Pakistan has had a long history of military intervention in politics since its inception in

1947. The military has played a dominant role in Pakistani politics for most of the
countrys history directly or indirectly influencing the countrys political economic and
social systems.

The militarys involvement in Pakistans politics can be traced back to the countrys first
military coup in 1958 when General Ayub Khan took control of the government. Since
then Pakistan has experienced several military coups and military-dominated regimes.
The latest military coup occurred in 1999 when General Pervez Musharraf ousted the
elected government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

The militarys influence on Pakistans politics is not limited to coups and takeovers. The
military has a significant presence in Pakistans political system through various
institutions such as the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Military Intelligence (MI) and the
Defense Ministry. The military also controls a significant portion of Pakistans economy
through its various business ventures and the militarys welfare foundation the Fauji
Foundation.

The military has been involved in Pakistani politics for various reasons. One of the
primary reasons for military intervention in politics is to maintain the militarys
institutional interests. The military sees itself as the guardian of Pakistans security and is
often concerned with maintaining the countrys territorial integrity and combating
internal threats such as terrorism and extremism.

Another reason for military involvement in politics is to address the perceived

incompetence and corruption of civilian governments. The military sees itself as a more
efficient and capable institution that can address Pakistans economic and social
problems. However the militarys interventions in politics have often resulted in
authoritarianism human rights abuses and the erosion of democratic institutions.

In recent years the militarys role in Pakistani politics has become more subtle with the
military preferring to work behind the scenes rather than directly taking over the
government. However the militarys influence on politics remains significant and civilian
governments in Pakistan often struggle to assert their authority and independence.

Here are some possible points to consider when discussing the role of the military in
Pakistani politics:

 History of military intervention:

 Reasons for military involvement:
 Military institutions:
 Economic influence:
 Subtle influence:
 Challenges to civilian rule:
 Impact on democracy:
 International implications:
 Future prospects:
 Military coups and takeovers:
 Civil-military relations:
 Militarys role in national security:
 Militarys role in disaster management:
 Militarys role in peacekeeping:
 Militarys role in economic development:
 Militarys involvement in intelligence-gathering:
 Civil society and military influence:
 Impact on regional stability:
 Brief overview of the topic Importance of the role of military in Pakistani politics for CSS
exams
 III. Reasons for military involvement
o Institutional interests:
o Perceived incompetence and corruption of civilian governments:
o Combating internal threats:
o Ideological differences:
 IV. Military institution
o Pakistan Army:
o Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI):
o Pakistan Air Force (PAF):
o Pakistan Navy:
 V. Civil-military relations
o Military interventions:
o The Constitution and military influence:
o Political interference:
o The role of the judiciary:
 VI. The military’s role in national security
o Defense and border security:
o Nuclear deterrence:
o Counterterrorism operations:
o Disaster management:
 VII. Economic development and disaster management
o Economic development:
o Disaster management:
o Humanitarian aid
o Peacekeeping:
 VIII. International implications
o Regional security:
o U.S.-Pakistan relations:
o China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC):
o International peacekeeping
 IX. Impact on democracy
o Military coups:
o Civil-military relations:
o Electoral interference:
o Limited civilian oversight
 X. Civil society and military influence
o Suppression of dissent:
o Limited space for civil society:
o Impact on social issues:
o Lack of accountability:
 XI. Conclusion

History of military intervention:

Pakistan has a long history of military intervention in politics with the first military coup
taking place in 1958 Since then the military has directly or indirectly influenced the
countrys political economic and social systems

Reasons for military involvement:

The military has been involved in Pakistani politics for various reasons including
maintaining institutional interests addressing perceived incompetence and corruption of
civilian governments and combating internal threats such as terrorism and extremism

Military institutions:
The military has a significant presence in Pakistans political system through various
institutions such as the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Military Intelligence (MI) and the
Defense Ministry

Economic influence:
The military controls a significant portion of Pakistans economy through its various
business ventures and the militarys welfare foundation the Fauji Foundation

Subtle influence:
In recent years the militarys role in Pakistani politics has become more subtle with the
military preferring to work behind the scenes rather than directly taking over the
government

Challenges to civilian rule:

The militarys interventions in politics have often resulted in authoritarianism human
rights abuses and the erosion of democratic institutions Civilian governments in
Pakistan often struggle to assert their authority and independence in the face of military
influence

Impact on democracy:
The militarys influence on Pakistani politics remains significant and the countrys
democratic institutions are still evolving The militarys interventions have had a lasting
impact on Pakistans democracy and the relationship between civilian and military
leaders

International implications:
The militarys role in Pakistani politics has also had implications for the countrys
relationship with other nations The United States and other Western countries have at
times supported military leaders in Pakistan while others have criticized the militarys
interventions in politics

Future prospects:
The future of democracy in Pakistan depends in part on the militarys role in politics
Some argue that the military needs to be more accountable to civilian leaders while
others believe that the military is necessary to maintain stability and security in the
country

Military coups and takeovers:

The military has directly intervened in Pakistani politics through coups and takeovers
Military coups have often resulted in the suspension of the constitution the dissolution
of parliament and the detention of political leaders

Civil-military relations:
Civil-military relations have been a contentious issue in Pakistani politics The military has
often been accused of interfering in civilian affairs and undermining democratic
institutions

Militarys role in national security:

The military sees itself as the guardian of Pakistans security and is often involved in
national security decision-making The military has played a key role in Pakistans
relations with neighboring countries particularly India and Afghanistan

Militarys role in disaster management:

The military has also played a key role in disaster management and relief efforts in
Pakistan During natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods the military has been
at the forefront of rescue and relief operations

Militarys role in peacekeeping:

Pakistani troops have been involved in UN peacekeeping missions in various countries
around the world The militarys involvement in peacekeeping has been seen as a way to
project Pakistans influence on the global stage

Militarys role in economic development:

The military has been involved in various economic development projects in Pakistan
particularly in the areas of infrastructure and energy The militarys involvement in the
economy has been criticized as leading to crony capitalism and reducing competition

Militarys involvement in intelligence-gathering:

The militarys intelligence agencies such as the ISI have been accused of being involved
in covert operations and interfering in politics The ISI has been accused of supporting
militant groups in Pakistan and beyond which has led to tensions with other countries
Civil society and military influence:
Civil society groups in Pakistan have often criticized the militarys influence in politics
and called for greater civilian control over the military However civil society groups have
also recognized the militarys contributions to national security and disaster
management

Impact on regional stability:

The militarys role in Pakistani politics has had an impact on regional stability in South
Asia Pakistans relations with neighboring countries particularly India and Afghanistan
have been influenced by the militarys role in politics

Certainly! Here are some possible outlines to consider when discussing the role of the
military in Pakistani politics:

Brief overview of the topic

Importance of the role of military in Pakistani politics
for CSS exams
The role of the military in Pakistani politics is a complex and controversial issue. The
military has been involved in Pakistani politics in various ways, including through coups,
takeovers, and civil-military relations. It has also played a key role in national security
decision-making, economic development, disaster management, and intelligence-
gathering. However, its involvement in politics has also been criticized for undermining
democracy and civil liberties. For CSS exams, understanding the role of the military in
Pakistani politics is essential as it is a critical factor in the country’s political landscape
and history. It is also an important topic in the context of regional stability in South Asia.

III. Reasons for military involvement

There are several reasons why the military has been involved in Pakistani politics over
the years. Some of these reasons include:

Institutional interests:
The military in Pakistan has a long-standing tradition of considering itself the guardian
of the countrys national interest. It sees its role as defending the country from external
and internal threats and preserving the countrys territorial integrity.

Perceived incompetence and corruption of civilian governments:

The military has intervened in Pakistani politics on several occasions when it believed
that civilian governments were incompetent or corrupt. The military has often portrayed
itself as a better alternative to civilian rule and has taken power to bring stability and
good governance to the country.

Combating internal threats:

The military has played a key role in combating internal threats to Pakistans security
including terrorism and extremism. This has often led to the militarys involvement in
intelligence-gathering and covert operations.

Ideological differences:

The military in Pakistan has often had ideological differences with civilian political
parties. This has led to the militarys support for political parties that align with its
ideology and opposition to those that do not.

IV. Military institution

The military in Pakistan is a complex institution with multiple branches and divisions.
Here are some key military institutions in Pakistan:

Pakistan Army:

The Pakistan Army is the largest and most powerful branch of the military in Pakistan. It
is responsible for land-based operations and has been involved in numerous conflicts,
both internal and external.

Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI):

The ISI is Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency and is responsible for gathering
intelligence both domestically and internationally. It has been accused of involvement in
covert operations, including political interference.
Pakistan Air Force (PAF):

The PAF is responsible for air-based operations, including air defense and support for
ground operations.

Pakistan Navy:

The Pakistan Navy is responsible for naval operations and has played a key role in
defending Pakistan’s coastline.

In addition to these branches, the military in Pakistan also has a strong economic
influence through various business ventures and the Fauji Foundation. The Fauji
Foundation is a large conglomerate of companies owned by the military that operates in
a variety of industries, including fertilizer, cement, and banking. This economic influence
has given the military significant power and influence within Pakistani society.

V. Civil-military relations
Civil-military relations have been a contentious issue in Pakistan since its inception. Here
are some key aspects of civil-military relations in Pakistan:

Military interventions:

The military has intervened in Pakistani politics on several occasions including through
coups and takeovers. These interventions have often been justified as necessary for
restoring order and good governance but have also been criticized for undermining
democratic institutions and civilian rule.

The Constitution and military influence:

The Constitution of Pakistan grants significant powers to the military including the
power to declare martial law and the power to remove civilian leaders. This has given
the military significant influence in politics and has led to tensions between civilian and
military leaders.

Political interference:

The military has been accused of interfering in the political process in Pakistan including
through supporting political parties and influencing election outcomes. This has led to
concerns about the militarys impartiality and the fairness of the political process in
Pakistan.

The role of the judiciary:

The judiciary in Pakistan has played a key role in balancing civilian and military power. In
recent years the judiciary has become increasingly independent and has been a key
player in challenging the militarys influence in politics.

VI. The military’s role in national security

The military in Pakistan has a significant role in national security given the countrys
complex security challenges. Here are some key aspects of the militarys role in national
security:

Defense and border security:

The military is responsible for defending Pakistans borders both externally and
internally. This includes maintaining a strong presence on the borders with India and
Afghanistan as well as combating internal threats such as terrorism and extremism.

Nuclear deterrence:

Pakistans nuclear program is managed by the military and the military is responsible for
maintaining a credible nuclear deterrence capability. This includes developing and
maintaining nuclear weapons as well as developing a robust command and control
system for the nuclear arsenal.

Counterterrorism operations:

The military has been involved in numerous counterterrorism operations in Pakistan

including in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and in urban centers such as
Karachi. These operations have been aimed at rooting out terrorist networks and
improving internal security.

Disaster management:
The military has played a key role in disaster management in Pakistan particularly in
response to natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods. The military has been
praised for its quick response and effective coordination during such crises.

VII. Economic development and disaster management

The military in Pakistan has played a significant role in economic development and
disaster management in the country Here are some key aspects of the militarys role in
these areas:

Economic development:

The military in Pakistan has a significant economic presence through various business
ventures including the Fauji Foundation These ventures have contributed to the
countrys economic development creating jobs and providing much-needed goods and
services to the population Additionally the military has been involved in infrastructure
development including building roads and bridges in remote areas of the country

Disaster management:

The military has played a key role in disaster management in Pakistan particularly in
response to natural disasters such as earthquakes floods and landslides The military has
deployed troops and resources to affected areas providing relief and aid to those in
need In some cases the military has also helped to rebuild damaged infrastructure and
housing

Humanitarian aid

The military has also been involved in providing humanitarian aid to people affected by
conflicts and disasters in other countries For example the military has sent medical
teams and supplies to help refugees from Syria and Myanmar

Peacekeeping:

The military in Pakistan has been involved in peacekeeping missions around the world
including in conflict zones such as Sudan and Congo These missions have helped to
promote stability and security in these regions and have contributed to Pakistans
international standing
VIII. International implications
The role of the military in Pakistani politics has significant international implications.
Here are some key aspects:

Regional security:

Pakistans strategic location nuclear capabilities and complex security challenges make it
a key player in regional security. The militarys role in managing these challenges
including border disputes with India and terrorist threats from Afghanistan has
implications for regional stability and security.

U.S.-Pakistan relations:

The United States has been a key ally of Pakistan particularly in the context of
counterterrorism efforts. However the militarys role in Pakistani politics has been a
source of tension in the relationship between the two countries. The United States has
expressed concern about the militarys influence on the democratic process and has
called for a stronger civilian government in Pakistan.

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC):

The CPEC is a major infrastructure development project in Pakistan which is being built
with significant Chinese investment. The military has played a key role in securing the
project given its strategic importance and potential to boost economic development in
Pakistan. The project has implications for regional trade and Chinas growing influence in
South Asia.

International peacekeeping

As noted earlier the Pakistani military has been involved in peacekeeping missions
around the world. This has implications for Pakistans international standing and its
relationships with other countries.

IX. Impact on democracy

The militarys role in Pakistani politics has had a significant impact on democracy in the
country. Here are some key aspects:

Military coups:

Pakistan has experienced several military coups throughout its history which have led to
the suspension of democratic institutions and the imposition of martial law. Military
interventions in politics have undermined the democratic process and weakened civilian
institutions including political parties and the judiciary.

Civil-military relations:

The militarys influence on politics and governance has led to an imbalance in civil-
military relations. The military has often been seen as the dominant force in politics with
civilian leaders struggling to assert their authority over military matters. This has
weakened the civilian governments ability to carry out its constitutional duties and has
contributed to political instability.

Electoral interference:

The military has been accused of interfering in elections and manipulating the political
process to favor certain candidates or parties. This has undermined the integrity of the
democratic process and has weakened the publics trust in electoral institutions.

Limited civilian oversight

: The militarys economic ventures and security operations are often conducted with
limited civilian oversight. This has allowed the military to operate with relative autonomy
which has led to concerns about transparency and accountability.

X. Civil society and military influence

The militarys role in Pakistani politics has also had an impact on civil society in the
country. Here are some key aspects:

Suppression of dissent:

The military has been accused of suppressing dissent and limiting freedom of
expression. This has included crackdowns on media outlets human rights activists and
political opponents which have limited the ability of civil society to hold the government
and military accountable.

Limited space for civil society:

The militarys influence on politics has also limited the space for civil society
organizations to operate. NGOs and other civil society organizations have faced
restrictions on their activities particularly those that are critical of the government or
military.

Impact on social issues:

The militarys influence on politics has also had an impact on social issues in the country.
For example the military has played a key role in the implementation of anti-terrorism
measures which have led to concerns about human rights abuses. Additionally the
militarys conservative values and influence on education policies have had an impact on
issues such as gender equality and religious freedom.

Lack of accountability:

The militarys influence on politics has also contributed to a lack of accountability. The
military has often been able to operate with limited oversight which has led to concerns
about corruption and misuse of public funds.

XI. Conclusion
In conclusion the militarys role in Pakistani politics has had a complex and multifaceted
impact on the countrys democracy civil society and national security. On the one hand
the military has played a key role in ensuring the countrys security and stability
particularly in the face of external threats and internal conflicts. However the militarys
influence on politics has also undermined democratic institutions limited freedom of
expression and restricted civil society activities.

Going forward it will be important for Pakistan to strike a balance between military
involvement in national security matters and civilian control over governance and
democratic institutions. Greater transparency accountability and oversight will be critical
for ensuring that the military operates within its constitutional limits and promotes
democratic values. Additionally promoting greater civil society engagement and
addressing social issues will be important for building a more inclusive and participatory
democracy in Pakistan. Ultimately achieving these goals will require sustained efforts by
all stakeholders including political leaders civil society organizations and the military
itself.

The civil-military relations form an essential strand of national security strategy. In peace,
they affect the internal stability of a nation state; in war, they influence the outcome. In the
developed countries the military is mostly busy in participation of formulation of national
security policy. However, in the developing countries, particularly those with a colonial past,
the military have long maintained a substantive role in domestic politics. That is, the
military have either overthrown the legally constituted governments, or overly influenced
decision-making at national levels. Same is the case in Pakistan.

Historical context
The evolution of the civil-military relations in Pakistan was affected by many factors that
were unique to the developing world. The political and administration infrastructures of
Pakistan have to be built from the scratch is one these factors. Like Indian Army, Pakistan
army originated from the British Indian army. However, unlike India, the civil military
relations in Pakistan evolved along the deadly different path. That is why Pakistan witness
frequent military interventions; at least three of them were overt. Thus, Since independence
in 1947, Pakistan has experienced 30 years of military rule (1958 to 1971, 1977 to 1988
and 1999 to 2008); even when not in government the military has constantly sought to
centralise and consolidate political power, and the military (notably military intelligence, the
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)) exerts significant overt and covert control over the civilian
authorities in both domestic and foreign affairs. Given Pakistan’s volatile relationship with
India, centred on the decades-long conflict for control of Kashmir, Pakistan has always been
a ‘security state’, and the national military has historically been a key player in the
geopolitical arena. However, information on Pakistan’s armed forces is very limited, and
interaction with Western civilian and military institutions is heavily controlled. The climate of
secrecy within the Pakistan military and its associated security services directly and
indirectly affects civil–military coordination and presents humanitarian actors with a highly
complicated operational environment.

The role of the military in Pakistani society

Pakistan’s military has multiple roles: preparing for and responding to natural disasters,
contributing military personnel to UN missions (Pakistan has a long history of contributing
troops and police to UN peacekeeping operations and has consistently been in the top three
of contributor nations.), under special circumstances maintaining law and order and
defending Pakistan’s borders and conducting security operations, counter-insurgency or
counter-terrorism operations. Pakistan’s volatile relationship with India has ensured that the
military has been well-resourced.
The armed forces consist of the Army (550,000), Navy (22,000) and Air Force (70,000),
totalling 642,000 military personnel in active service. Paramilitary forces number 304,000,
and there is a reserve force complement of 500,000.
The Army is structured using the traditional British two-tier hierarchy of officers and enlisted
ranks, a legacy of colonial rule. Officer ranks follow British military naming conventions, the
lowest being Second Lieutenant and the highest Field Marshal. In addition, there are three
ranks of Junior Commissioned Officer: Naib Subedar, Subedar and Subedar-Major. Non-
Commissioned Officer (NCO) ranks range from Solider at the lowest echelon to Battalion
Havildar Major at the highest. Officers are predominantly drawn from Pakistan’s middle
classes; indeed, employment as an officer is the predominant profession of the middle and,
increasingly, lower-middle classes. Selection is highly competitive, but once recruited
members of the military and their families enjoy extensive support, including medical care
at well-equipped facilities and a patronage network. According to Lieven (2011), the military
forms a separate ‘giant kinship group’ that ‘sees itself as a breed apart, and devotes great
effort to inculcating in new recruits the feeling that they belong to a military family different
from (and vastly superior to) Pakistani civilian society’. Regionally, the northwest Punjab
and KP and Punjabi and Pashtun/Pathan ethnicities respectively have provided the majority
of military recruits, particularly for the Army (Lieven, 2011). Moves are being made to make
the military a more national institution; recruitment initiatives have focused on Sindhi,
Mohajir and Baloch in an effort to increase their numbers in the forces, and new
cantonments have been built in Sindh and Balochistan. What effect this is having on the
ethnic make-up of the forces is impossible to say as statistics are not made available.
Preparing for disaster response has long been part of military training. When called on to
support civil authorities, military assistance has predominantly been channelled into less
secure areas, with civilian actors responding in the more accessible locations. The military
provides relief and rescue, logistical support, engineering expertise, emergency health
provision and basic reconstruction of infrastructure. The armed forces also have a disaster
preparedness role, for example by coordinating with the civil authorities in maintaining
water channels, in joint inspections of flood defences and participation in pre-monsoon
coordination meetings. In relation to complex emergencies, the Army feels that it has a
legitimate interest not only in responding to terrorism but also in rebuilding after security
operations. Given Pakistan’s longstanding commitment and experience as one of the
principal contributors of troops and police to UN peacekeeping operations, it is conceivable
that the security services consider themselves to be the best organisation to address both
disaster and conflict. The experience and expertise the Pakistan military brings is recognized
by the humanitarian community, and the Army is considered to be a significant player, with
the ability to provide personnel, logistics and key skills in response to disasters. A cross-
section of respondents were either comfortable with the military role in disaster response,
or felt that the armed forces were obliged to act due to the high level of state funds and
government resources they received.
The Army’s counter-insurgency operations against Taliban militants began in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in 2001, and continue today at various points along the
Afghan–Pakistan border (the Durand Line). Pakistan’s counter-insurgency strategy has been
described as ‘engage, destroy, and negotiate’, the inverse of the ‘clear, hold, build’
strategies of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)/NATO military forces in
Afghanistan (Zaidi, 2010). Local populations are evacuated before overwhelming force and
heavy firepower is used to attack militants headon; this is followed by the negotiation of a
ceasefire.
Collateral damage, mass internal displacement and the destruction of infrastructure have
been the result.
A lack of reconciliation and reconstruction initiatives following these offensives has
exacerbated the conflict and generated increasingly negative opinions of military activities
among local populations.
Western governments, especially the US, have been supportive of Pakistan’s counter-
insurgency operations. Foreign aid for disaster response operations, most notably from the
US, has been used to promote stability and gain local and national support for international
counter-terrorism and stabilisation objectives. This has had an impact on the provision of
humanitarian aid, with the Pakistan military controlling and in some cases blocking aid
flows. As discussed in the sections that follow, the response to the 2005 earthquake was
seen as a large-scale ‘hearts and minds’ opportunity by national and international military
forces, to improve local perceptions of military forces and their respective governments.2
An essential objective from the national military perspective was to decrease local
opposition to security operations in the mountainous region of South Waziristan on the
Afghan–Pakistan border. For the US, the response was seen as a way to reduce vitriolic
anti-American sentiment amongst local populations, which had been compounded by drone
attacks against Taliban militants. With the international drawdown
from Afghanistan scheduled for 2014, Pakistan is facing increasing pressure to reform its
security strategy. In an attempt to stem insurgency and unrest during the transition, it is
likely that Pakistan will step up counter-insurgency operations along the border, with
significant implications for the humanitarian response in this highly troubled region.

Why Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan have Always been on a Bumpy Road?

The most basic precondition of a true democratic setup is a healthy civil-military
relationship. In all democratic countries, an elected civilian government enjoys full control
over the military. However, in Pakistan, control over governance has oscillated between the
two; a decade of civilian supremacy followed by a decade of military rule. The reasons for
this periodic shuffling are incompetent political leadership, weak political parties and
institutions, rising power of civil-military bureaucracy, serious security threats to the
country and frequent use of military in aid of civil power.

In the early days of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam clearly articulated the role of the military in the
following words: “Do not forget that the armed forces are the servants of the people. You
do not make national policy; it is we, the civilians, who decide these issues and it is your
duty to carry out these tasks with which you are entrusted.”

Leadership Void
Soon after independence, in 1948, the Father of the Nation and the first Governor-General,
Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, passed away. Thus, a leadership void was created
after just one year of the country's establishment. The first Prime Minister of Pakistan,
Liaquat Ali Khan, who was Quaid's right hand lieutenant, was also assassinated in 1951.
About the rest of the leadership lot, the Quaid had ruefully remarked that “he had false
coins in his pocket.”

Delayed Finalisation of Constitution

Similarly, in 1954, there were nine members of the Prime Minister's cabinet, who were not
members of the Parliament, including Commander-in-Chief General Muhammad Ayub Khan.
Moreover, Pakistan took nine long years to finalise its first constitution that was enforced on
23 March 1956. This inordinate delay allowed the Governor-General to continue with his
authoritarian rule. This all was happening at a time when the country direly needed healthy
democratic traditions. In addition, the first general elections in the country, which were due
in 1951, were held after a lapse of almost quarter of a century, in 1970. This further
strengthened the non-democratic and authoritarian tendencies providing space to civil and
military bureaucracies to assume a dominant position in governance.

Weak Political Parties

For any healthy constitutional and political system to function smoothly, strong and well-
entrenched political parties are essential. Unfortunately, political parties in Pakistan have
failed to develop into strong vehicles of national political will. The main reason is that most
of our leaders belonged to feudal and capitalist classes and were thus, by their very nature,
inimical to a democratic polity. Their incompetence and constant wrangling for power led to
ceaseless infighting. For instance, as early as 1953, a clash between the leadership of the
Punjab and the central government led to the imposition of Martial Law in Lahore, the
provincial capital.

Weak Institutions
After independence, Pakistan had to start from scratch. There was no established
parliament, no civil secretariat, no supreme court, no central bank and no organised armed
forces. There was a paucity of competent parliamentarians. The proportion of the Indian
Civil Service officers who opted for Pakistan was small. The same was true of the higher
judiciary. Unlike other institutions, the proportion of Muslims in the Indian Army was
comparatively substantial, i.e., 33 per cent. This is also one of the reasons why the armed
forces of Pakistan assumed greater importance right in the beginning and were better
established than other institutions of the state.

Rising Power of Civil-Military Bureaucracy

Due to lack of basic infrastructure, Pakistan had to make new beginning in all spheres. But
the low level of literacy made this task very difficult. The country needed competent and a
determined leadership to build and nurture democratic institutions. But such a leadership
was hard to come by in a rural society in which the political, social and economic life was
dominated by the landed aristocracy. The feudal leadership of political parties was not
capable of dealing with the multifarious problems faced by the country. It depended heavily
on the civil and military bureaucracy. The result was the bureaucratic elite became
disproportionately assertive, steadily increasing their power at the expense of the political
elite. For instance, a civil bureaucrat Governor-General of Pakistan, Ghulam Muhammad
(1951-55), dissolved the National Assembly in 1954 and the Federal Court justified and
validated his unconstitutional act on the basis of the “law of necessity.”

Wrangling for Power

The first President of Pakistan, Iskander Mirza, relied on the military to ensure state's
integrity when the PML President, Qayyum Khan, threatened direct action and the Khan of
Kalat declared his secession from Pakistan. In order to deal with the disturbed situation,
Mirza took extreme step; he abrogated the Constitution, dissolved the legislative
assemblies, dismissed the central and provincial governments, banned all political parties
and postponed general elections indefinitely. He also declared Martial Law and appointed
General Ayub as the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA), who in turn removed Iskander
Mirza on October 27, 1958 and himself became the President. Thus began the era of
military-dominated governance.

Military's Sway over Political Setup

After seven years of instability (1951-58), in which as many as seven prime ministers rose
and fell, the military regime put the country on the path of economic and political stability.
Hamid Khan, a renowned lawyer, writes in “Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan”,
“Ayub's term of office [1958-69] was the golden era for the bureaucracy, which exercised
its powers, unbridled by any political interference.”
Again, after the restoration of democratic governance during 1988-99, four governments
were dissolved by the President of Pakistan invoking Article 58 (2)(b). On 12 October, 1999,
the military once again ousted the elected government and Pakistan was again under their
despotic rule.

Civil Dependence on Army

From the very beginning, the Army remained involved in civil administration. In 1947, it
was the Army that was asked to establish civil secretariat in Karachi. They vacated their
barracks, renovated them to house the secretariat and the staff coming from Delhi. It was
the Army which largely contributed to safeguarding the movement of several refugee
convoys carrying millions of refugees from East Punjab as well as establishing their camps
at Lahore. In short, the army was frequently called in aid of civil authorities in all natural
disasters, emergencies and other civil functions.

Present Situation
Presently, however, the situation is different. Pakistan's political leadership is more mature
and political parties are better established. The country has developed a middle class, an
active civil society, a vibrant media and an independent judiciary. Whenever required,
Parliament is getting briefing on security matters from the Services Chiefs and decisions are
taken through consensus. Although military enjoys autonomy in its internal affairs,
somewhat healthy civil-military relations exist. The Army is more deeply involved now than
a decade ago in support of activities for the civilian government: law-and-order tasks; relief
and rescue operations after natural disasters; the use of its organisational and technological
resources for public welfare projects; greater induction of its personnel in civilian
institutions; anti-terrorist activities; and containing narcotics trafficking.
A National Action Plan (NAP) was jointly formulated by the political parties and the armed
forces to win the war in the cities. Speaking to Russian magazine Sputnik, DG ISPR
conceded that only a part of the plan has so far been implemented while the rest remains
stalled due to ‘political challenges’. There is a need to correctly define the political
challenges. The major challenge is the pressure from the religio-political parties which are
strongly opposed to any government regulation or external oversight of the madrassas.
They also reject any revision of the mainstream educational curricula to remove hate
material and introduce tolerance. The army has to support the government in blocking the
two major sources of the spread of extremist ideas.
There has to be full cooperation between the army and the civilian governments at the
centre and the provinces. Similarly, Rangers and Police, and military and civilian intelligence
agencies have to work together rather than work at cross purposes. Terrorists will have a
field day if a tug of war was to ensue between governments led by the mainstream parties
and the establishment or if there is disregard for civilian institutions by the military-
controlled intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
The civilian institutions have to play a major role in the war against urban terrorism. What
one sees happening vis-a-vis the delay in setting up of NACTA indicates a trend which is not
healthy. The arrest of a policeman by Rangers after raiding a police station and his
subsequent release is also an indication of the malaise. One also does not expect military
commanders to issue statements with political implications.

The Way Forward

Presently, civil-military relations do not seem as healthy and cordial as they should be.
There are apprehensions on both sides. The government's tacit support to Geo in ISI
bashing case has increased the tensions between the two pillars of the state. Apparently,
army and the government are poles apart on the issue of operation against Taliban.
It is imperative that in the larger interest of the country both these institutions join hands to
save Pakistan from the monster of terrorism and steer the country out of multifaceted crises
which are adversely affecting Pakistan and its citizens. It is often said that Pakistan is in a
state of war and no war can be won when there is disunity among the state institutions.
1. Laws and clear constitutional provisions should be put in place that define the chain of
command and civilian authority over the military. Although apparently a piece of paper, this
provision establishes the legitimacy for any action to resist any encroachment by the
military.
2. Bring a change in culture, values and acceptability among the masses that civilian rule is
possible and should be put in place. This enculturation would be possible through a
committed media and impartial press.
3. Structures and processes should be put in place, detailing who will command. Fourth,
openness and transparency or freedom of information is vital so that everything is open to
the public and civilian leadership.
4. Let the military budgets or expenditures be controlled by civilian authorities. No doubt
the civilians linked to this process should be thoroughly scrutinised for their integrity.

Introduction
In any sovereign state, the maintenance of internal law and order and the
necessary provision for protection against external threats are the prime
responsibility of the state which delegates the authority to its defence forces to
discharge this responsibility and hence their significance. The paradox to this
imperative is Edmund Burke’s warning, “Armed discipline body is in essence,
dangerous to the liberty, the potential threat to an incumbent administration and
to the society at large”.
“Without an Army, there is neither independence nor civil
liberty.” – Napoleon Bonaparte

Harnessing this armed body to deliver and to remain subservient to civil rule is in
essence what the objective of ideal civil-military relations (CMR) ought to be.
Civil-military relations can be broadly termed as the relationship and distribution
of power between the armed forces and the civilian authority, which ironically, in
Pakistan has remained in the state of disequilibrium mutating into an abiding
civil-military conflict and an object of scathing diatribe in the public.

Record & Trends

One place in the world where there had been military rule aplenty is the African
continent, where about a quarter of the countries in Central, Eastern, and
Southern Africa are governed in one form or another by their armies, either
through direct military rule or through naturalization into the power structure and
in other cases through indirect influence.

Except for Tanzania and Zambia where there is some semblance of civil-military
relations, in other countries, these have been lopsided with a military bias. The
rate of coups within the region on average had been three successful coups per
annum during the past three-quarter century.

“The overall number of coup attempts in Africa remained remarkably consistent

at an average of around four a year in the four decades between 1960 and
2000″. For instance, Egypt faced a coup in 1952 and 2013, Sudan in 1958, 1969,
1971, 1985, 1989, 2019, and 2021 (for every successful coup there had been
two unsuccessful ones); Uganda in 1971, Nigeria had eight coups between 1966
and 1993.
However, comparatively speaking, coups have been less prevalent in Southern
Africa than in Central and East Africa, perhaps because of the way they were
decolonised. “Overall, Africa has experienced more coups than any other
continent. Of the 16 coups recorded globally since 2017, all but one – Myanmar
in 2021 – have been in Africa”.

Pakistan has not been an exception to this trend and is almost a mirror image of
the African fable, as the military has been virtually in the business of running the
country in its various forms of direct, indirect, or hybrid dispensation.
Bonapartism has remained a favorite vocation of military generals resulting in
decades of military rule (1958-71, 1977-1988, and 1999-2008), often solemnized
and greeted by the public.

Also Read: Pakistan–India Adversarial Relations: Instability for South Asia

The practice of changing regimes began with the toppling of the elected
government of Prime Minister Feroz Khan Noon in 1958 by President General
Sikandar Mirza, who in turn was shown the door by General Ayub and it has
continued ever since. However, since the abdication of the presidency by
General Musharraf, the military was tempted to take over, but abstained, as in
each of its four previous military rules, the Pakistan Army was left discredited and
unpopular even though some monumental development and nation-building
efforts.

More importantly, the military saw the futility of direct military rule when it can
have its way through manipulative coercive levers and have de facto control over
the government, especially on the nuclear programme, key foreign policy issues,
military financing, and national security decision-making.

Causes and Consequence

The question arises that why and under what circumstances the military
intervened and whether or not there is a commonality with African countries. In
the African case, the factors range from ethnic rivalry, economic crises,
governmental repression and corruption, perpetual poverty and public unrest,
personal and corporate ambitions etcetera.

Barring the first factor, the remaining, among others have more or less been the
cause of military interventions in Pakistan, justified in the name of the country’s
survival and sanctified through the implementation of the doctrine of necessity.
Such usurpations of power and prolonged military rule contributed to lasting
political instability in the majority of the countries as well as Pakistan, as also the
transformation of the country into a security and a praetorian state.

It also induced a fear psychosis among the political leadership that while wary of
the military junta also beseech the praetorian oligarchs to climb back to the
corridors of power on the purported pretext of invariable corruption, nepotism,
cronyism, bad governance, and security risk, among others.

Civil Quest for Dominance

While the dictum of civilian control has a universal appeal, given our sham
democratic system, low moral political moorings, and inept governance, such
norms are illusory and farfetched. Nonetheless and possibly in retaliation,
asserting civilian control over the military has remained the latent desire of the
political leadership, letting no event pass to take a swipe at the establishment
through innocuous yet devious means and measures.
Nawaz Sharif’s perpetual attempts to rein in the military chiefs, ending in his
abortive attempt to replace General Musharraf; PML (N)’s later vindictive swipe
on the military exposed in the Dawn Leaks; Nawaz Sharif and Maryam’s
harangue on the former general chief and General Faiz for overthrowing their
government; Zardari’s memo gate and open virulent threat to the generals; Imran
Khan’s tiff with the military over the replacement of then DG ISI Faiz Hameed
and asset leaks of the former chief’s family from FBR. All these have been rooted
in their deep-seated grudge against the military.

The on–off slurring diatribe by the civilian leadership on the military and the
latter’s attempt to have a subservient political dispensation is a sordid tale of
getting even, with near complete indifference towards the burgeoning foreign,
domestic, and economic challenges. The deteriorating civil-military relations have
taken Pakistan to the brink of economic disaster having serious implications for
national security.

The African recipe of asserting civilian authority is reflected in the Tanzanian

case, where the ruling party, after the mutiny of 1964, cemented civilian control
by integrating the military into the country’s elite bargain. As the armed forces
became ideologically and materially intertwined with the regime, they developed
a stake in the latter’s survival.

Much of the same has been in vogue in our case, however with a difference, as
this time round, the composition in the playbook of yesteryears is being
orchestrated with a vengeance and vendetta. The hobnobbing of the political
cronies (PDM) and the deep state is directed against a common political nemesis
(PTI and its leadership), perceived as a system outcast and a threat to the status
quo, who thus needs to be banished from the political chessboard – no matter
what the cost.

Also Read: Understanding the Value of Liberal Arts Education in Pakistan

The indifference or the lack thereof on the economic meltdown is perplexing

nonetheless economic stability will remain an important variable that may quickly
change the prevailing courtship. Pakistan is facing an existential crisis with the
debt surmounting over $274 billion amidst unrelenting plunder of state
institutions/infrastructure and mortgaging these for seeking more loans, reducing
fiscal independence and drastically impacting sovereign decision-making.
David O Smith’s assumption, “The military may have finally realized that the true
centre of gravity of Pakistan National Security lies in its economy and not in the
military capacity alone”, hopefully must have been reckoned with in its entirety.
Or we will mercilessly and in bewilderment see the ship sinking and do nothing in
the name of neutrality.
Intriguing though it may appear, the neutrality notion contextualization by Amir
Zia says it all, “Many view the fall of the Imran Khan’s government amid this
buzz of ‘neutrality’ as a switching of sides by the army, or worse, abject
surrender to the much-tried, tested and failed corrupt political dynasties in this
country”.

Intended Purpose and Objectives

Resultantly, the unfortunate conflagration of hatred and rift between the society
and the state (sic the military) – a fervent desire of the inimical forces, which
ironically have been callously choreographed by none other than the political
cartel in its internecine struggle and lust for power with such purported
objectives, as:

 Propping up the dwarfing image of the political elite, marred by corruption

scandals (Panama leaks, money laundering, etc.).
 Drawing the military down from the high moral pedestal and deriding its
iconic image of being a guardian of national interest.
 Yield space to the US and bring the military establishment under control.
 A more confident and emboldened political establishment, having regained
space, endeavor a more intrusive and searching role in affairs of the military,
curtailing its freedom of action on particularly strategic and nuclear issues.
 Make the military accomplice in state dispensation and when needed
apportion blame, making the military a scapegoat for its inept handling of
important foreign and domestic issues.
 Silence the political dissent and disarray the political opposition by
insinuating a military hand in the ongoing political unrest.
 If all else fails, eventually, provoke the military in taking any unconstitutional
step to remove the government and become a political martyr yet again to
improve political stature.
 Let the military/caretaker government deal with the difficult multifarious socio-
economic challenges and clean the Augean stables.

Modus Operandi
 While appearing to play a second fiddle to the military, let the military have a
say on issues of national import, with their own perfidious characteristic
indifference to national affairs.
 Keep the military leadership in good humour through obliging and appeasing
actions of routine nature, while continuing to guard and advance their political
and commercial interests.
 Through astute political brinkmanship consolidate their rabid dispensation by
appeasing the political allies, shrinking the space for the political opponents,
and precluding the possibility of any Bonapartist corrective course by the
military.
 Create organized chaos, turbulence, and disorder and induce a managed
economic collapse to an extent that holding of elections appears of
secondary importance and redundant – thereby seeking more time for
consolidating political rule on the pretext of propping up the faltering
economy.

Diminishing Military Support

A stock check of the entire situation and the current state of the civil-military
relations in Pakistan reveal one straight fact i.e. the military seems to be the
principal loser in this ongoing fratricide. Over the years, the fraternal bond of
love, affection, and reverence that the military so painstakingly built with the
populace with its blood and sweat, emerging as a saviour in almost every
national crisis, has come crashing down.

Also Read: Analyzing Pakistan’s Second Strike Capability: Pakistan's Babur 3 vs

India's INS Arihant

The ensuing animus between the Pakistan Army and the people has affected
national unity drastically. All this is perhaps due to the inadvertent misstep of
becoming indifferent and aloof (apolitical) – as a consequence, ushering in a
corrupt political cartel and then turning a blind eye to the flagrant incompetence,
misgovernance, mishandling, and rampant loot and plunder.

The romance with the military has been a dream gone sour, which could only be
re-lived, if the miltablishment lives up to its image, understand people’s
aspiration, and dole out an even hand, ensuring transparency, fair play, and
nudges the stakeholders to sort out the political impasse – rather than leaving an
impression of political vicitimisation or a witch-hunt against its erstwhile political
master.

The panacea of prevailing crises is hence none other than adherence to the
constitution and the rule of law by all state organs without prejudice and
distinction and an earnest recourse to the free-fair polls.

Considering Possibilities
While the time of much talked about and expected possibility of sending the
political order packing and replacing it with a technocratic government (otherwise
a non-starter) to institute a reformative political and economic agenda is gone,
there is no other alternative at hand than the resort to bring in a legitimate
political dispensation.

The present turn of events suggests the following immediate remedial and
imperatives:

 First and foremost is a perception reset – the battered and sullied image of
the military in public eyes needs to be restored.
 Undertake a Public Relations (PR) initiative to win the hearts and minds of
the people.
 Notwithstanding the government tactics of distancing itself from the episode,
ensure that the inquiry into Arshad Sharif’s murder and Imran Khan’s killing
attempt is conducted justly and in earnest – and in that, if there is a need for
internal institutional reshuffles – it ought to be done!
 With malice towards none, the military needs to live up to its resolve of
remaining apolitical and stop, shun, and refrain from political engineering,
eschewing playing the favorites. The image, however, of the COAS and the
would-be caretaker Chief Minister of Punjab together at the Kaaba’s
doorsteps didn’t serve well, sullying the impression of impartiality further.
 Being the only institution that has a lien over other state organs (Judiciary,
FIA, NAB, IB, Election Commission, et al), yields its influence to enable,
empower and engender a righteous course for instituting a just and fair
system.
 Inducement of political pressure on the government to bring in some
semblance of political order.
 Let the situation be taken over by events, while the military continues lending
a helping hand on important foreign, domestic, and nation-building issues.
  Nudging the government for sustainable foreign, defence, and economic
policies, as these are potential instability triggers, which indirectly affect the
deterrence capability.

Last Word
The founding father was categorical in defining the military’s role – stating, “Don’t
forget that the armed forces are the servants of the people. You don’t make
national policy; it is the civilians, who decide these issues and it is your duty to
carry out these tasks with which you are entrusted” – ironically, however, the
dictum has been trampled time and again in the name of national interest and
progress.

The genius of military leadership demands that it lives up to the abiding aphorism
and for a change finally go back to the barracks, but not before cleaning the
Augean stables. If you have started it, you ought to finish it also!

https://www.academia.edu/15075319/CIVIL_MILITARY_RELATIONS_IN_CONTEMPORARY_PAKISTAN

evolution :

1. Colonial Legacy and Governance Structures

 Influence of British colonial governance on Pakistan's governance structures.

 Replication of colonial governance with a focus on revenue extraction and coercive
instruments of state.
 Garrison town-like governance structure from the British era continued in Pakistan.

2. Pre-eminence of Commander in Chief (CinC)

 Unparalleled power of the CinC in the British colonial era.

 Retention of most CinC powers in the Government of India Act 1935.
 Pakistan's CinC maintained significant influence, even compared to democratic
countries.

3. Differing Views on Military Interventions

 Justification for military intervention by some writers based on civilian incompetence

and weak political institutions.
 Alternative view attributing military interventions to the military's ambitions for political
power.
 Structuralists' perspective linking military ascendancy to an overdeveloped state,
external threats, and weak political institutions.

4. Early Interactions between Civilian and Military Leadership

 Early reliance on military leadership for national security decisions due to external
aggression.
 Attempt at indigenization of the officers' corps after the Kashmir War in 1947-48.
 Failed coup attempt in 1951 due to grievances over civilian handling of the Kashmir
War.

5. Rise of Bureaucrats and Military's Involvement in Politics

 Bureaucrats forming alliances with the military to edge out politicians.

 Dismissal of the constituent assembly in 1954 and military's involvement in politics by
the bureaucracy.
 General Ayub Khan's acceptance of the offer to become Minister of Defence leading to
military's deeper involvement in politics.

6. Imbalance and Martial Law in 1958

 Institutional imbalance with frequent changes in civilian leadership and little change in
military leadership.
 Ayub Khan's imposition of Martial Law in 1958 due to political instability.

7. Failure of Democratization and Separation of East Pakistan

 Lack of sustainable political institutions and failure of democratization.

 Separation of East Pakistan in 1971, partly due to weak civilian institutions.

8. Bhutto's Initiatives and Weak Democratization

 Bhutto's attempts to institutionalize national security decision-making with limited

success.
 Failure to develop strong political and economic institutions.

9. More Military Interventions and Weak Democratic Interludes

 Military interventions during Zia and Musharraf's era.
 Weak democratic interludes between military rule.
 Institutional interests of the political elite preventing democratization.

10. Current Positive Trends in Civil-Military Relations

 Indicators of improved civil-military relations: diversification of the officer class,

improved decision-making processes, broadened recruitment base, and changes in
military style.
 Civil-military relations on an upward trajectory, but still requiring further improvements.

Miltary in Politics

Two conflicts that took place in 1965 and the mid 1980s reflect the consistent nature of the Pakistan
military to become too involved in the political side of Pakistan’s war strategies. The military ought to
take orders from the civilian leader. However, in the case of Pakistan, the political leaders during these
wars were both military generals. This immediately creates a conflict of interest and the outcomes of
these wars confirm this problem. Islamists thought became more influential during the wars and these
have contributed to the current problems facing Pakistan. The 1965 war – The war with India “linked
Pakistan’s military closer to an Islamist ideology. Religious symbolism and calls to Jihad were used to
build the morale of soldiers and the people.”65 The military men believed that the Bengalis were
brainwashed by Hindu India. With this mindset they justified the violent atrocities against the Bengalis.
“The traditional ulema and Islamists used the environment of jihad to advance their own agenda, and
one agenda item was that they should be accepted as custodians of Pakistan’s ideology and identity.”66
However, General Ayub Khan had his own vision of Islam’s role in Pakistan. “He 63 Siddiqa, 2007, p. 59-
60 65 Ibid. 65 Ibid., p. 41 66 Haqqani, 2002, p. 50 41 envisioned Islam as a nation-building tool,
controlled by an enlightened military leader rather than by clerics.”67 General Ayub felt he was the
“enlightened leader.” This is how Islam was used to further his own agenda. He used it to further fuel
the flames of hatred the Pakistanis felt for Hindu India; he felt this was nation building. By painting the
war as a fight for Islam’s existence on the Indian Subcontinent, jihad was justified. The state controlled
media also painted a picture of successful Pakistani military conquests against India. This slanted media
coverage convinced the Pakistani population that their war against India was a success. The opposite
was true. Pakistan had occupied more enemy land than India; however, India’s land was more
strategically located. Ayub Khan met with the Indian Prime Minister Lal Shastri in Tashkent (capital of
Uzbekistan) to discuss the details of swapping the land taken during the brief war. The public was in an
uproar. Due to the slanted media portrayals, they could not understand why Khan was giving up so
much to India if Pakistan had won the war. After intense protests, he resigned as president in March
1969. “Instead of transferring power to the speaker of the National Assembly, a Bengali, as required by
his own constitution of 1962, Ayub Khan returned the country to martial law. The army chief, General
Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan, became Pakistan’s president and chief martial law administrator and
ruled by decree, without a constitution
Ayub Khan used religion to justify the war against India. He used the Muslim/Hindu animosity to his
advantage and he used any means necessary to show the Pakistani people that this war was just. The
military had to defend Islam’s and Pakistan’s existence. The Kashmir issue and the security of Pakistan
against India created a need for the military. This war reminded Pakistanis how much the military was
needed to protect their nation. He knew very well that he could use Jihad and the survival of Islam on
the Subcontinent to justify the war.

The Russian invasion of Afghanistan

– This conflict began in December of 1979 and played a crucial role in General Zia-al Haq’s Islamic
agenda. Pakistan was in the perfect position to play the concerned neighbor. Zia saw an opportunity to
convince Islamists that this invasion was a threat against Islam. Recruits came from all over the world.
He used the ISI to assist in training the mujahideen (freedom fighters) and supply them with arms given
by the United States. “The ranks of the ISI were expanding as the agency handled the recruitment,
training, and operations of Afghan mujahideen.”69 An Islamist based education system, brought in by
the Pakistani government, was put in place for the Afghan refugees. The purpose of this education was
to convert these refugees into freedom fighters with a deep and passionate Islamist mentality. Zia also
made sure that the Islamist political parties of Pakistan played a role in this war. “As the scope of the
Afghan jihad expanded, so did the influence of 68 Ibid., p. 141 43 Islamist ideology in Pakistan. Ever
mindful of the need to retain control, Zia made sure that Jamaat-e-Islami was not the only Pakistan
party involved with the Afghan refugees and militants.”70 In August of 1998 Zia was killed in a
mysterious plane crash over region of Bahawalpur in India. The cause of the crash remains unknown.
Zia’s legacy is not well regarded by any means. His desire to legitimize his leadership by implementing
Islamic policies was quite transparent. He used any means necessary to gain that legitimacy. He used
money from the United States to fund the Afghan war, to train the mujahideen, and to increase the
strength of the Islamic parties. “Zia exploited the deeply-held religious sentiments of various factions
and set them against the minorities for the perpetuation of his hold on them.

The 1958 Military Takeover - Mohammad Ayub Khan In 1958, General

Mohammad Ayub Khan seized power through a military coup, taking control
of Pakistan and suspending the constitution. Ayub Khan's military career
began in the British Indian Army, and he rose through the ranks quickly after
Pakistan's independence in 1947. His appointment as the first Pakistani
commander of the Pakistan Army marked a significant milestone. Ayub
believed that Pakistan needed a strong centralized government, and he saw
civilian politicians as inefficient and responsible for the country's lack of
development. He justified his intervention as necessary to bring stability and
progress to Pakistan by entrusting decision-making to experts and specialists
rather than elected politicians.

2. The 1977 Military Coup d'état - Zia-ul-Haq General Zia-ul-Haq's rise to

power came after the 1977 elections, which were heavily contested, with
accusations of election rigging. The opposition parties, joined by Islamist
groups, formed the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) and demanded new
elections. Amid mass protests, the civilian government of Prime Minister
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto sought military help to quell the unrest. However, the
military saw an opportunity to intervene and used the protests as a pretext to
take control, claiming that the country was on the brink of complete
breakdown. Zia, known for his close ties with Islamist groups, used Islamic
rhetoric to justify his rule, paving the way for the Islamization of various state
institutions.

3. The 1999 Military Coup - Pervez Musharraf General Pervez Musharraf

came to power in 1999 through a military coup that deposed Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif's government. Musharraf's strategic planning prevented Sharif's
attempt to remove him from office during a flight, and military rule was
reinstated. After taking power, Musharraf reinstated Article 58(2)(b) of the
Constitution, allowing the President to dissolve the National Assembly, and
created the National Security Council (NSC), which further solidified the
military's role in policymaking. These steps institutionalized the military's
control over politics and allowed Musharraf to rule as both a military and
civilian leader.

4. Absence of Civil Supremacy and the Vicious Cycle Pakistan has

experienced a lack of strong civil institutions and a robust democratic system,
creating an environment conducive to military interventions. The military has
repeatedly justified its interventions by pointing to the political chaos,
corruption, and lack of progress under civilian rule. However, each military
intervention has further weakened civil institutions, perpetuating a cycle where
the military continues to intervene, citing the failure of civilian politicians and
institutions as a rationale.
5. Islamization and the Military During their respective reigns, military
leaders Ayub, Zia, and Musharraf introduced Islamic agendas in their policies
and governance. They used Islam to consolidate their leadership and justify
their intervention in politics. Appeasing Islamist groups was also part of their
strategy to ensure continued support from influential religious factions. As a
result, Pakistan experienced a growing role of Islam in state affairs during
these military-led regimes.
Regenerate response
The text highlights the Islamization of Pakistan under the military leadership of General
Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf.

1. Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization Efforts After coming to power with the support of the
Islamist political parties, Zia-ul-Haq emphasized the importance of Islam in the
government. He believed that for Pakistan to survive and thrive, it must adhere to Islam
as its guiding principle. Zia implemented several policies to Islamize Pakistan, including
the introduction of Zakat collection, the establishment of Sharia Courts, and the
rewriting of textbooks to promote Islamist ideology in education. He also favored
religious madrassas, allowing their graduates to be eligible for government jobs, thereby
strengthening the influence of religious institutions in the country.

2. Musharraf's Initial Approach Initially, Pervez Musharraf was hesitant about

supporting Islamist groups like the Taliban, considering them as ignorant and primitive.
However, he felt compelled to support them due to national security concerns,
especially in relation to Pakistan's tense relations with India. During this time, Musharraf
tried to curb religious extremism by reforming the Blasphemy Law, which allowed
anyone to accuse others of blasphemy, leading to their arrest. However, his attempts to
bring about changes faced opposition from Islamist parties, and he chose to back down.

3. Musharraf's U-turn After 9/11 After the 9/11 attacks in the United States,
Musharraf's stance towards Islamist extremists drastically changed. Under pressure from
the US, he decided to support the global war on terror and aligned with Western
powers. This led to a shift in his domestic policy, where he took action against hard-line
religious groups and tried to limit the influence of clerics and militants in the country.
However, his efforts faced challenges, and certain militant leaders were even released
from custody by the ISI.

4. Complex Relationship between ISI and Militants The Inter-Services Intelligence

(ISI), a branch of the Pakistani military, played a significant role in supporting and
cooperating with Islamist militant groups. The ISI has its own agenda and operates
independently from the civilian government, even influencing Pakistan's domestic and
foreign policies. The relationship between the ISI and the militants is a complex one,
with both parties using each other to further their interests. The government tolerates
the militants' presence for its power advantage, while the militants receive protection
and support from the military establishment.

5. Impact on Democracy and Stability The alignment of the military government with
Islamist militants has had adverse effects on Pakistan's democracy and stability.
Frequent military interventions and the government's reliance on Islamist groups have
hindered the development of strong civil institutions and a robust democratic system.
The military's use of Islamization as a tool to control politics has perpetuated a cycle of
political instability and violence in the country. The ISI's involvement with militant
groups further complicates the situation, creating challenges for establishing a stable
and democratic Pakistan.

What is the current state of play?

Khan's arrest left his supporters angry and determined to continue

protesting. His dramatic release by the court generated euphoria and
reduced public rage, yet has left uncertainty about what may happen to Khan
next. At the same time, Khan’s party faces a leadership vacuum, partly
because it has no clear second-in-command to lead and most of the senior
leaders have been arrested on charges of instigating and directing the
violence against the military. Spontaneous grassroots mobilization in support
of Khan is possible, but it remains to be seen whether the PTI can harness
the tide of emotion to sustain a countrywide mobilization given the detention
of much of its leadership and the prospect of Khan getting arrested again.
Meanwhile, the government and the military are trying to contain and deter
further unrest by deploying the army across the country and authorizing the
use of force if necessary. In a strongly worded press release, the military
criticized Khan and characterized the attacks by PTI’s actions as unpatriotic:
an assault on Pakistani institutions, notably army properties, that the
country’s external enemies “could not accomplish for 75 years” of Pakistan’s
existence.
 Against this backdrop of political upheaval, Pakistan is in a severe economic
crisis due to dwindling foreign exchange reserves and a high external debt
burden, putting the country on the brink of default. Moreover, there is a
heightened risk of terrorist violence. The Pakistani Taliban movement has
increased its insurgency within Pakistan from what is now its safe haven in
Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.
What happens next?

Four developments will significantly shape politics in Pakistan and determine

the prospects of stability in the near term.
 Judicial intervention. The Supreme Court’s order to release Khan adds to
tensions between the army and the court. The army had signaled its intent to
hold the PTI leadership, including Khan, to account for the violence against
military installations, so the release order, by offering reprieve to Khan and
the PTI, dilutes the army’s plan. The court’s intervention may also shield
Khan in future legal proceedings as judges are sensitive to cues from the
Supreme Court’s chief justice. That could frustrate military leaders and push
them to consider emergency measures, perhaps even direct intervention.

 Military cohesion. Khan’s future prospects and the government and the
military’s ability to counter the PTI also depend, in great measure, on the
military establishment’s cohesion. Pakistan’s military establishment,
generally composed of senior officers in the army and intelligence services,
has shown no overt signs of fracture, but the past year has
included signs of its cohesion being under pressure. Khan and his party
have significant support in military elite networks; retired military
officers have been extremely critical of the establishment’s approach and its
decision to distance itself from Khan since last year. Amid the widespread
protests and judicial intervention, senior military leadership may be under
pressure to de-escalate current tensions and take an off-ramp from the
crackdown against the PTI. On the other hand, the sense of embarrassment
and breach of honor due to PTI supporters’ attacks against military
installations could create a “rally around the flag” effect, and Khan’s support
 within the military’s elite networks may begin to diminish. The military’s
cohesion remains important to watch.

 Level of violence. An important factor will be the scale of violence. The

government, in coordination with the military, has launched a major
crackdown against the PTI for inciting and directing violence. While Khan’s
release immediately eased popular anger, a re-arrest, which is possible,
could revive protests. If protesters target military personnel and installations
again, the crackdown could become more severe. Terrorist violence by the
Pakistani Taliban, which has been surging, also could add to the instability.
In general, more agitation and violence can trigger emergency measures,
including countrywide curfews. That will also push the country towards a
direct military intervention. But if the protests persist beyond those
emergency measures, Khan may prevail, and the government and military
could back off.

 Economic crisis. A wild card is Pakistan’s precarious economic situation.

Pakistan has been muddling through a balance of payments crisis, and in the
next few months, it has major repayments due to its multilateral, private and
bilateral lenders. To manage these repayments and avert a default, Pakistan
foremost needs rollover and refinanced loans of a couple of billion dollars
from China. Pakistan is also looking to revive a program of loans from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), which remains stalled due to Pakistan not
meeting the IMF’s conditions. The crisis will make it harder for Pakistan to
convince the IMF — and possibly even Chinese leadership, which publicly
called for political stability in the country — to provide the help necessary to
avert default and keep the economy afloat. The narrow path for Pakistan to
avert economic collapse has narrowed further.