De la Cruz vs.

Paras Facts: RA 938, An Act Granting Municipal or City Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishment, Maintenance and Operation of Certain Places of Amusement Within Their Respective Territorial Jurisdictions, was enacted. De la Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. Bocaue issued Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance, referring particularly to cabarets and night clubs operated petitioners inter alia. Petitioners assailed the latter's constitutionality, as supposedly violative of their right to engage in a lawful business, asserting too that the hospitality girls they employ are healthy and do not go out with customers. Judge Paras of the Court of First Instance lifted the TRO he had earlier issued against the ordinance, ruling that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. Issue: WON Ordinance 84 is pursuant to RA 938 and therefore constitutional. Held/Ratio: NO. Had the ordinance merely sought to regulate and not prohibit the operation of cabarets and nightclubs, it would have been a valid exercise of police power. The general welfare clause of the Local Government Code, as well as related provisions thereof, all point toward the conclusion that municipal corporations can only regulate, and not prohibit, the operation of said establishments. The court emphasized that there must be reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. Ordering the closure of petitioners' establishments on can hardly be said to be reasonable, considering that the objective of fostering public morals is attainable by a more narrowly focused measure.

Technology Developers Inc. vs. Court of Appeals Facts: TDI received a stop-operation letter from acting mayor Cruz, of Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Said letter ordered the plant manager Manese to bring to the mayor's office, among other things, a mayor's permit and a Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit. Said plant only had a temporary operation permit from the National Pollution Control Center (now the Environmental Management Bureau), however. They also did not have a mayor's permit, and when

they went to the mayor's office to secure one, they were not entertained. Further on, without reasonable notice, the mayor ordered the plant to be padlocked. Petitioner filed certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with the RTC, with the judge granting preliminary mandatory injunction which was, however, overturned on MR by the private respondent. In the CA, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was raised by petitioner, which was denied for lack of merit, and so subsequently the MR they raised. Issue: WON the acting mayor acted properly in the closure of the plant. Held/Ratio: YES. Among the duties of the mayor was to ensure the health and safety of his constituents, which the court in this case ruled that the mayor was acting in favor of when he ordered the summary closure of the plant. It is, after all, the mayor who can grant or deny the operation of said business, so it should also be on him to close or order the cessation of operation of that business if he deems it to be injurious to the community. The mayor did not act without basis: the residents living around the area where the plant is were the ones who complained about the ill-effects of the emissions from the plant. Their account was corroborated by an investigation conducted which stated that because the plant did not have an appropriate air filter, all of the particulate matter went directly into the households.

Chua Huat vs. Court of Appeals Facts: Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., requested the City Engineer and Building Official of Manila, to condemn the dilapidated structures located at 1271 to 1277 Pedro Gil St. and 1553 to 1557 Paz St., Paco, Manila occupied by petitioners. Notices of condemnation were issued, condemnation being subject to confirmation of the mayor as under Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila. Architect Andres made the inspection reports, and the memorandum-reports made by the Evaluation Committee of the Office of the City Engineer all showed that the buildings suffer from structural deterioration by more than 50% and as much as 80%. Petitioners hired civil engineer Molas, a private practitioner, to inspect their building, and in his report, he said that the buildings have a good eight years remaining despite their age, said report being the basis of the petitioners' formal protest three months after notice. On April 26, 1983, petitioner Gamboa was informed of the issuance of a demolition order by the city engineer as regards the building at 1565 Paz St., and was told to vacate the premises

within 15 days from notice. Petitioners then filed for prohibition, with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order directly with the Supreme Court, against Mayor Bagatsing, the city engineer and Building Officer del Rosario, and Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc. They alleged a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The mayor confirmed the rest of the condemnation orders issued by the respondent City Engineer. The mayor and city engineer contend that the petition should be dismissed because: a) that it involves questions of facts and should therefore be discussed by the RTC; b) the condemned buildings posed a danger to the public; c) Sections 275 and 276 of its Compilation of Ordinances (also Revised Ordinances 1600) vests the city engineer with authority to order demolitions; d) condemnation and demolition of buildings is an exercise of the police power to promote public safety; and e) barring grave abuse of discretion, the courts cannot set aside a valid exercise of executive authority. Issue: WON there was a grave abuse of discretion by the city officials in this case. Held/Ratio: NO. The provisions mentioned by the mayor and the city engineer, along with Sec. 215 of PD 1096 (the Building Code) clearly empower the city officials to perform the acts they did so perform in this case. Furthermore, the petitioners could have appealed, as it was clearly provided for in PD 1096 that the occupants of a condemned building had fifteen days to appeal to the Secretary of Public Works, which the petitioners did not avail of in this case. The city officials were well within their rights, in the exercise of police power, to order the condemnation and demolition of structures deemed to be harmful nuisances to the public at large.

Binay vs. Domingo Facts: Resolution 60 was issued to confirm the burial assistance program initiated by the mayors office. Under the program, bereaved families with gross family income of Php2,000/month or less receives a Php500 cash relief from unappropriated available funds of the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution 60. The municipal secretary then certified a disbursement of Php400,000 for the implementation of the Burial Assistance Program. Said resolution went to the Commission on Audit for its expected allowance. But the COA disapproved the resolution and disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds for its implementation. COA Decision No. 1159 stayed the program, even after Resolution 243 was passed affirming it.

Issue: WON the resolution was a valid exercise of police power. Held/Ratio: YES. Briefly stated, the police power of a municipal corporation is based on two factors. First, the police power exercised by the municipal corporation must be pursuant to a valid delegation by the legislature of said power, whether express or implied. Second, under the general welfare clause, the exercise of said police power must be, succinctly, for the purpose of promoting general welfare among the population. It cannot be denied that the resolution in this case is a valid one, and that the COA seems to be trying to redefine the scope of police power. COA's contention that the scope of the program's application is limited and so therefore it does not fulfill the requirement of "general" welfare is mistaken. Equal protection has not been violated, since classification is valid if, inter alia, the members of the class are treated the same way. Further, there is a constitutional mandate to promote the welfare of the underprivileged. And so the Burial Assistance Program, while it certainly caters only to the class of those bereaved, at least all in the class similarly, and pursuant to the constitutional mandate to take care of those in need.

Tatel vs. Municipality of Virac Facts: Petitioner Tatel owns a warehouse in Barrio Sta. Elena, Virac. The operation of the abaca bailing machine inside the warehouse prompted some complaints. Upon a committee investigation, issues were raised regarding the possible fire hazard presented by the warehouse. Resolution No. 29 was passed by the municipal council declaring the warehouse a public nuisance under Art. 694 NCC. Private respondents contend that the petitioners warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional. Issue: WON Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void.

Held/Ratio: NO. The court having ruled that the storage of abaca and copra in said warehouse, a clear fire hazard, in the vicinity of a residential neighborhood, is a nuisance, it cannot therefore be contended that it does not fall under the purview of the resolution. The said resolution, also, is a valid exercise of police power, fulfilling the requirements of the same, to wit: it 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be unfair or oppressive, 3) must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade, 5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable. The ordinance was designed to avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire. Such prevention of danger is one of the primordial obligations of government.

Tamin vs. Court of Appeals Facts: Dumingag filed for ejectment of Medina and Rosellon. Municipality supposedly owned a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur, was reserved for public plaza under PP 365, and that the late mayor Real, Sr. leased an area of 1,350 square meters to respondents subject to them vacating the place in case of public need. Defendants did not, even upon the designation of a gymnasium to be built thereon said land. Judge Tamin issued an order setting the preliminary hearing for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of possession. Respondents filed motion to dismiss alleging the lack of jurisdiction, as the case is supposedly one of illegal detainer and properly sited with the municipal court. Tamin denied the motion. It also granted the municipality's motion for a writ of possession. According to Tamin, it is an accion de reivindicacion, a real action within his jurisdiction. Tamin justified the writ of possession with ancillary writ of demolition by applying the rule on eminent domain in analogy in that under said rule, the complainant is given the right to the writ of possession so that public construction and projects will not be delayed. Respondents filed an omnibus MR with motion to set aside order and to quash writ of possession and demolition but this was denied. The municipality implemented the writ of possession and ancillary writ of demolition issued by the petitioner Judge resulting in the dispossession of the private respondents from the parcel of land and the demolition of structures and buildings thereon owned by the respondents. The CA ruled that the RTC was wrong when it applied by analogy the rule on eminent domain to justify the issuance of the writ of possession and writ of demolition. The appellate court pointed out that under this rule: (i) There is clear statutory authority for the taking of possession by the government and (ii) The authority is premised on the government depositing the value of the land to be taken. In the case at bar, there is neither statutory authority for the trial court's action nor bond

given to compensate the petitioners for the deprivation of their possession and the destruction of their houses if it turns out that the land belongs to them. Issue: WON the municipality is entitled to a writ of possession and demolition. Held/Ratio: NO. This is for the reason that, despite the ruling of the Supreme Court that under the definition of a public nuisance in the NCC, petitioners definitely fall under the same, the municipality did not avail of the summary abatement of said nuisance available to it as a legal recourse, but instead instituted an accion reivindicatoria. Thus, the municipality is now constrained to wait for the result of the determination of whether the land is indeed set aside for public use, and additionally to provide a bond to the respondents.

Patalinhug vs. Court of Appeals Facts: On November 17, 1982, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 363, otherwise known as the Expanded Zoning Ordinance of Davao City, Sec.8 of which states: A C-2 District shall be dominantly for commercial and compatible industrial uses as provided hereunder: xxx 3.1. Funeral Parlors/Memorial Homes with adequate off street parking space and provided that they shall be established not less than 50 meters from any residential structures, churches and other institutional buildings. Petitioner constructed the Metropolitan Funeral Parlor at Cabaguio Avenue, Agdao, Davao City. On the complaint of residents of Brgy. Agdao that the construction of petitioners funeral parlor violated the aforementioned provision of Ordinance No. 363, vis-a-vis an Iglesia ni Kristo chapel and residential structures, the Sangguniang Panlungsod investigated, finding that the residence of Mr. Tepoot was only five inches to the south. Notwithstanding said finding, petitioner continued with the construction of his funeral parlor until it was finished on November 3, 1987. Issues: WON the funeral house was permissible under the city ordinances. Held/Ratio:

YES. The INC chapel was found to be more than 50 meters away. The trial court ruled that Tepoot's building was commercial because of the attached laundry business, though the appellate court found otherwise. The Supreme Court decided to side with the trial court. Though Tepoots building was declared for tax purposes as residential, since the area has been zoned commercial by city ordinance, the zoning must prevail. Declaring a commercial zone through a municipal ordinance is an exercise of police power with general welfare of the people in mind.

Greater Balanga Development Corporation vs. Municipality of Balanga Facts: A parcel of land in Barrio San Jose, Municipality of Balanga, Bataan is registered in the name of petitioner, a domestic corporation owned and controlled by the Camacho family, which donated to the Municipality of Balanga the present site of the Balanga Public Market. In 1987, GBDC conducted a relocation survey and found certain portions of the property had been invaded by shanties and market stalls, with the municipality charging market fees and market entrance fees from the occupants and users of the area. GBDC then applied with the Office of the Mayor of Balanga for a business permit to engage in business in the area. Mayor Banzon, Jr. issued Mayor's Permit No. 2729, granting petitioner the privilege of a "real estate dealer/privately-owned public market operator" under the trade name of Balanga Public Market on the same day. However, the Sangguniang Bayan of Balanga passed Resolution No. 12, s-88 annulling the Mayor's permit issued to petitioner. Thereafter, Mayor Banzon issued Executive Order No. 1, s-88 revoking the permit insofar as it authorized the operation of a public market. GBDC filed the instant petition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction or restraining order aimed at the reinstatement of the Mayor's permit and the curtailment of the municipality's collection of market fees and market entrance fees. The Court did not issue the preliminary reliefs. Issue: WON the mayor properly revoked the permit granted to GBDC. Held/Ratio: NO. There are two reasons for this. First, though the Sangguniang Bayan had the police power to regulate business and in the course of which revoke issued licenses, the reason they gave for doing so in this case ("anxiety, uncertainty, restiveness" among the stallholders and traders) did not constitute a valid ground for said revocation. Second,

the revocation by the mayor was tainted by a lack of due process, in that the alleged violation of Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code was not stated in the order of revocation, and neither was petitioner informed of this specific violation until the Rejoinder was filed in the instant case.

Tano et al vs. Socrates Facts: Petitioners in this case contend that the following ordinances: 1) Ordinance No. 15-92: "AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVEFISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1,1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF" 2) Office Order No. 23, requiring any person engaged or intending to engage in any business, trade, occupation, calling or profession or having in his possession any of the articles for which a permit is required to be had, to obtain first a Mayors and authorizing and directing to check or conduct necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from Puerto Princesa. 3) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2 entitled: "A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINECORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS" deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution. They complain that the mayor had absolute authority to determine permit issuance. They also claim that it took away their right to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as the Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering "into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion". Public respondents, governor Socrates and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause; they also contend that there was no violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Issue:

WON said ordinances are unconstitutional. Held/Ratio: NO. It is clear to the Court that both ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: first, to establish a "closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years; and second, to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities. Both, in the Court's view, justifies the ordinances as valid exercises of police power under the general welfare principle, specifically with regard to balanced ecology.

White Light Corporation et al vs. City of Manila Facts: Mayor Lim signed into law an ordinance entitled An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-time Admission, Short-time Admission Rates, and Wash-up Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila. The Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9 and prayed that the Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional. Petitioners White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation and Sta. Mesa Tourist Development Corporation filed a motion to intervene, which was granted by the RTC, also granting MTDC's subsequent motion to withdraw as plaintiff. RTC issued a TRO from enforcing the ordinance, then rendered the Ordinance null and void. The city filed for certiorari with the SC, but was remanded to the CA, which overturned the RTC decision and affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance. Issue: WON the ordinance is constitutional.

Held/Ratio: NO. The Court applied the rational basis test of substantive due process in order to determine whether or not the ordinance is constitutional, and said ordinance was later found to be wanting. The reason for the failure of the ordinance is that, in prohibiting the application of wash rates, the city effectively limits the right of everyone else to avail

of said rooms at said rates for valid reasons not already illegal. In fact, evidently, the behavior sought to be curtailed by the ordinance is already illegal, and the citizens are better served when the city applies already existing law more rigorously than when it enacts an ordinance that would also curtail the legitimate right to business of the motels and the legitimate right to enjoyment of said business of its clientele. Therefore, since the ordinance is so sweeping and constricting an act aimed at so narrow an object, it must be struck down as unconstitutional.