Hunter Biden Contempt Report
Hunter Biden Contempt Report
Hunter Biden Contempt Report
January __, 2024. Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed
____________
MR. COMER, from the Committee on Oversight and Accountability, submitted the following
REPORT
together with
_______ VIEWS
The Committee on Oversight and Accountability, having considered this Report, reports
favorably thereon and recommends that the Report be approved.
The form of the Resolution that the Committee on Oversight and Accountability would
recommend to the House of Representatives citing Robert Hunter Biden for contempt of
Congress pursuant to this Report is as follows:
Resolved, That Robert Hunter Biden shall be found to be in contempt of Congress for
failure to comply with a congressional subpoena.
Resolved, That pursuant to 2 U.S.C. §§ 192 and 194, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall certify the report of the Committee on Oversight and Accountability,
detailing the refusal of Robert Hunter Biden to appear for a deposition before the Committee on
Oversight and Accountability as directed by subpoena, to an appropriate United States attorney,
to the end that Mr. Biden be proceeded against in the manner and form provided by law.
Resolved, That the Speaker of the House shall otherwise take all appropriate action to
enforce the subpoena.
1
CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On December 13, 2023, Robert Hunter Biden failed to comply with deposition subpoenas
issued by the Committees on Oversight and Accountability and the Judiciary for testimony
relevant to the House of Representatives’ impeachment inquiry and the Committees’ oversight
investigations. 1 Instead, Mr. Biden opted to read a short, prepared statement in front of the
Capitol. Accordingly, Mr. Biden has violated federal law, 2 and must be held in contempt of
Congress. Mr. Biden’s testimony is a critical component of the impeachment inquiry into, among
other things, whether Joseph R. Biden, Jr., as Vice President and/or President: (1) took any
official action or effected any change in government policy because of money or other things of
value provided to himself or his family; (2) abused his office of public trust by providing foreign
interests with access to him and his office in exchange for payments to his family or him; or (3)
abused his office of public trust by knowingly participating in a scheme to enrich himself or his
family by giving foreign interests the impression that they would receive access to him and his
office in exchange for payments to his family or him. 3
1
Letter from Rep. Jim Jordan, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, and Rep. James Comer, Chairman, H. Comm.
on Oversight & Accountability, to Abbe D. Lowell, Partner, Winston & Strawn LLP (Nov. 8, 2023) [hereinafter
“Nov. 8 Letter”].
2
See 2 U.S.C. § 192 (“Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either House of
Congress to give testimony . . . upon any matter under inquiry before either House . . . or any committee of either
House of Congress, willfully makes default . . . shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .”).
3
Nov. 8 Letter, supra note 1.
2
The testimony sought by the subpoenas is also relevant to ongoing efforts to craft
legislative reforms to federal ethics and financial disclosure laws. The Committees seek to craft
legislative solutions that provide transparency when the President’s or Vice President’s family
members engage in lucrative financial transactions. As part of our investigation, the Committees
seek to craft legislative solutions aimed at deficiencies we have identified in the current legal
framework regarding ethics laws and the disclosure of financial interests related to the immediate
family members of Vice Presidents and Presidents—deficiencies that may place American
national security and interests at risk. Specifically, the Committees are concerned that foreign
nationals appear to have sought access and influence by engaging in lucrative business
relationships with high-profile political figures’ immediate family members.
The Constitution vests the House of Representatives with the “sole Power of
Impeachment” 4 and provides that the “President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” 5 As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit has stated, “[t]o level the grave accusation that a President may have
committed ‘Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors,’ U.S. Const. art. II, § 4,
the House must be appropriately informed.” 6 Congress’s authority to access information during
an impeachment investigation can be broader in certain instances than in a purely legislative
investigation, 7 a fact that the Executive Branch traditionally has recognized. 8 An impeachment
inquiry is the traditional means by which the House assembles and evaluates relevant
4
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
5
Id. art. II, § 4.
6
Comm. on Judiciary of U.S. House of Representatives v. McGahn, 968 F.3d 755, 765 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc).
7
TODD GARVEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV.: LEGAL SIDEBAR, LSB11083, IMPEACHMENT INVESTIGATIONS, PART II:
ACCESS, at 1 (2023) (“[T]here is reason to believe that invocation of the impeachment power could improve the
committees’ legal claims of access to certain types of evidence relevant to the allegations of misconduct against
President Biden.”). See also In re Application of Comm. on Judiciary, 414 F. Supp. 3d 129, 176 (D. D.C. 2019)
(“[D]enying [the House Judiciary Committee] evidence relevant to an impeachment inquiry could pose
constitutional problems.”), aff’d, 951 F.3d 589 (D.C. Cir. 2020), vacated and remanded sub nom. on other grounds,
DOJ v. House Comm. on the Judiciary, 142 S. Ct. 46 (2021); In re Request for Access to Grand Jury Materials, 833
F.2d 1438, 1445 (11th Cir. 1987) (concluding that “limit[ing] the investigatory power of the House in impeachment
proceedings . . . would clearly violate separation of powers principles”).
8
See GARVEY, supra note 7 (“As a historical matter, all three branches have suggested that the House possesses a
robust right of access to information when it is investigating for impeachment purposes.”); Jonathan David Schaub,
The Executive’s Privilege, 70 DUKE L.J. 1, 87 (2020) (“[P]residents and others have recognized throughout the
history of the country that their ability to withhold information from Congress disappears in the context of
impeachment.”).
3
information. 9 Indeed, conducting an impeachment inquiry without all pertinent evidence would
be an affront to the Constitution and irreparably damage public faith in the impeachment
process. 10
On September 27, 2023, pursuant to the directive of the Speaker, the Chairs of the
Committees, along with the Chair of the Committee on Ways and Means, released a
memorandum setting forth the justification for and scope of the inquiry into whether sufficient
grounds exist to draft articles of impeachment against President Biden. 11 On December 13, 2023,
the House of Representatives adopted House Resolution 918, directing the Committees, along
with the Committee on Ways and Means, to continue the ongoing impeachment inquiry. 12 By
approving House Resolution 918, the House also adopted House Resolution 917, 13 which
affirmed that “[t]he authority provided by clause 2(m) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House of
Representatives to the Chairs of the Committees . . . included, from the beginning of the existing
House of Representatives impeachment inquiry . . . the authority to issue subpoenas on behalf of
such Committees for the purpose of furthering the impeachment inquiry.” 14 House Resolution
917 also “ratifie[d] and affirm[ed] any subpoenas previously issued . . . by the Chairs of the
Committees on Oversight and Accountability, Ways and Means, or the Judiciary as part of the
impeachment inquiry.” 15
The deposition subpoenas to Mr. Biden were issued as part of the Committees’
impeachment inquiry. As will be explained in detail below, Mr. Biden’s testimony is necessary
for the Committees to determine whether sufficient grounds exist for the Committees to draft
articles of impeachment against President Biden.
However, the impeachment inquiry was not the only purpose underlying these deposition
subpoenas; the subpoenas were also issued to Mr. Biden pursuant to the Committees’ authorities
9
See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 116-346, at 28 (2019) (“Here, consistent with historical practice, the House divided its
impeachment inquiry into two phases, first collecting evidence and then bringing that evidence before the Judiciary
Committee for its consideration of articles of impeachment.”); H.R. Rep. No. 111-427, at 7 (2010) (“[T]he
impeachment inquiry was referred by the Committee on the Judiciary to a Task Force on Judicial Impeachment . . . ,
comprised of 12 Committee Members, to conduct the investigation.”). See also Hearing on the Basis for the
Impeachment Inquiry of President Joseph R. Biden: Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability, 118th
Cong. (Sept. 28, 2023) (statement of Jonathan Turley, Professor, The George Washington University Law School);
Memorandum from Rep. Jim Jordan, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Rep. James Comer, Chairman, H.
Comm. on Oversight & Accountability, and Rep. Jason Smith, Chairman, H. Comm. on Ways & Means, to
Members of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability, and H. Comm. on Ways &
Means (Sept. 27, 2023) [hereinafter “Sept. 27 Memo”].
10
See In re Application of Comm. on Judiciary, 414 F. Supp. 3d at 176 (“Impeachment based on anything less than
all relevant evidence would compromise the public’s faith in the process.”); In re Request for Access to Grand Jury
Materials, 833 F.2d at 1445 (“Public confidence in a procedure as political and public as impeachment is an
important consideration justifying disclosure.”); In re Report and Recommendation of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury, 370
F. Supp. 1219, 1230 (D. D.C. 1974) (“It would be difficult to conceive of a more compelling need than that of this
country for an unswervingly fair [impeachment] inquiry based on all the pertinent information.”).
11
Sept. 27 Memo, supra note 9.
12
H.R. Res. 918, 118th Cong. (2023).
13
Id.
14
H.R. Res. 917, 118th Cong. (2023).
15
Id.
4
to conduct legislative oversight. 16 Article I of the Constitution vests in Congress a “broad and
indispensable” power to conduct oversight and investigations that “encompasses inquiries into
the administration of existing laws, studies of proposed laws, and surveys in our social,
economic or political system for the purpose of enabling Congress to remedy them.” 17 Pursuant
to the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee on the Judiciary is authorized to
conduct oversight of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and criminal justice matters in the United
States to inform potential legislative reforms, 18 while the Committee on Oversight and
Accountability has been delegated broad authority to investigate “any matter” at “any time.” 19
16
See Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives, R. XI, cl. 2(m)(1) (2023) (providing that “a committee or
subcommittee is authorized . . . (B) to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such
witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents as it
considers necessary”); Rules of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability, R. 12(g) (“The Chair of the
Committee shall . . . [a]uthorize and issue subpoenas as provided in House Rule XI, clause 2(m), in the conduct of
any investigation or activity or series of investigations or activities within the jurisdiction of the Committee.); Rules
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, R. IV(a) (“A subpoena may be authorized and issued by the Chair, in accordance
with clause 2(m) of rule XI of the House of Representatives, in the conduct of any investigation or activity or series
of investigations or activities within the jurisdiction of the Committee, following consultation with the Ranking
Minority Member.”).
17
Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2031 (2020)
18
Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives, R. X, cl. 1(l) (2023).
19
Id., cl. 4(c)(2).
20
See, e.g., Subpoena from Rep. James Comer, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability, to Financial
Institution 1 (Feb. 27, 2023).
21
See Memorandum from Maj. Comm. staff, H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability, to Members of the H.
Comm. on Oversight & Accountability, Re: New Evidence Resulting from the Oversight Committee’s Investigation
into the Biden Family’s Influence Peddling and Business Schemes (Mar. 16, 2023); Memorandum from Maj.
Comm. staff, H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability, Members of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability,
5
Committee’s subpoenas issued to various banks for Biden family members’ bank records also
showed a direct benefit to President Biden through a series of complicated financial
transactions. 22
In the spring of 2023, two brave whistleblowers stepped forward to notify Congress of
how DOJ had impeded, delayed, and obstructed the criminal investigation of the President’s son,
Hunter Biden. 23 Following their testimony, the Committees on the Judiciary, Oversight and
Accountability, and Ways and Means requested and conducted relevant interviews with officials
from DOJ, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 24
On September 12, 2023, the Speaker of the House directed the Committees to conduct an inquiry
to determine whether sufficient grounds existed for the impeachment of President Biden. 25 On
September 27, 2023, the Committees released a memorandum laying out, among other things,
the subject matter of the impeachment inquiry, including: (1) foreign money received by the
Biden family; (2) President Joe Biden’s involvement in his family’s foreign business
entanglements; and (3) steps taken by the Biden Administration to slow, hamper, or otherwise
impede the criminal investigation of the President’s son, Hunter Biden, which involves funds
received by the Biden family from foreign sources. 26
Re: Second Bank Records Memorandum from the Oversight Committee’s Investigation into the Biden Family’s
Influence Peddling and Business Schemes (May 10, 2023) [hereinafter “May 10 Memo”]; Memorandum from Maj.
Comm. staff, H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability, Members of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability,
Re: Third Bank Records Memorandum from the Oversight Committee’s Investigation into the Biden Family’s
Influence Peddling and Business Schemes (Aug. 9, 2023) [hereinafter “Aug. 9 Memo”].
22
See Memorandum from Maj. Comm. staff, H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability, to Members of the H.
Comm. on Oversight & Accountability, Re: Fourth Bank Records Memorandum from the Oversight Committee’s
Investigation into the Biden Family’s Influence Peddling and Business Schemes (Nov. 1, 2023) [hereinafter “Nov. 1
Memo”].
23
See generally Transcribed Interview of Gary Shapley, Supervisory Special Agent, Internal Revenue Serv. (May
26, 2023) [hereinafter “Shapley Interview”]; Transcribed Interview of Joseph Ziegler, Special Agent, Internal
Revenue Serv. (June 1, 2023) [hereinafter “Ziegler Interview”].
24
See e.g., H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY ET AL., 118TH CONG., THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S DEVIATIONS FROM
STANDARD PROCESSES IN ITS INVESTIGATION OF HUNTER BIDEN, at 1-2 (2023); Transcribed Interview of Lesley
Wolf, former Assistant U.S. Att’y, Dist. of Del. (Dec. 14, 2023).
25
Press Release, Rep. Kevin McCarthy, Speaker of the House, Speaker McCarthy Opens an Impeachment Inquiry
(Sept. 12, 2023).
26
Sept. 27 Memo, supra note 9.
27
See Subpoena from Rep. James Comer, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability, to Mr. Robert
Hunter Biden (Nov. 8, 2023) [hereinafter “Nov. 8 Oversight Subpoena”]. Relatedly, on November 9, the Committee
on the Judiciary issued a companion subpoena to Mr. Biden for testimony on December 13. Subpoena from Rep.
Jim Jordan, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, to Mr. Robert Hunter Biden (Nov. 9, 2023) [hereinafter “Nov. 9
Judiciary Subpoena”].. Regulations issued by the Committee on Rules authorize such a joint deposition. See
Regulations for the Use of Deposition Authority, 169 Cong. Rec. H115, H147, 118th Cong. (Jan. 10, 2023). See also
Rules of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, R. XI; Rules of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability, R. 15(f).
28
See Joint Deposition Notice, H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability and H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
Deposition of Robert Hunter Biden on December 13, 2023 (Dec. 7, 2023) [hereinafter “Biden Joint Deposition
6
for his deposition. Instead, Mr. Biden read a prepared statement in front of the U.S. Capitol and
immediately departed.
The Oversight and Accountability Committee, with the other investigating committees,
has accumulated significant evidence suggesting that President Biden knew of, participated in,
and profited from foreign business interests engaged in by his son, about which the Committees
intended to question Mr. Biden during his deposition. 29 Mr. Biden’s decision to defy the
Committees’ subpoenas and deliver prepared remarks prevents the Committee from carrying out
its Constitutional oversight function and its impeachment inquiry. 30 Mr. Biden’s refusal to
comply with the Committees’ subpoenas is a criminal act. It constitutes contempt of Congress
and warrants referral to the appropriate United States Attorney’s Office for prosecution as
prescribed by law.
A. The Committees Seek Information from Hunter Biden Central to the Investigative
Purpose of the Impeachment Inquiry of President Joe Biden and the Committees’
Legislative Oversight Investigation
Information held by and known to Mr. Biden is vital to the impeachment inquiry of
President Biden and the Committees’ ongoing efforts to craft legislative reforms to federal ethics
and financial disclosure laws. Throughout 2023, the Committees have been investigating (1)
foreign money received by the Biden family; (2) President Biden’s involvement in his family’s
foreign business entanglements; and (3) steps taken by the Biden Administration to slow,
hamper, or otherwise impede the criminal investigation of the President’s son. 31 The Committees
have collected evidence that President Biden not only knew about, but also participated in and
profited from, his family’s international business activities, including business conducted by his
son, Mr. Biden. This evidence includes bank records, discussions with Mr. Biden’s former
business associates, interviews with investigators from Mr. Biden’s criminal investigation, and
government records from the Department of the Treasury, National Archives and Records
Administration (National Archives), FBI, and IRS. 32 Cumulatively, the evidence obtained thus
far warrants further investigation by the Committees. To do so, the Committees must take Mr.
Biden’s deposition. With the possible exception of President Biden, Mr. Biden is the most
important witness possessing information about President Biden’s involvement in his son’s
business dealings.
To date, the Committees have collected hundreds of pages of documents and witness
testimony relevant to the impeachment inquiry that demonstrate why Mr. Biden’s deposition is
crucial to the Committees’ investigation. During a transcribed interview with the Committee on
Oversight and Accountability, Devon Archer, a long-time associate of Mr. Biden, described how
President Biden was “[t]he Brand” and was used to send “signals” of power, access, and
Notice”]; Rules of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, R. XI; Rules of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability, R.
15(b).
29
Biden Joint Deposition Notice, supra note 28.
30
See Hunter Biden Statement on Subpoena and Investigation, C-SPAN (Dec. 13, 2023), https://www.c-
span.org/video/?532415-1/hunter-biden-statement-subpoena-investigation.
31
See generally Sept. 27 Memo, supra note 9.
32
Id.
7
influence to enrich the Biden family from foreign sources while he served as vice president. 33
Mr. Archer testified that Mr. Biden placed his father on speaker phone during meetings with
business associates approximately “20 times.” 34 Importantly, Mr. Archer detailed specific
instances of then-Vice President Biden’s involvement in his family’s foreign business
entanglements in 2014 and 2015. 35
Mr. Archer testified that then-Vice President Biden dined with foreign individuals from
countries such as Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan who conducted business with Mr. Biden.
Specifically, in February 2014, then-Vice President Biden dined at Café Milano with oligarchs
from Russia and Kazakhstan who funneled millions of dollars to Hunter Biden and his business
associates. 36 Then-Vice President Biden dined with other foreign business associates of Mr.
Biden, including Ukrainian Burisma executive Vadym Pozharsky, at Café Milano in April
2015. 37 At the time, Burisma was under investigation by Ukrainian Prosecutor General Viktor
Shokin for corruption. 38 In 2015, then-Vice President Biden hosted Mr. Biden, Mr. Archer, and
other business associates at the official residence of the Vice President. 39 According to Mr.
Archer, the topic of discussion was filling the top seat at the United Nations. 40 The Kazakhstani
government official who wanted the U.N. position attended both dinners at Café Milano with
then-Vice President Biden. 41
In addition, the Committee on Ways and Means obtained communications in which Mr.
Biden invoked his father to influence his foreign business deals. For instance, the Committee
uncovered a threatening message from Mr. Biden to a Chinese business executive related to a
business deal with CEFC China Energy, a now-defunct Chinese conglomerate with close ties to
the Chinese Communist Party, in which Mr. Biden wrote, “I am sitting here with my father and
we would like to understand why the commitment made has not been fulfilled.” 45 Four days
33
Transcribed Interview of Devon Archer, at 29–30 (July 31, 2023) [hereinafter “Archer Interview”].
34
Id. at 51.
35
See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
36
Archer Interview, supra note 33, at 57.
37
Id. at 65-66.
38
Press Release, Rep. James Comer, Chairman, H. Comm. Oversight & Accountability, Comer Presses State
Department for Information on then-Vice President Joe Biden’s Sudden Shift on Ukraine Policy (Sept. 12, 2023).
39
Archer Interview, supra note 33, at 45-46, 57, 65-66, 78.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
E-mail from Eric Schwerin to Kate Bedingfield (Dec. 4, 2015, 10:45 AM).
43
E-mail from Kate Bedingfield to Eric Schwerin (Dec. 4, 2015, 2:30 PM).
44
Archer Interview, supra note 33, at 33-36.
45
Shapley Interview, supra note 23, Ex. 11.
8
later, on August 3, 2017, Mr. Biden sent another message to a CEFC executive suggesting that
now-President Biden may have been involved in his business ventures, boasting that “[t]he
Biden’s [sic] are the best I know at doing exactly what the Chairman wants from this
partnership[].” 46 The following day, a CEFC subsidiary wired $100,000 to a company owned by
Mr. Biden. 47 On August 8, 2017, nine days after Mr. Biden invoked his father in a threatening
message to a CEFC executive, a Chinese company affiliated with CEFC wired $5 million to a
company jointly established by Mr. Biden and another CEFC associate. 48 The same day, Mr.
Biden transferred $400,000 from this joint venture to his personal company. 49 Through a
complicated series of transactions designed to make the funds difficult to trace, laid out in full by
the Committee on Oversight and Accountability, now-President Biden ultimately received
$40,000 of the proceeds. 50
Mr. Biden’s business associates have also indicated that now-President Biden was
involved in his son’s business affairs. For instance, on May 13, 2017, James Gilliar, one of Mr.
Biden’s business associates, emailed another associate, Tony Bobulinski, and carbon copied Mr.
Biden and a third associate named Rob Walker, about “renumeration packages” for six
individuals involved in a deal with CEFC. 51 The email listed an equity split in the new business
venture that includes “10 held by H for the big guy?” 52 Although DOJ prosecutors prohibited
IRS and FBI investigators from pursuing the identity of “the big guy” during the criminal
investigation of Mr. Biden, 53 Mr. Bobulinski has publicly confirmed that not only is the email
authentic, but also that “the big guy” refers to now-President Biden. 54 A week later, on May 20,
2017, Mr. Gilliar told Mr. Bobulinski in a WhatsApp message, “Don’t mention Joe being
involved [in the CEFC deal], it’s only when u are face to face, I know u know that but they are
paranoid[.]” 55
46
Id.
47
May 10 Memo, supra note 21, at 25.
48
Nov. 1 Memo, supra note 22 at 5.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 5-10.
51
E-mail from James Gilliar to Tony Bobulinski et. al. (May 13, 2017, 5:48 AM).
52
Id.
53
Shapley Interview, supra note 23, at 18, 120.
54
Michael Goodwin, Hunter biz partner confirms email, details Joe Biden’s push to make millions from China:
Goodwin, N.Y. POST (Oct. 22, 2020).
55
WhatsApp message from James Gilliar to Tony Bobulinski (May 20, 2017). See also Emma-Jo Morris et al.,
Hunter Biden’s ex-business partner told ‘don’t mention Joe’ in text message, N.Y. POST (last updated Oct. 23, 2020)
(reporting that the message concerned Joe Biden’s involvement in the CEFC deal).
56
See generally Shapley Interview, supra note 23; Ziegler Interview, supra note 23.
57
Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and FEMA Administrator Deanne Criswell, THE WHITE
HOUSE (Aug. 14, 2023).
9
business dealings. 58 President Biden replied, “no.” 59 Following contradictory testimony from one
of Mr. Biden’s former business associates that President Biden was “on speakerphone” with Mr.
Biden’s former business associates “talking business,” President Biden angrily told reporters, “I
never talked business with anybody. I knew you’d have a lousy question.” 60 The reporter
followed up, asking President Biden to explain why the question was lousy, and President Biden
responded, “Because it’s not true.” 61 In his prepared remarks on December 13, Mr. Biden
provided yet another account of President Biden’s involvement in his business dealings, claiming
that his “father was not financially involved in [his] business.” 62
The Committees are also investigating the national security implications of a Vice
President’s or President’s (and candidates for such offices) immediate family members receiving
millions of dollars from foreign nationals, foreign companies, or foreign governments without
any oversight. Current financial disclosure laws and regulations do not require non-dependent
family members of senior elected officials to provide any information to the public.
Consequently, the Committees are seeking meaningful reforms to government ethics and
disclosure laws that will provide necessary transparency into a Vice President’s or President’s
immediate family members’ income, assets, and financial relationships.
The Committees also intend to craft legislation that would strengthen reporting
requirements relating to certain foreign transactions involving senior elected officials’ family
members and that would implement robust financial disclosure requirements that shed light on
ownership of opaque corporate entities. Moreover, in order to prevent financial transactions from
being structured in a way to evade oversight, the Committees are examining whether certain
reporting requirements, including any new reporting requirements for senior elected officials’
family members, should extend for a period of time after a President or Vice President leaves
office.
The Committees aim to draft legislation that delivers more transparency to the American
people, deters foreign interests from attempting to obtain influence over and access to the highest
levels of the federal government by entering business deals with Presidential and Vice-
Presidential family members, discourages such family members from profiting from their
relative’s public service, and ensures the nation is safe from our foreign adversaries. Mr. Biden’s
deposition is critical in achieving these legislative goals. In particular, the Committee must
understand precisely how such influence-peddling has occurred. Given the complicated financial
transactions surrounding Mr. Biden’s foreign business dealings, as well as the apparently close
relationship between his foreign business dealings during and after his father’s tenure as Vice
President, it is imperative for the Committees to depose him to be able to shape effective and
targeted legislative solutions that would expose and thus hopefully deter attempts at influence-
58
GOP Oversight, Reporter: “Did you lie about never speaking to Hunter bout his business dealings?”, YOUTUBE
(Aug. 21, 2023), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p6y5kIQ9N1M; Steven Nelson, Biden insists he told truth
about not talking foreign biz with Hunter – despite mounting evidence, N.Y. POST (June 26, 2023).
59
Id.
60
Alexander Hall, Biden scorched for response to question about talking to Hunter’s business associates:
‘Pathological liar,’ FOX NEWS (Aug. 10, 2023).
61
Id.
62
Hunter Biden Statement on Subpoena and Investigation, supra note 30.
10
peddling by similarly situated family members, including activities that could jeopardize national
security.
In sum, the Committees have uncovered that the Biden family has accumulated more than
$15 million from foreign entities, with most going to Mr. Biden. 63 Mr. Biden was central to these
business arrangements and his deposition is vital to properly understanding them. In addition,
President Biden’s statements regarding his involvement in his son’s business ventures are
collectively inconsistent and further underscore the need for Mr. Biden’s testimony. It is vital to
the Committees’ investigation that Mr. Biden be deposed, under oath, about how he utilized his
father and the power of his father’s positions to influence foreign business aboard and enrich the
Biden family.
B. Hunter Biden’s Refusal to Comply with the Committees’ Subpoenas for a Deposition
The cover letter noted that the “Biden family used corporate bank accounts of third-party
associates to receive wires from foreign companies and nationals.” 66 These “associates then
dispersed money to various Biden family members in incremental payments over time.” 67 Mr.
Biden “was at the center of many of these transactions and actively involved in the web
connecting the Biden family to foreign money.” 68 Mr. Biden was able to bring in millions of
dollars for the Biden family and did so by “leveraging the Biden brand and the positions of trust
63
Hearing with IRS Whistleblowers About the Biden Criminal Investigation: Before the H. Comm. on Oversight &
Accountability, 118th Cong. (July 19, 2023).
64
Nov. 8 Oversight Subpoena, supra note 27; Nov. 9 Judiciary Subpoena, supra note 27; Nov. 8 Letter, supra note
1.
65
Nov. 8 Letter, supra note 1, at 4.
66
Id. at 1.
67
Id.
68
Id.
11
held by his father.” 69 For example, Mr. Biden “arranged and attended meetings between then-
Vice President Biden and foreign individuals who directly or indirectly paid [Mr. Biden] millions
of dollars, including individuals from Kazakhstan, Russian, and Ukraine.” 70 In short, Mr. Biden
has the relevant information that the Committees need to determine whether President Joe Biden
abused his oath of office to benefit himself and his family. The Committees also detailed the
legislative purpose underlying the subpoena, explaining that Mr. Biden’s testimony is “relevant
to ongoing efforts to craft legislative reforms to federal ethics and financial disclosure laws.” 71
On November 28, 2023, Mr. Biden’s attorney, Abbe Lowell, wrote to the Committees
regarding the subpoenas to Mr. Biden. 72 On behalf of Mr. Biden, Mr. Lowell disparaged and
attacked the Committees’ inquiry, challenged the Committees’ legislative purpose in issuing the
subpoenas, and demanded that the Committees treat Mr. Biden in a manner unlike any other
witness in the investigation. 73 In particular, Mr. Lowell represented to the Committees that Mr.
Biden would only “appear at a public Oversight and Accountability hearing.” 74
The subpoenas Mr. Biden has received compel him to appear before
the Committees for a deposition; they are not mere suggestions open
to Mr. Biden’s interpretation or preference. Several Justice
Department, FBI, and IRS officials have testified in transcribed
interview and deposition settings, as has Devon Archer, Mr. Biden’s
business associate. Notably, other Hunter Biden business associates
are also cooperating with our subpoenas and not demanding a public
hearing first. Mr. Biden seems to believe that he should be treated
differently than other witnesses before the Committees. 77
The Committees asked Mr. Lowell to confirm by December 4 whether Mr. Biden would appear
for his deposition. 78
69
Id. During the transcribed interview of Devon Archer, a Biden business associate, Archer confirmed that then-
Vice President Joe Biden was “the brand” that Mr. Biden sold. Archer Interview, supra note 33, at 29-30.
70
Nov. 8 Letter, supra note 1, at 2 (citing Aug. 9 Memo, supra note 21, at 2)
71
Id. at 4.
72
Letter from Abbe D. Lowell, Partner, Winston & Strawn LLP, to Rep. James Comer, Chairman, H. Comm. on
Oversight & Accountability (Nov. 28, 2023) [hereinafter “Nov. 28 Letter”].
73
Id.
74
Id. at 3.
75
Letter from Rep. Jim Jordan, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, and Rep. James Comer, Chairman, H.
Comm. on Oversight & Accountability, to Abbe D. Lowell, Partner, Winston & Strawn LLP (Dec. 1, 2023)
[hereinafter “Dec. 1 Letter”].
76
See id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
12
On December 6, 2023, Mr. Lowell responded to the Committees, writing that Mr. Biden
had “chosen” to testify only at a public hearing and demanding that the Committees deviate from
their standard investigative procedure to provide Mr. Biden with special treatment. 79 The same
day, the Committees again responded to Mr. Lowell, reiterating that the subpoenas do not
provide Mr. Biden a choice to make—rather, “the subpoenas compel him to appear for a
deposition . . . .” 80 The Committees warned Mr. Biden that failure to appear pursuant to the terms
of the subpoenas would result in the Committees initiating contempt of Congress proceedings. 81
The following day, on December 7, 2023, the Committees issued a joint deposition notice
for Mr. Biden to appear on December 13, 2023 at 9:30 a.m. 82 Biden did not appear for his
deposition. 83 At 9:39 a.m. on December 13, 2023, the Committees convened the deposition and
opened the record. 84 The Committees then introduced the following documents into the record:
(1) the November 8, 2023 subpoenas issued by Chairmen Comer and Jordan compelling Mr.
Biden to appear for a deposition on December 13, 2023, at 9:30 a.m.; (2) the November 28, 2023
letter from Mr. Lowell to Chairman Comer; (3) the December 1, 2023 letter from Chairmen
Comer and Jordan to Mr. Lowell; (4) the December 6, 2023 letter from Mr. Lowell to Chairman
Comer; (5) the December 6, 2023 letter from Chairmen Comer and Jordan to Mr. Lowell; and (6)
the December 7, 2023 joint deposition notice issued by Chairmen Comer and Jordan. 85
Following further discussion by Members on both Committees, the deposition concluded at 9:58
a.m. 86
Meanwhile, at around 9:40 a.m., Mr. Biden arrived on the grounds of the U.S. Capitol
and read a prepared statement to an assembly of reporters. 87 In his prepared remarks, Mr. Biden
generally denied the allegations against him and his family, attacked the Committees and the
inquiry, and renewed his demand for special treatment in how the Committees obtained his
testimony. 88 He read:
79
Letter from Abbe D. Lowell, Partner, Winston & Strawn LLP to Rep. James Comer, Chairman, H. Comm. on
Oversight & Accountability at 3 (Dec. 6, 2023) [hereinafter “Lowell Dec. 6 Letter”].
80
Letter from Rep. James Comer, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability and Rep. Jim Jordan,
Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, to Abbe D. Lowell, Partner, Winston & Strawn LLP (Dec. 6, 2023)
[hereinafter “Committees Dec. 6 Letter”].
81
Id.
82
Biden Joint Deposition Notice, supra note 28.
83
See generally Deposition of Robert H. Biden (Dec. 13, 2023) [hereinafter “Biden Deposition”]; Jordain Carney,
Hunter Biden defies Public GOP subpoena, demanding public hearing at the Capitol, POLITICO (Dec. 13, 2023).
84
Biden Deposition, supra note 83, at 1.
85
Id. at 6–7.
86
Id. at 17.
87
See Hunter Biden Statement on Subpoena and Investigation, supra note 30.
88
Id.
13
and their colleagues have distorted the facts by cherry-picking lines
from a bank statement, manipulating texts I sent, editing the
testimony of my friends and former business partners, and
misstating personal information that was stolen from me. . . . No
matter how many times it is debunked, they continue to insist that
my father’s support of Ukraine against Russia is the result of a non-
existent bribe. 89
Mr. Biden departed the Capitol without ever appearing for his deposition.
C. Hunter Biden’s Purported Reasons for Non-Compliance with the Subpoenas Are
Without Merit
Through his attorney, Mr. Biden has offered several generalized and amorphous bases for
his noncompliance with the Committees’ subpoenas. These excuses are unpersuasive, and the
Committee rejects them.
First, in Mr. Lowell’s November 28 letter to the Committees, he suggested that the
Committees’ investigation lacks a legitimate legislative purpose. 90 Contrary to this assertion, the
Supreme Court has recognized that Congress has a “broad and indispensable” power to conduct
oversight, 91 and that a legislative purpose is valid if it “concern[s] a subject on which legislation
could be had.” 92 The Committees have repeatedly described the legislative purposes of the
investigation, 93 including in direct correspondence with Mr. Lowell. 94 Mr. Lowell has not
contested the legitimacy of these stated purposes but rather has taken issue with how the
Committees have chosen to conduct their investigation, which is a matter for the Committees to
decide, not Mr. Lowell or Mr. Biden.
89
Id.
90
Nov. 28 Letter, supra note 72; see also Hunter Biden Statement on Subpoena and Investigation, supra note 30
(“I’m here today to answer at a public hearing, any legitimate questions Chairman Comer and the House Oversight
Committee may have for me. I’m here today to make sure that the House committee’s illegitimate investigations of
my family did not proceed on distortions, manipulated evidence and lies.” (emphasis added)).
91
Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2031 (2020) (quoting Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187,
215 (1957) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
92
Id. (quoting Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 506 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In
the prepared remarks he delivered on the Capitol grounds on December 13, Mr. Biden claimed that the Committees
were improperly investigating his personal affairs. This is not the case; however, to the extent that Mr. Biden’s
personal affairs bear on the investigation, case law is clear that “Congress may inquire into private affairs and
compel their exposure, if this exposure is in pursuit of an independent legislative purpose.” 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA
& JOHN E. NOVAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 8.4(d)(iii) (2022) (citing
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957)). See also Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 127 (1959)
(“Congress may not constitutionally require an individual to disclose his political relationships or other private
affairs except in relation to [a valid legislative] purpose.” (emphasis added)); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155,
161 (1955) (stating that Congress’s “power to investigate, broad as it may be . . . cannot be used to inquire into
private affairs unrelated to a valid legislative purpose.” (emphasis added)).
93
See, e.g., H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY ET AL., 118TH CONG., THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S DEVIATIONS FROM
STANDARD PROCESSES IN ITS INVESTIGATION OF HUNTER BIDEN, at 77 (2023); Sept. 27 Memo, supra note 9, at 5
(Sept. 27, 2023); Letter from Rep. Jim Jordan, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, et al., to Merrick Garland,
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just. (July 21, 2023).
94
Dec. 1 Letter, supra note 75; Nov. 8 Letter, supra note 1.
14
The Committees are considering legislative reforms such as, but not limited to,
meaningful reforms to government ethics and disclosure laws that will provide necessary
transparency into a Vice President’s or President’s immediate family members’ income, assets,
and financial relationships, as well as potential reforms to the Foreign Agents Registration Act.
The Committees are also weighing legislation that would strengthen reporting requirements
related to certain foreign transactions involving senior elected officials’ family members and that
would implement robust financial disclosure requirements that shed light on ownership of
opaque corporate entities. Moreover, to prevent financial transactions from being structured in a
way to evade oversight, the Committees are examining whether certain reporting requirements,
including any new reporting requirements for senior elected officials’ family members, should
extend for a period of time after a President or Vice President leaves office. Additionally, the
Committees’ oversight of DOJ’s preferential treatment of Mr. Biden will inform potential
legislation which could include strengthening laws protecting whistleblowers from retaliation,
reforming the “special attorney” statute, 95 codifying the special counsel regulations, 96 and
reforming DOJ’s Tax Division.
Second, Mr. Biden has challenged the validity of the ongoing impeachment inquiry. 97
The House’s constitutionally vested impeachment power is separate and distinct from its
legislative powers. 98 Although the House approved House Resolution 918, which directed the
Committees to continue their impeachment inquiry on the same day that Mr. Biden refused to
appear for his deposition, such a resolution is not necessary for the House to conduct an
impeachment inquiry. 99 The Constitution includes no requirement that the full House vote to
start an impeachment inquiry. In fact, the House has launched several impeachment inquiries
without a full House vote, 100 and four years ago a federal district court expressly rejected the
argument that a House resolution is required to begin an impeachment inquiry. 101 As set forth in
the memorandum issued on September 27, 2023, the impeachment inquiry started well before the
Committees issued deposition subpoenas to Mr. Biden. 102
95
See 28 U.S.C. § 515.
96
See 28 C.F.R. § 600 et seq.
97
Nov. 28 Letter, supra note 72; Hunter Biden Statement on Subpoena and Investigation, supra note 30. Even if this
attack on the legitimacy of impeachment inquiry had merit, which it does not, the subpoenas issued to Mr. Biden by
the Committees would still be valid in furtherance of the Committees’ legislative oversight work as discussed above.
98
GARVEY, supra note 7 (“By launching an impeachment inquiry, the House is effectively signaling a transition in
the purpose of its investigations. Applied to the current topic, whereas previously, the committee investigations into
the Biden family served the committees’ consideration of potential legislation . . . the investigations are now also
pursuing evidence relevant to a possible impeachable offense. These two purposes are not mutually exclusive.”).
99
See In re Application of Comm. on Judiciary, 414 F. Supp. 3d 129, 168 (D.D.C. 2019) (“Even in cases of
presidential impeachment, a House resolution has never, in fact, been required to begin an impeachment inquiry.”),
aff’d, 951 F.3d 589 (D.C. Cir. 2020), vacated and remanded sub nom. on other grounds DOJ v. House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 142 S. Ct. 46 (2021); H.R. Rep. No. 116-266, at 7 (2019) (“[N]either the Constitution nor House rules
requires that the full House vote to authorize an [impeachment] inquiry.”).
100
For example, in the 1980s, the full House did not vote to authorize the impeachment inquiries involving Judge
Harry Claiborne, Judge Alcee Hastings, or Judge Walter Nixon. And in 2019, the Speaker of the House announced
the beginning of a formal impeachment inquiry into President Trump more than a month before the full House voted
to authorize it.
101
See In re Application of Comm. on Judiciary, 414 F. Supp. 3d at 168 (“Even in cases of presidential
impeachment, a House resolution has never, in fact, been required to begin an impeachment inquiry.”).
102
See Sept. 27 Memo, supra note 9.
15
Moreover, by adopting House Resolution 917, the full House has expressly affirmed that
“[t]he authority provided by clause 2(m) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives
to the Chairs of the Committees . . . included, from the beginning of the existing House of
Representatives impeachment inquiry . . . the authority to issue subpoenas on behalf of such
Committees for the purpose of furthering the impeachment inquiry.” 103 And the House has also
“ratifie[d] and affirm[ed] any subpoenas previously issued . . . by the Chairs of the Committees
on Oversight and Accountability, Ways and Means, or the Judiciary as part of the impeachment
inquiry,” 104 which includes the subpoenas issued to Mr. Biden. Indeed, on June 12, 2023, and
August 11, 2023, resolutions setting forth articles of impeachment against President Biden
related to Mr. Biden’s business activities were introduced and referred to the Committee on the
Judiciary. 105
Finally, Mr. Biden challenges the venue for this testimony, objecting to the subpoenas’
compulsion for a nonpublic deposition and demanding to testify in public instead. 106 As the
Committees have informed Mr. Biden, however, it has been the consistent practice of
Committees of the House of Representatives in recent Congresses—during both Republican and
Democrat majorities—as well as these Committees during this inquiry to obtain testimony
initially in a deposition setting. 107 This practice, which includes alternating hour-long segments
of questioning by the majority and minority, allows committees to methodically and thoroughly
examine a matter through direct and cross examination without the time constraints of a hearing
imposed by House rules. These depositions result in a deeper understanding of the matter and
more fulsome assessment of the relevant facts.
As the Committees informed Mr. Biden, the Committees are willing to pursue public
testimony at a future date; however, the Committee need not and will not accede to Mr. Biden’s
demand for special treatment with respect to how he provides testimony. To alleviate Mr.
Biden’s stated concerns about transparency with respect to his testimony, the Committees
informed his attorney that the deposition would be videotaped and that the transcript would be
released promptly following the deposition. Mr. Biden’s attorney, however, did not acknowledge
the Committee’s concessions. In any event, it is up to the Committees to choose the investigative
methods and tools that will best further their investigation; so long as those choices are lawful,
Mr. Biden has no say in the matter.
In no uncertain terms, Mr. Biden has no valid reason for failing to comply with the
Committees’ duly authorized subpoenas. Conversely, the Committees’ need for Mr. Biden’s
testimony is well-established pursuant to Congress’s constitutionally prescribed legislative and
impeachment functions. By flagrantly defying the Committees’ subpoenas, Mr. Biden has
violated federal law.
103
H.R. Res. 917, 118th Cong. (2023).
104
Id.
105
See H.R. Res. 493, 118th Cong. (2023); H.R. Res. 652, 118th Cong. (2023).
106
Nov. 28 Letter, supra note 72; Lowell Dec. 6 Letter, supra note 79,; Hunter Biden Statement on Subpoena and
Investigation, supra note 30.
107
Dec. 1 Letter, supra note 75.
16
D. Precedent Supports the Committees’ Position to Proceed with Holding Hunter Biden in
Contempt
The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that “the power to investigate is inherent in the
power to make laws because ‘[a] legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change.’” 108 Further, “[w]here the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information—which not infrequently is true—recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Experience has taught that mere requests for such information often are unavailing, and also that
information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of
compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed.” 109 Accordingly, 2 U.S.C. § 192 provides that
a witness summoned before Congress must appear or be “deemed guilty of a misdemeanor”
punishable by a fine of up to $100,000 and imprisonment for up to one year. 110 Like the
“ordinary federal criminal statute,” 2 U.S.C. § 192 “requires a criminal intent—in this instance, a
deliberate, intentional refusal to answer.” 111
Congress has frequently held individuals in contempt for failing to comply with a duly
issued subpoena. In the 116th and 117th Congress, the Democrat-controlled House “approved six
criminal contempt of Congress citations” for such misconduct. 112 In fact, after congressional
Democrats held White House officials Stephen Bannon and Peter Navarro in contempt of
Congress, DOJ successfully pursued criminal charges against them. 113
Mr. Biden has not asserted any claims of privilege, nor has he asserted any basis for
immunity from answering questions. In correspondence with his attorney prior to the scheduled
date of the deposition, the Committees addressed and rejected Mr. Biden’s justifications for not
complying with the terms of the subpoenas, as well as his demand for special treatment. 114 The
Committees specifically notified Mr. Biden, via his attorney, that his failure to appear for the
deposition as required by the subpoenas would lead to the Committees initiating contempt of
Congress proceedings. 115 Mr. Biden’s failure to appear for the deposition in the face of this clear
advisement and warning by the Committees constitutes a willful failure to comply with the
subpoena under 2 U.S.C. § 192.
108
Eastland, 421 U.S. at 504 (citing McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927)).
109
Id. at 504–05 (citing McGrain, 273 U.S. at 175).
110
The prison term for this offense makes it a Class A misdemeanor. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(6). By that classification,
the penalty for contempt of Congress specified in 2 U.S.C. § 192 increased from $1,000 to $100,000. 18 U.S.C. §
3571(b)(5).
111
Quinn, 349 U.S. at 165.
112
TODD GARVEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10974, CRIMINAL CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS: FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS, at 3 (2023).
113
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Former White House Advisor Convicted of Contempt of Congress (Sept. 7,
2023); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Stephen K. Bannon Found Guilty by Jury of Two Counts of Contempt of
Congress (July 22, 2022).
114
Dec. 1 Letter, supra note 75; Committees Dec. 6 Letter, supra note 80.
115
Committees Dec. 6 Letter, supra note 80.
17
CONCLUSION
The Committees have accumulated significant evidence suggesting that President Biden
knew of, participated in, and profited from foreign business interests engaged in by his son,
about which the Committees intended to question Mr. Biden during his deposition. 116 However,
Mr. Biden brazenly defied the Committees’ subpoenas, choosing to read a prepared statement
outside of the Capitol instead of appearing for a deposition as required by the subpoenas. 117 Mr.
Biden’s willful refusal to comply with the Committees’ subpoenas constitutes contempt of
Congress and warrants referral to the appropriate United States Attorney’s Office for prosecution
as prescribed by law.
COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION
On January 10, 2024, the Committee met in open session and [ . . .].
COMMITTEE VOTES
In compliance with clause 3(b) of House rule XIII, the Committee states that the
following recorded votes occurred during the Committee’s consideration of the Report:
[ . . .]
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of House rule XIII, the Committee advises that the
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause
2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the descriptive
portions of this report.
The Committee finds the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII and section 308(a) of
the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, and the requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII and
section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, to be inapplicable to this Report.
Accordingly, the Committee did not request or receive a cost estimate from the Congressional
Budget Office and makes no findings as to the budgetary impacts of this Report or costs incurred
to carry out the Report.
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of House rule XIII, no provision of this Report establishes or
reauthorizes a program of the federal government known to be duplicative of another federal
program.
116
Biden Joint Deposition Notice, supra note 28.
117
See Hunter Biden Statement on Subpoena and Investigation, supra note 30.
18
PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of House rule XIII, this Report is to
enforce the Committee’s authority to subpoena and obtain testimony related to determining
whether sufficient grounds exist to impeach President Joseph Robinette Biden Jr. and the
sufficiency of federal ethics and financial disclosure laws.
ADVISORY ON EARMARKS
In accordance with clause 9 of House rule XXI, this Report does not contain any
congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clauses 9(d),
9(e), or 9(f) of House Rule XXI.
19