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    Game Theory Mid Term

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    gedhi toaka
    The document describes three game theory scenarios involving choices between attending a party with or without a clown, a professor choosing weapons and a student choosing to study or not, and a similar scenario to the second one with different payoffs. It asks to identify dominated strategies, find Nash equilibriums, and compare equilibrium outcomes between similar games with different payoffs.

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    Game Theory Mid Term

    Uploaded by

    gedhi toaka
    7 views2 pages
    The document describes three game theory scenarios involving choices between attending a party with or without a clown, a professor choosing weapons and a student choosing to study or not, and a similar scenario to the second one with different payoffs. It asks to identify dominated strategies, find Nash equilibriums, and compare equilibrium outcomes between similar games with different payoffs.

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    Game Theory Mid Term - Copy

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    The document describes three game theory scenarios involving choices between attending a party with or without a clown, a professor choosing weapons and a student choosing to study or not, and a similar scenario to the second one with different payoffs. It asks to identify dominated strategies, find Nash equilibriums, and compare equilibrium outcomes between similar games with different payoffs.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    7 views2 pages

    Game Theory Mid Term

    Uploaded by

    gedhi toaka
    The document describes three game theory scenarios involving choices between attending a party with or without a clown, a professor choosing weapons and a student choosing to study or not, and a similar scenario to the second one with different payoffs. It asks to identify dominated strategies, find Nash equilibriums, and compare equilibrium outcomes between similar games with different payoffs.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
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    Game Theory Mid Term

    NITIE Mumbai

    1) Roger has invited Caleb to his party. Roger must choose whether or not to
    hire a clown. Simultaneously, Caleb must decide whether or not to go the
    party. Caleb likes Roger but he hates clowns {he even hates other people
    seeing clowns! Caleb's payoff from going to the party is 4 if there is no clown,
    but 0 if there is a clown there. Caleb's payoff from not going to the party is 3 if
    there is no clown at the party, but 1 if there is a clown at the party. Roger likes
    clowns {he especially likes Caleb's reaction to them -but does not like paying
    for them. Roger's payoff if Caleb comes to the party is 4 if there is no clown,
    but 8-x if there is a clown (x is the cost of a clown). Roger's payoff if Caleb
    does not come to the party is 2 if there is no clown, but 3-x if there is a clown
    there.

    (a) Write down the payoff matrix of this game.

    (b) Suppose x = 0. Identify any dominated strategies. Explain. Find the Nash equilibrium.
    What are the equilibrium payoffs?

    (c) Suppose x = 2. Identify any dominated strategies. Explain. Find the Nash equilibrium.
    What are the equilibrium payoffs?

    (d) Suppose x = 3. Identify any dominated strategies. Explain. Find the Nash equilibrium.
    What are the equilibrium payoffs?

    (e) Suppose x = 5. Identify any dominated strategies. Explain. Find the Nash equilibrium.
    What are the equilibrium payoffs?

    2) Consider the following game

    Professor M
    Revolver Knife Wrench
    Student S Study 1,3 2,-2 6,6
    Not Study 3,1 1,4 5,6

    a) Graph the expected payoffs from each of the professor M strategies as a function
    of Student S p –mix.
    b) Over what range of P mix does Revolver yields higher expected payoff for
    Professor M than Knife?
    c) Over what range of P mix does Revolver yields higher expected payoff for
    Professor M than Wrench
    d) Which Pure Strategies will professor M use in his equilibrium mixture and why?
    e) What is the mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium of the Game ?

    3) Consider the following game

    Professor M
    Revolver Knife Wrench
    Student S Study 1,3 2,-2 6,6
    Not Study 3,2 1,4 5,6

    a) Which strategies will professor M use in his equilibrium outcome and why?
    b) What is the mixed strategy NE of the game?
    c) Note that this game is slightly different from the above Game. How are the two
    Games different. Explain why you think the equilibrium outcome has changed?

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