AD-A282 093

A RAND NOTE

Senegal and Liberia: Case Studies in U.S.

IMET Training and Its Role in Internal
Defense and Development
DTIC
ELECTE William H.McCoy, Jr.
JUL 2 2 1994
SEF

T om-is Deezt approved

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94-2291

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A RAND NOTE N-3637-USDP

Senegal and Liberia: Case Studies in U.S.

IMET Training and Its Role in Internal
Defense and Development

Williaem H. McCoy, Jr.

Prepared for the

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Preface

This Note was prepared as part of a larger project entitled "The Effectiveness of
U.S. Military Training Activities in Promoting Internal Defense and Developmenm
in the Third World." The purpose of the project is to assess the effectiveness of
programs to train U.S. students in foreign internal defense (FID) and foreign
students in internal defense and development (IDAD), to examine the benefits
that the United States derives from these programs, and to consider how future
efforts can be improved and strengthened.

This Note is one of four documents presenting the results of six comparative case
studies prepared as part of the second phase of the project These regional case
studies-which embrace El Salvador and Honduras, Thailand and the
Philippines, and, in this Note, Senegal and Liberia-examine the effectiveness of
U.S. training of international military students in promoting human rights,
professionalism, democratic values, national development, and appropriate civil-
military relations. Specifically, they consider whether training within the United
States and in the host countries themselves achieves these objectives. This Note
is intended to be of interest to government and military officials concerned with
U.S. military aid to, and training of, the militaries of countries in the less-
developed world. Note that the research for this Note was completed in July
1992 and therefore is current only until that time.

The project's final phase was completed in November 1992 and provides general
recommendations for improving the organization, dispensation, doctrine, and
focus of future U.S. FID and IDAD training efforts, along with specific
recommendations for the key countries identified in the case studies. Previous
project publications include the following.

"* Jennifer Morrison Taw and William H. McCoy, Jr., InternationalMilitary

Student Training:Beyond Tactics, RAND, N-3634-USDP, 1993.
"* Jennifer Morrison Taw, Thailandand the Philippines: Case Studies in U.S.
IMET Trainingand Its Role in InternalDefense and Development, RAND,
MR-159-USDP, 1994.
" Michael T. Childress, The Effectiveness of U.S. TrainingEfforts in Internal
Defense and Development: The Cases of El Salvadorand Honduras, RAND,
MR-250-USDP, forthcoming.
iv

Jennifer Morrison Taw, The Effectiveness of TrainingInternationalMilitary

Students in InternalDefense and Development: Executive Summary, RAND,
MR-172-USDP, 1993.

The research presented here was conducted for the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD-SO/LIC) within
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. It was carried out within
the International Security and Defense Strategy Program of RAND's National
Defense Research Institute (NDRI), a federally funded research and development
center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff.
 V

Contents

Preface .................................................. iii

Figures and Tables .......................................... vii
Summ ary ................................................. b.
Acknowledgments .......................................... xvii
Acronyms and Abbreviations .................................. xix
L.
INTRODUCTION ....................................... 1
Relating Means to Ends .............................. ..... 1
U.S. Strategic Objectives ................................. 1
The Relationship of Training to U.S. Strategy .................. 2
The Purpose of Training .................................. 2
How Training Is Accomplished ............................ 4
Training's Impact on Internal Defense and Development ......... 5
Recent Studies and Assessments of Training .................... 6
Strategic Interests in Africa ................................ 8
2. THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA .............................. 9
History and Background .................................. 9
The Regime of Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe ................ 9
The Civil War (1989-?) .................................. 10
U.S. Relationship and Strategic Interests ....................... 11
The Urd -1dStates' Historical Relationship with Liberia .......... 11
The U.S. Response to Samuel K. Doe ........................ 12
U.S. Attempts to Fromote Democracy in Doe's Regime ........... 13
U.S. Response to the Civil War ............................ 14
Internal Defense Threats and Internal Development Problems ....... 16
Internal and External Defense Threats ....................... 16
Internal Development Requirements in the 1980s ............... 16
The Armed Forces of Liberia .............................. 17
Host-Nation Trefining Goals and Requirements .................. 19
The U.S. Training Response ................................ 20
U.S. Training Goals .................................... 20
Actual U.S. Training .................................... 20
Training or Security Assistance Accomplishments ............... 22
U.S. Influence ........................................ 23
Effect on Internal Development ............................ 23
Impact on Internal Defense ............................... 25
Liberia Summary ....................................... 26
Causes of Collapse in Liberia ............................. 26
The Costs of a Civil War-What Is Needed Now? .............. 27
Tiaining and Assistance Requirements for the 1990s ............. 29
Is This a Workable Solution? .............................. 32
vi

3. THE REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL ............................. 34

1Lstory and Backgound .................................. 34
S-negal Under the French ................................ 34
Senegal in Independence ................................ 35
U.S. Relationship and Strategic Interests ....................... 36
Defense and Development Needs ........................... 37
Senegal's External Threats ............................... 38
Internal Unrest-the Casamance ........................... 38
Sccioeconomic Ills ..................................... 40
The Armed Forces of Senegal .... .......................... 42
Host-Nation Training Goals and Requirements ................. 44
The U.S. Training Response ................................ 45
Mobile Training Teams ................................. 47
Exercises and Deployment for Training ...................... 48
Training or Security Assistance Accomplishmants ............... 49
Internal Development Improvements in Senegal ............... 50
Internal Defense ...................................... 52
Senegal Summary ....................................... 53
4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................. 56
Key Findings .......................................... 56
Republic of Liberia ...................................... 56
Republic of Senegal .................................... 57
Is IDAD Training Important? ............................. 58
Does IRET-E Have a Future m Afria? ...................... 59
Will the Real Reason Please Stand Up•? ....................... 06
Bibliography .............................................. 63
 vii

Figures
2.1. Per Capita Gross National Product and Income Growth in
Liberia .................................... ........ 18
3.1. Per Capita Gross National Product and Income ;rowth in
Senegal ........................................... 41

Tables
2.1. Liberian Achievements Scorecard ......................... 23
2.2. Training Provided to Libearian Soldiers in the United States ....... 24
3.1. U.S. Training in Senegal ................................ 46
32 Training Provided to Senegalese Soldiers in the United States ..... 50
4.1. The Success of Training in Africa ......................... 60
 ix

Summary

This Note was prepared as part of a larger project entitled "The Effectiveness of
U.S. Military Training Activities in Promoting Internal Defense and Development
in the Third World." The purpose of the project is to assess the effectiveness of
programs to train U.S. students in foreign internal defense (FID)1 and foreign
students in internal defense and development (IDAD),2 to examine the benefits
that the United States derives from these programs, and to consider how future
efforts can be improved and strengthened.

This Note compares and contrasts U.S. training programs in Liberia and Senegal
Spec';,icaliy, it examines the history, background, and internal defense and
development issues; the strategic importance of the two nations that resulted in
U.S. involvement there; and the trainting programs the United States has
provided for the purpose of improving those nations' internal defense and
[internal] developmen't.

The Note then examines the specific IDAD requirements for each of the nations
and, on the basis of those requirements, assesses the value of current training and
postulates specific issues that should be addressed in order to improve each
nation's IDAD. It also examines the utility of the expanded International
Military Education and Training (IMET-E) program, which is designed to
broaden training to relevant civilian membeis of foreign governments in
particular courses of study so that they can develop a better understanding of
civil-military operations. programming and budgeting, the judicial system, and
human rights.

1
Foreigninternal defense is the "participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in
any of tne action programs taken by ariother government to free and protect its society from
subversion, lawlessness and insurgency." Department of Defense, Departmentof Defense Dictionaryof
Militaryand Associated Terms, Washi-ngton, D.C.: Us. Government Printing Office, Joint Publication
1-02, Deceraber 1989, p. 15n lin the context of this study, FID is those actions taken by the United
States2 in support of other nations' internal defense and development.
lnternaldefense and development is "the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its
growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency." Headquarters,
Departments -f the Aiiny and the Air Force, Milit~y Operationsin Low Intensity Conflict, Washington,
D.C.: Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, 5 December 1990, p. GLOSSARY-5.
x

The Value of Training

Training of foreign military students is a means of enhancing military-to-military
relationships, fostering self-reliance, and developing a better understanding of
internationally recognized human rights. Training provides the United States
with the opportunity to build rapport with foreign militaries and to develop a
common method of operation in case it is needed. For instance, such
relationships in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Senegal, and Pakistan facilitated
the formation of a capable and combat-ready international coalition against Iraq
in 1990. While most agree that IMET is a low-cost, hign-payoff form of aid,
which by and large seems to perform admirably and provide what the United
Stctes ih.tends, unfortunately, it has not always been successful. However, in
those situations where U.S. national policy or training objectives are not achieved
in a country, training in and of itself is rarely the sole reason for the failure.

Liberia: A Training Failure

The Liberian military, despite years of U.S. aid in the 1980s, the training of over
300 students in America, and the deployment of over 20 Mobile Training Teams
(MTrs) to provide much-needed training in individual and unit skills, still failed
to perform at a critical time in its history in 1989, when the civil war in that
country began. The result now is that the country is a shambles and will require
total reconstruction. And the military is all but destroyed.

Clear signals were sent throughout the 1980s that the training program was not
succeeding and, in fact, that President Doe did not want it to succeed because of
the threat it would have posed to him. MTr team chiefs continuously stated that
their efforts were not changing the state of readiness of the Liberia.-i military.
Students trained in the United States were not being utilized effectively upon
their return to Liberia to provide improvement to a seriouwly degrading military.
The very lack of a coherent training plan, or involvement in developing one, by
the Liberian military should have signaled to the U.S. Embassy a definite lack of
commitment to sincere development by the government. At the point when war
began in 1989, Doe and the Liberian military failed to take actions deemed
essential to quell the small insurgent uprising-despite advice from the ITnited
States. The result was the overthrow of the Doe regime.

Unfortunately, after almost three years, a bloody civil war continues as National
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) leader Charles Taylor, now with a force of
approximately 10,000 mostly out-of-control Liberian teenagers, adopts and
emulates the same corruption, greed, and intransigence that characterized the
 xi

despot he sought to overthrow. Meanwhile, almost 30,000 Liberians have died-

the vast majority civilian-and almost half of the population has been uprooted
in what is now regarded as one of the bloodiest wars in African history.

The threat to Liberia and the region was extensive. Although the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been somewhat successful in
corralling most of the belligerents, Charles Taylor continued to control the
majority of the country outside Monrovia and, it is believed, with external
support, continues to fight even though he has said he would honor the peace
and disarmament accords.

Without total commitment to reform by the Liberian government and a sincere

desire to bring peace, stability, and prosperity to the country, any action the
United States takes, if it decides to help, will not solve Liberia's problems. (Some
recommended actions for Liberia, based on the research and analysis contained
in this Note, are found on pages 26-33.) Even with that commitment, such
actions may not succeed. If the United States is indeed interested in helping
Liberia to evolve into a more stable society, it must be prepared to assist in a way
that is more involved than in the past. A more involved form of assistance-
consisting of a combined and prudent attempt by the two countries to move
forward toward a secure and stable democracy-will be essential for Liberia to
reverse its course.

Senegal: A Training Success

Senegal is a good example of an emerging democracy. It plays a major role in
maintaining regional stability and has substantial influence and stature with its
neighbors. A well-trained military contributes, as a disciplined member of the
federal government, toward national development and, at the same time,
provides a stabilizing factor both within the country and in the region. With a
relatively small program from the United States, the Senegalese military has been
able to take advantage of the best the US. military has to offer, its participation
ranging from enrollment in in-country branch advanced courses to attendance at
various U.S. military acade-mies.

The Senegalese military is active in IDAD and believes that one of its principal
missions is to participate in the development of its nation because of the poverty
in Senegal-it can be no other way. The military engineer works on projects that
benefit both the military and the civilian populace throughout the country. The
military medical department constitutes one-third of the medical capability of
Senegal. And the training provided to the military, both by the United States and
by others, provides a basis for improving the professionalism and -lpabilities of
xii

the force. The Senegalese military commented specifically that it prefers tha U.S.
style of training over that provided by others because it is more interactive and
allows for specific training to standard in subjects the military requires. The
military there is active in the development of the U.S. tnining program and
regards U.S. training at Continental U.S. (CONUS)-based schools as a key
component in the career development of its officer corps.

In the years that follow, IMET and other forms of U.S. training will continue to
contribute to success or improvements in IDAD enjoyed by Senegal Future
training strategies of both military and civilian personnel should focus on those
areas with which the country is struggling, such as its economic growth needs, its
gendarmerie,and specific types of training and programs that will ultimately
improve the living conditions and overall satisfaction of the Senegalese people.
Some recommended actions for Senegal, based on the research and analysis
contained in this Note, are found on pages 53-55.

Should the United States Train in Nation-Building?

A question that has been the subject of consideraole debate is, Does internal
defense and development training to the military hinder development of a
country?3 Although in many situations it may be problematic, in Africa, where
most countries have barely enough food to feed themselves and where many
people go without shelter and food, military training in internal development
provides an aspect of hope. Through cooperative progLams such as civic action,
in which the host-nation military works with the U.S. military to provide a
service or a facility for the civilians that will improve their immediate or long-
term living conditions, training improves the host nation's ability to provide for
its people. Training in the United States in engineering, medicine, signals and
communication, and transportation provides improvements in the
professionalism of the military. When the soldier returns home, he is more
capable of responding to Lhe needs of his people in a professional, competent
way. And when he leaves military service, he has acquired a skill that, if utilized,
serves to improve the community.

Of course, for IDAD to succeed, two fundamental requirements must be met.

First, the government must be committed to its success. Second, if the military is

3
There is much evidence to suggest that certhin militaries without a firm foundation in "service
to nation," or militaries in countries with weak civilian leadership, may use DAD training for
individual benefit or to strengthen the military's control over its government. See Schwarz, Benjamin
C., American CounterinsurgencyDoctrineand El Salvador The Frustrationsof Reform and the Illusions of
Nation Building,Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-4042-USDP, 1992.
 xii°

to participate in IDAD, it must understand what its role and position in the
gov unment are and must abide by that understanding.

The first requirement may sound like rhetoric, but it is clear that, while Senegal is
committed, Liberia was not. Corruption and ethnic discrimination by the
government were clear signals that Liberia was not interested in improving the
living conditions for more than a select few. In situations such as these, the
United States must be prepared to take firm action to ensure that the host
government clearly understands the consequences of lack of progress toward
internal defense and development.

As to the second requirement of rilitary participation, again the contrast

between Senegal and Liberia is extraordinary. Senegal's military believes that its
fundamental role is to participate in the dt velopment of Senegal-not for its own
betterment but for the befterment of the Senegalese. It also understands that it is
only one of the many participants involved in IDAD there. From Senegal'a
perspective, training in management and professional skills serves to contribute
immediately and ultimately to its internal defense and development. With
regard to Liberia, training it to implement an effective IDAD strategy may be
critical to its future.

IMET-E in Africa
The expanded IMET program will ultimately enhance the training of selected
individuals in Africa. 4 Currently, in many countries there is a poor
understanding of the role and position of the military-on the part of both the
military and the civilians in government. Human rights and judicial reform are
essential in a number of countries. Financial management and better
management of the defense establishments of these small countries are critical.

However, as important as these type.- of programs are, instruction in tactics,

strategy, and other defense issues is just as important to African military leaders.
Those leaders will not be in favor of instituting a program for civilians that takes
away from their military training capability. Therefore, the IMET-E program
must be separate and in addition to a country's regular IMET program if it is to

4
IMFr-E, or expanded IME-r, is a program begun in 1991 to "train foreign civilian and military
officials in managing and administering military establishments and budgets, and for training foreign
military and civilian officials in creating and maintaining effective judicial systems and military codes
of conduct, including internationally recognized human rights." See U.S. Code, Public Law 101-513,
Title M, "Military Assistance," 104 Stat. 1997, for legislative direction, and the Defense Security
Assistance Agency (DSAA), Report to the United States Congresson Development of the Expanded IMET
Initiative, Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 15 July 1991, for an indication of how the
Department of Defense is implementing the program.
xiv

succeed. And because there are clearly other educational needs that should be
addressed for internal development to succeed, the scope of IMET-E should be
increased to encompass those as well.

In addition to increasing IMET-E in scope, how IMET-E is solicited in the country

will also need to be improved. At present, the security assistance officer
represents the IMET program to the country. If the intent of the program is to
gain support for instruction to members of other agencies in a foreign
government, then broader participation by the U.S. Embassy will be necessary.

Understanding Why We Train

Clearly, there are many reasons why the United States provides training to
foreign militaries, and now to civilians. An evaluation of U.S. motives for
training in the post-Cold War era may reveal that U.S. interests and objectives
should be changed. A key difference between the objectives of the United States
and those of the recipients seems to lie in whose interests the training is believed
to serve. A result the United States all too often overlooks is that improving a
foreign military may actually result in not having to employ U.S. combat forces
at some later date. However, attempting to focus on objectives that seek to
obtain leverage or influence has in the past resulted only in accusations,
resentment, and fears of infringement on a nation's sovereignty.

Perhaps the most cogent objective of training is stated in Webster's Ninth New
CollegiateDictionary,in which training is defined as the act of teaching "so as to
make fit, qualified, or proficient." 5 If this definition were to be adopted as the
primary objective, then U.S. training to definable standards in tactics,
professionalism, leadership, and technical courses would be provided to foreign
militaries in order for them to be more capable against external enemies and
internal subversive elements. As in the U.S. military, then, training would be
provided to improve the readiness of that foreign force. Whatever benefits
accrued by the host nation-or the United States, for that matter-as a result of
training would be secondary. In part, much of the confusion over the program
stems from the number of different and sometimes contradictory objectives for
and interpretations of why the United States provides training. A simple and

5
Merriam-Webster, Inc., Webster's NinthNew CollegiateDictionary,Springfield, Mass., 1989,
p. 1251.
 xV

measurable definition of the objective, such as that provided by Webster, would

enable the Departments of State and Defense to eliminate much of the previous
debate and controversy over the subject of IMET and its influence on IDAD.
 xvii

Acknowledgments

This research could not have been completed without the generous and, often,
time-consuming efforts of many people within the Departments of Defense
(DoD) and State (DoS). Particularly of note within DoD were the efforts of
Colonel Arthur Hotop from European Command Security Assistance Office-
Africa Desk; Colonels Smith and Ahearn, and Mr. Hank Garza from the Defense
Security Assistance Agency; Ms. Theresa Whelan from the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Assistance; and Mr. Norman
Custard, Major Elaine Bustamante, and Ms. Meridyth Martin from the Security
Assistance Training Field Activity, Headquarters, Training and Doctrine
Command.

Also, many thanks to Ambassador Katherine Shirley and the staff of the United
States 1rmbassy to Senegal for sponsoring a trip there to examine firsthand the
training programs and to discuss the issues and threats to Senegal, and plans for
the future. In particular, the Security Assistance Office was most helpful in
setting up interviews with key people in the Embassy and in the Senegalese
military. Major Scott Lloyd provided endless help in understanding how the
Security Assistance and MET programs work in Senegal.

The review and valuable insights provided by Bruce Hoffman, Jennifer Taw, and
Kongdan Oh were also of immeasurable assistance. Of course, any opinions
expressed herein are my own.
 xix

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Symbol Definition
AFL Armed Forces of Liberia
CONUS Continental United States
DA Developmental Assistance; Department of the Army
DCM Deputy chief of mission
DFT Deploy-for-training
ECOMOG ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
E-LMIMT Expanded International Military Education and Training;
referred to in this Note as IMET-E
ESF Economic Support Fund
FID Foreign internal defense
FMCS Foreign Military Construction Sales
FMF Foreign Military Financing
FMS Foreign Military Sale-,
GNP Gross national product
GOL Government of Liberia
GUS Government of the United States
HQ Headquarters
HQDA Headquarters, Department of the Army
IDAD Internal defense and development
IGNU Interim Government o" National Unity
IMET International Military Education and Training
IMF International Monetary Fund
INPFL Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
ITAP International Training and Assistance Program
LAP Liberian Action Party
LUP Liberian Unification Party
MAP Military Assistance Program
MFDC Mouvement des ForcesDemocratiquesde Casamance
Xx

Symbol Definition
MRM Movement for the Redemption of Liberian Moslems
MTr Mobile Training Team
NDPL National Democratic Party of Liberia
NPFL National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPRA National Patritic Reconstrucdon Assembly
OASD (ISA) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Internal
Security Affairs
OAU Organization of African Unity
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
PAI African Independence Party
PDS Senegalese Democratic Party
POMCUS Prepositioned material configured in unit sets
PRC People's Redemption Council
PS Socialist Party (of Senegal)
SAO Security Assistance Office [or officer]
TAFT Technical Assistance Field Team
TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command
UL-MO United Liberation Movement of Liberia '",rD1._mocracy
UP Unity Party
UPP United People's Party
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USEUCOM U.S. European Command
WATC West African Training Craise
1. Introduction

Relating Means to Ends

The development of U.S. policies, goals, and objectives has always been an
extremely complex process, involving the integrated planning and coordination
of all branches and departments of government For the past 45 years, this
process has had one point of focus: the Soviet Union and the spread of
communism. Today, that focus is gone; yet the process continues in essentially
its same form to determine strategic interests and identify ways to protect those
interests.

U.S. Strategic Objectives

Strategic interests and objectives are articulated in The NationalSecurity Strategy of
the United States, which is prepared annually and presented to Congress by the
president. The objectives of the United States are

"* The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its
fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.
"* A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual
prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.
"* Healthy, cooperative, and politically vigorous relations with allies and
friendly nations.
"* A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human
rights, and democratic institutions flourish.1

The various departments of government develop foreign policy, plans, programs,

and capabilities designed to achieve the national objectives. Accordingly,
Security Assistance is designed specifically to achieve those objectives. Security
Assistance is defined in the Departmentof Defense Dictionaryas:
Groups of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other
related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles,

1
Natznal Security Strategy of the United States, Washington, DC.: U.S. Govemment Printing
Office, August 1991, pp. 3-4.
2

military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit,

2
or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.

It is achieved through a variety of economic and military programs, including

economic support, developmental assistance, the Public Law 480 food for peace
programs, counter-narcotics programs, the Peace Corps, peacekeeping, foreign
3
military financing, and International Military Education and Training.

The Relationshipof Trainingto U.S. Strategy

Education and training are related to U.S. strategy because they are intended to
contribute to healthy, cooperative, and politically vigorous relations with alhes
and friendly nations. They also assist in the development and maintenance of
regional stability by enhancing the capabilities of foreign militaries, which may in
turn reduce the need to employ U.S. forces in combat. They also can assist in the
development of democratic institutions and a general awareness of the
democratic values and ideals that are important to the United States, such as
freedom of speech and respect for human rights.

However, training is not an answer in and of itself. It is a component of an

overall strategy for integrating a number of capabilities into a coherent and
effective foreign policy toward developing nations that have legitimate needs.
Training, in some cases, may provide an awareness of societal deficiencies and
actually result in additional frustration and instability.

The Purpose of Training

There is some difference of opinion as to precisely what training of foreign
militaries is designed to accomplish, or how it is to be accomplished. The
Foreign Assistance Act stipulates what Congress believes International Military
Education and Training (IMET), is designed for. iMET is to:

"* Establish mutually beneficial relationships.

"* Improve foreign self-reliance.
"* Increase understanding of human rights.4

2
Department of Defense, Departrmentof Defemse Dictionaryof Militanjand.Associated Terms,
Washington,
3
D.C.: US. Government Printing Office, Joint Publication 1-02,1 December 1989, p. 327.
US. D-.artment of State, CongressionalPreseniationfor Security Assistance programs,
Washington, b.C.: US. Government Printing Office, FY 92.
4
1J-S. Congress, Congressional Declarationof Purpose(of InternationalMilitaryEducation and
Training), Washington, D.C.: US. Government Printing Office, 22 US.C. 2347b, n.d.
 3

The Department of Defense, charged with implementing IMET, seeks to

emphasize training that impioveF •heprofessionalism of foreign militaries.
Toward such improvement, it offers te qualified military personnel selecth-d by
their country training in the same types of subjects offered to U.S. military
personnel. The objectives of IMET, according to the Security Assistance
Management Manual,are

"* To create skills needed for effecti•e operation and maintenance of equipment
acquired from the United States.
"* To assist the foreign country :n developing expertise and systems for
effective management of its defense establishment.
"* To foster development by the foreign country of its own ihtdigenous training
capability.
"* To promote military rapport and understanding leading to increased
rationalization, standardization, and interoperability.5

Despite the objectives stated in the Security AssistanceManagement Manual or in

the Foreign Assistance Act, many in the military view the value of training
foreign militaries in much more pragmatic terms. Military officers believe that
the primary reason the United States trains foreign military personnel is to
establish military-to-military relationships that may be useful in times of crisis.
In fact, it was just such relationships hn Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Senegal,
and Pakistan that facilitated the formation of the international coalition against
Iraq in 1990. In addition, such training, along with the provision of equipment
through Foreign Military Financing, facilitates interoperability among the forces
in times of crisis, as it did in Iraq. Finally, tra•.ing, although cheap in
comparison with many other government programs, gives the United States a
certain freedom of action in other countries, whether through overflight rights or
basing agreements. In the military view, these are the ultimate goals of security
assistance from which training stems. The extent to which the training improves
the professionalism or democratic values of foreign military forces, while
important, is in many ways secondary to the primary goal of influence. 6

Unfortunately, by its action, Congress seems to view the primary purpose of

training through the prism of human rights as it did in El Salvador and Liberia in
the 1980s and in Thailand in i992. So, when a country embracing diverse

5
Department of Defense, Securi•y Assistance Management Manual(SAMM), Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, DoD 5105.38-M, pp. 1000-1-1000-2.
6
Conversations with representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD),
Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and
Headquarters, US. European Comm.ind (HQ USEUCOM).
4

cultural backgrounds commits or permits human-rights abuses against its

people, the U.S. military and government lose an opportunity to maintain contact
and possibly influence agair-t such abuses because training sanctions are
imposed.

From the recipient's perspective, the training offered by the United States may
either be valuable or simply a means to an end. It may be valuable because the
country may not physically have the capability to train its own but still have the
reqluirement. Or it may have a sincere need to improve its military but lack the
funds to do so; U.S. IVIET grants help, It also contributes to the knowledge and
awareness of the United State3 and its society. But in many cases, such
awareness is not a consideration to the recipient. Less grand goals, such as
rewarding personnel for service or learning something niw, may more than
likely be the true reason for the recipient's participating.

Despite grandiose U.S. objectives for IMET, the end result must be considered in
the appropriate corttext. IMET seeks to provide a service that is lacking to a
recipient. It seeks to establish contacts within other countries' military and that
of the United States. And it seeks to expose foreign personnel to the "American
experience." To quote one individual who has been involved in security
assistance for 15 years:
IMET is like planting seedcom. You throw out ten kernels. Six may
sprout. And of those six, four may grow through the drought. And of
those four, two may bear fruit. Likewise ii, MET, of ten students, six may
go back to their countries with positive feelings about the United States
and democracy. Of those six, four may progress in their careers, either in
the military or, after getting out, in civilian service. And of those four,
maybe two
7
might be placed into a position where they can influence their
society.

T7Ow TrainingIs Accomplished

Security Assistance Programs, by law, fall under the broad responsibility of the
secretary of state; the military aspects of the program, principally Foreign
Military Financing and Lnternational Military Education and Training, are
administered by the secretary of defense.

Training can be accomplished in a number of ways, either in the United States or

in the host country:

7
Conversation with HQ USEUCOM representative.
 5

" Through International Military Education and Training (IMET), and

sometimes through Foreign Military Financing, military students are brought
to the United States to study and participate with their U.S. counterparts in
military training institutions.
" A Mobile Training Team (MTI?), consisting of 8-12 U.S. military personnel
and funded cither by IMET funds or by their own unit, can be sent to a
foreign country for up to a six-month period to train its soldiers and officers
in specific skills. If longer times are required, a Technical Assistance Field
Team (TAFT) may be sent for up to one year.
"• The United States can also deploy-for-training (DFT) a U.S. unit, a portion of
a unit, or a com rosite unit to a foreign country to train and work with the
host-nation armed forces as well as for the purpose of providing some
expressed capability to the citizenry (Le., medical or engineering support).
"* Joint-combined exercises can be conducted with foreign military
organizations primarily to provide the combined forces the opportunity to
train together and interoperate.

Training'sImpact on InternalDefense and Development

The benefits of these forms of training vary with the srudent, the foreign military
un't, and the conditions extant in the country. Generally, training creates a
certain rapport between the two militaries. It may have a positive effect on the
professionalism and awareness of the foreign student. Indeed, it could influence
the student to take steps within the realm of his authority to try to change his
country and emulate some of the more positive aspects of American society. Or
it may hay no effect.

Particularly in Africa, where change and development have not occurred despite
considerable investment by many countries around the world, training in the
United States may simply be a respite for a deserving individual from an
otherwise dreary existence. Actual change as a result of training by any of the
methods mentioned previously is problematic for many reasons. Firs:, despite
the best of intentions to place a trained individual in a place where he can
influence or transfer his knowledge to his peers or subordinates, the personnel
system in most African countries is simply not sophisticated enough to identify
those with the training and then assign them appropriately. Second, in some
African countries, knowledge represents a threat to the government and so
trained students, especially military personnel, become a liability. Third, a
majority of the students coming to the United States, or a majority of the
personnel who receive training in-country from M'ITs, are so junior in the
6

institution of their military and government that the training becomes

insignificant. Fourth and final, the situation in his country may be so
overwhelmingly desperate that, once returned to that environment, the student
must concentrate on taking those measures that ensure survival. 8 It simply may
be too hard for African institutions at their present level of development to
benefit in any particularly grand way from the training the United States offers.

A more fundamental issue, however, may be what effect, if any, that military
traving has on internal defense and development (IDAD). The Departmentof
Defense Dictionarydefines IDAD separately as internal defense and internal
development. However, Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20 defines
IDAD as "the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and
protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency." 9 So military
support to IDAD may be incidental to the full range of measures a nation is
taking. Indeed, it may be erroneous to attempt to charge or blame the military
for success or failure of a particular country's IDAD strategy given the unified
totality of effort and commitment required by all participants.

A military force can definitely hinder development; however, whether

development hinges on the divic action of a nation's military is questionable.
Inasmuch as military training does contribute to the overall education,
experience, and base of knowledge of an individuial, the extent to which that
indi vidual becomes a contributing member of his country-either in or out of the
military-and the opportunities of which he takes advantage then become his
responsibility.

Recent Studies and Assessments of Training

During the past ten years, IMET and Security Assistance have been evaluated
extensively by virtually every aspect of U.S. society (proponents, opponents,
academics, etc.) to attempt to see what benefits accrue to the United States from
training other nations' militaries and what means are available, other than
anecdotal evidence, to evaluate the effectiveness of such training.

In 1989, Congress directed both the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the
Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) to prepare reports on the objective
effectiveness of IMET. In particular, Congress wanted the reports to address the

8Ibid.
9
Headquarters, Departments of the Army and the Air Force, Military Operationsin Low fntensity
Conflict, Washington, D.C.: US. Government Printing Office, Field Manual 100-20/Aih Force
Pamphlet 3-20, 5 December 1990, p. GLOSSARY-5.
 7

effectiveness of the program, the value and outcomes of the courses offered, and
the program's specific accomplishments in advancing U.S. foreign policy and
national security objectives. 10 As one would expect, DSAA highlighted the
effective, low-cost attributes of IMET-the establishment of enduring military-to-
military relationships and the development of generally favorable attitudes
toward the United States-whereas GAO found that there was no means in place
to determine the effectiveness of the program beyond anecdotes, or even to
determine how trained personnel are utilized. The GAO also addressed the issue
of using iMET funds to train foreign students in nation-building, a term that is
closely ielated to IDAD, and found:

"* That training in nation-building should be considered on a country-by-

country basis
"• That the recipient country required appropriate resources to implement the
training
"• That other forms of training, such as Mobile Training Teams, might be more
appropriate
"* That most U.S. military personnel interviewed believed that the IMET
program should be increased in order to accon..nodate both the professional
military aspects of training and the nation-building aspects of training.

The result of all previous assessments and of this research is that, with its many
different objectives and findings, training of foreign military students is many
things to many people. It fosters rapport, trust, and confidence in U.S.
equipment, personnel, and tactics. It gives the United States some influence on
other nations' actions. It assists in the development and the defense of foreign
nations. It improves the professionalism of foreign militaries, reducing
somewhat the need of U.S. forces to intervene. And it exposes foreign students
to American culture, values, and ideals. However, training does not necess.zily
cure all the ills of a country and, taken by itself, cannot foster change in a
country's fundamental causes of instability without a concerted and dedicated
effort by the host-nation government in a myriad of other areas as well.

10
United States Senate, Forign Operations,Export Financing,and Related ProgramsAppropriation
Bill, 1990, Report 101-131 of the Committee on Appropriations to accompany H.R. 2939, 101st
Congress, 1st Session, 14 September 1989, pp. 161-162.
8

Strategic Interests in Africa

U.S. strategic interests in Africa have traditionally been designed to prevent or
eliminate the spread of communism, fascism, and totalitarianism. The United
States has sought to develop friends and allies in Africa to counter the spread of
Soviet domination there. To accomplish this, the United States has offered
economic and military aid to countries, ostensibly to promote democracy and
create stability, but in fact to establish an environment wherein the United States
was permitted a certain freedom of action and the Soviet Union (or Cuba) was
not. The stated 1980s' goal of Security Assistance in Africa was to use it "as a tool
to project and protect U.S. interests and to counter the threat of communist
expansion." 1'

The following two case studies of the republics of Liberia (Section 2) and Senegal
(Section 3) reveal the dichotomy of two different governments: the level of their
dedication to democratic development, the effect of ethnicity on success or
failure, the ability of the govanment to work with or against its military, and the
usefulness (or lack thereof) of U.S. policy and training strategies. Conclusions
and recommendations are presented in Section 4.

11US. Congress, Accomplishments of Security Assistance, 81-85, Presentation on Security

Assistance, FY87. This assertion has been refuted by senior members of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense charged with development and implementation of Security Assistance and training polides
in Africa.
 9

2. The Republic of Liberia

History and Background

Although considered by many to be anglophonic or an American colony as a
result of the migration of freed U.S. slaves in the nineteenth century, Liberic is in
fact a diverse composite of several ethnic, religious, and national groups. Many
of the 14 tribes extant in Liberia today migrated there sometime between the
twelfth and seventeenth centuries.

Until 1980, political authority within the country was strongly centralized by
continuous leadership under the True Whig Party, a group of predominantly
Americo-Liberians. 1 In April 1980, as a result of a decade-long economic and
social decline attributed by many to a lack of imagination and leadership on the
part of the country's government,2 a U.S.-trained army master sergeant named
Samuel K. Doe seized power in a bloody coup that resulted in the murder of over
200 people, including the previous president, William Tolbert, 24 of his personal
staff the night of the c. up, and 13 cabinet ministers a few days later. In addition,
3
over 500 political opponents were taken prisoner.

The Regime of Master SergeantSamuel K. Doe

Doe's ten-year reign was brutal and corrupt, and characterized by constant
change. Doe placed people whom he trusted in various governmental positions,
resulting "ii.a gradual transition of the seat of power in Liberia from Americo-
Liberian to members of the Krahn, Doe's ancestral tribe. During his tenure, Doe
wa challenged almost amnually by coup attempts as members of his own cabinet
and others attempted to remove him from power. Until the end, each attempt
was met with brutal repression.

1
With the help of the U.S. Congress in 1838, freed slaves united and formed the Commonwealth
of Liberia. In 1847, Liberia became Africa's first independent nation.
Banks, A. S., et al., PoliticalHandbook of the World, 1990,State University of New York at
Binghamton: CSA Publications, 1990, p. 376 .
"3"Whence Liberia?" Aftica Inde., April 1980, pp. 21-22. Doe and his unit had been trained by a
Special Forces Mobile Training Team for six months just prior to the coup.
10

During Doe's first five years, the nation was under a state of martial law: People
who opposed him were arrested, political parties were banned, and elections
were suspended. Beginning in 1984, Doe permitted the formation of opposition
political parties (although they were nonetheless harassed and repressed). In
October 1985 the first national elections since the coup were held.4 Widespread
allegations of election fraud and ballot tampering wer, reported and resulted in
another attempted coup in November 1985. The leader of the coup, Brigadier
General Quiwonkpa, an IMET-trained military officer and co-leader of the 1980
coup that put Doe in power, was killed in the attempt.5 Many of his supporters
were either killed or imprisoned, with Doe-orchestrated reprisals claiming an
additional 5,000 lives.6 The majority of the deaths were civilians from the Gio
and Mano tribes, wl.om Doe apparently sought to punish for their alleged
support of the coup.

Beyond the fraud and oppression that characterized the Doe government,
corruption, mismanagement, and general administrative ineptitude were
commonplace. Most of Doe's cabinet were corrupt and erroneously, in the words
of one observer, saw such corruption as "the only way in which they could
become rich enough to live the kinds of lifestyles which the public expected of
politicians." 7 Thus, by the end of the decade, corruption and mismanagement,
combined with rapid population growth and the flight of foreign business from
oppression, resulted in a drop in national wealth by 16 percent while personal
income declined by 33 percent.8

The Civil War (1989-?)

In December 1989, a small group of insurgents led by former Doe cabinet
member Charles Taylor began a popular -aprising against the government. 9 Doe
and his administration's long tradition of ineptness was demonstrated
throughout its handling of the uprising. When the Armed Forces of Liberia
(AFL) could possibly have controlled the situation, they were not deployed,
despite U.S. advice to do so. When they were finally sent to suppress the

4The Europa World Yearbook, VoL 11,1991, p. 1674.

5
BG Qultwonkpa was highly respected by the people of Liberia for taking a stand against the
corruption and mismanagement in the early 1980s that had infected the Doe Administration. That
action ultimately led to his exile Ln 1983 to avoid persecution by Doe.
6
Sivard, Ruth L, World MilitaryandSocial Expenditures, 14th ed., Leesburg, Va.: WMSE Pubs.,
1991,t,. 25.
"Huband,Mark, "The Scars of War," Africa Report, March-April 1991, p. 50.
8
See The Europa World Yearbook, Vol. 11, 1991, p. 1676, for a look at the demise of the Liif.lrian
economy in the 1980s.
9
"he insurgents belonged to the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL).
 11

rebellion, the army was deployed piecemeal and controlled from Monrovia.
Tense ethnic rivalries, forged by years of abuse by the Doe regime, turned the
populace to the rebels when Doe's forces massacred 600 Gio and Mano refugees
(including women and children) who had sought asylum in a Lutheran church in
Monrovia. 10 This turn was not, however, due to any belief that the rebels were
better at governance, but to a profound desire to rid the country of a despot.11

Unfortunately, the war continues as Charles Taylor adopts and emulates the
same corruption, greed, and intransigence that characterized the despot he
sought to overthrow. A peacekeeping force deployed by the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) now controls Monrovia and has
been able to negotiate a fragile peace agreement with what is left of the Armed
Forces of Liberia and a rival faction of Taylor's NPFL-the Independent National
Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) 1, ! by Yormie Johnson. The peace plan calls
for each of the factions to lay down its weapons and report to garrisons under the
supervision of the peacekeeping force. Unfortunately, although Taylor has
reportedly agreed to these conditions, his followers, now estimated at 10,000,
have neither surrendered their weapons nor ceded control of any territory.
Meanwhile, almost 30,000 Liberians have died-the vast majority civilian-and
almost half of the population has been uprooted in what is now regarded as one
of the bloodiest wars in African history.12

U.S. Relationship and Strategic Interests

The United States' HistoricalRelationshipwith Liberia
The United States has had a long and varied relationship with the Republic of
Liberia. Stated U.S. policy toward Liberia has principally been designed to
maintain and strengthen ties between the two countries, based partly on the fact
that some of the population, albeit an extremely small portion, is of U.S. descent.

The United States took the lead in the nineteenth century in negotiating with
tribal chiefs to provide land and protection to freed slaves. In 1926, the U.S.-
owned Firestone Corporation introduced commerce to Liberia through the
cultivation, harvest, and export of rubber-a crop that has been a principal

10"Liberia After Doe: The Bloody Struggle for Power," Africa Report, September-October 1990,
p.5.
"11Banks
2
et aL, 1990, p. 378.
1 Noble, K. B., "Liberian Rebel Leader Rules Empire of His Own Design," The New York Times
International,April 14,1992; "Liberia After Doe," 1990, p. 5; Kieh, G. K., "Combatants, Patrons,
Peacemakers, and the Liberian Civil Conflict," Studies in Conflictand Terrorism, Vol. 15, No. 2, Spring
1992, p. 138.
12

export since its discovery there and a ciitical resource during World War ]1,
when Japan controlled much of the world's rubber supplies. Also during World
War II, Liberia became a major stopover for U.S. soldiers entering the African
theater of operations. In support of this stopover, U.S. Army engineers built
roads throughout the interior of Liberia and began construction of a deep-water
port in Monrovia. 13 From the end of World War Il until 1980, when Doe seized
power, U.S. and Liberian relations were generally cordial and mutually self-
supportive as Liberia appeared to prosper and the United States' basic interest in
Africa-stopping communist expansion-was achieved.

The U.S. Response to Samuel K. Doe

Throughout Doe's reign, the United States overlooked the continuous excesses
that gave him a reputation in Africa rivaling even that of former Ugandan
dictator Idi Amin.14 U.S. policy in Liberia could best be described as
inconsistent-absent any standards by which the Doe government was expected
to abide.

Along with a majority of the world, the U.S. Congress condemned Doe when
he seized power. However, in September 1980, after Doe began to show interest
in closer ties with the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Libya, the United States sent
the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard M. Moose to
Liberia to investigate the situation and report to Congress on possible U.S.
courses of action. Upon the completion of his fact-finding mission, Mr. Moose
recommended four objectives the United States should pursue to "ensure the
success of the new Doe government":

"* Assist the new government in stabilizing its economy by assisting in the
development of a budget, adjusting the IMF [International Monetary Fund]
deficit, and providing rice under P.L. [Public Law] 480.
"* Encourage the People's Redemption Council (PRC) to return to civilian rule
and release all political prisoners.
" Support military training, provide new equipment to the military, and build
enlisted housing.
" Support long-term development of the country.15

13 Thomson, J.H., The Liberian Coupd'Etat: Its Impact on Economic and Security Assistance, Defense
Technical Information Center, 30 March 1988.
14
"Liberia After Doe," 1990, p. 6.
15
"U-S. Attitudes to New Liberia," West Africa, 8 September 1980, pp. 1703-1704.
 13

A reversal in congressional attitude toward the Doe government occurred almost

immediately and is best represented by its instant infusion of money into
Liberia-$10.7 million in economic aid and $5.5 million in military aid--during
fiscal year 1980. In addition, three U.S. Army Mobile Training Teams were sent
to Liberia that year to train the newly formed 1st Infantry Battalion, the Army
16
Staff, and the Ranger Company.

Aid to Liberia during the 1980s exceeded that given to any other sub-Saharan
country. As stated in Department of State CongressionalPresentationsfor Security
Assistance Programs throughout the 1980s, U.S. aid to Liberia was designed to:

"* Enhance cooperative defense and security,

"* Preserve the longstanding close relationship between the two countries,
"* Promote democratic institutions and respect for human rights,
"* Enhance the Liberian Army's nation-building role,
"* Support economic stab-lity and infrastructure development17

However, despite the articulation of these broad policies, U.S. interests and
actions in Liberia focused on the creation of and access to certain facilities and
capabilities deewed essential to maintain U.S. freedom of action in Africa. They
included an Omega communications and navigation relay station near Monrovia
and the largest Voice of America transmitter in the world. The United States also
obtained military landing and refueling rights at Roberts International Airfield
outside Monrovia, a U.S.-built airport, and a port call in Monrovia for U.S. ships.
In addition, the U.S. Embassy in Liberia had the largest contingent of personnel
in Africa, numbering nearly 500, primarily there to collect intelligence on the
region.

U.S. Attempts to Promote Democracy in Doe's Regime

The U.S. government attempted in a number of ways to ensure that the Doe
regime quickly transitioned into a civilian democracy. During the first five years,
they assisted the government in the development of a national constitution that
closely resembled the United States' constitution. And they continuously
pressured Liberia to release political prisoners and hold free elections.

16
Thomson, 1988, pp. 47-48.
17
U.S. Department of State, Vol.1, 1987, p. 80.
14

In October 1985, after the first elections since Doe seized power, the Reagan
Administration, ignoring both widespread reports of election fraud and the
carnage that followed the election, praised the "newly-elected" Doe
Administration as "a civilian government based on elections... a journalistic
community of government and non-governmental newspapers and radio
stations, an ongoing tradition among the citizenry of speaking out, and a new
constitution which protects those freedoms." 18 The administration's position is
curious, given the fact that the U.S. Congress, anticipating election fraud in
August 1985, admonished Doe to conduct a "free and fair election in a climate
19
where critics may express their views without fear of arrest or retribution."
And afterward, the U.S. Congress quickly joined the world in condemning the
elections and passed a nonbinding resolution on the administration to withhold
U.S. economic and military aid from Liberia until it could be verified that the Doe
20
government was moving toward democracy.

In 1987, in response to a U.S. General Accounting Office study concluding that as

much as $50 million of U.S. aid had been diverted or misused, 21 and in hopes of
increasing the Doe Administration's credibility, the United States sent a team of
financial experts to Liberia to assist in developing viable financial institutions
and better accountability. The team, however, was unable to improve Liberia's
fiscal situation and departed after only a few months, concluding that the
majority of government officials were more interested in short-term political
survival and deal-making than in long-term recovery or nation-building efforts.
In other words, the government was basically interested more in personal gain
than in national governance.

U.S. Response to the Civil War

The Bush Administration appeared to have been unable to embrace a clear and
focused policy toward the evolving situation in Liberia since the civil war began
in 1989. Although the administration initially supported Doe, it eventually
abandoned him and adopted a totally neutral position on the civil war,

18
"lIberia After Doe," 1990, p. 6 . Words from then-Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs Chester Cocker.
19
U.S. Congress, ProspectsforDemocracy in Liberia, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Africa of
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 99th Congress, 1st Session, September
18,1985,
20
P. S.
US. Congress, A Sense of the House Resolution on Liberia, House Resolution 367, February 24,
1986.
21
General Accounting Office, Liberia Problems in Accountability and Control over U.S. Assistance,
Washington D.C. GAO Report NSIAD-87-86BR, February 1987; Banks et aL, 1990, p. 378.
 15

supporting neither Taylor22 nor Johnson but maintaining open lines of

communication with each. When, in September 1990, an "al-Liberian
conference" selected an interim government to fill the vacuum left by the death
of Samuel Doe, the U.S. government voiced support for the interim government
and maintained liaison with it, but never formally recognized the government.23
In addition, the tentativeness with which the administration has addressed the
Liberian refugee situation has prompted some to accuse the United States
government of racism.24

In September 1990, while waiting for what he perceived would be intervention

by U.S. forces on his behalf, Doe was captured, tortured, and killed by Johnson.
The U.S. government did consider intervening; unfortunately for Doe,
Washington had concluded that he was a liability, his administration was inept,
and he had lost the support of his people through his flagrant abuse of their basic
human rights.25 In addition, the United States at that time was totally committed
to military developments in Kuwait as part of Operation Desert Shield.

The United States has now elected to work "behind the scenes" to support the
ECOWAS peace initiative. Visits to the region by the assistant secretary of state,
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the vice president have all been
designed to show support for ECOWAS, as well as to determine areas where the
United States can assist. Financial aid has been provided: $230 million in
humanitarian aid and close to $26 million to support the peacekeeping force.26
U.S. military units and Mobile Training Teams have been deployed to
neighboring countries in the region to train indigenous forces in an attempt to
strengthen the militaries and dissuade spread of the Liberian war. And, to
encourage their involvement in maintaining peace in the region and to assist in

22The United States has had difficulty supporting the current president's (Dr. Amos Sawyer)
election and has indicated that any new government of Liberia would not be legitimate until Taylor
was made a part of it. Huband, M., "The Power Vacuum," Afrii Report, January-February 1991,
p. 28. While the basis for this position is not clear, it is clear that as an insurgent, Charles Taylor has
neither been eleted nor has any legitimate right to govern. In addition, Taylor has planned and
approved many of the atrocities the NPFL committed against both the AFL and the people of Liberia.
Finally, Charles Taylor is a wanted criminal in the United States, having escaped from a Boston jail in
1985 while awaiting extradition to Liberia for embezzling almost $1 million. Noble, 1992, p. A3;
"Liberia After Doe," 1990, pp. 5-6; Banks et al., 1990, p. 377. Before the embargo imposed in October
1992 he was shipping timber, iron ore, diamends, arid rubber out of Liberia and depositing the
proceeds into a private Swiss accot-nt. "Update, Liberia," Africa Report,July-August 1991, p. 7 .
23
Novicki, M., "Dr. Amos Sawyer Keeping the Peace," Africa Report, November-December
1991; "Liberia After Doe," 1990, p. 6; Kieh, 1992, p. 134. George Kieh implies that the reason the
United States has not yet fully committed itself to support Dr. Sawyer is the possibility that he would
not be as amenable to U.S. considerations as other possible candidates.
24"Safe Haven for Liberians in the US.," Afrtca Report, January-February 1991, p. 11; "Exiled
Liberians in the US. Granted a Reprieve," Afrim Report, March-April 1991, p. 11.
25"Liberia After Doe," 1990, p. 5.
26Da Costa, P., "Good Neighbors," Africa Report, November-December 1991, p. 23; US. State
Department Press Release, 16 June 1992.
16

economic recovery, the United States has forgiven over $47 million in debt owed
by Senegal. 27 These actions seem to be designed to give Africa the opportunity
to develop a solution to what the administration considers to be an African
problem.

The United States has lost a considerable amount of influence in Liberia and
Africa: first, through its association with the Doe regime and then by its
vacillation during the civil war. The few survivors of the AFL believe the United
States deserted them at a crucial moment; Liberians in general denounce the
Bush Administration for failing to act to stop the carnage while U.S. Marines
were stationed off the coast of Monrovia, evacuating American citizens.28
Indeed, many of the Marines themselves had some difficulty understanding why
they were not used to provide humanitarian assistance to the vast numbers of
Liberians who were without basic services.29 However, because Liberia is
purportedly a "U.S. possession," the international community was waiting for
the United States to act. The questions become, What might the United States
have done differently and what should be done now?

Internal Defense Threats and Internal Development

Problems
Internaland External Defense Threats
Other than coup attempts, which occurred with regularity during the 1980s, there
were no threats, either internal or external, for which the Liberian armed forces
had to be ready to defend the government or the country. Doe generally
distrusted his neighbors, primarily Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast, because he
knew they did not approve of the coup that brought him to power. He also was
afraid that Libya was conspiring to depose him. However, most of his suspicions
were unfounded.

InternalDevelopment Requirements in the 1980s

Prior to Doe, the Liberian government had begun to increase the number of
indigenous trained technical, professional, and managerial personnel. As a result
of the worldwide recession of the 1970s, combined with corruption endemic in

27Kieh, 1992, p. 139; "Update, Liberia," 1991, p. 12. Similar actions are being taken with Ghana,
Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda in support of their economic
reform programs.
281a Costa, "Good Neighbors," 1991, p. 23.
29Discussions with U.S. Marines guarding the Embassy compound.
 17

Libelia's government of that time and out-of-control population growth, national

wealth fell by 10 percent from 1974 to 1980 at the same time that individual
yearly income dropped by 27 percent, from $1,040 to $759. Development of the
country was hampered by poor management and planning, combined with a
lack of national funds for infrastructure investment. Doe's coup exacerbated the
situation when he killed most of the even marginally qualified cabinet members
and replaced them with even less trained personnel.

The economy remained a predominant cause of the instability in Liberia during

Doe's reign. Based primarily on the export of iron ore, rubber, and timber, the
national economy declined an average of 1.3 percent per year in the 1980s at a
time when the population was growing by an average of 3.1 percent per year (see
Figure 2.1).30 Unemployment rose from 50 percent in 1980 when Doe took power
to 58 percent in 1988, while the consumer price index rose by over 100 percent.
Income distribution remained skewed, with 68 percent of the nation's wealth
being in the hands of only 5 percent of the people. 3 1 Agriculture ceased as
people began to seek refuge in neighboring countries; as other businesses fled
simply to survive, the entire economic structure of the country crumbled.
Finally, in 1987, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) censured Liberia for
failure to meet its debts at the same time that the U.S. Congress imposed the
Brooke-Alexander Amendment, cutting off further aid, for Liberia's default on its
U.S. aid repayment schedule and its failure to implement acceptable political
reforms.

Besides the deaths from atrocities, health care ar d health delivery systems were
severely inadequate. Of course, with a lack of adequate health care systems,
during the peak of the civil war many who could have been helped simply died
as the medical institution also crumbled. 32 While population grew, and families
were faced with the reality of not being able to sustain themselves, the infant
mortality rate grew by 145 percent

*TheArmed Forces of Liberia

Doe inherited a military of approximately 5,000 strong, consisting mostly of army

personnel and a small coast guard. The army's mission focused generally on

3
0The Europa World Yearbook, VoL 11,1991, p. 1676 .
lKieh, 1992, pp. 128-129.
32Even if they had had the desire to assist in this area, the Liberian military could not. They
were not even structured with enough medical assets to care for themselves, and the few medics
available were untrained.
 RANOIS40-2 1.0I
7

80(1 PC GNP 2
"=' PC GNP growth
700 -
S0
"600
iVVN
500
O. " 00 •.......o,:•,
- -- -4 o
( .4004-
z
W300- itt.
"" ... ... .- 6 (U

S200 - (.

0 -10
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987

SOURCE: Compiled from The Europa World Yearbook 1980-1987

Figure 2.1-Per Capita Gross National Product (GNP) and Income Growth in Liberia

defense of the nation from external aggression, maintenance of internal security,

and conduct of anti-smuggling operations. The army consisted of five infantry
I ,,alions, an elite Executive Mansion Guard, one artillery battalion, one
engineer battalion, a, id one aviation reconnaissance company. After both the
coup and a series of purges designed to rid the .Armed Forces of Liberia of any
threats to his power, Doe increased the size of the military to about 7,000 men,
which by 1983 included one additional infantry battalion, a brigade support unit,
a military police unit, and a logistics command. He also added the maintenance
of law and order to its mission. From 1980 to 1983, the military's budget
increased from $16.5 million to $27.2 million. In addition, in 1983 the size of the
engineer battalion doubled, ostensibly to enable it to fulfill a new mission
defined by Doe: to involve itself in civic action. However, given the poor state of
its training, there is no indication that the AFL was very involved, or, for that
matter, capable of being involved, in civic action during the Doe years.

As Doe's military became involved in the politics of the country, they were
subjected to the same corrupting influences that had overtaken the rest of the
government by 1983. Most senior leaders, lieutenant colonel and above, were
corrupt and this corruption was resented by lower ranking personnel. It also
 19

affected them directly: Officers sold food and clothing meant for their soldiers
and deposited the proceeds in personal bank accounts, and repair paits provided
by the United States were either stolen by the officers and used on their personal
vehicles or sold. As corruption increased and the economy declined, even less
money was made available for the armed forces. A combination of inadequate
funds and poor leadership skills led to the cessation of individual and unit
training. Unit skills quickly deteriorated. Moreover, a destructive cycle ensued
whereby the less trained the soldiers and units became, the less confidence the
soldiers had in their leaders.

The strongest indication that discipline and morale had eroded was the
indiscriminate and abusive treatment meted out to the population. As soldiers
took from the people they were supposed to defend, they lost the public respect
they had enjoyed for years. By the end of Doe's reign, the human-rights abuses
against the Liberian people had become completely out of control.

Ironically, the AFL failed to suppress the coup of 1990 for the same reasons the
military failed to suppress the coup of 1980-poor and corrupt leaders and
poorly trained soldiers and units. It also had little training in counterinsurgency
operations. In addition, the AFL command and control and logistics systems
were inadequate and ineffective, resulting in the AFL's inability to put down the
enemy that challenged Doe's power.

Host-Nation Training Goals and Requirements

Doe never dearly articulated his training goals---either for the military or for his
government. However, what is clear is that Doe had an abiding distrust of
competence. What few institutions for governance Liberia had were destroyed
when Doe seized power. Major ministerial positions were then filled with loyal
members of the coup, most of whom lacked the education or experience to fulfill
the requirements of their new positions. This single deficiency became much
more apparent as years passed.

Doe's negative attitude toward an educated citizenry was borne out in his
suppression of educational institutions. Likewise, although he supported
military training programs for the opportunity and leverage they gave him with
the United States, he was leery of the results. Just as Doe was afraid of education
because of the inherent threat an informed citizenry posed to his reign, so too
was he afraid of an effective and competent military. His answer to education
was to continuously repress and harass students and teachers; for the military, he
created organizational dysfunction by ensuring that collective training was kept
to a minimt.n and leaders remained incompetent. In his view, once competence
20

was achieved, the military leaders (or students) would be a threat to his power.33
A trained military, more than anything else, posed the most serious threat to
him.

Beyond Doe's basic distrust of education, however, was Doe and his senior
commanders' overriding belief that the United States would support the regime
and intervene against any enemy.34 As long as Doe was confident that the
United States would protect him and as long as he could prevent a competent
(i.e., threatening) military from emerging, Doe could concentrate on his first
priority-retaining power.

The U.S. Training Response

Because Liberia's training goals were not stated, the U.S. Embassy took the steps
necessary to develop what it considered to be an appropriate training strategy in
view of its knowledge of the deficiencies in the AFL.35 Training provided to
Liberia was based on the annual planning process conducted by the security
assistance officer in the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, in consultation with the
Liberian Ministry of Defense.36

U.S. TrainingGoals
The goal of U.S. Security Assistance Programs in Liberia in the 1980s was to
develop the AFL into a well-disciplined and professionally competent force
capable of defending the sovereignty of the government of Liberia and carrying
out the orders of the commander-in-chief. 37 Therefore, the U.S. training plan for
Liberia was designed to improve military leadership, individual and unit
training, and equipment maintenance.

Actual U.S. Training

Annual assessments of Liberia's military enabled the Security Assistance Office
(SAO) to predict the types of training required in the United States and the types

33
Wonkeryor, Edward L., Liberia MilitaryDictatorship:A Fiasco'Revolution,' Strugglers'
Community Press, 1985, p. xii.
34This belief may ba due to a unique bilateral treaty between the United States and Liberia, the
1951 Defense Cooperation Agreement, which states that "in the event of aggression or threat of
aggression agaList Liberia, GUS [government of the United States] and GOL [government of Liberia]
will imme-iiately determine what action may be appropriate fe the defense of Liberia."
3
5Converstations with HQ USEUCOM representatives.
36Perhaps, in retrospect, the Embassy should have reconsidered the expenditure of any funds
on training, given Doe's predisposition to eliminate educational threats.
37
Security Assistance Training Plan for Liberia.
 21

of lIflTs required to assist in Liberia. Because the IMET program is a worldwide,

relatively small training program that Congress manages closely, the number of
Liberian students actually trained in the United States was very small. Indeed,
over the 1980s, A18 Liberian students attending courses in the United States
represented roughly 6 percent of the African military students. During the same
period, over 20 U.S. Army Mobile Training Teams deployed to Liberia in an
attempt to improve the AFL's training status.

Training in the United States. Liberia's training program was principally

designed to provide professional military education (PME) to those leaders
identified as having career potential, thereby improving the overall
professionalism of the force. Each of the courses in the United States provided
Libe'.ian students the opportunity to meet and interact with their U.S.
counterparts while being exposed to the American experience and democracy
through the Informational Program.38

Classes in U.S. military training institutions are intensive courses of study

designed to stress and enhance the student's leadership and management skills
as well as his knowledge base in a particular subject (infantry tactics,
engineering, strategy, etc.). While these courses are generally designed to
enhance the military principles deemed necessary for combat, many of the same
principles are applicable to the civilian sector. Therefore, when students return
to their own countries, they have learned something that should help their
military to become more capable and themselves to become more marketable
after they retire or are discharged. For example, officers trained in the engineer
officer basic and advanced courses receive considerable training in leadership,
administration, training, and combat engineering skills (obstacle emplacement
and removal, river crossing, survivability operations, etc.). However, they also
receive extensive training in horizontal and vertical construction and attendant
project management skills. Likewise, each of the different courses offered to or
requested by Liberia had an immediate military and an ultimate civilian
application.

MTIrs and DFTs Deployed to Liberia. Whereas IMET in the United States
focuses on training the individual, Mobile Training Teams and units that are
deployed for training or exercises overseas focus on training the unit or
individuals within a unit who would not otherwise receive such instruction.
Most of Liberia's MTr requirements stemmed from deficiencies noted in

38The Informational Program is a congressional and DoD-mandated program designed to

exe,ose foreign students to U.S. ideals and values. It is not an indoctrination program and would not
be received as positively if it were.
22

maintenance and supply. MTrs were also deployed to assist in medical training
and assistance, as well as in more traditional developmental roles, such as
construction; specifically to assist in the development of the skill within the unit
as well as within the Liberian training institution; and to train Liberian infantry
and ranger units in tactical employment. U.S. members of MITs were expected
to display outstanding character and to provide quality training. In this way,
Liberian military units would be exposed to the democratic ideals and values
that form the basis of the American soldier while simultaneously acquiring the
tactical and technical skills required to improve unit readiness.

Training or Security Assistance Accomplishments

It is difficult to ascertain specifically what was erroneous in U.S. policies toward
Liberia that resulted in so gross a failur- Yet dearly none of the stated policies
or goals succeeded. The foandation for supporting Doe came from the basic
recommendations of the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Mr.
Richard M. Moose, and was further articulated in various Security Assistance
documents. Yet the United States was unsuccessful in helping Liberia either to
stabilize its economy or to encourage the government to return to civilian rule.
And, although the United States expended considerable resources during Doe's
ten-year reign, long-term development was not achieved there. Despite U.S.
attempts and over $200 million in military aid, the United States was not able to
influence the AFL's actions; nor was the AFL receptive to advice when the
insurgency began.

Nothing of importance can be said of improvements in the overall readiness,

training, professionalism, desire, or quality of the armed forces. According to
one observer, it was impossible to gauge any ability in the leadership or the
soldiers because, when the fighting began, the leaders ran to save their lives and
many of the soldiers either deserted to the other side or were killed in a vain
attempt to protect Doe.39

As Table 2.1 illustrates, other than providing a specific resource, such as

equipment or facilities, none of the objectives articulated for Liberia during the
1980s was achieved. The military was a dismal failure in responding to a small
insurgency. Human-rights abuses by the government destroyed its legitimacy in
the eyes of the citizenry. And poor leadership and fear of training resulted in an
undisciplined and incompetent force.

39
Discussion with US. Marine on Operation SHARP EDGE.
 23

Table 2.1
Liberian Achievements Scorccard

Policy or Goal Success Policy or Goal Success

Was the economy Was respect for human rights
stabilized? No improved? No
Did the government return to Was military equipment
civilian rule? No provided? Yes
Were democratic institutions Were new enlisted barracks
established? No built? Yes
Was long-term development Did the AFL contribute to civic
achieved? No action or nation-building? No
Was the long-standing close Was the AFL well-disciplined and
relationship preserved? No professionally competent? No
Were cooperative defense and Did the AFL defend the sovereignty
security established? No of Liberia? No
Did training improve the AFL? No

U.S. Influence
Through its aid to the Doe government, the United States did influence certain
actions deemed in its best interests (although unstated). Doe closed the Libyan
Embassy and suspended diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union in return for
increased aid from the Reagan Administration. The United States retained access
to its facilities as well as liberal overflight, landing, and port-call rights.
However, these accomplishments cost the United States over $600 million from
1980 to 1989,40 making Liberia the largest per capi; r recipient of U.S. aid in sub-
Saharan Africa. In addition, by threatening to c"'.,ff aid in 1986, the United
States was able to affect Doe's tolerance of human-rights abuses-but only
temporarily and ineffectually.

Effect on InternalDevelopment

During the Doe years, the military was used very little to assist in internal
development partially because of its inability to do so and because of Doe's
restrictions on its use. As a result, while most of the training provided both in
Liberia and in America had applicability to internal development, no benefit
accrued to Liberia. For instance, instruction provided in engineering and
medicine applied directly to some of the internal development requirements of
Liberia during the 1980s. The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at

40Defense Security Assistance Agency, ForeignMilitarySales, ForeignMilitary ConstructionSales

and MilitaryAssistance Facts,as of September 30,1990; GAO, 1987; US. Department of State, FY 1990
24

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, provides a general education to mid-level career

officers on a wide variety of military and strategic subjects and could have
contributed to the country's knowledg2 ir. national managemeat and
administration (see Table 2.2). The mor technical courses (physical security,
maintenance, public affairs) should have improved somewhat the technical
capabilities of the country. Several reasons can be given for why benefits did not
accrue.

First, the number of people in the military who were trained, even though it was
more than any other country in sub-Saharan Africa, was so small as to have no
effect on the overall development of the country, the capability of the military, or
even individual units. Most of the military trained by the United States prior to
1980 were killed or went into exile upon Doe's assumption of power.4 ' During

Table 2.2
Training Provided to Liberian Soldiers in the United States

Course 1985 1986 1987a 1988a 1989

Adjutant General 4 3 2
Artillery 1
Aviation 2 1
Chaplain 2
Command and General Staff College 1 1 1
Engineering 10 1 1 2
Finance 2 1
Infantry 16 15 4
Intelligence 2
Maintenance 36 8
Medical 10 2 1
Ordnance 4 2 1
Physical security 1 1 1
Public affairs 1 1 1
Quartermaster 3 4 1
Signal 2 1 1
Special Operations 3
Transportation 1 1 1
SOURCE: Security Assistance Training Field Activity, FL Monroe, Va.
aBrooke sanctions were imposed in 1987 and again in 1988 in an attempt to persuade the
Liberian government to develop democratic institutions and because of Liberia's default on its aid
repayments.

41
There is evidence to suggest that Doe killed IMET-trained officers because he believed they
would not agree with his dictatorship or his corrupt and repressive methods. When BG Quiwonkpa
opposed the Doe government's corruption and lack of civilian rule-problems that Doe promised the
Liberian people he would change-he was ostracized and ultimately killed during a coup attempt in
1985.
 25

the 1980s, the United States trained 317 Liberians in the United States, or
approximately 5 percent of the AFL. In addition, the MTrs and DFTs who
provided training in-country focused not only on leadership and unit training
but on military civic action, engineering, and medical support, as well as
maintenance and supply. However, there is no evidence to suggest that those
deployments or the training conducted in the United States had any effect at all
on the internal development of Liberia or on the ability of the military to assist in
such development. In fact, the opposite might actually be true. In 1980, enlisted
housing was cited as critically deficient.42 Accordingly, the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers designed and ultimately constructed enlisted barracks-at a cost of
approximately $43 million. However, due to their lack of expertise, Liberian civil
and military engineers were not able to control the construction of the project
despite the fact that it was a primary mission of the AFL. After their completion,
the barracks rapidly fell into disrepair from lack of maintenance.

Second, as Doe's regime tightened its rein on Liberia, most of the programs
initiated by the government were implemented for the benefit only of the Krahn
tribe. Neither Doe, his government, nor the AFL had any interest in helping the
country as a whole. In fact, although there were ethnic differences before Doe's
rise to power, they were predominantly between the indigenous tribes and the
Americo-Liberian segment. Doe won popular support for a time by extricating
Liberia from the Americo-Liberian rule. However, he rapidly lost that support
by treating the Krahn preferentially. 43

Third, in the past two years, so much has happened that has reversed any
improvements possibly occurring in the country. By all indicators, during the
1980s Liberia degenerated into a crumbling mess. The last two years have only
placed the coup de grace on the nation. If internal development is to have a
possibility of success in the future, any action that occurs now toward it must be
a coordinated international endeavor, with the full support and commitment of a
Liberian government interested in legitimacy and reform.

Impact on InternalDefense

U.S. military training did not effectively change the professionalism or

capabilities of the Liberian armed forces despite continuous deployment of
Mobile Training Teams to Liberia and the training of Liberian military

42Recall this was one of the reasons Doe and his supporters took over in the first place.
43
Conversation with persons from HQ USEUCOM and Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs (OASD-ISA).
26

students in the United States. Nor did it improve the abilities of the military
to counter an insurgency. Indeed, the majority of the training focused on
improving leadership and logistics. Tactics training focused on more
conventional operations and less on the necessity, for instance, of taking actions
that make the government appear more legitimate and desirable than the
insurgency. However, the corruption and abuses committed by the AFL make
it doubtful that anything would have legitimized the government or the AFL in
the eyes of the Liberian citizenry. Thus, owing to the persistent abuses by the
AFL, when Charles Taylor led the National Patriotic Front of Liberia across the
border into Liberia in December 1989 with only 167 lightly armed men, the
insurgent force rapidly grew to a formidable size.

While most students who came to the United States seemed to be on a par with
their U.S. counterparts, they were never successful in transferring either the
quality of instruction or the quality of life found in the United States to their
peers and subordinates in Liberia. Likewise, MTT team chiefs were struck by the
necessity to "start from ground zero" every time a new team went to Liberia.

Whereas just ten years before most of the leaders were killed by Doe, and
corporals were promoted to generals and were assumed to be competent to lead
an army, Liberia again has no military leadership: Most of the leaders have been
killed. Any solution to Liberia's military problems now will require a long-term,
intensive, and closely managed effort to develop the core of a professional and
competent force.

Liberia Summary
Inasmuch as the primary U.S. policies and objectives in Liberia during the 1980s,
although unstated, were to stop communist expansionism and retain access to
vital facilities and capabilities, ics aid and training programs might well be
considered successful. However, Liberia may well be a perfect example of the
operation's being a success but the patient still dying.

Causes of Collapse in Liberia

What were the fundamental causes of downfall for the Doe regime and how
could the United States have acted differently to prevent it? Clearly, the issues
are broader than just a military dimension, or, more specifically, a military
training dimension (the primary focus of this case study). Doe's approach to
governance in general-his permissiveness toward corruption, his lack of
experience in governmental management and administration, and his lack of
 27

understanding of the needs of his people, combined with a blatant disregard for
their basic human rights-led to his downfall.

During the 1980s, the United States provided Liberia over $600 million in aid; of
that, almost $400 million was economic aid (e.g., Economic Support Fund [ESFI,
Developmental Assistance IDA], Public Law 480, Peace Corps). Of the $200
million in military aid provided, about 5 percent was for training. However, U.S.
support and training of Doe's military had no impact on the military's
performance either prior to or during the civil war; nor did they provide the
United States the leverage to alter Doe's performance or egregious behavior.

In addition, the total disregard for civilian casualties during the the past two
years of civil war has created a situation in which none of the factions is deemed
worthy of leading the nation. Even though the war is not completely over yet,
what is known is that some 30,000 Liberians have been killed, thousands more
have been injured, and almost 800,000 have fled the country for safety.44 And,
while the United States has not taken an active military role in ending the strife
there, it has contributed $230 million toward humanitarian assistance and
forgiven almost $400 million in foreign debts from African nations in an effort to
influence the situation without getting involved.

The Costs of a Civil War-WhatIs Needed Now?

The threat to Liberia and the region was extensive. However, even if peace
comes back to Liberia, the rape of the country and its people has all but
destroyed it. Nearly half of the population has sought refuge in neighboring
countries and overseas. Their return will impose a tremendous burden on an
emerging government that is ill-prepared for the task before it. There is a lack of
basic necessities-food, water, sanitation facilities, and medical care. The
extensive corruption in the country over the past administrations and, more
recently, the siphoning off to Swiss bank accounts of national revenue by Charles
Taylor have left the country literally bankrupt. The treasury is empty; exports
and imports have ceased; most small businesses have been looted and the
businessmen have left; the Liberian dollar is worthless; and basic transport and
commercial trade have disintegrated with the flight of the Mandingo people.
And possibly most troubling, rice, Liberia's staple and the reason for the
dissatisfaction that began Liberia's trouble over 13 years ago, has not even been
produced in over two years.

"4Manyof the troubles of Liberia today are now blamed on the Krahn. What is unfortunate is
that the majority of the Krah i did not actually benefit from the years of abuse permitted by Doe, yet
they all now bear the brunt ot Liberian anger over the atrocities and abuses committed by all parties.
28

The children of Liberia, now mostly aligned with the NPFL, are a source of
considerable difficulty. Mostly 15 to 17 years old (and younger), these children
have had to live with nothing all their lives-to search for food and even shelter
as the Doe regime disintegrated and proved unable to provide for the basic needs
of its people. Taylor offered hope in 1989. Now, for the last two years at least,
they have wanted for nothing. According to many eyewitness reports, these
teenagers are now the backbone of the NPFL. They walk around the country
with AK-47s, exuding confidence and bravado. If they want something, they
take it. If they get resistance, they simply shoot the resister. Many of these teens
are either drunk or on drugs: Their eyes are bloodshot, and they seem to be
incoherent and unable to control their emotions. It will be extremely difficult to
convince them to lay down their weapons and return to a life they remember and
have rejected. Yet, without their cooperation, success cannot be achieved, and
Liberia cannot grow without its youth.45

Beyond this teenager problem is the issue of ethnicity, which has plagued this
tribal-based society for decades. Without some form of national commitment to
ensure tribal and ethnic integration and an appreciation of and respect for ethnic
diversity, Liberia will cease to exist.

Even international support agencies will be sorely pressed to revive institutions

that never had qualified administrators or staff officers during the Doe regime
and now suffer from radical neglect. Each institution will require substantial
effort and training to ensure it becomes qualified and trusted by the Liberian
citizenry.

The sheer numbers of people who are afraid to leave Monrovia now is indicative
of the unrest and instability still present. However, at this point the majority of
the population of Liberia, by some estimates over 900,000, has come to Monrovia
for the security that the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) represents.
With its normal population of 400,000 already placing an excessive load on the
community infrastructure, this increase only further decreases living
conditions.46

Interim President Amos Sawyer's challenges are tremendous; his prospects are
bleak.

45
Conversations with the defense attachd of Senegal, the director of operations for the Armed
Forces of Senegal, and the former minister of justice for the Doe regime, now working at the United
Nations.
46Kieh, 1992, p. 138.
 29

Trainingand Assistance Requirementsfor the 1990s

Why should we care? This is a fundamental question that must be addressed.
There is no longer a fear of Soviet or Cuban intervention. Likewise, there is no
longer a necessity to maintain such a large CIA presence in Liberia. So the basic
issue becomes, Why should we care? The appropriate answer may well be
"because it's the right thing to do." For humanitarian reasons or in the interests
of regional stability, it may indeed still be in the best interests of the United States
to help foster a more stable and secure environment in West Africa. Without
help, however, peace cannot be achieved and Liberia will continue to destabilize
the region.

Assuming the United States does care and has an interest in returning to Liberia,
it might be possible to forge a training strategy, in close coordination with a
legitimate and committed government, that assists in the pursuit of a program of
reform. Clearly, the focus of training should turn from military tactics,
techniques, and procedures to the more practical courses that will give
governmental ministries the ability to develop appropriate reforms to govern a
people with a tremendous amount of legitimate cdistrust for both a government in
power and the United States. This said, what might be the appropriate courses of
action for training in the 1990s?

Politica. The interim and ultimate governments of Liberia may require

assistance in determining precisely what political reforms are required to return
the country to peace and prosperity. Such assistance can be accomplished
through the deployment of U.S. interagency and international teams of experts to
provide the necessary education to Dr. Sawyer's (or his legitimate successor's)
cabinet and staff and to assist them in assessing reform and reconstruction
requirements. 47 Indeed, a more robust exchange program, similar to that
attempted under Doe in 1987, might warrant reconsideration in an attempt to
assist in the development of economic and political stability, legitimacy, and a
warmer relationship than that which currently exists between the two countries.
Likewise, selected cabinet and staff members could be sent to the United States
for training and education, particularly in the areas of corporate and
governmental management and administration. Key tenets of the exchange
program should include development of programs that achieve established goals
and increased attention to education and experience transfer to ensure that, as
rapidly as possible, Liberian ministers and their staffs become competent and
capable civil servants.

47
Such deployment appears to be within the scope of the Cranston-Leahy IMEr-E initiative and
would be ideal, if desired, for building a government from the ground up.
30

Socioeconomic. Among the most important aspects of Liberia's social issues is

the need to establish a program for ethnic recovery. Any serious attempt to
govern or assist must be centered on Liberia's sincere efforts to more fully
integrate each of the diverse aspects of its society. Resolving the ethnic hatred
that now abounds in Liberia is the key to elimination of human-rights violations.
No simple program of education on the evils of abuse or the rule of law will
erase the last ten years of systematic tibal destruction and hatred that have run
rampant. The appreciation for the diversity in Liberia's society must become
embedded in every aspect of Liberia's educational system; ethnic integration
must become a reality within Liberia's government. Assistance programs should
be measured against legitimate long-term improvements in the area of ethnic
balance, and assistance should not be provided without the government's sincere
move toward this balance. Without ethnic balance, Liberia is doomed to repeat
over and over again the pogroms of the last ten years. U.S. and international
advisers have a key role to play, as do members of the Peace Corps and churches.
Each should concentrate its efforts on stressing the positive aspects of ethnic
diversity, and each must likewise ensure that human-rights violations are met
instantly with a united negative response (e.g., condemnation or removal of
aid).48

Liberia for the last ten years has corrected threats to its internal security by
employing its armed forces against the people, consequently eliminating the
image of the military as a protector of the people; rather, the AFL has become
synonymous with a threat to their survival. While there used to be a police force
with specific internal security responsibilities, during the Doe years the police
were incorporated into the AFL. Specific training in police procedures must be
developed and provided to a core of Liberian police. It must be linked to the
judicial system evolving from the destruction and should not be considered as an
extension of the armed forces. With congressional relief provided on a test
basis,49 the U.S. Department of Justice could organize, either through
governmental, international, or private sources, an appropriate instructional
capability to develop a currently nonexistent capability in Liberia to maintain law
and order using appropriate, internationally recognized methods.

"48Manywho provided comments or input to this case study believed that this sort of imposition
would be considered an infringement on the sovereignty of Liberia. However, if both govermments
agree to certain achievements upfront, then failure to make progress constitutes a lack of
commitment.
49
U.S. Cod.•, Section 660D, Public Law 93-559, Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, prohibits agencies
of the US. gove rnment from training, advising, or financing foreign pohce agencies, with certain
exceptions.
 31

Military. The military of the 1990s faces the same problems that the military of
the 1980s faced-no leaders and poorly trained soldiers. But a more serious
question to be addressed now regards the function and focus of a military in
tomorrow's Liberia. Assuming that ECOWAS will provide the means for
security for the near term, the more serious threat to Liberia lies in reconstruction
and the ability of the country to rapidly respond to the needs of its people by
improving their fundamental living conditions. This is not to imply that
Liberia's security needs do not require a combat capability. However, any such
capability should be small and well trained. Use of a system of reserves may
well be the best approach for expanding its combat capability during times of
hostilities.

While there has been much debate recently on the utility of military forces in
"nation-building," and there is considerable evidence to prove that the AFL of
the past has not done well in this area, Liberia's needs are so great that it must
apply even its military resources toward reconstruction of the country. In the
area of infrastructure, Liberia's civil war has literally destroyed everything of
significance. Likewise, its medical and transportation capabilities have been
critically depleted. For the next several years the military's best application
could well be to provide an interim capability in the areas of health,
transportation, and engineering until civilian capabilities are established.

The problem is that the army has been left with no leaders and poorly trained
soldier- whose ability to do these types of projects well is limited unless a
revised training approach involving an investment of resources and talent is
developed. If a U.S. goal is to foster stability-not only in Liberia, but
regionallyn-then the United States will have to take the lead in developing a
professional military in Liberia capable of assisting in that effort. Because there
are no leaders, they will have to be developed. Because the soldiers are poorly
trained in subjects such as medicine and engineering, they will have to be taught.
The extent of the training requirements may require extraordinary measures on
the part of the United States.

History has shown that U.S. aid and training had little effect on the abilities or
performance of the AFL, in part because of the relative inexperience of the senior
officers of the AFL, many of whom were promoted to generalship after the 1980
coup. As the Liberian armed forces rebuild in the 1990s, they are again faced
with the prospect of no leadership. To remedy this lack, the United States may
consider offering to assign U.S. military officers to key advisory positions within
the Liberian armed forces for a transitional period of up to ten years. Likewise,
certain Liberian military officers could be assigned to U.S. units following
training in the United States, for on-the-job training, followed by application of
32

their new skills in specific positions in their own army. There are some
immediate and long-term advantages to this approach.

First, without experienced leaders, the AFL will just return to its previous
corrupt and ineffective stature. U.S. military officers in appropriate advisory
positions could mold effective leaders and also could show Liberian officers how
to lead by example. This could have a tremendous impact, giving the Liberian
military a greater sense of respect for the basic human and civil rights of its
citizens.

Second, U.S. leaders in key advisory positions in construction and medical units
would enable the AFL to rapidly begin rebuilding the country. U.S. leaders
could train the Liberians not only in leadership but in the more technical skills
required for civic action, providing a certain aspect of quality control in those
civic action projects, both during the project and afterward.

Finally, U.S. leaders can instill the staff skills required to manage a military
organization, including the participation in planning, programming, and
budgeting, and the military's role in a functioning democracy. U.S. leaders could
also ensure that Liberians trained in the United States were placed in the most
effective positions upon their return to ensure that their new skills are transferred
to the maximum extent possible.

In terms of composition, Liberia's active-component armed forces should remain

small and focus on those skills necessary to assist the newly forming governi -.ent
in rebuilding the country. Accordingly, a large engineering and medical
capability, transportation units, and other logistics capabilities that will improve
Liberia's living conditions should be the emphasis for the short ferm.50 Two light
infantry battalions should be sufficient to provide for external security in the
short term. In the long term, Liberia may want to consider developing an ability
to expand when required through the use of an effective reserve capability.
Finally, a critical point should be that internal security, along with maintenance
of law and order, should be the responsibility of a police force separate from the
military.

Is This a Workable Solution?

Will this approach work? Not in and of itself. Without total commitment to
reform by the Liberian government and a sincere desire to bring peace, stability,

r0Orne Liberian government should simultaneously concentrate on developing additional

capabilities such as these in the civilian sector.
 33

and prosperity to the country, fulfillment of the above-mentioned requirements

will not solve Liberia's multitude of problems. Even with that commitment, the
approach may not succeed. But approaching Liberia with a status-quo solution,
one that has failed in the past, is not the answer. If the United States is indeed
interested in helping Liberia to evolve into a more stable society, it must be able
to assist in a way that is more involved than in the past. Such assistance should
not be considered interventionism, but rather a combined attempt by two
countries to move forward. As Liberia's institutions evolve to a position of
independence and self-sufficiency, the United States would then be able to
remove itself from the affairs of this currently beleaguered country.
34

3. The Republic of Senegal

History and Background

The oldest and strongest French colony in its time, Senegal sits on the western-
most point of Africa and has, since France's intervention there in the seventeenth
century, enjoyed a unique position in French history. Today, Senegal's largely
democratic and progressive society is a stabilizing force in West Africa, a factor
that can be attributed somewhat to the years of French influence and the
attendant education provided to, and experience gained by, the Senegalese
bourgeoisie. While France's involvement there in many ways typified its colonial
practices throughout Africa, Senegal enjoyed a special relationship apart from its
neighbors, partly because it was the first to be colonized and partly because of its
strategic importance to France's interests in Africa. 1

Senegal Under the French

The period of French rule in Senegal, which became a French colony in 1920,2
resulted in many social and economic improvements not previously available.
French foreign policy was designed to assimilate the people of its colonies into
French society and culture.3 Accordingly, many citizens who would not
otherwise have had the opportunity were sent to schools in France and education
became mandatory for all school-aged children. Economically, France attempted
to make Senegal self-sufficient by increasing production of export crops.
Politically, many of the upper-class Senegalese were given the opportunity of
French citizenship and the right to vote. Also, France removed much of the
authority previously enjoyed by tribal chiefs and appointed district managers,
normally under the supervision of a French civil servant or military officer.
Senegal, above all other of France's African possessions, prospered and showed
marked signs of socioeconomic improvement.

1
France's territories in Africa, called French West Africa, consisted of eight countries-
Mauritania, Mali, Senegal, Niger, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Benin, and Guinea--and its governance
lasted from around 1895 to 1958.
2
Banks et al., 1990, p. 555 .
3
Nelson, Harold D., Area Handbookfor Senegal, Washington, D.C.: US. Government Printing
Office, 1981, p. 17.
 35

Senegal, however, was not content to be a possession of France, despite the

benefits accruing to it as the seat of French rule in Africa. Even though the
official French policy was to assimilate Africans into French society, there was
considerable discrimination by the French in the execution of this policy.
Africans did not have equal rights with the French, a situation that became a
major political issue over the governing of the territories in the early 1900s.
After World War II, partly at the urging of the emerging European alliance and
the tremendous contributions of African units during the war, France
reexamined its foreign policies and colonial practices. On the basis of the right of
self-determination, it began to develop far-reaching political, social, and
economic reforms that ultimately led to the dissolution of French West Africa as
4
a French territory.

In 1956, along with the rest of French West Africa, Senegal was given broad
control over its internal political affairs, including the right to vote for all its
citizens. Consequently, while still considered a French territory, Senegal
controlled internal governmental decisions and France lost almost all political
significance. 5 In 1958, Senegal became a self-governing member of the French
Community. 6 In April 1959, Senegal and the French Sudan joined together to
form the Mali Federation, named after the great empire of the fourteenth century.
The federation was not successful, and in August 1960 Senegal seceded and
became independent.

Senegal in Independence
Since 1960, Senegal has continued to prosper, although recent signs of economic
stagnatior have somewhat stunted its growth. The country has been governed
continuously by the Socialist Party since gaining independence, although
numerous other political parties are permitted.

Senegal's first president was Leopold Senghor. French-educated and a world-

renowned poet and writer, President Senghor was Senegal's representative to the
French National Assembly from 1946 to 1958, when Senegal petitioned for
independence. Initially adhering to France's parliamentary form of government,
President Senghor was a driving force in every decision made in Senegal. He did
not allow other political parties until 1976, when he stipulated that there could be
three political parties in Senegal, each adhering to a specific ideology based on

4Department of the Army, Area HandbookforSenegal, Washington, D.C.: DA Pamphlet 550-70,

1974, 28-31.
"Cbid.,p. 30.
6
The Europa World Yearbook, Vol. 1, 1991, p. 2302.
36

his perception of the developing political factions extant at the time.7 The liberal
democratic faction became the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS); the Marxist-
Leninist faction became the African Independence Party (PAI); and the centrist
democratic socialist faction of Senegal remained the Socialist Party (PS). In 1978,
Senghor authorized the creation of an additional right-wing party, the Senegalese
Republican Party (MRS). President Senghor's political popularity continued
throughout his term, with little public dissent, and he remained unchallenged as
president until he resigned in 1981 and turned over control of the government to
his prime minister, Abdou Diouf.

President Diouf, although from the Socialist Party as well. .stituted sweeping
changes designed to improve governmental administration and living
conditions. He extended the process of political liberalization by removing
restrictions on political party activity and encouraging broader political
participation; reduced government involvement in the economy; and widened
Senegal's diplomatic involvement, particularly within the region.8 He was re-
elected in 1983 and 1988 and, in all likelihood, owing to his present popularity,
will again be re-elected during the 1993 elections.

U.S. Relationship and Strategic Intererts

In the past, U.S. relations with Senegal have been somewhat restrained, partly
because of Senegal's close relationship with France. After Senegal became
independe.t in 1960, there was a period of transition during which the French
remained actively involved in Senegalese affairs, primarily in an advisory
capacity. Even today, the French continue to have a significant military presence
in Senegal. 9 As a result, many of the Senegalese bourgeoisie, having been
educated by the French and inculcated with the "French" experience, were
sympathetic.to French requests and generally opposed to those who opposed the
French. At the time of Senegal's independence, U.S. relations with France had
been deteriorating because of lack of U.S. support for the French conflict in
Indochina and the subsequent U.S. intervention there. 10

7
8
Banks et al., 1990, p. 557.
U.S. Department of State, Background Notes: Senegal, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, July 1991, p. 2 .
9
According to the political officer in the U.S. Embassy, Senegal, the French have not been in
favor of U.S. involvement in Senegal. They believe it is an encroachment into an area traditionally
reserved for them.
10
Relations with the United States in the 1960s chilled to a point that France requested that all
U.S. military forces leave their soil by April 1,1%7. In doing so, the United States rendered many of
the facilities they had occupied unusable, thereby creating an even greater chasm with France, and
thereby with Senegal.
 37

Having fought alongside French units in Indochina, Senegal also resented U.S.
involvement in Vietriam, particularly since the United States supported a
Vietnaniese govem-rr ent that ousted the French. In addition, during the early
years of independence, the United States and Senegal were in opposition on
several key United Nations issues, such as Chinese representation in the United
Nations and the condemnation of Portuguese military incursions into southern
Senegal, both of which were not favored by the United States. 11

Today, however, the relationship between the two countries has improved
considerably. The Diouf government is basically pro-Western and closely
associates itself with the United States on a range of issues, nonetheless
continuing its dose ties with France. U.S. aid to Senegal is designed to assist the
country in further establishing its thriving democracy while simultaneously
stren -thening the professionalism of its military and ensuring access to key
facilities in the country. The two most important facilities are the deep-water
port at Dakar and the international airport in that city, which is currently
designated as an emergency landing site for the U.S. space shuttle.

Although, prior to 1980, U.S. aid tc Senegal was minimal, it grew steadily during
the Reagan Administration. In the 1990s, partly in gratitude for its participation
in the Gulf War and involvement in the peacekeeping effort in Liberia, the
United States forgave $47 million of Senegal's debt and took steps to ensure that
it receives a sizable share of the material being removed from Europe as the U.S.
Army decreases in size there.12 In a situation where the military aid program for
all of Africa is declining in fiscal year 1993, Sen.gal's Foreign Military Financing
(FMF) and IMET program are growing, to $1.105 million.13 In addition, Senegal
in all likelihood will receive the lion's share of Africa's discretionary funds used
for developing democracies ($41 million) in FY 93.14

Defense and Development Needs

Senegal is known for its progressive, democratic government. On a continent
where hunger ind starvation are a way of life for most, no one in Senegal is
going hungry.15 However, despite Senegal's successes in many areas, the
country continues to have areas of concern, both internally and externally. The

11
Department of the Army, 1974, p. 223.
12
1nterview with SAO in US. Embassy, Senegal
13
U.S. Department of State, FY 1993, p. 9 .
14
15
SAO, U.S. Embassy, Senegal
Interview with U.S. Embassy political officer.
38

periodic strikes and riots that occur in Senegal serve to remind the government of
the fact that, even with over 30 years of progress and democracy, the
fundamental living conditions of ics people must be improved if it is to maintain
both its legitimacy and stability. Without resolution, some of these areas may
soon serve to destabilize the progressive conditions in Senegal.

Senegal's External Threats

At one time or another since 1960, Senegal has had disputes with all its
neighbors. These disputes have ranged from disagreements over the citizenship
of a particular class of people to virtual combat over the alignment of a border.
Oddly enough, whereas Senegal in the past has had disputes with former
colonies of Portugal (Guinea-Bissau) and Britain (The Gambia), relations today
seem to have normalized. Ironically, Senegal's biggest current external rivalry is
with another former French colony, Mauritania.

Mauritania and Senegal have regularly disagreed on the precise boundary

between their countries, resulting in a number of disputes generally surrounding
the status of land, crops, and people to the north of the Senegal River. On several
occasions, the countries' militaries have traded artillery fire, and several civilian
casualties have occurred-on both sides.

Most recently in 1989, Mauritaunia mysteriously "disowned" some 60,000

members of the Maurs ethnic group and exiled them to Senegal. Left with no
recourse, Senegal petitioned the United Nations for resolution, whereupon the
United Nations implemented a program to ensure that these exiles were fed.
However, this program ends in December 1992.16 It is expected that Senegal will
then have to assume responsibility for the exiles, which may ultimately heighten
17
tensions once again between the two nations.

InternalUnrest-the Casamance
Senegal has had a long-standing dispute, sometimes expressed in violence, with
a small group of insurgent separatists in its southern district, the Casamance.
The Casamance is virtually separated from the majority of Senegal by The
Gambia, a sliver of land roughly 30 miles on each side of the Gambia River that
extends 200 miles into Senegal from the Atlantic Ocean, a point made regularly

16
The program has been extended.
17
Interview with U.S. Embassy political officer.
 39

by dissident Casamancais when they complain of the lack of attention they

receive from the government.

The Casamance is distinct from the remainder of Senegal in a number of ways.

First, whereas most of Senegal has an arid, quasi-desert environment, the
Casamance is fertile and forested. Whereas the Wolof tribe is the largest ethnic
group of Senegal (43 percent), Casamancais are descendants predominantly of
the Diola. Whereas many in northern Senegal speak French as a second
language, Casamancais speak Portuguese. Whereas almost 9G percent of the
population of Senegal are practicing Muslims, the Casamancais are mostly
Christian or animist. And whereas northern Senegal needs the Casamance for
the benefit of its crops and fertile lards, a faction in the Casamance does not
perceive that it needs Senegal. 18 After World War 11, a faction in the Casamance,
which grew into the Mouvement des ForcesDemocratiquesde Casamance (MFDC),
assisted the emerging government of Senegal in its move towards independence,
ostensibly in return for autonomy and land rights. However, according to MFDC
leaders, these promises never materialized, and this breach of faith has resulted
in a small separatist movement that exists there today.19

Beginning in the early 1980s, the MFDC became more militant and assumed
many of the characteristics of a terrorist organization-random bombings, hit-
and-run tactics, and harassment and intimidation of the local populace. Early on,
the Diouf government responded by deploying the gendarmerie's(military police)
Intervention Unit to suppress the attacks. However, despite increased military
and police presence in the region, the MFDC continued its attacks on
government officials in its struggle for autonomy.

The size of the movement has remained relatively small, around 300 by official
and media reports,2 leading many to believe that it does not have popular
Casamancais support. In 1990, Dakar appointed a military governor for the area
and provided military units for eliminating the threat once and for all. However,
while the governor has taken a basically militant approach in attempting to
resolve the issue, military personnel involved in the conflict have, as one
observer has argued, no clearcut guidelines on how to operate in the Casamance,
have not been sufficiently trained in counterinsurgency techniques, and do not
have sufficient understanding of the enemy they face-their own countrymen. 21

18
Department of the Army, 1974, various pages; The Europa World Yearbook, 1991, pp. 2302-2306;
Embassy political officer.
19
Da Costa, Peter, "The Secessionist South,- Afrima Report,Janu?_,y-February 1991, p. 22.
20Ibid., p. 22.
21
Political officer, U S. Embassy, Senegal.
40

In March 1991, President Diouf established a dialogue and achieved a fragile

ceasefire with the MFDC.22 It is dear that there are no easy solutions: The
MFDC wants independence and is prepared to fight toward this goal, regardless
of whether the majority of the Casamance supports it or not. Casamancais have
neither the experience nor institutions in place to govern. But beyond this, the
government of Senegal does not want and cannot afford for the Casamance to
secede since the majority of the country's agriculture is in the region.

So this fragile peace, while mutually beneficial, will not last without some
additional forms of governmental intercession. 3 Indeed, over the past ten years,
hundreds of people hae been killed, imprisoned, and tortured. Atrocities have
been committed by both the government and the MFDC. What is dear is that
there is a tremendous difference of opinion among the various complainants, and
the longer the government takes to resolve the issue, the longer it runs the risk of
further degrading its legitimacy and alienating more Casamancais.

Socioeconomic Ills
President Diouf inherited a country in economic stagnation. Although he has
been able to make broad improvements in Senegal's social and political position
in Africa, he has not been able to reverse the country's stagnant economy despite
the implementation of economic austerity measures and economic liberalization.
Therefore, although in real terms GNP increased during the 1980s, per capita
GNP registered no growth (see Figure 3.1) and actually declined by an annual
average of 1.2 percent from 1987 to 1989. The drop in annual income growth can
be attributed in large part to population growth, which exceeded 3 percent per
year.24 But Senegal's actual financial position is also in decline, because an ever-
increasing amount of its foreign credit is being used to acquire food for its
people. Decreases in export demand, an inability to increase agricultural
production to the level of self-sufficiency, lackluster improvements in education,
and unyielding labor unions that resist modernization have only served to
exacerbate tb. country's socioeconomic problems.

As a result of the lack of improvement in either the economy or the living

conditions of the people of Senegal, the country has experienced a large number
of strikes and riots during the past ten years. The Diouf Administration has
reacted decisively during these times of unrest in the belief that failure to do so

22A new cease-fire was signpd in July 1993.

23
Political officer, US. Embassy, Senegal.
24
The Europa World Yearbook, 1991, p. 2305.
 41

SPC GNP RMDD4O4 1•07,

800 - PC GNP growth 16

•14 S
700 a,. ýo
12
400 ,10

000
00 • .. . 2 S
200 -2
0 11 M

-6-

10. SOUCE Copldfo5h uoaWol erok9018

000
100-

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987

SOURCE: Compiled from The Europa Word Yearblook 1980-1 987

Figure 3.1-Per Capita Gross National Product (GNP) and Income Growth in Senegal

would adversely affect peace and security. In 1987, following a strike by the
national police, Diouf immediately fired 20 percent of the force and suspended
the remainder-using the gendarmerieand the military to maintain order while he
opened a dialogue in an attempt to redress some of the policemen's grievances.
In 1988, following the elections, a strike and riots instigated by the opposition
PDS, who alleged fraud by the ruling Socialist Party, resulted in the arrest of the
party leaders and a declaration of a state of emergency.25

In a virtually brilliant move toward interparty consensus and cooperation,

President Diouf recently appointed the leader of the PDS, Abdoulaye Wade, as
his minister of state. In 1991, during a transportation strike, President Diouf
brought in the army to drive the buses until the strikers returned to work,
resulting in almost no loss in public service. Also, student riots in 1984 and in
1988 to protest lack of employment opportunities for graduates resulted in the
government's pledge to take measures to improve the problem.

25The Europa World Yearbook, 1991, p. 2302; Banks et aL, 1990, p. 556.
42

President Diouf's basic position regarding conflict resolution is that the first step
involves the willingness on the part of the parties involved, of which the
government is always one, to open and sustain a dialogue. This willingness is
evident in the president's approach to internal problems with workers and
students, with separatists in the Casamance, with his neighbors--particularly in
Mauritania, The Gambia, and Liberia-and even with the political opposition.
To date it has proven extremely successful. However, by the end of 1992, the
president will also need to match actions with words as troubles along the
northern border and in the southern district both come to a head in December.26

The Armed Forces of Senegal

Senegal's military is a mostly volunteer force composed of an army, air force,
navy, and gendarmerie. It consists of about 12,000 personnel with the majority
(almost 90 percent) found in the army and gendarmerie. This represents a growth
in the armed forces of about 50 percent over the last 15 years.27 The president is
the commander-in-chief, and there is a civilian minister of defense. Former Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces LTG Mamadou Seck is an IMET graduate and is
strongly pro-Western and pro-United States. His decision not to retire, despite
exceeding the mandatory retirement date, has caused some consternation among
the upper echelons of the Senegalese government but is not anticipated to
destabilize either the military or the country. Indeed, Seck did retire in July 1993
and was succeeded by General Kieta.28

The Armed Forces of Senegal have a distinguished reputation in the region as a

well-disciplined and, if necessary, lethal force. The Senegalese army has a long
tradition of service throughout the world. Formed by the French in the 1850s as
the TirailleursSenegalese, they were well known in Africa, during both world
wars, and in Indochina as a fearless and extremely capable force. Upon Senegal's
achieving independence in 1960, the army retained many of its French
characteristics and, in some instances, retained French advisers and commanders
in a transitional capacity to ensure that the force developed into an appropriate
military.29 Even today, much of its training, equipment, and support is from the
French. Indeed, France provides more military aid to Senegal than any other
country 30 (although Germany and the United States have begun to play

26
UN support for the Mauritanian refugees expires on 31 December 1992. In addition, the
Casamancais separatists regard Christmas as th - anniversary of their movement.
27Department of the Army, 1974, p. x.
28SAO and deputy chief of mission in U.S. Embassy, Senegal, 1 July 1992.
29
Department of the Army, 1974, pp. 20 and 335.
33
U.S. Department of State, 1991, p. 4 . The United States ranks third in aid to Senegal.
 43

significant roles), maintains a presence of over 1,300 marines in-country, and

conducts annual exercises with the army in Senegal. More recently, Senegal's
army served with distinction in the Gulf War in 1991 and even now is in Liberia
as a major, stabilizing component of ECOMOG.

The major combat units of the army include the following battalions: six
infantry, one commando, one airborne, one armor, and one artillery. Combat
service support capabilities are contained in one transportation battalion and
communications, supply, medical, and maintenance companies. Five of the
infantry battalions are deployed throughout the country, one per district. The
remainder of the army is stationed in or near Dakar.31 The military has the
principal mission of defending Senegal against external or internal aggression.
However, other missions include search and rescue, medical evacuation, coastal
surveillance, and assisting in the development of Senegal. 32

Senegalese military engineers are renowned for their development efforts and
regard such efforts as their single most important mission.33 They constitute two
construction battalions and an engineer school One battalion is deployed
throughout the country, and the other is located near Thies. They are very active
in civic action projects, many of which are U.S.-funded, and have contributed
significantly to irirastructure improvements in the country through construction
and renovation of roads, schools, and medical and dental clinics. They are also
currently involved in a multiyear U.S.-funded project to construct a naval base at
Elinkine in the Casamance district and have been involved in the planning
process for the construction of a canal to transport fresh water from the Senegal
River in the north to Dakar.

The military medical department comprises over one-third of the total medical
capability of the country. As a result, most medical facilities in Senegal are
manned by both military and civilian doctors and treat both civilian and military
personnel. In addition, Senegalese military medical teams are periodically sent
to the more remote areas of Senegal to provide medical treatment in the absence
of civilian doctors.

Overall, the military is well organized and postured to assist the government in
the maintenance of order and development, as well as to ensure the territorial

31
US. Embassy, Senegal, 1992 Security Assistance Program,and SAO.
32
1bid.; director of operations for the Senegalese armed forces; Senegalese Engineer 3chool
representative.
33Senegalese Engineer School representative. The importance that the engineers place on
development is shared by the director of operations for the Senegalese Armed Forces. He sees the
engineer as fundamental to development in Senegal and believes that the president places the same
significance on engineers--based on the fact that Diouf's special assistant is an engineer.
44

integrity of the country. The force is predominantly equipped with French

equipment that is at the point of deterioration and will soon have to replaced.
The engineer battalions were issued U.S. construction equipment during the
1970s, much of which is now close to or beyond salvage. Yet, they continue to
fabricate parts to keeo them running. Medical clmics are getting some necessary
relief from drawdowi equipment coming out of Europe. And, due to Senegal's
participation with ECOMOG,34 the army L-.:eceivin'gmillions of dollars in excess
U.S. trucks, jeeps, communications equipment, weapons, soldier support items,
and ammunition. How its armed forces train for the future will foretell the
success of Senegal in its development efforts, because the military is an essential
element of Senegal's development.

Host-Nation Training Goals and Requirements

Senegal's military training goals and its use of U.S. military training are designed
to support and complement the development of its armed forces. The program is
well thought out. Soldiers designated for training in the United States are
programmed by the armed forces joint staff two years in advance. The military
leadership strives to pick the best-qualified personnel to represent their country
in the United States. The training for those military personnel selected is closely
associated with the follow-on assignment of that individual, and the single most
important training goal for the Senegalese armed forces is "to get the right
soldier the right training at the right time."35 U.S. training, then, becomes a
component of the Senegalese soldier's career development, in the same way that
the basic, advanced, command and staff, and senior service courses are critical to
the career progression of U.S. officers.

Using IMET funds, the Senegalese military recently procured six language labs to
improve the English proficiency of the military. Labs have been or are being
installed in Dakar, Thies, Saint Louis, and Kaolack and will provide the
capability to simultaneously teach 110 students. The military has also sent 16
personnel to the United States since 1987 to receive training in English-language-
instruction techniques. The Senegalese did this because they realized they were
wasting a considerable amount of their limited IMET grant funds in long courses
of English-language instruction in the United States. Teaching English to
prospective students in-country enables them to use IMET funds more efficiently.
Also, the military recognizes that English is rapidly becoming the universal

34Senegal is no longer a member of ECOMOG, although it is still receiving equipment originally

requested to support the operation.
35Director of operations for the Senegalese armed forces.
 45

language of peacekeeping, and since they envision Senegal participating in

multinational peacekeeping efforts, they will need to be fluent in English.
Indeed, the Senegalese government has also recently seen the importance of
English to future development and has made English instruction compulsory in
secondary schools.

Early on, Senegal recognized that sending young officers and soldiers to the
United States for training resulted in cultural overload: The individuals were not
mature enough to live and operate in the culturally diverse and dynamic
environment of the United States. As a result, the military leadership began to
get more involved in the selection process by ensuring that older, more mature
officers and soldiers, usually of higher rank, were selected for courses. They
began to move away from using the U.S.-offered basic courses (because they
usually were attended by younger officers) and began concentrating on higher
courses of instruction. 36 In 1986, they opened the equivalent of an Infantry
Officer Basic School to provide instruction to their junior officers themselves.
Today, training support from others outside Senegal is required at higher
institutions, such as advanced courses and command and staff and senior service
colleges, and in technical matters, such as engineering, computer science, and
medicine. Military leaders have also begun to take more interest in postgraduate
37
studies and in defense logistics and resource management programs.

A fundamental problem, however, lies in the fact that over 45 percent of the
armed forces is under 20 years of age.38 So, to provide the type of training that
enhances military tactical and technical proficiency while maintaining Senegal's
desire not to culturally overwhelm the younger soldiers (as happens in the
United States), more in-country training is required.

The U.S. Training Response

U.S. training objectives in Senegal support its Security Assistance goals there.
They are

* To seek to encourage and support stable democratic institutions in Senegal-

elections, independent press, religious freedom, and respect for human
rights.
0 To promote economic recovery and development in Senegal.

36
1bid.
37
U.S. Embassy, Senegal, 1992 Security Assistance Program,and 'JAO.
38Director of operations for the Senegalese armed forces.
46

"* To encourage a pro-U.S. orientation of the Senegalese armed forces.

"• To ensure continued U.S. access to Senegal's ports and airfields.
"* To support Senegal's peacekeeping role.
STo support and foster a disciplined Senegalese military responsive to civilian
authority. 39

The security assistance officer (SAO), in conjunction with the Senegalese Armed
Forces headquarters and the Embassy staff, develops a training program to
support Senegal's training requirements and priorities. The primary SAO
objectives for Senegal are to provide training that enhances the armed forces'
tactical and technical proficiency and logistical and managerial competence, to
build rapport between the two armed forces, and to provide an understanding of
U.S. culture.

Prior to 1980, 49 Senegalese students had been trained in the United States. That
number doubled during the period 1981 to 1985 and almost tripled from 1986 to
1990. In the . -.90s, Senegalese training in the United States seems to be averaging
around 30 students per year (see Table 3.1).40

In order to have an effect on Senegalese training needs and deficiencies, the SAO
has aggressively pursued other, in-country training means, including
employment of Mobile Training Teams from Europe and the United States,
utilization of naval resources such as the West African Training Cruise (WATC),
and participation in deployment-for-training exercises by both active and reserve
component engineer and medical units. In addition to funding as a result of
Presidential Determination 95-2 in November 1991, which provided almost $15
million in U.S. military drawdown materiel from Europe to Senegal, the SAO has

Table 3.1
U.S. Training in Senegal

1950 1981 1986

Typeof to to to
Training 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
Students 49 96 134 31 31 30
MTls 6
Exercises 1 2 5

39
U.S. Embassy, Senegal, 1992 Security Assistance Program.
40Dfense Security AssistanceAgency, 1990; GAO, 1987; U.S. Department of State, FYs 1990-1993;
SAO, U.S. Embassy, Senegal.
 47

pursued other methods, including reobligation of unused funds from other

countries, the African Coastal Security program, Civic Action prcgram funds,
and Military-Humanitarian Action funding. The primary purpose of this action
has been to show how the Security Assistance Program can indeed support
Senegal's development needs. The most telling statistic about the increase in
training and Security Assistance activity in Senegal is the increase in man-days
directed to the effort from the last quarter of fiscal year 1991 to the first quarter of
4
fiscal year 1992-from 90 man-days to 2,307 man-days. 1

All parties concerned-the SAO, U.S. trainers, and the Senegalese---have a'reed
on the method of conducting in-country training. Each U.S. soldier is paired
with a Senegalese soldier. They work together in an attempt to improve both
that single soldier's capability as well as to provide him the capability to pass the
knowledge on to other soldiers in his upit. This type of training is remarkable in
its difference from the French method of training. The French advisers come in
and tell the Senegalese on what they will be trained; they do not solicit the
Senegalese tra-iing needs. Then they conduct the training. Rarely is there any
testing, and the French never conduct live-fire training. They also do not
associate with the Senegalese during training breaks. The U.S. style of training is
much more interactive and, in the Senegalese view, more acceptable.

The U.S. trainer and soldiers come to the Senegalese and first ask where training
is required. The Senegalese and the U.S. soldiers then discuss training
approaches and agree upon intended outcomes. During the training, the U.S.
soldiers live and eat with the Senegalese soldiers. Senegalese soldiers are trained
to specific standards, and, within the ability of the Senegalese to provide the
ammunition, live-fire and qualification exercises are often conducted.42

Mobile TrainingTeams

Senegal has received several MTrs during FY 1992 designed to assist in

developing its military or in preparing soldiers for peacekeeping duties in
Liberia. Most MTs have been small, one- or two-man groups of subject-matter
experts in an area that the Senegalese military has requested support in. In
keeping with the SAO's primary goal to improve the Senegalese military's
maintenance and supply capability, most MTfs focus on training the trainer and
the user in these areas. For instance, three MTTs have trained Senegalese soldiers
and sailors on vehicle and boat maintenance-particularly preventive-

41
SAO, US. Embassy, Senegal.
42Discussions with various Senegalese officers.
48

maintenance procedures (an area that has up to now seemed foreign to the
Senegalese military). In addition, two MTTs have provided training on stockage
and requisition procedures, and have attempted to assist the army in establishing
a repair-parts account. Finally, in preparation for peacekeeping in Liberia, the
U.S. Air Force provided an MTT to provide training on airload procedures
aboard cargo aircraft.

The 3rd Special Forces Group, stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, has taken
an active role in assisting the SAO with the development of training programs
and has offered its services as often as practicable. The single constraint seems to
be on budget. However, it has provided personnel to film the area, in order to
prepare an informative film on Senegal and the environment and culture in
which U.S. trainers who deploy there will find themselves, and it is looking for
cheap methods of deploying teams to assist in construction and medical training,
such as hitching rides on ships with scheduled port calls in Dakar or aboard
periodically scheduled U.S. Air Force flights that depart Charleston, South
Carolina, en route to Africa.

Exercises and Deploymentfor Training

Both the National Guard and the 3rd Special Forces Group have actively sought
opportunities to conduct joint and combined exercises with the Senegalese
military. During the past year, the group participated in an exercise with the
Senegalese army designed to enhance Senegalese training in the following skills:
parachute operations, airfield seizure procedures, use of a variety of weapons,
and medical procedures (such as basic first aid). The National Guard has
conducted two exercises during FY 1992, under the National Guard Bureau
International Training and Assistance Program (ITAP), to work with the
Senegalese military on construction projects and regional medical operations.

The cost of deployment to Africa is excessive and becomes exorbitant if the unit
takes its own equipment. While it is generally recognized that the training
benefits of these deployments are enjoyed by all-the U.S. and Senegalese
militaries and the Senegalese civilians whose living conditions some of these
projects affect-other, cheaper options will have to be explored if the U.S. Army
is to continue to support these initiatives in the fiscally constrained future.

The annual WATC visited Senegal both in FY 1991 and FY 1992. This year, the
USS Manitowoc from Norfolk, Virginia, called on Dakar from 28 June 1992 to 1
July 1992. During their port call, the ship's personnel, sponsored by the defense
attache, conducted training orientations with Senegalese counterparts on naval
communications, engineering, and damage control. The training was conducted
 49

by first having the Senegalese sailors and officers meet their U.S. counterparts;
then both parties went to the Senegalese ship and reviewed Senegalese
procedures and ship status; after that, the parties went to the Manitowoc to see
how the U.S. Navy did the same thing. It gave each navy the opportunity to see
how the other did similar types of tasks, such as fire control or onboard
communications equipment repair. The training was designed primarily to build
rapport, trust, and confidence rather than to impart or improve knowledge in
some specific subject. At the same time, the Coast Guard element on the ship
met with their counterparts to discuss search and rescue and coastal patrol
procedures, and a 47-man Marine contingent gave training in amphibious and
airfield takedown procedures. Overall, the training, conducted in conjunction
with a port call, was a cheap and effective way to build rapport, trust, and
confidence between the two navies.43 Accompanying forces from the Coast
Guard, Marines, and the Army were able to work quite effectively with their
counterparts-the major obstacle being the lack of French-language expertise on
the part of the U.S. participants. 44

Training or Security Assistance Accomplishments

The principal goal of the SAO is to build raF port with the Senegalese military
and provide resources in return for continued access by the United States to key
facilities in Senegal. He has attempted to instill a confidence in the U.S.
willingness and ability to provide training and materiel to assist Senegal in its
development. In this respect, he has been successful. The SAO has an excellent
relationship with the Senegalese military, both at the junior-officer and senior-
officer levels. And by his aggressive pursuit of additional funds to assist the
military in training and the country in its development, he has shown that the
Security Assistance Program can work.

Remarkably, the Senegalese training program should be viewed as more mature

than many older programs. Since 1985, it has trained (or is training) 34 persoinel
in graduate-level military institutions in the United States. Such training has
increased the familiarity of the more senior Senegalese military officers with U.S.
tactics, techniques, equipment, and culture. Another 187 students have been
trained in specific areas designed to enhance their careers in their specific branch.
(See Table 3.2.) In all likelihood, given their headquarters' determination to

43
Defense attache, U.S. Embassy, Senegal.
44
Personal observations and discussions with members of the ship's crew and the defense
attach4.
50

Table 3.2
Training Provided to Senegalese Soldiers in the United States

Institution 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Military academies 2 1 1
Graduate-Level Institutions
Senior service
colleges 2 2 2 1 1
Command and Staff
Colleges 1 2 3 4 3 3 2 1 1
Graduate studies 1 1 2 2
Course
Amphibious warfare 1 1 1 1 1
Armor 2 1 1 2 2 1 1
Artillery 2 1 2 1 1
Aviation 1 1 1 1 1
Engineering 1 1 1 2 1 2 1
Finance 1 1 1 3 3
Infantry 23 4 4 5 9 7 7 8
Intelligence 1 7 4 2 1
Language training 4 4 4 2 2 2
Ordnance 3 2 1 3 1
Quartermaster 5 2 1 1 1 3 1 1
Signal 2 2 1 1 1
Transportation 1 1 4 2 2
SOURCE: Security assistance officer, U.S. Embas. ,Senegal.

select only the best Senegalese officers for training in the United States, many of
these officers will indeed become prominent in the military at some point in the
future. However, given the nature of the courses of study and the caliber of the
personnel sent, the officers should also be competitive in civilian careers after
they leave the service.

In addition to enhancing U.S. influence in Senegal, the CONUS-based courses

provided to the Senegalese students have resulted in a base of knowledge that
should improve both the armed forces and the ultimate development of the
country. The question is, Has it shown any marked improvement in the
development of the country or the professionalism of, and regard for human
rights by, the armed forces?

InternalDevelopment Improvements in Senegal

Before beginning a discussion of internal development in Senegal, it is important
to note that the armed forces are a very small component of society there-less
than 1 percent of the total population. The country has a five-year plan divided
 51

into four basic levels of investment. The first level is designed to improve
agriculture, livestock, fisheries, and water supply. The second level is designed
to develop and promote energy, industry, and Senegalese craftsmanship. The
third level is designed to promote tourism, trade, transportation, and
telecommunications. And the fourth level is designed to address urban, health
care, education, cultural, and youth development needs. The five-year plan
programmed approximately 464 billion francs from 1981 to 1985 and 645 billion
francs from,. 1985 to 1989.45 So, there are several major development programs
ongoing in Senegal that do not even involve the military. Indeed, the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID), itself with a $30 million
program for Senegal during this fiscal year, is prohibited by law from working
with the host-nation military. 46

However, the military and the engineers, in particular, are simultaneously at the
beginning and end of development in Senegal. The military develops the
discipline and knowledge of young soldiers, again 45 percent of whom are under
20 years old. As +G-esesoldiers leave the service, they take with them knowledge
gained in the army. Former military engineers become cointractors and compete
along with other civilian contractors for construction projects, both civilian and
government. Medics and doctors leave the army to become medical practitioners
in their local communities. Pilots leave the air force to become pilots on Air
Senegal; aviation mechanics become mechanics with the same airline. And many
senior officers, schooled by France and the United States in national planning
and strategy, become important participants in the national and local
47
governments.

Today, the military itself, with very little aid from the United States (around $5
million over the last five years), has become very active in infrastructure
development. Engineers have built or are building and renovating roads,
medical and dental clinics, and schools around the country, and a navy base in
southern Senegal. They do so either independently or with the assistance of U.S.
engineers who deploy to Senegal to train with the Senegalese engineers. Doctors
provide much-needed medical attention to people throughout the country. And
soldiers in general provide President Diouf with a unique capability to restore
services that are often disrupted by strikes. Military personnel, trained to drive
and maintain military vehicles by the United States, France, and Germany, are

¢tThe Europa World Yearbook, 1984, p. 2342, and 1987, p. 2375. In 1984, 464 billion francs equalled
approximately $1.1 billion; in 1987,645 billion francs equalled approximately $2 billion. It is not clear
how much of thes- hinds was actually expended on development, if any.
46
Interview with USAID representative in Senegal.
47Director of operations for the Senegalese armed forces; Senegalese Engineer School
representative; SAO.
52

capable of operating any of the different types of transportaion assets in the

country-buses, trucks, ferries, boats, planes, and even trains.

InternalDefense

Senegal's infantry battalions are strategically deployed throughout the country,

one per district, primarily for external security purposes and also as a stabilizing
function: People are less ready to rise up in the face of an infantry battalion.
However, with the exception of the Casamance, Senegal's infantry has not been
used against its own people. Senegal's army is considered to be an indomitable
force in the region and fully capable of defending its territorial integrity against
any external attack, with the possible exception of Mal. Training by the United
States recently has been designed to enhance an already capable force. Most
infantrymen who return to the United States for infantry training also attend
airborne training at Fort Benning, Georgia. Recent MTTs have enhanced light
infantry techniques-mainly in parachute and airfield takedown procedures-
enabling the infantry to become more responsive to disorder in the Casamance
and to be more effective in Liberia.

Until recently, the only forces used in the Casamance, the major area of civil
unrest in Senegal, were the gendarmerie. While they represent almost 30 percent
of Senegal's armed forces, and are engaged in a small but growing
counterinsurgency operation in the Casamance, they are prohibited from being
trained by Section 660D of the Foreign Assistance Act because they are
considered to be police. More recently, after some criticism, the gendarmerie's
human-rights record has improved, which may, in fact, be because they are an
elite group with a strong tradition of service and recognize the detrimental
effects of blatantly killing or torturing their own citizens. However, if
improvements are to be made in human rights in the former French West Africa,
then the gendarmeriewill have to be trained. They are not a police force like the
French gendarmerie. They are more like a military police unit whose primary
responsibility is the internal defense of Senegal4 8 They have the capability to
deploy to other countries (when invited) and intervene in unrest, and have been
used in this capacity before. Hrwever, prolonging the situation in the
Casamance only serves to further destroy Senegal's otherwise good human-
rights record.49

"4Interview
49
with chief, Security Assistance (Africa Region), HQ USEUCOM.
Da Costa, "The Secessionist South," 1991, p. 23.
 53

Senegal Summary
Training only facilitates development; it does not, in and of itself, improve living
conditions. Training in Senegal is provided by a number of U.S. agencies and
other countries. While improved coordination of training is both necessary and
desirable between the various international contributors and, within the United
States, between various agencies, any attempt to do so given the various political
interests in Senegal must be considered as a long-term objective. However, with
the full participation of a government dedicated to democratic development (as
Senegal is), the types of training being provided to the military serve a useful and
beneficial purpose. It is constructive in that it develops the military institution. It
is complementary in that it assists in the development of infrastructure and results
in the amelioration of some otherwise negative living conditions. And it is
supportive in that it improves the knowledge base and discipline of future
members of the civil sector.

Training in the United States is beneficial because of the interaction with other
U.S. and foreign students. However, because of fiscal constraints, it touches only
a small percentage of the target population. Expanded IMET, in which civilians
can be trained as well, only makes the target population larger.5° Therefore,
innovative and aggressive approaches to training in Senegal itself serve the
multiple ends of familiarizing U.S. personnel with the area and culture and
familiarizig and training many more Senegalese with U.S. personnel,
equipment, and tactics. More trained soldiers, sailors, and airmen, especially
those who would not otherwise be provided the quality of training they get from
U.S. trainers, result in a more professional military. This is assuming that the
military wants or can take more training.51

Training enhancements in Senegal should be considered along the following four

general vectors:

Increased In-Country Training. To increase exposure of more Senegalese

military personnel to U.S. tactics, equipment, personnel, and culture, a more
robust, long-term in-country training program should be instituted. At the same
time, it would provide those U.S. personnel and units having a regional
orientation the opportunity to maintain their readiness while achieving U.S.
training objectives for the Senegalese military. Particular emphasis should be
placed on combat service support subjects, such as construction, medicine,

50The Armed Forces of Senegal are opposed to any program that educates civilians in lieu of the
miitar,7 because it takes away from the funds available to the military.
51The Senegalese armed forces operations director is personally involved in all aspects of US.
training offers and wants to ensure that each proposal supports their training goals and objectives.
54

transportation, maintenance, logistics, and civil affairs, to build on the fledgling

strengths of the military and on counterinsurgency techniques in order to quell
the unrest in the Casamance in the most peaceful and humane way possible. In
particular, the number of engineers trained in the United States over the past five
years does not support the importance that the Senegalese military seems to put
on development. 52 In-country training programs expose more soldiers and
officers to detailed and intense training programs cooperatively developed by the
Senegalese with the assistance of the SAO. If the Senegalese are reluctant to send
more engineers to the United States, they may be more receptive to deployments
of MITs or TAFTs designed to provide more intense, long-*erm training.

Training Base. To facilitate continued U.S. training of the engineer battalions

and cooperative construction projects of the nature described in this case study,
cc-asideration should be given to negotiating with the government of Senegal the
staging of a composite set of equipment from those units deactivated in Europe.
Such staging would reduce the per-deployment cost of engineer and medical
units that come to West Africa to train or build. 53 At some point in the near
future, Senegal's engineer battalion will also require newer equipment. If
development is to continue to be a priority (for Senegal and the United States),
equipment and spare parts will have to be updated.

Counterinsurgency Training. Training of the gendarmerieand the other military

units deployed in the Casamance on counterinsurgency techniques, as well as an
ambitious development program in Casamance, will illustrate that Dakar is
concerned about the welfare and legitimate needs of the Casamancais and may
serve to turn the tide on a slowly growing separatist movement there. However,
training of the gendarmeriewill require a congressional waiver to Section 660D of
the Foreign Assistance Act.

Expanded IMET. Expanded IMET has a place in Senegal. The Embassy has
presented the new program to the government of Senegal and is prepared to
implement it once it is more developed. On their own, the Senegalese military
have taken advantage of Defense Resource Management courses and other
programming and budgeting courses designed to give them some experience in
U.S. methods of managing larger military institutions. However, other, broader
issues are affecting the stability of Senegal that could be addressed through

12There are other avenues of training (e.g., France), which may explain this anomaly.
53
" Me SAO has already begun the development of a project proposal that would result in a
staging area for US. forces that deploy to Senegal It considers sufficient space for approximately 50
personnel with equipment, at a cost of $170,000. It does not consider the cost of a permanent pre-
positioned material configured in unit sets (POMCUS)-type facility that could be used to store
equipment during the time between deployments.
 55

IMET-E, possibly cooperatively with other U.S. agencies, instead of only DoD, as
currently limited by law. Beyond this, however, is the need to identify any
IMET-E allocation separately and in addition to the current IMET program, or it
will not be accepted by the current chief of staff. And strong consideration
should be given to personnel exchange programs that allow government and
civilian personnel the opportunity to experience U.S. methods of governance.
Finally, exportable IMET-E programs will be accepted much more readily than
requiring a government minister or civil servant to go to the United States for an
extended period.

Senegal is a good example of an emerging democracy. It plays a major role in

regional stability and has substantial influence and stature with its neighbors.
The 1992 conference for the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was held in
Dakar in June 1992. President Diouf is this year's president of the OAU and has a
major role to play in ECOWAS. However, Senegal has a continuing problem
with a stagnant eccnomy. To rise to the next level of stability and democracy,
Senegal must find a way to refurbish its economy. A well-trained military can
contribute, as a disciplined member of the federal government, toward national
development and, at the same time, provide a stabilizing influence within both
the country and the region during times of strife. With a relatively snall
program from the United States, the Senegalese military has been able to take
advantage of the best the United States military has to offer, from branch
advanced courses to the various military academies. In the years that follow,
U.S. training should contribute to any success enjoyed by Senegal. Future
training strategies of both military and civilian personnel must focus on those
areas with which the country is st-uggling, such as its economic growth needs, its
gendarmerie,and specific types of training and programs that will ultimately
improve the living conditions and overall satisfac~tion of the Senegalese people.
56

4. Conclusions and Recommendations

The purpose of these two case studies has been to assess the effectiveness of
training to foreign students and its impact on the internal defense and
development (IDAD) of those students' countries. It is curious that, while U.S.
national security interests relate to IDAD, none of the stated or perceived IMET
training objectives e des. A dichotomy in interests and objectives exists here
because, whereas national interests are designed to result in a more stable and
secure world, training objectives appear to be designed to expand U.S. influence.
Taken in isolation, it is difficult to assess the contribution of training to overall
increases in world stability or U.S. influence abroad. It is just as difficult to assess
the success of training as a contributor to a country's development or the
improvement of conditions in a country because of the diffuse nature of the
environment. Clearly the instabilities that exist can be addressed somewhat
through training. However, many, much more difficult issues must also
simultaneously be addressed-by the affected nation and not by the United
States. The United States can subtly persist in its assistance attempts, but it is the
host nation that must commit itself to reform and development. Otherwise, the
reforms and development will not last.

Key Findings
Republic of Liberia
To blame the U.S. training pregram for the failure of U.S. policy or the Liberian
government would be ludicrous. It is clear that U.S. training did not have any
impact whatsoever on preventing the downfall of the government. Neither the
training nor the ccrisiderable investment in U.S. aid swayed the government's
performance or provided the United States with any leverage during the 1980s.
From the study of the country during the Doe years, some key findings emerge
that should be considered in future policymaking.

The ethnocentricity of the Doe regime divested the government of its ability to
provide for the needs of all its people and spawned the distrust and, ultimately,
the loss of legitimacy that rushed its downfall. And there now exists a blatant
disregard for life, particularly by the children in the NPFL. These may become
the most important obstacles to resolving the almost three-year-old civil war.
 57

Training did not effectively improve the professionalism or capabilities of the

Liberian army. It had no understanding of the role that a military plays in a
democratic government or of the military's role in countering insurgency.
Leaders were consumed by corruption and lacked concern for the individual
soldier. While most students who came to the United States seemed to be on a
par with their U.S. counterparts, they were not successful in transferring either
the quality of instruction or the quality of life found in the United States. Also,
despite training in engineering, Liberian military personnel proved incapable of
managing even small-scale development projects without considerable oversight
from U.S. engineers. Likewise, MTT team chiefs were struck by the necessity to
"start from ground zero" every time a team went to Liberia. Increased
monitoring and influence in the future will be required to ensure that training
contributes to the overall effectiveness of the military and development of the
nation.

All that may have been achieved in the 1980s as a result of the huge expenditure
of U.S. aid has been lost in the devastation of the last two years. Infrastructure
improvements have been destroyed. Military and civilian leaders, who may not
have been adequate in the first place, have been killed or exiled. Clearly, if the
United States decides to become involved in Liberia again-and this must be
considered at length first-it must not approach the devastating situation there
in a business-as-usual manner. The reconstruction and training of Liberia will
require extraordinary measures for many years to come. For details, see "Liberia
Summary," pp. 26-33.

Republic of Senegal
Senegal is a progressive democratic society supported by a disciplined and
capable military subject to civil control and direction. The military believes that
one of its fundamental purposes is to participate in the development of its nation.
To this end, the Senegalese military puts great emphasis on professionalism and
civic action. The leadership manages closely the training provided by donor
nations and ensures that it meets their needs and fits into their schedule. If the
military is receptive to additional U.S. training, consideration should be given to
providing more in-country training, particularly by the 3rd Special Forces Group,
other U.S. combat support and service support units (engineering, medical, civil
affairs, maintenance, logistics, transpo'tation), and through more focused
training in the United States on subjects that contribute directly to IDAD.

Ultimately, if training becomes institutionalized in Senegal, it may be appropriate

to negotiate with the government to develop an austere, permanent or
58

semipermanent U.S. training staging base to more efficiently manage overseas

deployments to West Africa. The installation would provide a base of operations
for U.S.-deployed forces in Senegal as well as a projection point to other
locations in Africa for civic action and humanitarian assistance. Also, because
the U.S. reserve component may become the force of choice for these types of
missions in the future, consideration should be given to maintaining a composite
set of equipment for their use during operations there.

Increased interaction between USAID and the U.S. and Senegalese militaries will
ensure more coordinated and capable civic actions in Senegal. USAID's goals in
Senegal and those of the SAO and the Senegalese militaries coincide in some
respects.1 While USAID should continue to focus on initiatives that enhance and
develop the civiian sector, the military may be the only capability available in
certain districts because of the unsecure and, in some cases, almost uninhabitable
areas of the country. Additionally, USAID's budget and the positive image of the
popular Senegalese military assisting in the development of its nation will be
received well by a citizenry in need of so much.

Senegal's socioeconomic problems require a separate assessment and quick

action designed to redress the grievances of the people. Such action may require
training in institutions outside the Department of Defense but must be
accomplished if economic stagnation is to be reversed. The military's impact in
these areas is minimal at best. The actions of USAID are, likewise, aimed at the
margin. However, training of targeted key individuals in a program similar to
IMET-E may have the best chances of success because it will enable them to be
trained in areas that will improve the social, economic, political, and, ultimately,
the institutional aspects of Senegal. For details, see "Senegal Summary," pp. 53-
55 of this report.

Is IDAD TrainingImportant?

What does training in internal defense and development do for African

countries? In a situation where most countries in Africa have barely enough food
to feed themselves and where many go without shelter and food, training in
internal development provides an aspect of hope.

Through cooperative programs such as civic action, in which the host-nation

military, working with the U.S. military, provides a service or a facility for the
civilians in order to improve their immediate or long-term living conditions,

1
USAID's four basic country goals are population control, increased agricultural productivity,
reforestation, and liberalization of markets. USAID representative, Senegal, June 1992.
 59

training improves the host nation's ability to provide for its people. Training in
the United States in engineering, medicine, signals and communication, and
transportation provide improvements in the professionalism of the military.
When the soldier returns home, he is more capable of responding to the needs of
his people in a professional, competent way. And when he leaves the military,
he has acquired a skill that serves to improve the community, if utilized.

Of course, there are some fundamental requirements for IDAD to succeed. First,
the government must be committed to its success. While this may sound like
rhetoric, it is clear that while Senegal is committed, Liberia was not. Corruption
and ethnic discrimination by the government were clear signals that Liberia was
not interested in improving the living conditions for more than a select few. In
situations such as these, the United States must be prepared to take firm action to
ensure that the host government clearly understands the consequences of lack of
progress toward internal defense and development

Second, if the military is to participate in IDAD, it must understand what its role
and position in the government are and must abide by that understanding.
Again, the contrast between Senegal and Liberia is extraordinary. Senegal's
military believes that its fundamental role is to participate in the development of
Senegal-not for its own betterment but for the betterment of the Senegalese. It
also understands that it is only one of the many participants involved in IDAD
there. From Senegal's perspective, training in management and professional
skills serves to contribute immediately and ultimately to the internal defense and
development of the country. With regard to Liberia, training to implement an
effective IDAD strategy may be critical to its future.

Does IMET-E Have a Futurein Africa?

Expanded IMET will ultimately enhance the training of selected individuals in

Africa. Currently, in many countries, there is a poor understanding of the role
and position of the military-both on the part of the military and the civilians in
government. Human-rights and judicial reform are essential in a number of
countries. Financial management and better management of the defense
establishments of these small countries are critical.

However, as important as these types of programs are, the instruction in tactics,

strategy, and other defense issues is just as important to African military leaders.
In an environment where many of these militaries can hardly afford to train their
personnel at all, the United States-grant IMET program provides them with
some relief. These militaries will not be in favor of instituting a program for
civilians, then, that takes away from that training capability. Therefore, the
60

IMET-E program must be separate and in addition to a country's regular IMET

program if it is to succeed. Also, because there are clearly other educational
needs that should be addressed as well in order for internal development to
succeed, the scope of IMET-E should be increased to encompass them.

In addition to increasing IMET-E in scope, some additional improvement in how

it is solicited in the country will also need to be made. At present, the SAO
represents the IMET program to the country. If the intent is to gain support for
attendance at schools or MTT sessions in-country by members of other agencies
in that government, then broader participation by the U.S. Embassy will be
necessary.

Will the Real Reason Please Stand Up?

An examination of the objectives of training foreign militaries reveals that there
were significant differences in the effect on IDAD in the two countries studied
(see Table 4.1). The difference is because training is only a very small part of the
many components and factors that contribute to a successful IDAD strategy in a
country. All agencies must be committed to taking appropriate actions, actions
that show that the government is concerned for the welfare and improvement of
its people. Military training may have a long-term improvement of such

Table 4.1
The Success of Training in Africa

Stated or Perceived Objectives Liberia Senegal

Congressional objectives
"* Establish mutually beneficial relationships No Yes
"* Improve foreign self-reliance No Some
"* Improve understanding of human rights No Unknown
Department of Defense objectives
* Improve operational and maintenance capability No Some
* Develop expertise and systems to effectively manage the No Yes
defense establishment
* Foster development of an indigenous training capability No Yes
* Promote military rapport and understanding No Yes
Military perceptions
0 Build military-to-military relationships No Yes
* Facilitate interoperability No Yes
* Gain irfluence Some Yes
Recipient's perception
"* Meet a financial need Yes Yes
"• Provide quality training that is internally lacking Yes Yes
 61

commitment in that it educates people who ultimately may move into positions
of prominence and may remember the training they received. Or they may not.
The burdens of trying to implement what was learned in the "pristine"
environment of the United States may just be too difficult when a soldier or an
officer returns to his home.

A review of Table 4.1 shows that there is some similarity in the U.S. objectives
and perceptions. Congress, DoD, and those interviewed all indicated an interest
in developing beneficial relationships. Both Congress and DoD indicate an
interest in fostering self-reliance, although it is not clear that there are actual
goals and milestones established for the development of a self-reliant military
establishment that would result in the decline in U.S. training in that country. In
fact, it may be counterproductive to instill self-reliance because it would
negatively affect U.S. influence.

What is interesting about both the stated and perceived objectives in Table 4.1 is
the difference in the success achieved in Senegal and Liberia. This difference
points to the fact that other factors beyond training have significant influence on
the success of IDAD in countries the United States seeks to assist. It also points
to the need to better assess movement by aid recipients in directions supported
by the United States. Perhaps U.S. objectives are overly ambitious and should be
reconsidered as a component of a comprehensive assistance program rather than
in isolation.

Indeed, current U.S. training objectives may be difficult to attain until a point of
contention arises. For instance, it was not clear whether Senegal would stand up
with the coalition during the Gulf War until it happened. Similarly, in the end,
the Liberian armed forces did not do what the United States wanted or what was
in their best interests and were destroyed by a numerically inferior force. And
while interoperabilitycan be assessed during combined exercises, it is not clear
that a country will respond to the same threat to which the United States
responds unti± the threat occurs. At best, the training (and equipment) provided
by the United States does one key thing- It provides a service the host nation
neither has nor is capable of providing because of a lack of resources or
experience. Whether the result of providing this service .vMil be one that is
beneficial to the United States, however, is problematic.

A key difference between the objectives of the United States and those of the
recipients seems to lie in whose interests the training is believed to serve. The
recipient seems willing to cope with the stated, self-serving objectives of the
United States in the interest of filling an institutional void with what it knows is a
62

high-quality "filler"-training paid for by the United States-as long as it does

not interfere with that country's interests.

Perhaps the most cogent objective of training is stated in Webster's Ninth New
CollegiateDictionary,wherein training is defined as the act of teaching "so as to
make fit, qualified, or proficient." 2 If this definition were to be adopted as its
primary objectives, then U.S. training to standard in tactics, professioialism,
leadership, and technical courses would be provided to foreign militaries in
order for them to be more capable against external enemies and internal
subversive elements. Moreover, training to standard and its application within
the host country can be measured more objectively than can the current
objectives and policies governing IMET. As in the U.S. military, training would
then improve the readiness of that foreign force. And, as in the U.S. military,
training would enhance the professional development, leadership, and
managerial expertise of foreign militaries, and through them the ultimate
development of their countries.

Whereas seeking to improve a foreign military may result ultimately in not

having to employ U.S. combat forces at some later date, attempting to focus on
objectives that seek to obtain leverage or influence has only in the past resulted in
accusations, resentment, and fears of infringement on a nation's sovereignty.
With the dictionary's definition as the primary objective, as it is for U.S. students
attending the same courses, the other "stated objectives and perceptions" may
ultimately become results.

2
Merriam-Webster, Inc., 1990, p. 1251, definition 3b of the verb train.
 63

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