Political Geography 99 (2022) 102769

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Political Geography
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/polgeo

Full Length Article

The unequal geographies of climate finance: Climate injustice and

dependency in the world system
David Ciplet a, Danielle Falzon b, *, Ike Uri c, Stacy-ann Robinson d, Romain Weikmans e,
J. Timmons Roberts c, f
a
Environmental Studies Program, University of Colorado Boulder, 4001 Discovery Drive Boulder, CO, 80303, USA
b
Department of Sociology, Rutgers University, 26 Nichol Avenue, New Brunswick, NJ, 08901, USA
c
Department of Sociology, Brown University, 108 George Street, Providence, RI, 02912, USA
d
Environmental Studies Program, Colby College, 5356 Mayflower Hill, Waterville, ME 04901, USA
e
Department of Geosciences, Environment and Society, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Avenue Franklin Roosevelt 50 – 1050, Brussels, Belgium
f
Institute at Brown for Environment and Society, Brown University, 85 Waterman Street, Providence, RI, 02912, USA

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Central to climate justice is the question of who will pay for the mitigation and adaptation efforts needed as the
Climate change climate crisis worsens, particularly in countries that bear little responsibility for global greenhouse gas emissions.
Climate finance Climate finance is a complex set of mechanisms intended to address this concern. World-systems theory has long
Climate justice
understood international development assistance as a tool that reproduces spatial dependency between states. In
Dependency theory
this paper, we ask whether climate finance follows the expectations of world-systems theory and reproduces
Development
World-systems theory relationships of dependency, or if it instead advances climate justice and challenges spatial dependency in the
world-system. Through this analysis, we consider the implications of climate finance for world-systems theory.
We use recent empirical data to ask whether climate finance follows or challenges world-systems theory ex­
pectations, focusing on five areas: (1) spatial flows of climate finance between the core, semi-periphery, and
periphery; (2) the governance of climate finance institutions; (3) the types of projects supported by climate
finance; (4) the relationship of projects to dominant systems of extraction, production, and consumption; and (5)
the agency of peripheral state and non-state actors in shaping climate finance in relation to their interests. Taken
together, we argue that climate finance in many ways reproduces relationships of dependency, though potential
avenues exist for contesting this unequal balance of power and for advocating for climate justice. This case il­
lustrates the need to approach analyses of dependency in a nuanced way, interrogating specific processes through
which dependency is produced and contested across scales.

1. Introduction frame the contrast between rich, industrialized (core) countries that had
benefitted from burning large volumes of fossil fuels, and the poorer
“Climate justice is the simple idea that those who have done the most (periphery) countries that did not and who are more susceptible to the
to cause the climate crisis – and who have the most resources – must wide range of climate impacts because of a host of historical, economic,
also do the most to fix it. In global terms, this means that wealthy political, and social factors. With the concept, came the notion that
countries like the U.S. [United States] must lead by example when it historical responsibility for mitigating the impacts of climate change
comes to climate action by undertaking urgent emissions reductions rested with the wealthy countries, but not without huge tensions around
at home and providing hugely ramped-up financial support for ac­ who should finance the actions. These tensions have remained unre­
tion in poorer countries”. solved and, since that time, a range of academic scholarship has focused
~Brandon Wu, Director of Policy and Campaigns, ActionAid USA on analyzing the constitutive elements of climate justice. Much of it,
(Wu, 2021) while acknowledging the interconnectedness with finance, has come to
similar conclusions – that raising and distributing large sums of funding
The concept of ‘climate justice’ emerged in the 1990s, primarily to

* Corresponding author. 26 Nichol Avenue, New Brunswick, NJ, 08901.

E-mail address: [email protected] (D. Falzon).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2022.102769
Received 4 May 2021; Received in revised form 26 September 2022; Accepted 27 September 2022
Available online 5 October 2022
0962-6298/© 2022 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
D. Ciplet et al. Political Geography 99 (2022) 102769

to address injustice does not happen in a historical vacuum. Rather, it production, and consumption; and (5) the agency of peripheral state and
takes place in a world where stark forms of historical and modern-day non-state actors in shaping climate finance in relation to their interests.
inequality, along with grievances over a broad lack of procedural jus­ Where data is lacking, we highlight areas for future research. By doing
tice, negatively impact the global governance of responses to climate this, we also consider how the complex case of climate finance can
change. inform world-systems theory, which has not developed its understand­
Scholarship in human geography is broadly concerned with under­ ing of the role of international development finance significantly since
standing the spatial dynamics of societies, economies, and cultures. It relatively simplistic analyses of the Bretton Woods institutions (i.e. the
has taken up the critical task of deepening understandings of climate World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) in the 1970s and
justice, emphasizing the need to critically assess how climate change and 1980s. Moreover, we draw upon the findings to highlight the ways in
responses to it function across spatial and temporal scales (Burnham which the project of world-systems theory can develop a more nuanced
et al., 2013a, 2013b; Chatterton et al., 2013; Fisher, 2015; Routledge, understanding of spatial dependency. We then discuss these findings and
2011). In this body of work, climate justice has been primarily posi­ their implications for the relationship between climate finance and
tioned within the international sphere, as a set of exchanges between climate justice and world-systems theory more broadly.
nation-states (Barrett, 2013; Fisher, 2015). From early analyses of the
unequal distribution of climate impacts across the social landscape (see 2. Unequal exchange, uneven development, the global capitalist
Kasperson & Kasperson, 2001), a lot of this work has focused on the class and climate governance: theory and space
governance of responses to climate change. This work has highlighted
for instance, the negative effects of depoliticized and technocratic ap­ To understand patterns in the distribution of climate finance, it is
proaches to the climate crisis (see Nightingale et al., 2020; Swynge­ valuable to step back to understand how these flows are informed by
douw, 2010), particularly within adaptation (see Eriksen et al., 2015, relations of dependency developed over centuries of colonialism, capi­
2021; Mikulewicz, 2020; Omukuti, 2020; Robinson, 2019; Scoville-Si­ talist expansion, and decolonization under conditions of dependent
monds et al., 2020). The importance of finance for climate justice has capitalism. These are forces which also created the conditions for
also been noted (Burnham et al., 2013b; Paavola & Adger, 2006). climate change (see Bonilla, 2020; Davis & Todd, 2017; Sultana, 2022;
However, despite its core concern with spatial forms of inequality, only Yusoff, 2018). Theorists of the dependency school suggested that nations
limited work in geography has applied a critical lens directly to climate categorized as ‘underdeveloped’ are not underdeveloped because they
finance (e.g., Bracking, 2015). Moreover, the broader literature on are inherently flawed or simply at earlier stages in a universal
climate justice leaves the role of climate finance undertheorized. modernization trajectory (contra e.g., Rostow, 1959 for modernization
In this article, we help to fill this gap by analyzing climate finance theory). Rather, dependency theorists argued that developing countries
through the lens of world-systems theory, which we see as being a useful remain poor because they are exploited by wealthy and powerful nations
framework for considering the political geography of the enduring de­ in their scouring of the globe for surplus and profit (Baran, 1957; Frank,
pendency between states (e.g., Wallerstein, 1979; Shannon [1989] 1969, p. 225; Prebisch, 1950; Rodney, 1974). Latin American scholars
2018). Broadly, ‘climate finance’ refers to financial resources mobilized argued that ‘underdeveloped’ nations are forced into a relationship of
to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and to adapt to the impacts of ‘dependent development,’ where they require inputs from wealthy na­
climate change (Kalaidjian & Robinson, 2022). Today, climate finance is tions and companies based in these nations to develop (Cardoso &
a complex set of mechanisms intended to facilitate the transfer of funds Faletto, 1979; Evans [1979] 2018).
between states for mitigation and adaptation, among other climate re­ These ideas were adopted and adapted by scholars of world-systems
sponses (Kalaidjian & Robinson, 2022). Climate finance is increasingly theory. World-systems theory presented an intellectual challenge to the
variegated, with novel and more fragmented forms of finance emerging two dominant conceptions of power in the international system at the
(CPI, 2021; Roberts et al., 2021; Weikmans & Roberts, 2019). Given this time, that of economic liberals and realists. On the one hand, economic
complexity, assessing the relationships between climate finance and liberals viewed relationships of inequality in the international system as
climate justice is not a straightforward task. This entails determining temporary and malleable given the ‘convergence’ that would occur in
whether the distribution of climate finance, its governance, and its the wealth gap between states. Liberals posited that economic growth
implementation reproduce dependency between states, or whether they rates in developing states would outpace that in wealthy states, ulti­
can deliver justice that is being sought by marginalized actors. mately leveling the playing field (Gerschenkron, 1952; see Rassekh,
Scholarship in world-systems theory has posited that international 1998). Thus, power in the international system was contingent on
development finance is one mechanism, among many, through which divergent stages of development, not structural imbalances. On the
exploitation is carried out and structures of economic and political hi­ other hand, realists posited that relationships of inequality were indeed
erarchy are reproduced (Hayter, 1976; Wood, 1986). Through this lens, durable over time. They argued that this was due to comparative dif­
we ask whether climate finance reproduces relationships of dependency ferences in military power and its use by self-interested wealthy states to
and furthers the core’s exploitation of the periphery, or if it instead has exert control to their advantage (Waltz, 2000).
the potential to advance climate justice imperatives. We focus narrowly Alternatively, world-systems theory presented an understanding of
on public financial resources that are provided to countries in the Global relationships of power in the international system that is distinctly
South. Since the agreement of the United Nations Framework Conven­ spatial in nature. Namely, world-systems theorists posit that a global
tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, public transfers of climate hierarchy of wealth and privilege is maintained by wealthy states
finance have been seen by developing countries as fundamental to through durable structural economic advantages and a system of uneven
delivering a just solution to the climate crisis (Khan et al., 2020). While global rules and practices that extend across geographical zones.
financial flows have consistently missed the benchmarks set in UNFCCC Moreover, the main ‘agents’ in this system are not states, but rather the
negotiations (Roberts et al., 2021; Oxfam, Kowalzig, Carty, & Zagema, transnational capitalist class that plays a larger role in determining and
2021), billions of dollars have still flowed through climate finance steering state interests and decision-making (see Shannon, 2018).
mechanisms (OECD, 2020; Shannon, 2018; UNFCCC, 2021). Through this lens, core ‘developed’ and peripheral ‘developing’ na­
We begin the article with a brief overview of the core tenets of world- tions are two categories of nations in an interconnected world economy
systems theory before presenting empirical evidence across five key where resources and political loyalty flow from the periphery to the
areas of analysis: (1) spatial flows of climate finance between the core, core. As a result, the core appropriates surplus value, and the periphery
semi-periphery, and periphery; (2) the governance of climate finance is the site of exploitation and surplus value extraction (Wallerstein,
institutions; (3) the types of projects supported by climate finance; (4) 1974, 1979). Core nations, representing transnational capitalist class
the relationship of projects to dominant systems of extraction, interests, maintain this process of surplus extraction with a global

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governance regime that sets an unbalanced agenda for the world econ­ inextricably linked to maintaining relationships of unequal exchange.
omy. A third category of nations, the semi-periphery, is also exploited by He argued that long-term acceptance of aid by peripheral states and
core nations but obtains some advantages from this system and partic­ relationships of debt overdetermines their developmental paths and
ipates in the continued exploitation of nations in the periphery (Wal­ constrains their development choices. Moreover, beginning with the
lerstein, 1976, 1979). That is, countries like Brazil, India, and South European Recovery Program (also known as the Marshall Plan), which
Africa that are in the semi-periphery serve as headquarters for major was created to transfer aid from the US to Western European countries
corporations (parastatal and private national), which oversee develop­ after World War II ended in 1945, the established aid regime was also
ment projects in neighboring countries. Functionally, they are extracting part of an effort to lock ‘Third World’ countries into dependent devel­
surplus from those neighbors while in turn operating in a dependent opment and export-oriented economies.
relationship to the wealthy core nations. Dependency is thus multifac­ However, unlike many other forms of international development
eted, including features such as financial capital in the form of debt finance, climate finance flows have been influenced by consensus-based
payments and investments, payments for technology and services from decision-making processes in the UNFCCC. During the founding of the
the core, and political fealty and dependence on aid. UNFCCC in 1992, it was established that developing nations in the pe­
For world-systems theorists, the role of international development riphery – which are not responsible for historic emissions but often face
assistance is inextricably linked to an unequal global economic system some of the worst effects of climate change – should receive priority in
that fosters dependency. Amin (1987) usefully explained how low wages adaptation finance (Roberts & Parks, 2007). Core nations, primarily
in the peripheral nations, when compared with wealthy nations, created responsible for climate change, should then provide that finance. In
a condition of ‘unequal exchange’, allowing capitalist countries to pro­ 2009, promises of climate finance became more concrete in the
tect their profit margins. Capital accumulation in Europe relied on the Copenhagen Accord, including a commitment by wealthy countries to
extraction of natural resources and repressed labor in Africa, Asia, and jointly mobilize US$100 billion a year for developing countries by 2020.
Latin America. Mines and plantations provided vast wealth, initially to In 2015, this commitment was extended through 2025 as part of the
Spain and Portugal, but these were financed by banks in Northern Paris Agreement (CP.21.9; Decision.114). However, the Paris Agree­
Europe, where most of the wealth eventually flowed. For Amin, the ment also codified a stark shift in the UNFCCC from an approach that
dominance of foreign capital in less developed countries meant distorted designated core countries as responsible for taking action to address
export activity and the hypertrophy of the service sector. As a result of climate change, to a framework in which all countries were expected to
this, countries in the periphery would incur heavy debts to core coun­ play a role in mitigating greenhouse gas emissions (Ciplet & Roberts,
tries, becoming dependent on them as well as inseparably linked with 2017). As part of this, many peripheral states have also made fulfillment
the world capitalist system in disadvantaged ways. of their nationally determined contributions to mitigate greenhouse gas
Through this lens, international development assistance is utilized emissions contingent on receiving specific levels of climate finance
primarily to facilitate the interests of the transnational capitalist class (Pauw et al., 2020).
and the states in the core and semi-periphery through which they exert Applying the insights of world-systems theory to this case of climate
influence (Hayter, 1971). Colonial relationships have been upheld over finance generates several expectations for the distribution of climate
time in part through international development assistance relationships finance in the world economy. World-systems theory would expect that
and requirements, which encourage peripheral states to conform to a climate finance flows will follow current capitalist relations, with funds
global set of ‘liberal’ or ‘neoliberal’ economic norms, which further going to nations and world regions based on their ability to generate
reinforce durable relationships of inequality in the world-system (Hay­ revenue for the capitalist class in the core and semi-periphery, or at least
ter, 1971; Wood, 1986). While specific forms of aid may produce posi­ protect those revenues from political instability. While provider states
tive impacts in recipient countries, a world-systems approach are not monolithic in their interests or approaches to development, we
encourages us to consider individual impacts in a broader historical would expect broad trends that states with less strategic value to the core
context, considering the extent to which such impacts relate to spatial and semi-periphery are neglected. From this perspective, climate
relationships of dependence. Overcoming relationships of dependent finance flows should follow four main patterns.
development involves emancipatory transformation that allows states to First, world-systems theory would expect that funding flows neglect
develop on their own terms (Amin, 1987). economically peripheral low-income developing countries in favor of
Such efforts by peripheral states and civil society actors are not new. relatively wealthier countries with more developed economic sectors.
Most notably, the New International Economic Order promoted by pe­ As shown in Fig. 1 below, from 2016 to 2020, low-income countries
ripheral states in the 1970s sought to create a more equitable global received the smallest share of climate finance among developing coun­
governance regime (Krasner, 1985). However, existing scholarship has tries. Low-income countries represent 20% of the total number of
not made clear the extent to which climate finance – often rhetorically developing countries but received only 8% of the climate finance during
framed as a paradigm shift from existing development practices – con­ this period. Similarly, the Least Developed Countries group (LDCs),
forms to world-systems theory expectations, as compared to the tenets of which exhibit the lowest indicators of socio-economic development,
climate justice. In the substantive sections that follow, we lay out ex­ only received 17% of the climate finance despite representing 34% of
pectations for climate finance in five areas to examine whether existing the number of developing countries. As such, these countries have
patterns conform to world-systems theory or whether they might be received far less per country than developing countries with more
shifting toward a new paradigm of climate justice. developed economic sectors. This is even though climate finance for the
46 LDCs more than doubled between 2016 and 2019 from US$6 billion
3. Spatial flows of climate finance between zones to over US$15 billion per year (OECD, 2021). Thus, as world-systems
theory would expect, most climate funds have flowed to countries
Hayter (1976) argued in her study of the World Bank, International with more developed economic sectors.
Monetary Fund, the United States Agency for International Develop­ We, however, find a different story when evaluating climate finance
ment, and other aid institutions that “aid is, in general, available to those allocation with consideration of the population size of countries. In
countries whose internal political arrangements, foreign policy align­ terms of percent of the population, low-income countries represent
ments, treatment of foreign private investment, debt-servicing record, 10.2% of people living in developing countries. As recipients of 8% of
export policies, and so on, are considered desirable, potentially desir­ climate finance to countries between 2016 and 2020 (OECD, 2022), they
able, or at least acceptable, by the countries or institutions providing are receiving an amount of climate finance slightly less than would be
aid, and which do not appear to threaten their interests.” Similarly, expected if funds were allocated equitably on a per capita basis. LDCs
Wood (1986) made the case that international development assistance is represent 16.2% of people living in developing countries. As recipients

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D. Ciplet et al. Political Geography 99 (2022) 102769

Fig. 1. Climate finance provided and mobilized across regions and income groups in 2016–2020
(Source: OECD, 2022, p. 9, p. 9).

of 17% of climate finance, they are receiving slightly more per capita However, all three country groupings are receiving a larger per­
than would be expected. As such, a case could be made that the small centage of funding than would be expected if funds were allocated
amounts of per country funding received by these groups are propor­ equitably in relation to developing country populations. Specifically, on
tional to their relatively smaller populations. a population basis, LDCs have received 1% more of the finance than
Second, world-systems theory would anticipate that climate finance expected, African countries have received 9% more than would be ex­
flows do not privilege countries with heightened climate vulnerability, pected, and SIDS have received 1% more than would be expected.1 Thus,
as would be expected from a needs-based approach. Climate vulnera­ again, a case could be made that the small amounts of funding received
bility takes many forms, and it is thus difficult to categorize in universal are proportional to the relatively smaller populations of these country
terms. However, vulnerable nations were defined in UNFCCC negotia­ groups.
tions as initially consisting of three negotiating groups: the Africa Group, Moreover, for adaptation finance, in particular, there is evidence that
Small Island Developing States (SIDS), and the LDCs. when vulnerability is defined in relation to current and anticipated
As anticipated by world-systems theory, all three of these groups climate change impacts (rather than predetermined country groupings),
have received less funding than expected if funds were distributed the most vulnerable countries receive more funding. This is true on both
equitably across developing countries. In addition to the LDCs discussed a per country and per capita basis. Betzold and Weiler (2017) find that
above, African countries representing 39% of the total number of when anticipated future vulnerability to climate impacts is considered,
developing countries, have only received 26% of climate finance allo­ about 0.5% more of annually distributed adaptation finance goes to the
cated to countries between 2016 and 2020 (OECD, 2022). Likewise,
SIDS, which are often considered to be among the most impacted by
climate change due to their vulnerability to sea-level rise, received only 1
2% of climate finance during that period despite representing 28% of the Populations in 2020 of the groups include the following: LDCs:
1,057,438,163; Africa group: 1,136,046,775; SIDS: 65,000,000; Low-income
total number of developing countries. Thus, as world-systems theory
countries: 665,149,035; Lower middle-income countries: 3,330,652,547;
would expect, climate funds have not privileged the most vulnerable
Upper middle-income countries: 2,522,452,391 (World Bank, 2020; https://d
countries. ata.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL).

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most vulnerable countries, as compared to the least vulnerable coun­ systems theory expectations, the motivations and reasoning of wealthy
tries. In addition, when assessed in relation to exposure to previous states remain unclear. Specifically, it is unclear if wealthy state funding
extreme weather events, the most vulnerable countries receive about US decisions are driven to a greater extent by transnational capitalist class
$3 per year for each citizen more than the least vulnerable countries interests or by other factors, including wealthy country preferences
(Betzold & Weiler, 2017). Overall, we find a complex and mixed story in related to investing where institutional capacity is high, and where
relation to the world-systems theory expectation in this area. Notably, corruption is low. Moreover, attention is necessary to assess not only
we find some evidence to suggest that core countries may be making patterns from core countries (for which the OECD studies focus), but also
decisions about climate finance allocation – especially adaptation to consider South-South financing flows from semi-peripheral to pe­
finance – with consideration to conditions and extent of climate change ripheral countries (see Ciplet & Roberts, 2017).
vulnerability in recipient countries.
Third, world-systems theory would anticipate that climate finance 4. Governance practices
flows would favor financing governments with strong administrative
capacity. Such governments tend to have stronger legal and political The world-system does not just reproduce itself organically due to
institutions to guarantee private property rights. Such institutions are differing development trajectories and enduring postcolonial in­
often backed by transnational investors of international capital to pre­ equalities. Rather, the global division of labor and relationships of un­
vent national interference with property rights, including the national­ equal exchange are maintained by a system of global governance, which
ization of industries and the expropriation of natural resources out of leverages control of peripheral states through processes of both coercion
private hands (Gill, 1998). and consent. Specifically, multilateral and bilateral development and
A recent study by Garschagen and Doshi (2022), focusing on adap­ financial institutions grew as a postcolonial means of control and
tation flows from the Green Climate Fund since 2015, found that 57% of appeasement after World War II. Such means of control include ineq­
countries in the highest climate vulnerability quartile, but with weak uitable international trade agreements, conditionality on loans to pe­
government institutions and fragile state-bureaucracies (i.e. mostly ripheral states which require export-oriented and investor-friendly state
LDCs in Africa and conflict-ridden countries) have missed out and not policies, and foreign aid that reflects provider priorities and interests.
been able to access project funding. On the contrary, almost half of Importantly, a transnational elite, including many decision-makers in
overall dollars went to those countries with strong institutional capacity peripheral states, views its interests as advanced by domestic policies
and topping the world rankings of government effectiveness maintained which conform to the interests of a global investor class (Robinson,
by the World Bank (Garschagen & Doshi, 2022). High-ranking countries 2012). Despite modest gains related to extreme poverty in many coun­
such as Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, and the Philippines have had tries, liberal and neoliberal policies have corresponded with growing
success in getting their national entities accredited and consequently inequality in regions such as Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, as
accessing Green Climate Fund financing (Garschagen & Doshi, 2022). well as a widening wealth gap between core and peripheral countries (e.
Thus, available data confirms the trend expected by world-systems g., Hickel, 2017).
theory, that wealthy countries favor contributions to developing coun­ Governance is, therefore, a crucial point of analysis through which
tries with strong administrative capacity. Alternatively, this could be we can understand whether and how the global dynamics between core
informed by wealthy countries’ fear of corruption in the Global South, or and periphery states persist in climate finance. World-systems theory
expectation that their dollars may have greater impact toward the argues that money and resources flow from Global North to Global South
desired adaptation or mitigation objective in such contexts. Therefore, countries, through private actors in coordination with nation-state
the factors motivating wealthy states to avoid low-capacity states is not governments, in such a way that perpetuates (rather than challenges)
clear. Moreover, more research is needed to assess climate finance more the world-system. For climate finance, this would mean a system of
broadly in this regard beyond flows through the Green Climate Fund. governance in which the money invested facilitates the extraction of
Fourth, world-systems theory would anticipate that climate finance surplus value from the periphery for the benefit of the core. Thus, from a
flows would continue foreign aid trends of wealthy countries dispro­ world-systems theory perspective, we would expect that actors in
portionately financing former colonies where they have explicit eco­ wealthy countries, transnational elites, and international organizations
nomic ties. Robinson and Dornan’s (2017) analysis of adaptation would likely exert outsized influence over the governance of climate
financing commitments from the OECD-Development Assistance Com­ finance. This would be true in climate finance agenda-setting, in the
mittee to SIDS did not find evidence that former colonies receive sub­ allocation and distribution of funds, and in exerting control over how
stantially more funds than other developing countries. However, France the resources should be used once they have been dispensed.
was a notable exception, proving considerable financing to Mauritius, First, world-systems theory would anticipate that funding in­
for example. For Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom, among the stitutions would provide limited or no decision-making power to pe­
more prominent colonizers, the study found a statistically significant ripheral states. World-systems theory has devoted scant attention to
relationship between colonial status and adaptation funds committed; variations within global governance institutions that may promote more
however, the relationship was weak (Robinson & Dornan, 2017). Thus, equitable forms of governance. The theory implicitly assumes that
existing data on climate finance does not support world-systems theory global governance institutions exist as uniform vessels to promote the
expectations that aid will flow to former colonies. This contrasts with the interests of core states and the capital interests that control them.
findings in the broader aid allocation literature which generally iden­ Several funding institutions that have emerged from the UNFCCC
tifies colonial links as important determinants of international devel­ climate negotiations have made efforts to develop leadership from
opment finance levels (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Becker, 2020; developing countries. This includes the Least Developed Countries Fund,
Berthélemy & Tichit, 2004; Fuchs et al., 2014). However, further the Special Climate Fund, the Adaptation Fund, and the Green Climate
research is needed beyond adaptation finance in order to examine pat­ Fund. For example, the Adaptation Fund has more peripheral country
terns related to mitigation finance. representatives on its board than core country representatives. Howev­
Overall, there is some evidence that climate finance is flowing to er, in UN climate finance institutions where core and peripheral coun­
countries, regions, and priorities as we would expect from a world- tries are meant to have an equal say over the allocation of funds,
systems theory perspective in ways that may be reproducing relation­ providers still have the ability to earmark funds to dictate how they are
ships of dependency. However, some data contradicts these expecta­ spent (Graham & Serdaru, 2020). In addition, top executives in UN
tions. This includes funding per capita in low-income states, funding to climate finance institutions often come from powerful core countries
individual countries with heightened climate vulnerability, and funding (IPS, 15 March 2021). This gives them outsized influence over these
to former colonies. Moreover, even when trends do line up with world- institutions and creates and maintains a boundary excluding global

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talents from developing countries. Existing data supports this world-systems theory prediction. Specif­
Additionally, rather than being disbursed directly to vulnerable ically, the UNFCCC funds only command a small fraction – less than 5%
country governments, climate finance often flows to international or­ – of international public climate finance (UNFCCC SCF, 2021; OECD,
ganizations as intermediaries such as multilateral development banks, 2022). Though the broad global agenda for climate finance begins in
including UN funds and programs (e.g. UN Development Programme, these more egalitarian (but still unequal) UN institutions, most climate
UN Environment, UN Human Settlements Programme), and specialized finance is distributed through traditional bilateral and multilateral
agencies (e.g. World Bank Group, Food and Agriculture Organisation of mechanisms (OECD, 2022), whereby provider countries retain direct
the UN, World Health Organisation). These organizations are substan­ control over the allocation of funds. In these institutions one or few
tially controlled by core countries and led by members of a transnational provider countries set the agenda for how finance will be allocated and
elite class. Compared to these organizations, developing country gov­ distributed. This gives them substantial power in climate finance
ernments often have less robust institutional infrastructures for ac­ governance, as they influence what climate projects are ultimately
counting and transparency, and are often perceived to be prone to funded and what requirements must be met in terms of outcomes and
corruption and mismanagement. In these cases, international organi­ reporting. Moreover, private finance accounted for approximately 16%
zations are seen as the less risky and more efficient options for chan­ of total climate finance in 2020 (OECD, 2022). These organizations are
neling funds. For example, under the funds managed by Global not beholden to the climate finance agenda set by the UNFCCC and,
Environmental Facility, all proposals for funding must be prepared and therefore, can pursue their own interests in distributing climate finance
submitted through one of 18 international organization partner agencies (Roberts et al., 2021).
(e.g. the Asian Development Bank, UN Development Programme, and Third, world-systems theory would anticipate that public climate
the World Wildlife Fund), and countries cannot directly access the finance would be delivered primarily as loans rather than grants. In this
Facility. way, climate finance would allow core countries the greatest control
However, there have been efforts in recent years to enhance coun­ over how funds are used; it would cost them the least, and foster de­
tries’ direct access to climate finance from the UN institutions. The pendency among recipient countries. While there is debate about
Adaptation Fund and the Green Climate Fund have both set up specific whether grants are a more efficient means of combating poverty than
pools of money for within-country institutions to apply for project loans (e.g. see Cohen et al., 2007), peripheral countries in the UNFCCC
funding. The Green Climate Fund’s “Enhancing Direct Access” pilot al­ have largely advocated for increasing the share of grants in relation to
lows countries to submit programmatic plans for climate work, which, loans (Roberts et al., 2021; Weikmans et al., 2020). Despite this, the data
when funded, would then be broken down into projects as determined at suggests that loans have far outpaced grants and that this trend has
the country level (GCF, 2021). The Adaptation Fund’s “Enhanced Direct intensified over time. The share of loans in public climate finance pro­
Access” window similarly allows National Implementing Entities to vided by core countries rose from 52% in 2013 to 74% in 2018 (UNFCCC
submit proposals for funding that the National Implementing Entities SCF 2021). Multilateral development banks provided only about 5% of
would then allocate toward projects at the national or subnational level their climate finance as grants between 2017 and 2018 (UNFCCC SCF,
(Adaptation Fund, 2021). Each of these mechanisms, though, still re­ 2021). One exception to this is the Green Climate Fund, where there has
quires the applicant country or institution to have the proper accredi­ been a roughly even distribution of funding amounts in the form of
tation with the funds to apply, and overall priorities are still set by the grants (44%) and loans (43%) (GCF, 2021). However, as discussed
funding institutions themselves (Kalaidjian & Robinson, 2022). The above, this only represents a small share of overall climate finance.
accreditation process can be prohibitive, potentially limiting the This trend is further reinforced by the provision of non-concessional
apparent value of the enhanced direct access efforts (Kalaidjian & loans, which have less-generous market-based interest rates compared
Robinson, 2022). Notably, the Adaptation Fund and Green Climate Fund to concessional loans. Twenty-eight percent of bilateral loans between
have adopted measures to remove institutional hurdles such as 2016 and 2018 were non-concessional, according to official develop­
burdensome reporting requirements for LDCs and SIDS, in particular. ment assistance-related criteria (OECD, 2020). The proportion of
As of this writing, the Green Climate Fund has funded 136 of its 173 non-concessional loans is even higher for multilateral development
projects (77%) through international access modalities, while only 22 banks. Thus, public finance has been largely (though not all) in forms
projects were funded directly through national organizations (13%). that facilitate dependency and increase the debt of peripheral countries.
Fifteen (9%) were funded directly through regional organizations. Fourth, once finance is distributed to countries and institutions,
Under the Adaptation Fund, there appears to be greater funding of na­ world-systems theory would anticipate that governance of the funds is
tional entities – 51 projects went through multilateral implementing controlled by elites in the periphery. This follows the expectation that a
entities, nine to regional entities, and 76 to national entities. However, if transnational capitalist class (Sklair, 2002) would control the flows of
we exclude indirect adaptation projects that were aimed at institutional funds, adding a nuanced layer of within-country inequality in this
capacity building, “readiness” to receive climate funds, and national framework.
planning document preparation (45 projects), the numbers look more Related scholarship notes that climate funds are typically channeled
similar. Moreover, projects funded through national entities command at the domestic level into international non-governmental organizations
smaller amounts compared to projects of international entities. and large national organizations run by elites based in capital cities.
Overall, contrary to world-systems theory expectations, there have These organizations are utilized because they are considered to have the
been some notable developments within the UNFCCC process to elevate institutional capacity to use and disseminate the funds (Lewis, 2011;
the strength of developing countries in decision-making. However, there Masud-All-Kamal & Nursey-Bray, 2021). However, there are also
are still mechanisms within these institutions through which core na­ numerous case studies about efforts for community-based adaptation
tions have maintained control over agenda setting and institutional that involve actors at various scales, including local community-based
practices. non-governmental organizations and directly-impacted community ac­
Second, world-systems theory would predict that climate finance tors. Specifically, community-based adaptation initiatives are “com­
would be channeled through institutions in which core actors have munity-led process, based on communities’ priorities, needs,
disproportionate influence over how funds are allocated. Moreover, knowledge, and capacities …” (Reid et al., 2009, p. 13). However,
other financing institutions, in which representation between core and scholars have found that community-based adaptation projects some­
peripheral countries are more equitable, would be relatively neglected times suffer from elite capture and susceptible to influence from finan­
and under-financed. This would maximize the control that core actors cial contributors and implementing partners on project design and
have over the provision of climate finance and minimize the priorities of implementation (Berquist et al., 2015; Buggy & McNamara, 2016;
periphery countries to which the resources flow. Masud-All-Kamal & Nursey-Bray, 2021). Moreover, community-driven

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initiatives are likely the exception, not the norm, to how climate finance year, with most of this funding going to Sub-Saharan Africa (IEA, 2011).
projects are carried out, especially those related to greenhouse gas As we would expect from a world-systems theory perspective, the
mitigation. Thus, existing evidence supports the world-systems theory data shows that when it comes to energy financing, priority has been
expectation that at the domestic level in peripheral countries, much if given to renewable energy generation and energy efficiency projects
not most of climate finance is controlled by elites. with high greenhouse gas mitigation potential in countries and com­
munities in which populations already have access to electricity.
5. Types of projects supported by climate finance Because provider countries are more concerned with supporting projects
with global environmental benefits, projects limited to supporting local
World-systems theory would anticipate that not all project types are energy needs are often neglected. These projects are also often costly
equally supported. Rather, it would be expected that those projects with and in countries, such as the LDCs, with limited institutional capacity
benefits for countries in the core receive disproportionate attention, and existing infrastructure (IEA, 2017).
while those that yield less benefits for core countries – and perhaps more Of the US$20 billion of public finance devoted to energy projects in
benefits for those in the periphery – are neglected. We propose and 2015, less than 20% reached the countries with the largest populations
assess four related predictions. who lack access to electricity (i.e. ‘high impact’ countries, predomi­
First, world-systems theory would anticipate that climate finance nantly in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia) (SEforAll, 2018). Similarly, an
would disproportionately support greenhouse gas mitigation projects assessment that analyzed all Green Climate Fund projects between 2015
rather than climate change adaptation. This is because greenhouse gas and 2018 found that only 14% of the total funding allocated to energy
mitigation is seen as a global public good that benefits core countries, interventions went to support energy access projects (Dorman & Ciplet,
while adaptation has generally been understood as a local public good 2022). Moreover, only 15% of energy funds went to support ‘high
that concentrates benefits among local populations (Benzie & Persson, impact’ countries. Low-income countries received an even lower share
2019; Khan & Munira, 2021). of energy funds at 10% of the project portfolio budget, with the vast
Recent reports have confirmed that there is a bias toward mitigation majority of funds supporting middle-income countries (Dorman & Cip­
finance, whereas adaptation finance is often a lower priority and a let, 2022). This is despite a commitment by the Green Climate Fund to
secondary objective of many interventions (Buchner et al., 2019; OECD, address energy access.
2022; Oxfam, 2020). However, this bias seems to be shrinking. While
adaptation finance rose by US$8.3 billion between 2019 and 2020, 6. Relationship of finance to dominant systems of extraction,
mitigation finance dropped by US$2.8 billion (OECD, 2022). In 2020, production, and consumption
mitigation projects still received 58% of total climate finance provided
and mobilized (OECD, 2022). World-systems theory, as well as prior scholarship on unequal
During the first five years of the Green Climate Fund being in oper­ development, argues that global flows of production and extraction
ation and across its 173 projects, 64% of its nominal funds have sup­ happen unequally, benefiting countries in the core and exploiting
ported mitigation and 36% have supported adaptation, even though it countries in the periphery. Core countries have a vested interest in
aims for a balanced portfolio (GCF, 2021). The split is different when maintaining barriers to entry to high-profit economic activities, and
considering grant equivalences, and 52% flows to mitigation and 48% to countries in the periphery are often limited to low-profit opportunities,
adaptation, still slightly favoring mitigation (GCF, 2021). such as raw mineral extraction, low value materials processing, or the
Despite the growth in adaptation finance flows, urgent and massive cultivation of cash crops (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979; Arrighi and Drangel,
upscaling of adaptation investments will be required to close the adap­ 1986). Globalization and growing consumerism in the core have inten­
tation finance gap that results from increasing adaptation needs in the sified these divisions. This relationship – characterized as unequal ex­
Global South (Pauw et al., 2021, 2022). These data also show that change – is violently extractive (Amin, 1976), built on the suppression of
funding for ‘loss and damage’ to compensate victims of climate impacts wages in peripheral nations, especially in rural ‘labor reserves’.
is virtually non-existent, even thirty years after the idea was first raised Following world-systems theory, we would expect climate finance to
by small island developing states in 1991 (see Lai et al., 2022; Robinson function as a critical tool to maintain unequal relationships of extrac­
et al., 2021). tion, production, and consumption across scales. These are vast topics,
Second, world-systems theory would anticipate that climate finance but to begin evaluating whether the arc of history is bending towards
would disproportionately support renewable energy generation pro­ climate justice, we take up three related trends. Unlike some of the issues
jects rather than energy access projects. While the neglect of adaptation reviewed above, data relating to these trends in climate finance is not as
finance has often gained more attention in the academic and policy readily available.
literatures, energy access is another priority issue for peripheral states. First, world-systems theory would expect that climate finance in­
Approximately one billion people still lack access to basic electricity vestments would continue to support fossil fuel industry interests. Oil,
services (IEA and World Bank 2017). Like climate adaptation, energy gas, and coal corporations are some of the largest and most powerful
access is often understood as a local public good, while renewable en­ economic actors on the planet. From a world-systems perspective,
ergy projects in urban communities that displace fossil fuels and related powerful actors in core and semi-peripheral zones of the global economy
emissions is seen as a global public good (Dorman & Ciplet, 2022). As seek to monopolize fossil fuel resources and infrastructure to power their
such, a tension exists in energy finance between the sustainability goals economies through arrangements with peripheral heads of state and
of wealthy countries and the equity and development goals of ministries of mining. Core states have often intervened militarily or
low-income states and rural communities (Ciplet & Harrison, 2020). through covert actions to support the interests of their fossil fuel cor­
Countries and communities with low rates of energy access, which porations (Gedicks, 2001). Fossil fuel producing states, for example in
tend to be low-income, tend to have small greenhouse gas footprints. the Middle East, Russia and neighboring states, have not traditionally
The LDCs, for example, account for 12% of the global population but less been included in the core, though they have a vested interest in ongoing
than 1% of historical greenhouse gas emissions (UNCTAD, 2017). En­ fossil fuel consumption by the core and other countries. Some of these
ergy access projects thus have limited potential for mitigating climate states have sought to ascend in the world-systems hierarchy by
change. Despite this, climate justice necessitates public dollars that leveraging their oil, seeking to drive up prices through inter-state cartels
support off-grid and mini-grid energy projects in rural communities. The like the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.
International Energy Agency has claimed that achieving the goal of Following world-systems theory, we would expect that climate
universal energy access by 2030 (now codified in UN Sustainable finance would be oriented toward maintaining the hegemony of the
Development Goal #7) would require an estimated US$48 billion per fossil fuel industry. As part of this, core country departments of foreign

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affairs, energy, mining, and environment would remain captured by ecological and social impacts (Baker, 2012; Corbera & Brown, 2010;
fossil fuel industry interests, and we might expect those countries, as Finley-Brook & Thomas, 2013; Jumani et al., 2017), including nega­
well as fossil fuel producing countries, to work to slow any transition tively affecting poverty alleviation and rural development processes
away from the current dominance of fossil fuels. Climate finance might (Wittman & Caron, 2009). However, others purport the potential for
be a part of that effort, delaying efforts at systemic reform by allowing some social and ecological benefits under certain conditions with social
core nations to claim emissions reductions funded abroad, as evidence and ecological safeguards (Chhatre et al., 2012). Climate finance also
they are ‘addressing the problem’ (e.g. see, Meckling, 2011). may support the concentration of polluting or environmentally
The data supporting this expectation is mixed. On the one hand, after destructive projects in the periphery. The transition to renewables is
decades of claiming to be helping the environment (Redman et al., developing ‘sacrifice zones’ to produce lithium, cobalt, and other key
2015), funders like the World Bank and several other multilateral funds materials necessary for renewable energy and electricity storage tech­
have curbed some types of fossil fuel investments, particularly related to nology (Riofrancos, 2020).
coal. Most notably, in 2013, the World Bank claimed to reduce its new Third, world-systems theory would expect that climate finance in­
coal power investments to “only in extremely rare circumstances” vestments would not address over-consumption. The nature of social
(Volcovici et al., 2021, online). In 2019, the Bank also committed to stop domination is that one’s own choices are not up for negotiation,
funding upstream oil and gas operations (Volcovici et al., 2021). As for including levels and types of consumption. Many analyses show the
the United States, after decades of international spending on fossil fuel wildly disproportionate impact on natural systems of average citizens of
projects, the Biden Administration issued an executive order promoting Global North nations compared to those in the South (e.g. see Jorgenson,
an end to international financing of carbon-intensive fossil fuel-based 2003; Roberts & Parks, 2007; Jorgenson & Clark, 2011). In the North,
energy (Friends of the Earth n.d.). Investments for renewable energy major environmental campaigning groups avoid confronting their (po­
are (finally) far outpacing fossil fuels. In their 2021 World Energy In­ tential) supporters about the level of their consumption. Likewise,
vestment report, the International Energy Agency argued that “renew­ climate finance provided by developed nations does not make re­
ables dominate investment in new power generation and are expected to quirements of developing nations about consumption levels of their
account for 70% of 2021’s total of USD 530 billion spent on all new elites or broader populations. Little research exists in this area. How­
generation capacity” (IEA, 2021, p. 7). ever, our observation of climate finance flows suggests that they do not
On the other hand, there are trends that suggest that fossil fuel in­ question major social arrangements, instead taking an incrementalist
dustries still have a strong hand in orienting international investments. approach, both in switching to renewable energy sources and in funding
Urgewald, a non-profit environmental and human rights organization in adaptive measures that would not require relocation or major changes in
Germany that researches coal companies, reports that despite its policies lifestyles.
in limiting fossil fuel investments, the World Bank remains a major
investor and driver of fossil fuels. Specifically, they report that since the 7. Role and influence of peripheral states and civil society
2015 Paris Climate Agreement, the World Bank has financed US$12
billion in direct project finance for fossil fuels in over 35 countries, US As a theory concerned with the reproduction of inequality globally,
$10–20 billion annually as government budget support which does not early world-systems theory scholarship devoted limited attention to
restrict spending on fossil fuels, billions in fossil fuel enabling infra­ peripheral civil society actors as agents of change (e.g., Wallerstein,
structure, fossil-fuel friendly policy reforms that are driving new in­ 1976, 1979). Numerous critiques during this period argued that
vestments, and technical assistance aimed at increasing fossil fuel world-systems theory offered a deterministic understanding of global
investments (Urgewald n.d.). As such, it appears that the World Bank is economic domination which lacked an understanding of processes of
pursuing a two-pronged strategy of positioning itself as the largest transformation and resistance (see Cox, 1992; Skocpol, 1979; Wendt,
climate finance investor while still maintaining a strong hand in its 1987). Through this lens, peripheral states and civil society had limited
bread-and-butter issue of large-scale fossil fuel investment. Similarly, roles in shaping the aid regime to support their interests (see Wood,
the Green Climate Fund – the UN’s flagship climate fund – has had a 1986), though the ability for them to do so in the future was not
policy of zero investment in fossil fuels. However, the Fund has part­ precluded.
nered with large private banks, including JP Morgan Chase and Deut­ More recent conceptions of world-systems theory have taken social
sche Bank, which are heavily invested in fossil fuel projects around the movements more seriously in shaping world history outcomes. For
world (King, 2016). example, Arrighi and Silver (2001, p. 289, cited in Smith & Wiest, 2012,
In 2020, there was also a global uptick of coal investments, after p. 10) argue that the extent to which systemic chaos occurs in periods of
years of decline. Investments in fuel supplies also remain over­ hegemonic decline is “ultimately in the hands of the movements”.
whelmingly carbon-intensive, with only 1.3% spent on low-carbon fuels. However, peripheral states have still been largely viewed as lacking
Fossil fuel subsidies by international institutions also remain a major agency in multilateralism due to a lack of material, military, or struc­
concern. According to the International Monetary Fund, US$5.9 trillion tural power. Overall, from a world-systems theory perspective, we
in direct and indirect subsidies prop up fossil fuel industries each year would expect that climate finance would reflect the priorities of core and
(Parry et al., 2021). semi-peripheral states and the capital interests that they represent. In
Second, world-systems theory would expect that climate finance lieu of major external shifts in the world order, the demands of pe­
investments would externalize environmental harm to the periphery. ripheral states and civil society would be represented in climate finance
Environmental sociologists in the world-systems tradition have devel­ governance, prioritization, and distribution patterns only to the extent
oped the concept of ecologically unequal exchange (Bunker, 1984; that they do not threaten the dominance of core states and the structures
Bunker & Ciccantell, 2005; Frey et al., 2019; Roberts & Parks, 2009). of dependency in the broader aid regime.
From this perspective, environmental ‘bads’ such as waste materials, As such, world-systems theory would anticipate that justice-
deforestation, and extractive industries, are offshored to countries in the oriented demands by peripheral states and civil society are only
periphery. Environmental ‘goods’ such as the preservation of forests, marginally represented in climate finance. The available evidence
green spaces, and clean air and water, have been concentrated in core mostly supports world-systems theory expectations in this area. Climate
countries (Dicken, 1998; Gould et al., 1995). finance strongly reflects the interests of core and (a few) semi-peripheral
The continued interest in carbon offsets, allowing capitalist firms and contributor states. However, numerous small concessions have been
individuals in market economies to continue to emit greenhouse gases made by wealthy states that correspond directly to the demands of pe­
while buying reductions or sequestration elsewhere, appears to fit this ripheral states and civil society actors. Ciplet (2015) argues that despite
pattern. Numerous studies link carbon offset projects to negative the promises made in the Copenhagen and Cancun UNFCCC

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negotiations in 2009 and 2010, respectively, low-income states have 8. Conclusion

since been only moderately successful in influencing provider countries
to adopt their interpretation of the key phrases related to climate While geographers and climate scholars have shed light on a myriad
finance. questions related to climate justice (e.g., Burnham et al., 2013a, 2013b;
Likewise, civil society and peripheral states have largely framed their Chatterton et al., 2013; Fisher, 2015; Routledge, 2011), there has been
demands in relation to climate finance around the concept of ‘climate little attention to the spatial and scalar patterns in climate finance that
debt,’ which asserts that a debt that is owed to peripheral states should contribute to injustice.
be delivered as reparations in response to past and current harm (Ciplet, World-systems theory offers a useful lens to understand power as it is
2017; Khan et al., 2020). Concessions made by core countries related to expressed spatially at a macro-scale and structurally to make inequality
climate debt demands have been integrated in ways that are stripped of durable over time. In applying world-systems theory’s insights and ex­
meaning and impact (Ciplet, 2017). Khan et al. (2020) make similar pectations for relations of power between core and periphery to the case
arguments related to adaptation finance. They suggest that the princi­ of climate finance, we have assessed the flows of climate finance be­
ples governing adaptation finance largely reflected neoliberal justice tween the core and periphery, the ways in which climate finance is being
including “a focus on voluntary action, a growing emphasis on governed, the types of projects supported, the extent to which they
leveraging private finance and market-based strategies, and a refusal by disrupt the dominant relations of extraction, production, and con­
wealthy States to define commitments in relation to responsibility, sumption, and the agency of peripheral states and non-state actors to
developing country needs, liability, or historical debt” (Khan et al., assert their interests. The available data suggests that, to some extent,
2020, p. 265). In terms of increasing transparency related to climate climate finance is reproducing relationships of dependency. Not only are
finance in line with the demands of low-income states and civil society there spatial asymmetries in the power and resources associated with
actors, Ciplet et al. (2018, p.132) argue that while transparency norms climate finance, both concentrated in core nations, there are also scalar
have been recognized, “their translation into accountability mechanisms asymmetries where resources and power are controlled internationally,
has been weak, and information disclosed by countries is often opaque”. including among international organizations.
Studies of the UNFCCC show that countries in the Global North are However, greater nuance is needed to explain patterns that diverge
able to wield most of the power in the climate negotiations (Ciplet et al., from world-systems theory expectations of exploitation and domination.
2015; Falzon, 2021; Parker and Karlsson, 2018). These core countries While the spatial distribution of climate finance flows appears to be
have had particularly outsized influence in climate finance negotiations informed by economic interests, there does appear to be some consid­
where they have refused clear definitions of climate finance, obligations eration of climate vulnerability that informs the allocation of funds.
for finance contributions, and liability for past damages that must be Moreover, even though core countries have substantial power in the
repaid (Ciplet et al., 2015; Lai et al., 2022; Parker et al., 2015; Vanhala & institutions making decisions on climate finance, much of the global
Hestbaek, 2016). Even when core countries make a substantial promise climate finance agenda is developed within the UNFCCC, an institution
on climate finance, such as the US$100 billion per year goal set in that provides more influence to peripheral states than many other in­
Copenhagen in 2009, the promises fall short or do not come to fruition ternational institutions. Likewise, some of the governance practices in
(Kalaidjian & Robinson, 2022; Roberts et al., 2021). related institutions such as the Green Climate Fund and the Adaptation
When it comes to civil society influence related to climate finance, Fund attempt to create greater parity of participation between core and
studies have demonstrated that actors such as Indigenous peoples’ or­ peripheral states. Finally, we have noted that small concessions have
ganizations, waste pickers, and gender justice advocates have achieved been made to respond to the demands of peripheral states and civil so­
changes in funding institution methodologies, and in some cases, rep­ ciety actors related to climate debt, something that we would not expect
resentation in decision-making processes (Ciplet, 2014, 2019; according to more absolutist versions of world-systems theory.
Schroeder, 2010). However, the larger demands around institutional Though we have identified these important points of divergence
accountability for human rights and social needs have not been met from the expectations of world-systems theory, these findings do not
(Ciplet, 2014, 2019). For Indigenous people, this has meant that de­ necessarily indicate a system of climate finance that is rooted in climate
mands for compliance mechanisms to ensure ‘free and prior informed justice. As such, we have also identified several areas for future research
consent’ in terms of local decision-making have been met with weak or that would help elaborate and clarify the relationship between climate
non-existent protections (Ciplet, 2014, 2019). finance and climate justice in the world system. First, there is a dearth of
Overall, world-systems theory expectations in relation to the influ­ data on who controls climate finance within countries once funding has
ence of peripheral actors is mostly correct. Gains from the periphery and been distributed. Specifically, research into the power of elites in
civil society mostly reflect ambiguous promises without clear compli­ influencing climate finance governance, what Frank (1974) called the
ance mechanisms and co-opted rhetoric related to climate justice ‘lumpenbourgeoisie,’ would help speak to within-country inequalities.
(Beauregard et al., 2021). This includes distributive justice gains that Second, more studies are needed to elucidate broader trends on the
have resulted in a relatively small amount of climate finance flowing to extent to which distinct forms of climate finance entrench, rather than
the periphery, largely on the terms of core countries (Islam, 2022; Khan challenge, relationships of dependency and unequal ecological exchange
et al., 2020). In terms of procedural justice, much of the decision-making between the core and periphery. Third, there is an opportunity for
power in the regime has shifted to core states, with major decisions focused inquiry into the conditions under which peripheral states and
being made in bilateral or mini-lateral negotiations which exclude pe­ civil society actors are more or less likely to influence the governance of
ripheral states and civil society (Ciplet & Roberts, 2017). climate finance. Understanding when these actors can assert their pri­
However, the focus on structural power by world-systems theory orities will help inform how to transform the system of climate finance
leaves notable empirical and theoretical questions unanswered. This such that it contributes to climate justice. Finally, studies could also
includes the conditions under which peripheral states and civil society focus on the role of semi-peripheral states in relation to the issues that
actors are more or less likely to influence the governance of climate we have identified, in order to discern whether they facilitate or hamper
finance. It also means directing attention to how specific developments climate justice, or experience climate injustice themselves.
in the world historic order create or facilitate distinct opportunities for The case of climate finance reveals that the macro-scale and struc­
such networks to disrupt patterns of dependency in climate finance. tural considerations of spatial inequality should be complemented with
These may include the decline of U.S. hegemony, ecological crisis other agent-centered and micro-level considerations of power and how
related to climate change, and the fragmentation of political and eco­ they are expressed in global climate politics. Notably, there are multiple
nomic alliances in the world-system (Ciplet, 2017). strands in the world-systems theory literature – some that adhere to the
original tenets and others that have evolved in complexity. In addition,

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Declaration of competing interest Ciplet, D., & Harrison, J. L. (2020). Transition tensions: Mapping conflicts in movements
for a just and sustainable transition. Environmental Politics, 29(3), 435–456. https://
doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2019.1595883
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial Ciplet, D., & Roberts, J. T. (2017). Climate change and the transition to neoliberal
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence environmental governance. Global Environmental Change, 46, 148–156. https://doi.
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