Railway Signalling Principles

Jörn Pachl
Railway Signalling
Principles
Edition 3.0
2 Railway Signalling Principles
Published under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence
Author:
Prof. Dr.-Ing. Jörn Pachl, FIRSE
Professor of railway systems engineering at Technische Universität Braunschweig
Braunschweig, May 2024
Edition 3.0
https://doi.org/10.24355/dbbs.084-202405240811-0
Railway Signalling Principles 3
PREFACE
Railway signalling systems are complex control systems. As a result of the long railway history,
there are a lot of specific national solutions based on different technologies. The key to learn
how signalling systems work is to understand the fundamental control principles these systems
are based on. By definition, the signaling principles are the underlying principles of a signalling-
based safeworking system that are based on the national standards but are independent of
the requirements of a specific railway operating company and of the technology used.
This E-book explains the fundamental principles all railway signalling systems have in com-
mon. It is done in a generic way that does not focus on specific national solutions. The intention
is to provide core knowledge of long-term value that will not be outdated just by the next gen-
eration of technology. The content of this E-book is based on the long-standing experience of
teaching railway operations and signalling at universities and higher vocational training institu-
tions in different parts of the world.
Beside some minor corrections, the 3nd edition provides a revision of the section on the ETCS
to keep track with the latest developments.
Jörn Pachl
CONTENTS
Preface.................................................................................................................................. 3
1 Basic Elements and Terms ................................................................................................. 6
1.1 Controlled Trackside Elements .................................................................................... 6
1.1.1 Movable Track Elements ....................................................................................... 6
1.1.2 Lineside Signals .................................................................................................... 8
1.1.3 Track Clear Detection ............................................................................................ 9
1.2 Basic Operating Terms ...............................................................................................13
2 Spacing Trains ..................................................................................................................19
2.1 Theory of Train Separation .........................................................................................19
2.2 Train Control Principles ...............................................................................................21
2.2.1 Train Control by Lineside Signals .........................................................................21
2.2.2 Train Control by Cab Signalling ............................................................................30
2.3 Block Control Principles ..............................................................................................32
2.3.1 Block Control by verbal Communication ...............................................................33
2.3.2 Block systems for Fixed Block Operation..............................................................34
2.3.3 Block Control in Moving Block Operations ............................................................42
3 Interlocking Principles........................................................................................................43
3.1 Safe Routes through a Point Zone ..............................................................................43
3.1.1 Route Classes ......................................................................................................43
3.1.2 Point locking .........................................................................................................44
3.1.3 Locking and releasing Routes ..............................................................................46
3.1.4 Conflicting Routes ................................................................................................47
3.1.5 Flank Protection ...................................................................................................48
3.1.6 Overlaps ...............................................................................................................51
3.1.7 Intermediate Points...............................................................................................53
3.1.8 Track Clear detection ...........................................................................................53
3.2 Internal Logic of Interlocking Systems .........................................................................54
3.2.1 Tabular Interlocking ..............................................................................................54
3.2.2 Geographical Interlocking .....................................................................................56
3.3 Generations of Interlocking Systems ...........................................................................58
3.4 Handling Interlocking Failures .....................................................................................60
4 Automatic Train Protection ................................................................................................62
4.1 Classification of ATP Systems ....................................................................................62
4.2 European Train Control System (ETCS) .....................................................................63

4.2.1 ETCS and ERTMS ...............................................................................................63
4.2.2 ETCS Levels ........................................................................................................64
4.3 Chinese Train Control System (CTCS) .......................................................................71
4.4 Positive Train Control (PTC) .......................................................................................72
5 Level Crossings .................................................................................................................74
5.1 Level Crossing Protection ...........................................................................................74
5.2 Control and Monitoring of Level Crossings ..................................................................75
5.3 Calculation of the Initiation Section .............................................................................77
References ...........................................................................................................................78
Symbols in Diagrams ...........................................................................................................79
Glossary ...............................................................................................................................80
1 BASIC ELEMENTS AND TERMS
The purpose of signalling systems is to ensure safe movements of trains on a railway infra-
structure by locking movable track elements in a proper position, checking the clearance of
track sections, locking out conflicting moves, and control train movements in a way to keep
them safely apart. This first chapter describes the trackside elements controlled by signalling
systems and explains the basic terms used in the operating procedures for the safe control of
movements with railway vehicles on a railway infrastructure.
1.1 Controlled Trackside Elements
1.1.1 Movable Track Elements
Turnouts
A turnout is an assembly of rails, movable points, and a frog, which effect the tangential branch-
ing of tracks and allows trains or vehicles to run over one track or another (Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1 Components of a turnout
The movability of the points is provided by using point blades made of flexible steel. In older
installations, there are sometimes still turnouts at which the movability of the point blades is
effected by bolted joints. The points may be operated manually or by a point machine. Point
machines are either electric motor drives or electrically controlled pneumatic cylinder drives.
In case of a small angle of divergence, a movable frog (also called ‘swing nose frog’) operated
by an additional point machine could be provided. Movements on a turnout where the points
face approaching traffic are called ‘facing point movements’ whereas movements in which the
frog faces approaching traffic are called ‘trailing point movements’ (Figure 1.2).
The angle of divergence is not stated in degrees but either by its tangent written as a fraction,
e.g., 1 : 12, or by the so-called turnout or frog number, which is the reciprocal of that fraction.
So, a 1 : 12 angle equals a frog number 12. The limit of occupation of the converging tracks is
called ‘the fouling point’. Many railways mark this limit with a trackside fouling point indicator.
Figure 1.2 Movements on points
Note: The term turnout is mostly used in civil engineering. In railway operation and signalling,
a turnout is usually referred to as a pair of points (points in short), although this term in its
original meaning only applies to the part of a turnout where the points are located. This part of
a turnout is also known as a switch. In North American railway operation and signalling, turn-
outs are usually referred to as switches (Armstrong, 2008; Bisset et. al., 2008; White, 2003).
Consequently, the point machine is also called a switch machine.
In British civil engineering terms, points are also often referred to as switches. There, an entire
turnout is called a 'switch and crossing', using the term 'crossing' for the frog part of the turnout.
This differs from the terms in railway operation and signalling, where the term points is always
used instead of switch.
Figure 1.3 Crossings
Figure 1.4 Single and double slips
Crossings
A crossing is an assembly of rails that effects two tracks to cross at grade. Like points, cross-
ings are equipped with fouling point indicators. The inner part of a crossing is called a ‘dia-
mond’. Crossings with a large angle of intersection are designed rigidly. In case of a small
angle of intersection (usually less than 1 : 9), fixed diamond frogs are replaced by movable
points (‘switch diamond’, Figure 1.3).
Small angle crossings may be equipped with additional points providing a slip connection to
permit movements from one track to another. A crossing with a slip connection at one side is
called a ‘single slip’, and a crossing with slip connections at both sides is called a ‘double slip’
(Figures 1.4). In the North American terms, crossings with slip connections are called slip
switches.
Derailers
Derailers (called derails in the North American terms) are trackside devices that are used to
protect train movements against unattended movements of vehicles on converging tracks. An
unsafe movement will be derailed before it could join the protected route. In the protecting
position, a derailing piece is raised over one rail. Like points, derailers can be hand or power
operated. On many railways, derailers must not be installed outside of sidings (see Section
1.2). Instead of derailers, some railways also use trap points, which have quite the same effect.
1.1.2 Lineside Signals
While being gradually replaced by advanced radio-based train control systems, in which trains
are guided by cab signal indications, lineside signals are still the most common technology for
controlling train movements. On railways where train movements are strongly separated from
shunting movements (see Section 1.2), which is the case on most railways outside North Amer-
ica, there are usually also two basic kinds of lineside signals:
Main signals
Main signals authorise a regular train movement to enter a line section. In this tutorial, the term
main signal is used in a generic way for all signals controlling regular train movements, no
matter, whether or not an individual railway would separate these signals from shunting sig-
nals. The movement authority provided by a main signal is limited by the next main signal or a
point specified in the operating rules.
Apart from lines with a low speed, a signal that authorises a train movement requires an ap-
proach aspect at the braking distance in approach to the signal because the stopping distance
is generally greater than the range of vision. The approach aspect is necessary for a safe
braking when approaching a stop signal. On lines where the distance between signals does
not significantly exceed the braking distance, the approach aspect is usually provided by the
signal in rear. On lines with very long distances between main signals, distant signals are
placed at the braking distance in approach to a main signal. A distant signal can only provide
an approach aspect for the signal ahead but it cannot show a stop aspect. Another common
term for a distant signal used in the rulebooks of some railways is warner signal (Chandra &
Agarwal 2008).
On North American lines, there is a general lack of distant signals. On signalled tracks, the
approach indication is always provided by the block signal in rear, regardless of block length.
Distant signals are only used in approach to an interlocking area on a non-signalled track.
Shunting signals
Shunting signals are used to authorise shunting movements and to protect trains against
shunting movements. On most railways, the stop aspect of a main signal also applies for shunt-
ing movements. On tracks where shunting movements may pass main signals, a shunt aspect
is incorporated in the main signal, so that shunting movements may be authorised to pass
main signals in stop position. For shunting signals, an approach aspect is not provided because
shunting movements run at a very low speed that allows the driver to stop short of any vehicle
or obstruction.
On some railways, the stop aspect of shunting signals is absolute, i.e., it indicates stop for all
kinds of movements. Such shunting signals must also be cleared for train movements author-
ised by a main signal. Movements running under authority of a main signal may pass cleared
shunting signals at the speed authorised by the main signal or the timetable. Some railways
use shunting signals with a shunting stop aspect that does not apply to train movements. This
is typical for several East European, Russian, and Chinese railways where a blue light is used
for this purpose. On those railways, movements running under authority of a main signal may
ignore the stop aspects of shunting signals.
On railways that do not use the distinction between main and shunting signals, there is a signal
aspect that authorises a movement to pass a signal cautiously on sight prepared to stop short
of any vehicle or obstruction. That aspect is used both for shunting purposes but also to au-
thorise train movements to enter a section that may be occupied.
Concerning the control principle, there is a distinction between controlled and automatic sig-
nals. Controlled signals are all signals that protect track sections that contain movable track
elements or points where conflicts with movements on conflicting routes may occur. The nor-
mal position of controlled signals is stop. To clear a controlled signal, a route is set in the
control system that will lock all movable track elements in the proper position and lock out all
conflicting moves. The route setting may be initiated by a human operator or an automatic
route setting system. If route setting is automated, the signals are still referred to as controlled
signals.
Automatic signals work automatically by the passage of the train through track sections. They
are forced to stop position by track clear detection devices if the section beyond the signal is
occupied. Automatic signals can only be used to protect track sections that do neither contain
any movable track elements nor points where conflicts with movements on conflicting routes
may occur. Depending on the type of control system, the normal position of automatic signals
may be stop or clear.
1.1.3 Track Clear Detection
The purpose of track clear detection devices is to check that all relevant track sections are
clear of vehicles before a train may be authorised to pass through a route. There are two types
of track clear detection devices: track circuits and axle counters.
Track circuits
A track circuit is an electrical circuit of which the rails of a section form a part. It usually has a
source of current at one end and a detection device at the other. Sections are divided by insu-
lated rail joints (Figure 1.5).
If the section is occupied by a vehicle, the axles produce a short circuit by shunting the two
rails. As a result, the detection device does not receive any current and therefore it detects the
section as occupied. The detection device is often implemented by a track relay, which is in a
picked up position when the section is clear and dropped when the section is occupied. In
modern installations, the relay is often replaced by an electronic detector. Since a track circuit
is based on the closed circuit principle, any interruption of the current will lead to a safe state
by making the section occupied.
The maximum working length of a track circuit is limited by the resistance between the two
rails. Track circuit sections cannot be made much longer than about 2 km. Also, non-shunting
vehicles and situations in which the safe working is limited by rusty or dirty rails require specific
operating procedures.
Figure 1.5 Track circuit
Non-shunting vehicles are vehicles that are not safely detected by track circuits, since they do
not produce a reliable electrical connection between the rails. A range of maintenance and
inspection vehicles fall into this category. Track circuits occupied by non-shunting vehicles
must be protected under staff responsibility by securing protective signals in stop position. If
the rails of a track circuit section are heavily rusted, even regular vehicles will no longer safely
be detected. That is, why most railways established the rule that there must be a minimum
number of movements within a specified period of time to keep the track circuits safe. A typical
rule is one movement per day. If there was no movement within that period, the next move to
enter that section must be made on sight unless the clearance of the section can be checked
by other means. The rails of a track circuit section must also be kept clean, since heavy
dirt may have the same effect as rust.
On electrified lines, the rails are used as a return for the traction current. Therefore, adjacent
track circuits must be electrically connected to allow the traction current to pass the insulated
rail joints. The simplest solution is providing a common rail by single-rail track circuits. To pro-
vide better protection against parasitic currents in case of an accidentally shunted insulated
rail joint, joints are often provided in both rails using cross bonds to connect the track circuits
(Figure 1.6). This way, the return of the traction current changes to the other rail at insulated
rail joints.
On most railways, single-rail track circuits are only used for short track circuits, e.g., within
point zones, but not for track clear detection of longer sections. Track circuits for longer
stretches of track require a better protection against parasitic currents. For this purpose, dou-
ble-rail track circuits are used. The electrical connection for the return of the traction current is
achieved by so-called impedance bonds (Figure 1.7).
Figure 1.6 Single-rail track circuits
Figure 1.7 Impedance bonds
In its most simple form, at both sides of the insulated rail joints, a coil is placed between the
two rails of the track. The coils are connected by a centre connector that divides each coil into
two halves. The traction current enters the coil from each rail, and leaves the coil through the
centre connection, passing through the opposing coil into the rails of the next section. In this
way, two opposing magnetic fields are produced, one in each half of each coil, which are bal-
anced in strength and neutralise each other. By using AC track circuits, the impedance will
prevent the coil from shunting the track circuit. In a modified version, transformers are used
instead of single coils. Both the source of the traction current and the track relay are no longer
directly connected to the rails but via these transformers. Since, as explained above, the op-
posing magnetic fields produced by the traction current in the trackside coils equalise each
other, they will not cause inductive currents in the coil connected to the track relay.
Some railways (e.g., in Switzerland) use digitally coded track circuits in which the track relay
is replaced by an electronic device. With this technology, single-rail track circuits with joints in
only one rail may be used for sections of any length. This eliminates the need for impedance
bonds.
There are also jointless track circuits, also known as audio frequency track circuits. These are
specific track circuits that work with an audio frequency AC track current. Due to the inductive
and capacitive track characteristics, the working length of such a track circuit would limit itself.
For a safe continuous track clear detection, the adjacent track circuits must overlap each other.
A controlled overlapping of adjacent track circuits can be achieved by S-shaped rail connectors
(Figure 1.8). There are also jointless track circuits that provide a controlled overlapping without
such connectors but lead to a longer overlapping zone.
Figure 1.8 S-shaped connector to separate jointless track circuits
Axle counters
An axle counter is a system consisting of counting points at the boundaries of a section and a
counter connected to the counting points (Figure 1.9). The occupancy of a section is detected
by comparing the number of axles that enter the section with the number of axles that leave
the section. To give a clear indication, the parity of numbers is necessary. Counting points are
usually made up of double contacts to detect the direction of movement. This is necessary for
correct detection whether an axle is entering or leaving the section.
Figure 1.9 Axle counter
In contrast to track circuits, the maximum working length is not limited. There are also no prob-
lems with non-shunting vehicles or rust or dirt on the rails.
1.2 Basic Operating Terms

Classification of Tracks
In railway operations, a track is often also referred to as a line. A route consisting of just one
track is called a single line, while a route with double track operation, i.e., two parallel tracks
and a specified direction for normal moves on both tracks is called a double line. For opera-
tional purposes, tracks are divided into two main classes. While they that are called differently
in the rulebooks of individual railways, the basic idea is always the same:
• Tracks that may be used for regular train movements

• Tracks that must only be used for shunting movements
The distinction between train and shunting moves is explained later in this section. The tracks
used for regular train movements are called main tracks or running lines. The term main track
is mainly used in North America, but was also adopted by some railways outside North Amer-
ica. It is also used in some international textbooks (Theeg & Vlasenko, 2020). Many other
railways, in particular railways with roots in the British systems, prefer the term running line.
The lines between stations and their continuation through stations and interlocking areas be-
long into this category. It also includes tracks for passing and overtaking trains which are called
loops on most railways (Figure 1.10). On signalled lines, tracks used for train movements are
equipped with signalling appliances for the safe passage of trains. Along the line a train passes
through, points are usually interlocked with signals that provide the movement authority. Sid-
ings are all tracks that must only be used for shunting movements. The points of sidings are
often not interlocked.
Figure 1.10 Classification of tracks
Note: In the North American terms, a line is a route that may consist of several parallel tracks.
Furthermore, loops are called sidings; tracks other than main tracks are called yard, second-
ary, or industrial tracks. Single-end tracks connected to a main track are called spur tracks.
Block Sections
A line with a fixed block system is divided into block sections for the purpose of safe train
separation. A train must generally not enter a block section until it has been cleared by the
train ahead. On lines with lineside signals, block sections are limited by signals, which govern
train movements. A signal that limits a block section outside a station area is called a block
signal. While the basic idea of train separation by fixed sections also applies on station tracks,
many railways that separate the station areas from the open line (see following paragraph on
interlocking areas) use the term block section only outside of station areas.
Interlocking Areas
An interlocking area is a track area, where controlled signals are interlocked with points and
other signals in a way that a signal can only be cleared when all points are locked in the proper
position and all conflicting moves are locked out. Signals that govern routes in an interlocking
area are called interlocking signals. The points and signals are controlled either by a local
interlocking station or from a remote control centre. Local interlocking stations are called
interlocking towers in North America, and signal boxes or signal cabins on most other railways.
A locally staffed interlocking station contains both the interlocking system and the user
interface for the operator. Modern interlocking systems are usually remote controlled from a
control centre.
There are two basic signal arrangements in interlocking areas (Figure 1.11). First, there are
interlocking areas without consecutive interlocking signals. An interlocking signal provides
authority to run through the entire interlocking area into the next block section. Second, there
are interlocking areas with consecutive interlocking signals.
Figure 1.11 Types of interlocking areas
Such an interlocking area may contain tracks protected by controlled signals on which trains
may originate, terminate, pass, and turn. In this tutorial, these tracks are called station tracks.
Consequently, an arrangement of station tracks is called a station area. Also, in this tutorial,
the tracks outside the opposing interlocking signals limiting the station area are called the open
line. The terms station area and open line are used here in a generic way not referring to the
practice of an individual railway. Due to the big variety of operating principles used worldwide,
terms used in the rulebooks of individual railways may differ.
A platform station for scheduled stops of passenger trains is not necessarily associated with a
station track in the sense as defined above, which needs not have a platform. There are also
platform stations on the open line, which do not necessarily imply any provision of pointwork
or the ability to reverse trains within the signalling system.
On most railways, the interlocking signals protecting a station area from both sides are called
home signals. The interlocking signals that govern train movements to leave a station track
into a section of the open line are often called station exit signals or just exit signals. These
terms are also used in this tutorial. Other commonly used terms for these signals are section
signals, starter signals, or leaving signals. Interlocking signals within the station area that are
neither home nor exit signals are called intermediate interlocking signals (Figure 1.12). On
some railways, they are also called inner home signals (when passed by arriving trains) and
inner starter signals (when passed by departing trains).
Figure 1.12 Station area with intermediate interlocking signals
In North America, interlocking areas with consecutive interlocking signals within the same in-
terlocking limits are not common. The reason is that the distinction between station tracks and
tracks of the open line does not exist in the North American rules (Bisset et. al., 2008). In
Europe and most other railways outside of North America, station areas with consecutive in-
terlocking signals are very common. In modern British signalling centres, there is also no longer
any formal distinction between station tracks and sections of the open line. However, interlock-
ing areas may contain consecutive interlocking signals. So, in a generic way, the terms used
here will also fit to the British system.
Movements with Railway Vehicles

On most railways, the normal train movements are separated from the so-called shunting
movements. In North America, the rules for both kinds of movements do not differ as signifi-
cantly as in most other countries. That is the reason why in North American operations, as
mentioned above, shunting signals are not used.
Train movements, also known as 'running movements', are movements of locomotives or self-
propelled vehicles, alone or coupled to one or more vehicles, with authority to occupy a section
of line under operating conditions specified in the operating rules. Every train displays rear end
markers (tail lights or marker boards) to enable the lineside staff to check the train complete-
ness. All regular movements running along the line from station to station are train movements.
The authorisation of a train movement has two elements:
• A valid timetable as the authority to run through the network along a pre-defined route
by specified operating conditions (timetable authority)
• A movement authority for every single section of track in the path of the train
The movement authority to enter a section of track is issued by the operator who is in charge
of controlling train movements on that section of track. This way, a train is always under exter-
nal guidance of a train control operator. The authority for train movements is given by:
• A proceed indication of a main signal

• A proceed indication of a cab signal display
• A call-on signal permitting a train to pass a signal displaying a stop aspect under special
conditions
• A written or verbal instruction permitting a train to pass a signal displaying a stop aspect
under special conditions
• A written or verbal authority on non signal-controlled lines
Shunting movements are movements for making up trains, moving vehicles from one track to
another, and similar purposes. Shunting movements are accomplished without a timetable un-
der simplified conditions at a very low speed that allows the driver to stop short of any vehicle
or obstruction. On main tracks and on sidings controlled by an interlocking station or control
centre, a verbal agreement between the shunting crew and the operator is needed before the
operator may authorise the shunting move. That verbal agreement performs a similar function
as the timetable authority for train movements. Block rules are not in effect. Shunting units may
enter occupied tracks. Movements in industrial sidings are also carried out as shunting move-
ments.
The authority of shunting movements is given by:
• A proceed indication of a shunting signal, which may be combined with a main signal
to authorise a shunting move to pass the main signal in stop position
• Verbal permission
In the North American terms, the term shunting is not used. Shunting movements are called
‘switching movements’ or ‘movements of yard engines’.
Concerning shunting movements, the railways designated different limits in accordance with
their individual operating practice.
On European railways, apart from modern British rules, shunting units must not enter line sec-
tions outside the home signal limits of a station area. The same rule also applies on many
railways outside Europe. The area between the home signals that may be used for shunting is
usually limited by limit of shunt or shortly LOS boards (Figure 1.13).
Figure 1.13 Shunting limits of a station area
The distance between the home signal and the LOS board equals the overlap of the home
signal. Shunting units may pass the shunting limit boards only with a written permission from
the operator. Before issuing authority to a shunting unit to pass the shunting limit board, the
operator has to make sure that there is no train approaching the home signal.
While in modern British railway operations, the formal distinction between station areas and
the open line doesn’t exist, shunting units must be prevented from entering a section on which
they are not protected against opposing movements. If no main or shunting signal exists to
limit the shunting move, limit of shunt signals are placed at the shunting limit. These LOS
signals are inoperative shunting signals permanently displaying a stop aspect.
Double Track Operations

For double track operation, there is usually a specified direction of traffic for each track. While
right-track operation dominates slightly worldwide, there is a significant number of countries
where left-track operation is the standard form. On lines not equipped with a bidirectional sig-
nalling system for two-way working, all regular train movements have to be made with the
normal direction of traffic. On such lines, movements against the normal direction (also called
‘wrong line moves’ or ‘reverse movements’) have to be authorised by special instructions under
staff responsibilty. On lines that are equipped with a signalling system for two-way working,
movements against the normal direction can be authorised by clearing a main signal.
Many railways do not install intermediate block signals for reverse movements because on
most lines, reverse movements are not carried out frequently. For temporary single track work-
ing is case of a track closure, the direction on the remaining track will change after almost
every train. So, intermediate block signals would have no effect on capacity. Intermediate block
signals for movements against the normal direction do only make sense on sections, where
parallel moves on both lines are carried out on a regular basis.
Figure 1.14 shows typical examples of signal arrangements for double track operation. On
many railways, a normal direction of traffic is only in effect outside of station areas.
Figure 1.14 Signal arrangements for double track operations
2 SPACING TRAINS
In a steel wheel on steel rail system, the static friction coefficient is on average eight times less
than in road traffic. As a result, the maximum braking force that can be transmitted between
wheel and rail for a given weight is also eight times less. That leads to braking distances for
railway vehicles that may exceed the viewing range of the driver significantly. Thus, train sep-
aration cannot simply be based on the viewing range but has to be controlled by trackside
technology.
2.1 Theory of Train Separation

There are three basic theoretical principles of train separation:
• Relative braking distance

• Absolute braking distance
• Fixed block distance
Relative Braking Distance

In relative braking distance mode, the distance between two following trains equals the differ-
ence of the braking distances of the trains plus an additional safety margin. For the headway
(‘head-to-head’) distance between two trains following each other, the length of the first train
has to be added (Figure 2.1 a). The braking distances of both trains have either to be calculated
with braking curves based on the same deceleration rate, or by applying the rule that in case
of a better braking performance of the second train, a minimum safety margin must always be
kept between the two trains.
While relative braking distance leads to a maximum of line capacity, there are two essential
problems. When points are to be moved between two trains, the second train cannot follow at
relative braking distance but must be kept at full braking distance in approach to the points
until the points are safely locked in the new position. As a result, the line capacity is limited by
the point zones where successive trains may take different routes. Another problem is that in
case of an accident of the first train, the second train has no chance to stop and is going to
collide with the first train. For these problems, this principle has not yet applied for train sepa-
ration but is used by some freight railways for processing the coupling and uncoupling of helper
locomotives on the move.
Absolute Braking Distance

Absolute braking distance leads to a distance between two following trains that equals the
braking distance of the second train plus an additional safety margin. For the minimum head-
way, the length of the first train has to be added (Figure 2.1 b).
Train separation by absolute braking distance is often seen as the best suited principle of train
separation. The only problem that has so far prevented the introduction of this principle outside
of mass transit systems is the lack of a usable technology for on-board checking of train com-
pleteness (train integrity) of freight trains, which is needed for safe location of the train’s rear
end. However, with the further development of radio-based operating technologies, train sep-
aration by absolute braking distance may be widely introduced in the near future. The absolute
braking distance mode is also generally known as ‘moving block’.
Figure 2.1 Principles of train separation
Fixed Block Distance

In a fixed block system, the line is divided into consecutive block sections. A block section may
be exclusively occupied by only one train at a time. The distance between two following trains
equals the braking distance of the second train plus the length of the block section plus an
additional safety margin. Thus, the headway distance equals the headway of absolute braking
distance plus the length of the block section (Figure 2.1 c). While the minimum headway of a
fixed block system exceeds the minimum headway of a moving block system, the capacity
limiting effect of the block sections is often overrated.
In train control with lineside signals, the block sections are limited by signals. Nowadays, run-
ning in fixed block distance is the most common principle of train separation worldwide.
2.2 Train Control Principles

The principle used for safe train separation depends on the following criteria:
• How movement authority is transmitted from track to train

• How the track is released behind a train
If movement authority is only transmitted at discrete points, e. g. at lineside signals, this will
necessarily lead to a fixed block system. Each movement authority has to cover the entire
section up to the next point at which further authority may be received. On lines where trains
are governed continuously by a cab signal system, this restriction does not exist. However,
continuous transmission of movement authority is not yet a sufficient criterion to abolish fixed
block sections. In addition, the train has to release the track not in fixed intervals but continu-
ously. This requires a permanent train-borne checking of train completeness. Since for tradi-
tional railway systems, a sufficient solution for that problem has not yet been found, train sep-
aration at a fixed block distance is still the standard principle for safe train spacing on most
railways worldwide.
Before explaining the different principles of train separation, another essential feature has to
be mentioned. The braking distance of a train does not mainly depend on the weight of the
train but on the percentage of the weight that is used to transmit braking force between wheel
and rail. Trains with the same braking ratio have generally the same braking distance. For safe
train separation, a train must always have a clear track ahead at least as long as the braking
distance. Thus, from the viewpoint of capacity, it makes sense to assemble vehicles into trains.
All vehicles that form a train do need just one common braking distance for the entire consist.
This will significantly reduce the capacity consumption that is produced by the long braking
distances. This is why running whole trains instead of single vehicles is one of the very basic
characteristics of a railway system.
2.2.1 Train Control by Lineside Signals
Guiding Trains in Fixed Block Operation

While, with the introduction of radio-based train control system, railways move more and more
toward cab signalling, lineside signals are still the dominating from of train control. They are
even used in many new installations. Since lineside signals can only transmit movement au-
thorities at fixed intervals, train control by lineside signals always leads to a fixed block opera-
tion. For this, the line is divided into block sections limited by signals. To clear a signal for a
train that is to enter a block section, the following conditions must have been fulfilled (Figure
2.2):
• The train ahead must have cleared the block section

• The train ahead must have cleared the overlap beyond the next signal (only on lines
where block overlaps are used)
• The train ahead must be protected by a stop signal
On lines with bidirectional operation, the train must also be protected against opposing move-
ments.
Figure 2.2 Control length of signals on a fixed block line
The control length of a signal is the length of track beyond a signal that must be safe and clear
to enable that signal to be cleared. When overlaps are used, the control length exceeds the
length of the block section and overlaps with the control length of the next signal. The main
purpose of the overlap is to provide additional safety in case a train overruns a stop signal by
a short distance due to bad brake handling. A signal must not be cleared until the full control
length is clear. Thus, the clearing point beyond a signal equals the end of the control length of
the signal in rear. Some railways do not use overlaps. In that case, the control length of a
signal equals the block length.
Lineside Signal Indications

Lineside signals provide information both for safe train separation but also for guiding trains
through point zones. Concerning the classification of signal aspects, these systems can be
divided in two basic principles of signalling:
• Speed signalling
• Route signalling
In a speed signalling system, the signals indicate the speed not to be exceeded by a train. In
route signalling, the facing point signals indicate the route over which the train is being sent.
In route signalling, the driver must know the speed limit of every route the train may run over.
While systems follow the speed signalling principle, route signalling is also still quite common,
in particular on railways with roots in the British system.
In some systems, the speed or route information is part of the block signal aspect e.g., by using
combinations of different lights. Other systems, in particular modern European installations,
use supplementary speed or route indicators. In such systems, the block signal itself gives only
information about the occupation of the following block sections. So the block signal aspects
can be designed in a very simple form.
For train separation, most railways use three basic indications, usually displayed by a red,
yellow, and green aspect. That’s why, such a system is also known as three-aspect signalling.
Since different names are used for these indications in the rulebooks of individual railways, the
generic terms as stated in Table 1 are used here.
Table 1 Basic signal indications
Stop Train must stop at the signal

Expect stop Train may proceed with caution prepared to stop at the signal ahead
Clear Train may proceed
Regarding the principle of providing the approach indication there are two kinds of signalling
(Figure 2.3):
• One-block signalling
• Multiple-block signalling
In one-block signalling (Figure 2.3 a), the indication of a main signal depends only on the state
of the block section beyond the signal. A main signal cannot provide any approach information
for the next signal. So, every main signal must have a distant signal whose only purpose it is
to provide the required approach indication. The distant signal is placed at the braking distance
in approach to the main signal. On lines with short block sections that do not significantly ex-
ceed the braking distance, the distant signal is placed at the main signal in rear. In such sys-
tems, the head of a main signal and the head of the distant signal for the next main signal are
often mounted one above the other on the same mast.
In multiple-block signalling, the indication of a main signal depends on the state of two or more
following block sections. Very common is two-block signalling in which the approach indication
is given by the aspect of the rear main signal without need for separate distant signals (Figure
2.3 b). Since two-block signalling uses the same three basic signal aspects as one-block sig-
nalling, both principles fall into the category of ‘three-aspect signalling’.
Multiple-block signalling renders a very efficient signalling but requires block sections not much
longer than the stopping distance. On lines with very long block sections, multiple-block sig-
nalling is not useful because approach indication given too early will reduce the capacity of the
line by increasing the the signal headway of following trains. Many modern signal systems may
be alternatively used with one-block or multiple-block signalling depending on the actual block
length.
Some railways even use three-block signalling in which a main signal provides information on
three block sections ahead by using an advance approach indication (Figure 2.3 c). For this,
a forth signal aspect is used telling the driver to be prepared to stop at the second signal ahead.
That is, why such a system is called four-aspect signalling. By three-block signalling, the brak-
ing distance may exceed the block length enabling signals to be placed at shorter intervals to
improve capacity. On railways that use speed signalling, the same effect can be achieved by
progressive speed signalling (Figure 2.4).
In progressive speed signalling, a train approaching a stop signal is progressively slowed down
by speed indications. So, the maximum speed at which the train may pass the last signal in
approach to a stop signal will ensure a safe braking within the short block section. Although
more than three signal aspects are used (mostly four aspects but in some installations even
more), it is only a two-block signalling system because an approach information is only given
for the signal ahead.
Figure 2.3 Different Principles in the Application of the Approach Indication
Figure 2.4 Progressive speed signalling
A very common application of short block sections are moving-up signals at platform stations
of mass transit railways (also known as staggered or multiple home signals). The purpose of
these signals is to save time between the departure of one train and the arrival of the next train
at the same platform track. The moving-up signal is placed beyond the station entrance signal
directly at the platform. Thus the station entrance signal and the moving-up signal form a very
short block section. The control length of the station entrance signal leads up to the clearing
point at the end of the overlap of the moving-up signal (Figure 2.5).
Figure 2.5 Moving-up signal
During a platform stop, a train is protected by two stop signals, since it occupies the control
length of both the station entrance signal and of the moving-up signal. When a departing trains
has cleared the control length of the station entrance signal (position 1 in Figure 2.5), a follow-
ing train may already move up toward the platform while the departing train is still protected by
the moving-up signal. The moving-up signal clears after the train has completely left the station
section (position 2 in Figure 2.5). At stations with a very high density of traffic, multiple moving-
up signals may be applied (but hardly more than four). Some railways even place moving-up
signals in the middle of the platform.
The Blocking Time Model

For the non-delayed passage of trains, a signal must be cleared before an approaching train
is forced into a brake application by the aspect of the signal in rear. The minimum headway
between two following trains depends on the so-called ‘blocking time’ (Hansen & Pachl 2014,
Pachl 2018).
Figure 2.6 Blocking time of a block section
The blocking time (from the German term ‘Sperrzeit’) is the time interval in which a section of
track (usually a block section) is allocated exclusively to a train and therefore blocked to other
trains. The blocking time lasts from the latest possible time movement authority to enter the
section has to be issued by clearing a signal without delaying the train up to the time at which
movement authority to another train to enter the same section can be issued. So, the blocking
time describes the time window that has to be kept clear for the non-delayed passage of a train
through a track section. While it is explained here for a lineside signalling system, the idea
behind the blocking time model is universal and can also be applied to cab signalling systems
and to automatic train operations. As explained in section 2.2.2, it even works for moving block
systems.
The blocking time of a track section is usually much longer than the time the train occupies
that section. In train control with lineside signals, for a train without a scheduled stop, the
blocking time of a block section consists of the following time intervals (Figure 2.6):
• Signal control time, i.e. the control time needed to clear the signal
• The signal watching time, i.e. a certain reaction time by which the signal that provides
the approach indication must be cleared ahead of the train to prevent the driver from
applying the brakes
• The approach time between the signal that provides the approach indication and the
signal at the entrance of the block section
• The time between the block signals
• The clearing time to completely clear the block section and – if required – the overlap
• The release time to ‘unlock’ the block section
The approach time equals the time the signal has to be cleared ahead of a train to prevent this
train from passing an aspect at the signal in rear that will force the train into a brake application.
It does not apply if the train has a scheduled stop at the signal at the entrance of the block
section. In such a case, the signal watching time applies at that signal. There, it is the reaction
time of the driver to get the train into motion after the signal has been cleared.
Figure 2.7 Blocking time stairway
Drawing the blocking times of all block sections a train passes into a time-over-distance dia-
gram leads to the so-called ‘blocking time stairway’ (Figure 2.7). The blocking time stairway
represents perfectly the operational use of a line by a train. Computer-generated blocking time
stairways are a typical feature of advanced scheduling systems to establish conflict-free train
paths.
By means of the blocking time stairways, it is possible to determine the minimum headway
between two trains. The blocking times directly establish the signal headway as the minimum
time interval between two following trains in each block section. The line headway is the mini-
mum headway between two trains not only considering one block section but the whole block-
ing time stairways of the line (Figure 2.8). In this case, the blocking time stairways of two
following trains touch each other without any tolerance in at least one block section (the ‘critical
block section’).
Figure 2.8 Signal headway and line headway
On lines with mixed traffic, the minimum line headway depends significantly on the speed dif-
ferences between trains. On lines where all trains run at quite the same speed (typical on mass
transit railways), the critical block sections are usually the block sections in which the blocking
time includes the dwell time of platform stops (station sections, Figure 2.9). On such lines,
signals should be placed in a way that keeps the blocking time of the station sections as short
as possible.
Figure 2.9 Blocking time stairways on a mass transit railway
The Protected Zone Model

The protected zone model is an alternative approach to model the effect, the signalling system
has on the spacing of trains. The term ‘protected zone model’ was first used in (Pachl, 2018).
The basic idea is that behind every train, the signalling system provides a certain zone to
protect that train against following trains. The protected zone can be divided into two parts
(Figure 2.10 a). First, there is a part of absolute protection, which is marked by red colour. This
part consists of all track sections the protected train has exclusive authority to occupy. This is
the zone protected by a stop signal. Second, there is a part in which other trains are forced to
slow down to prevent them from running into the part of absolute protection. That zone starts
at the first restrictive signal encountered by a following train. In the diagram, this part is marked
by yellow colour. The protected zone reaches its greatest length when a train is going to clear
a block section (Figure 2.10 b). After the train has cleared the block section, the protected zone
has its shortest length and starts to grow again (Figure 2.10 c).
The change from the situation of Figure 2.10 b to the situation of Figure 2.10 c represents a
single ‘step’ in the blocking time stairway. While diagramming the protected zones with addi-
tional times for operating and watching the signals along the path of a train movements would
lead to picture similar to a blocking time stairway, there is one essential shortcoming.
Figure 2.10 The protected zone model
Because the approach time is not added at the beginning but at the end of the occupation of
the block section, the protected zone model cannot handle cab signalling systems in which the
signalled braking distance depends on the actual speed of a train. In such systems, a train can
only calculate its own braking distance but not the braking distance for a following train.
2.2.2 Train Control by Cab Signalling
In cab signalling, the movement authority is directly displayed on the driver’s desk. On most
railways that use cab signalling, it is combined with a continuous Automatic Train Protection
(ATP) system that provides the control data for the cab signals. While cab signalling allows the
infrastructure operator to remove lineside signals completely, cab signalling may also be used
as an overlay system on lines equipped with lineside signals, so trains may be controlled either
by cab signals or lineside signals. To avoid confusion for the driver, most railways established
the rule that on such lines, cab signal indications are always superior to lineside signals.
On some railways, there are still older cab signal systems in use that work only as auxiliary
systems. On such lines, trains are still governed by lineside signals, but the cab signal indica-
tions support the driver in watching the lineside aspects.
Cab signalling with fixed block sections

The main reason for having fixed block sections on lines with cab signalling is the need for
checking of train completeness by track clear detection technology. This is the case on all lines
with freight traffic, since a sufficient solution for checking train completeness of freight trains
does not yet exist. As an approved technology, it is also used on many lines with exclusive
passenger operations. On cab signaling lines without lineside signals, most railways use block
marker boards to mark the block limits for degraded mode operations.
Sometimes, block sections are also used on cab signal controlled lines with exclusive passen-
ger operations where train completeness is checked on board without track clear detection
technology. That principle is called virtual block, because the block sections exist only virtually
in the control system without any field installations along the line. The reason for having virtual
block sections instead of moving block is to reduce the amount of data transmission by radio.
In contrast to a moving block system where the continuous upgrade of the movement authority
requires data transmission at very short intervals, the movement authority of a virtual block
system is only upgraded after the train ahead has cleared a block section. This significantly
reduces the data traffic from track to train. If capacity needs to be improved, the block lengths
can easily be reduced in the control system without changing anything in the field.
Figure 2.11 Blocking time of a block section on a cab signalling line
The main difference of cab signalling with fixed block sections from a fixed block system with
lineside signals is the independence from the approach distance of the lineside signal system,
which is the distance between the signal at the entrance of the block section and the signal in
rear that provides the approach indication. The approach time is no longer the running time
between these two signals but the running time within the real braking distance based on the
supervision curves of the cab signal system. Also, due to the absence of lineside signals, a
signal watching time to spot a signal aspect at a specific location is no longer needed. The
other elements of the blocking time do not differ from a system with lineside signals (Figure
2.11).
Cab Signalling with Moving Block

Moving block is based on absolute braking distance. Since the fixed block sections are elimi-
nated, the line is cleared continuously behind the rear end of a moving train. Beside a contin-
uous detection of the train location and train completeness, it also requires a continuous up-
grade of the movement authority. Figure 2.12 demonstrates the effect on the minimum head-
way compared with a fixed block cab signaling system.
Figure 2.12 Headway in cab signaling with fixed block and moving block
Today, moving block is only used in some transit systems. One reason why the interest of
standard railways in moving block is rather limited is that the potential improvement of line
capacity by the introduction of moving block is often overrated. On a moving block line, the
length of the block sections is reduced to zero. That means that the running time within the
block sections will be eliminated in the blocking time diagram. All other components of the
blocking time can also be found in moving block. On most lines, the total of these other com-
ponents is much greater than the part of the blocking time that can be eliminated by moving
block. That is why, compared with fixed block operation with short block sections, moving block
will just lead to a moderate improvement of capacity. On lines with mixed traffic of trains run-
ning at different speeds, the possible improvement is almost negligible compared to a system
with short block sections. Same is true for single lines with bidirectional operation. That is, why
many railways prefer the principle of virtual block in new developments of radio based cab
signalling systems.
2.3 Block Control Principles

To ensure safe train separation, the control procedures must ensure that the movement au-
thority to enter a section of line must not be issued unless two basic conditions are in effect:
• The line is clear up to the desired authority limit and the rear end of the last train ahead
is safely protected by that limit.
• All opposing moves on the same stretch of line are safely locked out.
While these basic safety requirements are valid both in fixed block and moving block systems,
the solutions to meet these requirements differ.
2.3.1 Block Control by verbal Communication
On branch lines operated at a low speed and a very low traffic density, train movements may
be protected just by operating rules under staff responsibility. This is based on verbal commu-
nication by radio or telephone. For this, two principles exist:
• Dispatcher-controlled operation
• Train control by local operators
Today, most lines of that kind have some kind of dispatcher control. The dispatcher is an op-
erator responsible for train control on a longer stretch of line. The dispatcher communicates
with the train crews by radio. Points are manually operated by the train crews. Train crews
report the arrival at stations or specific locations to the dispatcher who keeps track of all move-
ments either by manually recording these messages on a paper train sheet or by entering them
into a computer system. Movement authorities issued by the dispatcher are also transmitted
verbally by radio and recorded manually. When a computer workstation is used, train locations
and movement authorities are visualized on a computer screen. That control system is just an
offline system controlled by the data manually entered by the dispatcher, however. On lines
with a higher density of traffic, a simplified signalling system may be used as a safety overlay.
In such a system, automatic block signals controlled by track circuits would protect occupied
sections of line. Since there are no controlled signals, movements authority has still to be is-
sued verbally by the dispatcher. This is frequently used in North America where the traffic
density on many lines does not justify the effort to install a remote control system.
While less frequently used today, train control by verbal communication of local operators is
still common on some railways. On such lines, all stations that limit a block section must be
locally staffed. The local operators communicate by telephone and exchange control mes-
sages on trains entering and leaving the block section, and on direction control to protect op-
posing moves. The exchanged messages and the train movements are manually recorded.
Movement authorities are usually issued by lineside signals controlled by the local operators.
Under very simplified conditions, station are only equipped with home signals. Then, the au-
thority to leave the station into the next section of line is given verbally, or by a hand or flag
signal.
In old British systems, block sections are protected by block instruments in conjunction with
bell codes. Local operators offer and accept trains and report trains entering and leaving sec-
tion by bell codes. This is overlaid by block instruments to indicate the state of the block sec-
tion. There are coacting instruments at the entrance and the exit of section, which can only be
operated from the exit side. These instruments are pure communication devices not inter-
locked with the signals. So, the basic principle is very similar to a systems based on verbal
communication. The telephone communication is just replaced by bell codes and block indica-
tions. So, this is not yet a block system with positive locking of signals in the sense of the next
paragraph. That kind of block protection is no longer used in new installations.
2.3.2 Block systems for Fixed Block Operation
In mainline operations, the fixed block criteria are enforced by block systems that provide pos-
itive locking of signals in stop position as long it is not safe for a train to enter the block section
these signals protect. Since block systems are only used to enforce fixed block operation on
line sections between station areas, they are often referred to as line block systems (UIC,
2012; Theeg & Vlasenko, 2020). On station tracks between successive interlocking signals,
fixed block operation is not enforced by a block system but by the interlocking system when
setting routes from signal to signal. This will be explained in Chapter 3. That is, why on many
railways, station tracks between successive interlocking signals are not referred to as block
sections.
Block Working Principles

To protect a train that has entered a block section against following trains, the signal at the
entrance of the section is locked in stop position. The signal can be either a lineside signal or
just a section limit (usually marked by block marker board) where a train must not proceed
without cab signal indication. If converging lines lead into the same section, the block locking
is in effect for all signals leading into that block section. After the train has completely left the
block section including the overlap (if overlaps are required) and is protected by a stop signal,
the block section is released. Now, a signal at the entrance of the block section can be cleared
for a following train (Figure 2.13).
Figure 2.13 Block protection of following movements
If the line just consists of one single block section, opposing moves can be easily locked out
by locking all opposing signals in stop position before a signal to enter the section can be
cleared. On a longer stretch of line that consists of several block sections, opposing moves
are locked out by direction locking. A signal to enter such a stretch of line can only be cleared
after the entire section has been locked for the desired direction. The direction locking holds
all opposing signals in stop position as long there is at least one train on the line.
Figure 2.14 Direction locking with non-symmetrical normal position
In some systems, the direction locking releases after the entire section has been completely
cleared of trains. In such a system, the direction locking is re-established when the next train
of either direction is going to enter the single track section. Thus, no direction is cleared in
normal state. This is also known as a block system with symmetrical normal position. In other
systems, the direction locking remains in effect even after the last train has left the single track
section. Only when a train is going to enter the section from the opposing side, the locking is
switched to the other direction. Then, the new direction will be kept locked until another change
of direction is required. This is known as a block system with non-symmetrical normal position
(Figure 2.14).
If direction locking with non-symmetrical normal position is used on a line section that connects
the control areas of different operators, two principles exist for controlling the direction change:
• Direction change is initiated by the station that is currently holding the direction.
• Direction change is initiated by the station that is requesting the direction.
If the direction change is initiated by the station that is currently holding the direction, a proce-
dure for offering and accepting trains must be established between the two operators. Other-
wise, the operator receiving the train would not be aware of the necessity to initiate a direction
change. If the direction change is initiated by the station that is requesting the direction, the
operator that is requesting the direction needs an indication on the control interface that the
direction change is currently possible and not blocked by a cleared signal on the opposing
station. Otherwise, in case of a failed direction request, the operator wouldn’t see the reason.
A procedure for offering and accepting trains is not necessarily needed but sometimes used
to avoid traffic control conflicts.
An alternative principle for protecting opposing movements is traffic locking, which is the stand-
ard solution in North America (Aubertin, 2018). There, automatic signals at bidirectional line
sections between interlocking areas are cleared in normal state for both directions. When a
controlled signal is cleared to leave an interlocking area, all opposing automatic signals up to
the next interlocking area are ‘tumbled down’, i.e., restored to stop. The ‘tumble down’ proce-
dure is triggered from section to section until the entire direction is blocked. Then, it is also no
longer possible to clear an opposing controlled signal at the adjacent interlocking area (Figure
2.15).
Figure 2.15 Principle of traffic locking
Manual Block Systems

In a manual block system, the block sections are not yet equipped with continuous track clear
detection. The signals protecting the block sections are manually controlled by local operators.
The stations are equipped with electric block instruments connected by a block line. After a
train has entered a block section, the operator at the entrance of the section would restore the
signal and operate a block instrument to lock the signal in stop position. A coacting instrument
at the exit side of the section informs the next operator on the approaching train. If the operator
at the block entrance failed to operate the block instrument, a rotation lock would lock the
signal in stop position until it is properly locked by the block instrument. When the train has left
the section, the operator at the exit side would check train completeness by watching the rear
end marker, restore the signal to stop, and operate the block instrument to release the block
section. This will release the block instrument at the entrance of the section, so that the signal
at the entrance is no longer locked in stop position. To prevent the operator from accidently
releasing a block section when the train has not yet left the section, an electric lock prevents
operation of the block instrument at the exit side until the train has passed through a short
track circuit beyond the signal. So, these coacting block instruments work exactly in accord-
ance with the block cycle as shown in Figure 2.13.
On lines with bidirectional operation, direction locking can also be effected by coacting block
instruments on both sides of the single track section. At the station that is not holding the
direction, signals pointing against the locked direction are locked in stop position by a block
instrument. To change the direction, the operator at the station currently holding the direction
would operate a block instrument that will lock the signals in stop position and release the block
instrument at the opposing station. The stretch of line between the two stations may contain
several block sections. To change the direction, it is checked that all block instruments at in-
termediate block sections are in the normal position. This meets the principle shown in Figure
2.14.
Today, most manual block systems work as so called semi-automatic block systems, which
uses relay circuits instead of block instruments. In a semi-automatic block system, the block
locking after a train has entered the block section is effected automatically. However, after the
train has left the section, it has to be released manually by an operator. In modern control
centres, semi-automatic block systems are often used at the interface to lines still equipped
with old technology.
Manual block systems as described above are also known as tokenless block. Another solution
to protect single track sections is token block. It’s still frequently used on railways with roots in
the British system. In its most simple form, every single track section has a physical token
(e.g., a staff, key or tablet). Only the operator in possession of the token is allowed to authorise
trains to enter the line. To change the permitted direction, the token is handed to the train driver
to carry it to the opposing station.
Further development led to electric token block systems. In such systems, corresponding con-
trol stations are equipped with token instruments electrically connected to each other. A deter-
mined number of tokens is assigned to every track section. Every train has to pick up a token
to enter the section. As long as the total number of all tokens kept in the connected instruments
equals the determined number of tokens for the section, it is possible to release exactly one
token from either one of the two instruments. After having removed a token, all other tokens in
both instruments are locked. When the operator at the opposing control station has returned
the token into the token instrument there, both instruments are released. After that, another
token may be removed to authorise a train to enter the section. Since only one token can be
released at a time, intermediate block sections are not possible.
While being old technology, token block controls are also to be found in modern control centres
where a token block line connects to the controlled area. Since there is no longer any local
staff available, the token instrument is remotely released from the control centre and operated
by the train crew. A new development is Digital Token Block (DiBloc). It works like a traditional
token block system but with the token instruments no longer connected by an electric block
line but by internet or digital radio. This is a very cost-efficient solution for branch lines with low
traffic.
Automatic Block Systems

In an automatic block system, block sections are equipped with automatic track clear detection
to enable the signals to work automatically. An automatic signal will only clear if the entire
control length up to the clearing point beyond the next signal is clear and a train ahead is
protected by a stop signal. To release a block section, a train must not only have cleared the
section and – if required – the overlap, but must also have restored the next signal. This con-
dition confirms that the train has safely passed the exit side of the block section. So, the safe
block working does not only depend on the track clear detection but is overlaid by the block
cycle of Figure 2.13.
This improves the safety of automatic block systems based on track circuits. If the occupation
of the block section disappeared due to a malfunction of the track circuit while the train has not
yet left the section (e.g., if some dirt has gotten on the rails), the block section will not release.
It will also not release if the train has left the section but failed to restore the signal at the exit
side of the section to stop position due to a malfunction of the next track circuit. For automatic
block systems working with axle counters, that safety procedure is automatically enforced,
since the track occupation could never disappear without having the train passed through the
counting point. Passing through the counting point will also safely restore the signal to stop.
Concerning the control principle, automatic block systems can be divided into two classes
(Figure 2.16):
• Decentralised automatic block systems

• Centralised automatic block systems
Figure 2.16 Decentralised and centralised automatic block systems
In a decentralised automatic block system, the control devices are located in field cabinets
directly at the block signals. These block signal cabinets exchange block control information
either by an electric block line or through coded track circuits. After a train has left a block
section, the signal at the entrance of that section is immediately cleared. So, in normal state,
automatic block signals that are not held down by direction locking are cleared no matter
whether a train is approaching or not. On bidirectional lines where opposing moves are pro-
tected by direction locking, all signals pointing against the locked direction are locked in stop
position. When a direction change is initiated, all signals are restored to stop. After the new
direction has been locked, all signal pointing into this direction will clear. On bidirectional lines
where opposing moves are protected by traffic locking, automatic signals of both directions are
cleared in normal state and only ‘tumbled down’ to protect an opposing move.
In a centralised automatic block system, the block control is part of the centralised control
system that also controls the interlocking areas. Instead of exchanging block control infor-
mation, centralised block sections are treated similar like routes in an interlocking system (see
Chapter 3). However, these ‘block routes’ do not lock any points or movably parts of the infra-
structure. They are just part of the block control logic. Before a signal can be cleared at the
entrance of a centralised block section, the block section has to be locked. After the train has
passed the signal, it is restored and kept locked in stop position, until the train has released
the block section. By locking the block section from the entrance side and releasing it from the
exit side, that control logic also meets the principle of the block cycle shown in Figure 2.13.
In normal state, all centralised block sections are released. Consequently, all automatic block
signals on a centralised automatic block line are in stop position. By clearing a controlled signal
to enter an automatic block line, the first block section will be locked. That block section will
trigger the next block section, and so on. So, all automatic block signals will clear ahead of the
train. On lines with bidirectional working, opposing moves are protected by direction locking.
The direction can only be changed when all intermediate block sections are released.
Depending on the rules of individual railways, block overlaps may be provided at automatic
block signals. If block overlaps are used on automatic block lines, there are three different
principles to provide overlap protection (Figure 2.17):
• Signals placed at the overlap distance before the track clear detection limits
• Separate track clear detection section for the overlap
• Using the next block section as an overlap
Placing the signals at the overlap distance before the track clear detection limits is the most
simple solution. However, in such a system, the overlap beyond a signal is not controlled by
that signal but by the signal at the entrance of the block section. If a train has lost vehicles in
the overlap, the lost equipment is protected by the signal at the entrance of the block section,
while the signal at the exit side may clear not protecting the occupied overlap. This may be-
come a safety problem in degraded mode operations when a train is authorised to pass through
a block section cautiously on sight. Then, the driver may encounter a cleared signal in front of
the occupied overlap. To safely handle such situations, some railways established the rule that
a train with authority to proceed on sight through a block section, has to continue in on sight
mode after having passed a cleared signal at the end of the section for a specified distance
beyond that signal. This is not necessary if the overlap gets a separate track clear detection
section. Then, any occupation of the overlap will always restore the signal to stop. On lines
with very short block sections, an entire block section could be used as an overlap. This prin-
ciple is widely used on mass transit railways.
Figure 2.17 Overlap solutions for automatic block lines
Handling Block System Failures

In case of a malfunction of a manual block system, degraded mode operation is based on
verbal communication between local operators. When a train has left a block section, the op-
erator at the exit side of the section would report the clearance of the section to the operator
at the entrance side. Then, the operator at the block entrance may authorise the next train to
pass the signal protecting the block section and report the departure to the operator at the exit
side. On lines with bidirectional operation, the operators of the limiting stations would have to
offer and accept every single train to protect opposing moves. All these messages are manu-
ally recorded. Before a train may be authorised to enter a line with bidirectional operation, the
operator has to check in the train record that the last train ahead has the cleared the first block
section and no opposing train has been accepted.
On automatic block lines, that procedure is not possible due to the absence of local operators.
For degraded mode operations, two different principled are used by individual railways:
• Automatic block lines with absolute block working

• Automatic block lines with permissive working
On automatic block lines with absolute block working, the stop aspect on automatic block sig-
nals is absolute, i.e., it does not differ from the stop aspect on controlled signals. A train must
not pass any signal in stop position without authority from the operator (absolute stop = ‘stop
and stay’). In case of a block system failure, so that the operator has either to execute a reset-
ting command to release the block section or has to authorise the train to pass a signal pro-
tecting a block section in stop position, the operator has to perform a clearance check for the
relevant block section.
For that clearance check, the operator has to clearly identify the last train that passed through
the relevant block section. For that train, the following criteria have to be confirmed:
• The train has arrived at a station beyond the relevant block section.
• The train must be protected by a stop signal. This includes, if required, the clearance
of the overlap beyond that signal.
• The train must be complete. This is to be checked either by local staff or by the train
crew.
Before authorising a train to pass a stop signal to enter a block section on a line with birectional
operation, the operator has also to confirm that there is no opposing train on the entire section
between the limiting controlled signals, and the opposing controlled signals protecting the sec-
tion are secured in stop position.
If train completeness of the last train ahead cannot be confirmed, the next train has to be
authorised to pass through the relevant section on sight. If, in a case in which train complete-
ness cannot be confirmed, the operator is going to reset the axle counter of a block section
under staff responsibility, the order to proceed on sight must be issued before the resetting
command is executed. If the resetting fails, the operator has to secure the signal protecting the
relevant section in stop position. Then, the operator is required to perform clearance checks
for all following trains until a signal maintainer has reestablished normal working of the block
system.
If the operator cannot clearly identify the last train ahead, a clearance check is not possible. In
such a case, the next train has to be authorised to pass through the relevant section on sight,
but the operator must not reset the block section. Without having confirmation of the last train
ahead, the operator cannot be sure whether a track occupation shown on the user interface is
caused by lost equipment obstructing the track, a track clear detection failure, or by a 'forgotten'
train that is still occupying the section. In the last case, resetting the block section may lead to
a hazard if the forgotten train unexpectedly proceeds. On passenger lines, following trains with
the same number of axles are a frequent occurrence. If a second train has occupied the section
on sight after the axle counter has been reset, the unexpectedly moving first train may count
out the same number of axles the second train has counted in. Thus, the section would clear
while still occupied by the second train. For details see (Theeg & Vlasenko, 2020).
The rule to perform a clearance check for each individual train will increase the workload of
the operator and significantly decrease the capacity during degraded mode working. That is,
why many railways use permissive working on automatic block lines.
On automatic block lines with permissive working, only controlled signals have an absolute
stop indication while automatic signals are permissive signals (Figure 2.18). A train may cau-
tiously pass a permissive signal in stop position after the train has stopped in front of the signal
and the driver has clearly identified the signal as a permissive signal (permissive stop = ‘stop
and proceed’). For that, permissive signals are marked by a special marker plate or by using
a special kind of stop aspect. If a train has passed a permissive signal displaying a stop aspect,
the train has to pass through the entire block section cautiously on sight.
Figure 2.18 Absolute and permissive signals on automatic block lines
On lines with permissive signalling, it is of great importance to restore a signal to stop with a
very high reliability. If a signal fails to protect a train that has passed the signal, the signal at
the block entrance would remain locked in stop position by the block system. If a following train
passed that stop signal in permissive mode, that train would encounter a proceed aspect at
the next signal leading into an occupied block section. In block systems where the required
high reliability in restoring signals cannot be guaranteed, trains must run under the rule that a
train running in permissive mode has to ignore a proceed aspect at the next signal and has to
go on running permissive in the following block section. Only when the train has passed a
proceed aspect at the second signal, the driver may end the permissive mode and proceed at
normal speed.
2.3.3 Block Control in Moving Block Operations
Moving block systems need an accurate on-board train location system that transmits the cur-
rent location at very short intervals to a radio block centre. With every reported location, the
train must also confirm train completeness. By these data, the radio block centre calculates
the danger point to protect the rear end of the train.
Between that danger point and the authority limit of a following train, there is a supplementary
safety distance that is an equivalent to the block overlap in a traditional fixed block system. It
is the minimum safety distance kept between the two trains if the second train stops behind
the first train. If points are going to be moved between two trains following each other in moving
block, an additional time window for moving the points is needed. That time windows is to be
calculated by the radio block centre when upgrading the movement authority for the second
train.
The radio block centre will always safely prevent frontal crashes by locking out overlapping
opposing movement authorities. On line sections outside of station areas where trains cannot
reverse, an additional direction control is needed that works similar as the direction locking in
a fixed block system. A train must not enter such section as long any opposing movement is
travelling through that section or has authority to enter that section from the next location where
the train sequence may be changed.
3 INTERLOCKING PRINCIPLES
When passing through a point zone, beside safe train separation, movable track elements
must be locked in the proper position, and the train must be protected against conflicting moves
that would interfere with its path. This is effected by interlocking. The term interlocking comes
from the fact that the signals governing train moves are interlocked with movable track ele-
ments and signals governing conflicting routes.
3.1 Safe Routes through a Point Zone

Interlocking is based on the principle that before a train can be authorised to pass through a
point zone by clearing a lineside signal or issuing cab signal authority, a safe route up to the
authority limit is established. That route must meet the following conditions:
• All points must be properly set and locked.

• All points must be kept locked as long a train has authority to move on them.
• Conflicting moves must be locked out.
• The route must be protected against inadvertent movements on converging tracks
(flank protection).
• All track sections the train has authority to pass through, must be clear.
3.1.1 Route Classes
In modern interlocking systems, locked routes are also provided for shunting movements.
That’s why, there is a distinction between main routes and shunt routes. Main routes are routes
for regular train movement governed by a main signal or cab signal indication. Shunt routes
are used for shunting movements authorised by a shunt aspect or verbal authority. Some of
the requirements for a main route are not in effect for a shunt route. So, a shunt route may
govern a shunting movement into an occupied track. Flank protection for shunt routes is usu-
ally either simplified or not required at all.
In North America, where train movements are not as strongly separated from shunting move-
ments, the same routes may be used both for train and shunting movements. This principle is
also used on some railways outside North America, e.g., in The Netherlands.
A main route starts always at a controlled signal (the entrance signal of the route). The exit of
a route can be:
• The next controlled signal (the exit or destination signal of the route)
• The end of the interlocking area
Routes with an entrance and an exit signal are routes between successive signals within the
same interlocking area. On railways where overlaps are required, the points within the overlap
beyond the exit signal are interlocked with the entrance signal (Figure 3.1 a). Because the
clearance of the section between the entrance and the exit signal is checked by the interlocking
system, this kind of a route also directly ensures a safe train separation.
Figure 3.1 Main routes
Routes with the exit at the end of the interlocking area govern train movements to leave that
area. Such a route cannot ensure a safe train separation. The route leads into a section of line
that is protected by a block system. In North American interlocking systems, the route will
always end at a controlled signal facing in the opposing direction that limits the interlocking
area (Figure 3.1 b). In the North American terms, this signal is called an ‘exit signal’. That term
should not be confused with the use of the term ‘exit signal’ for routes between successive
controlled signals of the same direction as explained above. On Continental European rail-
ways, the exit of such a route is a track section beyond the last points of the route. In contrast
to the North American practice, this route exit is not necessarily associated with an opposing
controlled signal. On British railways, the exit of a route is always a signal. There, a route to
leave an interlocking area and to enter an automatic block line leads up to the first automatic
block signal.
Figure 3.2 shows a more detailed view of the elements of a route between two successive
interlocking signals. The details will be explained in the following sections.
3.1.2 Point locking
Before a signal can be cleared, all points and derailers must be locked in the proper position.
The locking of points has two aspects:
• To prevent the operation of the points

• To prevent movements of the point blades under a moving train
The first condition is guaranteed by the internal logic of the interlocking system. To meet the
second condition, all points are equipped with a point lock apparatus that mechanically locks
the point blades in a proper position. Some railways use independent point locks, which are
actuated by a separate control device from that which drives the points. More common are
dependent point locks that are actuated by the same control device as that which drives the
point blades.
Figure 3.2 Elements of a route
Figure 3.3 Design and working diagram of a claw lock mechanism
A typical example is the claw lock which exists in several variations. Figure 3.3 shows a modern
type which is very common in Continental Europe. As typical for all point locks of that kind, the
point blades are not permanently connected but can be moved separately. When the points
are operated, the open blade moves at first while the closed blade is being unlocked. Then,
both blades move simultaneously, until the formerly open blade has reached the closed posi-
tion. Now, the new open blade on the opposing side will move farther away from the stock rail,
until the new closed blade is safely locked.
Large turnouts with long flexible blades may have one or more additional point locks along the
blades to hold them safely in place. These intermediate point locks are operated by a back
drive that consists of a rodding mechanism driven by the point machine.
Beside the point locking principle described above, some railways use a completely different
kind of point locks, which are called internal point locks. By this principle, point locking is not
effected directly between point blades and stock rails, but inside the point machine. For this,
the point blades are permanently connected, so locking the driving rod in the point machine
will hold them in place. To guarantee that the closed blade is firmly pressed against the stock
rail, both blades must be kept at a fixed distance, which is enforced by so-called stretcher bars.
3.1.3 Locking and releasing Routes
After the train has passed the signal, all route sections must be kept locked until the train has
cleared them or has come to a safe stop.
On many railways, route locking is based on the principle of approach locking. As long no train
is approaching, the route is just locked by the cleared signal. When restoring the signal, the
route will immediately release. When an approaching train has reached a position at which
cancelling the route would change a signal aspect in front of the train, the route will be ap-
proach locked. Now, after restoring the signal, approach locking will hold the route locked.
After having passed the signal, the normal route locking comes into effect and will maintain all
elements locked under the moving train. Some railways, in particular railways that follow Ger-
man principles, do not use approach locking but establish full route locking immediately when
clearing a signal independently from an approaching train. In Figure 3.4, both route locking
principles are compared.
The normal release of route locking is usually effected automatically after the train has cleared
the points. The automatic route release can be accomplished by complete route release with
one single clearing point, or by a sectional route release. For complete route release, the train
must have cleared the entire point zone and must have occupied the destination track. Sec-
tional route release requires track elements that may release separately to have separate sec-
tions for track clear detection. To prevent separately releasing track sections to be cleared
before the train has passed through, they must have a minimum length that exceeds the max-
imum possible distance between two axles in the train consist. For safety reasons, separately
releasing track elements are connected by a so-called sequence locking. This prevents the
release of a track element until the previous element has released.
Where overlaps are provided, points within the overlap are equipped with time release. They
will release automatically with a defined delay after the train has occupied the last track section
on the approach of the route exit signal.
Figure 3.4 Route locking principles
It may happen that a locked route has to be manually released under staff responsibility if the
route has either to be cancelled without having a train passed or if the normal route release
failed after the passage of the train. For the latter case, most railways provide an emergency
route release. Route cancellations and the emergency route releases are protected either by
time locking or by a specific command procedure with automatic recording.
3.1.4 Conflicting Routes
Routes that require points to be locked in opposite positions will lock out each other automati-
cally by the locked points. This is known as ‘conflicting locking’ (Figure 3.5). If there is no
difference in the position of the points of two conflicting routes, the interlocking between points
and signals will not prevent conflicting movements. In such cases, a special interlocking func-
tion must be provided to lock out conflicting routes. Examples are opposing routes leading into
the same track (also known as ‘opposing locking’) and routes with an intersection at a crossing
without movable points.
Figure 3.5 Conflicting routes that do not differ in the position of points
When a train has arrived on a station track and is going to proceed in shunting mode, many
railways have the rule that the shunting authority must not be issued before the train has come
to a stop. For this, a main route leading into a station track and the following shunt route lock
out each other.
3.1.5 Flank Protection
Flank protection should prevent vehicles on converging tracks from running into a route that is
cleared for a train movement. This could be achieved by:
• Operating rules
• Flank protection devices
Flank protection by operating rules means that to protect a main route against inadvertent
movements on tracks joining the path of the train, specific station tracks must not be used for
shunting or for storing equipment as long the route is set. Since this form of protection is not
very efficient, it should only be used when other forms of flank protection are not available.
Flank protection devices are controlled trackside elements. Flank protection may be provided
by flank points, derailers, or stop signals. Stop signals are only sufficient for flank protection
against movements controlled by a driver. To protect a train against vehicles that could get
into motion unintentionally (e.g., on tracks where equipment is stored), or against the flank
hazard from tracks with heavy shunting, flank protection must be effected by flank points or
derailers. On many railways, derailers must not be installed outside of sidings. For high speed
lines, flank protection against shunting moves and parked equipment is always effected by
flank points.
Remote Flank Protection

If possible, flank protection should be provided by elements that are directly adjacent to the
route to be protected. If there is no suitable element available, flank protection could be pro-
vided by elements that are further away from the point to be protected. This kind of flank pro-
tection is called remote flank protection (Figure 3.6).
The points located between the protective elements and the points to be protected are called
flank transfer points since they do not protect but transfer the flank protection. At flank transfer
points, the protective paths may split, so that one route element is protected by several pro-
tective elements.
The flank area, also known as the flank zone (UIC, 2012), is the track section between a flank
protection device and the fouling point of the route to be protected. When having a turnout in
the flank area as shown in the example of Figure 3.6, the flank area splits into several branches
so that the fouling point of the route to be protected is protected by several protective elements.
While the flank area must be kept clear of vehicles, there may be moves crossing through the
flank area without harming the protected route (Figure 3.7).
Figure 3.6 Remote Flank protection
Figure 3.7 Crossing move through flank are
Selective Protective Points

A specific arrangement of flank protection are selective protective points, which are also known
as dual-called flank points (Figure 3.8). These are flank points that may receive competing
flank calls from the routes of different train moves. To prevent routes from locking out each
other by the position of selective protective points, the protective position of these points is
usually assigned to one of the two routes. To compensate for the lack of protection for the
other route, that route will get remote flank protection. So, for that route, the selective protective
points will become flank transfer points.
There are three different principles to control selective protective points:
• Protective position permanently assigned to one of the two routes

• Protective position flexibly assigned by priority control
• Protective position flexibly assigned by the ‘First In—First Out’ principle
Figure 3.8 Dual called points
When having the protective position permanently assigned to one route, the points will always
be locked in the protective position by that route. While this principle is common practice in
older interlocking systems, some railways keep using it in modern technology. The protective
position of the selective protective points is usually assigned to the route of higher priority. In
older interlocking systems controlled by locally staffed interlocking stations, the operator was
often required to bring the selective protective points into the protective position also for the
inferior route as long that route is set alone. This was not enforced by the interlocking, how-
ever.
Priority-controlled flank protection provides more flexibility in assigning flank protection. As

long only one of the two routes is set, the selective protective points are moved into the pro-
tective position for that route. If the two routes are set at the same time, the selective protective
points will move into the protective position for the route of higher priority. The superior route
will even take away flank protection from the inferior route. Assigning flank protection by the
‘First In—First Out’ principle is the best solution if the two routes have the same priority. The
selective protective points will always move into the protective position for the route that is set
first.
On railways that use selective protective points with flexibly assigned flank protection, it's com-
mon practice to leave these points unlocked as long they receive competing flank calls. Locked
points will even release when called for flank protection by another route. This allows the op-
erator to manually reassign the protective position. This is safe, since in such a case, there is
always remote flank protection.
As an additional feature, selective protective points with flexibly assigned flank protection could
work in a ‘supplementary’ protective mode. After the route for which flank protection was pro-
vided has released, the selective protective points will automatically move to the protective
position for the second route.
Points may also get competing flank calls from just one route or from chained routes belonging
to the same train movement (Figure 3.9). Dual-called points of that kind are also known as
self-selective protective points. In such a case, the protective position is either permanently
assigned to one of the two points to be protected, or the self-selective protective points remain
unlocked. Then, the protection is effected by a common remote flank protection element.
Figure 3.9 Self-selective protective points
3.1.6 Overlaps
If overlaps are applied, the locked route exceeds the authority limit provided by a main signal
or by cab signal indication up to a danger point to be protected. Within the overlap, conflicting
routes are locked out to prevent a train running into the overlap from crashing into other vehi-
cles. Beyond home signals, the overlap is usually provided by placing the signal at the full
overlap distance before the point zone. Then, it’s sufficient to check that the overlap is clear
before the block section on the approach of the home signal is released.
Inside station areas, there is usually not sufficient space to place exit signals and intermediate
interlocking signals at the full overlap distance before the point zone. Then, points within the
overlap are locked as part of any route leading to that signal. Also, conflicting moves passing
through points or crossings within the overlap must be locked out.
On some railways, home signals may also be placed directly in front of the arrival points with
an overlap leading into the point zone. Then, at the braking distance on the approach of that
signal, an ‘outer home signal’ is placed. The section from the outer home signal to the home
signal is not part of the block system but controlled by a route of the interlocking system. To
clear the outer home signal, a route is set from the outer home to the home signal, which will
lock the overlap beyond the home signal (Figure 3.10).
Figure 3.10 Example for the use of an outer home signal
This is sometimes done to shorten the distance between the home signal and following signals
inside the station area for capacity reasons. It’s a typical signal arrangement on mass transit
railway systems. A typical example is the New York Subway, where the outer home signals
are called ‘approach signals’ (Dougherty, 2018). Another reason for outer home signals is to
get a level crossing near the station area under protection of a controlled signal. Railways that
do not use the term ‘outer home signal’ would simply call it a home signal and the signal in
front of the arrival points an intermediate interlocking signal.
Overlap rules quite differ between railways. Depending on the rules of individual railways, spe-
cific points in the overlap may remain unlocked to enable special overlap functionalities. Such
special overlap principles are:
• Selective overlaps
• Swinging overlaps
• Shared overlaps
Where selective overlaps are provided, when setting a route, a choice can be made between
different available overlaps. The alternative overlaps could be of different length or could lead
into different tracks. Once the signal has been cleared, there is no chance to change the over-
lap without cancelling the route, however. When the selected overlap is shorter than the regular
overlap, the train will be slowed down by the signalling system.
Swinging overlaps mean that the overlap can be switched into another track without cancelling
the route. As long both overlaps are available, the facing points at the splitting point are un-
locked (‘able to swing’). Swinging the overlap is no longer possible when the train has overrun
the signal. Sometimes, it is already blocked when the arriving train has reached the last track
clear detection section on the approach of the signal. This rule is usually applied if there is not
a sufficient distance between the signal and the splitting point of the overlaps.
As an alternative solution for selective and swinging overlaps, some railway do not require an
overlap if the exit signal of the route is already cleared. When an approaching train should
proceed at the exit signal on a route that would be locked out by the overlap beyond that signal,
the route at the exit signal is set first. After having cleared the exit signal, the route on the
approach of that signal can be set. It’s less flexible than selective or swinging overlaps but
sufficient in many cases.
Figure 3.11 Shared overlaps
At shared overlaps, the overlaps of different routes may overlap each other without locking out
the relevant routes (Figure 3.11). This is considered to be safe since it is not assumed that two
trains would ever run into their overlaps at the same time. To enable shared overlaps, trailing
points at which one overlap is joined by another overlap remain unlocked. These points must
have trailable point locks.
3.1.7 Intermediate Points
Intermediate points are points that are located in a station track in a way that a train that is
stopping at its regular stopping position would not clear the points (Figure 3.12). While the
signal to leave the station track is located beyond the intermediate points, these points must
be locked by a route starting at that signal. So, the route has a section located on the approach
of the signal governing the route. When a train has arrived on the station track, intermediate
point are either released together with the overlap, or they are kept locked as long they are
occupied.
Figure 3.12 Intermediate points
3.1.8 Track Clear detection
For safe track clear detection of a turnout or crossing, the detection limit must exceed the
fouling point limit by the maximum possible vehicle overhang ahead of the first axle. For stand-
ard gauge railways, the track clear detection limit is planned 6 m beyond the fouling point. If
there is not sufficient space between adjacent turnouts or crossings to meet the above condi-
tion, points must not be moved as long the adjacent element is occupied.
Figure 3.13 Combining and separating track sections of separating points
If possible, the track sections of adjacent points and crossings may be combined into common
track sections to spare track circuits or axle counters. This can only be done if no conflicts
between independent routes are generated. Adjacent trackside elements must always be sep-
arated in the following cases (Figure 3.13):
• If parallel routes are possible on these elements

• If a signal is placed between these elements
Separate track clear detection of adjacent points is also needed to prevent train moves from
being blocked by occupied flank areas or by occupied flank points that cannot be moved to the
protective position.
3.2 Internal Logic of Interlocking Systems

For the design of an interlocking installation, all locally relevant interlocking functionalities re-
sulting from the principles described in the previous paragraphs must be put into a logical
model. That model is used both as a planning document for the interlocking design for the
given layout but also as a control logic for the internal control of the interlocking system for that
layout. For that model, two principles exist:
• Tabular interlocking
• Geographical interlocking
3.2.1 Tabular Interlocking
In tabular interlocking, also known as route-oriented interlocking, the interlocking is completely

based on predefined routes that are described by a route control table (also known as a locking
sheet, locking chart, or interlocking table). In that table, the rows represent the routes and the
columns represent the interlocking conditions relevant for these routes. Figure 3.14 and Table
2 demonstrate the principle for a small junction with a single line diverging from a double line.
Figure 3.14 Infrastructure example
In this example, Table 2 just contains route conflicts and point positions. A full route control
table may have more columns for track clear detection, route locking and release criteria, and
signal aspect sequences. Some railways establish separate tables for these issues, however.
Table 2 Route control table for the layout of Figure 3.14
ROUTE ROUTES LOCKED OUT POINTS

NORMAL REVERSE
11-B1 11-B2, 11-C, 21-B1, 12-A1, 12-A2, 22-A1, 1, 2, 3, 4
32-A1
11-B2 11-B1, 11-C, 21-B1, 21-B2, 21-C, 12-A1, 12- 1, 2, 5 3, 4
A2, 22-A1, 22-A2, 32-A1, 32-A2
11-C 11-B1, 11-B2, 21-B1, 21-B2, 21-C, 12-A1, 1, 2 3, 4, 5
12-A2, 22-A1, 22-A2, 32-A1, 32-A2
21-B1 11-B1, 11-B2, 11-C, 21-B2, 21-C, 12-A1, 12- 3, 4 1, 2
A2, 22-A1, 22-A2, 32-A1, 32-A2
21-B2 11-B2, 11-C, 21-B1, 21-C, 12-A2, 22-A1, 22- 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
A2, 32-A1, 32-A2
21-C 11-B2, 11-C, 21-B1, 21-B2, 12-A2, 22-A1, 1, 2, 3, 4 5
22-A2, 32-A1, 32-A2
12-A1 11-A1, 11-B2, 11-C, 21-B1, 12-A2, 22-A1, 1, 2, 3, 4
32-A1
12-A2 11-B1, 11-B2, 11-C, 21-B1, 21-B2, 21-C, 12- 3, 4 1, 2
A1, 22-A1, 22-A2, 32-A1, 32-A2
22-A1 11-B1, 11-B2, 11-C, 21-B1, 21-B2, 21-C, 12- 1, 2, 5 3, 4
A1, 12-A2, 22-A2, 32-A1, 32-A2
22-A2 11-B2, 11-C, 21-B1, 21-B2, 21-C, 12-A2, 22- 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
A1, 32-A1, 32-A2
32-A1 11-B1, 11-B2, 11-C, 21-B1, 21-B2, 21-C, 12- 1, 2 3, 4, 5
A1, 12-A2, 22-A1, 22-A2, 32-A2
32-A2 11-B2, 11-C, 21-B1, 21-B2, 21-C, 12-A2, 22- 1, 2, 3, 4 5
A1, 22-A2, 32-A1
In mechanical locking frames based on the traditional British system, a different principle is
used, which is known as cascade locking. In a cascade interlocking system, a route is estab-
lished by a locking cascade, which is effected by permanent and conditional locking between
different points and between points and signals. To set a route, the operator has to follow a
predefined ‘lever sequence’ to get the route properly locked. That principle is no longer relevant
for modern interlocking systems, however. For the different notation of the locking sheets, see
(Pachl, 2018).
The contents of the route control table may be directly transformed into the software of a com-
puter-based interlocking or into the wiring diagram of a relay interlocking. The internal logic of
relay interlockings following this principle is also called ‘free-wired’ logic because every inter-
locking has its own specific wiring according to the control table. The shortcoming of tabular
locking is that the route control tables may become very complex for larger layouts. In relay
interlockings, the manual design of the relay circuitry based on the route control table may also
become a very complex task. However, tabular interlocking is still a suitable principle for the
design of interlocking systems for layouts of moderate complexity. It is also used in several
computer-based interlocking systems.
3.2.2 Geographical Interlocking
Geographical interlocking was first developed for relay interlocking systems to reduce the effort
for designing complex interlocking layouts in free-wired logic. In geographical relay interlock-
ings, the track elements are represented by pre-fabricated relay groups, i.e., boxes containing
all relays needed to control a particular element including the wiring. The relay groups have
sockets by which they can be connected by multi-wire cables in accordance with the track
layout. By connecting the relay groups, the correct circuitry for a given layout will automatically
appear. For specific functionalities, special plugs could be attached to the relay groups to mod-
ify the internal wiring. That simplified the design of complex relay interlockings significantly.
The signal planners were no longer required to manually design the electric circuitry. Instead,
they established a diagram, in which the relay groups are represented by boxes that are con-
nected by lines representing the multi-wire cables. For the special plugs to be attached to
specific relay groups, the relevant plug IDs are entered into the boxes.
Figure 3.15 Geographical interlocking
The same principle was later adopted for computer-based interlocking systems using a similar
kind of diagrams. There, the boxes are longer relay groups but logical elements representing
the track elements. Instead of plug IDs, numbers representing specific use cases are entered
into the boxes.
When a route is set in a geographical interlocking system, the entrance and exit elements are
marked and a search current is started from the entrance element of the route. At facing points,
the search current splits into two branches (Figure 3.15). The term ‘search current’ still comes
from relay interlocking but is also used figuratively in computer-based interlockings. The result
is a tree structure of search currents. When one branch of the search current has found the
exit element of the route, a response current is sent back to the entrance element. At facing
points, the other branches of the search current are deleted.
After this process, a path has been found from the entrance to the exit. Conflicting routes are
avoided automatically by the overlapping search currents. When different routes exist from an
entrance element to an exit element, additional rules are used which route to select.
All points in the route also send a search current for the flank call into the diverging track. Route
setting can only be completed if the flank call gets a positive response from a protective ele-
ment. On tracks where a protective elements does not exist, the search current must be re-
versed by a special (virtual) flank protection reverse element to generate a positive response
(Figure 3.16). In some interlocking systems, the elements of the points can be programmed
not to start a flank call, so that flank protection reverse elements are not needed.
Figure 3.16 Flank protection reverse element
The problem of selective protective points is solved by predefined rules, which determine how
points shall react when dual-called for flank protection. The flank points will go into the protec-
tive position for the superior route while the flank call of the inferior route is forwarded to search
for remote flank protection. In the example of Figure 3.17, point 1 is dual called for flank pro-
tection by points 2 and 3. Since the call from point 2 is superior, the inferior call from point 3 is
forwarded. The flank search finally finds shunting signal 21X that will provide remote flank
protection.
In geographical interlockings, conflicting routes that do not differ in the position of points will
automatically lock out each other if the exit elements overlap. Some railways allow opposing
shunt routes leading simultaneously into the same track. Whether this is allowed or not usually
depends on the length of the track. To enable such routes, the exit elements must be arranged
in a way so they do not overlap (Figure 3.18). If, on shorter tracks, opposing shunt routes must
be locked out, the exit elements must be arranged overlapping each other.
Figure 3.17 Selective protective points in geographical interlocking
Figure 3.18 Locking out opposing routes by overlapping exit elements
3.3 Generations of Interlocking Systems

While computer-based interlocking is the dominating interlocking technology today and almost
exclusively used in all new installations, older generations of interlocking systems are still in
use. In some countries, they have still a significant share.
Mechanical and Electro-mechanical Interlocking Systems

Mechanical and electro-mechanical interlocking systems are controlled by leverframe ma-
chines, in which the levers of points and signals are mechanically interlocked. The develop-
ment of mechanical interlocking systems dates back to the late 19th century. In mechanical
interlocking, points and signals are operated by the muscle-power of the local operator. The
levers are connected to the controlled track elements by mechanical wire or rod transmission.
To compensate for the lack of an electrical monitoring of the point positions, facing points are
often equipped with an independent point lock, which is operated by a separate lever. Since
the maximum control distance of points is limited to about 400 m (for signals about 1200 m),
large track layouts are often divided into different locally staffed interlocking stations. The first
electromechanical interlocking systems were developed at the beginning of the 20th century.
In electromechanical interlocking, points and signals are controlled either by electric motor
drives or electro-pneumatic drives. The leverframe consists of miniature levers that are actually
electrical switches but also still mechanically interlocked. Point positions are electrically moni-
tored.
While developed more than 100 years ago, there are still interlocking systems of that genera-
tion in use, outside the core network even in some developed countries. They are expected to
disappear within the next decade, however.
Relay Interlocking Systems

In relay interlocking systems, the control logic is realised by relay circuitry without any mechan-
ical elements. The circuitry may be based either on tabular interlocking with a free-wired logic,
or on geographical interlocking. Points and signals are no longer operated by levers but by
simple push buttons usually located in an illuminated geographical track diagram. The devel-
opment of relay interlocking systems already started in the 1920s. They were the dominating
interlocking technology in the 2nd half of the 20th century. In many countries, they are still used
in big numbers. In some countries, they are even still the dominating interlocking technology.
Computer-based Interlocking Systems

In a computer-based interlocking system, the control logic is represented by software. The first
computer-based interlocking systems were developed in the 1980s. In the 1990s, for new in-
stallations, more and more railways switched from relay interlocking to computer-based inter-
locking. On many railways, the track elements controlled by computer-based interlockings
have already outnumbered the elements controlled by older interlocking generations.
Key Interlocking of Hand-throw Points

Key interlocking is used to interlock hand-throw points at which a siding is connected to a main
track. It is a feature to be found in all generations of interlocking systems. For key interlocking,
hand-throw points are equipped with a key point lock for each position the points can be locked
in. The key locks are designed in a way that the key can only be removed from the lock when
the points are properly locked in the position that corresponds to that key. Some points may
be equipped with double key locks designed in a way that by unlocking the points another key
will be released to unlock other points.
Normally, the key is held in an electric key device controlled by the interlocking system. When
a route is set through the points, the key is electrically locked in that device. The electric key
device is controlled by the interlocking system like a trackside element. The proper position of
the points is checked by the presence of the corresponding key in the device. The locking is
effected by locking the key in the device preventing it from being removed to unlock the points.
To enable a shunting move to go into the siding, the electric key instrument is released by the
control centre (Figure 3.19 a). When having removed the key, a member of the shunting crew
would open the lock to move the points of the main track turnout. This lock is often designed
as a double key lock releasing another key to open a flank point or a derailer protecting the
main track. After having cleared the main track, a member of the shunting crew would move
the points to normal position, lock everything, and return the final key into the electric key
device (Figure 3.19 b). Now, the control centre could set routes for trains passing on the main
track.
Figure 3.19 Example for key interlocking
3.4 Handling Interlocking Failures

If an interlocking signal doesn't clear as expected, there are three possible causes:
• The route is rejected by the interlocking system.

• The route is not rejected by the interlocking, but route setting has not been completed
correctly.
• For interlocking signals leading into a block section: The route is not rejected but the
interlocking signal is locked by the block system.
Before taking any action to bypass safety functions under staff responsibility, the operator has
to clearly identify, which of the three situations is relevant. If the route is rejected by the inter-
locking system, the operator has at first to check whether the route is still blocked by conflicting
moves, by trackside elements manually locked on the user interface, or by locked trackside
elements that have not correctly released after a train or shunting move has passed. If the
route is still blocked by a conflicting move, the operator has to wait until that move has cleared
the relevant track elements. If the route is blocked by trackside elements manually locked on
the user interface, the operator has to check whether it's safe to remove the lockings or to wait
until it will be safe to do so. If trackside elements have not correctly released after the last
move, the operator has to check that the last move has safely cleared the relevant elements.
Then it is safe to execute an emergency route release. The safety procedure to perform an
emergency route release very depends on the operating rules and interlocking principles of
individual railways. While some railways enforce emergency route release just by automatic
recording, most railways delay the execution of the release command by time locking.
If route setting has not completed correctly, the operator has to identify the track elements that
prevent the signal from being cleared. Then, a safe route has to be established under staff
responsibility. For this, there are three different cases:
• Route locking is in effect and displayed on the user interface.

• Route locking is not in effect but the position of all movable track elements is correctly
indicated on the user interface.
• Route locking is not in effect and the position of movable track elements cannot be
checked on the user interface.
If route locking is in effect and correctly displayed on the user interface, the operator may trust
that all movable track elements are locked in the proper position. There is no need to apply
manual lockings for trackside elements on the user interface. Before authorising the train to
pass the interlocking signal in stop position, the operator just has to check that the track is
clear or, if not possible, order the train to proceed through the route on sight. If route locking is
not in effect, the operator has to bring all movable track elements manually into the proper
position and secure them by applying manual lockings on the user interface. If route locking is
not in effect and the position of movable track elements cannot be checked on the user inter-
face, the relevant elements must be secured on site by applying mechanical key locks. In
centralised operations, this is usually done by a maintainer who has to confirm that the ele-
ments have been secured in the proper position. The need for applying the lockings on site
may lead to severe delays. In all cases in which route locking is not in effect, automatic point
setting must be switched off before authorising the train to pass the interlocking signal in stop
position to prevent any points in the route to be moved unintentionally.
In all cases in which a train is authorised to pass an interlocking signal leading into a block
section in stop position, beside the procedures described here, the operator has also to apply
the degraded mode procedures for the block system as described in the paragraph on block
system failures.
Sometimes, a need may arise to cancel a locked route without having a train passed. An ex-
ample is a situation in which a signal has been cleared for a train to depart from a platform
track but the train cannot depart due to an engine problem. In such a case, the operator has
to restore the signal and to cancel the route. Another situation is a wrongly selected route. This
may occur by mistake of the operator or by a malfunction of the automatic route setting system.
It is always safe to cancel a route as long no train is approaching the signal that governs the
route. With a train approaching, before releasing the route under staff responsibility, the oper-
ator has at first to reset the signal to stop. On railways where route cancellation of a route with
a train approaching is not protected by time locking, the operator has to make sure that the
train has safely come to a stop before releasing the route.
4 AUTOMATIC TRAIN PROTECTION
Automatic Train Protection (ATP) systems transmit information on movement authorities and
speed limits from the line to the train to initiate an automatic brake application if the train vio-
lates the valid limits. In train control with lineside signals, an ATP system works in addition to
the lineside signals and with the main purpose of preventing trains from violating stop signals.
On cab signalling lines, the ATP system provides the guiding information for the cab signal
indication.
4.1 Classification of ATP Systems

Concerning the form of data transmission between track and train, there is a general distinction
between intermittent and continuous ATP systems. In an intermittent ATP system, the data is
transmitted to the train at discrete points along the track. Data transmission points are provided
at signals and sometimes at selected intermediate locations between signals. While different
solutions can be found in existing systems, the most commonly used solution is to use induc-
tive transponders for data transmission. Intermittent ATP systems are mainly an add-on to
lineside signals with the main purpose to prevent trains from overrunning stop signals. When
approaching a stop signal, the train will get a first data transmission at the beginning of the
braking distance. That data transmission initiates a braking curve supervision forcing the train
to slow down to a speed at which the train can be brought to a stop within the overlap distance.
When violating the stop signal at that speed, the train will come to a stop before the danger
point. When passing the signal after it has been cleared, the data point at the signal will up-
grade the supervised speed in the on-board unit. To avoid a negative impact on capacity by
forcing trains to approach a cleared signal at a slow speed until the speed limit will be upgraded
by the data point at the signal, additional data points may be provided on the approach of the
signal. When passing such an infill data point after the signal has been cleared, the speed limit
will be upgraded immediately.
Continuous ATP systems transmit control data continuously from track to train. This enables
the ATP system not only to protect but also to guide the train. The control data transmitted to
the train is used for the cab signal indication. Lineside signals are no longer needed but may
be provided for degraded mode operations. For data transmission, the following principles are
used:
• Data transmission by coded track circuits (pulse or frequency code)

• Data transmission using a cable loop track antenna
• Radio-based data transmission in combination with transponders for the purpose of
train location.
Note: In the public transport domain, train control based on a continuous ATP system with two-
way data transmission between track and train and a continuous train detection eliminating the
need for track clear detection technology is known as Communication-Based Train Control
(CBTC). Since this term is not used outside the public transport domain, it is also not used
here. Different from the ATP systems used on standard railways, CBTC systems are usually
closer integrated with the interlocking system to form a common control system for a public
transport line or network.
Today, a big number of different national ATP systems exists. Also, there are still railways that
do either not yet have any ATP systems or just very simple ones. Today, there are three big
international ATP project to replace older systems for better interoperability and to be used in
all new installation:
• The European Train Control System (ETCS)

• The Chinese Train Control System (CTCS)
• The North American Positive Train Control System (PTC)
Existing installations of older ATP systems are gradually replaced by systems covered by these
projects. That is, why the following paragraphs concentrate on the principles behind these
three system families. For a description of principles used in older ATP systems, see (Theeg
& Vlasenko, 2020).
4.2 European Train Control System (ETCS)

For the European railway system, one of the big challenges is to improve interoperability. One
of the key points to be solved in cross-border operation is the interoperability of ATP systems.
While on European mainlines, ATP is a standard feature, the variety of existing ATP systems
is enormous (Bailey, 1995). With a very few exceptions, ATP systems change at any national
border. Today, the only solution for cross-border operation is either to change locomotives at
national borders or to use expensive multi-equipped locomotives. To overcome this situation,
the ETCS project was launched.
4.2.1 ETCS and ERTMS
ETCS stands for European Train Control System and is a layer (i.e., a sub-project) of the
European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS). Today, the ERTMS just consists of the
ETCS and the digital radio system GSM-R. While ETCS represents the train control part of
ERTMS, the GSM-R provides the wireless communication system needed for the higher ETCS
levels. GSM-R is not only needed for the ETCS but has also replaced the older radio systems
for general voice and data communication in railway operations. It is based on the public GSM
standard but provides some specific features needed in train control. Since GSM is already an
outdated mobile communication standard, it will be replaced in the next years by the FRMCS
(Future Rail Mobile Communication System), which is based on 5G radio technology.
Originally, the ERTMS also contained a traffic management layer consisting of a train infor-
mation system (TIS) for tracking trains in international freight corridors and a project to harmo-
nise interlocking principles (Winter, 2009). Later, the traffic management layer was removed
from the ERTMS and transformed into separate projects. While the TIS is already successfully
applied on international freight corridors across Europe, the harmonisation of interlocking prin-
ciples is still at an early stage.
The idea of ETCS is to gradually replace the existing ATP systems by an advanced train control
system. In that system, train control information can be transmitted by transponders (so-called
Eurobalises), short loop antennas (so-called Euroloops), or by digital radio.
4.2.2 ETCS Levels
Based on the different communication technologies, several levels have been specified for the
trackside equipment (Stanley, 2011). By these levels, the ETCS can be adapted to different
operating needs. In all these levels, the same on-board equipment is used.
ETCS Level 1
In Level 1, ETCS works as an advanced intermittent ATP system. Train control information is
transmitted by controlled transponders, which get their information from the traditional signal-
ling system via a lineside electronic unit (Figure 4.1).
Figure 4.1 ETCS level 1
When approaching a stop signal, a transponder at the beginning of the braking distance will
transmit data to calculate the brake supervision curve in the on-board unit. The train will have
to follow this curve until having reached a so-called release speed. At this speed, the signal
can be passed. If the driver passes a stop signal at release speed, the train will get an emer-
gency brake intervention and be brought to a safe stop within the overlap. The system guar-
anties that the train will never violate the danger point at the end of the overlap (the so-called
supervised location). If the signal has been cleared in the meantime, the transponder at the
signal will upgrade the on-board unit to the speed permitted in the section beyond the signal.
To improve capacity, a train approaching a stop signal may be released from the braking curve
supervision after the signal has been cleared by transmitting infill information. As shown in
Figure 4.2, infill information may be provided by additional transponders (spot infill), a loop
antenna (loop infill), or by digital radio (radio infill).
ETCS level 1 can be operated either in full supervision or in limited supervision mode. In full
supervision, the train speed is permanently supervised by the ETCS. If loop or radio infill infor-
mation is provided at all points that may limit a movement authority, trains can be governed by
cab signals without need for lineside signals. Without such infill information, lineside signals of
some kind are still needed. After a train has stopped at a signal, the authority to proceed cannot
be transmitted by the ETCS. After the signal has cleared, the driver may proceed at release
speed. When having reached the transponder at the signal, the locomotive device will read the
electronic movement authority and upgrade the cab display.
Figure 4.2 Infill solutions for ETCS level 1
This procedure does not require full-equipped lineside signals. Instead, ETCS stop markers
with a single signal light indicating that the transponder contains a valid authority are a suffi-
cient solution (Figure 4.3). However, full-equipped signals may be provided for degraded mode
operations and mixed traffic with non-equipped trains.
Figure 4.3 ETCS stop marker with authority indicator
In limited supervision, the ETCS emulates the functionality of a traditional intermittent ATP
system. In this mode, trains are always governed by lineside signals while the ETCS supervi-
sion works in the background.
ETCS Level 2
In Level 2, ETCS works as a continuous ATP system in which the train control data is trans-
mitted by digital radio. Non-controlled transponders are used as reference points (‘electronic
mileposts’) for the on-board train location system. In specified intervals, trains automatically
transmit their location data to a Radio Block Centre (RBC) that issues the movement authori-
ties to the trains. The RBS is connected to the interlocking system. When route setting for a
train movement has been completed, the route data is transmitted to the RBC to generate the
movement authority.
Figure 4.4 ETCS level 2 without train integrity monitoring
There are two options for track clear detection. On lines without on-board monitoring of train
integrity, track clear detection is effected by track circuits or axle counters (Figure 4.4). Lineside
signals are not needed but may be provided for degraded mode operations or mixed traffic
with non-equipped trains. Most railways prefer to replace controlled signals by ETCS stop
markers that must not be passed without valid authority. Depending on the operating rules of
individual railways, intermediate block sections may be limited by ETCS location markers.
Since these ETCS location markers do not provide an absolute stop indication, the design
differs from the ETCS stop markers (Figure 4.5).
Figure 4.5 ETCS markers on a Level 2 line without lineside signals
Today, the rules concerning the application of the ETCS stop and location markers are not yet
completely harmonised between individual railways. Due to different rules for shunting move-
ments, some railways use specific ETCS boards for vehicles running in ETCS shunting mode,
while other railways don’t.
If ETCS Level 2 is combined with on-board monitoring of train integrity, conventional track clear
detection devices are no longer needed (Figure 4.6). Until 2023, that form of ETCS Level 2
was officially called Level 3. Later, it was integrated into Level 2 because the principles of how
trains are guided do not differ. Together with train location data, trains also confirm train integ-
rity to the RBC. So, the RBC can calculate the authority limit for a train from the position the
rear end of a train ahead has safely cleared. By this, that kind of ETCS Level 2 is not only an
ATP and cab signal system but provides a radio-based train separation replacing the traditional
block systems.
Figure 4.6 ETCS Level 2 with train integrity monitoring
Due to the absence of traditional track clear detection technology, lineside signals for degraded
mode operations cannot be used. Depending on the operational needs, train separation can
be effected by virtual or moving block.
With virtual block, virtual block sections are established in the control system without having
real physical block sections on the line. While these virtual block sections are not equipped
with track clear detection technology, the block limits may be marked by ETCS location mark-
ers for degraded mode operations. The location information received from the trains by radio
is transformed into information showing occupied and clear virtual block sections. Movement
authority is provided by allocating a number of block sections to a train. The end of movement
authority is in any case the limit of a virtual block section (Figure 4.7 a). Different from moving
block, the movement authority is not to be upgraded continuously with the movement of the
rear end of the train ahead but in accordance with the release of the virtual block sections. This
will significantly reduce the radio traffic for the transmission of guiding data from the RBC to
the train. Depending on traffic demands, the operational performance may be flexibly adjusted
by reconfiguring the virtual blocks in the control system without changing any field installations.
In a moving block system, a train clears the track behind its rear end in accordance with the
tracking intervals of train location (Figure 4.7 b). Moving block makes only sense on lines with
a very high density of one-directional traffic with harmonized speed profiles. The typical moving
block application is a mass transit railway. On standard railways, in most cases, virtual block
will be a more efficient solution. That is why most railways are today rather interested in virtual
block than in moving block.
Figure 4.7 Virtual block and moving block
Figure 4.8 shows the guiding and supervision principle for a train guided by cab signalling in
ETCS level 2. The essential curve from which everything is derived is the EBD curve (for
'Emergency Brake Deceleration'). This is kind of a worst-case braking curve that can always
be safely guaranteed, even if the braking system is not fully available. This curve has a flatter
shape than an emergency braking curve when the full braking performance is available. The
target point of the EMD curve is the the supervised location (danger point). So, even if parts of
the braking system are not working, the EMD curve always guarantees that the train will never
violate the supervised location.
The starting point of the EMD curve, i.e., the intersection of the EMD curve with the ceiling
speed, is preceded by the EMI curve (from 'Emergency Brake Intervention') at which the emer-
gency brake application is initiated. The distance between EMI and EMD is the reaction time
of the braking system. The target point of the EBI curve is also the supervised location. As an
option, the EMI curve may be preceded an SBI curve (from 'Service Brake Intervention') at
which a normal service brake application is initiated. The target point of the SBI curve is the
end of authority. If SBI is not sufficient to slow down the train, the brake application will be
upgraded to an emergency brake application at the EMI point. The SBI option is not used on
all railways. For not overloading the diagram of Figure 4.8 with too many curves, SBI and EBI
are just shown by the relevant points on the ceiling speed for an individual train.
If the train violates the permitted speed, i.e., the guiding curve of the cab signalling, a brake
application is not immediately initiated. As long the train has not yet reached the SBI or EBI
point, the driver will just get a warning as a reminder to comply with the permitted speed. To
support the driver, the permitted speed is preceded by an indication curve at which the driver
is advised to start braking for not violating the permitted speed.
Figure 4.8 Guiding and supervision principle in ETCS Level 2
If the overlap is reduced by moving the supervised location closer to the end of authority, the
EMD curve and all the preceding points are moved against the direction of travel. Since the
target points of the permitted speed curve is still the end of authority, this will result in a longer
and flatter guiding curve while the shape of the EMD curve will not change.
ETCS Level 2 HD
ETCS Level 2 with on-board monitoring of train integrity requires all trains to be equipped with
that technology. For passenger trains, this can be achieved by using existing electric lines
through the train consist. In conventional freight operations, such an electric communications
line through the train consist does not yet exist. Several European railway are currently working
on the development of a so-called digital automatic coupler. That new coupler requires the
freight wagons to be equipped with an electric data line that is connected when vehicles are
coupled.
With that development, we may see the first freight trains with on-board checking of train in-
tegrity in the near future. A complete migration of the new couplers will take decades, however.
Thus, for a rather long period of time, we will see mixed traffic of trains with and without on-
board monitoring of train integrity. To enable an application of ETCS Level 2 with on-board
monitoring of train integrity under that condition, a hybrid solution combining the two ETCS
Level 2 versions is preferred by several railways. In that hybrid solution ETCS Level 2 with
virtual block sections that are overlaid by longer block sections still controlled by track clear
detection technology. Trains with on-board monitoring of train integrity would occupy and re-
lease the line according with the virtual block sections. Non-equipped trains may occupy the
line according with the virtual block sections but can only release the line according with the
longer block sections controlled by track clear detection technology. That ETCS version is
called ETCS Level 2 HD (for ‘high density’).
For the minimum line headway between two trains, it is always relevant whether or not the first
train is equipped with train integrity monitoring. With an increasing share of trains equipped
with train integrity monitoring, the capacity will be improving without changing anything on the
infrastructure. Figure 4.9 demonstrates that principle by a blocking time diagram. For the min-
imum line headway between two trains, it is always relevant whether or not the first train is
equipped with train integrity monitoring. With an increasing share of trains equipped with train
integrity monitoring, the capacity will be improving without changing anything on the infrastruc-
ture.
Figure 4.9 Blocking time stairways in ETCS Level 2 HD with virtual block
ETCS Level STM/NTC

The ETCS Level STM/NTC, was originally not a part of the ETCS specification but was added
later. STM stands for Specific Transmission Module. It is a specific on-board device that ena-
bles an ETCS controlled vehicle to run on lines not yet equipped with ETCS but with an older
ATP system. For this, the vehicles must be equipped with antennas needed to read information
provided by the old system. In the STM, the data received from the old systems is transformed
into the ETCS data format so the control information can be displayed to the driver on the
ETCS user interface. However, the degree of control and protection very depends on the ca-
pabilities of the old system. In new installations, that level is called NTC for National Train
Control.
The STM was developed as a temporary solution to support migration from old systems to
ETCS. There are contrary arguments on the usefulness of this approach, however. The key
objective of ETCS is interoperability without multi-equipped locomotives. The STM approach
is still based on locomotives equipped with multiple antenna systems but reduces the need for
a fast roll-out of trackside ETCS installations. This might finally not enhance but slow down the
ETCS migration process.
4.3 Chinese Train Control System (CTCS)

For years, the Chinese railway network has been extensively growing. China already has the
world’s largest high speed rail network. All new and upgraded lines are equipped with the
CTCS – the Chinese Train Control System. The CTCS is based on ETCS technology with
some modifications to meet the specific operational requirements of Chinese railways. Differ-
ent from the ETCS approach, there is no separation between the computer-based interlocking
system and the Radio Block Centre. Instead, there is one integrated control system for inter-
locking and train control. For continuous transmission of train control data, either radio trans-
mission by GSM-R or coded track circuits are used. For the use of coded track circuits, a
separate level was defined that has no equivalent in the ETCS specification (Table 3).
In this level, jointless frequency-coded track circuits are used. Location reference is provided
by additional transponders of the Eurobalise type. The continuous data transmission by the
coded track circuits may be supported by intermittent transmission by controlled transponders.
Table 3.3 compares the numbering of ETCS and CTCS levels.
Table 3 Comparision of ETCS and CTCS levels
Functionality ETCS CTCS
Intermittent ATP Level 1 Level 1
Continuous ATP with coded track circuits - Level 2
Continuous ATP with data transmission

Level 2 Level 3
by radio
Continuous ATP with data transmission
Level 2 Level 4
by radio and train integrity monitoring
CTCS Level 2 may be used up to a speed of 250 km/h. Lines operated at a speed exceeding
250 km/h must be equipped with CTCS Level 3. CTCS level 4, which is an equivalent to ETCS
Level 2 with on-board train integrity monitoring, is not yet in operation. However, since Chinese
high speed lines are separated from the conventional network, there are some chances to
have the first lines equipped with level 4 in the near future.
4.4 Positive Train Control (PTC)

Positive Train Control (PTC) is a concept from North America that is in some aspects similar
to the ETCS, while other aspects are quite different. The objective of PTC is not to improve
interoperability but to enhance safety. With just a few exceptions, the majority of the North
American rail lines was not equipped with ATP. As stated earlier, a significant share of the
lines are even ‘dark territories’, i.e., lines operated under simplified operating procedures with-
out a signal-controlled operation. In 2008, as a consequence of several severe rail accidents,
US congress issued the Railroad Safety Improvement Act (often referred to as the ‘PTC man-
date’), which enforces the introduction of PTC. By the definition of that act, PTC is a safety
system that prevents:
• Train-to-train collisions
• Overspeed derailments
• Incursions into established work zone limits
• Train movements through points in the wrong position
Installation of PTC is mandatory on main lines with passenger traffic, on lines with a high traffic
density, and on lines with regular transport of hazardous materials.
On signal-controlled lines, trains are provided clear and safe track sections by the signalling
system. The only function to be added by PTC is a continuous ATP system for speed control
and enforcement of the authority limits. This is very similar to the philosophy of ETCS Level 2.
However, PTC can also provide an integrated protection of following trains based on the mov-
ing block principle. This is quite similar to the approach of ETCS Level 2 with on-board train
integrity monitoring.
A significant difference from ETCS is the protection of hand-throw points on unsignalled lines.
For this, point positions are monitored to prevent trains from running through turnouts if the
points are not properly set. That function is nonexistent in ETCS, since even the most simplified
ETCS applications are always based on interlocked points with centralised control.
Different from ETCS, PTC is not a technical specification but a set of safety functions defined
independently of the technology. At the beginning, interoperability was not mandatory. The
four leading Class I railways (Union Pacific, BNSF, CSX, Norfolk Southern) have agreed on a
common standard to ensure an interoperable systems design. Later, that standard became
mandatory for all new PTC implementations. Another difference from ETCS is the use of GPS
as the primary train location system. PTC can be used either as a system to govern train
movements directly, or as an overlay system to existing train control systems.
PTC may be implemented in three different levels:
• Non-vital overlay
• Vital overlay
• Vital stand-alone
When PTC is used as a non-vital overlay, trains are still governed by conventional systems
(signal indications or verbal authorities). PTC just acts as a safety overlay in the background.
In a vital overlay PTC implementation, trains are governed by PTC while the block and inter-
locking functions are provided by conventional CTC. As a vital stand-alone system, PTC will
replace the conventional CTC systems and integrate all signalling and train control functions
into one system. All currently planned PTC project follow either the non-vital or vital overlay
approach. Signalling companies are also working on solutions for vital stand-alone PTC sys-
tems to be used in future projects.
By the end of 2020, US railways had completed PTC implementation on all lines that fall under
the PTC mandate. That is about one third of the US rail network. While PTC is a North Ameri-
can development, there are also some project in South America and Africa.
5 LEVEL CROSSINGS
At level crossings, rail traffic has absolute priority. While the design differs a little from country
to country, a St. Andrew’s cross is used everywhere to mark a level crossing for road users.
Depending on the traffic density on the road and the characteristics of the railway line, different
protection measures are used.
5.1 Level Crossing Protection

Concerning the protection measures, there are three types of level crossings:
• Level crossings without traffic light protection

• Level crossings protected by traffic lights without barriers
• Level crossings protected by traffic lights with barriers
Level crossings without traffic light protection are just marked by a St. Andrew’s cross. Road
users must have a clear view on the railway line to be able to stop safely when a train is
approaching. For this, an approaching train must be clearly visible from a distance at which a
road user approaching the level crossing can make a clear decision whether or not it will be
safe to pass the level crossing. That distance includes the braking distance and a sufficient
reaction time for the decision making of the driver. The distance from the decision point on the
road and the needed approach distance on the railway line form a viewing triangle that must
be kept clear of any view-blocking items. That triangle is calculated both for a slow and for a
fast road user. The two triangles are put one above the other to get the entire area that must
be kept clear (Figure 5.1). Additionally, trains approaching the level crossing would warn road
users by repeated whistle signals. This very simple form of protection is only acceptable on
secondary railway lines with a low speed and density of traffic.
Figure 5.1 Viewing triangles for a fast (1) and a slow (2) road user
On level crossings protected by traffic lights, stop lights for road users are activated when a
train is approaching. Depending on the national road traffic regulations, the stop indication is
given either by flashing or steady red lights. In some countries, the traffic light will at first show
a yellow light and then switch to red. While in most countries, the traffic lights are just dark as
long no train is approaching, in some countries, a clear indication is given (usually a green or
white light).
The traffic lights must be activated a sufficient time ahead of an approaching train so that road
users that have already passed the beginning of the stopping distance can still safely pass the
level crossing. This time is called the level crossing approach time (not to be confused with the
approach time in blocking time calculations). The level crossing approach time is calculated
from the maximum time a road user needs from the beginning of the stopping distance until
having cleared the level crossing by full vehicle length plus a safety margin of a few seconds.
On level crossings protected by traffic lights with barriers, there is another constraint. When
the traffic lights are activated, the barriers must not be closed immediately. After the traffic
lights are activated, road users that have already passed the beginning of the stopping dis-
tance must still be able to pass through the open barriers. The so called pre-signalling time
from activating the traffic lights until closing the barriers is calculated from the maximum time
a road user needs from the beginning of the stopping distance until having cleared the barriers
by full vehicle length. The level crossing approach time is the total of that pre-signalling time,
the time for closing the barriers, and a safety margin. On level crossings protected by full bar-
riers, i.e., barriers blocking all lanes of the road, it must be checked that no road user is acci-
dently locked between the barriers. This can be done either by operators checking the clear-
ance of the level crossing visually (either on site of by remote cameras) or automatically by
radar scanners. On level crossing protected by half barriers, the clearance of the level crossing
is not monitored because the leaving lane is not blocked, so that road users cannot be locked
in.
5.2 Control and Monitoring of Level Crossings

A level crossing protected by traffic lights or by traffic lights with barriers can be controlled in
three ways:
• manually controlled level crossings

• automatic level crossings
• level crossings controlled by the interlocking system
Pure level crossing operators are almost extinct today. Level crossings controlled by a local
operator are still to be found at locally staffed interlocking stations. There, the level crossing is
usually interlocked with controlled signals. Level crossings may also be controlled by an oper-
ator in a control centre who monitors the level crossing by remote cameras. Sometimes, the
level crossing protection is manually activated by the operator but automatically deactivated
by trackside devices after the passage of the train.
At automatic level crossings, traffic lights and barriers are activated by trackside devices (rail
contacts, track circuits) placed at the required distance on the approach of the level crossing.
After the passage of a train, trackside devices will also check that the train has cleared the
level crossing so that it is safe to automatically open the barriers and switch off the traffic lights.
Automatic level crossings may be monitored by a remote monitoring device, by a driver’s cross-
ing indicator, or by a main signal. A remote monitoring device will check the proper working of
the level crossing protection for any train passing. Also, the trackside devices for the detection
of an approaching train are permanently monitored. If a malfunction is detected, the operator
in the control centre will be alerted. Then, all trains must be given an order to pass through
that level crossing cautiously until a signal maintainer has restored normal operation.
At level crossing monitored by a driver’s crossing indicator, a lineside indicator is placed at the
braking distance on the approach of the level crossing. When approaching the level crossing,
the train has to check the proper working of the level crossing protection by that indicator. If
the traffic lights have been correctly activated by the approaching train, the driver will get an
indication that the train may pass the level crossing without restrictions. If the protection was
not correctly activated, the driver will get a warning indication to slow down the train and pass
the level crossing with caution.
At automatic level crossings monitored by a main signal, a main signal protecting the level
crossing will only clear when the level crossing protection has been correctly activated by an
approaching train. When, in case of a level crossing malfunction, a train has to be authorised
by the operator to pass that main signal in stop position, the driver must be ordered to pass
the level crossing protected by that signal with caution. On lines with bidirectional operation, a
level crossing may be monitored by a main signal in one direction but by a driver’s crossing
indicator in the opposing direction.
Figure 5.2 Calculation of the initiation section
Level crossings controlled by the interlocking system are part of a locked route and therefore
interlocked with the signal governing the route. The level crossing protection is activated by
the route setting and deactivated by the passage of the train through the level crossing. In case
of malfunction of the level crossing, the signal governing the route will not clear. It shall be
noted that there may also be automatic level crossings inside of interlocking areas. These level
crossings are not part of locked routes but may be monitored by an interlocking signal.
5.3 Calculation of the Initiation Section

The initiation section is the distance at which an approaching train has to activate the level
crossing protection. That distance depends on the monitoring principle (Figure 5.2). At re-
motely monitored level crossings, the length of the initiation section is calculated from the line
speed and the necessary approach time. At level crossings monitored by a driver’s crossing
indicator, the level crossing protection must be activated a sufficient time on the approach of
the crossing indicator to enable the driver to watch the clear indication. The signal watching
time is the same time as needed at a lineside signal providing an approach indication for the
signal ahead as explained in Chapter 2 in the paragraph on the blocking time model. The
initiation section is significantly longer than on a remotely monitored level crossing and will
extend the time the level crossing is blocked for road users. At level crossings monitored by a
main signal, the initiation section is extended by the distance between the main signal and the
level crossing. This will also further extend the time the level crossing is blocked for road users.
REFERENCES
Armstrong, H.: The railroad, what it is, what it does, 5th Edition, Simmons-Boardman Books,
Omaha 2008
Aubertin, F. J.: Your Guide to Railway Signals. Simmons-Boardman Books, Inc.. Omaha 2018
Bailey, C. (Editor): European Railway Signalling. Institution of Railway Signal Engineers. A &
C Black, London 1995
Bisset, K.; Rowbotham, T.; Thurston, D.; Burkhardt, R.; Power, J.; Hoelscher, J.: Introduction
to North American Railway Signaling. Institution of Railway Signal Engineers. Simmons-Board-
man Books, Inc.. Omaha 2008
Chandra, S.; Agarwal, M.M.: Railway Engineering. Oxford University Press 2008
Dougherty, P.: Tracks of the New York City Subway. New York City 2018
Hansen, I.; Pachl, J. (editors): Railway Timetabling & Operations – Analysis, Modelling, Opti-
misation, Simulation, Performance Evaluation. Eurailpress, Hamburg 2014
Pachl, J.: Railway operation and control, 4th Edition, VTD Rail Publishing, Mountlake Terrace
2018
Stanley, P. (editor): ETCS for Engineers. Eurailpress, Hamburg 2011
Theeg, G.; Vlasenko, S. (editors): Railway Signalling and Interlocking – International Compen-
dium. Eurailpress, 3rd Edition, Hamburg 2020
UIC: ERTMS Glossary. English – French – German. International Union of Railways (UIC), 1st
Edition, Paris 2012
White, T.: Elements of Train Dispatching, Vol. 1. VTD Rail Publishing, Mountlake Terrace 2003
Winter, P. (editor): Compendium on ERTMS – European Rail Traffic Management System.

Eurailpress, Hamburg 2009
SYMBOLS IN DIAGRAMS
The symbols for track and signal diagrams resemble the German standard but are used in a
generic way not referring to a particular railway.
The symbols used in activity diagrams are a subset of the SysML/UML notation.
GLOSSARY
Absolute signal - A signal that must not be passed in stop position without permission from
the operator.
Approach locking - Form of route locking that comes into force after the train has occupied
the approach section.
Approach time - 1) The running time between a signal that provides an approach indication
and the following signal. 2) The time, level crossing protection must be activated ahead of an
approaching train.
Automatic block system - A block system in which the signals work automatically. Lines with
an automatic block system must be equipped with track clear detection.
Automatic signal - A signal that works automatically by the passage of the train through track
sections.
Automatic Train Protection (ATP) - A system that transmits information about movement
authorities and speed limits from the line to the train to cause automatic braking if the train
ignores the valid limits.
Axle counter - A track clear detection system consisting of counting points at both ends of a
section and a counter connected to the counting points. The occupancy of a section is detected
by comparing the number of axles that enter the section with the number of axles that leave
the section.
Block section - A section of track in a fixed block system, which a train may only enter if the
section is not occupied by other vehicles.
Block signal - A main signal that governs train movements into a block section.
Block system - A signalling system that provides a safe spacing of trains. Block systems may
be divided into fixed block systems and moving block systems.
Blocking time - The minimum time interval that must be kept clear for the non-delayed pas-
sage of a train through a track section.
Cab signaling - A signalling system that displays the movement authorities on the driver's
desk.
Clearing point - A point a train must have cleared completely before a signal in rear may be
cleared or a locked route may be released.
Controlled signal - A signal that is controlled by an operator.
Control length of a signal - The length of track beyond a signal that must be clear and safe
before the signal can be cleared for a train movement.
Crossing - An intersection of two tracks at grade.
Derailer - A flank protection device that would derail an unsafe movement before it could join
the protected route.
Direction locking - A form of opposite locking in which a locked direction is established that
holds opposing signals in stop position. Direction locking may be in effect on a block line that
consists of several block sections.
Distant signal - A signal that provides an approach indication to a signal but that cannot show
a stop aspect. A distant signal does not limit a block section.
Double slip - A crossing combined with four pairs of points to provide slip connections at both
sides of the crossing.
Driver’s crossing indicator - A lineside indicator placed at the braking distance on the ap-
proach of a level crossing, by which the driver can check the proper working of the level cross-
ing protection.
Dual called points - Another term for selective protective points.
Dwarf signal - A ground mounted signal.
Emergengy route release - A manually initiated release of a route or parts of a route if normal
route release fails after the passage of a train.
Entrance signal - An interlocking signal at a route entrance.
Exit signal - 1) A controlled signal that governs train movements to leave a station track. It is
also called a station exit signal. 2) A controlled signal at a route exit. It is also called a destina-
tion signal.
Facing point movement - A movement on a pair of points in which the point blades face
approaching traffic.
Fixed block system - A block system in which the track behind a train is sectionally cleared
in accordance with fixed block sections.
Flank area - The section of track between a flank protection device and the fouling point of the
route to be protected.
Flank points - Points that are locked in a protective position to provide flank protection to a
route.
Flank protection - A measure to prevent vehicles from running into a route, which is cleared
for a train movement.
Flank protection device - A trackside element that provides flank protection.
Flank transfer points - Points that are located in the flank area between an element that
provides remote flank protection and the route to be protected.
Fouling point - The limit of occupation of converging tracks at turnouts and crossings.
Geographical interlocking - An interlocking system in which the track elements are repre-
sented by logical objects connected to each other in form of the track layout.
Headway - The time or distance interval calculated from ‘head to head’ between two succes-
sive trains.
Home signal - 1) A signal governing entrance to an interlocking area. 2) A signal governing

entrance to a station area.
Initiation section - The distance at which an approaching train has to activate the level cross-
ing protection.
Insulated rail joint - A rail joint that ensures electrical insulation of adjacent rails to limit a track
circuit.
Interlocking - An arrangement of points and signals interconnected in a way that each move-
ment follows the other in a proper and safe sequence.
Interlocking signal - A controlled signal that governs a route within an interlocking.
Interlocking station – A locally staffed control room from which an interlocking area is con-
trolled.
Intermediate interlocking signal - An interlocking signal that is neither a home signal nor a
signal that governs a route to leave the interlocking area.
Intermediate points - Points that are located in a station track in a way that a train stopping
at its regular stopping position would not clear the points.
Intermittend ATP - An ATP system in which the data is transmitted to the train at discrete
points along the track.
Jointless track circuit - A track circuit that uses an AC audio frequency current, so that the
working length is limited by the capacitive and inductive track characteristics without a need
for insulated rail joints.
Key interlocking - A method to achieve interlocking between signals and hand-throw points
by mechanical key locks.
Line headway - The headway that results from the blocking time stairways of two successive
trains.
Main route - An route governed by a main signal.
Main signal - A signal that governs regular train movements. This term is used by many rail-
ways to distinguish these signals from shunting signals.
Main track - A track that may be used for regular train movements.
Manual block system - A block system in which the signals are controlled manually and the
clearing of the block sections is checked by local operators watching the rear end markers.
Moving block system - A block system in which the track behind a train is cleared continu-
ously.
Open line - Main tracks outside of station areas.
Operator - An employee who is in charge to authorise train and shunting movements.
Outer home signal - A controlled signal in approach to a home signal that does not directly
protect points but that may be interlocked with points within the overlap beyond the home
signal.
Overlap - A certain length of track beyond a signal that must be kept clear as long a train
movement is approaching that signal.
Permissive signal - A signal that may be cautiously passed in stop position after the train has
stopped at the signal. After having passed a permissive signal in stop position, the movement
through the next block section must be made cautiously on sight.
Point lock - A locking device that mechanically locks the points in a proper position to prevent
unintended movements of the point blades and movable frogs as long a train is running through
the points.
Point machine - A machine that drives points, movable frogs, or derailers.
Points - The movable parts of a turnout that are moved to set different routes.
Rear end marker - A marker at the rear end of a train.
Relay interlocking - An interlocking system in which the interlocking is achieved by relay cir-
cuits.
Remote flank protection - Flank protection that is provided by an element that is not directly
adjacent to the route to be protected.
Route cancellation - A manually initiated release of a route after having restored the signal.
Route control table - A tabular sheet that contains all interlocking conditions for a given layout.
Route locking - The locking of all points and flank protection devices as long as a route is set.
Route release - The release of locked points after the train has cleared the clearing point of a
route.
Running movement - Another term for a train movement.
Selective protective points - Flank points that may receive competing flank calls from differ-
ent routes.
Self-selective protective points - Protective points that could receive conflicting flank calls
from one train movement.
Semi-automatic block system - A block system in which the block locking after a train has
entered the block section is effected automatically, but the section has to be released manu-
ally.
Shared overlaps - A form of overlap protection in which two or more overlaps may share a
track section without causing a route conflict.
Shunt aspect - A proceed aspect allowing a shunting move to pass a signal.
Shunting - All movements other than train movements.
Shunting signal - A signal that is used to authorise shunting movements.
Shunting limits - An area marked by shunting limit boards or signals, shunting movements
must not leave.
Shunt route - A route governed by a shunting signal or the shunt aspect of a main signal.
Siding - A track that may not be used for regular train movements.
Signal aspect - The appearance of a lineside signal, as viewed from the direction of an ap-
proaching train, or the appearance of a cab signal.
Signal headway - The headway that results from the blocking times of two successive trains
in a single block section
Signal indication - The information that is given by a signal aspect.
Single slip - A crossing combined with two pairs of points to provide a slip connection at one
side of the crossing.
Station area - An arrangement of station tracks limited by opposing home signals.
Station exit signal - A controlled signal that governs train movements to leave a station track.
Station track - A main track protected by controlled signals within an interlocking area on
which trains may originate, terminate, pass, and turn.
Swinging overlap - A form of overlap protection in which the overlap can be switched into
another track without cancelling the route.
Tabular interlocking - An interlocking system in which the locking between signals and points
is achieved in form of a route locking table.
Time locking - An application that will hold a route locked for a specified time after the signal
has been manually restored.
Token block - A block system for single track operation in which the movement authority de-
pends on the possession of a token which is handed out to the train driver.
Track clear detection - A device that detects the occupation and clearance of a track section.
Track circuit - A track clear detection device consisting of an electrical circuit of which the
rails of a section form a part. The clearance of the section is detected by a detection device at
one end of the section which receives a current from a source at the other end of the section.
Traffic locking - A principle of protecting opposing movements on automatic block lines on

which automatic signals of both directions are cleared in normal state but automatically re-
stored to stop position (‘tumbled down’) by an opposing move.
Trailing point movement - A movement on a pair of points where the frog faces approaching
traffic.
Train movement - A locomotive or self-propelled vehicle, alone or coupled to one or more

vehicles, with authority to occupy a main track in accordance to rules specified for train move-
ments.
Turnout - An assembly of rails, movable points and a frog, which effect the tangential branch-
ing of tracks and allows trains or vehicles to run over one track or another.

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Prof. Dr.-Ing. Jörn Pachl, FIRSE

Professor of railway systems engineering at Technische Universität Braunschweig

Braunschweig, May 2024

4.2 European Train Control System (ETCS) .....................................................................63

1 BASIC ELEMENTS AND TERMS

1.1 Controlled Trackside Elements

1.1.1 Movable Track Elements

Figure 1.1 Components of a turnout

Figure 1.2 Movements on points

Figure 1.3 Crossings

Figure 1.4 Single and double slips

1.1.2 Lineside Signals

1.1.3 Track Clear Detection

Figure 1.5 Track circuit

Figure 1.6 Single-rail track circuits

Figure 1.7 Impedance bonds

Figure 1.8 S-shaped connector to separate jointless track circuits

Figure 1.9 Axle counter

1.2 Basic Operating Terms

• Tracks that may be used for regular train movements

Figure 1.10 Classification of tracks

Figure 1.11 Types of interlocking areas

Figure 1.12 Station area with intermediate interlocking signals

Movements with Railway Vehicles

The authorisation of a train movement has two elements:

• A proceed indication of a main signal

The authority of shunting movements is given by:

Figure 1.13 Shunting limits of a station area

Double Track Operations

Figure 1.14 Signal arrangements for double track operations

2.1 Theory of Train Separation

• Relative braking distance

Relative Braking Distance

Absolute Braking Distance

Figure 2.1 Principles of train separation

Fixed Block Distance

2.2 Train Control Principles

• How movement authority is transmitted from track to train

2.2.1 Train Control by Lineside Signals

Guiding Trains in Fixed Block Operation

• The train ahead must have cleared the block section

Figure 2.2 Control length of signals on a fixed block line

Lineside Signal Indications

Table 1 Basic signal indications

Stop Train must stop at the signal

Figure 2.3 Different Principles in the Application of the Approach Indication

Figure 2.4 Progressive speed signalling

Figure 2.5 Moving-up signal

The Blocking Time Model

Figure 2.6 Blocking time of a block section

Figure 2.7 Blocking time stairway

Figure 2.8 Signal headway and line headway

Figure 2.9 Blocking time stairways on a mass transit railway

The Protected Zone Model

Figure 2.10 The protected zone model

2.2.2 Train Control by Cab Signalling