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 Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 44, No. 3, Spring 2021

How Belt and Road Initiative

(BRI) and the China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC)
are Reshaping China’s Soft
Power?
Ayesha Siddique*
Saeed Shafqat*

Abstract
A rising and globalizing China has evoked mixed reactions. There is a growing
body of literature that highlights China’s military hegemonic tendencies. This has

*Ayesha Siddique is a Research Associate at the Centre for Public Policy and Governance.
She graduated summa cum laude from the Centre for Public Policy and Governance, Forman
Christian College University, Lahore, Pakistan with a Master of Philosophy (MPhil) in Public
Policy (2017-2019). Her dissertation focused on “Assessing China’s soft power in relation
to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor”. Her research interests include marketing and
corporate social responsibility, international financial regimes, and Pakistan-China relations.
*Saeed Shafqat, PhD is Professor and founding director of the Centre for Public Policy
and Governance at Forman Christian College University, Lahore, Pakistan. In 2019, the
French government honored him with the Ordre des Palmes académiques which is bestowed
on distinguished academics and teachers and for their contributions to the advancement
of culture and education. His previous academic positions include Quaid-i-Azam
Distinguished Professor and Chair at the Pakistan Center at Columbia University, Visiting
Professor of South Asian Studies, the College of Wooster, Ohio, Chief Instructor Civil
Services Academy. His current research is on China’s Rise and its impact across Greater
South Asia and the Gulf. His recent publications include: “China’s Rise: How is it Impacting
the Gulf, Iran, Pakistan and Beyond?” Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, March
2017) and Saeed Shafqat & Saba Shahid, “China, Pakistan Economic Corridor: Demands,
Dividends and Directions” (Lahore: Centre for Public Policy and Governance, 2018), and
Changing Dynamics of China-India Relations: CPEC and Prospects for Pakistan (Lahore: Centre
for Public Policy and Governance, 2020).

61
overshadowed the Chinese efforts at promoting co-operative interdependence, of
which the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a symbol and emerging reality. This
paper contextualizes the BRI, along with the China Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC), to examine and explore the symbols, tools and contours of the Chinese
soft power. This study contends that, despite apprehensions by critics about China’s
motives underlying the BRI, for the participant countries it offers infrastructural
development through economic investment and educational exchanges that showcase
Chinese culture and its soft power. Do the participating countries find these offers
appealing? This raises two critical questions: Does China’s economic development
oriented soft power through BRI obviates its military designs? Does China have the
tools that Joseph Nye conceptualizes for the soft power that a global power requires?
This study makes a critical appraisal of Joseph Nye’s concept of Soft Power and
analyses how the Chinese scholars and policy makers are transforming its usage and
conceptual applicability as China stands for globalization, multilateralism, common
and shared goals for the planet and humanity. Given COVID 19, China’s soft power
appeal could have political and security implications for the global world order.

Introduction
This paper contextualizes the BRI, along with the China Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC), to examine and explore the symbols, tools
and contours of the Chinese soft power. This study contends that, despite
apprehensions by critics about China’s motives underlying the BRI, for
the participant countries it offers infrastructural development through
economic investment in educational and cultural exchanges that showcase
Chinese culture and its soft power. Do the participating countries find these
offers appealing? This raises two critical questions: Does China’s economic
development oriented soft power through BRI obviates its military designs?
Does China have the tools that Joseph Nye conceptualizes for the soft power
that a global power requires? This paper is divided into three sections. The
first section provides a critical appraisal of Joseph Nye’s concept of “soft
power” and how the Chinese scholars and policy makers are employing it.
The second section analyses how the BRI has spurred academic educational
exchange processes, deepening people-to-people contact, engagement and
interconnectivity, thereby, providing a strong socio-cultural foundation
to the Chinese soft power. The third section explains the grand vision
underlying China’s BRI, which constitutes its soft power, and its linkage
with peace, security and hard power, as China stands for globalization,
multilateralism, common and shared goals for the planet and humanity.
Soft power is a quintessential component of a global power. American

62
soft power has grown along with its economic and military power, and is
best reflected through its tolerance for dissent, respect for human rights,
religious freedom, quality of higher education, Hollywood, and promotion
and protection of free market and democratic values. With the rise of China,
a critical question is being asked; does China have the soft power of a global
power? China’s rise is somewhat different, given that it has benefited from
the complex process of global interdependence and chosen to pursue
economic development through peace, continuity of policies and stability.
China is conveying to the world that hard and soft power have a symbiotic
interrelationship. Given COVID 19, China’s soft power appeal could have
political and security implications for the global world order, and the paper
alludes to some of the challenges arising out of it.

Smokescreen of Soft Power and ‘Hidden Military Motives’?

In the twenty-first century, China and the Communist Party of China
(CPC) have emerged as the strongest proponent of globalization, and not
communist revolution.1 China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (previously
One Belt One Road) is a key driver of this Chinese-led globalization.
This study argues that the BRI has three vital components; first, it links
development with security; essential economic drivers, such as trade and
infrastructure investment are inextricably linked to political stability and
peace. Second, the BRI promotes cultural and educational exchanges as
manifestations of China’s soft power. Third, it envisions regional connectivity
and economic interdependence as catalysts of the soft power and security
nexus.2
The BRI is an ambitious initiative that covers around 65 countries,
4.4 billion people and 40 percent of the global GDP.3 From the Chinese
perspective it is fully cognizant of the cultural sensitivities, economic needs
and security concerns of participant states. In addition to factors such as
the production and exchange of knowledge, innovation and technological
1
Kerry Brown, The World According to Xi (I.B. Tauris, 2018), 89.
2
For a detailed analysis on development and security nexus, see, Saeed Shafqat, “China’s
Rise: How Is It Impacting the Gulf, Iran, Pakistan and Beyond?” Asian Journal of Middle
Eastern and Islamic Studies March 2017) pp 1-22, p 4-5
3
The Chinese government released a complete document on March 28, 2015 on “On
st
Visions and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21 Century Maritime
Silk Road,” The document provides a comprehensive overview of how China has conceived
and designed BRI and aims to pursue its accomplishment, National Development and
Reform Commission (NDRC), “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic
Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road”, National Development and Reform Commission,
http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/ t20150330_669367.html (accessed 1 July 2018).

63
growth, trade and transportation costs, China recognizes that security acts as
a pivotal determinant of the geography of development. China has clutched
this opportunity to exhibit its military ambitions. Thus, China’s revival of
the ancient Silk Road into the modern BRI redefines the parameters of
traditional geo-economics and international relations.
In a recent study, Jonathan Hillman, while providing an insightful critique
and practical constraints of the BRI, acknowledges it as an “undeniably
bold” effort; “The BRI is more than a policy -it is a brand. With such large
amounts of investments available, central and local governments, private
firms and non-profit organizations are incentivized to repackage their work
around BRI.”4 In fact, with time, the BRI has gained global recognition
and legitimacy. For instance, in April 2017, the United Nation’s Social and
Economic Council held a workshop with Chinese experts titled “The Belt
and Road Initiative: Progress and Future Cooperation - Dialogue between the United
Nations and Chinese experts”. Chinese and UN experts concluded that it was
in line with 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets, as
the initiative focuses on five categories of the SDGs namely, people, planet,
prosperity, peace and partnership.5
President Xi Jinping has been emphasizing the need for global
interconnectivity, interdependence and in that perspective, highlighting the
role of the BRI as a vehicle of economic partnerships and socio-cultural
connectivity. At his UN address in 2017, he stated that the BRI “aims to
achieve win-win and shared development.”6 Reviving the old Silk Roads,
connecting Asia, Europe and beyond, it comprises of two mega-initiatives:

4
Jonathan E. Hillman, The Emperor’s New Road: China and the Project of the Century
(Washington, D.C: CSIS, 2020) pp 11-12
th
5
Chinadaily.com.cn, April 2017. A month later (On May 14 2017,) speaking at the
B&R Summit in Beijing, the upcoming Secretary General of the UN, Antonio Guterres,
urged the international community to support and join the initiative as it is, “rooted in a
shared vision for broad development.” He went on to say that China is the ‘central pillar of
multilateralism’ and supporter of global institutions and leading contributor to UN peace
missions. Many world leaders (29 presidents/prime ministers and representatives of over
130) echoed similar sentiments demonstrating solidarity, support and praise for the initiative.
India was conspicuous by its absence. Speaking as host of the Summit, President Xi Jinping
promised to contribute another 100 billion dollars towards the B&R to create, what he called
a, ‘big family of harmonious coexistence’. For more details see: Xinhua Net, “UN chief
urges global efforts to tap Belt and Road potential for common development”, Xinhua Net,
14 May 2017. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/14/c_136282138.htm (accessed 1
July 2018).
6
XinhuaNet, “President Xi Jinping’s Speech at the UN -Work Together to Build a
Community of Shared Future for Mankind,” XinhuaNet, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/
english/2017-01/19/c_135994707.htm.

64
the Belt (Silk Road Economic Belt), and the Road (21st century Maritime Silk
Road Initiative), and six corridors along the route.7 It is China’s means to
“foster a new type of international relations featuring win-win cooperation,”
according to President Xi Jinping.8
Along with the BRI, it appears that the study of political science and
international relations (IR), both in theory and practice, has undergone
transformation in China. Social sciences and political studies had been
evolving and developing in the Chinese universities for the past three
decades, but the rise of President Xi Jinping has given it a new salience. For
the first time, one of the seven members of the highest decision making body
-the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China- is a
professor of law and politics, someone who has been an influential thinker
and advisor to President’s Jiang Zemin (1993-2003), Hu Jintao (2003-13)
and now President Xi Jinping, since 2013 to date.9 This is Wang Huning, a
professor and specialist in political theory, philosophy and law from Fudan
University. He is credited with bringing the concept of “soft power” in the
Chinese academic discourse back in the 1990’s.10
Wang was instrumental in shaping the debate among Chinese scholars
on culture and soft power.11 He underscored the centrality of culture in
defining Chinese soft power. He articulated that “if a country has admirable
culture and ideological system,” other states would be attracted towards it,
and there would be no need to use hard power which is “expensive and less
efficient.”12 Furthermore, Wang demonstrated this himself by participating
in international debates and advising teams of the Fudan University students,
and winning the Asia-Pacific region debates. He is the first academic and
policy intellectual to be elevated to the top most leadership tier in China.
Wang is perceived to be close to President Xi Jinping, and is considered

7
Saeed Shafqat and Saba Shahid, China, Pakistan Economic Corridor: Demands, Dividends and
Directions (Lahore: Centre for Public Policy and Governance, 2018)pp 11-15
8
XinhuaNet, “President Xi Says to Build Belt and Road into Road for Peace, Prosperity,”
XinhuaNet, May 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/14/c_136281412.htm.
9
Brown, The World According to Xi, 74–75.
10
Bonnie Glaser and Melissa Murphy, “Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics,” in Chinese
Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States (Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 2009), 12.
11
For an insightful discussion and debate among Chinese scholars, see, Jukka Aukia, “The
Cultural Soft Power and China: A Tool for Dualistic National Security” JCIR, Vol 2, No1,
2014. Pp 71-94, p 80-84
12
Wang Huning, “Culture as National Soft Power: Soft Power,” Journal of Fudan University
(March 1993).

65
to be the principal architect of Xi Jinping’s “China Dream.”13 Wang’s rise
and advisory role in the top echelons of policy making circles clearly shows
that the intellectuals may not be visible, but are embedded in the Chinese
policy planning process. Patapan and Wang have provocatively labelled
Wang Huning as the “hidden ruler,” shaping the direction of contemporary
Chinese politics.14
Contemporary China’s advocacy for multilateralism, free trade and
globalization has evoked mixed reactions from academia, think tanks and
policy makers. The Western world in general and America in particular is
attributing “hidden military motives” to the BRI, and depicting China as a
hegemonic global power.15 For example, Nadege Rolland brings attention
to how, with the BRI expanding geographically, China is highlighting the
rise of new security threats, requiring greater military protection. Nadege
Rolland presents “security threats” as a ploy by China to justify expansion
of its security footprint and military capabilities, especially the scope of
action of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).16
Similarly, many Western analysts and notable figures have been issuing
concerns over China’s BRI. For instance, Francis Fukuyama, cautions that
China is exporting its developmental, political and ideological model.17 This
echoes an alarmist and ideological mind set of the American scholars. Several
others contend the BRI to be a part of China’s peripheral diplomacy, which
is not simply about win-win cooperation, but in fact to “reconstitute the
regional order – and eventually global order - with new governance ideas,

13
Haig Patapan and Yi Wang, “The Hidden Ruler: Wang Huning and the Making of
Contemporary China,” Journal of Contemporary China 27, no. 109 ( January 2, 2018): 12,
https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2017.1363018. According to the authors in 1995 Wang
Huning was picked up by President Jiang Zemin and has continued to gain greater respect,
access and authority in the CPC becoming member of the Politburo (size 25 core members).
14
Patapan and Wang, “The Hidden Ruler.”
15
For a scathing critique of the CPC and China’s militaristic designs, see Michael R.
Pompeo, Secretary of the State’s speech at the Nixon Library; https://sv.usembassy.
gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-remarks-at-the-richard-nixon-presidential-library-and-
museum-communist-china-and-the-free-worlds-future/ accessed on November 8,2020.
16
Nadege Rolland, “Securing the Belt and Road: Prospects for Chinese Military
Engagement Along the Silk Roads,” The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR),
September 2019, https://www.nbr.org/publication/securing-the-belt-and-road-prospects-
for-chinese-military-engagement-along-the-silk-roads/.
17
Francis Fukuyama, “Exporting the Chinese Model,” Project Syndicate, January 12, 2016,
https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/china-one-belt-one-road-strategy-by-francis-
fukuyama-2016-01.

66
norms, and rules.”18 Some believe it to be China’s strategy to transition from
a Peaceful Power to a Great Power status and ultimately, establish a Sino-
centric world order.
President Trump’s administration ( January 2017 to January 2021) and its
spokespersons also remained hostile towards China and captive to the Cold
War mentality, and its blinkered historical analogy constrained America’s
China strategy.19 In 2017, the US Department of Defense declared China’s
CPC as an “existential threat,” demonizing and delegitimizing the CPC,
implying regime change, short of calling for it. In animosity to the CPC,
President Xi Jinping is also being portrayed as reincarnation of Josef Stalin.20
In fact, in the past two years, a growing consensus has emerged among the
Democrats and the Republicans to treat China as a “strategic rival.” As the
new President-elect Joseph Biden has assumed Presidency in January 2021,
the anti-China rhetoric could become nuanced and less harsh. But would
the new administration abandon “de-coupling” and rejuvenate “coupling”
with China through economic engagement and strategic cooperation? In
February 2021 while addressing the virtual Munich Security Conference,
President Joseph Biden was unequivocal in declaring China as a “strategic”
and “ideological” competitor, so there is nuanced continuity of Trump’s
policy in Biden’s approach towards China, yet he has kept the window of
opportunity open on co-operation on climate change, fighting the pandemic
and searching for common ground on global public health issues and trade.21
The US strategic competition with China, nonetheless, continues to unfold,
with the BRI in particular portrayed as a vehicle of China’s hegemonic
tendencies, obliterating the larger Chinese vision of promoting dialogue
and engagement, co-operation and interdependence, and international
relations based on win-win co-operation. The US perspective is eloquently
expressed by Elizabeth Economy: “China is an illiberal state seeking
leadership in a liberal world order.”22 She argues that China has made its

18
William A Callahan, “China’s ‘Asia Dream’: The Belt Road Initiative and the New
Regional Order,” Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 1, no. 3 (September 1, 2016): 226–43,
https://doi.org/10.1177/2057891116647806.
19
Michael McFaul, “Xi Jinping Is Not Stalin,” Foreign Affairs, 2020, https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-08-10/xi-jinping-not-stalin.
20
McFaul
21
Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference, February,
19,2021; https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/19/remarks-
by-president-biden-at-the-2021-virtual-munich-security-conference/, accessed on 26th February
2021.
22
Elizabeth C. Economy, “China’s New Revolution: The Reign of Xi Jinping.” Foreign
Affairs, Vol 97, No3, May/June 2018 pp 60-74, p 61 &74

67
“revolutionary intentions clear,” and that the US should also respond in
“equally unambiguous terms.” Understandably, the US considers itself as
the architect and defender of the “liberal world order.” How can it allow an
“illiberal state” to step in its shoes or even dare to try replacing it? Hence,
it has been deflating China -a China that in fact stands for globalization,
multilateralism, common and shared goals for the planet and humanity.
It is visible that the recent outbreak of Covid-19 has flustered Xi
Jinping’s vision of building a resilient co-operation network and economic
interconnectivity through the BRI. China has been striving to maintain a
stable economy and it is commendable that during the pandemic so far, China
has been able to maintain a constant three per cent annual growth rate. If this
persists, British Sinologist, Kerry Brown, insightfully observes, “China will
have won the battle to show that diplomacy and international relations can
be run largely value free (or at least Western value free), and focused purely
on economic and material outcomes.” Many countries would continue to
engage with China, on economic, monetary and material terms, while not
having to conform to its value system or ideologies.23 This is a significant
feature of China’s economic-leaning soft power. With this soft power,
China is trying to convince the international community of its peaceful rise.

SECTION 1: Joseph Nye’s Soft Power Concept and

How China is Employing it
Professor Joseph Nye, who coined the term, defines “soft power” as
attractive power –the ability of a country to get others to want what it
wants through attraction as opposed to coercion.24 It is about promoting
co-operation by creating “an attraction to shared values, and the justness
and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values.”25 The three
soft power resources, countries have at their disposal, are its culture,
political values and foreign policy.26 Nye’s initial work revolves primarily
around assessing the American soft power, and he credits it to strong liberal
democratic values, free-market economic model, vibrant civil society,
globally popular Hollywood and its artistic and cultural offshoots and
industries. He vigorously argues that China’s soft power may never match

23
Kerry Brown, “Hearing: U.S.-China Relations in 2020,” in “Testimony before the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission,” Panel One: China’s Assessment of Its Strategic
Environment (U.S.-China Economic And Security Review Commission), accessed October
2, 2020, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-09/Brown_Testimony.pdf.
24
Joseph Nye, Soft Power: Means to Success in World Politics (Public Affairs, 2004), 11.
25
Nye, 7.
26
Nye, 11.

68
that of the US. An authoritarian party with strong socio-political control,
lack of democratic culture and a weak civil society impede China’s soft
power efforts.27
Like Nye, many Western analysts have a strong liberal bias and
understandably support and promote those liberal social, economic and
political values as manifested through liberalism. Comparing these with the
Chinese “authoritarian system,” they find China lacking the foundations
of what Nye, calls soft power. For example, a leading American Sinologist,
David Shambaugh, contends that under the Communist Party rule China has
a “repressive political system.”28 Thus, he dismisses any notions of Chinese
soft power. Unlike Nye, Shambaugh and Fukuyama, Kerry Brown, however,
has a more nuanced understanding of the CPC and state relationship. He
argues that the state and Party no longer exercise complete control over the
society and economy. The emerging non-state sector and the middle class
have been a key contributor to innovation and development of China and
exercise greater autonomy today. Elaborating his argument, Brown makes
a provokingly insightful observation; “it is the Party which has become
a parasite, relying on it (non-state sector) to survive.”29 This signifies that
assertions about the monolithic character of the CPC, and absence of any
countervailing forces within it, are exaggerated.
With reference to the BRI, the Western scholars remain sceptical about
the sources and capability of China’s soft power. This is largely because
most of the Western scholars have been measuring soft power on the basis
of the template provided by Nye for American soft power.30 The resilience
of Nye’s conceptualization merits attention as the Chinese scholars too have
been latching on to it to explain and analyse Chinese soft power.31 This
is problematic as Nye’s soft power template has limited utility to explain
Chinese soft power. Nye’s soft power concept was laid out and rose to
prominence in the 1990’s and so must be analysed within that historical
context. It was relevant in the post -World War II period, when European
powers were militarily and economically devastated and the US emerged

27
Joseph Nye, “No, the Coronavirus Will Not Change the Global Order,” Foreign
Policy, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/16/coronavirus-pandemic-china-united-
states-power-competition/.
28
David Shambaugh, “China’s Soft-Power Push,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2015. Pp
99-107
29
Brown, The World According to Xi, 62–63.
30
Trefor Moss, “Soft Power? China has Plenty”, The Diplomat, June 4, 2013.
31
Young Nam Cho and Jong Ho Jeong, “China’s Soft Power: Discussions, Resources, and
Prospects,” Asian Survey 48, no. 3 (2008): 455, https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2008.48.3.453.

69
as the champion of free market economy and liberal democratic values.32
The advocacy of civil liberties, democratic values, civic virtues and reliance
on free market economy added to the attractiveness of the American soft
power template. However, as this American-styled soft power gave way to
frequent and excessive use of hard power, of which the Afghan and Iraq
wars are prime recent examples, Nye’s American soft power template was
jolted and its legitimacy and credibility came under serious scrutiny. In
fact, Nye acknowledged that the Iraq war turned out to be “costly for our
(American) soft power.”33
The US soft power has tarnished even further in the past few years.
During his tenure, President Trump alienated the European and other allies,
undermined US led multilateralism, disrupted immigration and attraction
to the US universities and technology power houses, thereby, undercutting
the US soft power.34 Nye, who remains one of the most articulate exponents
of American soft power, has been highlighting the declining American soft
power, based on his experience and expertise. He has the experience of
working in several American administrations, including as Deputy to the
Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology,
and as a member of the Foreign Affairs Policy Board, providing advice on
matters of U.S. foreign policy. He has also chaired the National Security
Council Group on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In one of his
recent articles, he expressed his dismay, stating that President Trump’s
“looseness with the truth has debased the currency of trust that is needed
in a crisis, and his continual disdain for our allies means that we have fewer
friends.”35 According to Nye, this is how the US is increasingly falling prey
to the Thucydides Trap, or in other words, a self-created fear of China’s rise
threatening to replace America’s hegemony as the world power.36 As more
and more states join China’s BRI, the US policy makers are becoming more
hawkish, and claim China to be threatening the US global economic and

32
Eric Li, “The Rise and Fall of Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, August 2018, https://
foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/20/the-rise-and-fall-of-soft-power/.
33
Nye, Soft Power: Means to Success in World Politics, xii.
34
Fareed Zakaria, “Trump Prepares to Pass the World Leadership Baton to China,”
Washington Post, March 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-prepares-
to-pass-the-world-leadership-baton-to-china/2017/03/16/c64ccee2-0a84-11e7-a15f-
a58d4a988474_story.html.
35
Joseph Nye, “No, President Trump: You’ve Weakened America’s Soft Power,” The New
York Times, February 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/25/opinion/trump-soft-
power.html.
36
Joseph Nye, “Power and Interdependence with China,” The Washington Quarterly 43, no.
1 ( January 2, 2020): 14–15, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1734303.

70
military hegemony, necessitating decoupling from China.
Under Trump Presidency, the US behaviour and conduct in international
relations remained increasingly aggressive and confrontational, unlike that
of a superpower. The US acted like, what Tufts Professor Michael Beckley
calls a “rogue superpower”—“an economic and military colossus lacking
moral commitments, neither isolationist nor internationalist, but aggressive,
heavily armed, and entirely for itself.”37 To cap it all, America’s denouncement
of alliances, protectionism, issuance of greater visa restrictions and stricter
immigration policies indicated the tightening political and policy making
landscape. In all the three sources of soft power, namely, culture, political
values and foreign policy, Nye stated that “Mr Trump has reversed attractive
American policies and made America weaker rather than greater.” When
he inferred America First narrowly, he made everyone else feel second rate.38
While Trump’s presidential term has ended, his policy prescriptions have
damaged American reputation irreparably, and it would take some time to
restore American credibility, soft power and reputation.
In contrast, China has been engaging all through co-operative
interdependence, connectivity and mutual gain opportunities, with Wang
Huning’s ascendancy to the top-most political echelon being depicted by
the Chinese scholars as an “antidote to strongman politics.”39 Wang, the
principal architect of China’s soft power, has remained low-key, and is
popularly described as a soft-spoken and well-mannered scholar-turned-
political figure.40 While he has written on a wide array of topics, in his
most important book, Comparative Political Analysis, he writes about
an increasingly globalizing world with everyday matters of life, such as
environment and transport, becoming so interlinked that they are becoming
political issues of global significance.41 Many of Wang’s writings, scholars
note, “hew so closely to Xi’s policies.”42 Wang may be considered an
equivalent to National Security Advisor to the American President, although
he is designated as the Vice-Chairman of the Central Leading Group on the
37
Michael Beckley, “Rogue Superpower: Why this could be Illiberal American Century”,
Foreign Affairs, November/December 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-
states/2020-10-06/illiberal-american-century-rogue-superpower?utm_medium=promo_
email&utm_source=pre_release&utm_campaign, accessed on 19 October 20 20.
38
Nye, “Opinion | No, President Trump.”
39
Yi Wang, “Wang Huning: China’s Antidote to Strongman Politics,” The Diplomat, 2017,
https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/wang-huning-chinas-antidote-to-strongman-politics/.
40
Patapan and Wang, “The Hidden Ruler,” 12.
41
Patapan and Wang, 9.
42
Yi Wang, “Meet The Mastermind Behind Xi Jinping’s Power,” New Perspectives Quarterly
35, no. 1 (2018): 15–18, https://doi.org/10.1111/npqu.12116.

71
Construction of the One Belt One Road (CLGOBOR). More importantly,
he is a policy advisor who has risen to ranks in the CPC hierarchy by virtue
of his intellectual prowess and on the strength of his ideas.43
Wang’s ascendency reflects that China is shaping its soft power through
its intellectual’s dexterity. In 2017, the Chinese leadership publicly revealed
its plan to significantly expand the country’s soft power base by 2035. It
claimed that China’s modernisation “offers a new option for other countries
and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their
independence; and it offers Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to
solving the problems facing mankind.”44 President Xi Jinping, in particular,
has been at the forefront in projecting China’s vision of wanting to build
a world of shared interests through multilateral arrangements, increased
co-operation and people-to-people connectivity. Simultaneously, he has
energized the diversity, growth and competition among the Chinese think
tanks for feeding into, and influencing, the policy process. Thus, the CPC
and its leadership have given legitimacy to the role of intellectuals and think
tank scholars and analysts.45 Contrarily, the Western scholars continue to
characterize Xi Jinping as authoritarian and dictatorial, and the CPC as
intolerant and repressive.46
As a matter of fact, in the Chinese political system, the leadership and
the CPC, in concert with societal forces, including think tanks, have been
playing a critical role in shaping the country’s soft power narrative. Under
the leadership of President Xi Jinping, like his predecessors, the Party
has shown considerable degree of organizational stability and a broad
consensus among the top leaders on continuity of policies. Leadership and
cultural values are intertwined and embedded through the CPC. According
to both Yan Xuetong and Wang Huning,47 a strong, centralized and unified
43
Patapan and Wang, “The Hidden Ruler,” 14.
44
Yan Xuetong, “Chinese Values vs. Liberalism: What Ideology Will Shape the International
Normative Order?,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 11, no. 1 (March 1, 2018): 1–22,
https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poy001.
45
Francois Godement, “A Hundred Think Tanks Bloom in China” European Council on
Foreign Relations (ECFR.EU, August, 2016) pp.1-12.
46
Aaron L. Friedberg, “Bucking Beijing: An Alternative U.S. China Policy” Foreign Affairs,
September/October 2012. PP 48-58. Pp 49-50. He calls Chinese elites, ‘arrogant’ and
‘insecure’ who want to ‘hold on political power’ through CPC.p49. Also see Shambaugh(2015)
pp 99-100
47
Yan Xuetong, “Chinese Values vs. Liberalism: What Ideology Will Shape the International
Normative Order?,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 11, no. 1 (March 1, 2018): 1–22,
https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poy001; Jane Perlez, “Behind the Scenes, Communist Strategist
Presses China’s Rise,” The New York Times, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/13/
world/asia/china-xi-jinping-wang-huning.html.

72
political leadership is a source of Chinese soft power.48 Concentration of
power in the leader is based on meritocracy, which is considered a virtue in
the Chinese culture and political system.49 It is the backbone on which the
Chinese soft power is erected, with a sound and morally grounded leadership
considered an unbridled asset for soft power projection. While in Nye’s,
view, a country’s soft power is more effective if the power is dispersed and
there are competing groups/ power centres as is typically the case in major
democratic countries.50 Nye makes a case for the Western democracies
stating that “in democracies where public opinion and parliaments matter,
political leaders have less leeway to adopt tactics and strike deals than in
autocracies.”51 This shows that the Chinese formulation of soft power differs
from the American template, each based on its own national conditions,
history, culture and moral and ethical orientations of the leadership.
Furthermore, unlike Nye’s conceptualization of soft power that asserts a
kind of defensive particularism by pushing for democratic liberal values,
the Chinese soft power constitutes non-interference, multilateralism, strong
unified political leadership, with bringing harmony among societies and
states as the desired goal and key guiding principle. The BRI beams the
soft power of China differently; it is not about having a specific attractive
culture, political values or foreign policy; the three soft power resources of a
country, proposed by Nye. Rather, the BRI offers a “loose framework” that
can be “modified” by the participatory countries according to their needs,
choices and resources.52 Co-operation under the BRI umbrella shows
sensitivity to the local conditions, and inclusiveness through connectivity,
and China upholding the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs
of other countries.
Several scholars and analysts however hold a different perspective. For
48
Guozuo Zhang, Research Outline for China’s Cultural Soft Power, trans. Xiaoyan Li, Research
Series on the Chinese Dream and China’s Development Path (Social Sciences Academic
Press China & Springer Singapore, 2017), 97.while also offering detailed explanations of the
scope of and essential questions concerning Chinese cultural soft power. The book is divided
into six parts, which, taken together, concisely yet thoroughly examine the theoretical roots
of soft power and the current status of China’s soft power as illustrated in concrete cases.
49
Daniel A. Bell, The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2015). Bell makes an insightful and
refreshing analysis of Chinese political system and the role of meritocracy in the making of
leadership compared to Western democracies. Pp 4-6.
50
Nye, Soft Power: Means to Success in World Politics, 16.
51
Nye, 16.
52
Nadine Godehardt, “No End of History: A Chinese Alternative Concept of International
Order,” German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2016, 23, https://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2016RP02_gdh.pdf.

73
instance, Hillman’s study, which is a combination of travelogue, history,
politics, economics and also his personal observations of on ground realities
across the BRI countries and societies, presents a different view. He highlights
the hurdles and practical difficulties likely to constrain the success of the BRI,
and dilute its soft power.53 While Hillman’s scepticism merits attention, it is
noteworthy that many countries are, nonetheless, increasingly embracing
the BRI. It offers them an opportunity to identify areas of shared interest
through engagement and cooperation, thereby increasing the possibility of
achieving win-win outcomes. The participant countries in fact, have the
freedom to devise their own development path, and more importantly,
retain their cultural practices. This makes the BRI “flexible, inclusive and
open.”54 While remaining within the definitional context laid out by Nye,
whereby soft power is “an attraction to shared values, and the justness and
duty of contributing to the achievement of those values,”55 this is how China
is presenting the world with an adaptation, variant and alternative form of
Nye’s soft power conceptualization. This is how the BRI is emerging as a
symbol of Chinese soft power.

SECTION 2: BRI: Pivoting on Academic and Cultural Exchanges

The cornerstone of America’s soft power, besides promoting democracy
and protecting free market, in the post-World War II period, was its higher
education and academic exchanges. According to Nye, “academic and
scientific exchanges played a significant role in enhancing American soft
power,” as international students became carriers of American values in
their homelands.56The Fulbright Program is a shining example of that. In
the previous decades, the world has witnessed more than three hundred
leaders –prime ministers and presidents and influential figures of different
countries- having academic qualifications from the US colleges and
universities. This has contributed in many ways to the benefit of the US
and adoption of American values. However, the international student body
has been declining in the past few years. The US saw a decline of 9.6% in
its international student body in 2018, and another 2% in the subsequent

53
Hillman, see chapters 3 and 5, where the author raises concerns about access, transparency
and accountability with reference to BRI projects across the countries.
54
Godehardt, 20.
55
Nye, Soft Power: Means to Success in World Politics, 7.
56
Nye, 45.

74
year.57 Despite this downward trend, the US is still the top destination of
choice of international students.58 Interestingly, the number of Chinese
students coming to the US is the highest among the international students.
However, these Chinese students have been paying full tuition fees and also
returning to China upon completion of their studies. This high return rate
clearly shows that Beijing has been successful in curbing the brain drain.

Bringing and Building Soft Power at Home and Abroad:

Back in 1979, the US-China exchanges constituted the largest student-to-
student exchange between any two civilizations in world history.59 Since
Deng Xiaoping’s “Open Door” reforms in 1978, China has been sending its
own students overseas to pursue higher studies. Nearly 5.86 million Chinese
students have studied abroad from 1978 to 2018.60 China has been able to
expose its younger generation to the Western education, way of life, and
also fight brain drain by absorbing eighty-three percent of these students
back to China.61 These Chinese youngsters –future leaders- are “politically
open and individualistic because of their modern educational background
and international experience… and (are) learned about different cultures,”
according to Yan Xuetong.62 This is remarkable and demonstrates how
China has built and expanded upon Nye’s conceptualization of soft power.
President Xi Jinping has galvanized these academic exchanges,
sharpening the focus and vigorously emphasizing on the dire need for
China to “...strengthen people-to-people and cultural exchanges with other
countries...to tell China’s stories well, present a true, multi-dimensional, and

57
Michael T. Nietzel, “International Student Enrollment Down Again At U.S. Universities,”
Forbes, November 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeltnietzel/2019/11/18/
international-student-enrollment-down-again-at-us-universities/.
58
Institute of International Education, “Project Atlas Infographics -2019 Press
Release,” Global Mobility Trends (Institute of International Education, 2019),
https://www.iie.org/en/ Research-and-Insights/ Project-Atlas/ Explore-Data/
Infographics/2019-Project-Atlas-Infographics.
59
Hongshan Li, U.S-China Educational Exchange: State, Society and Intercultural Relations,
1905-1950 (Rutgers University Press, 2008), 1.
60
Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China, “More Chinese Study Abroad
in 2018,” Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China, March 2019, http://
en.moe.gov.cn/news/media_highlights/201904/t20190401_376249.html.
61
Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China, “Brief Report on Chinese
Overseas Students and International Students in China 2017,” Ministry of Education of the
People’s Republic of China, April 2018, http://en.moe.gov.cn/documents/reports/201901/
t20190115_367019.html.
62
Xuetong, Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers, 51.

75
panoramic view of China, and enhance our country’s cultural soft power.”63
In 2018, about 662,100 Chinese students left the country to study abroad,
making China the top contributor of international students globally.64 At
the same time, as many as 492,185 international students were inbound
to China, making China the third top destination of choice among foreign
students globally.65 Through student exchanges, China socializes students
to its culture, exposing them to Chinese soft power. This manifests itself
in different forms, from the traditional Chinese culture, to popular culture
constituting art, entertainment, music and cinema, to high culture, which
includes its thriving educational system, study of social sciences and
literature. On international student and academic exchanges China has
adopted the American model skillfully and according to its needs.
This demonstrates that China does have a strong foundation and sources
to formulate its own narrative of soft power. Demographically, younger
adults across the globe hold a favorable view of China, at present.66 These
young adults are China’s target audience. By inviting and hosting them,
China further familiarizes them with Chinese politics and way of life. It has
undertaken a strategic and targeted approach in offering these opportunities.
For instance, it has been providing thirty-percent more scholarships to
students belonging to less politically free countries in the East Asia and
Pacific region, as opposed to their counterparts in more free countries.
Consequently, these less politically free countries accounted for the largest
numbers of students inbound to China.67
However, this must not overshadow Chinese efforts of opening space for
dialogue and understanding. Kerry Brown makes a passionate appeal to
the Western world to “stop moralizing against China,” pointing out that the
63
China Daily, “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Report at 19th CPC National Congress,” 2017,
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-11/04/content_
34115212.htm.
64
Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China, “More Chinese Study Abroad
in 2018.”
65
Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China, “Statistical Report on
International Students in China for 2018,” Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic
of China, 2019, http://en.moe.gov.cn/documents/reports/201904/t20190418_378692.html.
66
Laura Silver, Kat Delvin, and Christine Huang, “People around the Globe
Are Divided in Their Opinions of China” (PEW Research Centre - Global
Attitudes and Trends, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/12/05/
people-around-the-globe-are-divided-in-their-opinions-of-china/.
67
Samantha Custer et al., “Influencing the Narrative: How the Chinese Government
Mobilizes Students and Media to Burnish Its Image.” (Williamsburg, VA: AidData at William
& Mary, December 2019), 37, http://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/Influencing_the_Narrative_
Report.pdf.

76
West knows too little about China, its history and culture. He pleads that
“there needs to be much more support for basic education about China and
for knowledge-based engagement with it…on China, there is scant evidence
of even a decent level of understanding amongst most politicians, opinion
formers, and commentators.”68 In the light of this insightful observation, it
is pertinent to note that through its academic exchange programs, China
provides an opportunity for engagement, dialogue and people-to-people
contact. If this is not an evidence of the growing Chinese soft power, what
more do the Western observers want?
The BRI, in particular, has played a pivotal role in accelerating these
people-to-people exchanges and expanding the Chinese soft power. The
BRI aims at expanding co-operation in five key areas, “policy coordination,
facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-
to-people bonds,”69 of which people-to-people bonds is the least discussed,
despite being of greatest importance. This fifth goal of strengthening the
people-to-people bond embraces cultural and academic exchanges, to
co-operating in a variety of areas of common interest, such as tourism
and public health. The academic exchanges in particular have gained
momentum along the Belt and Road countries, where China has also
deployed its Confucius Institutes network -Chinese equivalents of UK’s
British Council and France’s Alliance Françoise to facilitate the educational
exchange process.
China has been sending many of its students to study in the BRI
countries. While the US and Europe were historically the leading study
destinations of Chinese students, the BRI countries are gaining popularity.
This way China has made the educational exchange process, a two-way
process. For instance, in 2017, 66,100 Chinese students were studying in
the BRI participant countries.70 Similarly, there were 317,200 students
from the BRI countries studying in China, accounting for 64 percent of

68
Kerry Brown, “Why the West Needs to Stop Its Moralising against China,”
E-International Relations, August 2020, https://www.e-ir.info/2020/08/10/
why-the-west-needs-to-stop-its-moralising-against-china/.
69
National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and
Ministry of, and Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, “Vision and Actions on
Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” March
2015.
70
Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China, “Brief Report on Chinese
Overseas Students and International Students in China 2017.”

77
China’s international student body.71 There are several reasons that have
helped China attract students from along the Belt and Road route. In many
of the recipient countries, mostly developing and middle to low-income
countries, China’s economic power adds to its attractiveness. The BRI
projects showcase China’s economic power, clout and expertise, and the
locals see themselves to be benefiting from China’s growing economy in
the form of economic aid, foreign investment and academic scholarships
tied to the BRI projects —the tools and engine of Chinese soft power. To a
considerable degree, it is transforming into a favorable view of China. A
PEW Research Study concludes that people who believe to be benefiting
from China’s booming economy have a 64% chance of holding a favorable
view of China.72
China’s soft power ventures are backed by its economic power, which
Nye categorizes as hard power. Feeling “threatened” and motivated by
considerations of “strategic competition,” the US, India, Australia and
Japan tend to curb the scale of Chinese soft power by characterizing it
as a “charm offensive.” To debunk this rising soft power, they point its
lack of transparency, entrenched cronyism, poor governance practices,
environment repercussions, debt trap diplomacy and China’s circular
lending strategies underlying the BRI.73 Thus, the credibility and salience
of Chinese soft power is caricatured and belittled. Yet, it is important to note
that soft power is a type of “power,” relational and contextual in nature, and
so must be understood within the context in which the power relationships
exist. China’s relations with the BRI participant countries are burgeoning
with time, and the participant countries largely hold a positive perception
of China’s engagement with them. Local people and political elites in
these countries have been blaming their own government, not China,
for controversies surrounding the BRI projects, including those related
to corruption, mismanagement and the so called ”debt trap.” This is best
illustrated by the case of Pakistan, which houses one of the corridors, also
the “flagship” project of the BRI: the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC).
71
Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China, “Growing Number of Foreign
Students Choosing to Study in China for a Degree across Multiple Disciplines,” Ministry
of Education of the People’s Republic of China, April 2018, http://en.moe.gov.cn/News/
Top_News/201804/t20180403_332258.html.
72
Laura Silver, Kat Delvin, and Christine Huang, “Appendix: Factors That Influence Views
of China,” Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.
org/global/2019/12/05/appendix-factors-that-influence-views-of-china/.
73
For a paradoxical view; a scathing critique and the awesome character of BRI, see
Hillman, pp 10-14

78
CPEC: the ‘Black Hole’ or Jewel of BRI?
There is no denying that Pakistan continues to suffer from a reputation
crisis, and rejuvenating reputation loss is never easy. For example, in a
recent study, Jonathan Hillman labels CPEC as the “Black Hole” of the
BRI. Eloquently, he argues; “In South Asia, the flagship of China’s BRI
may become its greatest test. Xi has put his personal stamp on the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), traveling to Islamabad in April 2015
to cement the two countries “all-weather strategic cooperative partnership”
and signing a host of agreements. But after ballooning to a mythical $100
billion, CPEC has drifted back to earth and delivered only a fraction of
its initial promise. Dangerously, China is betting it can succeed where the
United States and the international community have failed for decades.”74
Ironically, on several occasions the Pakistani leadership, while offering
clarifications and trying to be transparent, instead have ended up further
complicating such perceptions. However, this does not change the fact that
there is great support for the CPEC in Pakistan. Any issues arising out of it
are, in fact, blamed on Pakistan’s own poor management of the project, and
this does not hurt China’s soft power. For instance, when Razak Dawood,
the Advisor to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, expressed his despair over
CPEC, he stated; “The previous [Pakistani] government did a bad job
negotiating with China on CPEC; they didn’t do their homework correctly
and didn’t negotiate correctly so they gave away a lot.”75 He apportioned
blame on his own country, not China.
Given this context, five Chinese initiatives; namely, educational exchanges
and fellowships, China Study Centers, Confucius Institutes, Gwadar-China
Scholarship and the China- Pakistan “Dosti” Radio channel, are enhancing
the Chinese soft power and changing the dynamics of China-Pakistan
relations. Since the formal launch of the CPEC in 2015, there has been
twofold increase in the number of Pakistani students going to China. There
were 15,654 students in China in 2015,76 and the number shot up to 28,023
74
Jonathan Hillman, p 19 .In chapter 7 that focuses on Pakistan, Hillman, makes a scathing
critique of Pakistan, demonizing it and warning China, if the US and West could not
succeed in this country China would also fail, here is his punchline, “They (China) may
regret choosing Pakistan as the BRI’s proving grounds…If neighboring Afghanistan is the
graveyard of empires, Pakistan’s the black hole of foreign assistance”. Pp 132 &134
75
Henny Sender, Farhan Bokhari, and Jamil Anderlini, “Pakistan Rethinks Its Role in
Xi’s Belt and Road Plan,” Financial Times, September 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/
d4a3e7f8-b282-11e8-99ca-68cf89602132.
76
China Power (Center for Strategic and International Studies), “Is China Both a Source
and Hub for International Students?,” ChinaPower Project, September 2017, https://
chinapower.csis.org/china-international-students/.

79
by 2018.77 China is the second top destination of Pakistanis, after the UK.
Pakistan has been the third top source of international students to China,78
and the prime beneficiary of Chinese scholarships globally.
China has crafted an effective and well-designed educational diplomacy
with Pakistan under the CPEC, and there are several instances that
demonstrate this. For instance, the China Road and Bridge Corporation
(CRBC), in collaboration with China’s Southeast University, has offered
fully funded scholarships for hundred Pakistanis over a period of five years
under its program “Inherit of Pak-China Friendship: Hundred Talents
Study Financing Program.”79 The scholarship specifically sponsors Pakistani
personnel engaged in projects under the CPEC. It underwrites a two-year
long Master’s in Transportation Engineering; designed exclusively to help
students excel in the CPEC integrated transportation.80 Ten people benefitted
from this opportunity in 2017 and twenty-four in the subsequent year.81 The
program has been custom designed for both countries to mutually benefit
out of it, and in fact, it is in line with the Government of Pakistan’s vision to
achieve development through the CPEC.
These CRBC sponsored scholarships are geared towards equipping
students solely with the skills necessary to deliver the CPEC, and fill
job vacancies relevant to it. These jobs are created by different CPEC
infrastructural projects like road building and transportation lines. Hence,
these jobs are here today and could be gone tomorrow. They only exist
until the time the project is operational. In other words, such programs are
imparting skills, which are of value only within a limited context and for
a limited time period. This indicates poor strategizing on part of Pakistan.
The burden of translating China’s soft power into a win-win case lies with
Pakistan. It is risky for Pakistan to keep building a workforce with skills

77
Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China, “Statistical Report on
International Students in China for 2018,” Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic
of China, 2019, http://en.moe.gov.cn/documents/reports/201904/t20190418_378692.html.
78
Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China.
79
HEC Pakistan, “Opening Ceremony Of First Batch Of Pakistani Students Selected
Under CRBC Scholarship Program,” Higher Education Commission, Pakistan, December
19, 2017, http://hec.gov.pk/english/news/news/Pages/Ceremony-CRBC-scholarship.aspx.
80
HEC Pakistan, “HEC-CRBC Scholarship Program Offered By China Road And Bridge
Corporation For The Year 2018,” Higher Education Commission, Pakistan, April 24, 2018,
http://hec.gov.pk/english/scholarshipsgrants/lao/CRBC/Pages/default.aspx.
81
Associated Press of Pakistan, “CRBC Scholarships for Pakistani Students to Strengthen
Pak-China Relations: Chairman HEC,” Associated Press Of Pakistan, September 2018,
https://www.app.com.pk/national/crbc-scholarships-for-pakistani-students-to-strengthen-
pak-china-relations-chairman-hec/.

80
that have a limited applicability and have limited utility for future job
opportunities. Studies reveal that in the near future, the CPEC is likely
to create as many as 700,000 jobs in different sectors such as airport
operations management and logistics sector.82 Those are the jobs needed
to strategize towards building a pool of skills-oriented and professionally
competent workforce. The onus is on the Pakistani leadership and
policy makers, to maximize the educational, technical and professional
advantages that the educational exchanges with China offer and convert
these into a long-term and sustainable opportunity for Pakistan. In efforts
to further expand the educational ties, in August 2017, top business schools
in China (eight in total) and Pakistan (nine in total) launched the CPEC
Consortium, supported by the Higher Education Commission (HEC) of
Pakistan. These manifests shared vision and win-win cooperation through
educational exchanges and aims to increase academic collaboration to
support the economy and management systems of China and Pakistan. The
consortium seeks to bring business school leaders on one single platform
for collaborative research, and educational and management development
programs to support CPEC. The Chinese universities and institutes that are
part of the consortium include Fudan University, Hong Kong Polytechnic
University, Nanjing University, Peking University, Shanghai Jiao Tong
University, Tsinghua University, University of Science and Technology of
China, and Zhejiang University. Pakistani universities include Baluchistan
University of Information Technology, Engineering and Management
Sciences (BUITEMS), COMSATS Institute of Information Technology,
Institute of Information Technology, Institute of Business Administration
(IBA), Institute of Business Management Sciences (IMS), Lahore University
of Management Sciences (LUMS), National University of Sciences and
Technology (NUST), Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE),
and University of the Punjab.83
All this demonstrates China’s strategic clarity. In fact, it is best
demonstrated by how China has customized its programs in response to
local realities. Its scholarship opportunities are inclusive in nature, sensitive
to the local environment and cater to the local Pakistani needs. An example
of this is the “Gwadar-China Scholarship Program,” offered by China in
collaboration with the HEC in 2017. It is an international program designed
for the Baluchi youth, and in particular, for the indigenous students of
82
Hassan Khawar, “CPEC and Skills Development,” The Express Tribune, May 2018, http://
tribune.com.pk/story/1715631/6-cpec-skills-development.
83
https://www.hec.gov.pk/english/news/news/Pages/Conference-CPEC.aspx accessed on
December, 14, 2020.

81
Gwadar. It offers numerous opportunities, of which, the key one is to learn
the Chinese language at the leading native Chinese language institutes
in China.84 Fourteen students of Gwadar benefitted from this program in
March 2018, and another thirty-six in November the same year.85
This “Gwadar China Scholarship” is exemplar of an exchange opportunity
mutually beneficial for both the countries. It allows China to project soft
power by housing Pakistani students and introducing them to the Chinese
lifestyle. For Pakistan, it is beneficial both in the short-run and long run.
In the short run, this program is likely to produce competitive Chinese
language proficient individuals who will benefit from the job opportunities
emerging through the CPEC. Most important of all, such programs are
likely to create a sense of inclusiveness and ownership of the CPEC in
the Baluchi students. It is imperative to realize it in its true spirit; for in
engaging Baluchistan lays the prospects of the CPEC as a “game changer.”
And in that spirit, the future of Pakistani federation lies in Baluchistan, and
Pakistan should not miss this opportunity. In the long run, such exchange
programs are likely to have familiarized Pakistani students with the Chinese
culture, ethics and society, and polished their social skills to work with the
Chinese in any firm or enterprise across the globe. Even within Pakistan,
the Chinese community is expanding, meaning that in the near future, both
Pakistani and Chinese will have to work together for meeting each other’s
everyday needs, be it at grocery shopping, restaurants or cultural events.
Hence, Pakistan gets to translate this Chinese soft power engagement from
zero-sum to positive-sum through such opportunities, making it a win-win
for both the countries.
To facilitate these exchanges, China’s Confucius Institute (CI) network
has been a pivotal force. Pakistan currently houses four Confucius
Institutes, each at four different educational institutes. Globally, there are
more than five hundred CIs established in 154 countries and regions.86
Chinese leadership made a strategic move by side tracking Mao Zedong
Thought, and resuscitating Confucius Thought and expanding its soft power
through the CIs. Hard data suggests that countries with a greater number of

84
Higher Education Commission, Pakistan, “Gwadar-China Scholarship Program,” Higher
Education Commission Pakistan, 2018, https://www.hec.gov.pk/english/scholarshipsgrants/
GCSP/Pages/default.aspx.
85
Higher Education Commission, Pakistan, “HEC Sends off 36 Gwadar Students for
Chinese Language Course in Beijing,” Higher Education Commission Pakistan, October
2018, https://hec.gov.pk/english/news/news/Pages/Gwadar-Students-in-Beijing.aspx.
86
XinhuaNet, “Confucius Institutes a Boost to Cultural Exchanges,” XinhuaNet, December
2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-12/05/c_137653186.htm.

82
Confucius Institutes have generally held a more favourable view of China.87
CIs have been instrumental in improving foreigners’ perception of China.
More importantly, they have helped China attract students and facilitated
the educational exchange process. There is a strong positive correlation
of the location of Confucius Institutes with the number of students going
to China.88 Countries with more Confucius Institutes have reportedly sent
more students to China. South Korea, Thailand and Pakistan house one of
the highest numbers of Confucius Institutes regionally, and consequently,
have been the top three sources of international students to China.89
The CIs help facilitate the exchange process in at least three ways. One,
they serve as promotional tools for Chinese exchange and study abroad
opportunities, publicizing and marketing them to the Pakistani communities.
Two, they serve as official test centres for Chinese language proficiency test
(HSK) –the Chinese equivalent of the English language tests: IELTS and
TOEFL. Three, the CIs serve as a platform for celebrating cultural festivals,
promoting people-to-people contact and training the locals in Chinese
language and culture.
The CIs have been designed to serve as China’s soft power tools prior to,
and independent of the CPEC. However, their conjunction with the CPEC
has expanded the scope of China’s educational diplomacy with Pakistan.
The CI’s have been organizing job fairs, international conferences and
exhibitions, boosting the CPEC. For instance, in May 2018, the Confucius
Institute at the Punjab University in Lahore hosted a “CPEC Chinese Job
Fair.” It helped in aligning Pakistani-based Chinese companies engaged in
the CPEC projects to potential employees, in order to maximize future
job opportunities for them, and as many as thirty firms participated in the
event. In this way, the Confucius Institutes are serving as a platform for
bringing together the Chinese enterprises and the Pakistani entrepreneurs,
thus, strengthening the CPEC.
China is also building its presence in Pakistan’s media landscape. In
2016, China Radio International (CRI) collaborated with the Pakistan
Broadcasting Corporation (PBC) to launch “Radio FM 98,” jointly titled
87
Samantha Custer et al., “Silk Road Diplomacy: Deconstructing Beijing’s Toolkit to
Influence South and Central Asia” (Williamsburg, VA: AidData at William & Mary,
December 2019), 60–67, http://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/Silk_Road_Diplomacy_Report.
pdf.
88
Samantha Custer et al., “Influencing the Narrative: How the Chinese Government
Mobilizes Students and Media to Burnish Its Image.” (Williamsburg, VA: AidData at William
& Mary, December 2019), 35, http://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/Influencing_the_Narrative_
Report.pdf.
89
Custer et al., 35.

83
“Dosti Channel.”90 The idea was first initiated during President Xi’s visit
to Pakistan in 2015, and formally launched in 2016.91 By partnering with a
local channel, China effectively entered into the Pakistani media landscape.
It created space for a two-way communication. Had it not partnered, and
simply gotten a broadcasting license to run its own channel, it would have
been dispensing one way-communication92 by simply transmitting its
content without any understanding of the local context. The fact that the
CRI is joint-ventured, assures that the content is not simply dictated by
the Chinese media source, but in fact is broadcasted in collaboration with
the locally produced programs93. This demonstrates China’s sensitivity to
the Pakistani cultural context, which is a key characteristic of its soft power
template.
Currently, the Dosti Channel operates in Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad,94
and functions 24/7. It is furthering people-to-people connectivity. According
to Chan Xing, the Chinese Director of Dosti Channel, the channel has
captured a receptive Chinese and Pakistani audience, with a large number
of people tuning in to the channel to listen, call and converse.95 Thus, the
channel has been facilitating interaction between the Pakistani citizens and
the Chinese in Pakistan, fostering people-to-people relations. Ironically and
interestingly, the primary languages of transmission are Urdu and English,
both of which are understood by a vast majority of Pakistanis. In addition, a
“Learn Chinese” program is also broadcasted on a daily basis.96 This is how
Chinese and Pakistanis are crisscrossing the language barrier. The catch,

90
The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “CRI’s
Radio Channel in Pakistan Now Broadcasting Locally Produced Programming,” China
Radio International, http://www.scio.gov.cn/32618/Document/1536547/1536547.htm.
91
The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “CRI’s
Radio Channel in Pakistan Now Broadcasting Locally Produced Programming,” China
Radio International, http://www.scio.gov.cn/32618/Document/1536547/1536547.htm.
92
Custer et al., “Ties That Bind: Quantifying China’s Public Diplomacy and Its ‘Good
Neighbor’ Effect,” 2.
93
The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “CRI’s
Radio Channel in Pakistan Now Broadcasting Locally Produced Programming,” China
Radio International, http://www.scio.gov.cn/32618/Document/1536547/1536547.htm.
94
Pakistan Today, “Pakistan, China Launch Transmission of ‘Dosti’ Channel,”
Pakistan Today, November 10, 2016, https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2016/11/10/
pakistan-china-launch-transmission-of-dosti-channel/.
95
Zulfiqar Baig, “Dosti Channel: Can Radio Bring Two Countries Closer?,” The Express
Tribune, September 18, 2018, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1805820/1-dosti-channel-can-
radio-bring-two-countries-closer/.
96
BBC Monitoring, “Analysis: China’s Growing Presence in Pakistani Media,” BBC
Monitoring, December 18, 2017, https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c1do6djm.

84
however, is that it only an hour-long program; limited air time for a program
in foreign language allows the channel to blend in well with the local Urdu
and English language content. Hence, such foreign, yet locally produced
programs are less likely to be perceived as a new “Other.” Interestingly,
radio is one of the most powerful means to reach out to the Pakistani masses.
Pakistani consumers on average spend about 14 hours every week tuned in
to the radio.97 This makes radio the second-most consumed form of media
after TV in Pakistan.98 In this sense, the Dosti Channel signifies China’s
efficient use of its media source as an official soft power tool to advance
people-to-people ties.
To summarize, educational exchanges, Confucius Institutes, Radio
channels and the CPEC have propelled Chinese soft power. The
cumulative effect of these programs has been deepening of people-to-
people connectivity, besides infrastructural development and enhancement
of academic exchanges. This enabling environment has boosted learning of
Chinese language, thereby, promoting a better understanding of Chinese
history and culture and a healthier appreciation of its soft power. There
has been a mushroom growth of China study centers, Chinese language
programs within school and college curriculum in Pakistan, amplifying
research collaborations. It is worth noting that Pakistan, at present, has the
highest co-authored publications with China than with any other country.99
This makes Pakistan (CPEC) the jewel of BRI.

BRI’s Soft Power: Insights from South and Central Asia:

Insights from South and Central Asia reveal the growing Chinese soft
power presence. This is primarily through China’s academic exchange
opportunities, several of which are tied to its BRI projects, providing
strong academia-industry linkages and better employment opportunities.
In the South Asian region, Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port is an oft quoted
case critics cite to demonstrate China’s debt trap diplomacy underlying the
BRI, thereby, undermining and overshadowing the Chinese soft power
efforts. Yet, Sri Lankans speaking for themselves, for instance, Dushni
Weerakon and Sisira Jaayasuriya, leading Sri Lankan economists, explain
that Hambantota’s 99-year lease to China needs to be understood as part
of the greater problem of Sri Lanka’s on-going economic and debt crisis,
97
Radio Score, “Radio Score,” Radio Score, 2017, http://radio-score.com/#home.
98
Radio Score.
99
Ehsan Masood, “Scientists in Pakistan and Sri Lanka Bet Their Futures on China,” in
Nature, China’s Science Silk Road: Part 2 (Nature, 2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/
d41586-019-01125-6.

85
and not exclusively a problem created by the Chinese debt.100 Hence, the
BRI participant countries have not blamed China for the issues arising out
of the BRI.
China has successfully been able to project its economic clout and
capability as an economic giant and benefactor in these countries and that
spikes its soft power. While perceptions are not monolithic, and different
views exist across different regions and countries, and along different
political, economic and income strata, yet, students from the South Asian
countries are generally developing favorability of China with time. For
instance, Nepalese students, interviewed upon their return home from
China, expressed their approval of the Chinese political system for its
efficiency, good governance in terms of safety and security, promotion of
economic development, quick implementation of infrastructural projects
and delivering results. It made them realize that China offers lessons to
learn. They also noted that the infrastructural development projects in their
own home country remained politicized and a mere rhetoric of words.101
These examples show that the students from the participant countries are
energetically availing themselves of the educational exchange opportunities
tied to China’s BRI projects. For these countries, China provides exclusive
partnerships, preferential policies, institutional frameworks and especially
funding opportunities to expand the educational exchange co-operation. A
significant 66 percent of the Chinese government scholarship beneficiaries
happened to be from the BRI countries in 2017.102 Many of these scholarship
beneficiaries are students from countries with a GDP per capita and income
per capita lower than that of China.103 For students in these countries,
China’s study-abroad opportunities promise better economic prospects for
working in the BRI projects at home and Chinese firms across the globe.

100
Weerakon Dushni and Sisira Jayasurriya, “Commentary: Sri Lanka’s Debt Problem
Wasn’t Made in China,” Channel News Asia, March 2019, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/
news/commentary/sri-lanka-debt-port-borrowing-problem-not-made-in-china-11309738.
101
Romi Jain, “China’s Soft Power Aims in South Asia: Experiences of Nepalese Students
in China’s Internationalization of Higher Education” (Doctor of Philosophy in Urban
Education, Clevleand State University, 2018), https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/
etdarchive/1061/.
102
Office of the Leading Group for Promoting the Belt and Road Initiative, “The
Belt and Road Initiative Progress, Contributions and Prospects” (Beijing, China:
Foreign Languages Press, 2019), 19 https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/wcm.files/upload/
CMSydylgw/201904/201904220254037.pdf.
103
Custer et al., “Influencing the Narrative: How the Chinese Government Mobilizes
Students and Media to Burnish Its Image.,” 37.

86
 China has strategically placed itself as a ”better value-for-money” study
abroad destination, offering valuable market-industry linkages, especially
through the BRI projects. This is a key facet of its soft power. Its targeted
scholarship programs include the “Silk Road Scholarship” and “Belt and
Road Initiative Scholarship,” which allow locals to gain a specialized skill-set
in order to avail the BRI related job opportunities and easily transition into
the well-established Chinese job market. Other examples include China’s
“Scholarship for Youth of Excellence Scheme of China (YES China).” This
gives students from along the Belt and Road, a chance to pursue degrees
such as a Master of One-Belt-Road Sustainable Infrastructure Engineering
(MOSI) or AIIB Master of International Finance (AMIF).104 China has
doubled its efforts in promoting student exchanges in Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan, in particular.105 These countries are two of the largest recipients
of Chinese government scholarships in Central Asia, where China has
been particularly keen to dispel the negative images of China, which
is a legacy of the Cold War. These improvisations by China, on Nye’s
conceptualization of soft power, are paying dividends as perceptions about
China are propitiously changing.
Empirical evidence suggests that young Kazakhs today are more
welcoming towards China, and also relatively neutral, despite any “hidden
motives” China may have in engaging with Kazakhstan. They are eager to
study and work in China.106 This stands in stark contrast to the view of their
ancestors, who possess a typical “Cold War mentality” and a strong affinity
with Russia.107 Similarly, youngsters in Uzbekistan have also grown fond of
China and expressed their favorability towards it. This is largely because
of China’s investment in local human capital and provision of modern
educational opportunities for them and that attract students, and promote
talent and innovation through the educational architecture supplementing
the BRI’s infrastructural projects.108 Recognizing the salience of educational
exchanges and the experiences of foreign students in China, David
Shambaugh has perceptively observed that these “will certainly sensitize
them to Chinese viewpoints and interests… they will possess knowledge
104
CSC Scholarship, “Youth of Excellence Scheme of China,” Chinese Government
Scholarship, 2017, https://www.chinesescholarshipcouncil.com/youth-of-excellence-scheme-
of-china.html.
105
Samantha Custer et al., “Silk Road Diplomacy: Deconstructing Beijing’s Toolkit
to Influence South and Central Asia” (Williamsburg, VA: AidData at William & Mary,
December 2019), 8, http://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/Silk_Road_Diplomacy_Report.pdf.
106
Custer et al., 6.
107
Custer et al., 45.
108
Callahan, “China’s ‘Asia Dream.’”

87
of the Chinese language, as well as Chinese society, culture, history, and
politics…They will also share personal connections with former classmates
and will move up through professional hierarchies simultaneously.”109
This leads to the conclusion that the academic exchanges provide a strong
socio- cultural foundation to the BRI, setting the pace for China to promote
and pursue its vision of shared humanity, interdependent world order, and
showcasing Chinese soft power. 110 China is reformulating and improvising
the soft power ingredients conceptualized by Nye and slowly and gradually
reaping its dividends.

SECTION 3: BRI: Transforming Chinese Soft Power

Pivoted around the educational exchange process, the BRI is spurring
cooperation in a range of areas, from economic, cultural, and political to
geo-strategic. Since all participant countries have an opportunity to identify
areas of shared interest, it increases the likelihood of achieving positive
outcomes. Although Nye has reservations over the Chinese approach, yet,
he acknowledges that the BRI has allowed China to strengthen ties with its
trading partners. He admits that “China’s economic success story enhances
its soft power.” This is evidenced by the fact that 128 out of 190 countries
trade more with China than the US today.111
The Chinese leadership has been playing a significant role in advancing
the country’s vision and goals. It is an undeniable fact that the leadership has
been backing, sponsoring and funding the BRI, and has been vigorous and
articulate in enhancing the country’s soft power. The critics however often
point out that there is little resonance and ownership of it by the ordinary
people, both within and outside of China. Kerry Brown reminds us that
Xi Jinping and the CPC actually “go to great lengths to stress that they are
people-centred.” Unlike in the time of Mao Zedong, people in China today,
particularly the emerging middle class have a greater say in the running of
their country. In essence, the “power dynamics have changed.” It is “the
desires of the people which guide the Party and affect the way it formulates
policy.”112 Consequently, many of the Party policies are people-centred, in
words, deeds, and actions.
Increasingly, it is evident that the BRI revolves around the ordinary
people and in fact, goes a step further by aiming to bring the people
109
David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” International
Security 29, no. 3 (2004): 64–99.
110
Custer et al., 49. For a contrary view, see ,Shambaugh (2015) pp 102-107
111
Nye, “Power and Interdependence with China,” 13–16.
112
Brown, The World According to Xi, 116–18.

88
together—connectivity is its underlying theme. The BRI is not simply an
infrastructural project; in fact, it is underscored by China’s grand vision of
creating a shared world—a “harmonious society” at home and a “harmonious
world” abroad. The BRI has been incorporated in the Constitution of
China, and is inalienable from the broader CPC narrative, its Core Socialist
Values and the Xi Jinping Thought –all of which spell out China’s vision of
creating a community of common destiny and shared future. For instance,
a PEW Research Centre study conducted recently, documented Nigerians
living near a site of a major Belt and Road project developing a sense of
ownership for the project and favorable views of China once the project
had neared completion.113 The critics however, view this as propaganda
that is ideologically driven, and claim that it covers up “hidden motives” of
China. They are unwilling to see the BRI as economic, educationally and
culturally driven. They remain dismissive of any constructive and positive
intent and outcome of BRI, unwilling to accept the growing evidence of the
soft power gains it is beginning to offer to China.114
The BRI helps China enhance its soft power in at least four ways.
First, the BRI is based on multilateral co-operation processes. Several
multilateral mechanisms are now formally a part of it, including the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), along with financial mechanisms, such as the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The BRI is intertwined with
a range of national, regional and global bodies, and entities such as China’s
Confucius Institute network. These forums open space for dialogue, sharing
views and bridging differences. Multilateralism is especially helpful when
leaders meet, according to Kishore Mahbubani, the former ambassador
from Singapore to the UN. It creates a sense of community among people
coming from different parts of the world, which in turn has a ripple effect
across the globe.115 Nye, in one of his early writings, states how multilateral
arrangements are more likely to enhance a country’s soft power than
unilateralism because “the currency of soft power is attraction based on
shared values and the justness and duty of others to contribute to policies
113
Dennis Quinn, “Nigerians Living near a Major Belt and Road Project Grew More
Positive toward China after It Was Completed” (PEW Research Centre -Global Attitudes
and Trends, April 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/04/23/nigerians-
living-near-a-major-belt-and-road-project-grew-more-positive-toward-china-after-it-was-
completed/.
114
Jonathan Hillman, p15
115
Kishore Mahbubani, The Great Convergence: Asia, the West, and the Logic of One World
(Public Affairs, 2017), 45, https://www.publicaffairsbooks.com/titles/kishore-mahbubani/
the-great-convergence/9781610390347/.

89
consistent with those shared values.”116 The BRI’s multilateralism helps
China move a step closer to its goal of a shared global community.
The second way by which China envisions building a shared world is
through reviving the “Silk Road Spirit” -a metaphor for peace, cooperation,
inclusiveness and mutual learning through shared experiences. With
the world increasingly converging on four key areas –environmental,
economic, technological, and aspirational,117 revival of the “Silk Road
Spirit” further accelerates this convergence, allowing for an advancement
of shared interests in all these domains, under the BRI framework. For
convergence on advancing environmental awareness, the BRI has a total
of twenty-two formal multilateral mechanisms focusing exclusively on
environmental repercussions. Of these, the most prominent one is the
BRI International Green Development Coalition, which has more than
120 participant organizations from 60 states and environment ministries
from 25 BRI states.118 In the economic realm, the BRI is promoting
interdependence, transparency and openness. China is spearheading this
with its total investment under the BRI ranging from about $1 trillion to $8
trillion.119 Thirdly, convergence in the technological landscape is manifested
in China’s “Digital Silk Road,” for which 16 countries have officially signed
Memorandums of Understanding (MoU).120 Critics however, see it as “digital
authoritarianism,” even though it is evidently geared towards minimizing
the digital gap and allowing all to share the benefits from open access to
technology and information. Fourthly, the BRI is delivering people’s
common set of material aspirations. For instance, it is catering to people’s
shared educational aspirations, as explained in the previous section. In all
these four domains, the BRI is accelerating people’s convergence on a set
of shared interests for a shared future.
The BRI also provides a framework for collectively resolving common
problems, whereby the benefits of joining the BRI are far greater than
staying out of it. In some ways, the management of Covid-19 has put to test
the character and management skills of Chinese leadership for building a
116
Nye, Soft Power: Means to Success in World Politics, 7.
117
Mahbubani, The Great Convergence: Asia, the West, and the Logic of One World, 55–88.
118
Sarah Lidslaw and Lachlan Carey, “Chinese Multilateralism and the Promise of a Green
Belt and Road,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), November 2019,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinese-multilateralism-and-promise-green-belt-and-road.
119
Jonathan Hillman, “How Big Is China’s Belt and Road?,” Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/
how-big-chinas-belt-and-road.
120
Huang Yong, “Construction of Digital Silk Road Lights up BRI Cooperation,” People’s
Daily Online, 2019, http://en.people.cn/n3/2019/0424/c90000-9571418.html.

90
sustainable co-operation network. For China, support from the participant
countries during this public health crisis is a valuable metric to gauge their
receptivity to its soft power. While some, such as Pakistan, have showed
support, many have raised concerns that it is this increased interdependence
and people-to-people connectivity spurred by the BRI that is leading to a
greater public health crisis. Several world leaders, such as the American and
French Presidents, and the Australian and Canadian Prime Minister have
also chosen to point towards China for virus spread.
This has resulted in hostility towards China. Additionally, the Western
media, academia and policy makers have also been increasingly aggressive
in highlighting other issues. The Chinese academia and policy analysts on
the other hand, are conscious of this and trying to address it. For example,
Yan Xuetong observes that, if China were to truly expand its soft power,
it must establish moral superiority. He incisively observes that China
remains contradicted in this regard at present.121 Yan Xuetong advocates
that China must allow free speech, religious freedom, and promote unity in
diversity. This is an unachievable goal, according to David Shambaugh, for
as long as the Chinese leadership remains clung onto what he terms “hard
authoritarianism.”122
At present, China has struck a balance in managing its relations with
other states, adopting what Evan Osnos of the New Yorker calls a “struggle
but not smash” approach.123 China has converted the US hostility into an
opportunity; it has neither been breaking ties from the global institutions, like
the US did under the Trump presidency, nor is it eager to gain hegemony,
like the US did in the last century. In fact, it is striking a reasonable
balance in its relationships by participating, competing, managing and in
essence, struggling- a “struggle but not smash” approach. In contrast, the
US is presenting and confronting China as a geo-strategic threat, stirring
realist theory, and thus thwarting the Chinese soft power. The Europeans
are also confronted with a predicament; on the one hand, the Trump
administration has been abandoning alliances, while, many European states
have signed bilateral agreements with China on G5 technology, rail road
and cyber connectivity for instance. In this acrimonious and unpredictable

121
Xuetong, “Chinese Values vs. Liberalism,” 22.
122
David Shambaugh, China’s Future, 1 edition (Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity,
2016). For more recent and nail biting criticism of President Xi and the CPC see Richard
McGregor, “Party Man: Xi Jinping’s Quest to Dominate China” Foreign Affairs, September/
October 2019. Pp 17-25.
123
Evan Osnos, “The Future of America’s Contest with China,” The Newyorker, 2020, https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/01/13/the-future-of-americas-contest-with-china.

91
global environment, China has been engaging all through co-operative
interdependence, with its soft power, despite suspicions by hostile powers,
gaining momentum.

Conclusion
From the above review of literature, analysis and evidence it may be
concluded that by pivoting educational and cultural exchanges, promoting
cooperative interdependence, the BRI is becoming transformational,
gaining legitimacy and credibility, as the number of participating countries
has risen to about sixty five.124 China’s ambition continues to maximize the
number of participants. The soft power dividend, radiating through BRI,
inclusive of the CPEC, is becoming visible in three distinct ways. First,
it is based on multilateral co-operation processes, whereby ownership by
member states is the key and that is evidently on the rise, giving legitimacy
to the BRI; second, its “Silk Road Spirit” facilitates convergence on a set of
common values for the advancement of shared interests in four important
domains –technological, economic, environmental and aspirational, which
includes educational; and three, it provides a framework to act collectively
in addressing common problems. States are joining the BRI voluntarily, and
in pursuit of their national interests and pragmatic needs, and not because
of fear or coercion. This reflects the BRI’s soft power, as participating
countries find it rewarding economically, educationally, culturally and
for improvements in innovation and connectivity. The BRI is a symbol of
China’s soft power, and despite hiccups, its progress is irrefutable. China has
successfully been “getting others to want what it wants through attraction”
and not through projection of military power, energizing and refashioning
Nye’s soft power conceptualization. Nye does have reservations over the
Chinese refashioning of his soft power, yet he encourages the US to welcome
it as well.125 More recently, writing for Asia Society Policy Institute, Daniel
Russel and Admiral (retired) Samuel Locklear, have argued that China is
“weaponizing” BRI, yet the US should not abandon diplomacy with China
as it is pursuing “the largest scale infrastructure project the world has ever

124
Rolland, “Securing the Belt and Road.”
125
Joseph Nye, “Xi Jinping’s Marco Polo Strategy,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute –The
Strategist, June 2017, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/xi-jinpings-marco-polo-strategy/.

92
known.”126 Thereby reinforcing that the BRI is an emerging reality of
Chinese “Smart Power.”127
Idealizing and building a shared world is both problematic and
challenging. By unpacking the BRI, the Chinese leadership has provided
an alternate platform than the existing one- it is not challenging the existing
order but showing the world, in the words of the American poet, Robert
Frost, “The Road Not Taken.” President Xi Jinping has taken the road
“less travelled by, and that has made all the difference.” China is offering
a different choice to those who are willing to join; it is not saying “you are
either with us or against us.” That said, there remain several impediments in
China’s way of realizing its grand vision of creating a “harmonious world”
with shared vision for global peace. It is a tall order in a realist world where
conflict, rivalry, strategic competition and war has been and continues to
be a reality. Given the rise of China and the perceived US threat to its
military hegemony and democratic ideals, the legitimacy and sustainability
of the BRI’s promised peaceful and harmonious global order is intrinsically
tied to the US response towards China, which remains confrontational and
“Containment” driven. To mitigate and avoid such a “calamity,” Kevin Rudd,
proposes a perceptive and balanced way forward, he says the two need to
build trust and develop a framework of “Managed strategic competition”
in which both super powers can test the strengths and weaknesses of each
other and the world can see and decide on its own and then wryly he leaves
it to the imagination of all by saying, “may the best system win.”128
Yet, these challenges are a litmus test of China’s resilience and its
leadership’s ability to truly knit the participating countries together,
enhance partnerships and make the BRI sustainable. The success of the
BRI is ultimately rooted in its ability to build constructive, meaningful and
sustainable people-to-people ties. For it is only when there is a resonance

126
https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/china-is-weaponizing-the-belt-and-road-what-can-
the-us-do-about-it/?mccid=dfd3771eaf&mc_eid=4baa25aadf accessed on November 2, 2020.
For a similar but more nuanced perspective, see, Henry Farrel and Abraham Newman, “The
Folly of De-coupling from China: It Isn’t Just Perilous—It is Impossible” https://www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/china/2020-06-03/folly-decoupling-china?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_
source=on_the_ballot&utm_campaign=on_the_ballot_2020_active accessed on December
4,2020.
127
Joseph S. Nye, “Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power”, Foreign Affairs, July-
August 2009, p.160-163. According to Nye a combination of hard and soft power is needed
for effective foreign policy and this is what China appears to be doing through BRI.
128
Kevin Rudd is the President of Asia Society and formerly the Prime Minister of Australia,
“Short of War: How to Keep U.S.-Chinese Confrontation From Ending in Calamity” | Foreign
Affairs, March/April 2021, pp 2-20. P 20.

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 and ownership of it at the grass-roots level among the people that China
will be able to win acceptance of and realize its vision in its true spirit. The
Coronavirus (Covid-19) threat could slow down this process, but as soon
as it is brought under control, the BRI’s footprint is likely to expand in the
countries that seek to foster connectivity, cooperation, and aim to pursue
common goals that have a shared vision of global peace and sustainable
development. This study reveals that, the academic exchange process,
backed by Chinese economic investments under the BRI, are acting as a
catalyst in advancing China’s soft power. This “distributive globalism” of
the BRI holds the promise of an interdependent, cooperative, peaceful and
harmonious global order.

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