a 17 (best) scale | 2011
The size of the domestic market is calculated as the natural log
of the sum of the gross domestic product valued at PPP plus
the total value (PPP estimates) of imports of goods and services,
minus the total value (PPP estimates) of exports of goods and
services. Data are then normalized on a 17 scale. PPP estimates
of imports and exports are obtained by taking the product of
exports as a percentage of GDP and GDP valued at PPP.

2011, 2012
9.02 Firm-level technology absorption

To what extent do businesses in your country absorb new
technology? [1 = not at all; 7 = aggressively absorb] | 201112
weighted average
Source: Authors calculations. For more details, refer to Appendix

A in Chapter 1.1 of this Report.

2011, 2012
10.02 Foreign market size index

9.03 FDI and technology transfer
Value of exports of goods and services, normalized on a 17

(best) scale | 2011
To what extent does foreign direct investment (FDI) bring new

technology into your country? [1 = not at all; 7 = FDI is a key
source of new technology] | 201112 weighted average
The size of the foreign market is estimated as the natural log of

the total value (PPP estimates) of exports of goods and services,
normalized on a 17 scale. PPP estimates of exports are obtained
by taking the product of exports as a percentage of GDP and
GDP valued at PPP.

2011, 2012
Source: Authors calculations. For more details refer to Appendix

A in Chapter 1.1 of this Report.
9.04 Internet users

Percentage of individuals using the Internet | 2011
Internet users refers to people using the Internet from any device
(including mobile phones) in the last 12 months. Data are based
on surveys generally carried out by national statistical offices or
estimated based on the number of Internet subscriptions.
10.03 GDP (PPP)

Gross domestic product valued at purchasing power parity in
billions of international dollars | 2011
Source: International Telecommunication Union, World

Telecommunication/ICT Indicators 2012 (June 2012 edition)
10.04 Exports as a percentage of GDP
9.05 Fixed broadband Internet subscriptions

Fixed broadband Internet subscriptions per 100 population |
2011
Exports of goods and services as a percentage of gross

domestic product | 2011 or most recent year available
This refers to total fixed (wired) broadband Internet subscriptions

(that is, subscriptions to high-speed access to the public
Interneta TCP/IP connectionat downstream speeds equal to
or greater than 256 kb/s).
Total exports is the sum of total exports of merchandise and

commercial services.
Sources: World Trade Organization, Online statistics database
(accessed June 4, 2012); International Monetary Fund, World
Economic Outlook Database (April 2012 edition); national sources

11th Pillar: Business sophistication
9.06 Internet bandwidth

International Internet bandwidth (kb/s) per Internet user | 2011
International Internet bandwidth is the sum of capacity of all
Internet exchanges offering international bandwidth measured in
kilobits per second (kb/s).
11.01 Local supplier quantity

How numerous are local suppliers in your country? [1 = largely
nonexistent; 7 = very numerous] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012

11.02 Local supplier quality
9.07 Mobile broadband subscriptions
How would you assess the quality of local suppliers in your

country? [1 = very poor; 7 = very good] | 201112 weighted
average
Mobile broadband subscriptions per 100 population | 2011

Mobile broadband subscriptions refers to active SIM cards
or, on CDMA networks, connections accessing the Internet
at consistent broadband speeds of over 512 kb/s, including
cellular technologies such as HSPA, EV-DO, and above. This
includes connections being used in any type of device able to
access mobile broadband networks, including smartphones,
USB modems, mobile hotspots, and other mobile-broadband
connected devices.

2011, 2012
11.03 State of cluster development
Sources: International Telecommunication Union, ITU World

edition); Informa Telecoms & Media; national sources
In your countrys economy, how prevalent are well-developed

and deep clusters? [1 = nonexistent; 7 = widespread in many
fields] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
12th Pillar: Innovation
11.04 Nature of competitive advantage

What is the nature of competitive advantage of your countrys
companies in international markets based upon? [1 = low-cost
or natural resources; 7 = unique products and processes] |
2011, 2012
12.01 Capacity for innovation

In your country, how do companies obtain technology? [1 =
exclusively from licensing or imitating foreign companies; 7 =
by conducting formal research and pioneering their own new
products and processes] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
11.05 Value chain breadth

In your country, do exporting companies have a narrow or
broad presence in the value chain? [1 = narrow, primarily
involved in individual steps of the value chain (e.g., resource
extraction or production); 7 = broad, present across the entire
value chain (i.e., do not only produce but also perform product
design, marketing sales, logistics, and after-sales services)] |
2011, 2012
11.06 Control of international distribution

To what extent are international distribution and marketing from
your country owned and controlled by domestic companies?
[1 = not at all, they take place through foreign companies;
7 = extensively, they are primarily owned and controlled by
domestic companies] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
11.07 Production process sophistication

In your country, how sophisticated are production processes?
[1 = not at all labor-intensive methods or previous
generations of process technology prevail; 7 = highly the
worlds best and most efficient process technology prevails] |
2011, 2012
11.08 Extent of marketing

In your country, to what extent do companies use sophisticated
marketing tools and techniques? [1 = very little; 7 = extensively]
2011, 2012
11.09 Willingness to delegate authority

In your country, how do you assess the willingness to delegate
authority to subordinates? [1 = low top management controls
all important decisions; 7 = high authority is mostly delegated
to business unit heads and other lower-level managers] | 2011
12 weighted average
2011, 2012
12.02 Quality of scientific research institutions

How would you assess the quality of scientific research
institutions in your country? [1 = very poor; 7 = the best in their
field internationally] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
12.03 Company spending on R&D

To what extent do companies in your country spend on R&D?
[1 = do not spend on R&D; 7 = spend heavily on R&D] | 2011
12 weighted average
2011, 2012
12.04 University-industry collaboration in R&D

To what extent do business and universities collaborate on
research and development (R&D) in your country? [1 = do
not collaborate at all; 7 = collaborate extensively] | 201112
weighted average
2011, 2012
12.05 Government procurement of advanced technology

products
Do government procurement decisions foster technological
innovation in your country? [1 = no, not at all; 7 = yes,
extremely effectively] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
12.06 Availability of scientists and engineers

To what extent are scientists and engineers available in
your country? [1 = not at all; 7 = widely available] | 201112
weighted average
2011, 2012
12.07 PCT patent applications

Number of applications filed under the Patent Cooperation
Treaty (PCT) per million population | 2008-2009
This measures the total count of applications filed under the
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), by priority date and inventor
nationality, using fractional count if an application is filed by
multiple inventors. The average count of applications filed in 2008
and 2009 is divided by population figures for 2009.
Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), Patent Database, June 2012; United
Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population
Division, 2011; World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision,
CD-ROM Edition; authors calculations
TECHNICAL NOTES AND SOURCES FOR THE

SUSTAINABILITY-ADJUSTED GCI
The data used in Chapter 1.1 of this Report represent the
best available estimates from various national authorities,
international agencies, and private sources at the time
the Report was prepared. It is possible that some data
will have been revised or updated by the sources after
publication. Throughout the Report, n/a denotes that
the value is not available or that the available data are
unreasonably outdated or do not come from a reliable
source. For each indicator, the title appears on the first
line, preceded by its number to allow for quick reference.
The numbering is the same as the numbering used
in Appendix B of Chapter 1.1. Below is a description
of each indicator or, in the case of Executive Opinion
Survey data, the full question and associated answers. If
necessary, additional information is provided underneath.
S03.02 Access to improved drinking water

Percent of total population with access to improved drinking
water | 2010 or most recent year available
Percent of the population with reasonable access to an adequate
amount of water from an improved source, such as a household
connection, public standpipe, borehole, protected well or spring,
or rainwater collection. Unimproved sources include vendors,
tanker trucks, and unprotected wells and springs. Reasonable
access is defined as the availability of at least 20 liters per person
per day from a source within 1 kilometer of the dwelling.
Source: World Health Organization, World Health Statistics 2012
online database (retrieved June 5, 2012)
S03.03 Accessibility of healthcare services

How accessible is healthcare in your country? [1 = limited
only the privileged have access; 7 = universalall citizens have
access to healthcare] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
S04 Social safety net protection

In your country, does a formal social safety net provide
protection from economic insecurity due to job loss or
disability? [1 = not at all; 7 = fully] | 201112 weighted average
S01 Income Gini index

Measure of income inequality [0 = perfect equality; 100 =
perfect inequality] | 2010 or most recent year available
This indicator measures the extent to which the distribution of
income among individuals or households within an economy
deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots
the cumulative percentages of total income received against
the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest
individual. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz
curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as
a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus a Gini
index of 0 represents perfect equality, while a value of 100 implies
perfect inequality.
Sources: The World Bank, World Development Indicators Online
(retrieved June 1, 2012); CIA World Factbook (retrieved June 6,
2012); national sources

2011, 2012
S05 Extent of informal economy

How much economic activity in your country would you
estimate to be undeclared or unregistered? [1 = most economic
activity is undeclared or unregistered; 7 = most economic
activity is declared or registered] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
S06 Social mobility

To what extent do individuals in your country have the
opportunity to improve their economic situation through their
personal efforts regardless of the socioeconomic status of
their parents? [1 = little opportunity exists to improve ones
economic situation; 7 = significant opportunity exists to
improve ones economic situation] | 201112 weighted average
S02 Youth unemployment

Youth unemployment measured as the ratio of total
unemployed youth to total labor force aged 1524 | 2010 or

2011, 2012
Youth unemployment refers to the share of the labor force ages

1524 without work but available for and seeking employment.
Source: International Labour Organization, Key Indicators of the
Labour Markets Net (retrieved June 5, 2012)
S07 Vulnerable employment
S03.01 Access to sanitation

Percent of total population with access to improved sanitation
facilities | 2010 or most recent year available
Percent of the population with at least adequate access to
excreta disposal facilities that can effectively prevent human,
animal, and insect contact with excreta. Improved facilities
range from simple but protected pit latrines to flush toilets with a
sewerage connection. To be effective, facilities must be correctly
constructed and properly maintained.
Source: World Health Organization, World Health Statistics 2012
online database (retrieved June 5, 2012)
Proportion of own-account and contributing family workers in

total employment | 2010 or most recent year available
Vulnerable employment refers to the proportion of unpaid
contributing family workers and own-account workers in total
employment. Own-account workers are those workers who,
working on their own account or with one or more partners,
hold the type of job defined as a self-employed job and have
not engaged on a continuous basis any employees to work for
them during the reference period. A contributing family worker
is a person who holds a job in a market-oriented establishment
operated by a related person living in the same household and
who cannot be regarded as a partner because the degree of his
or her commitment to the operation of the establishment, in terms
of the working time or other factors to be determined by national
circumstances, is not at a level comparable with that of the head
of the establishment.
(retrieved June 1, 2012)
S08.01 Stringency of environmental regulation
S10 No. of ratified international environmental treaties
How would you assess the stringency of your countrys

environmental regulations? [1 = very lax; 7 = among the worlds
most stringent] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
S08.02 Enforcement of environmental regulation

How would you assess the enforcement of environmental
regulations in your country? [1 = very lax; 7 = among the
worlds most rigorous] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
S09 Terrestrial biome protection

Degree to which a country achieves the target of protecting 17
percent of each terrestrial biome within its borders | 2010 or
This indicator is calculated by Columbia Universitys Center for
International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) by
overlaying the protected area mask on terrestrial biome data
developed by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF)s Terrestrial Ecoregions of the World for each country. Scores are capped at 17
percent per biome such that higher levels of protection of some
biomes cannot be used to offset lower levels of protection of
other biomes, hence the maximum level of protection a country
can achieve is 17 percent. CIESIN uses time series of the World
Database on Protected Areas (WDPA) developed by the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) World Conservation
Monitoring Centre (WCMC) in 2011, which provides a spatial time
series of protected area coverage from 1990 to 2010. The WCMC
considers all nationally designated protected areas whose location
and extent is known. Boundaries were defined by polygons
where available; where they were not available, protected-area
centroids were buffered to create a circle in accordance with the
protected area size. The WCMC removed all overlaps between
different protected areas by dissolving the boundaries to create a
protected areas mask.
Source: Yale University and Columbia University, Environmental
Performance Index (EPI) 2012 edition, based on WWF World
Wildlife Fund USA and UNEP WCMC data.
Total number of ratified environmental treaties | 2010

This indicator provides the total number of environmental treaties
ratified by a country. It measures the total number of international
treaties from a set of 25 for which a state is a participant. A state
becomes a participant by Ratification, Formal confirmation,
Accession, Acceptance, Definitive signature, Approval, Simplified
procedure, Consent to be bound, Succession, and Provisional
application (which are here grouped under the term ratification,
for reasons of convenience). The treaties included are: the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 1948
Washington; the International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954 London, as amended in
1962 and 1969; the Convention on Wetlands of International
Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat, 1971 Ramsar; the
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and
Natural Heritage, 1972 Paris; the Convention on the Prevention
of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter,
1972 London, Mexico City, Moscow, Washington; the Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora, 1973 Washington; the International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) as modified
by the Protocol of 1978, 1978 London; the Convention on
the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, 1979
Bonn; the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
1982 Montego Bay; the Convention on the Protection of the
Ozone Layer, 1985 Vienna; the Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987 Montreal; the Convention on
the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and their Disposal, 1989 Basel; the International Convention
on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation,
1990 London; the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, 1992 New York; the Convention on Biological
Diversity, 1992 Rio de Janeiro; the International Convention to
Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious
Drought and/or Desertification, particularly Africa, 1994 Paris; the
Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December
1982, 1994 New York; the Agreement relating to the Provisions
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea relating
to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 1995 New York; the Kyoto
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on the
Climate Change, Kyoto 1997; the Rotterdam Convention on
the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, 1998 Rotterdam;
the Cartagena Protocol of Biosafety to the Convention on
Biological Diversity, 2000 Montreal; the Protocol on Preparedness,
Response and Cooperation to Pollution Incidents by Hazardous
and Noxious Substances, 2000 London; the Stockholm
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 2001 Stockholm;
the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture, 2001 Rome; and the International Tropical Timber
Agreement 206, 1994 Geneva.
Source: The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN)
Environmental Law Centre ELIS Treaty Database
S11 Agricultural water intensity

Agricultural water withdrawal as a percent of total renewable
water resources | 2006 or most recent year available
Agricultural water withdrawal as a percent of total renewable
water resources is calculated as: 100 agricultural water
withdrawal/total renewable water resources. In turn, total
renewable water resources = surface renewable water +
renewable groundwater overlap between surface and
groundwater. Where available, this indicator includes water
resources coming from desalination used for agriculture (as in
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain,
and Spain).
Source: FAO AQUASTAT database, available at http://www.fao.
org/nr/water/aquastat/main/index.stm (retrieved May 31, 2012)
S12 CO2 intensity
S14.02 Forest loss
CO2 intensity (kilograms of CO2 per kilogram of oil equivalent

energy use) | 2008
Forest cover lost over the period 200010 based on satellite

data | 2010
Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are those stemming from the

burning of fossil fuels and the manufacture of cement. They
include carbon dioxide produced during consumption of solid,
liquid, and gas fuels and gas flaring. Energy use refers to use
of primary energy before transformation to other end-use fuels,
which is equal to indigenous production plus imports and stock
changes, minus exports and fuels supplied to ships and aircraft
engaged in international transport. A logarithm transformation is
applied to the ratio of these statistics in order to spread the data
distribution.
This indicator represents the loss of forest area owing to

deforestation from either human or natural causes, such as forest
fires. The University of Maryland researchers used Moderate
Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) 500-meter
resolution satellite data to identify areas of forest disturbance,
then used Landsat data to quantify the area of forest loss. This
indicator uses a baseline forest cover layer (forest cover fraction
with a 30 percent forest cover threshold) to measure the area
under forest cover in the year 2000. It then combines forest loss
estimates from Landsat for the periods 200005 and 200510 to
arrive at a total forest cover change amount for the decade. This
total is then divided by the forest area estimate for 2000 to come
up with a percent change in forest cover over the decade. Further
details on the methods used are found in Hansen, M., S. V.
Stehman, and P. V. Potapov. 2010. Quantification of Global Gross
Forest Cover Loss. Proceedings of the National Academies
of Science, available at www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/
pnas.0912668107. A logarithm transformation is applied to these
statistics in order to spread the data distribution.

(retrieved June 1, 2012)
S13 Fish stocks overexploited

Fraction of countrys exclusive economic zone with
overexploited and collapsed stocks | 2006
The Sea Around Us (SAU) projects Stock Status Plots (SSPs)
are created in four steps (Kleisner and Pauly, 2011). The first step
is to define a stock. SAU defines a stock to be a taxon (either at
the species, genus, or family level of taxonomic assignment) that
occurs in the catch records for at least 5 consecutive years, over
a minimum of 10 years, and which has a total catch in an area
of at least 1,000 tonnes over the time span. In the second step,
SAU assesses the status of the stock for every year relative to the
peak catch. SAU defines five states of stock status for a catch
time series. This definition is assigned to every taxon meeting
the definition of a stock for a particular spatial area considered
(e.g., exclusive economic zones, or EEZs). Stock status states
are: (1) Developingbefore the year of peak catch and less
than 50 percent of the peak catch; (2) Exploitedbefore or after
the year of peak catch and more than 50 percent of the peak
catch; (3) Overexploitedafter the year of peak catch and less
than 50 percent but more than 10 percent of the peak catch;
(4) Collapsedafter the year of peak catch and less than 10
percent of the peak catch; (5) Rebuildingoccurs after the year
of peak catch and after the stock has collapsed, when catch
has recovered to between 10 and 50 percent of the peak. In
the third step, SAU graphs the number of stocks by status by
tallying the number of stocks in a particular state in a given year
and presenting these as percentages. In the fourth step, the
cumulative catch of stock by status in a given year is summed
over all stocks and presented as a percentage in the catch
by stock status graph. The combination of these two figures
represents the complete Stock Status Plot. The numbers for this
indicator are taken from the overexploited and collapsed numbers
of stocks over total numbers of stocks per EEZ. A logarithm
transformation is applied to these statistics in order to spread the
data distribution.

Performance Index (EPI) 2012 edition, based on University of
Maryland data
S15 Particulate matter (2.5) concentration

Population-weighted exposure to PM2.5 in micrograms per
cubic meter, based on satellite data | 2009
This indicator was developed by the Battelle Memorial Institute in
collaboration with Columbia Universitys Center for International
Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) and funding from the
NASA Applied Sciences Program. Using relationships between
the Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS)
Aerosol Optical Depth (AOD) and surface PM2.5 concentrations
that were modeled by van Donkelaar et al. (2010), annual average
MODIS AOD retrievals were used to estimate surface PM2.5
concentrations from 2001 to 2010. These were averaged into
three-year moving averages from 2002 to 2009 to generate global
grids of PM2.5 concentrations. The grids were resampled to
match CIESINs Global Rural-Urban Mapping Project (GRUMP) 1
kilometer population grid. The population-weighted average of the
PM2.5 values was used to calculate the countrys annual average
exposure to PM2.5 in micrograms per cubic meter. A logarithm
transformation is applied to these statistics in order to spread the
data distribution.
Performance Index (EPI) 2012 edition based on NASA MODIS
and MISR data (van Donkelaar et al. [2010]), Battelle, and CIESIN
S16 Quality of the natural environment

Performance Index (EPI) 2012 edition based on Sea Around Us
data
S14.01 Forest cover change

Percent change in forest area over the period 199010 | 2010
How would you assess the quality of the natural environment in

your country? [1 = extremely poor; 7 = among the worlds most
pristine] | 201112 weighted average
2011, 2012
This measure represents the percent change in forest area,

applying a 10 percent crown cover as the definition of forested
areas, between time periods. We used total forest extent rather
than the extent of primary forest only. The change measure is
calculated from forest area data in 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010.
The data are reported by national governments, and therefore
methods and data sources may vary from country to country.
Positive values indicate afforestation or reforestation, and negative
values represent deforestation.
Performance Index (EPI) 2012 edition based on Sea Around Us
data
List of Countries
Country
Page
Country
Page
Country
Page
Algeria
124
Ghana
150
Namibia
176
Benin
126
Guinea
152
Nigeria
178
Botswana
128
Kenya
154
Rwanda
180
Burkina Faso
130
Lesotho
156
Senegal
182
Burundi
132
Liberia
158
Seychelles
184
Cameroon
134
Libya
160
Sierra Leone
186
Cape Verde
136
Madagascar
162
South Africa
188
Chad
138
Malawi
164
Swaziland
190
Cte dIvoire
140
Mali
166
Tanzania
192
Egypt
142
Mauritania
168
Uganda
194
Ethiopia
144
Mauritius
170
Zambia
196
Gabon
146
Morocco
172
Zimbabwe
198
Gambia, The
148
Mozambique
174
Algeria
GDP (US$ billions)* .............................................197.9
GDP per capita (US$) ......................................5,503.2
Agriculture ..............................................................6.9
Industry ................................................................62.1
Services ...............................................................31.0
Score, (01) best ..................................................0.70

10,000
Algeria
MIddle East and North Africa
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 110 ..... 3.7
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ........................................... 87 ...... 4.0

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ........................................... 86 ...... 4.0
Factor
driven

Institutions .................................................................... 141 ...... 2.7
Infrastructure ................................................................ 100 ...... 3.2
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ..................................................................... 49 ...... 4.3
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ..................................................................... 141 ...... 2.1
Algeria

Corruption ............................................................................... 14.0
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 6.3
Inflation ...................................................................................... 4.5
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 2.4
Tax rates.................................................................................... 2.4
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Algeria
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 2.5 ..........140

Organized crime ..................................................... 3.3 ..........137
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 3.4 ............88
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05
Government budget balance, % GDP*..................-3.6 ............82

Gross national savings, % GDP* .......................... 50.1 ..............6
General government debt, % GDP* ....................... 9.9 ............11
4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

Malaria cases/100,000 pop.* ................................. 0.0 ............72
5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 1.5 ..........144
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Benin
Population (millions) ................................................9.1
GDP (US$ billions)* .................................................7.3
GDP per capita (US$) .........................................802.2
Agriculture ............................................................32.2
Industry ................................................................13.4
Services ...............................................................54.4
Score, (01) best ..................................................0.43
Rank (out of 187 economies).................................167

2,500
Benin
Sub-Saharan Africa
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 119 ..... 3.6
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ......................................... 104 ...... 3.8

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ......................................... 103 ...... 3.7
Factor
driven
Basic requirements (60.0%) ....................................... 113 ...... 3.8

Institutions ...................................................................... 99 ...... 3.5
Infrastructure ................................................................ 122 ...... 2.6
Health and primary education ....................................... 111 ...... 4.7
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Labor market efficiency .................................................. 67 ...... 4.4
Market size ................................................................... 122 ...... 2.5
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ....................................................................... 84 ...... 3.0
Benin
Factor-driven economies

Corruption ............................................................................... 23.8
Tax rates.................................................................................. 14.0
Inadequate supply of infrastructure .......................................... 11.1
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 6.6
Inefficient government bureaucracy ........................................... 6.4
Inflation ...................................................................................... 5.2
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 0.9
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Benin
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 3.9 ............90

Intellectual property protection ............................... 3.2 ............91
Public trust in politicians ......................................... 2.3 ............98
Favoritism in decisions of government officials ....... 3.1 ............65
Wastefulness of government spending ................... 3.7 ............40
Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes .... 3.3 ............91
Efficiency of legal framework in challenging regs. ... 3.7 ............66
Govt services for improved business performance... 3.9 ............52
Business costs of crime and violence..................... 4.5 ............89
Organized crime ..................................................... 4.6 ..........103
Reliability of police services .................................... 4.4 ............61
Ethical behavior of firms ......................................... 3.6 ............97
Efficacy of corporate boards .................................. 4.6 ............60
Strength of investor protection, 010 (best)* .......... 3.3 ..........125
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 3.1 ..........104
Quality of railroad infrastructure .............................. 1.6 ..........107
Quality of port infrastructure ................................... 3.7 ............95
Available airline seat kms/week, millions* ............. 20.9 ..........120
Quality of electricity supply ..................................... 2.5 ..........122
Mobile telephone subscriptions/100 pop.* ........... 85.3 ..........102
Fixed telephone lines/100 pop.* ............................. 1.7 ..........121
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

Gross national savings, % GDP* ............................ 9.8 ..........126
Inflation, annual % change* .................................... 2.7 ..............1
General government debt, % GDP* ..................... 31.3 ............45
Country credit rating, 0100 (best)* ...................... 24.2 ..........118
4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10
Business impact of malaria .................................... 3.8 ..........123

Malaria cases/100,000 pop.* ........................ 27,461.1 ..........131
Business impact of tuberculosis ............................. 4.3 ..........115
Business impact of HIV/AIDS ................................. 4.2 ..........118
HIV prevalence, % adult pop.* ............................... 1.2 ..........110
Life expectancy, years*......................................... 55.6 ..........125
Quality of primary education ................................... 3.4 ............90
5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08
Secondary education enrollment, gross %* .......... 37.1 ..........127

Tertiary education enrollment, gross %*................ 10.6 ..........108
Quality of the educational system ........................... 3.6 ............71
Quality of math and science education .................. 4.3 ............51
Quality of management schools ............................. 4.4 ............53
Availability of research and training services ........... 4.1 ............76
6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16
Intensity of local competition .................................. 4.5 ............93

Extent of market dominance .................................. 3.8 ............66
Effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy ..................... 3.8 ............92
No. procedures to start a business* .......................... 6 ............47
Imports as a percentage of GDP* ........................ 41.4 ............81
Degree of customer orientation .............................. 4.5 ............89
7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Flexibility of wage determination ............................. 5.5 ............24
Hiring and firing practices ....................................... 4.0 ............64
Brain drain ............................................................. 3.4 ............73
Women in labor force, ratio to men* ..................... 0.87 ............39
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

Soundness of banks .............................................. 4.9 ............81
Legal rights index, 010 (best)* ................................. 6 ............65
9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07

Individuals using Internet, %* ................................. 3.5 ..........131
Broadband Internet subscriptions/100 pop.* .......... 0.0 ..........129
Intl Internet bandwidth, kb/s per user* .................. 3.4 ..........116

10.01 Domestic market size index, 17 (best)*................. 2.3 ..........123
10.02 Foreign market size index, 17 (best)* .................... 2.8 ..........124

11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

Production process sophistication.......................... 3.5 ............81
12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Company spending on R&D................................... 3.0 ............77
Govt procurement of advanced tech products ...... 3.7 ............62
PCT patents, applications/million pop.* .................. 0.0 ..........111
Botswana
GDP (US$ billions)* ...............................................17.7
GDP per capita (US$) ......................................9,537.4
Agriculture ..............................................................2.5
Industry ................................................................46.8
Services ...............................................................50.8

20,000
Botswana
Sub-Saharan Africa
15,000
10,000
5,000

Score, (01) best ..................................................0.63
0
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 .................................................. 79 ..... 4.1
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ........................................... 80 ...... 4.0

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ........................................... 76 ...... 4.1
Factor
driven

Institutions ...................................................................... 33 ...... 4.8
Infrastructure .................................................................. 87 ...... 3.6
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication
Efficiency enhancers (43.6%) ...................................... 89 ...... 3.8

Higher education and training ......................................... 95 ...... 3.7
Goods market efficiency ................................................ 78 ...... 4.2
Financial market development ........................................ 53 ...... 4.4
Market size ..................................................................... 97 ...... 2.9
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development
Innovation and sophistication factors (7.9%) ............. 82 ...... 3.4

Business sophistication ................................................. 95 ...... 3.7
Innovation ....................................................................... 73 ...... 3.1
Botswana

Poor work ethic in national labor force..................................... 19.8
Inadequately educated workforce ............................................ 12.2
Corruption ................................................................................. 6.3
Inflation ...................................................................................... 4.3
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 2.0
Tax rates.................................................................................... 1.5
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 1.0
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Botswana
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 4.9 ............46

Diversion of public funds ........................................ 4.7 ............31
Irregular payments and bribes ................................ 5.0 ............36
Judicial independence............................................ 5.5 ............22
Burden of government regulation ........................... 3.8 ............43
Transparency of government policymaking............. 4.7 ............43
Business costs of terrorism .................................... 6.5 ..............7
Organized crime ..................................................... 6.3 ............20
Strength of auditing and reporting standards ......... 4.9 ............50
Protection of minority shareholders interests ......... 4.5 ............44
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09
Quality of overall infrastructure ............................... 4.4 ............64

Quality of roads ...................................................... 4.4 ............55
Quality of air transport infrastructure....................... 4.1 ............96
Available airline seat kms/week, millions* ............... 5.6 ..........141
Mobile telephone subscriptions/100 pop.* ......... 142.8 ............19
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

Gross national savings, % GDP* .......................... 14.7 ..........100
Inflation, annual % change* .................................... 8.5 ..........113
4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

Malaria cases/100,000 pop.* ............................. 232.9 ..........102
Tuberculosis cases/100,000 pop.* ..................... 503.0 ..........136
HIV prevalence, % adult pop.* ............................. 24.8 ..........143
5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

Tertiary education enrollment, gross %*.................. 7.4 ..........119
Internet access in schools ...................................... 3.5 ............96
Extent of staff training ............................................ 3.9 ............68
6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

Extent and effect of taxation................................... 4.7 ............13
Total tax rate, % profits* ....................................... 19.4 ............13
No. days to start a business* .................................. 61 ..........131
Agricultural policy costs.......................................... 4.6 ............20
Prevalence of trade barriers ................................... 4.6 ............42
Trade tariffs, % duty* .............................................. 6.7 ............81
Prevalence of foreign ownership............................. 5.3 ............35
Business impact of rules on FDI ............................. 4.8 ............49
Burden of customs procedures .............................. 4.4 ............54
7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Pay and productivity............................................... 3.9 ............68
Reliance on professional management ................... 5.2 ............30
Brain drain ............................................................. 3.8 ............44
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08
Availability of financial services ............................... 4.6 ............72

Affordability of financial services ............................. 4.1 ............75
Financing through local equity market .................... 3.9 ............49
Ease of access to loans ......................................... 3.4 ............35
Venture capital availability ....................................... 2.9 ............47
Regulation of securities exchanges ........................ 4.3 ............56
9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07
Availability of latest technologies ............................ 4.6 ............93

Firm-level technology absorption ............................ 4.4 ............98


11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

State of cluster development.................................. 3.6 ............74
Nature of competitive advantage ............................ 3.4 ............73
Willingness to delegate authority ............................ 4.0 ............46
12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07
Capacity for innovation........................................... 2.8 ............96

Quality of scientific research institutions ................. 3.6 ............73
University-industry collaboration in R&D ................. 3.7 ............63
Availability of scientists and engineers .................... 3.5 ..........112
Burkina Faso
GDP (US$ billions)* ...............................................10.2
GDP per capita (US$) .........................................601.0
Agriculture ............................................................33.3
Industry ................................................................22.4
Services ...............................................................44.4
Score, (01) best ..................................................0.33

2,500
Burkina Faso
Sub-Saharan Africa
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 133 ..... 3.3
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ......................................... 136 ...... 3.3

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ......................................... 134 ...... 3.2
Factor
driven

Institutions ...................................................................... 83 ...... 3.7
Infrastructure ................................................................ 136 ...... 2.2
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ................................................................... 114 ...... 2.6
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ..................................................................... 107 ...... 2.9
Burkina Faso

Corruption ............................................................................... 17.5
Tax rates.................................................................................. 11.2
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 8.2
Inflation ...................................................................................... 1.7
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 1.3
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Burkina Faso
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 4.3 ............66

Business costs of terrorism .................................... 5.4 ............85
Organized crime ..................................................... 5.2 ............73
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 2.6 ..........125
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

Primary education enrollment, net %* .................. 63.2 ..........136
5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

No. procedures to start a business* .......................... 3 ..............8
7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08
Cooperation in labor-employer relations ................. 4.1 ............95

Brain drain ............................................................. 2.8 ..........114
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09
Local supplier quantity ........................................... 4.4 ............95

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Burundi
GDP (US$ billions)* .................................................2.4
GDP per capita (US$) .........................................274.9
Agriculture ............................................................35.2
Industry ................................................................18.6
Services ...............................................................46.3

2,500
Burundi
Sub-Saharan Africa
2,000
1,500
1,000
500

Score, (01) best ..................................................0.32
0
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 144 ..... 2.8
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ......................................... 140 ...... 2.9

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ......................................... 137 ...... 3.0
Factor
driven

Institutions .................................................................... 142 ...... 2.6
Infrastructure ................................................................ 141 ...... 1.9
Macroeconomic environment ....................................... 137 ...... 3.1
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ................................................................... 140 ...... 1.6
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ..................................................................... 140 ...... 2.2
Burundi

Corruption ............................................................................... 18.5
Tax rates.................................................................................... 9.3
Inflation ...................................................................................... 9.2
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 5.0
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 1.9
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Burundi
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 2.4 ..........141

Organized crime ..................................................... 3.9 ..........125
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 2.7 ..........121
Quality of railroad infrastructure ........................ n/appl. ...........n/a
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

Inflation, annual % change* .................................. 14.9 ..........135
4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

Malaria cases/100,000 pop.* .......................... 8,931.5 ..........122
5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 1.7 ..........142
Women in labor force, ratio to men* ..................... 1.03 ..............3
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Cameroon
GDP (US$ billions)* ...............................................25.6
GDP per capita (US$) ......................................1,225.2
Agriculture ............................................................19.5
Industry ................................................................30.6
Services ...............................................................49.9
Score, (01) best ..................................................0.48

2,500
Cameroon
Sub-Saharan Africa
2,000
1,500
1,000
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 112 ..... 3.7
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ......................................... 116 ...... 3.6

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ......................................... 111 ...... 3.6
Factor
driven

Institutions .................................................................... 107 ...... 3.4
Infrastructure ................................................................ 125 ...... 2.5
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ..................................................................... 87 ...... 3.2
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ....................................................................... 79 ...... 3.1
Cameroon

Corruption ............................................................................... 22.8
Tax rates.................................................................................... 9.7
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 7.0
Inflation ...................................................................................... 2.0
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 1.8
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Cameroon
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 3.8 ............97

Organized crime ..................................................... 4.7 ............96
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 2.9 ..........112
Available airline seat kms/week, millions* ............. 45.2 ............99
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

Gross national savings, % GDP* .......................... 14.8 ............99
4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

Buyer sophistication ............................................... 3.1 ............99
7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 3.2 ............92
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07

FDI and technology transfer ................................... 4.7 ............73


11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

Local supplier quality.............................................. 4.1 ............97
Value chain breadth................................................ 3.4 ............81
12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Cape Verde
GDP (US$ billions)* .................................................1.9
GDP per capita (US$) ......................................3,660.9
Agriculture ............................................................10.4
Industry ................................................................17.8
Services ...............................................................71.8

4,000
Cape Verde
Sub-Saharan Africa
3,000
2,000
1,000

Score, (01) best ..................................................0.57
0
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 122 ..... 3.5
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ......................................... 119 ...... 3.6

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ......................................... 117 ...... 3.5
Factor
driven

Institutions ...................................................................... 57 ...... 4.1
Infrastructure ................................................................ 114 ...... 2.8
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Technological readiness .................................................. 90 ...... 3.4
Market size ................................................................... 143 ...... 1.2
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development
Innovation and sophistication factors (10.0%) ......... 119 ...... 3.0

Innovation ..................................................................... 120 ...... 2.7
Cape Verde
Efficiency-driven economies

Tax rates.................................................................................. 11.6
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 6.2
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 4.2
Corruption ................................................................................. 3.0
Inflation ...................................................................................... 2.7
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Cape Verde
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 4.0 ............86

Organized crime ..................................................... 4.5 ..........104
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 4.1 ............65
Fixed telephone lines/100 pop.* ........................... 14.9 ............84
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05
Government budget balance, % GDP*..................-8.9 ..........138

General government debt, % GDP* ..................... 77.6 ..........123
4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

Malaria cases/100,000 pop.* ............................... 68.8 ............96
Infant mortality, deaths/1,000 live births* .............. 29.2 ............99
5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Redundancy costs, weeks of salary* ....................... 30 ..........124
Brain drain ............................................................. 3.2 ............93
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07

Individuals using Internet, %* ............................... 32.0 ............83
Mobile broadband subscriptions/100 pop.*............ 3.0 ............95


11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Chad
GDP (US$ billions)* .................................................9.3
GDP per capita (US$) .........................................891.9
Agriculture ............................................................13.6
Industry ................................................................48.8
Services ...............................................................37.5
Score, (01) best ..................................................0.33

2,500
Chad
Sub-Saharan Africa
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 139 ..... 3.1
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ......................................... 142 ...... 2.9

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ......................................... 139 ...... 2.7
Factor
driven

Institutions .................................................................... 140 ...... 2.7
Infrastructure ................................................................ 140 ...... 1.9
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ................................................................... 112 ...... 2.7
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ..................................................................... 113 ...... 2.7
Chad

Corruption ............................................................................... 17.2
Tax rates.................................................................................... 8.8
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 5.6
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 4.9
Inflation ...................................................................................... 1.9
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Chad
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 2.6 ..........139

Organized crime ..................................................... 3.5 ..........134
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 3.1 ..........103
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05
Government budget balance, % GDP*................... 3.2 ............15

4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 2.8 ..........112
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Cte dIvoire
GDP (US$ billions)* ...............................................24.1
GDP per capita (US$) ......................................1,062.1
Agriculture ............................................................24.3
Industry ................................................................30.3
Services ...............................................................45.4
Score, (01) best ..................................................0.40

2,500
Cte dIvoire
Sub-Saharan Africa
2,000
1,500
1,000
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 131 ..... 3.4
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ......................................... 129 ...... 3.4

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ......................................... 129 ...... 3.3
Factor
driven

Institutions .................................................................... 129 ...... 3.2
Infrastructure ................................................................ 102 ...... 3.1
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ..................................................................... 94 ...... 3.1
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ..................................................................... 115 ...... 2.7
Cte dIvoire

Corruption ............................................................................... 16.5
Government instability/coups .................................................. 13.8
Tax rates.................................................................................... 7.1
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 4.6
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 3.8
Inflation ...................................................................................... 2.4
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Cte dIvoire
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 3.2 ..........126

Organized crime ..................................................... 3.5 ..........132
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 3.0 ..........107
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 3.4 ............79
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07

Intl Internet bandwidth, kb/s per user* ................ 18.0 ............64


11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Egypt
GDP (US$ billions)* .............................................235.7
GDP per capita (US$) ......................................2,931.8
Agriculture ............................................................13.9
Industry ................................................................36.7
Services ...............................................................49.3
Score, (01) best ..................................................0.64

10,000
Egypt
Middle East and North Africa
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 107 ..... 3.7
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ........................................... 94 ...... 3.9

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ........................................... 81 ...... 4.0
Factor
driven

Institutions ...................................................................... 96 ...... 3.6
Infrastructure .................................................................. 83 ...... 3.6
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ..................................................................... 29 ...... 4.8
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ..................................................................... 109 ...... 2.8
Egypt

Policy instability ....................................................................... 17.0
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 9.7
Corruption ................................................................................. 6.3
Access to financing ................................................................... 5.6
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 5.4
Tax rates.................................................................................... 4.6
Inflation ...................................................................................... 3.0
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Egypt
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 4.0 ............85

Organized crime ..................................................... 5.0 ............82
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 2.9 ..........109
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10
Business impact of malaria .............................. n/appl. ..............1

Malaria cases/100,000 pop.* ................................. 0.0 ..............1
5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

No. days to start a business* .................................... 7 ............25
7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 2.2 ..........132
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07

Mobile broadband subscriptions/100 pop.*.......... 21.0 ............46


11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

Control of international distribution ......................... 4.0 ............72
12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Ethiopia
GDP (US$ billions)* ...............................................31.7
GDP per capita (US$) .........................................365.2
Agriculture ............................................................41.9
Industry ................................................................12.6
Services ...............................................................45.5

2,500
Ethiopia
Sub-Saharan Africa
2,000
1,500
1,000
500

Score, (01) best ..................................................0.36
0
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 121 ..... 3.6
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ......................................... 106 ...... 3.8

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ......................................... 119 ...... 3.5
Factor
driven

Institutions ...................................................................... 74 ...... 3.8
Infrastructure ................................................................ 119 ...... 2.6
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ..................................................................... 66 ...... 3.6
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ..................................................................... 114 ...... 2.7
Ethiopia

Corruption ............................................................................... 13.9
Inflation .................................................................................... 12.0
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 7.8
Tax rates.................................................................................... 3.8
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 0.0
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Ethiopia
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 4.1 ............79

Organized crime ..................................................... 6.2 ............24
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 4.1 ............64
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 2.7 ..........118
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Gabon
GDP (US$ billions)* ...............................................16.0
GDP per capita (US$) ....................................10,518.3
Agriculture ..............................................................3.7
Industry ................................................................60.6
Services ...............................................................35.6

20,000
Gabon
Sub-Saharan Africa
15,000
10,000
5,000

Score, (01) best ..................................................0.67
0
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 .................................................. 99 ..... 3.8
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) .......................................... n/a ...... n/a

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) .......................................... n/a ...... n/a
Factor
driven

Institutions ...................................................................... 67 ...... 3.9
Infrastructure ................................................................ 117 ...... 2.7
Macroeconomic environment ........................................... 9 ...... 6.2
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ................................................................... 110 ...... 2.7
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ..................................................................... 136 ...... 2.4
Gabon

Restrictive labor regulations ..................................................... 10.9
Corruption ................................................................................. 8.5
Tax rates.................................................................................... 5.3
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 3.9
Inflation ...................................................................................... 2.8
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 0.7
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Gabon
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 4.9 ............44

Organized crime ..................................................... 6.0 ............31
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 2.3 ..........138
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

Tertiary education enrollment, gross %*.................. n/a ...........n/a
6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

Trade tariffs, % duty* .............................................. 0.1 ..............4
7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 3.5 ............65
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Gambia, The
GDP (US$ billions)* .................................................1.0
GDP per capita (US$) .........................................543.0
Agriculture ............................................................29.9
Industry ................................................................12.0
Services ...............................................................58.1
Score, (01) best ..................................................0.42

2,500
The Gambia
Sub-Saharan Africa
2,000
1,500
1,000
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 .................................................. 98 ..... 3.8
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ........................................... 99 ...... 3.8

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ........................................... 90 ...... 3.9
Factor
driven

Institutions ...................................................................... 35 ...... 4.7
Infrastructure .................................................................. 82 ...... 3.6
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ................................................................... 141 ...... 1.4
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ....................................................................... 52 ...... 3.4
The Gambia

Tax rates.................................................................................. 24.8
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 6.6
Inflation ...................................................................................... 4.5
Corruption ................................................................................. 4.1
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 2.1
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Gambia, The
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 4.9 ............45

Govt services for improved business performance... 4.8 ..............9
Organized crime ..................................................... 5.8 ............41
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 4.5 ............51
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

Total tax rate, % profits* ..................................... 283.5 ..........141
7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 4.3 ............33
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

Extent of marketing ................................................ 3.8 ............88
12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Ghana
GDP (US$ billions)* ...............................................38.4
GDP per capita (US$) ......................................1,579.7
Agriculture ............................................................27.3
Industry ................................................................25.3
Services ...............................................................47.4
Score, (01) best ..................................................0.54

3,000
Ghana
Sub-Saharan Africa
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 103 ..... 3.8
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ......................................... 114 ...... 3.6

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ......................................... 114 ...... 3.6
Factor
driven

Institutions ...................................................................... 75 ...... 3.8
Infrastructure ................................................................ 110 ...... 2.9
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ..................................................................... 70 ...... 3.6
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ....................................................................... 95 ...... 3.0
Ghana

Corruption ............................................................................... 11.9
Tax rates.................................................................................. 11.5
Inflation ...................................................................................... 8.8
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 4.5
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 2.7
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Ghana
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 3.9 ............91

Organized crime ..................................................... 5.1 ............78
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 3.5 ............85
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 3.6 ............53
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Guinea
GDP (US$ billions)* .................................................5.2
GDP per capita (US$) .........................................488.2
Agriculture ............................................................13.0
Industry ................................................................47.2
Services ...............................................................39.4
Score, (01) best ..................................................0.34

2,500
Guinea
Sub-Saharan Africa
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 141 ..... 2.9
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) .......................................... n/a ...... n/a

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) .......................................... n/a ...... n/a
Factor
driven

Institutions .................................................................... 128 ...... 3.2
Infrastructure ................................................................ 142 ...... 1.9
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ................................................................... 129 ...... 2.3
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ..................................................................... 125 ...... 2.6
Guinea

Corruption ............................................................................... 13.2
Inflation ...................................................................................... 9.2
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 3.4
Tax rates.................................................................................... 2.0
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 1.7
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Guinea
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 3.2 ..........127

Organized crime ..................................................... 4.1 ..........119
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 2.0 ..........140
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Redundancy costs, weeks of salary* ......................... 8 ............22
Brain drain ............................................................. 3.0 ..........101
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Kenya
GDP (US$ billions)* ...............................................34.1
GDP per capita (US$) .........................................832.5
Agriculture ............................................................23.1
Industry ................................................................19.2
Services ...............................................................57.7
Score, (01) best ..................................................0.51

2,500
Kenya
Sub-Saharan Africa
2,000
1,500
1,000
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 106 ..... 3.7
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ......................................... 102 ...... 3.8

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ......................................... 106 ...... 3.6
Factor
driven

Institutions .................................................................... 106 ...... 3.4
Infrastructure ................................................................ 103 ...... 3.1
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ..................................................................... 75 ...... 3.5
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ....................................................................... 50 ...... 3.4
Kenya

Corruption ............................................................................... 20.8
Inflation .................................................................................... 13.9
Tax rates.................................................................................. 11.0
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 9.3
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 2.3
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Kenya
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 3.6 ..........110

Organized crime ..................................................... 4.2 ..........115
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 3.9 ............72
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

Trade tariffs, % duty* .............................................. 9.0 ..........100
7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 3.4 ............67
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

Legal rights index, 010 (best)* ............................... 10 ..............1
9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Lesotho
GDP (US$ billions)* .................................................2.5
GDP per capita (US$) ......................................1,282.6
Agriculture ..............................................................7.8
Industry ................................................................33.7
Services ...............................................................58.5
Score, (01) best ..................................................0.45

2,500
Lesotho
Sub-Saharan Africa
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 137 ..... 3.2
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ......................................... 135 ...... 3.3

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ......................................... 128 ...... 3.4
Factor
driven

Institutions .................................................................... 121 ...... 3.3
Infrastructure ................................................................ 126 ...... 2.5
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ................................................................... 136 ...... 1.9
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ..................................................................... 138 ...... 2.3
Lesotho

Corruption ............................................................................... 13.2
Crime and theft ....................................................................... 12.5
Tax rates.................................................................................... 8.9
Inflation ...................................................................................... 6.1
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 2.4
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Lesotho
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 3.3 ..........125

Organized crime ..................................................... 4.9 ............89
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 2.9 ..........111
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05
Government budget balance, % GDP*................-10.5 ..........144

4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

Malaria cases/100,000 pop.* ................................(NE) ..............1
5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

Imports as a percentage of GDP* ...................... 124.7 ..............3
7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 2.1 ..........134
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Liberia
GDP (US$ billions)* .................................................1.5
GDP per capita (US$) .........................................398.7
Agriculture ..............................................................n/a
Industry ..................................................................n/a
Services .................................................................n/a

2,500
Liberia
Sub-Saharan Africa
2,000
1,500
1,000
500

Score, (01) best ..................................................0.33
0
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 111 ..... 3.7
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) .......................................... n/a ...... n/a

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) .......................................... n/a ...... n/a
Factor
driven

Institutions ...................................................................... 45 ...... 4.3
Infrastructure ................................................................ 115 ...... 2.8
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ................................................................... 144 ...... 1.2
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ....................................................................... 54 ...... 3.3
Liberia

Corruption ................................................................................. 9.6
Tax rates.................................................................................... 5.8
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 5.5
Inflation ...................................................................................... 3.9
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 1.4
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Liberia
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 4.4 ............62

Organized crime ..................................................... 4.9 ............91
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 3.8 ............76
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

Gross national savings, % GDP* ............................ n/a ...........n/a
4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

Trade tariffs, % duty* .............................................. n/a ...........n/a
7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 3.8 ............49
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Libya
GDP (US$ billions)* ...............................................35.7
GDP per capita (US$) ......................................5,510.0
Agriculture ..............................................................1.9
Industry ................................................................78.2
Services ...............................................................19.9
Score, (01) best ..................................................0.76

15,000
Lybia
12,000
9,000
6,000
3,000
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 113 ..... 3.7
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) .......................................... n/a ...... n/a

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ......................................... 100 ...... 3.7
Factor
driven

Institutions ...................................................................... 81 ...... 3.7
Infrastructure .................................................................. 88 ...... 3.6
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ................................................................... 102 ...... 2.9
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ..................................................................... 129 ...... 2.5
Lybia

Corruption ............................................................................... 13.0
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 2.2
Tax rates.................................................................................... 2.1
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 1.0
Inflation ...................................................................................... 0.9
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Libya
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 3.7 ..........101

Organized crime ..................................................... 6.0 ............34
Strength of investor protection, 010 (best)* .......... n/a ...........n/a
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 3.1 ..........102
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

General government debt, % GDP* ....................... 0.0 ..............1
4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

HIV prevalence, % adult pop.* ............................. <0.2 ............50
Primary education enrollment, net %* .................... n/a ...........n/a
5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08
Secondary education enrollment, gross %* ........ 110.3 ............11

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

Total tax rate, % profits* ......................................... n/a ...........n/a
No. procedures to start a business* ....................... n/a ...........n/a
No. days to start a business* ................................. n/a ...........n/a
7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Redundancy costs, weeks of salary* ...................... n/a ...........n/a
Brain drain ............................................................. 2.4 ..........125
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

Legal rights index, 010 (best)* .............................. n/a ...........n/a
9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Madagascar
GDP (US$ billions)* .................................................9.9
GDP per capita (US$) .........................................453.1
Agriculture ............................................................29.1
Industry ................................................................16.0
Services ...............................................................54.9
Score, (01) best ..................................................0.48

2,500
Madagascar
Sub-Saharan Africa
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 130 ..... 3.4
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ......................................... 130 ...... 3.4

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ......................................... 124 ...... 3.5
Factor
driven

Institutions .................................................................... 136 ...... 2.9
Infrastructure ................................................................ 137 ...... 2.1
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ................................................................... 113 ...... 2.7
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ..................................................................... 106 ...... 2.9
Madagascar

Corruption ............................................................................... 12.4
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 7.6
Inflation ...................................................................................... 4.0
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 3.9
Tax rates.................................................................................... 2.1
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Madagascar
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 2.6 ..........138

Organized crime ..................................................... 4.0 ..........123
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 2.5 ..........130
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

General government debt, % GDP* ....................... 5.7 ..............5
4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 2.7 ..........116
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Malawi
GDP (US$ billions)* .................................................5.6
GDP per capita (US$) .........................................346.8
Agriculture ............................................................30.5
Industry ................................................................16.1
Services ...............................................................53.4

2,500
Malawi
Sub-Saharan Africa
2,000
1,500
1,000
500

Score, (01) best ..................................................0.40
0
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 129 ..... 3.4
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ......................................... 117 ...... 3.6

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ......................................... 125 ...... 3.4
Factor
driven

Institutions ...................................................................... 76 ...... 3.8
Infrastructure ................................................................ 135 ...... 2.2
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ................................................................... 123 ...... 2.4
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ....................................................................... 99 ...... 2.9
Malawi

Foreign currency regulations .................................................... 25.9
Tax rates.................................................................................. 10.7
Corruption ................................................................................. 6.5
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 5.3
Inflation ...................................................................................... 2.8
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 1.9
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Malawi
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 3.9 ............88

Organized crime ..................................................... 5.4 ............61
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 3.4 ............89
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 3.3 ............86
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Mali
GDP (US$ billions)* ...............................................10.6
GDP per capita (US$) .........................................669.1
Agriculture ............................................................36.5
Industry ................................................................24.0
Services ...............................................................39.1

2,500
Mali
Sub-Saharan Africa
2,000
1,500
1,000
500

Score, (01) best ..................................................0.36
0
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 128 ..... 3.4
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ......................................... 128 ...... 3.4

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ......................................... 132 ...... 3.3
Factor
driven

Institutions .................................................................... 120 ...... 3.3
Infrastructure ................................................................ 107 ...... 3.0
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ................................................................... 118 ...... 2.6
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ....................................................................... 88 ...... 3.0
Mali

Corruption ............................................................................... 15.8
Tax rates.................................................................................... 5.1
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 4.7
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 2.6
Inflation ...................................................................................... 0.7
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Mali
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 3.6 ..........108

Organized crime ..................................................... 4.4 ..........109
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 3.6 ............82
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 3.0 ..........102
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Mauritania
GDP (US$ billions)* .................................................4.2
GDP per capita (US$) ......................................1,184.9
Agriculture ............................................................16.3
Industry ................................................................46.2
Services ...............................................................37.5

10,000
Mauritania
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000

Score, (01) best ..................................................0.45
0
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 134 ..... 3.3
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ......................................... 137 ...... 3.2

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ......................................... 135 ...... 3.1
Factor
driven

Institutions .................................................................... 122 ...... 3.3
Infrastructure ................................................................ 113 ...... 2.8
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ................................................................... 131 ...... 2.1
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ..................................................................... 121 ...... 2.7
Mauritania

Corruption ............................................................................... 10.0
Inflation ...................................................................................... 4.0
Tax rates.................................................................................... 2.6
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 1.7
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 0.7
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Mauritania
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 3.4 ..........117

Organized crime ..................................................... 5.7 ............53
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 2.7 ..........119
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 2.5 ..........119
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Mauritius
GDP (US$ billions)* ...............................................11.3
GDP per capita (US$) ......................................8,741.5
Agriculture ..............................................................3.5
Industry ................................................................26.6
Services ...............................................................69.9

15,000
Mauritius
Sub-Saharan Africa
12,000
9,000
6,000
3,000

Score, (01) best ..................................................0.73
0
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 .................................................. 54 ..... 4.4
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ........................................... 54 ...... 4.3

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ........................................... 55 ...... 4.3
Factor
driven

Institutions ...................................................................... 39 ...... 4.6
Infrastructure .................................................................. 54 ...... 4.3
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ................................................................... 109 ...... 2.7
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ....................................................................... 98 ...... 2.9
Mauritius

Corruption ................................................................................. 9.2
Inflation ...................................................................................... 4.5
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 1.7
Tax rates.................................................................................... 1.3
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 0.8
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Mauritius
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 5.2 ............36

Organized crime ..................................................... 6.3 ............17
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 4.3 ............58
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

Extent and effect of taxation................................... 5.1 ..............9
Business impact of rules on FDI ............................. 5.5 ..............9
7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 3.4 ............66
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Morocco
GDP (US$ billions)* ...............................................99.3
GDP per capita (US$) ......................................3,084.4
Agriculture ............................................................15.1
Industry ................................................................29.9
Services ...............................................................55.1

10,000
Morocco
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000

Score, (01) best ..................................................0.58
0
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 .................................................. 70 ..... 4.1
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ........................................... 73 ...... 4.2

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ........................................... 75 ...... 4.1
Factor
driven

Institutions ...................................................................... 54 ...... 4.1
Infrastructure .................................................................. 61 ...... 4.1
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ..................................................................... 57 ...... 4.1
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ....................................................................... 97 ...... 3.0
Morocco

Corruption ............................................................................... 12.6
Foreign currency regulations .................................................... 10.7
Tax rates.................................................................................... 4.5
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 2.4
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 1.0
Inflation ...................................................................................... 0.0
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Morocco
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 4.6 ............53

Organized crime ..................................................... 5.8 ............42
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 4.0 ............70
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 3.6 ............55
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Mozambique
GDP (US$ billions)* ...............................................12.6
GDP per capita (US$) .........................................571.0
Agriculture ............................................................32.0
Industry ................................................................24.2
Services ...............................................................43.8

2,500
Mozambique
Sub-Saharan Africa
2000
1,500
1,000
500

Score, (01) best ..................................................0.32
0
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 138 ..... 3.2
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ......................................... 133 ...... 3.3

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ......................................... 131 ...... 3.3
Factor
driven

Institutions .................................................................... 112 ...... 3.4
Infrastructure ................................................................ 129 ...... 2.4
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ................................................................... 101 ...... 2.9
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ..................................................................... 122 ...... 2.6
Mozambique

Corruption ............................................................................... 16.6
Tax rates.................................................................................... 4.4
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 3.8
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 3.7
Inflation ...................................................................................... 3.7
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Mozambique
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 3.5 ..........112

Organized crime ..................................................... 4.1 ..........117
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 2.4 ..........135
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 3.4 ............76
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Namibia
GDP (US$ billions)* ...............................................12.5
GDP per capita (US$) ......................................5,862.0
Agriculture ..............................................................7.3
Industry ................................................................19.6
Services ...............................................................73.1

8,000
Namibia
Sub-Saharan Africa
6,000
4,000
2,000

Score, (01) best ..................................................0.63
0
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 .................................................. 92 ..... 3.9
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ........................................... 83 ...... 4.0

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ........................................... 74 ...... 4.1
Factor
driven

Institutions ...................................................................... 52 ...... 4.2
Infrastructure .................................................................. 59 ...... 4.2
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ................................................................... 120 ...... 2.6
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ..................................................................... 101 ...... 2.9
Namibia

Corruption ............................................................................... 10.7
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 7.1
Tax rates.................................................................................... 5.0
Inflation ...................................................................................... 4.6
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 3.9
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Namibia
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 5.1 ............40

Organized crime ..................................................... 5.3 ............70
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 5.1 ............35
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

Total tax rate, % profits* ......................................... 9.8 ..............3
7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 3.3 ............80
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Nigeria
Population (millions) ............................................163.1
GDP (US$ billions)* .............................................244.1
GDP per capita (US$) ......................................1,522.1
Agriculture ............................................................32.7
Industry ................................................................40.7
Services ...............................................................26.6
Score, (01) best ..................................................0.46

2,500
Nigeria
Sub-Saharan Africa
2000
1,500
1,000
500
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 115 ..... 3.7
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ......................................... 127 ...... 3.4

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ......................................... 127 ...... 3.4
Factor
driven

Institutions .................................................................... 117 ...... 3.3
Infrastructure ................................................................ 130 ...... 2.3
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ..................................................................... 33 ...... 4.6
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ....................................................................... 78 ...... 3.1
Nigeria

Corruption ............................................................................... 18.1
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 6.5
Inflation ...................................................................................... 4.1
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 2.3
Tax rates.................................................................................... 1.1
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Nigeria
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 3.4 ..........119

Organized crime ..................................................... 3.5 ..........133
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 2.8 ..........114
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 3.8 ............48
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Rwanda
GDP (US$ billions)* .................................................6.3
GDP per capita (US$) .........................................620.3
Agriculture ............................................................32.2
Industry ................................................................15.0
Services ...............................................................52.8

2,500
Rwanda
Sub-Saharan Africa
2,000
1,500
1,000
500

Score, (01) best ..................................................0.43
0
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 .................................................. 63 ..... 4.2
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ........................................... 70 ...... 4.2

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ........................................... 80 ...... 4.0
Factor
driven

Institutions ...................................................................... 20 ...... 5.2
Infrastructure .................................................................. 96 ...... 3.2
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ................................................................... 128 ...... 2.3
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ....................................................................... 51 ...... 3.4
Rwanda

Tax rates.................................................................................. 17.5
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 7.5
Inflation ...................................................................................... 5.9
Corruption ................................................................................. 0.4
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 0.4
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Rwanda
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 5.2 ............34

Public trust in politicians ......................................... 5.6 ..............6
Favoritism in decisions of government officials ....... 5.1 ..............5
Wastefulness of government spending ................... 5.5 ..............4
Burden of government regulation ........................... 5.3 ..............2
Transparency of government policymaking............. 5.5 ..............7
Govt services for improved business performance... n/a ...........n/a
Organized crime ..................................................... 5.8 ............40
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 5.0 ............40
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

Tuberculosis cases/100,000 pop.* ..................... 106.0 ............93
5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

No. days to start a business* .................................... 3 ..............4
Agricultural policy costs.......................................... 5.5 ..............2
Burden of customs procedures .............................. 5.6 ..............6
7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 4.8 ............19
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Senegal
GDP (US$ billions)* ...............................................14.5
GDP per capita (US$) ......................................1,132.7
Agriculture ............................................................17.8
Industry ................................................................23.7
Services ...............................................................58.4
Score, (01) best ..................................................0.46

2,500
Senegal
Sub-Saharan Africa
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 117 ..... 3.7
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ......................................... 111 ...... 3.7

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ......................................... 104 ...... 3.7
Factor
driven

Institutions ...................................................................... 90 ...... 3.6
Infrastructure ................................................................ 124 ...... 2.5
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ................................................................... 105 ...... 2.8
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ....................................................................... 62 ...... 3.3
Senegal

Tax rates.................................................................................. 12.7
Tax regulations ........................................................................ 11.2
Corruption ................................................................................. 9.8
Inflation ...................................................................................... 3.7
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 0.5
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Senegal
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 4.1 ............78

Organized crime ..................................................... 5.3 ............66
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 3.2 ............97
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 3.4 ............74
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Seychelles
GDP (US$ billions)* .................................................1.0
GDP per capita (US$) ....................................11,204.1
Agriculture ..............................................................1.8
Industry ................................................................17.9
Services ...............................................................80.3

25,000
Seychelles
Sub-Saharan Africa
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000

Score, (01) best ..................................................0.77
0
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 .................................................. 76 ..... 4.1
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) .......................................... n/a ...... n/a

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) .......................................... n/a ...... n/a
Factor
driven

Institutions ...................................................................... 47 ...... 4.2
Infrastructure .................................................................. 42 ...... 4.7
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ................................................................... 142 ...... 1.4
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ....................................................................... 93 ...... 3.0
Seychelles

Tax rates.................................................................................... 8.7
Inflation ...................................................................................... 6.4
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 5.1
Corruption ................................................................................. 4.6
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 4.6
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Seychelles
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 4.7 ............50

Organized crime ..................................................... 5.8 ............45
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 4.3 ............60
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08
Secondary education enrollment, gross %* ........ 119.2 ..............5

Tertiary education enrollment, gross %*.................. n/a ...........n/a
6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

Imports as a percentage of GDP* ...................... 112.5 ..............5
7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 3.3 ............85
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Sierra Leone
GDP (US$ billions)* .................................................2.9
GDP per capita (US$) .........................................485.8
Agriculture ............................................................44.4
Industry ................................................................18.2
Services ...............................................................37.4

2,500
Sierra Leone
Sub-Saharan Africa
2,000
1,500
1,000
500

Score, (01) best ..................................................0.34
0
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 143 ..... 2.8
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) .......................................... n/a ...... n/a

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) .......................................... n/a ...... n/a
Factor
driven

Institutions ...................................................................... 95 ...... 3.6
Infrastructure ................................................................ 138 ...... 2.1
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ................................................................... 138 ...... 1.8
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ..................................................................... 139 ...... 2.3
Sierra Leone

Corruption ............................................................................... 11.7
Inflation ...................................................................................... 8.8
Tax rates.................................................................................... 6.5
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 3.3
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 2.6
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Sierra Leone
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 3.6 ..........111

Organized crime ..................................................... 5.1 ............79
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 2.8 ..........116
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

Infant mortality, deaths/1,000 live births* ............ 113.7 ..........144
Primary education enrollment, net %* .................... n/a ...........n/a
5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 2.3 ..........130
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

South Africa
GDP (US$ billions)* .............................................408.7
GDP per capita (US$) ......................................8,078.5
Agriculture ..............................................................2.4
Industry ................................................................30.6
Services ...............................................................67.0

12,000
South Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000

Score, (01) best ..................................................0.62
0
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 .................................................. 52 ..... 4.4
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ........................................... 50 ...... 4.3

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ........................................... 54 ...... 4.3
Factor
driven

Institutions ...................................................................... 43 ...... 4.4
Infrastructure .................................................................. 63 ...... 4.1
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Financial market development .......................................... 3 ...... 5.7
Market size ..................................................................... 25 ...... 4.8
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ....................................................................... 42 ...... 3.5
South Africa

Corruption ................................................................................. 9.0
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 4.1
Tax rates.................................................................................... 0.7
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 0.7
Inflation ...................................................................................... 0.6
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
South Africa
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 5.4 ............26

Organized crime ..................................................... 4.3 ..........111
Strength of auditing and reporting standards ......... 6.6 ..............1
Efficacy of corporate boards .................................. 5.8 ..............1
Protection of minority shareholders interests ......... 6.0 ..............2
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 4.9 ............42
Available airline seat kms/week, millions* ........ 1,146.3 ............24
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

Effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy ..................... 5.3 ..............6
7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 3.8 ............47
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08
Availability of financial services ............................... 6.4 ..............2

Financing through local equity market .................... 5.4 ..............3
Soundness of banks .............................................. 6.7 ..............2
Regulation of securities exchanges ........................ 6.5 ..............1
Legal rights index, 010 (best)* ............................... 10 ..............1
9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Swaziland
GDP (US$ billions)* .................................................4.0
GDP per capita (US$) ......................................3,383.5
Agriculture ..............................................................7.9
Industry ................................................................45.8
Services ...............................................................46.3
Score, (01) best ..................................................0.52

6,000
Swaziland
Sub-Saharan Africa
5,000
4,000
3,000
2000
1,000
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 135 ..... 3.3
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ......................................... 134 ...... 3.3

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ......................................... 126 ...... 3.4
Factor
driven

Institutions ...................................................................... 88 ...... 3.6
Infrastructure .................................................................. 99 ...... 3.2
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ................................................................... 133 ...... 2.0
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ..................................................................... 137 ...... 2.3
Swaziland

Corruption ............................................................................... 16.6
Tax rates.................................................................................... 5.9
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 4.7
Inflation ...................................................................................... 4.1
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 1.1
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Swaziland
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 4.0 ............83

Organized crime ..................................................... 5.1 ............77
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 4.6 ............47
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

Gross national savings, % GDP* ...........................-1.5 ..........141
4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

Tuberculosis cases/100,000 pop.* .................. 1,287.0 ..........144
5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 2.4 ..........127
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Tanzania
GDP (US$ billions)* ...............................................23.9
GDP per capita (US$) .........................................565.5
Agriculture ............................................................27.1
Industry ................................................................26.5
Services ...............................................................46.4
Score, (01) best ..................................................0.47

2,500
Tanzania
Sub-Saharan Africa
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 120 ..... 3.6
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ......................................... 120 ...... 3.6

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ......................................... 113 ...... 3.6
Factor
driven

Institutions ...................................................................... 86 ...... 3.6
Infrastructure ................................................................ 132 ...... 2.3
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ..................................................................... 77 ...... 3.5
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ....................................................................... 75 ...... 3.1
Tanzania

Corruption ............................................................................... 16.3
Inflation .................................................................................... 10.7
Tax rates.................................................................................... 7.2
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 4.4
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 2.5
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Tanzania
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 3.6 ..........106

Organized crime ..................................................... 4.8 ............93
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 3.2 ............94
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 3.1 ............94
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Uganda
GDP (US$ billions)* ...............................................17.4
GDP per capita (US$) .........................................504.9
Agriculture ............................................................23.4
Industry ................................................................25.4
Services ...............................................................51.1

2,500
Uganda
Sub-Saharan Africa
2,000
1,500
1,000
500

Score, (01) best ..................................................0.45
0
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 123 ..... 3.5
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ......................................... 121 ...... 3.6

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ......................................... 118 ...... 3.5
Factor
driven

Institutions .................................................................... 102 ...... 3.5
Infrastructure ................................................................ 133 ...... 2.3
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ..................................................................... 85 ...... 3.2
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ....................................................................... 82 ...... 3.0
Uganda

Corruption ............................................................................... 18.4
Inflation .................................................................................... 16.3
Tax rates.................................................................................... 9.6
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 2.6
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 1.1
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Uganda
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 4.1 ............80

Organized crime ..................................................... 4.2 ..........112
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 2.9 ..........110
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Flexibility of wage determination ............................. 6.3 ..............1
Hiring and firing practices ....................................... 5.2 ..............7
Brain drain ............................................................. 3.1 ............97
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Zambia
GDP (US$ billions)* ...............................................19.2
GDP per capita (US$) ......................................1,413.8
Agriculture ............................................................20.7
Industry ................................................................37.7
Services ...............................................................41.5
Score, (01) best ..................................................0.43

2,500
Zambia
Sub-Saharan Africa
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 102 ..... 3.8
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ......................................... 113 ...... 3.7

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ......................................... 115 ...... 3.5
Factor
driven

Institutions ...................................................................... 56 ...... 4.1
Infrastructure ................................................................ 111 ...... 2.9
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ................................................................... 111 ...... 2.7
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ....................................................................... 61 ...... 3.3
Zambia

Corruption ............................................................................... 15.0
Tax rates.................................................................................... 9.5
Inflation ...................................................................................... 3.9
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 3.4
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 2.1
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Zambia
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 4.5 ............58

Organized crime ..................................................... 5.8 ............37
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 3.2 ............96
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

Total tax rate, % profits* ....................................... 14.5 ..............6
7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 3.4 ............69
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

Zimbabwe
GDP (US$ billions)* .................................................9.5
GDP per capita (US$) .........................................752.1
Agriculture ............................................................12.8
Industry ................................................................22.9
Services ...............................................................64.3

2,500
Zimbabwe
Sub-Saharan Africa
2,000
1,500
1,000
500

Score, (01) best ..................................................0.38
0
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
Rank
(out of 144)
Score
(17)
GCI 20122013 ................................................ 132 ..... 3.3
Transition
12
GCI 20112012 (out of 142) ......................................... 132 ...... 3.3

GCI 20102011 (out of 139) ......................................... 136 ...... 3.0
Factor
driven

Institutions .................................................................... 101 ...... 3.5
Infrastructure ................................................................ 128 ...... 2.4
Efficiency
driven
Innovation
driven
Institutions
7
Innovation
Infrastructure
6
5
Business
sophistication

Market size ................................................................... 135 ...... 1.9
Transition
23
Macroeconomic
environment
4
3
2
1
Market size
Health and
primary
education
Higher education
and training
Technological
readiness
Goods market
efficiency
Financial market
development

Innovation ..................................................................... 127 ...... 2.6
Zimbabwe

Corruption ................................................................................. 7.6
Tax rates.................................................................................... 2.6
Crime and theft ......................................................................... 0.5
Tax regulations .......................................................................... 0.5
Inflation ...................................................................................... 0.0
0
10
15
20
Note:
25
30
Zimbabwe
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
INDICATOR
VALUE RANK/144
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Property rights ....................................................... 2.6 ..........137

Organized crime ..................................................... 5.8 ............36
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09

Quality of roads ...................................................... 3.2 ............95
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05

Gross national savings, % GDP* .........................-10.0 ..........142
Country credit rating, 0100 (best)* ........................ 5.3 ..........142
4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10

5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08

6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16

7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08

Brain drain ............................................................. 3.0 ..........103
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08

9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07



11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09

12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07

About the Authors
Jennifer Blanke
Jennifer Blanke is Chief Economist and Head of the Global
Competitiveness and Benchmarking Network team at the
World Economic Forum. Since joining the team in 2002,
she has written and lectured extensively on issues related
to national competitiveness and has edited a number of
competitiveness reports, with a particular regional focus
on Western Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. From 1998
to 2002, she was Senior Programme Manager responsible
for developing the business, management, and technology
sections of the World Economic Forums Annual Meeting
in Davos. Before joining the Forum, Dr Blanke worked
for a number of years as a management consultant for
Eurogroup, Mazars Group in Paris, France, where she
specialized in banking and financial market organizations.
Dr Blanke obtained a Master of International Affairs from
Columbia University (United States) and an MA and a PhD
in International Economics from the Graduate Institute of
International Studies (Geneva).
Margareta Drzeniek Hanouz
Margareta Drzeniek Hanouz is Lead Economist and Head of
Competitiveness Research with the Global Competitiveness
and Benchmarking Network at the World Economic
Forum, where she researches and writes on issues of
national competitiveness, especially those related to the
Arab world, Eastern Europe, and international trade. She
is lead author or editor of a number of regional and topical
reports and papers, including The Global Enabling Trade
Report. Previously she oversaw the economic modeling for
some of the Forums scenario projects and was charged
with developing the economics section of the program for
the World Economic Forums Annual Meeting in Davos.
Before joining the Forum, Dr Drzeniek Hanouz worked for
several years with the International Trade Centre in Geneva,
where she was in charge of relations with Central and
Eastern European countries. Dr Drzeniek Hanouz received
a Diploma in Economics from the University of Mnster and
holds a PhD in International Economics from the University
of Bochum, both in Germany.
Caroline Ko
Caroline Ko is a Junior Economist with the Global
Competitiveness and Benchmarking Network at the
World Economic Forum. Her responsibilities include the
computation of various indexes, and she researches and
writes for numerous projects and studies. She is coauthor of The Europe 2020 Competitiveness Report and
the Rebuilding Europes Competitiveness Report, and has
been involved in conceptualizing the B20 employment
recommendations. More recently, she has taken the project
lead on The Africa Competitiveness Report. Prior to joining
the Forum, she worked for an economic policy consultancy
in the United Kingdom, where she analyzed economic
and financial policies in Central and Eastern Europe
and Central Asia. She also worked for the DirectorateGeneral for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European
Commission, where she assessed financial development
in the 2004 accession Member States. She holds an
undergraduate degree in Economics from the University of
Groningen and an MSc in Economics and Finance from the
University of Tilburg, both in the Netherlands.
Marjo Koivisto
Marjo Koivisto is a Political Economist at the World
Banks Africa Regions Finance and Private Sector
Development department. She has worked on privatesector development, competition, and innovation policy in
countries in the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. Prior to
joining the World Bank, Dr Koivisto was Assistant Professor
in International Relations at University of Exeter (United
Kingdom), a post-doctoral scholar at Harvard University
(United States), and was awarded her PhD from the London
School of Economics (United Kingdom).
Jennifer Mbabazi Moyo
Jennifer Mbabazi Moyo is Senior Research Economist
in the Development Research Department of the African
Development Bank, having joined the Bank in March 2012
as part of the Additionality and Development Outcomes
(ADOA) team. She has more than 10 years of experience as
an Economist, having previously worked at the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) in Washington, DC, in the Monetary
and Capital Markets Department and the Middle East
and Central Asia Department. More recently, she has
undertaken consultancy assignments on financial markets,
training and other capacity-building issues for the IMF, the
African Development Bank, and Deutsche Gesellschaft fr
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ, formerly GTZ). She has
also taught at Makerere University in Uganda. She holds a
PhD in Economics from the University of Nottingham in the
United Kingdom. Her research interests include financial
market issues, trade, poverty, income inequality, and
growth, areas in which she has published widely.
About the Authors
Peter Ondiege
Peter Ondiege is Chief Research Economist at the
Development Research Department (EDRE) of the African
Development Bank. He holds Master and PhD degrees
in Economics from the University of Tsukuba, Japan. He
coordinates the Investment Climate Assessment and Africa
Competitiveness Reports jointly undertaken with the World
Bank and World Economic Forum. He was in the Planning
and Budgeting Department of the African Development
Bank, where he served as the Annual Report Coordinator
from 2004 to 2007. Prior to joining the Bank in 2004, he
was an Associate Professor and a Director of the Housing
and Building Research Institute at the University of Nairobi,
Kenya; he also held a position at the Ministry of Planning
and National Development in Kenya. He has conducted
and led a number of study teams, mainly in the areas
of macroeconomic and sectoral reforms and enterprise
development, especially in the small- and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) sector. Dr Ondiege has published widely
in the field of urban and regional economics and the private
sector, focusing on SME development. He has also worked
as a consultant to a number of regional and international
organizations and agencies.
John Speakman
John Speakman leads the World Banks Africa Competitive
Industries and Public-Private Partnership practices. He has
worked at the World Bank for 17 years, serving in most of
the Banks regions on various private-sector development
activities. He has worked on a broad range of countries,
ranging from resource-rich economies to fragile states.
Prior to joining the World Bank, he was a Partner in Deloitte
New Zealand, where he worked on private-sector aspects
of international development. He is qualified in Law,
Accounting, and Economics.
Audrey Verdier-Chouchane
Audrey Verdier-Chouchane is Chief Research Economist
in the Research Division of the Development Research
Department of the African Development Bank. Prior to
joining the Bank in 2004, Dr Verdier-Chouchane taught
Macroeconomics and Development Economics at the
University of Nice, France, where she obtained a PhD
in Economics and a Master in Macro-dynamics and
International Finance. Apart from her previous publications
on financial development and growth, her research
interest includes the analysis and measurement of
poverty and inequalities in Africa. She has coordinated
and contributed to many flagship publications within the
African Development Bank, such as the African Economic
Outlook, the African Development Report, and The
Africa Competitiveness Report in collaboration with sister
institutions.
The publication of this years Africa Competitiveness Report comes at a time of growing international
attention on Africa as an investment destination and increasing talk of an African economic
renaissance. This greater optimism is being spurred on by a decade of strong growth, with many
countries relatively unscathed by the global economic crisis. However, growth remains unevenly
spread across the region, and its relatively short time period has not yet led to a convergence in living
standards with those observed in other rapidly growing developing regions. Indeed, Africa is at a
crossroads, and decisions and actions today will have a strong bearing on whether it places itself on
a path similar to that of other regions such as developing Asia, allowing it to transition from resourcedriven to higher-value-added growth. Regional integration in this context can play a critical role going
forward, offering a yet-untapped potential to get closer to this goal.
The aim of this Report is to provide a better understanding of the benefits of regional integration for
higher-value-added growth and to discuss current constraints as well as the policy environment
required to develop the necessary infrastructure for connecting Africas markets in a sustainable way.
Much has been done in recent years to improve the business environment in Africa. Continued policy
and institutional reforms are central to ensuring that African countries remain on a higher growth
trajectory. This years Report places a particular focus on connecting Africas markets in a sustainable
way by fostering trade facilitation, upgrading infrastructure in a way that strengthens backward and
forward linkages from such projects, and piloting growth pole projectsmulti-sector and multi-year
investments with the aim of accelerating export industries and supporting infrastructure around
particular natural resources or agglomeration economies.
This is the fourth Report on the regions business environment to leverage the knowledge and
expertise within the African Development Bank, the World Bank, and the World Economic Forum.
It presents a unified vision that maps out the policy challenges that must be met to boost Africas
competitiveness by connecting Africas markets through increased regional integration.
Also included are detailed competitiveness profiles for 38 African countries, providing a comprehensive
summary of their competitive strengths and weaknesses. The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013 is
an invaluable tool for policymakers, business strategists, and other key stakeholders, as well as
essential reading for all those with an interest in the region.
World Economic Forum

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CH-1223 Cologny/Geneva
Switzerland
Tel +41 (0) 22 869 1212
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www.weforum.org

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Africa

@ 2013 World Economic Forum

The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013 is the result of

AT THE WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM

AT THE WORLD BANK

Professor Klaus Schwab

Jim Yong Kim

AT THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF DENMARK

Christian Friis Bach

We thank Hope Steele for her superb editing work and

Jennifer Mbabazi Moyo

@ 2013 World Economic Forum

Part 3: Competitiveness Profiles

by Donald Kaberuka (African Development Bank

How to Read the Competitiveness Profiles....................................109

Group), Christian Friis Bach (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

Denmark), Klaus Schwab (World Economic Forum), Jim

Yong Kim (World Bank Group)

About the Authors

Part 1: Assessing Africas Competitiveness

1.1: Assessing Africas Competitiveness

by Jennifer Blanke and Caroline Ko (World

Part 2: Connecting Africas Markets in

2.1: Enabling African Trade: Findings from

by Margareta Drzeniek Hanouz and Caroline Ko

2.2: Developing Africas Infrastructure

by Peter Ondiege, Jennifer Mbabazi Moyo, and

2.3: Growth Poles: Raising Competitiveness

by John Speakman and Marjo Koivisto (World Bank)

@ 2013 World Economic Forum

The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013 | iii

@ 2013 World Economic Forum

The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013, the fourth

regional integration within the continent, and to ensure

@ 2013 World Economic Forum

The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013 | v

@ 2013 World Economic Forum

The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013 was prepared

@ 2013 World Economic Forum

The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013 | vii

@ 2013 World Economic Forum

The World Economic Forums Global Competitiveness

@ 2013 World Economic Forum

The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013 | ix

x | The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013

@ 2013 World Economic Forum

The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013 comes out

critical for developing competitiveness in Africa, this

@ 2013 World Economic Forum

The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013 | xi

Box 1: Data used in this Report

in many areas in order to set itself on a sustainable

xii | The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013

a Business, Dealing with Construction Permits, Registering

half of the rankings at 52nd, while Burundi is the lowest

@ 2013 World Economic Forum

many of the same competitiveness challenges as their

Box 2: The African Development Bank:

raises the cost of trading, particularly for landlocked