CHAPTER 3 Reviwer
CHAPTER 3 Reviwer
CHAPTER 3 Reviwer
1. In Europe, European Union (EU) was enlarged to include ten new, mostly
former socialist, member states in 2004.
2. In Asia, the member states of the Association of South-East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) began to advance widening the membership beyond regime
differences.
3. Intergovernmental forums such as ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, and Korea), and
more recently the East Asia Summit, have been successively launched.
4. The inclusion of India, Australia, and New Zealand has even blurred the
geographical identity of Asia.
5. Other examples include APEC (Asia–Pacific Economic Co-operation),
NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), and MERCOSUR
(Mercado Común del Sur), created in 1989 and 1990
Afred Sauvy in 1952 who saw the Third World (Tiers Monde) as a modern parallel
to the Third Estate (Tiers Etat) of the French Revolution, the class of commoners
after the aristocracy and the clergy.
1. With the breakup of the Soviet Union and the liberation of Eastern Europe,
with the practical disappearance, in other words, of the Second World, the poor,
underdeveloped countries of the Third World are more often referred to today as
"South" or "developing countries," surely an improvement over the former
designation, "backward countries." "Third World" continues to be a useful and
powerful analytic concept, however, because its problems are not only and
primarily economic, much less geographic.
2. Dramatic changes, foremost of which is the rise to economic power of China,
India, and the dragons of Asia. Still the majority of poor people continue to
reside in the Third World \ Two Thirds World.
West has been an important part of modern Third World/Global South history,
not only during but colonialism even after independence.
Third World/Global South has gone though and the policies they have been
subjected to in their post-colonial struggle for political independence and
economic development: the development project, the globalization project,
and the imperial project.
THE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
LESSON OUTLINE
Trump era promises to present unwelcome challenges to the conventional
policy‐making and scholarly wisdom about the role of American power in
Australia's region—no matter how it is defined.
Regionalization is described as the practice or trend of separating regions into little portions
and dividing huge areas into regions or districts. Regionalism is defined as the political goal of
creating a legally binding agreement between states on a geographically limited scale.
Regionalization
It has become commonplace to make a distinction between forms of
regionalism to refer to the collaborative political efforts of states and
regionalization to refer to the actions of economic actors such as multinational
corporations (Dent 2013).
This essay is primarily concerned with regionalism and the self‐conscious
attempt to create politically defined and organized regions.
It is, however, important to recognize two further possible characteristics of
regional processes. First, they are not simply driven by the ‘functional’ needs
of business—or politics, for that matter—as many of the early theorists of
European integration believed (Rosamond 2005).
The contrast between the EU's experience and that of Southeast Asia,
which in the ASEAN has one of the most enduring intergovernmental
organizations in the so‐called ‘developing world’, is instructive and
revealing.
Both the EU and ASEAN were powerfully shaped by external geopolitical
forces during their formative years, but internal differences and ideas about the
purpose of regional integration led to very different outcomes.
GLOBALIZATION
The United States rather belatedly turned its attention to the most
economically dynamic and strategically significant region in the world (Le
Mière 2013).
The shorthand for this change of strategic focus was the pivot
But however, the United States' priorities during the administration of Barak
Obama were described; one expression of this impulse was the desire to
develop new connections with the East Asian region. Importantly, it is a
position that has been directly repudiated by close advisors to the Trump
administration (Gray and Navarro 2016).
The United States was also keen to demonstrate its willingness to fulfil its
role as what has been described as an ‘offshore balancer’ (Layne 1997;
Mearsheimer & Walt 2016).
First, as in the past (Beeson 2006), there are a number of competing visions
of ‘the region’. As a consequence, its boundaries remain uncertain,
contested, and contingent.
Second, such differences are reflected in the memberships and goals of
the various organizations and initiatives that have recently emerged.
There is a noteworthy difference between initiatives that are driven by
economic goals—APEC, the TPP; and the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP)—and those that have a more strategic focus,
such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Indo‐Pacific.
Third, even where the membership and boundaries of organizations are
more settled, there is equally long‐standing scepticism about their
effectiveness and actual influence over their members.
Indeed, ASEAN's own ‘widening’ process has further compromised its
capacity for the sort of ‘deepening’ that famously characterized the EU in its
heyday.