2023 Fed Stress Tests

2023 Federal Reserve Stress Test Results
June 2023
B O A R D O F G OV E R N O R S O F T H E F E D E R A L R E S E RV E S Y S T E M
The Federal Reserve System is the central
bank of the United States. It performs five key
functions to promote the effective operation
of the U.S. economy and, more generally, the
public interest.
The Federal Reserve
■ conducts the nation’s monetary policy to promote maximum employment

and stable prices in the U.S. economy;
■ promotes the stability of the financial system and seeks to minimize

and contain systemic risks through active monitoring and engagement in
the U.S. and abroad;
■ promotes the safety and soundness of individual financial institutions

and monitors their impact on the financial system as a whole;
■ fosters payment and settlement system safety and efficiency through

services to the banking industry and U.S. government that facilitate
U.S.-dollar transactions and payments; and
■ promotes consumer protection and community development through

consumer-focused supervision and examination, research and analysis of
emerging consumer issues and trends, community economic development
activities, and administration of consumer laws and regulations.
To learn more about us, visit www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed.htm.

i
Contents
Preface .............................................................................................................................. iii

Executive Summary ......................................................................................................... 1
Background ....................................................................................................................... 3
Stress Test Process ........................................................................................................... 3
Participating Banks ............................................................................................................ 3
Results for Banks under the Severely Adverse Scenario ......................................... 7

Capital .............................................................................................................................. 7
Pre-tax Net Income ........................................................................................................... 13
Losses ............................................................................................................................ 17
Pre-provision Net Revenue ................................................................................................ 21
Appendix A: Additional Bank-Specific Results ......................................................... 25
Appendix B: Disclosure Loan Category Definitions ................................................. 51

iii
Preface
The Federal Reserve promotes a safe, sound, and efficient banking system that supports the U.S.
economy through its supervision and regulation of domestic and foreign banks.
As part of its supervision efforts, the Federal Reserve conducts annually a supervisory stress test.
The stress test assesses how large banks are likely to perform under hypothetical economic
conditions.1 Figure 1 summarizes the stress test cycle.
Figure 1. How stress testing works for large banks
The Federal Reserve conducts stress tests to ensure that large banks are sufficiently capitalized and able to lend to
households and businesses even in a severe recession. The stress tests evaluate the financial resilience of banks by
estimating losses, revenues, expenses, and resulting capital levels under hypothetical economic conditions.
The Federal Reserve develops

stress test scenarios
The Federal Reserve develops

or selects stress test models
Using the scenario data and bank The Federal Reserve

data as variables in the stress uses the results of the
test models, the supervisory stress test,
Federal Reserve projects how in part, to set capital
Banks submit detailed bank data banks are likely to perform under requirements for
hypothetical economic conditions participating banks
The stress tests ensure that large banks are sufficiently capitalized and able to lend to house-
holds and businesses even in a severe recession. They evaluate the financial resilience of banks
by estimating losses, revenues, expenses, and resulting capital levels under hypothetical eco-
nomic conditions.
1
U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs), covered savings and loan holding companies (SLHCs), and intermediate holding
companies of foreign banking organizations (IHCs) with $100 billion or more in assets are subject to the Federal
Reserve Board’s supervisory stress test rules (12 C.F.R. pt. 238, subpt. O; 12 C.F.R. pt. 252, subpt. E) and capital plan-
ning requirements (12 C.F.R. § 225.8; 12 C.F.R. pt. 238, subpt. S).
iv 2023 Federal Reserve Stress Test Results
As part of this cycle, the Federal Reserve publishes four documents:

• Stress Test Scenarios describes the hypothetical economic conditions used in the supervisory
stress test. The Stress Test Scenarios document is typically published by mid-February.
• Supervisory Stress Test Methodology provides details about the models and methodologies used
in the supervisory stress test.
• Federal Reserve Stress Test Results reports the aggregate and individual bank results of the
supervisory stress test, which assesses whether banks are sufficiently capitalized to absorb
losses during a severe recession. The Federal Reserve Stress Test Results document is typically
published at the end of the second quarter.
• Large Bank Capital Requirements announces the individual capital requirements for all large
banks, which are partially determined by the results of the supervisory stress test. The Large
Bank Capital Requirements document is typically published during the third quarter.
These publications can be found on the Stress Test Publications page (https://
www.federalreserve.gov/publications/dodd-frank-act-stress-test-publications.htm).
For information on the Federal Reserve’s supervision of large financial institutions, see https://
www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/large-financial-institutions.htm. For information on the Fed-
eral Reserve’s supervision of capital planning processes of banks, see https://
www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/stress-tests-capital-planning.htm.
For more information on how the Federal Reserve Board promotes the safety and soundness of
the banking system, see https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg.htm.
1
Executive Summary
The 2023 stress test shows that the 23 large banks subject to the test this year have sufficient
capital to absorb more than $540 billion in losses and continue lending to households and busi-
nesses under stressful conditions. In the immediate years after the 2007–09 Global Financial
Crisis, banks subject to the stress test substantially increased their capital, which has remained
largely level for the past few years (see figure 2). The aggregate and individual bank post-stress
common equity tier 1 (CET1) capital ratios remain well above the required minimum levels
throughout the projection horizon.
Figure 2. Aggregate common equity capital ratio for 23 banks in the 2023 stress test
14 Percent
12
10
4
2009:Q1
2010:Q1
2011:Q1
2012:Q1
2013:Q1
2014:Q1
2015:Q1
2016:Q1
2017:Q1
2018:Q1
2019:Q1
2020:Q1
2021:Q1
2022:Q1
2023:Q1
Note: The Federal Reserve’s evaluation of a bank’s common equity capital was initially measured using a tier 1 common
capital ratio but now is evaluated using a common equity tier 1 capital ratio. Not all of the banks included in the 2023
stress test reported data for all periods since 2009.
Source: FR Y-9C.
Under the severely adverse scenario, the aggregate CET1 capital ratio of the 23 banks falls from
an actual 12.4 percent in the fourth quarter of 2022 to its minimum of 10.1 percent, before rising
to 10.7 percent at the end of the projection horizon (see table 1). The 2.3 percentage point aggre-
gate decline this year is smaller than the aggregate decline of 2.7 percentage points last year, but
comparable to aggregate declines in recent years (see box 2 for more information). While the
decline in the aggregate capital ratio was smaller this year than last, the results vary significantly
across different types of banks. The largest banks entered the stress test with large unrealized
2 2023 Federal Reserve Stress Test Results
Table 1. Aggregate capital ratios, actual, projected 2023:Q1–2025:Q1, and regulatory minimums
Percent
Stressed minimum capital ratios, Minimum regulatory

Regulatory ratio Actual 2022:Q4
severely adverse capital ratios
Common equity tier 1 capital ratio 12.4 10.1 4.5
Tier 1 capital ratio 14.1 11.8 6.0
Total capital ratio 16.1 14.1 8.0
Tier 1 leverage ratio 7.5 6.2 4.0
Supplementary leverage ratio 6.3 5.2 3.0
Note: The capital ratios are calculated using the capital action assumptions provided within the supervisory stress testing rules. See
12 C.F.R. §238.132(d); 12 C.F.R. §252.44(c). These projections represent hypothetical estimates that involve an economic outcome that is
more adverse than expected. The minimum capital ratios are for the period 2023:Q1 to 2025:Q1. Supplementary leverage ratio projections
only include estimates for banks subject to Category I, II, or III standards.
losses on securities portfolios.2 The values of these securities appreciate in the scenario as
interest rates are projected to decline. On average, this results in somewhat smaller capital ratio
declines for the largest banks. However, banks with concentrations in mortgages, credit cards, and
commercial real estate generally had larger declines in post-stress capital ratios this year.
While stress tests are one of many supervisory tools, they are the most risk-sensitive and dynamic
component of the regulatory capital framework. They help ensure banks can withstand acute finan-
cial stress and still be able to lend to households and businesses. However, recent events have
highlighted the need for humility when assessing large bank resilience. Stress tests should con-
tinue to evolve over time to reflect an appropriately wide range of risks in today’s complex and
interconnected financial system. The exploratory analysis conducted this year demonstrates the
capacity of supervisory stress testing to test for a wider range of risks and the value of doing so.
Further details of the results are provided in the “Results for Banks under the Severely Adverse
Scenario” section of this report, which includes results presented both in the aggregate and for
individual banks, as well as results highlights in “Box 2. Results Highlights from 2019 to 2023.”
This report includes

• background information regarding the 2023 stress test,
• description of stress test model changes,
• stress test results and highlights, and
• bank-specific stress test results (appendix A).
2
Only firms subject to Category I or II standards or firms that opt in are required to include unrealized gains and losses
on securities in the calculation of capital. Category III and IV firms are not required to include unrealized gains and
losses on securities in the calculation of capital.
3
Background
The results of the 2023 stress test include information for each bank, such as capital ratios,
pre-tax net income, losses, revenues, and expenses, projected under severely adverse economic
and financial conditions.
Stress Test Process

The Federal Reserve projects these stress test results using a set of supervisory models that take
as inputs bank-provided data on their financial conditions and risk characteristics, as well as the
Federal Reserve’s scenarios. The stress test uses models developed or selected by the Federal
Reserve, which may be refined each year in advance of the stress test, and these models use
bank-provided data collected primarily through regulatory reporting.3 This year, the supervisory
severely adverse scenario is characterized by a severe global recession accompanied by a period
of heightened stress in commercial and residential real estate, as well as corporate debt markets.4
Participating Banks
A total of 23 banks are participating in this year’s stress test.5 Figure 3 shows when different
types of banks are required to participate in the stress test, and table 2 lists participating banks.
In 2022, 33 banks participated in the stress test because Category IV banks are generally
required to participate in the test only every other year.6 Therefore, the aggregate results reported
for the 2023 stress test are not fully comparable with the 2022 stress test results.
3
For more information on the models and bank-provided data, see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
2023 Supervisory Stress Test Methodology (Washington: Board of Governors, June 2023), https://
www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2023-june-supervisory-stress-test-methodology.pdf.
4
For more information on the scenarios, see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2023 Stress Test Sce-
narios (Washington: Board of Governors, February 2023), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/
files/bcreg20230209a1.pdf.
5
The Federal Reserve expects banks to wait until after 4:30 p.m. EDT on Friday, June 30, 2023, to publicly disclose any
information about their planned capital actions and stress capital buffer requirements. This will give all banks sufficient
time to examine and understand their results.
6
On October 10, 2019, the Board finalized a rule amending its stress test rules to subject certain banks with total con-
solidated assets between $100 billion and $250 billion to the supervisory stress test requirements on a two-year cycle
(Prudential Standards, 84 Fed. Reg. 59,032 (Nov. 1, 2019)). Because of this rule change, the number of banks in this
year’s stress test is different from the 33 banks that participated in last year’s stress test. For more information on
which banks participated in the 2022 stress test, see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Dodd-Frank
Act Stress Test 2022: Supervisory Stress Test Results (Washington: Board of Governors, June 2022), https://
www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2022-dfast-results-20220623.pdf.
Figure 3. When bank holding companies are required to participate in the stress test
The Board conducts stress tests of bank holding companies it supervises on an annual or two-year cycle. Based on a
bank holding company’s financial condition, size, complexity, risk profile, risks to the U.S. economy, or scope of opera-
tions or activities, the Board may conduct a stress test of a bank holding company more or less frequently than
required.
U.S. global systemically important bank holding companies (Category I)
Domestic and foreign bank holding companies with $700 billion or more in total assets
or $75 billion or more in cross-jurisdictional activity (Category II)
Every year Domestic and foreign bank holding companies with $250 billion or more in total assets
or $75 billion or more in weighted short-term wholesale funding, nonbank assets, or
off-balance-sheet exposure (Category III)
Domestic and foreign bank holding companies with $100 billion or more in total assets
that do not meet the requirements for every-year stress testing (Category IV)
Every 2 years Note: Bank holding companies of this asset size may also elect to participate in a stress test in a year ending
(in years ending in an in an odd number.
even number)
Background 5
Table 2. Banks participating in the 2023 stress test
Name Risk based category

Bank of America Corporation Category I
The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation Category I
Barclays US LLC Category III
BMO Financial Corp. Category IV
Capital One Financial Corporation Category III
The Charles Schwab Corporation Category III
Citigroup Inc. Category I
Citizens Financial Group, Inc. Category IV
Credit Suisse Holdings (USA), Inc. Category III
DB USA Corporation Category III
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Category I
JPMorgan Chase & Co. Category I
M&T Bank Corporation Category IV
Morgan Stanley Category I
Northern Trust Corporation Category II
The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. Category III
RBC US Group Holdings LLC Category IV
State Street Corporation Category I
TD Group US Holdings LLC Category III
Truist Financial Corporation Category III
UBS Americas Holding LLC Category III
U.S. Bancorp Category III
Wells Fargo & Company Category I
Note: BMO Financial Corp., Citizens Financial Group, Inc., M&T Bank Corporation, and RBC US Group Holdings LLC are on a two-year stress
test cycle; therefore, they were included in last year’s stress test and would normally be included next in 2024. In connection with their recent
applications, the Board required BMO Financial Corp., Citizens Financial Group, Inc., and M&T Bank Corporation to receive a new capital
requirement this year based on the 2023 stress test. RBC US Group Holdings LLC elected to opt in to the 2023 stress test.
Source: Federal Reserve Supervision and Regulation Report, table A.1.
Box 1. Model Changes since 2022 Stress Test

Each year, the Federal Reserve refines both the substance and process of the stress test, including its
development and enhancement of independent supervisory models. The supervisory stress test
models may be enhanced to reflect advances in modeling techniques; enhancements in response to
model validation findings; incorporation of richer and more detailed data; and identification of more
stable models or models with improved performance, particularly under stressful economic conditions.
Each year, the Federal Reserve also makes relatively minor refinements, if necessary, to models that
may include re-estimation with new data, re-specification based on performance testing, and other
refinements to the code used to produce supervisory projections.
For the 2023 stress test, the Federal Reserve made four notable updates to the supervisory models:1
• The international other consumer, international small-business, international first mortgage, and
international home-equity portfolios, which are components of the other retail loans model, will be
assigned loss rates associated with a percentile of the historical loss distribution. Under the supervi-
sory severely adverse scenario, this percentile is related to the frequency of severe recessions.
• The commercial real estate loss given default (LGD) model was updated to make it more risk sensi-
tive to loan-specific variation in the collateral value of a firm’s outstanding commitments. The
updated model directly recognizes the impact of granular differences in collateral value on recoveries
for defaulted loans.
• The pre-provision net revenue (PPNR) model was updated to capture trading revenues based on
FR Y-9C and FR Y-14 data. In prior exercises, trading revenues for these firms were modeled in the
aggregate and allocated to each firm based on its market share.
• Intermediate holding companies, which became subject to the stress test in 2018, now have suffi-
cient PPNR data history to be modeled individually and will no longer be modeled based on industry
aggregate performance.2
In addition, in recent cycles, an adjustment was made to the Trading model for affordable housing
public welfare investments. Due to recent revisions to the data collected on the FR Y-14Q report, this
adjustment is no longer necessary.
1
Other than the revisions to the other retail loans model, the results for the 2023 stress test for the other revisions listed in this
section will reflect the average output from the 2022 and 2023 models, in accordance with the stress test policy on averaging
material model changes.
2
See page 76 of the 2018 stress test results for a description of the industry model: Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test 2018: Supervisory
Stress Test Methodology and Results (Washington, Board of Governors, June 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/
files/2018-dfast-methodology-results-20180621.pdf.
7
Results for Banks under the Severely

Adverse Scenario
This section contains the Federal Reserve’s results for the 2023 stress test under the severely
adverse scenario. The results are presented both in the aggregate and for individual banks.
The aggregate results incorporate the combined sensitivities of capital, losses, revenues, and
expenses across all banks to the stressed economic and financial market conditions contained in
the severely adverse scenario. The range of results across individual banks indicates differences
in business focus, asset composition, revenue and expense sources, and portfolio risk character-
istics. Boxes 2 through 4 contain additional information regarding key themes in this year’s stress
test. Box 2 contains additional insights about the results by placing them in context of results
from recent years. A discussion of commercial real estate exposures in the 2023 test is high-
lighted in box 3. Box 4 contains a summary of the results and lessons learned from the addi-
tional, exploratory market shock applied to U.S. global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). The
comprehensive 2023 stress test results for individual banks are in appendix A.
Capital
Under the severely adverse scenario, the aggregate CET1 capital ratio is projected to decline from
12.4 percent at the start of the projection horizon to a minimum of 10.1 percent before rising to
10.7 percent at the end of nine quarters (see table 3). Tables 4 and 5 present post-stress
Table 3. Aggregate capital ratios and risk-weighted assets, actual 2022:Q4 and projected
2023:Q1–2025:Q1
Percent except as noted
Actual Projected Projected

Item
2022:Q4 2025:Q1 minimum
Common equity tier 1 capital ratio 12.4 10.7 10.1
Tier 1 capital ratio 14.1 12.4 11.8
Total capital ratio 16.1 14.5 14.1
Tier 1 leverage ratio 7.5 6.6 6.2
Supplementary leverage ratio 6.3 5.6 5.2
Risk-weighted assets1 (billions of dollars) 10,090.1 9,969.1
Note: The capital ratios are calculated using the capital action assumptions provided within the supervisory stress testing rules. See 12 C.F.R.
§ 238.132(d); 12 C.F.R. § 252.44(c). These projections represent hypothetical estimates that involve an economic outcome that is more
adverse than expected. The minimum capital ratios are for the period 2023:Q1 to 2025:Q1. Supplementary leverage ratio projections only
include estimates for banks subject to Category I, II, or III standards.
1
For each quarter, risk-weighted assets are calculated under the Board’s standardized approach to risk-based capital in 12 C.F.R. pt. 217, subpt. D.
minimum capital ratios for each bank, and the change from the start of the projection horizon
varies considerably across banks (see figure 4). This variation is due to differences in banks’ busi-
ness lines, portfolio composition, and securities and loan risk characteristics, which drive changes
in the magnitude and timing of loss, revenue, and expense projections.
Table 4. Projected minimum common equity tier 1 capital ratio under the severely adverse scenario,
2023:Q1–2025:Q1: 23 banks
Percent
Stressed ratios with

Bank supervisory stress testing
capital action assumptions
Bank of America 10.6
Bank of NY-Mellon 12.8
Barclays US 9.3
BMO 9.3
Capital One 8.0
Charles Schwab Corp 22.8
Citigroup 9.1
Citizens 6.4
Credit Suisse USA 20.5
DB USA 17.4
Goldman Sachs 10.1
JPMorgan Chase 11.1
M&T 7.0
Morgan Stanley 11.2
Northern Trust 11.4
PNC 7.9
RBC USA 10.8
State Street 13.8
TD Group 15.9
Truist 6.7
UBS Americas 8.0
US Bancorp 6.6
Wells Fargo 8.2
§238.132(d); 12 C.F.R. §252.44(c). These projections represent hypothetical estimates that involve an economic outcome that is more
adverse than expected. The minimum capital ratio presented is for the period 2023:Q1 to 2025:Q1.
Results for Banks under the Severely Adverse Scenario 9
Table 5. Capital ratios, actual 2022:Q4 and projected 2023:Q1–2025:Q1 under the severely adverse
scenario: 23 banks
Percent
Common equity Supplementary

Tier 1 capital ratio Total capital ratio Tier 1 leverage ratio
tier 1 capital ratio leverage ratio1
Bank Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual
Mini- Mini- Mini- Mini- Mini-
2022: Ending 2022: Ending 2022: Ending 2022: Ending 2022: Ending
mum mum mum mum mum
Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4
Bank of America 11.2 11.1 10.6 13.0 12.9 12.4 14.9 14.9 14.6 7.0 6.8 6.6 5.9 5.8 5.6
Bank of NY-Mellon 11.3 16.0 12.8 14.4 19.0 15.8 15.3 20.0 16.8 5.8 7.6 6.3 6.8 9.0 7.5
Barclays US 13.5 10.2 9.3 15.1 11.8 11.0 16.9 13.8 13.0 8.2 6.3 5.8 5.8 4.4 4.1
BMO 12.6 9.3 9.3 13.5 10.2 10.2 15.0 12.2 12.2 9.9 7.4 7.4
Capital One 12.5 8.0 8.0 13.9 9.3 9.3 15.8 11.3 11.3 11.1 7.5 7.5 9.5 6.3 6.3
Charles Schwab Corp 21.9 27.0 22.8 28.9 34.0 29.8 28.9 34.3 29.9 7.2 8.4 7.4 7.1 8.4 7.3
Citigroup 13.0 9.7 9.1 14.8 11.5 10.9 17.3 13.9 13.5 7.1 5.3 5.0 5.8 4.4 4.2
Citizens 10.0 6.4 6.4 11.1 7.5 7.5 12.8 9.6 9.6 9.3 6.3 6.3
Credit Suisse USA 27.8 20.7 20.5 29.0 21.9 21.7 29.2 21.9 21.7 19.8 14.8 14.6 16.4 12.3 12.2
DB USA 26.1 17.5 17.4 34.4 26.7 26.6 34.4 27.0 26.9 10.4 7.4 7.3 9.5 6.7 6.7
Goldman Sachs 15.0 12.6 10.1 16.6 14.2 11.7 19.1 16.6 14.6 7.3 6.2 5.0 5.8 4.9 4.0
JPMorgan Chase 13.2 11.9 11.1 14.9 13.5 12.7 16.8 15.4 14.8 6.6 6.0 5.6 5.6 5.1 4.8
M&T 10.4 7.0 7.0 11.8 8.4 8.4 13.6 10.3 10.3 9.2 6.5 6.5
Morgan Stanley 15.3 14.9 11.2 17.2 16.8 13.2 19.3 19.0 15.5 6.7 6.5 5.0 5.5 5.4 4.1
Northern Trust 10.8 12.2 11.4 11.8 13.2 12.3 13.9 16.0 15.0 7.1 7.9 7.4 7.9 8.8 8.3
PNC 9.1 8.0 7.9 10.4 9.4 9.2 12.3 11.1 11.1 8.2 7.4 7.3 6.9 6.2 6.1
RBC USA 15.0 10.8 10.8 15.0 10.8 10.8 15.6 12.0 12.0 9.9 7.0 7.0
State Street 13.6 17.8 13.8 15.4 19.7 15.7 16.8 21.3 17.2 6.0 7.6 6.0 7.0 8.8 7.0
TD Group 17.4 15.9 15.9 17.4 15.9 15.9 18.6 16.9 16.9 9.2 8.4 8.4 8.1 7.4 7.4
Truist 9.0 6.7 6.7 10.5 8.2 8.2 12.4 10.8 10.8 8.5 6.6 6.6 7.3 5.7 5.7
UBS Americas 16.1 8.0 8.0 23.3 16.1 16.1 23.4 17.4 17.4 8.5 5.3 5.3 7.7 4.8 4.8
US Bancorp 8.4 6.9 6.6 9.8 8.4 8.1 11.9 10.5 10.3 7.9 6.7 6.4 6.4 5.4 5.2
Wells Fargo 10.6 8.4 8.2 12.1 9.9 9.7 14.8 12.7 12.6 8.3 6.7 6.6 6.9 5.6 5.4
23 banks 12.4 10.7 10.1 14.1 12.4 11.8 16.1 14.5 14.1 7.5 6.6 6.2 6.3 5.6 5.2
§238.132(d); 12 C.F.R. §252.44(c). These projections represent hypothetical estimates that involve an economic outcome that is more
adverse than expected. The minimum capital ratios are for the period 2023:Q1 to 2025:Q1.
1
Supplementary leverage ratio projections only include estimates for banks subject to Category I, II, or III standards.
Figure 4. Change from 2022:Q4 to minimum common equity tier 1 capital ratio in the severely adverse
scenario
Bank of America
Bank of NY-Mellon
Barclays US
BMO
Capital One
Charles Schwab Corp
Citigroup
Citizens
Credit Suisse USA
DB USA
Goldman Sachs
JPMorgan Chase
M&T
Morgan Stanley
Northern Trust
PNC Median=3.3
RBC USA
State Street
TD Group
Truist
UBS Americas
US Bancorp
Wells Fargo
–2 –1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percentage points
Note: Estimates of minimum common equity tier 1 (CET1) capital as a percent of risk-weighted assets are for the nine-
quarter period from 2023:Q1 to 2025:Q1. Negative values indicate CET1 ratio increases.
Box 2. Results Highlights from 2019 to 2023

The results of the 2023 stress test indicate large banks would experience substantial losses under the
severely adverse scenario but would maintain capital ratios well above minimum risk-based requirements.
The aggregate CET1 capital ratio declines by 2.3 percentage points from the start of the projection
horizon to its minimum in the 2023 stress test. This decline is smaller than the 2.7 percentage point
decline in the 2022 stress test, but comparable to projected declines in recent years (see figure A).
The smaller decline in this year’s aggregate post-stress capital ratio is mostly due to the path of
interest rates in the scenario.
Figure A. Aggregate maximum decline in stressed common equity tier 1 capital ratio,
severely adverse scenario
Percentage points
0.0
–0.5
–1.0
–1.5
–2.0
–2.1
–2.5 –2.3 –2.3
–2.4
–2.6
–2.7
–3.0
2019 June 2020 December 2020 2021 2022 2023
stress test stress test stress test stress test stress test stress test
Note: The bar represents the aggregate maximum common equity tier 1 (CET1) capital ratio decline of the banks in each exercise.
The values for the 2019 stress test are estimates of the CET1 capital ratio decline had the stress capital buffer rule been in place at
that time. For purposes of this figure, the 2019 stress test values assume (1) a constant level of assets over the projection horizon,
(2) no common dividend payments, (3) no issuances or repurchases of common or preferred stock (except those related to business
plan changes), and (4) fully phased-in capital deductions.
Interest rates fall more in the 2023 scenario than in scenarios from recent years because rates were
higher at the start of the stress test. The significant decline aligns with the typical behavior of interest
rates in a severe recession. For example, the 3-month Treasury rate declines by 390 basis points in
this year’s scenario. That rate did not decline in the December 2020, 2021, and 2022 scenarios, when
interest rates were near zero at the start of the stress test (see figure B).
The decline in interest rates in this year’s stress test has offsetting effects on bank capital: it
increases the projected market value of securities and reduces projected net interest income. Banks
entered the 2023 stress test with large unrealized losses on their available-for-sale (AFS) securities
portfolios. Unrealized gains and losses on AFS securities are recognized in accumulated other compre-
hensive income (AOCI) and flow through to the regulatory capital ratios for the largest firms.1
(continued)
1
Only firms subject to Category I or II standards or firms that opt in are required to include unrealized gains and losses on securities
in the calculation of capital. Category III and IV firms are not required to include unrealized gains and losses on securities in the
calculation of capital.
Box 2—continued
Figure B. 3-month Treasury yield, severely adverse scenario

4.0
4.0 Percent
3.5
3.0
2.3 −3.9
2.5
2.0 1.6
1.5 −2.2
−1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
1.0
0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
0.0
2019 June 2020 December 2020 2021 2022 2023
Start Minimum
At the beginning of the 2023 stress test, most banks started with large unrealized losses because the
market value of their securities fell as interest rates rose in 2022. However, under the hypothetical
recession in the stress test, rates decline, the market values of most securities increase, and these
unrealized losses decline. Figure C illustrates this relationship over the past few stress test cycles. In
conjunction with the decline in interest rates during the projection horizon, interest earned on assets
falls significantly, which somewhat offsets the projected improvement in securities values.
(continued)
Figure C. Accumulated other comprehensive income (AOCI) in capital to risk-weighted assets,

starting point and stressed minimum
Percent
0.0
−0.2
−0.3 −0.3
−0.4 −0.4 −0.4
−0.6 −0.5 −0.5 −0.5 −0.5 −0.5 −0.5
Average
−0.8 −0.8
−1.0 −1.0
−1.2
−1.4
2019 June 2020 December 2020 2021 2022 2023
Starting AOCI in capital Minimum quarter AOCI in capital
Note: Only firms subject to Category I or II standards or firms that opt in are required to include unrealized gains and losses on
securities in the calculation of capital. Category III and IV firms are not required to include unrealized gains and losses on securities
in the calculation of capital.
Box 2—continued
In contrast to the improvement in forecasted unrealized losses on securities, projected net income in
the stress test is roughly similar to prior years. The forecasted loss rates on consumer loans increased
this year, driven by the larger shocks to the unemployment rate and house prices in this year’s scenario.1
Meanwhile, the loss rates on wholesale loans, such as loans to businesses, decreased because the
credit quality of these loans has improved since last year (see figure D). In the aggregate, these effects
roughly offset.
Figure D. Cumulative consumer and wholesale loss rate through stressed minimum, severely
adverse scenario
7 Percent 6.6
6 5.7
4.9 4.8
5
4.1
4 3.5 3.4 3.6
3.1 3.2 3.3
3.0
3
2
1
0
2019 June 2020 December 2020 2021 2022 2023
Consumer loss rate Wholesale loss rate
Note: Consumer loss rate includes losses on domestic and foreign first-lien mortgages, domestic and foreign junior-lien mortgages
and home equity lines of credit, credit cards, automobile loans, student loans, and all other consumer loans. Wholesale loss rates
includes losses on domestic and foreign commercial real estate and commercial and industrial loans. Losses are cumulative through
the projection quarter at which the aggregate capital ratio is the lowest for each stress test.!
1
The relatively more severe unemployment and house price paths in this year’s scenario are consistent with the approach outlined in
the Policy Statement on the Scenario Design Framework for Stress Testing (see 12 C.F.R. pt. 252, appendix B), which calls for the
unemployment rate to increase to a level of 10 percent and house prices to fall such that the ratio of house prices to per capita
disposable income reaches the trough experienced in the 2007–09 Global Financial Crisis. These features of the scenario design
framework are intended to limit procyclicality in the financial system by increasing the severity of the scenario during economic
expansions and thereby increasing the resilience of the banking system to building risks.
Pre-tax Net Income

Projections of pre-tax net income are the largest component of post-stress changes in capital.7
Over the nine quarters of the projection horizon, aggregate cumulative pre-tax net income is pro-
jected to be negative $190 billion, which equals negative 1 percent of average total assets (see
table 6). As a percent of average assets, projected cumulative pre-tax net income is negative for
7
For risk-based capital ratios, the numerator is capital, which is primarily impacted from pre-tax net income and gains/
losses on AFS. The denominator for risk-based capital ratios is risk-weighted assets. Risk-weighted assets change mini-
mally throughout the projection horizon as the result of an assumption that a bank’s assets generally remain
unchanged.
20 out of 23 banks and varies considerably across banks, ranging from negative 5.7 percent to
positive 1.9 percent (see figure 5 and table 7). This range illustrates differences in the sensitivity
of the various components of pre-tax net income to the economic and financial market conditions
in the severely adverse scenario. These components include cumulative projections of losses and
pre-provision net revenue (PPNR), which are discussed in further detail below.
Table 6. Projected aggregate losses, revenue, and net income before taxes through 2025:Q1 under the
severely adverse scenario
Item Billions of dollars Percent of average assets1

Pre-provision net revenue 349.0 1.8
equals
Net interest income 791.6 4.1
Noninterest income 710.8 3.7
less
Noninterest expense2 1,153.4 6.0
3
Other revenue 0.0
less
Provisions for loan and lease losses 421.9
Credit losses on investment securities (AFS/HTM)4 5.4
5
Trading and counterparty losses 94.0
Other losses/gains6 18.1
equals
Net income before taxes −190.4 −1.0
Memo items
Other comprehensive income7 56.6
Other effects on capital Actual 2022:Q4 2025:Q1
AOCI included in capital (billions of dollars) −98.0 −41.4
1
Average assets is the nine-quarter average of total assets.
2
Noninterest expense includes losses from operational-risk events and other real estate owned (OREO) costs.
3
Other revenue includes one-time income and (expense) items not included in pre-provision net revenue.
4
For banks that have adopted ASU 2016-13, the Federal Reserve incorporated its projection of expected credit losses on securities in the
allowance for credit losses. AFS/HTM (available-for-sale/held-to-maturity).
5
Trading and counterparty losses include mark-to-market and credit valuation adjustment (CVA) losses and losses arising from the counter-
party default scenario component applied to derivatives, securities lending, and repurchase agreement activities.
6
Other losses/gains include projected change in fair value of loans held for sale or held for investment and measured under the fair-value
option, losses/gains on hedges on loans measured at fair value or amortized cost, and goodwill impairment losses.
7
Other comprehensive income is only calculated for banks subject to Category I or II standards or banks that opt in to including accumu-
lated other comprehensive income (AOCI) in their calculation of capital.
Figure 5. Pre-tax net income rates in the severely adverse scenario
Bank of America
Bank of NY-Mellon
Barclays US
BMO
Capital One
Charles Schwab Corp
Citigroup
Citizens
Credit Suisse USA
DB USA
Goldman Sachs
JPMorgan Chase
M&T
Morgan Stanley
Northern Trust
PNC
RBC USA
State Street
Median=–1.2
TD Group
Truist
UBS Americas
US Bancorp
Wells Fargo
–6 –5 –4 –3 –2 –1 0 1 2
Percent
Note: Estimates are for the nine-quarter period from 2023:Q1 to 2025:Q1 as a percent of average assets.
Table 7. Projected losses, revenue, and net income before taxes through 2025:Q1 under the severely adverse
scenario: 23 banks
Billions of dollars
Memo Other effects

Sum of revenues Minus sum of provisions and losses Equals
items on capital
Credit losses
Bank Other AOCI
Provisions for on invest- Trading and Other Net income
Pre-provision Other compre- included
loan and ment counterparty losses/ before
net revenue1 revenue2 hensive in capital
lease losses securities losses4 gains5 taxes
3 income6 (2025:Q1)
(AFS/HTM)
Bank of America 43.2 0.0 54.7 0.2 8.9 2.3 −23.0 22.3 13.1
Bank of NY-Mellon 8.5 0.0 1.8 0.3 1.3 0.0 5.1 3.9 −2.1
Barclays US 4.1 0.0 4.6 0.0 2.1 0.0 −2.6 0.0 0.0
BMO 2.8 0.0 7.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 −4.4 0.0 0.0
Capital One 31.2 0.0 45.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 −14.5 0.0 0.0
Charles Schwab Corp 11.8 0.0 1.7 −0.2 0.0 0.0 10.3 0.0 0.0
Citigroup 22.0 0.0 42.0 0.6 13.3 1.0 −34.9 6.5 −38.0
Citizens 5.4 0.0 11.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 −6.6 0.0 0.0
Credit Suisse USA −0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.2 −3.3 0.0 0.1
DB USA −0.4 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.9 0.2 −2.3 0.1 −0.2
Goldman Sachs 26.7 0.0 18.5 0.0 21.2 3.6 −16.6 2.0 −1.0
JPMorgan Chase 65.2 0.0 71.0 1.7 17.8 4.7 −30.1 9.4 −2.3
M&T 4.9 0.0 9.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 −4.9 0.0 0.0
Morgan Stanley 25.0 0.0 11.3 0.0 12.5 4.8 −3.7 3.4 −2.9
Northern Trust 3.6 0.0 3.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 −0.2 1.5 −0.1
PNC 14.0 0.0 17.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 −3.6 0.0 −0.1
RBC USA 2.5 0.0 6.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 −4.2 0.0 0.0
State Street 6.3 0.0 1.4 0.1 1.2 0.0 3.6 1.5 −1.8
TD Group 6.8 0.0 10.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 −3.9 0.0 0.0
Truist 11.8 0.0 20.3 0.9 0.0 0.1 −9.5 0.0 0.0
UBS Americas 1.1 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 −2.4 0.0 0.0
US Bancorp 17.9 0.0 23.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 −5.5 0.0 0.0
Wells Fargo 35.5 0.0 54.9 0.4 12.2 0.8 −32.9 6.0 −6.2
23 banks 349.0 0.0 421.9 5.4 94.0 18.1 −190.4 56.6 −41.4
Note: These projections represent hypothetical estimates that involve an economic outcome that is more adverse than expected. Values may not sum
precisely because of rounding.
1
Pre-provision net revenue includes losses from operational-risk events and other real estate owned (OREO) costs.
2
Other revenue includes one-time income and (expense) items not included in pre-provision net revenue.
3
For banks that have adopted ASU 2016-13, the Federal Reserve incorporated its projection of expected credit losses on securities in the allowance
for credit losses. AFS/HTM (available-for-sale/held-to-maturity).
4
Trading and counterparty losses include mark-to-market and credit valuation adjustment (CVA) losses and losses arising from the counterparty
default scenario component applied to derivatives, securities lending, and repurchase agreement activities.
5
Other losses/gains include projected change in fair value of loans held for sale or held for investment and measured under the fair-value option,
losses/gains on hedges on loans measured at fair value or amortized cost, and goodwill impairment losses.
6
Other comprehensive income is only calculated for banks subject to Category I or II standards or banks that opt in to including accumulated other
comprehensive income (AOCI) in their calculation of capital.
Losses Figure 6. Projected losses in the severely

adverse scenario
Over the projection horizon, aggregate losses
on loans and other positions are projected to
First-lien mortgages, domestic
be $541 billion. These losses comprise Other losses 34 (6%)
Trading and 18 (3%)
counterparty Junior liens and
• $424 billion in loan losses, accounting for losses HELOCs
94 (17%) 7 (1%)
78 percent of total losses;
Credit cards
Securities 120 (22%)
• $18 billion in additional losses from items
losses
such as loans booked under the fair-value 5 (1%)
option (see table 6), accounting for 3 per- Other

loans Other
cent of total losses; 64 (12%) consumer
loans
• $94 billion in trading and counterparty 35 (6%)
Commercial
losses at the 11 banks with substantial real estate,
Commercial and
industrial loans
domestic
trading, processing, or custodial operations, 65 (12%)
99 (18%)
accounting for 17 percent of total Billions of dollars (percent of total losses)

losses; and
Note: Percent of total losses may not sum to 100
• $5 billion in securities losses, accounting because of rounding.
for 1 percent of total losses (see figure 6).8
For loans measured at amortized cost, projected aggregate losses are $424 billion, with the loan
loss rate at 6.4 percent (see table 8).9 These loan losses flow into pre-tax net income through the
projection of provisions for loan and lease losses, which is $422 billion in aggregate and takes
into account banks’ established allowances for credit losses at the start of the projection
horizon.10
Projected consumer loan losses represent a smaller share (35 percent) of total losses than com-
mercial loan losses (42 percent). The loan portfolio that constitutes the largest amount of losses
is credit cards, representing 22 percent of total losses.
Total loan loss rates vary significantly across banks, ranging between 1.3 percent and 14.7 per-
cent (see table 9). This range results from differences in loan portfolio composition, which materi-
ally affects losses because projected loss rates vary significantly for different types of loans. For
example, aggregate loan loss rates range from 2.7 percent on domestic first-lien mortgages to
8
For banks that have adopted ASU 2016-13, the Federal Reserve incorporated its projection of expected credit losses on
securities in the allowance for credit losses, in accordance with Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), “Financial
Instruments–Credit Losses (Topic 326),” FASB ASU 2016-13 (Norwalk, CT: FASB, June 2016). Prior to the adoption of
ASU 2016-13, securities credit losses were realized through other-than-temporary impairment.
9
The loss rate is calculated as total projected loan losses over the nine quarters of the projection horizon divided by
average loan balances over the horizon.
10
Provisions for loan and lease losses equal projected loan losses plus the amount needed for the allowance to be at an
appropriate level at the end of each quarter.
17.4 percent on credit cards, due to the sen-

Table 8. Projected aggregate loan losses, by
type of loan, under the severely adverse sitivity and historical performance of these
scenario, 2023:Q1–2025:Q1
loans. Some loan portfolios are sensitive to
Portfolio home prices or unemployment rates and may
Billions
Loan type loss rates
of dollars experience high stressed loss rates due to the
(percent)1
Loan losses 424.0 6.4 considerable stress on these factors in the
First-lien mortgages, domestic 33.8 2.7 severely adverse scenario.11
2
Junior liens and HELOCs, domestic 7.0 4.9
Commercial and industrial3 99.3 6.7
Loan loss rates also reflect differences in the
Commercial real estate, domestic 64.9 8.8
characteristics of loans within each portfolio.
Credit cards 119.7 17.4
Other consumer4 35.1 5.4
For example, the median projected loss rate
Other loans5 64.2 3.8 on commercial and industrial (C&I) loans
1
Average loan balances used to calculate portfolio loss rates
across all banks is 6.3 percent. The loss rate
exclude loans held for sale, loans held for investment under on C&I loans among individual firms ranges
the fair-value option, and Paycheck Protection Program loans
and are calculated over nine quarters. from 2.5 percent to 16.6 percent. For credit
2
HELOCs (home equity lines of credit).
3
Commercial and industrial loans include small- and medium- cards, the range of projected loss rates
enterprise loans and corporate cards.
4
Other consumer loans include student loans and automobile among banks is 15.5 percent to 24.7 percent,
loans. and the median is 17.8 percent.
5
Other loans include international real estate loans.
For loans measured at fair value, losses enter

pre-tax net income through the other loans
loss category (see table 7). Loans measured at amortized cost and those measured at fair value
generally have similar risk factors, but the latter are exposed to risk from the effects of market
fluctuations, which can lead to more severe market value losses in periods of high market volatility
or asset illiquidity.
Aggregate trading and counterparty losses, which also flow into pre-tax net income, are $94 billion
for the 11 banks subject to the global market shock component and/or the largest counterparty
default component of the severely adverse scenario. Individual bank losses range from $1 billion
to $21 billion, resulting from the specific risk characteristics of each bank’s trading positions and
counterparty exposures, inclusive of hedges (see table 7). Importantly, these projected losses are
based on the trading positions and counterparty exposures held by banks on the same as-of date
(October 14, 2022) and could have varied if they had been based on a different date.
Aggregate credit losses on investment securities are $5 billion (see table 6). In addition, unreal-
ized gains and losses on available-for-sale (AFS) debt securities are reflected in accumulated other
11
In addition, losses are calculated based on the exposure at default, which includes both outstanding balances and any
additional drawdown of the credit line that occurs prior to default, while loss rates are calculated as a percentage of
average outstanding balances over the projection horizon.
comprehensive income (AOCI).12 Other comprehensive income (OCI) is projected to be $57 billion
in aggregate.
Table 9. Projected loan losses by type of loan for 2023:Q1–2025:Q1 under the severely adverse
scenario: 23 banks
Percent of average loan balances1
Junior liens
First-lien Commercial Commercial
Loan and Other Other
Bank mortgages, and real estate, Credit cards
losses HELOCs,2 3 consumer4 loans5
domestic industrial domestic
domestic
Bank of America 5.1 2.3 4.0 5.2 9.4 15.9 2.3 3.1
Bank of NY-Mellon 2.5 2.8 9.8 4.6 9.3 0.0 0.6 1.7
Barclays US 10.0 0.0 0.0 16.6 3.4 16.4 16.7 0.7
BMO 6.2 2.7 4.3 6.2 8.3 16.3 5.7 6.2
Capital One 14.7 3.2 7.8 11.2 9.9 22.2 10.4 4.9
Charles Schwab Corp 1.3 1.9 6.5 10.2 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8
Citigroup 7.2 3.7 19.1 4.6 9.3 15.6 18.3 2.8
Citizens 7.1 3.1 5.4 5.6 12.4 18.7 7.8 6.3
Credit Suisse USA 6.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.4 0.0 16.7 0.6
DB USA 5.0 3.4 9.9 2.5 11.2 0.0 4.5 1.9
Goldman Sachs 9.0 3.7 5.0 14.0 16.0 24.7 9.3 4.9
JPMorgan Chase 6.4 2.8 4.2 10.0 3.9 15.5 3.3 4.1
M&T 7.1 3.1 4.7 6.5 8.8 17.8 9.2 8.2
Morgan Stanley 4.2 2.8 5.0 11.7 13.7 0.0 1.3 3.9
Northern Trust 7.1 2.8 10.1 6.2 11.5 0.0 16.7 7.0
PNC 5.5 2.5 3.4 5.8 10.0 18.8 4.6 2.8
RBC USA 6.9 4.4 6.5 9.6 10.3 17.8 14.8 3.6
State Street 3.6 0.0 0.0 7.7 4.1 0.0 0.6 3.0
TD Group 5.9 2.7 5.5 6.2 7.5 21.4 2.9 3.5
Truist 5.9 2.4 3.8 5.3 9.6 16.3 8.3 3.6
UBS Americas 2.9 3.4 0.0 3.1 4.1 17.8 0.7 8.9
US Bancorp 6.3 3.0 6.0 6.6 9.5 16.5 5.5 4.0
Wells Fargo 5.7 2.1 2.8 6.4 9.7 17.8 5.1 4.5
23 banks 6.4 2.7 4.9 6.7 8.8 17.4 5.4 3.8
Note: These projections represent hypothetical estimates that involve an economic outcome that is more adverse than expected. Values may
not sum precisely because of rounding.
1
Average loan balances used to calculate portfolio loss rates exclude loans held for sale, loans held for investment under the fair-value
option, and Paycheck Protection Program loans and are calculated over nine quarters.
2
3
Commercial and industrial loans include small- and medium-enterprise loans and corporate cards.
4
Other consumer loans include student loans and automobile loans.
5
12
Only firms subject to Category I or II standards or firms that opt in are required to include unrealized gains and losses
on securities in the calculation of capital. Category III and IV firms are not required to include unrealized gains and
losses on securities in the calculation of capital.
Box 3. Commercial Real Estate in Supervisory Stress Test

The May 2023 Financial Stability Report highlights the elevated prices on commercial real estate (CRE)
and the possibility of a large correction in property values that could lead to substantial losses for
banks.1 The demand for offices, downtown retail, and hotels has seen dramatic and countervailing
changes over the past several years due largely to the pandemic and resulting changes. While many
bank CRE loans are held by smaller banks not subject to the supervisory stress test, the banks subject
to the stress test hold approximately 20 percent of office and downtown retail CRE loans. The 2023
stress test results demonstrate that large banks continue to have sufficient capital to withstand a
severe CRE downturn.
The 2023 severely adverse scenario featured heightened stress in the CRE market, including a 40 per-
cent decline in CRE prices. The scenario noted that declines in CRE prices should be assumed to be
concentrated in properties most at risk of a sustained drop in income and asset values: offices that
may be affected by remote work or hospitality sectors that continue to be affected by reduced busi-
ness travel.
Conditions of CRE sectors have moved in different directions over the past several years. Office vacan-
cies are elevated relative to pre-pandemic levels and increasing, while hotel vacancies peaked during
the pandemic in 2020 and have been falling since that time (see figure A).
Figure A. Vacancy rate by property type
80 Percent
70
Hotel Office Retail
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022
Note: Vacancy rate for each year uses the fourth quarter data only.
Source: CBRE Econometric Advisors.!
In the severely adverse scenario, banks are projected to lose $64.9 billion on CRE exposures, or
8.8 percent of average balances. Overall projected CRE loss rates have fallen since 2020 as the hospi-
tality sector recovered from the acute pandemic-related stress, but they remain elevated. Projected loss
rates in the office sector continue to increase because of the high level of current stress in office
market fundamentals and projected further deterioration in the scenario (see figure B). For example,
the office loss rate under this year’s scenario was around 20 percent. The projected office loss rates in
the last few stress test cycles are higher than the peak loss rate observed during the 2007-09 Global
(continued)
1
See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Financial Stability Report, May 2023. https://www.federalreserve.gov/
publications/files/financial-stability-report-20230508.pdf.
Box 3—continued
Financial Crisis. Despite the severe losses, each bank has sufficient capital to continue to operate
above regulatory capital requirements. To ensure the banking system remains sound and resilient, Fed-
eral Reserve supervisors have increased efforts to evaluate banks’ credit risk exposure with particular
attention on CRE lending.
Figure B. Office loss rate, cumulative 9-quarter
25 Percent
20
15 2007–09 Global Financial Crisis loss rate
10
0
2019 June 2020 December 2020 2021 2022 2023
Note: The 2007–09 Global Financial Crisis loss rate is based on office CMBS loans that became delinquent over the 9-quarter window
in which eventual realized losses were highest. Stress test loss rates are calculated based on firms subject to the stress test each year
and do not include owner occupied properties.
Source: Morningstar.!
Pre-provision Net Revenue

Pre-tax net income also includes projections of post-stress income and expenses captured in
PPNR. Over the projection horizon, banks are projected to generate an aggregate of $349 billion in
PPNR, which is equal to 1.8 percent of their combined average assets (see table 6).
PPNR projections are generally driven by the shape of the yield curve, the path of asset prices,
equity market volatility, and measures of economic activity in the severely adverse scenario. In
addition, PPNR incorporates expenses stemming from operational-risk events, such as fraud,
employee lawsuits, litigation-related expenses, or computer system or other operating disrup-
tions.13 In the aggregate, operational-risk losses are $185 billion.
13
These operational-risk expenses are not a supervisory estimate of banks’ current or expected legal liability, as they are
conditional on the severely adverse scenario and conservative assumptions, and they also incorporate the potential for
substantial losses that do not involve litigation or legal exposure.
Figure 7. Pre-provision net revenue rates in the severely adverse scenario
Bank of America
Bank of NY-Mellon
Barclays US
BMO
Capital One
Charles Schwab Corp
Citigroup
Citizens
Credit Suisse USA
DB USA
Goldman Sachs
JPMorgan Chase
M&T
Morgan Stanley
Northern Trust
PNC
RBC USA
State Street
TD Group
Truist
UBS Americas
US Bancorp
Median=2.1
Wells Fargo
–2 –1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Percent
Note: Estimates are for the nine-quarter period from 2023:Q1 to 2025:Q1 as a percent of average assets.
The ratio of PPNR to average assets varies across banks (see figure 7), primarily because of differ-
ences in business focus. For instance, the ratio of PPNR to assets tends to be higher at banks
focusing on credit card lending, since credit cards generally produce higher net interest income
relative to other forms of lending.14 Additionally, lower ratios of PPNR to assets do not necessarily
imply lower pre-tax net income, because the same business focus and risk characteristics deter-
mining differences in PPNR across banks could also result in offsetting projected losses.
14
Credit card lending also tends to generate relatively high loss rates, suggesting that the higher PPNR rates at these
banks do not necessarily indicate higher profitability.
Box 4. Exploratory Market Shock—Testing Inflationary

Pressures
In February 2023, for the first time, the Federal Reserve published an additional, exploratory market
shock component that applied only to U.S. G-SIBs.1 The purpose of the stress test is to understand a
firm’s resilience to a range of severe but plausible events, and the exploratory component furthers that
purpose by posing a different set of risks than is probed by this year’s global market shock component.
In contrast to this year’s global market shock component, which was characterized by a severe reces-
sion with fading inflation expectations, the exploratory market shock is characterized by a less severe
recession with greater inflationary pressures induced by higher inflation expectations, increases in
interest rates, an appreciation of the U.S. dollar, and increases in commodity prices.2 Consistent with
the nature of an exploratory exercise, the exploratory market shock does not contribute to the capital
requirements set by this year’s stress test.
Results
Both the global and exploratory market shocks affect banks through losses associated with their
trading positions and counterparty exposures. Under the exploratory market shock, we see that the
impact differs for firms relative to the severely adverse scenario. Full results are shown in table A.
Most banks experience smaller trading and counterparty losses in the exploratory market shock, while
one bank experiences larger losses. In aggregate, the trading and counterparty losses for the U.S.
G-SIBs decline from about 1.3 percent of risk-weighted assets in the global market shock component to
1.1 percent of risk-weighted assets in the exploratory market shock.
(continued)
Table A. Projected trading and counterparty losses through 2025:Q1 under the exploratory
market shock component: U.S. G-SIBs
Billions of dollars
Global market shock Exploratory market

Bank
component shock component
Bank of America 8.9 8.5
Bank of NY-Mellon 1.3 0.8
Citigroup 13.3 11.3
Goldman Sachs 21.2 18.1
JPMorgan Chase 17.8 15.7
Morgan Stanley 12.5 10.7
State Street 1.2 0.7
Wells Fargo 12.2 12.4
1
The U.S. G-SIBs are Bank of America Corporation, The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, Citigroup Inc., The Goldman Sachs
Group, Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co., Morgan Stanley, State Street Corporation, and Wells Fargo & Company. As in the supervisory
stress test, The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation and State Street Corporation were required only to incorporate an additional
counterparty default component into their exploratory market shock. The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation and State Street
Corporation were not required to apply the exploratory market shock to calculate mark-to-market losses on their trading or credit
valuation adjustments exposures.
2
The full description of the exploratory market shock is available here: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, 2023 Stress Test
Scenarios (Washington: Board of Governors, February 2023), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/
bcreg20230209a1.pdf.
Box 4—continued
What Did We Learn?
The purpose of the exploratory market shock was to assess the potential of multiple scenarios to cap-
ture a wider array of risks. While the total loss projections from these two sets of shocks were similar,
the underlying composition of losses varied significantly. For example, the exploratory market shock
losses resulted in different counterparty concentrations relative to the global market shock. The
changes were large enough to result in many banks’ largest counterparty switching. Similarly, the pro-
file of trading profit and loss was altered, providing further evidence that the use of more than one sce-
nario can expand the Federal Reserve’s view of risk exposures.
25
Appendix A: Additional Bank-Specific

Results
Table A.1. Bank of America Corporation

Projected stressed capital ratios, loan losses, risk-weighted assets, losses, revenues, and net
income before taxes
Federal Reserve estimates: Severely adverse scenario
Capital ratios and risk-weighted assets, actual 2022:Q4 Projected losses, revenue, and net income before taxes
and projected 2023:Q1–2025:Q1 through 2025:Q1
Percent of
Billions
Actual Projected Projected Item average
Item of dollars
2022:Q4 2025:Q1 minimum assets1
Common equity tier 1 capital ratio 11.2 11.1 10.6 Pre-provision net revenue 43.2 1.4
Tier 1 capital ratio 13.0 12.9 12.4 equals
Total capital ratio 14.9 14.9 14.6 Net interest income 118.7 3.9
Tier 1 leverage ratio 7.0 6.8 6.6 Noninterest income 81.8 2.7
Supplementary leverage ratio 5.9 5.8 5.6 less
Risk-weighted assets1 Noninterest expense2 157.2 5.2
(billions of dollars) 1,604.9 1,587.1 Other revenue3 0.0
Note: The capital ratios are calculated using the capital action assumptions less
provided within the supervisory stress testing rules. See 12 C.F.R. § 238.132(d); Provisions for loan and lease losses 54.7
12 C.F.R. § 252.44(c). These projections represent hypothetical estimates
that involve an economic outcome that is more adverse than expected. The Credit losses on investment securities
minimum capital ratios are for the period 2023:Q1 to 2025:Q1. Supplemen- (AFS/HTM)4 0.2
tary leverage ratio projections only include estimates for banks subject to Cat- 5
egory I, II, or III standards. Trading and counterparty losses 8.9
1
For each quarter, risk-weighted assets are calculated under the Board’s standardized Other losses/gains6 2.3
approach to risk-based capital in 12 C.F.R. pt. 217, subpt. D.
equals
Memo items
Projected loan losses, by type of loan,
2023:Q1–2025:Q1 Other comprehensive income7 22.3
Portfolio loss
Billions AOCI included in capital (billions of dollars) −9.2 13.1
Loan type rates
of dollars
(percent)1 1
2
Loan losses 54.4 5.1 Noninterest expense includes losses from operational-risk events and other
real estate owned (OREO) costs.
First-lien mortgages, domestic 5.4 2.3 3
Other revenue includes one-time income and (expense) items not included
Junior liens and HELOCs,2 domestic 1.1 4.0 in pre-provision net revenue.
4
For banks that have adopted ASU 2016-13, the Federal Reserve incorpo-
Commercial and industrial3 16.6 5.2 rated its projection of expected credit losses on securities in the allowance
Commercial real estate, domestic 7.2 9.4 for credit losses. AFS/HTM (available-for-sale/held-to-maturity).
5
Trading and counterparty losses include mark-to-market and credit valua-
Credit cards 14.9 15.9 tion adjustment (CVA) losses and losses arising from the counterparty
Other consumer4 2.1 2.3 default scenario component applied to derivatives, securities lending, and
repurchase agreement activities.
5 6
Other loans 7.2 3.1 Other losses/gains include projected change in fair value of loans held for
sale or held for investment and measured under the fair-value option,
1
Average loan balances used to calculate portfolio loss rates exclude loans losses/gains on hedges on loans measured at fair value or amortized cost,
held for sale, loans held for investment under the fair-value option, and and goodwill impairment losses.
7
Paycheck Protection Program loans and are calculated over nine quarters. Other comprehensive income is only calculated for banks subject to Cat-
2
HELOCs (home equity lines of credit). egory I or II standards or banks that opt in to including accumulated other
3
Commercial and industrial loans include small- and medium-enterprise comprehensive income (AOCI) in their calculation of capital.
loans and corporate cards.
4
5
Appendix A: Additional Bank-Specific Results 27
Table A.2. The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation

income before taxes
Percent of
Billions
Item of dollars
(billions of dollars) 159.1 159.1 Other revenue3 0.0
1
equals
Net income before taxes 5.1 1.2
Memo items
Portfolio loss
Billions AOCI included in capital (billions of dollars) −6.0 −2.1
Loan type rates
of dollars
(percent)1 1
2
4
5
5 6
1
7
2
3
4
5
Table A.3. Barclays US LLC

income before taxes
Percent of
Billions
Item of dollars
1
equals
Memo items
Portfolio loss
Billions AOCI included in capital (billions of dollars) 0.0 0.0
Loan type rates
of dollars
(percent)1 1
2
4
5
5 6
1
7
2
3
4
5
Table A.4. BMO Financial Corp.

income before taxes
Percent of
Billions
Item of dollars
Supplementary leverage ratio n/a n/a n/a less
1
n/a Not applicable. equals
Memo items
Projected loan losses, by type of loan, Other comprehensive income7 0.0
2023:Q1–2025:Q1 Other effects on capital Actual 2022:Q4 2025:Q1
Portfolio loss AOCI included in capital (billions of dollars) 0.0 0.0

Billions
Loan type rates 1
of dollars Average assets is the nine-quarter average of total assets.
(percent)1 2
Noninterest expense includes losses from operational-risk events and other
Loan losses 6.3 6.2 real estate owned (OREO) costs.
3
First-lien mortgages, domestic 0.2 2.7 in pre-provision net revenue.
4
Junior liens and HELOCs,2 domestic 0.1 4.3 For banks that have adopted ASU 2016-13, the Federal Reserve incorpo-
rated its projection of expected credit losses on securities in the allowance
Commercial and industrial3 2.4 6.2 for credit losses. AFS/HTM (available-for-sale/held-to-maturity).
5
Commercial real estate, domestic 1.1 8.3 Trading and counterparty losses include mark-to-market and credit valua-
tion adjustment (CVA) losses and losses arising from the counterparty
Credit cards 0.1 16.3 default scenario component applied to derivatives, securities lending, and
Other consumer 4
0.5 5.7 repurchase agreement activities.
6
Other losses/gains include projected change in fair value of loans held for
Other loans5 1.9 6.2 sale or held for investment and measured under the fair-value option,
losses/gains on hedges on loans measured at fair value or amortized cost,
1
Average loan balances used to calculate portfolio loss rates exclude loans and goodwill impairment losses.
7
held for sale, loans held for investment under the fair-value option, and Other comprehensive income is only calculated for banks subject to Cat-
Paycheck Protection Program loans and are calculated over nine quarters. egory I or II standards or banks that opt in to including accumulated other
2
HELOCs (home equity lines of credit). comprehensive income (AOCI) in their calculation of capital.
3
Commercial and industrial loans include small- and medium-enterprise
4
5
Table A.5. Capital One Financial Corporation

income before taxes
Percent of
Billions
Item of dollars
1
equals
Memo items
Portfolio loss
Loan type rates
of dollars
(percent)1 1
2
4
5
5 6
1
7
2
3
4
5
Table A.6. The Charles Schwab Corporation

income before taxes
Percent of
Billions
Item of dollars
minimum capital ratios are for the period 2023:Q1 to 2025:Q1. Supplemen- (AFS/HTM)4 −0.2
1
equals
Memo items
Portfolio loss
Loan type rates
of dollars
(percent)1 1
2
4
5
5 6
1
7
2
3
4
5
Table A.7. Citigroup Inc.

income before taxes
Percent of
Billions
Item of dollars
1
equals
Memo items
Portfolio loss
Loan type rates
of dollars
(percent)1 1
2
4
5
5 6
1
7
2
3
4
5
Table A.8. Citizens Financial Group, Inc.

income before taxes
Percent of
Billions
Item of dollars
1
Memo items

Billions
Loan type rates 1
(percent)1 2
3
4
5
Other consumer 4
6
1
7
2
3
4
5
Table A.9. Credit Suisse Holdings (USA), Inc.

income before taxes
Percent of
Billions
Item of dollars
Common equity tier 1 capital ratio 27.8 20.7 20.5 Pre-provision net revenue −0.8 −1.3
Total capital ratio 29.2 21.9 21.7 Net interest income −0.6 −1.1
1
equals
Memo items
Portfolio loss
Loan type rates
of dollars
(percent)1 1
2
4
5
5 6
1
7
2
3
4
5
Table A.10. DB USA Corporation

income before taxes
Percent of
Billions
Item of dollars
Common equity tier 1 capital ratio 26.1 17.5 17.4 Pre-provision net revenue −0.4 −0.4
DWS USA Corporation, the second U.S. intermediate holding company sub- Other losses/gains6 0.2
sidiary of Deutsche Bank AG, was subject to 2023 stress test and maintained
capital above each minimum regulatory capital ratio on a post-stress basis. equals
DWS USA Corporation had about $2 billion in assets as of the end of the Net income before taxes −2.3 −2.3
fourth quarter of 2022.
1 Memo items
For each quarter, risk-weighted assets are calculated under the Board’s standardized
approach to risk-based capital in 12 C.F.R. pt. 217, subpt. D. Other comprehensive income7 0.1
AOCI included in capital (billions of dollars) −0.2 −0.2
1
2023:Q1–2025:Q1 Average assets is the nine-quarter average of total assets.
2
Portfolio loss real estate owned (OREO) costs.
Billions 3
Loan type rates Other revenue includes one-time income and (expense) items not included
of dollars in pre-provision net revenue.
(percent)1 4
Loan losses 0.7 5.0 rated its projection of expected credit losses on securities in the allowance
for credit losses. AFS/HTM (available-for-sale/held-to-maturity).
2
Junior liens and HELOCs, domestic 0.0 9.9 tion adjustment (CVA) losses and losses arising from the counterparty
default scenario component applied to derivatives, securities lending, and
Commercial and industrial3 0.1 2.5 repurchase agreement activities.
6
Commercial real estate, domestic 0.4 11.2 Other losses/gains include projected change in fair value of loans held for
Credit cards 0.0 0.0 losses/gains on hedges on loans measured at fair value or amortized cost,
Other consumer 4
0.0 4.5 and goodwill impairment losses.
7
Other comprehensive income is only calculated for banks subject to Cat-
Other loans5 0.1 1.9 egory I or II standards or banks that opt in to including accumulated other
comprehensive income (AOCI) in their calculation of capital.
1
Average loan balances used to calculate portfolio loss rates exclude loans
held for sale, loans held for investment under the fair-value option, and
Paycheck Protection Program loans and are calculated over nine quarters.
2
3
4
5
Table A.11. The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.

income before taxes
Percent of
Billions
Item of dollars
1
equals
Memo items
Portfolio loss
Loan type rates
of dollars
(percent)1 1
2
4
5
5 6
1
7
2
3
4
5
Table A.12. JPMorgan Chase & Co.

income before taxes
Percent of
Billions
Item of dollars
1
equals
Memo items
Portfolio loss
Loan type rates
of dollars
(percent)1 1
2
4
5
5 6
1
7
2
3
4
5
Table A.13. M&T Bank Corporation

income before taxes
Percent of
Billions
Item of dollars
1
Memo items

Billions
Loan type rates 1
(percent)1 2
3
4
5
Other consumer 4
6
1
7
2
3
4
5
Table A.14. Morgan Stanley

income before taxes
Percent of
Billions
Item of dollars
1
equals
Memo items
Portfolio loss
Loan type rates
of dollars
(percent)1 1
2
4
5
5 6
1
7
2
3
4
5
Table A.15. Northern Trust Corporation

income before taxes
Percent of
Billions
Item of dollars
1
equals
Memo items
Portfolio loss
Loan type rates
of dollars
(percent)1 1
2
4
5
5 6
1
7
2
3
4
5
Table A.16. The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.

income before taxes
Percent of
Billions
Item of dollars
1
equals
Memo items
Portfolio loss
Loan type rates
of dollars
(percent)1 1
2
4
5
5 6
1
7
2
3
4
5
Table A.17. RBC US Group Holdings LLC

income before taxes
Percent of
Billions
Item of dollars
1
Memo items

Billions
Loan type rates 1
(percent)1 2
3
4
5
Other consumer 4
6
1
7
2
3
4
5
Table A.18. State Street Corporation

income before taxes
Percent of
Billions
Item of dollars
1
equals
Memo items
Portfolio loss
Loan type rates
of dollars
(percent)1 1
2
4
5
5 6
1
7
2
3
4
5
Table A.19. TD Group US Holdings LLC

income before taxes
Percent of
Billions
Item of dollars
1
equals
Memo items
Portfolio loss
Loan type rates
of dollars
(percent)1 1
2
4
5
5 6
1
7
2
3
4
5
Table A.20. Truist Financial Corporation

income before taxes
Percent of
Billions
Item of dollars
1
equals
Memo items
Portfolio loss
Loan type rates
of dollars
(percent)1 1
2
4
5
5 6
1
7
2
3
4
5
Table A.21. UBS Americas Holding LLC

income before taxes
Percent of
Billions
Item of dollars
1
equals
Memo items
Portfolio loss
Loan type rates
of dollars
(percent)1 1
2
4
5
5 6
1
7
2
3
4
5
Table A.22. U.S. Bancorp

income before taxes
Percent of
Billions
Item of dollars
1
equals
Memo items
Portfolio loss
Loan type rates
of dollars
(percent)1 1
2
4
5
5 6
1
7
2
3
4
5
Table A.23. Wells Fargo & Company

income before taxes
Percent of
Billions
Item of dollars
1
equals
Memo items
Portfolio loss
Loan type rates
of dollars
(percent)1 1
2
4
5
5 6
1
7
2
3
4
5
Table A.24. Projected loan losses by type of loan for 2023:Q1–2025:Q1 under the severely adverse scenario: 23 banks
Billions of dollars
First-lien Junior liens Commercial Commercial

Loan Credit Other Other
Bank mortgages, and HELOCs,1 and real estate,
losses cards consumer3 loans4
domestic domestic industrial2 domestic
Bank of America 54.4 5.4 1.1 16.6 7.2 14.9 2.1 7.2
Bank of NY-Mellon 1.6 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.8
Barclays US 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.7 0.0 0.1
BMO 6.3 0.2 0.1 2.4 1.1 0.1 0.5 1.9
Capital One 46.0 0.0 0.0 5.3 3.0 28.1 8.2 1.4
Charles Schwab Corp 1.4 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.6
Citigroup 47.3 3.5 1.1 7.1 2.4 24.6 2.8 5.8
Citizens 11.1 0.9 0.8 2.6 4.0 0.4 2.1 0.3
Credit Suisse USA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
DB USA 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1
Goldman Sachs 19.4 0.2 0.0 5.9 1.8 3.9 1.4 6.2
JPMorgan Chase 72.9 6.2 0.7 19.2 4.8 25.5 2.7 13.8
M&T 9.3 0.7 0.2 2.0 3.9 0.1 1.4 0.9
Morgan Stanley 10.1 1.5 0.0 1.4 2.0 0.0 0.5 4.7
Northern Trust 3.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.1 1.8
PNC 17.8 1.2 0.7 7.8 4.7 1.2 1.0 1.3
RBC USA 5.5 1.1 0.1 1.2 2.2 0.1 0.3 0.7
State Street 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.8
TD Group 10.8 1.0 0.4 2.1 2.2 3.2 0.8 1.3
Truist 19.1 1.4 0.4 4.6 5.1 0.6 5.0 2.0
UBS Americas 2.7 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.3 1.1
US Bancorp 24.3 3.5 0.8 7.0 5.1 4.3 2.3 1.3
Wells Fargo 54.2 5.1 0.5 12.7 13.6 8.2 3.7 10.3
23 banks 424.0 33.8 7.0 99.3 64.9 119.7 35.1 64.2
Note: These projections represent hypothetical estimates that involve an economic outcome that is more adverse than expected. Values may not sum precisely because
of rounding.
1
2
Commercial and industrial loans include small- and medium-enterprise loans and corporate cards.
3
4
51
Appendix B: Disclosure Loan Category

Definitions
Table B.1. Mapping of loan categories to disclosure categories
Disclosure category Loan type

First-lien mortgages, domestic Domestic first-lien mortgages
Junior liens and home equity lines of credit (HELOCs), domestic Domestic second-lien mortgages
Domestic HELOCs
Credit cards Domestic cards
International cards
Commercial and industrial Commercial and industrial loans
Corporate and business cards
Small business loans
Commercial real estate, domestic Domestic owner-occupied commercial real estate loans
Domestic construction loans
Domestic multifamily loans
Domestic non-owner occupied commercial real estate loans
Other consumer Student loans
Domestic auto loans
International auto loans
Domestic other consumer loans
International other consumer loans
Other loans Agricultural loans
Domestic farm loans
International farm loans
International owner-occupied commercial real estate loans
International construction loans
International multifamily loans
International non-owner occupied commercial real estate loans
International first-lien mortgages
International second-lien mortgages
Loans to foreign governments
Loans to financial institutions
Loans for purchasing and carrying securities
Other non-consumer loans
Other leases
Find other Federal Reserve Board publications (www.federalreserve.gov/publications.htm) or order
those offered in print (www.federalreserve.gov/files/orderform.pdf) on our website. Also visit the site for more
information about the Board and to learn how to stay connected with us on social media.
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2023 Fed Stress Tests

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2023 Fed Stress Tests

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2023 Federal Reserve Stress Test Results

The Federal Reserve

■ conducts the nation’s monetary policy to promote maximum employment

■ promotes the stability of the financial system and seeks to minimize

■ promotes the safety and soundness of individual financial institutions

■ fosters payment and settlement system safety and efficiency through

■ promotes consumer protection and community development through

To learn more about us, visit www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed.htm.

Preface .............................................................................................................................. iii

Results for Banks under the Severely Adverse Scenario ......................................... 7

Appendix A: Additional Bank-Specific Results ......................................................... 25

Appendix B: Disclosure Loan Category Definitions ................................................. 51

Figure 1. How stress testing works for large banks

The Federal Reserve develops

The Federal Reserve develops

Using the scenario data and bank The Federal Reserve

As part of this cycle, the Federal Reserve publishes four documents:

Stressed minimum capital ratios, Minimum regulatory

This report includes

• stress test results and highlights, and

• bank-specific stress test results (appendix A).

Stress Test Process

U.S. global systemically important bank holding companies (Category I)

Table 2. Banks participating in the 2023 stress test

Name Risk based category

Box 1. Model Changes since 2022 Stress Test

Results for Banks under the Severely

Actual Projected Projected

Stressed ratios with

Common equity Supplementary

Box 2. Results Highlights from 2019 to 2023

Figure B. 3-month Treasury yield, severely adverse scenario

Figure C. Accumulated other comprehensive income (AOCI) in capital to risk-weighted assets,

Starting AOCI in capital Minimum quarter AOCI in capital

Consumer loss rate Wholesale loss rate

Pre-tax Net Income

Item Billions of dollars Percent of average assets1

Figure 5. Pre-tax net income rates in the severely adverse scenario

Memo Other effects

Losses Figure 6. Projected losses in the severely

option (see table 6), accounting for 3 per- Other

accounting for 17 percent of total Billions of dollars (percent of total losses)

for 1 percent of total losses (see figure 6).8

17.4 percent on credit cards, due to the sen-

For loans measured at fair value, losses enter

Box 3. Commercial Real Estate in Supervisory Stress Test

Figure A. Vacancy rate by property type

Source: CBRE Econometric Advisors.!

Figure B. Office loss rate, cumulative 9-quarter

15 2007–09 Global Financial Crisis loss rate

Pre-provision Net Revenue

Figure 7. Pre-provision net revenue rates in the severely adverse scenario

Box 4. Exploratory Market Shock—Testing Inflationary

Global market shock Exploratory market

Appendix A: Additional Bank-Specific

Table A.1. Bank of America Corporation

Table A.2. The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation

Table A.3. Barclays US LLC

Table A.4. BMO Financial Corp.