394 KING'S BENCH DIVISION.

[1934]

1933 as having the same meaning as it had before the recent

CADBUEY alteration in the sub-rule—namely, " the assessable unit."
BBOTHERS,
LD.
That that would have been held to be its meaning before
V. the Act of 1926 seems to be reasonably clear. I cannot
SINCLAIR. suppose that the minor and consequential alteration of the
Vlnlav J law which was made in 1926 operated so as to make any
difference in the meaning of the term. If the Legislature
•had intended that part of the premises occupied should be
differently regarded from the rest of the premises for the
purposes of the proviso, I think they would have said so in
express words.
On these grounds I come to the conclusion that the proviso
has reference to the assessable unit itself, with the result that
this appeal succeeds and is allowed.

Appeal allowed.

Solicitors for appellants : Timbrell, Deighton <5e Nichols, for

A. Whittalcer, Bournville.
Solicitor for respondent : Solicitor of Inland Revenue.
J. R,

1934 L'ESTRANGE v. F. GRAUCOB, LIMITED.

Feb. 16, 19,
20.
Sale of Goods—Contract in uniting signed by Parties for sale of Automatic
Slot Machine—Clause in small print excluding " any express or implied
condition, statement, or warranty, statutory or otherwise"—No mis-
representation by Seller as to terms of Contract—Machine out of order—
Action by Buyer against Seller for Breach of Implied Warranty of Fitness
—Competence of Action.
The buyer of an automatic slot machine signed and handed to the
sellers an order form containing in ordinary print and writing the
essential terms of the contract, and in small print certain special terms
one of which was " any express or implied condition, statement, or
warranty, statutory or otherwise not stated herein is hereby excluded."
The sellers thereupon signed and handed to the buyer a printed order
confirmation assenting to the terms in the order form. The machine
was delivered by the sellers to the buyer, who paid to the sellers an
instalment of the price. The machine did not work satisfactorily, and
the buyer brought an action against the sellers in the county court
claiming (inter alia) damages for breach of an implied warranty that
2 K. B. KING'S BENCH DIVISION. 395

the machine was fit for the purpose for which it was sold. The sellers 1934
pleaded (inter alia) that the contract expressly provided for the exclusion
of all implied warranties. The buyer replied that at the time when she -^ ESTRANGE
signed the order form she had not read it and knew nothing of its -p GRA
contents, and that the clause excluding warranties could not easily be
read owing to the smallness of the print. There was no evidence of
any misrepresentation by the sellers to the buyer as to the terms of the
contract:—
Held, by the Divisional Court (Scrutton and Maugham L.JJ.),
reversing on this point the judgment of the county court judge, that
as the buyer had signed the written contract, and had not been induced
to do so by any misrepresentation, she was bound by the terms of
the contract, and it was wholly immaterial that she had not read it
and did not know its contents ; and that the action failed and the sellers
were entitled to judgment.
Parker v. South Eastern Ry. Co. (1877) 2 C. P. D. 416, 421,
observations approved and applied.
Wallis, Son db Wells v. Pratt & Haynes [1911] A. C. 394 and Andrews
Brothers (Bournemouth), Ld. v. Singer & Co. [1934] 1 K. B. 17
referred to.
Richardson, Spence <Ss Co. v. Rowntree [1894] A. C. 217, and the other
railway ticket cases, distinguished.

APPEAL from the Carnarvonshire County Court held at

Llandudno.
The plaintiff, Miss Harriet Mary L'Estrange, was the
owner of premises in Great Ormes Road, Llandudno, where
she resided and carried on the business of a cafe". The
defendants, Messrs. F. Graucob, Ld., of City Road, London,
E.C., were manufacturers and sellers of automatic slot
machines.
On February 7, 1933, two of the defendants' representatives,
a Mr. Page, their sales supervisor, and a Mr. Berse, one of
their travellers, called upon the plaintiff and asked her to
buy an automatic slot machine for cigarettes. A meeting
was arranged at the house of the plaintiff's stepmother
between these representatives of the defendants on the
one part, and the plaintiff, her stepmother, and a Mr. Pratt
who assisted the plaintiff in her business on the other part.
The plaintiff decided to buy from the defendants an
automatic cigarette machine of the description mentioned
below. Mr. Page then produced a form printed on brown
paper, headed " Sales Agreement," in which there were
blanks for the particulars of any given transaction. The
2F2 2
396 KING'S BENCH DIVISION. [1934]

1934 blanks on the form were then filled up with the particulars
L'ESTBANGE of the plaintiff's purchase and the form was signed by the
F. GBIUOOB, Plaintiff.
Li>. The document when completed was, so far as material,
in the following terms : " Sales Agreement. Date Feb. 7,
1933. To F. Graucob, Ltd., . . . . Please forward me as soon
as possible : One Six Column Junior Ham Automatic Machine
. . . . which I agree to purchase from you on the terms stated
below . . . . and to pay for the same in the following manner :
Instalments 81. 15s. Od. down. 18 payments of 31. 19s. lid."
Then after some other formal matter came certain clauses
in small print which, so far as material, were as follows :
" I agree to take delivery of the machine upon receiving
notice that it is ready for delivery, and to make the first
monthly payment 30 days after the date following that of
the posting of such notice and all subsequent payments
on the corresponding date of each succeeding month
If any payment shall not have been reoeived by you within
a fortnight after it has become due, all the remaining payments
shall fall due for immediate payment, and I agree to pay
interest on these remaining payments at the rate of ten per
cent, per annum as from the date of their so falling due.
In consideration of your undertaking to put in hand at once
work on this machine I agree not to countermand this
order This agreement contains all the terms and
conditions under which I agree to purchase the machine
specified above, and any express or implied condition,
statement, or warranty, statutory or otherwise not stated
herein is hereby excluded (sgd.) H. M. L'Estrange."
Then followed printed questions relating to the purchaser
and her business and premises with blank spaces for the
answers which. were filled in in manuscript appropriately to
this case.
On the same date the plaintiff handed to Mr. Page her
cheque for U. on account of the price of the machine.
On February 9, 1933, the defendants, having received the
above mentioned document, sent to the plaintiff an " order
confirmation " of that date signed by them ; a " guarantee "
2 K. B. KING'S BENCH DIVISION. 397

for eighteen months for the free fixing, maintenance, and 1934
insurance of the machine ; and an invoice. L'ESTRAXUK
On March 28, 1933, the machine was delivered a t the -j, r "•
plaintiff's premises, and on March 29 a mechanic of the *'"•
defendants came and installed it there, the plaintiff handing
to him on behalf of the defendants a further sum of
U. 15s. in respect of the price, and 6s. for packing, making
together 51. Is.
The machine did not work satisfactorily, and after a
few days it became jammed and unworkable. On April 7,
1933, the plaintiff wrote to the defendants that it had failed
and was still out of order, and a mechanic was sent to p u t it
right. On April 27, she again wrote t h a t it was far from
reliable ; and on April 28 a mechanic again attended to it,
and the plaintiff then signed a form t h a t it was working
to her satisfaction. On May 4, she wrote that the machine
had been of no use for a month, and asked for another
month in which to pay her first instalment, but added t h a t
since the last overhaul the machine had worked.satisfactorily.
On May 8, her patience being exhausted, she wrote t h a t
she had decided to forfeit her deposit, and requested the
defendants to remove the machine ; and on May 11 she
ceased to make use of the machine. The defendants, however,
declined to terminate the transaction.
On May 25, 1933, the plaintiff brought the present action
against the defendants in the county court, her claim being
for 91. Is., made up of the above sums of 4L and 5/. Is.,
as money received by the defendants to the use of the
plaintiff, having been paid by the plaintiff to the defendants
as part of the consideration for the delivery of the machine
pursuant to a contract in the terms of the above documents,
which consideration wholly failed by reason that the machine
was unfit for the purpose for which it was intended to be
used.
On June 9, 1933, the defendants delivered their defence
by which they denied t h a t the machine was delivered in a
condition unfit for the purpose for which it was intended ;
and further denied that the sum claimed by the plaintiff
398 KING'S BENCH DIVISION. [1934]

1934 was payable to her : and by way of counterclaim the

L'ESTRANOB defendants sought to recover from the plaintiff 111. 18s. 6d.
as
F GKAUCOB * n e balance of the price of the machine.
LD. On June 19, 1933, the plaintiff delivered an amended
claim which added a count for breach of an implied warranty
on the sale of the machine that it was reasonably fit for
the purpose for which it was sold ; but which still claimed
only 91. Is.
When the action came on for trial the plaintiff applied
for and obtained leave to put her claim for 91. Is. in three
alternative ways : (1.) repayment as on a total failure of
consideration ; (2.) return of money for breach of implied
conditions going to the root of the contract that the machine
was reasonably fit for the purposes for which it was required ;
and (3.) damages for breach of an implied warranty that
the machine was reasonably fit for those purposes.
To these alternative claims the defendants at the trial set
up the following respective defences : (1.) no total failure
of consideration ; (2.) no implied conditions, as the property
in the machine had passed to the plaintiff, the defendants
relying, as to this point, upon the Sale of Goods Act, 1893
(56 & 57 Viet. c. 71), s. 11 (c) ; (3.) no action on implied
warranty, as the agreement signed by the plaintiff expressly
provided for the exclusion of all implied warranties.
In reply to the last of these defences the plaintiff contended :
(1.) that she was induced to sign the document under the
impression that it was an order form ; and (2.) that at the
time when she signed it she knew nothing of the conditions
on which the defendants relied.
Evidence was given on behalf of the plaintiff by herself
and by Mr. Pratt. The plaintiff said that she did not read
the brown document and that the defendants did not read
it to her or tell her to read it, that she never read the words
in small type and did not remember that the agents had
ever called her attention to them, that she signed the
document and did so intentionally, that though she signed
the document she had no clear idea of what she was signing,
that she thought that the document was an order form or
2 K. B. KING'S BENCH DIVISION. 399

a form by which she was giving her consent to the purchase 1934
of a machine, that two days after the arrival of the machine
it ceased to work and that it could not afterwards be made F
to work continuously, and that on May 11 she ceased to
use the machine and decided to ask the defendants to take
it back and to forfeit her deposit. Mr. Pratt gave evidence
corroborating that of the plaintiff.
Evidence was given on behalf of the defendants by Mr.
Page and Mr. Berse. Mr. Page said that the interview on
February 7, 1933, lasted for over two hours, that he sat
near the plaintiff and read to her the whole of the brown
paper document including the small print, that the plaintiff
asked no question about the small print, that he pointed
out to her that the total price was not stated in figures in
the document, that the plaintiff signed the document at a
desk while he was sitting by her, and that he also read to
her the guarantee. Mr. Berse gave evidence substantially
to the same effect, and stated further that the blanks in
the brown document were filled up in accordance with the
answers given by the plaintiff.
On August 17, 1933, the county court judge gave judgment.
After stating the pleas and contentions of the parties and
the substance of the evidence on both sides he went on to
say that he found as a fact that when the defendants' two
canvassers left the plaintiff after the interview of February 7,
1933, she had no knowledge of the contents of the document
which she had signed except the amount of the purchase
price and the monthly instalment and the arrangement
about putting up the machine. He also found as a fact
that there must have been some defect in the mechanism
of the machine which rendered it so frequently unworkable
that it was not reasonably fit for the purpose for which it
was required. In his view there was an implied warranty
that the machine should be reasonably fit for that purpose,
and he found as a fact that that warranty was broken. On
behalf of the defendants it was contended that that warranty
was excluded by the conditions printed in small type in
the conditions of sale, and reliance was placed upon the rule
400 KING'S BENCH DIVISION. [1934]

1934 laid down in Parker v. South Eastern Ry. Co. (1) That rule,
L'ESTRANGB however, was subject to certain exceptions, and the question
F GKAUCOB w a s wnefcher this case came within it. The conditions here
LD. were printed in very small type, and when the issue was
whether the person signing the document knew of the
conditions it became material to ask whether the type was
of a reasonable size. In all such cases three questions must
be answered according to the directions of Lord Herschell L.C.
in Richardson, Spence & Go. v. Rowntree (2)—namely: (1.) Did
the plaintiff know that there was writing or printing on
the document ? (2.) Did she know that the writing or
printing contained conditions relating to the terms of the
contract ? (3.) Did the defendants do what was reasonably
sufficient to give the plaintiff notice of the conditions ?
In the present case he (the judge) found as facts that the
answer to the first of these questions was in the affirmative,
and the answers to the second and third of them in the
negative. On these grounds, therefore, he held that the
defendants were not entitled to rely upon the clause
which excluded implied warranties from the contract. He
estimated the damages to which the plaintiff was entitled
for breach of the implied warranty at 70Z. He gave judgment
for the plaintiff on the claim for 70/. ; and for the defendants
on the counterclaim for 71/.. 18s. 6d., the balance of the
price.
The defendants gave notice of appeal dated September 14,
1933, from so much of the judgment of the county court
judge as adjudged that the plaintiff should recover from
the defendants the sum of 70/. damages.

A. T. Denning and D. E. Evans for the defendants,

appellants.
Gordon, Alchin for the plaintiff, respondent.

SCKUTTON L.J. In this case the plaintiff commenced

proceedings against the defendants in the county court,
(1) 2• C. P . D. 416, 4 2 ] . (2) [1894] A. C. 217, 219.
2 K. B. K I N G ' S BENCH DIVISION. 401

her claim being for 9Z. Is. as money received by the defendants 1934
to the use of the plaintiff as part of the consideration for
the delivery of an automatic slot machine pursuant to a ^
contract in writing dated February 7, 1933, which consideration T,n.
was alleged to have wholly failed by reason of the fact that scmtton I,.J.
the machine was delivered in a condition unfit for the pur-
pose for which it was intended. The only document which
corresponds to the contract there mentioned is a long
document on brown paper headed " Sales Agreement."
By their defence the defendants denied that the machine
was delivered in a condition unfit for the purpose intended,
and denied that the sum claimed was payable to the plaintiff;
and they counterclaimed for the balance of the price of the
machine. Just before the trial the plaintiff amended her
claim by adding a count for breach of an implied warranty
that the machine was reasonably fit for the purpose for
which it was sold ; though she still claimed only 91. Is. There
the pleadings stopped. At the trial, as the judge has stated
in his judgment, the plaintiff's claim was put in three
different ways : total failure of consideration; breach of
implied conditions going to the root of the contract ; and
breach of warranty. The defendants pleaded : no total
failure of consideration ; no implied conditions ; and that
no action would lie for breach of implied warranty, as the
agreement expressly provided for the exclusion of all implied
warranties. To this last defence the plaintiff contended
that she was induced to sign the contract by the mis-
representation that it was an order form, and that at the
time when she signed she knew nothing of the conditions.
The county court judge has given judgment for the plaintiff
for 101., though there is no claim by the plaintiff for that
sum ; and he has given judgment for the defendants on
the counterclaim for 111. 18s. 6d., the balance of the price.
As to the defence that no action would lie for breach of
implied warranty, the defendants relied upon the following
clause in the contract : " This agreement contains all the
terms and conditions under which I agree to purchase the
machine specified above and any express or implied condition,
402 KING'S BENCH DIVISION. [1934]

1934 statement, or warranty, statutory or otherwise not stated

L'ESTBANOB herein is hereby excluded." A clause of that sort has been
F GBAUOOB b e f° r e *he Courts for some time. The first reported case
LD. i n which it made its appearance seems to be Wallis, Son &
L.J. Wells v. Pratt & Haynes (1), where the exclusion clause
mentioned only " warranty " and it was held that it did not
exclude conditions. In the more recent case of Andrews
Brothers {Bournemouth), Ld. v. Singer & Co. (2), where the
draftsman had put into the contract of sale a clause which
excluded only implied conditions, warranties and liabilities,
it was held that the clause did not apply to an express term
describing the article, and did not exempt the seller from liability
where he delivered an article of a different description. The
clause here in question would seem to have been intended
to go further than any of the previous clauses and to include
all terms denoting collateral stipulations, in order to avoid
the result of these decisions.
The main question raised in the present case is whether that
clause formed part of the contract. If it did, it clearly
excluded any condition or warranty.
In the course of the argument in the county court reference
was made to the railway passenger and cloak-room ticket
cases, such as Richardson, Spence & Co. v. Rowntree. (3)
In that case Lord Herschell L.C. laid down the law applicable
to these cases and stated the three questions which should
there be left to the jury. In the present case the learned
judge asked himself the three questions appropriate to these
cases, and in answering them has found as facts : (i.) that
the plaintiff knew that there was printed material on the
document which she signed, (ii.) that she did not know that
the document contained conditions relating to the contract,
and (iii.) that the defendants did not do what was reasonably
sufficient to bring these conditions to the notice of the plaintiff.
The present case is not a ticket case, and it is distinguishable
from the ticket cases. In Parker v. South Eastern Ry. Co. (4)
Mellish L.J. laid down in a few sentences the law which is
(1) [1911] A. C. 394. (3) [1894] A. C. 217.
(2) [1934] 1 K. B. 17. (4) 2 C. P. B. 416.
2 K. B. K I N G ' S BENCH DIVISION. 403

applicable to this case. He there said (1) : " In an ordinary 1934

case, where an action is brought on a written agreement which
is signed by the defendant, the agreement is proved by ^
Sj
proving his signature, and, in the absence of fraud, it is "-
wholly immaterial that he has not read the agreement and smitten h.i.
does not know its contents." Having said that, he goes
on to deal with the ticket cases, where there is no signature
to the contractual document, the document being simply
handed by the one party to the other (1) : " The parties
may, however, reduce their agreement into writing, so that
the writing constitutes the sole evidence of the agreement,
without signing i t ; but in that case there must be evidence
independently of the agreement itself to prove that the
defendant has assented to it. In that case, also, if it is
proved that the defendant has assented to the writing
constituting the agreement between the parties, it is, in the
absence of fraud, immaterial that the defendant had not
read the agreement and did not know its contents."
In cases in which the contract is contained in a railway
ticket or other unsigned document, it is necessary to prove
that an alleged party was aware, or ought to have been
aware, of its terms and conditions. These cases have no
application when the document has been signed. When a
document containing contractual terms is signed, then, in
the absence of fraud, or, I will add, misrepresentation, the
party signing it is bound, and it is wholly immaterial whether
he has read the document or not.
The plaintiff contended at the trial that she was induced
by misrepresentation to sign the contract without knowing
its terms, and that on that ground they are not binding
upon her. The learned judge in his judgment makes no
mention of that contention of the plaintiff, and he pronounces
no finding as to the alleged misrepresentation. There is a
further difficulty. Fraud is not mentioned in the pleadings,
and I strongly object to deal with allegations of fraud where
fraud is not expressly pleaded. I have read the evidence
with care, and it contains no material upon which fraud
(1) 2 C. P. D. 421.
404 KING'S BENCH DIVISION. [1934]

1934 could be found. The plaintiff no doubt alleged that the

I/ESTBANGK defendants' agent represented to her that the document
.„ „"• which was given her to be signed was an order form, but
Ln. according to the defendants' evidence no such statement
Scrutton I,.J. was made to her by the agent. Moreover, whether
the plaintiff was or was not told that the document
was an order form, it was in fact an order form, and an order
form is a contractual document. It may be either an
acceptance or a proposal which may be accepted, but it always
contains some contractual terms. There is no evidence that
the plaintiff was induced to sign the contract by mis-
representation.
In this case the plaintiff has signed a document headed
" Sales Agreement," which she admits had to do with an
intended purchase, and which contained a clause excluding
all conditions and warranties. That being so, the plaintiff,
having put her signature to the document and not having
been induced to do so by any fraud or misrepresentation,
cannot be heard to say that she is not bound by the terms
of the document because she has not read them.
The county court judge has given judgment for the
defendants on the counterclaim for the balance of the price,
111. 18«. 6d. I do not see how he could have done that
unless he found that the contract included the clause in
small print providing that, if any instalment of the price
should not be duly paid, all the remaining instalments should
fall due for immediate payment. That judgment on the
counterclaim must stand. As to the claim, judgment was
given for the plaintiff for 70/,. for breach of an implied
warranty, though only 91. Is. was claimed. Such a judgment
could not have been given even in the High Court without
an amendment of the claim. But even if there had been
an amendment, the further difficulty would have remained
that the signed document contained a clause excluding any
implied condition or warranty. If the view which I have
expressed as to the effect of a signed document is correct,
the plaintiff has no ground of claim, and the judgment in
her favour cannot stand. In my opinion, the judgment for
2 K. B. KING'S BENCH DIVISION. 405

the plaintiff on the claim should be set aside and judgment 1934
entered for the defendants on the claim ; and the judgment
for the defendants on the counterclaim should stand. y
LD.

MAFGHAM L.J. I regret the decision to which I have come,

but I am bound by legal rules and cannot decide the case on
other considerations.
The material question is whether or not there was a contract
in writing between the plaintiff and the defendants in the
terms contained in the brown paper document. In the case
of a formal contract between seller and buyer, such as a deed,
there is a presumption which puts it beyond doubt that the
parties intended that the document should contain the terms
of their contract. The brown paper document is not a formal
instrument of that character, yet, in my opinion, having
been signed it may well constitute a contract in writing.
A reference to any of the text-books dealing with the law of
contract will provide many cases of the verbal acceptance
of a written offer, in which the Courts have held that the
written offer and the acceptance, even though only verbal,
together constituted a contract in writing, which could not
be altered by extraneous evidence. The rule may not operate
equitably in all cases, but it is unquestionably binding
in law.
In the present case on February 7, 1933, an order form,
for such I consider the brown paper document to be, was
signed by the plaintiff. It was an elaborate form containing
a number of clauses, and among them certain terms and
conditions in regrettably small print but quite legible. The
plaintiff having signed that document gave it to a canvasser
of the defendants, who took it away. It had been filled
up in ink by the canvasser before she signed it. Another
document called an order confirmation dated February 9,
1933, was sent to her by the defendants. In my opinion
the contract was concluded not when the brown order form
was signed by the plaintiff but when the order confirmation
was signed by the defendants. If the document signed by
the plaintiff was a part of a contract in writing, it is impossible
406 KING'S BENCH DIVISION. [1934]

1934 to pick out certain clauses from it and ignore them as not
L'ESTBANGE binding on the plaintiff.
F GBAUOOB •"•n a c a s e °^ ^ s n a ^ u r e ^ i s possible that the document
ljD- signed by a contracting party may not be the contract,
Maugham L.J. but merely a memorandum in writing of a preceding verbal
contract between the parties, and if in this case it appeared
that the document in question was only a memorandum
of a previous contract which had not contained the clause
excluding all conditions and warranties, the plaintiff might
have relied upon the case of Roe v. Naylor (No. 2) (1) and
contended successfully that, as the clause was not a part
of the contract, she was not bound by it. In my judgment,
however, such a view as that is excluded here, because on
the facts there was no preceding verbal agreement between
the parties.
I deal with this case on the footing that when the order
confirmation was signed by the defendants confirming the
order form which had been signed by the plaintiff, there
was then a signed contract in writing between the parties.
If that is so, then, subject to certain contingencies, there
is no doubt that it was wholly immaterial whether the
plaintiff read the small print or not. There can be no dispute
as to the soundness in law of the statement of Mellish L.J.
in Parker v. South Eastern Ry. Co. (2), which has been read by
my learned brother, to the effect that where a party has
signed a written agreement it is immaterial to the question
of his liability under it that he has not read it and does not
know its contents. That is true in any case in which the
agreement is held to be an agreement in writing.
There are, however, two possibilities to be kept in view.
The first is that it might be proved that the document,
though signed by the plaintiff, was signed in circumstances
which made it not her act. That is known as the case of
Non est factum. I do not think it is necessary to add
anything to what Scrutton L.J. has already said about that.
The written document admittedly related to the purchase
of the machine by the plaintiff. Even if she was told that
(!) (1919) 87 L. J. (K. B.) 958. (2) 2 C. P. D. 416, 421.
2 K. B. KING'S BENCH DIVISION. 407

it was an order form, she could not be heard to say that it 1934
did not affect her because she did not know its contents. L'ESTRANOB
Another possibility is that the plaintiff might have been F Gl ^ n00B
LD
induced to sign the document by misrepresentation. She -
contended that she was so induced to sign the document Maugham L.J.
inasmuch as (i.) she was assured that it was an order form,
(ii.) that at the time when she signed it she knew nothing of
the conditions which it contained. The second of these
contentions is unavailing by reason of the fact that the
document was in writing signed by the plaintiff. As to the
first contention it is true that the document was an order
form. But further, if the statement that it was an order form
could be treated as a representation that it contained no
clause expressly excluding all conditions and warranties,
the answer would be that there is no evidence to
prove that that statement was made by or on behalf of the
defendants.
In this case it is, in my view, an irrelevant circumstance
that the plaintiff did not read, or hear of, the parts of the
sales document which are in small print, and that document
should have effect according to its terms. I may add, how-
ever, that I could wish that the contract had been in a
simpler and more usual form. It is unfortunate that the
important clause excluding conditions and warranties is in
such small print. I also think that the order confirmation
form should have contained an express statement to the
effect that it was exclusive of all conditions and warranties.
I agree that the appeal should be allowed.

Appeal allowed. Judgment entered for defendants

on claim as well as on counterclaim.

Solicitor for defendants, appellants : Herbert A. Phillips.

Solicitors for plaintiff, respondent : Theo. Ooddard & Co.,
far Chamberlain, Johnson & Parke, Llandudno.
J. R.