Société Générale - The Anatomy of A Fraud
Société Générale - The Anatomy of A Fraud
Société Générale - The Anatomy of A Fraud
My first similar experience goes back to 2005. I took a stand on Allianz stock, making the bet that the market would drop. It just so happened that shortly after, the market dropped following the London attacks, and there it was, a 500,000 jackpot. I then came up with the idea of a deal to cover my position. I had mixed feelings about this, because I was proud of the result and altogether surprised.
It generates the desire to continue, there is a snowball effect he confessed to the police. He continued with these strategies, his superiors appearing not to observe it. Kerviel declared that he operated the transactions because he wanted his reputation as a trader to improve, not because he wanted to cause the bank damage. Above all, I wanted to earn money for my bank. He admitted to concealing his actions from the superiors but he made it clear that other employees trespass the bank set of rules as well. Kerviel decides to continue his gambling streak, covering it up with fake deals. In January 2007, I reduce the DAX [the German stock market index] position because I stat to think that the Asian market is changing and if this confirms I could lose my position, if the market raises In February the Asian market suffers a small fall and I reduce my position. At the end of February I no million Euros I am more than pride and satisfied. He bets on the U.S sub-prime mortgage crisis, in March-July he loses because the markets are still rising. Nevertheless, as of July, the American market starts to collapse and he wins 500 million euros. Once obtaining such a result he can not stop. In November he managed to win even 600.000 per day. In December he wins 1, 4 billion Euros and doesnt declare it to the bank. Hence he announces his supervisors that he won only 55 million euros, which brings him a 300.000 euro bonus. The supervisors are surprised by the sum earned by Kerviel and question how he could raise such an amount. I provided fake receipts, I faked e-mails using the internal mailing system, everything I had to do to modify the contents confesses Kerviel. Not being careful enough, after the 2007 holidays, he finds himself in the midst of an internal control, initiated by the management. The control had been organized because, as Kerviel himself says, he didnt respect one simple rule: A trader who doesn't take any days off is a trader who doesn't want to leave his book to another. The control lead to a great outrage inside Socit Gnrale, but outside of it as well. According to Kerviel, his supervisors were aware of his operations to dissimulate the transactions, which he qualifies as a habit inside the bank. My supervisors were turning a blind eye. As Jrme Kerviel puts it, he dissimulated the operations with the implicit knowledge of the management. I admit taking very high positions which can be qualified as exceeding my mandate, and covering them up with a fictitious operation, he admits, but I can not believe that my supervisors werent aware of the sums I was operating with, it is impossible to obtain such large profits with small amounts. This confirms further more my conviction that as long as I was generating cash the supervisors were keeping quiet about the modus operandi and the sums involved he declared to the police.
institution concerning risk management and financial engineering. It is equipped with mandatory control systems, multiple and redundant, so that nothing gets past them. But these systems are provided with information by the traders, so if Jrme Kerviel introduced false data the system couldnt help but believe him. This was possible because, for a number of years, before he became a trader, Jrme Kerviel used to work in transaction monitoring and he knew the procedures very well. It is known that, when a working day ends, banks have to calculate the risk value (anticipation of maximum loss) and that Socit Gnrale had a tendency to exaggerate its risks, applying the caution principle. Having this in mind, it is curious why nothing about this case was observed. Making a long story short: Jrme Kerviel was working with a bond portfolio. Mainly, he had the mission to buy shares and sell them at a higher rate. All the traders have a limit fixed by the risk control department that depends on the decisions made by the general director. The limit is fixed according to the experience of each trader. But no trader, not even a senior one is authorized to engage such high risks. It is impossible. Every order he issues is registered by an informational system that sets off an alarm, if the invested amounts are exceeded. This means that the trader found a way to fool the system. For instance, maybe he issued orders in the name of his colleagues. He worked for a long time in the middleoffice, the service in which the orders are registered. This rarely happens. The dealers usually enter the front office directly and dont get a hold of the very complex informational system that registers the orders. He knew when and how to act. In the critical moment when the buyer could alert the bank, he would erase and replace the order with another. The mechanism was almost perfect. It is assumed that he had modified the control system in order to create the impression that he took positions to cover himself, meanwhile he was sending bigger and bigger buying orders. He manipulated the informational system; he used access codes that werent his, everything to camouflage a part of the transactions he was making and to make them seem less risky than they really were. Kerviel accumulated positions of over 50 billion euros, an amount that is outrageous and exorbitant for a bank with an exchange capital of 35, 9 billion euros.
of his supervisors he ends: As long as it doesnt show its all right. If you get caught you are hung.
Red flags
Kerviel sustains that his firs motivation was to earn money for the bank not for himself. Nevertheless the possibility of earning a bonus also motivated him. He admitted declaring the 55 million euros at the end of November in order to negotiate a bonus. He is certain that the superiors were aware of the positions he took because there had been alerts from the banks control system and his colleagues were being questioned. In November 2007, on intra-day successive operations, he went back and forth on the DAX [the German stock market index] and seeing it was juicy, took positions from coworkers' automated machines at the same time and this everyone saw and knew. On that day alone, he made 600,000 euros. Another warning sign was the ratio between the 55 million euros result reported for 2007 and the number of operations Kerviel had processed. In November 2007, Eurex Germany asked Socit Gnrale information for the second time about the operations Jrme Kerviel was processing. He was questioned by the bank and justified all the operations. In January 2008 he exceeded his limit and was sent emails with questions. For validation he forged an email. Why didnt the banks internal risk control system try to stop him? Kerviel thinks that it was in the banks interest as well to let him make money. If anything had been discovered the entire team would have been fired, including his supervisors. In other words, even if he won or lost, it was in the banks interest to turn a blind eye.
The similarities between Jrme Kerviel and Nick Leeson, the trader who caused Barings Bank a
loss of 850 pounds (about 1,3 billion dollars). -they both had remarkable performances which enabled them to act freely, when in fact these performances should have raised suspicions. -they both managed to hide information from the banks. Nick Leeson could dissimulate the information mainly because he was located in Singapore. Jrme Kerviel managed to cover up information too, but this is where the similarity stops. He wasnt geographically isolated, he was in Paris and, in the last 15 years, the transparency of the financial markets has increased considerably and internal controls have become trickier.
Dissimulation techniques
Jrme Kerviel explained to the investigators what the mattress technique was, an illegal procedure used by traders to dissimulate hyper speculative positions. When a manager estimates that the profitloss objectives have been reached, he can decide to report the remaining amounts in the next exercise, dissimulating it through different methods. As long as we earn and it doesn't show too much, as long as it's convenient, no one says anything says Jrme Kerviel, stating that his superiors encouraged risk taking. Describing the hypocrite attitude
The Irony
Only a few hours after the announcement of the historical 7 billion euros loss, Socit Gnrale is named by Risk Magazine Equity Derivatives House of the Year.
Opinions
Nick Leeson: The banking system hasnt learned its lessons from my adventure. It is the exact same story as Barings 1995. The gaps in the system have not been
covered. The banks are only preoccupied with earning money, not with protecting. These risk zones dont hold enough interest. The banking system is as vulnerable as it was in my time. Illegal operations probably happen every day, but the banks dont make them public because it would cause the clients to lose their trust. Even so, I find it extremely hard to believe that such a fraud was possible. Jean-Franois Cop, president of the parliamentary group UPM (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire) states the necessity of bank regulations that forbid the movement of back-office employees to front-office and creating a psychological observation system of the companys personnel. Ion-Marc Valahu, trading chief at Amas bank, Switzerland: Im sorry, but its very hard for me to believe that a trader, on his own, could cause a loss of 4,9 billion euros without anyone noticing. Nicolas Sarkozy, French president (aiming at Daniel Bouton, PDG Socit Gnrale): When something like this happens it cant remain without consequences responsibility-wise. Everyone has to question their own responsibility. I dont like to judge people, especially when they are in difficulty, but we are part of a system in which we are remunerated extremely well and, without any doubt, legitimately, but when something as serious as this turns up, you cant exonerate your responsibility. Franois Chrque, general secretary of CFDT (Confdration Franaise Dmocratique du Travail): I emphasize the fact that the Socit Gnrale employees of the stocks: they are the banks largest stockholder. The 58.000 employees of the French bank will individually lose between 8.000 and 10.000 euros, because if there is no profit, there is no profit participation as well. Christian Noyer, Governor of the Banque de France, declares that such an incident must never happen again and that the processes that have failed will be thoroughly examined and conclusions regarding the dysfunctions of the internal control will be drawn. He pronounces himself for the creation of a Chinese Wall between the traders and the back-office where their actions are controlled and validated. Laurent Fabius, ex prime minister, estimates that the SG incident has an impact similar to the mad cow disease and the toxic cloud of Chernobyl cumulated. PCF (the French Communist Party) representatives estimate that announcing a loss of 7 billion of which 4, 9 billion were lost by a single employee, Socit Gnrale invents the Dreyfuss-trader, hinting to capitan Albert Dreyfuss, accused of espionage and afterwards rehabilitated.
John Rusnak
Another important case of fraud is the one of Allfirst bank. The central character of the fraud was John Rusnak, currency trader. Through a sophisticated scheme spread
over a period of almost five years, he lost 691 million dollars (430 million pounds). As in the Barings case it was discovered through an error in the organizational structure of the treasury department. The illegal activities started in 1997 and their purpose was to cover the losses caused by the purchase of forward yen contracts. Furthermore in 1999, Rusnak made preferential deals with some financial institutions, including Bank of America and Citibank. In January, 2003, John Rusnak was found guilty and sentenced to seven and a half years in prison.
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Clayton, the American corporate and investment banking entity, branch of Crdit Agricole,
(September 2007) The unfortunate investment of an American trader, from Claytons New York branch, causes a gap of 250 million euros. He intervened on the credit markets with abnormally high amounts taking excessive risks, acting without authorization and exceeding the limits established by the bank.