Georgia Supreme Court Reinstates State Abortion Law While Appeal Is Heard

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SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

Case No. S25M0216

October 7, 2024

The Honorable Supreme Court met pursuant to adjournment.

The following order was passed:

STATE OF GEORGIA v. SISTERSONG WOMEN OF COLOR


REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE COLLECTIVE et al.

The State of Georgia’s Emergency Petition for Supersedeas


seeking a stay of the order of the Superior Court of Fulton County
in the above-styled action is hereby GRANTED with respect to
OCGA § 16-12-141, except as to OCGA § 16-12-141 (f).

The State of Georgia’s Emergency Petition for Supersedeas


seeking a stay of the order of the Superior Court of Fulton County
in the above-styled action is hereby GRANTED with respect to
OCGA § 31-9B-3 (a).

To the extent the State also seeks an “administrative stay,”


that motion is dismissed as moot.

This order shall take effect as of 5:00 p.m. on October 7, 2024.

All the Justices concur, except Ellington, J., who concurs in part
and dissents in part. Peterson, P.J., disqualified, and Pinson, J., not
participating.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA
Clerk’s Office, Atlanta

I certify that the above is a true extract from the


minutes of the Supreme Court of Georgia.
Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto
affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk
ELLINGTON, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

The trial court in this case exercised its jurisdiction under Title

9 of the Georgia Code to issue a judgment declaring that Section 4

of the “LIFE Act,” 2019 Ga. Laws Act 234 (H.B. 481), which amended

OCGA § 16-12-141, is unconstitutional (and that Section 11, which

amended OCGA § 31-9B-3 fails without Section 4). See OCGA § 9-4-

1 et seq. And the trial court exercised its jurisdiction to award to the

petitioners such relief as the pleadings and evidence showed them

to be entitled, specifically, an injunction prohibiting enforcement of

those unconstitutional laws by the State or any of its agents. See

OCGA § 9-4-3; James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. State, 263 Ga. 609,

613 (5) (437 SE2d 782) (1993) (“[A] petition may be filed seeking a

judgment declaring a statute or ordinance unconstitutional and

praying for an injunction against the enforcement of the questioned

law.”).

The State has filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s

judgment, as it is entitled to do, and, as provided by law, the trial

court will transmit the necessary parts of the record, and the appeal

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will be docketed in this Court. In the normal course, we will be

deciding the merits of the State’s claims of error after briefing, oral

argument, and due deliberation under our Constitution, the

Appellate Practice Act, and other applicable legal authority – and

relatively expeditiously, given the constraints of Georgia’s two-term

rule. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IX, Par. II (“The Supreme

Court and the Court of Appeals shall dispose of every case at the

term for which it is entered on the court's docket for hearing or at

the next term.”); OCGA § 15-2-4 (b) (terms of court of the Supreme

Court of Georgia). To the extent the State prevails on appeal, all or

parts of the trial court’s judgment may be reversed, and the

injunction may be lifted.

The State’s emergency petition for supersedeas seeks to have

the injunction issued by the trial court lifted immediately.

Generally, the filing of a notice of appeal in an injunction case does

not serve as a supersedeas. See OCGA § 9-11-62 (a); Brown v. Spann,

271 Ga. 495, 495 (520 SE2d 909) (1999). In the case of an order

granting an injunction, the General Assembly has provided that

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such orders “shall not be stayed during the period after its entry and

until an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal” unless

“otherwise ordered by the [trial] court,” which, “in its discretion may

suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the pendency

of the appeal upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as it considers

proper for the security of the rights of the adverse party.” OCGA §

9-11-62 (a), (c). See Green Bull Georgia Partners, LLC v. Register,

301 Ga. 472, 473 (801 SE2d 843) (2017) (“Although the appellate

courts also have the authority to grant a stay or injunction pending

appeal, an application for such relief ordinarily ought to be directed

in the first instance to the trial court.”).

It makes sense that the General Assembly committed this

discretion to the trial court in the first instance, since such an order

granting an injunction with immediate effect on its face represents

a determination, after weighing evidence regarding the parties’

competing interests and claims of impending harm, that the

enjoined action (in this case, enforcement of specific statutory

provisions) should not occur unless and until the injunction is

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subsequently modified or lifted. In its emergency motion, the State

concluded its argument with, “[a]s in ‘most cases,’ a stay pending

resolution of this appeal is appropriate[,]” citing Green Bull, 301 Ga.

at 475. The State conveniently ignores the fact that Green Bull

concerned an appeal from a trial court order granting an injunction

pending appeal under OCGA § 9-11-62, the procedure the State

seeks to sidestep here. Contrary to the State’s position, our decision

in Green Bull actually highlights the importance of the trial court’s

discretion in this arena: in that case, the trial court initially and

provisionally determined that an interlocutory injunction pending

final judgment from a pending foreclosure might be appropriate;

after further proceedings, the trial court decided that an injunction

was not appropriate; and the trial court then determined under

OCGA § 9-11-62 that “the case [was] close enough to warrant an

injunction pending appeal[.]” Id. Nothing in the trial court’s order in

this case suggests a view that it was a close call whether to grant

the plaintiffs’ requested relief.

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In its motion, the State fails to show any reason for urgency

that goes beyond their underlying arguments in favor of allowing

the State to prevent women from deciding whether to terminate a

pregnancy after embryonic cardiac activity can be detected and

before a fetus is viable. The fact that the plaintiffs faced a heavy

burden in establishing that Section 4 violates the Georgia

Constitution is no sound reason to grant the State’s motion for a

stay, given that the only court of competent jurisdiction to issue a

ruling on this issue thus far determined that the plaintiffs have

carried that burden. The parties’ competing arguments about the

harm flowing from either the enforcement or the non-enforcement of

the statutory provisions at issue will form the crux of the appeal to

come and should not be predetermined in the State’s favor before

the appeal is even docketed.

Cautious of usurping the authority of the General Assembly to

establish trial court and appellate procedure, including provisions

regarding when a notice of appeal acts as supersedeas (see OCGA §§

5-6-45; 5-6-46; 9-11-62), we routinely deny requests for supersedeas

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that is otherwise prohibited by law, just as we tend to affirm trial

court rulings regarding injunctions pending appeal, as we did in

Green Bull. We should deny the State’s request now. The injunction

at issue here concerns much more than a discrete legal dispute

between particular parties. Fundamentally, the State should not be

in the business of enforcing laws that have been determined to

violate fundamental rights guaranteed to millions of individuals

under the Georgia Constitution. The “status quo” that should be

maintained is the state of the law before the challenged laws took

effect. Accordingly, I dissent from the instant order, in part, to the

extent it grants a stay of the injunction against enforcement of

OCGA § 16-12-141, as amended by Section 4 of the 2019 LIFE Act,

and of OCGA § 31-9B-3 (a), as amended by Section 11 of the Act,

except that I concur to the extent the order declines to stay

enforcement of OCGA § 16-12-141 (f), as amended by Section 4 of the

Act.

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