Seeing as a Social Phenomenon 217

10
We will focus on vision. What we are learning today is that most of us
are unaware of the nature of our actual visual experience and its many
limitations. As (Pylyshyn 2000: 203) notes:
Seeing as a Social Phenomenon: less information is encoded with each glance than has been previ-
Feminist Theory and the ously assumed. Research by several workers has shown that informa-

Cognitive Sciences tion about the properties and relative locations of small changes in a
scene are rarely noticed during saccades. Nevertheless, humans have
Anne Jaap Jacobson the impression of a large, panoramic scene. Such a scene does indeed
exist, but it is in the real world and not in the mind.

The phenomenon Pylyshyn describes, change blindness, is further

reported in Chabris and Simons (2010).
From the point of view of distinctly human interests in getting to
the true facts of the case, human vision is an often faulty guide. Thus,
1 Introduction recent research shows that our actual visual experience is very partial in
comparison to the way we are inclined to think of it. Our considerably
Is seeing a social phenomenon? Are there political dimensions to the fuller perceptual reports must be drawn on resources additional to our
question of what can be seen? These questions are worth feminist inner experience. As such, they can be affected community contribu-
notice, particularly since doubts about basic ways of knowing are being tions as much as any other statements.
raised by the cognitive sciences. The problems surrounding recent
doubts about human knowledge intersect with feminist concerns at 2 Cognitive capacities
many familiar points.
Recent investigations into human cognition strongly support the We can see much of Anglo-American philosophy as having inherited
idea that individual human cognitive capacities are significantly less from the Enlightenment investigations a confidence in human cogni-
than many have been inclined to think, as we will see. The outcome tion, where ‘cognition’ is understood widely to cover memory, senses,
is that we are not the individual knowers that we often think we are. and the emotions, as well as more higher level cognitive activity such as
It is then important that much in feminist thought has a context in explicit reasoning. To a considerable extent, more ordinary culture has
which to place such a conclusion, since feminists are often engaged followed with a strong faith in the senses as instruments for uncovering
in showing how at various levels knowledge accomplishments involve truths. For example, eyewitness testimony has been considered nearly
the community (Longino 1990, 2002; Potter 1995; Lloyd 2000; Jaggar incorrigible by the lay public and by judges and prosecutors. A jury may
2008). To put it very roughly, recent research on human cognition find the idea that one failed to see what was before one’s eyes as simply
reveals gaps and errors, while those working on the social dimensions unbelievable (Chabris and Simons 2010).
of knowledge are often investigating how gaps and errors get rectified The connection between vision and the discovery of truths is
in the creation of knowledge. Perhaps the most obvious of the prob- reflected in many recent philosophical statements on vision. For exam-
lems are biases, such as the confirmation bias; in this case, the cor- ple, the introduction to the influential collection Perceptual Experience
responding community role may be just to review one’s work for such (Gendler and Hawthorne 2006) takes the central problem for philoso-
biases. But more generally, these two projects – the deconstruction phy of perception to be reconciling the fact of perceptual errors with
of individual knowledge and the delineation of social knowledge – our view of our perceptual access to the world; here truth seems to be
together point us toward a constructive project in understanding the aim of seeing. And in the collection Mark Johnston famously asserts
human cognition. that the function of sensory awareness is to disclose to our awareness

216
218 Anne Jaap Jacobson Seeing as a Social Phenomenon 219

the truthmakers and content providers of our sensory judgments; the works on science, even people very interested in pursuing a set of ques-
senses show us what makes our judgments true (Johnston 2006). Such a tions can find that the training needed is closed to them. In a synopsis
claim presents as unproblematic the idea that the senses do disclose the of his forthcoming work on Victorian female scientists, Holmes (2010)
world to us. But such views are very questionable. notes that the female scientists were largely confined to roles that, while
important, were often ancillary to the actual production of science.
We all believe that we are capable of seeing what’s in front of us, of And that, we may say, is just the beginning. Inquirers who resist the
accurately remembering important events from our past, of under- presence of some groups may develop theories that justify the continu-
standing the limits of our knowledge, of properly determining cause ation of exclusion of those groups from the community of knowers, too
and effect. But these intuitive beliefs are often mistaken ones that often with the result that knowledge about them is not developed or
mask critically important limitations on our cognitive abilities ... As is distorted. Perhaps most notoriously, over the centuries many writers
we go through life, we often act as though we know how our minds have claimed men are more able to do scientific research; among the
work and why we behave the way we do. It is surprising how often most recent is Simon Baron-Cohen (Baron-Cohen 2003), whose work is
we really have no clue. (Chabris and Simons 2010: xii) discussed in a chapter in this volume.
There are, then, often communal controls on the production of
Sight, memory, and the grasp of causal relations are the products of and access to knowledge, which may also promote or reinforce biases
evolution, which responds to such things as survival, reproduction, in inquirers. Also important for our purposes are the positive effects
and, in many cases, social needs. Through much of our evolution, varia- the community can have. Thus a community of inquirers may correct
tions were selected on the basis of their serving the needs we share with biases in its members (Longino 1990; Potter 1995). Here we can think of
many other species, which have little to do with human interests in the a community as enhancing the members’ ability to know (Lloyd 2000).
construction of factual narratives. Such constructions constitute much Relatedly, the community may help complete projects that are too large
in our sense of ourselves, and our views on the structure and purpose for an individual inquirer to undertake alone, or that bring in essential
of our societies, but our interest in them is an anomaly in nature. That pieces of expertise no one person will be able to encompass. Further, as
fact shows up when we examine our cognitive capacities. For example, some feminists have stressed, outsider status may confer on one situ-
vision and memory give us the gist of things, but they are not well ated knowledge that is not available to officially sanctioned groups of
suited to the fact gathering and explaining that Western society values cognizers (Harding 2004). For example, those who are discriminated
so highly. We may want to know just what happened, and how and against may have a much clearer view of the deficits in understanding
where and when it happened. But, as extensive experimentation tells in the dominant group than that group can discern for itself.
us, we miss out on a great deal that is right before our eyes, and what we Perhaps most philosophically challenging is the idea that the com-
do pick up is only partially retained by an often distorting memory. munity is involved in an individual’s knowledge all the way down, as
it were. Could knowledge acquisition be social in the way playing chess
3 Feminism and social knowledge or waltzing are? If so, then what one is doing is in part constituted by
what others are doing. This view is articulated in various places by Baier
As we remarked above, while cognitive science has been deconstructing (Baier 1991, 1994, 1997; Jacobson 2000) and appears to maintained by
individual knowledge of the facts, feminist theorists have been looking Longino in comments such as “The subject of experience, the individ-
at social bases for knowledge and who has it. Social factors may make ual, is a nexus of interpretation coming into existence at the boundary
us know even less, but they may also contain resources for compensat- of nature and culture” (Longino 1990: 221). It is not hard to understand
ing for individual deficits. Thus there are many ways in which society the thesis that knowledge of mathematics is partially constituted by
affects the knowledge of individuals. For example, both the means to the grasp of codes whose rules for use are determined by the commu-
produce knowledge and the ability to reveal the results of such produc- nity, and not any one individual. Seeing and remembering, we might
tion are often heavily influenced by decisions outside the control of any think, are very different, since they are just a matter of the individual
individual investigator. In ways discussed in many feminist-influenced experiences we have. However, it can look very implausible to say that
220 Anne Jaap Jacobson Seeing as a Social Phenomenon 221

our memory reports and our perceptual reports are reports of rather conception of cognition are not always sanguine for feminists. If women
full internal experiences, since it does not look as though we have such are already situated as unequal in their capacity to know, their credibil-
experiences. Rather, the view that we do looks like something con- ity may be further diminished by the new understandings. This result
structed, and the construction draws on a host of factors external to us. has actually occurred in part because the new ideas about memory have
Or so I will argue. become intertwined in the public eye with the question of whether
As we look at sensory capacities, and in particular vision, we can reports by women of recovered memories of sexual abuse are just the
discern room for many roles for a community. Those good at seeing unreliable products of suggestive therapy. Sue Campbell’s work in this
something may have needed special training, ranging from recogniz- area also highlights the extent to which women with such claims, and
ing a style of painting to being able to see the affordances made possible feminists supporting the possibility of their being true, have been dis-
by machinery. Seeing may deeply reflect cultural biases, since what we missed as delusional or as activist zealots (Campbell 2003). Campbell
notice in a scene are often what stereotypical biases lead us to expect concludes that the result is to deprive women of full personhood.
(Eberhardt et al. 2004). In addition, very importantly seeing can leave Memories, she argues, are in part social narratives that involve the con-
us with large gaps in our knowledge of a scene we surveyed. Bringing struction of selves.
other witnesses together can help. Similarly, getting someone to help Campbell’s work is on a complex situation, where moral, political,
even in a simple search, such as finding the keys, which are in fact on and philosophical concerns intersect in creating a problem for femi-
one’s desk, may be important to the task’s success. Further, and more nists. Looking at vision gives us a chance to consider a range of issues
generally, when seeing involves recognition, that is often the result of about gaps and errors without immediately encountering political prob-
cultural learning. lems. As we see at the end, though, the political implications are there.
That is, I will argue, perceptual reports are not best construed as
reports of internal experiences. Rather, they are contributions to share- 4 Vision: scope and limits
able discourse about what is. We can consider the approach to reports
of psychological states that are undertaken here to be ‘analytic,’ rather It is well to start with a number of ways vision’s contribution exceeds
than ‘synthetic.’ A synthetic approach is based on the recognition that what until recently we thought it could do. Vision has links to reactions
there is a gap between the supposed inner experience and our corre- that are important for our social behavior. The most recent research
sponding reports. It looks at the important ways in which community confirms the existence of ‘mirror neurons’ in human beings (Mukamel
has a role in creating the material for the report. A prominent example et al. 2010); because of them, most of us, for example, can mirror
is Sue Campbell’s recent work on memory (Campbell 2003; Campbell others’ actions and expressed emotions, and such mirroring appears
et al. 2009) which recognizes the limited and precarious nature of the very important in numerous ways to our understanding and actions
factual recording our memories do. For Campbell, an active audience (Iacoboni 2008). Interestingly, there is very recent evidence that inhib-
can participate in the construction of a person’s memory reports; mem- iting our motor imitations in response to the visual uptake of facial
ory reports can be understood as public performances shaped by inter- expression degrades our ability to understand others. Thus Botox when
actions. Such reports also provide one a sense of one’s self extended used to suppress facial movement may do more harm socially than
through time. We are not yet, I think, able to undertake a synthetic good (Bower 2010).
approach to vision; hence, I will take an analytic approach, one which Vision is often excellent at guiding action in other ways. The magno-
examines the elements of vision to investigate how reports of visual cellular pathway in the visual system enables some highly important
experience contrast with the experience itself, and the ways in which signals – such as ones from snakes and facial expressions – to get to the
the content of one’s report is or can be sensitive to one’s audiences, limbic system before they are recognized by any higher cognitive func-
either potential or actual. tion (LeDoux 1996). Because of this, we can act and react very quickly.
In sum, feminists have often been interested in dispatching the ideal Ordinary experience reveals that vision can help us cope with com-
of a solitary knower. The cognitive sciences appear happy to help. plexity we would find very hard to think our way through. For exam-
Nonetheless, the results of the wholesale questioning of a traditional ple, walking along a very irregular terrain can be quite risky, but if one
222 Anne Jaap Jacobson Seeing as a Social Phenomenon 223

simply looks where one is going, the walk becomes much safer, even expect to see, so that motorcycles and bikes are less safe to ride in areas
though it might be impossible for one to describe the variety of angles where they are uncommon (Chabris and Simons 2010).
at which one places one’s feet as one adjusts one’s walk to the surface. There has been a recent upsurge in research on the transition from
There are also many ways in which vision falls short of what we think saccades to objects. The 2008 Journal of Vision, for example, devoted
it does. Vision does not enable us to pick up the details of our environ- an issue to new research (Martinez-Conde et al. 2008). The subsequent
ment in the way we think it does. Thus we think we can take in a room research that I will concentrate on (Öğmen et al. 2006; Öğmen 2007;
in a glance, but in fact we pick up relatively little. In a way, this infor- Ayden et al. 2008), supersedes earlier distinguished research by phil-
mation should not be surprising. We hear stories about car accidents osophical enactivists (Noë 2004; Rowlands 2010), which stressed our
that occur because one driver just did not see the other car. Many of us intuitive grasp of the interactions among our movements and what is
know someone (and may be someone) who regularly fails to find keys seen in our environment (the ‘sensory-motor contingencies’).
that are in plain sight. The deliverance of unschooled common sense The transition from saccades to objects as it is investigated by the
seems to be that one opens one’s eyes and sees what is around one, but research we are considering is bottom-up; it is independent of any knowl-
that is wrong. edge of features other than those revealed in early vision. Consequently,
It is, then, a commonplace of vision science that we get much less what we have so far gives us experiences that provide us with a world
information at any one point in time than we tend to think we do. The in some sense segmenting into objects. As far as what is relevant for
visual system that produces our experience of a world of stable objects is our discussion goes, the scene is a three-dimensional partial array of
selective in many ways. But we can understand the limitations Pylyshyn colored objects and motion; we also have some changes in early vis-
and others (see above) are interested in if we think of vision as having ual processing that reflect our experiences of positively and negatively
two great consolidation stages and two stages in which limitations are valenced features in the world. Action-relevant factors that might once
introduced by the way our attention works. In both consolidation and have been matters of conscious recognition come to affect very primi-
limitation we can encounter ways vision is restricted of which we are tive features of early sensory processing. This is particularly true of the
largely unaware. reward signals that can show up in V1 and allow one to predict the tim-
In looking at a scene, our eyes tend to scan it by moving in saccades, ing of rewards (Shuler and Bear 2006; Montague 2007). We could think
which are rapid small movements punctuated by brief fixations. In of such experiences as giving us a schema that is produced rapidly and
such fixations, attention works to produce binding, so that qualities that is often a very good guide to action. There is, however, a wide gap
processed separately in very early vision are brought together in our between such a schema and the contents of such perceptual reports as
experience. Thus, color and shape are originally processed separately, “I see the red light of the setting sun filtering through the black and
but we tend to experience colored shapes as single things. This is the thickly clustered branches of the elms; I see the dappled deer grazing in
first great consolidation. groups on the vivid green grass” (Noë and Thompson 2002).
We also experience a world of steady objects, but saccades give us Some of the added content comes in as we are able to classify objects.
a jerky series of very partial takes on parts of such a world. A second There is an important period in development, which is completed around
great consolidation is created when we transform the jerky input into 12 months, when a child moves from taking spatio-temporal continuity
an experience of objects. The second consolidation also produces par- to be enough for the persistence of an object to taking the persistence of
tial results in comparison with the whole scene that we think we can a kind as required (Carey and Xu 2001). Before this stage, an object that
take in. In putting the products of our short takes together it tends to be is occluded may change into any other sort of object, at least as far as the
heavily selective and very object oriented. This second consolidation is perceiver is concerned. After this stage, the perceiver grasps the predict-
sometimes said to be or to involve amodal completion. ability of kind persistence. It is here that we seem to have an individual
The limits of attention add to the partiality of the results for both who experiences the world as made up of stable, lasting objects.
stages of consolidation. Thus the discontinuous nature of our saccades What is also important is that the conceptual content of kind con-
is compounded by our ability to bind only a limited number of ele- cepts, on any recent theory of concepts in psychology, is full of learned
ments. And a similarly restricting and interest-driven attention limits data. With classifying objects, we leave the realm of the pure sensory
what objects we see. We are, for example, more likely to see what we bottom-up processing and start to draw on the results of learning.
224 Anne Jaap Jacobson Seeing as a Social Phenomenon 225

Amodal completion by itself gives us a kind of perceptual organization. schematic take on the scene before us; without the inclusion of any
A great deal more is provided by further conceptualization, which is learned material, we have some movement, some organized objects,
learned through our social groups. along with some material about rewards priming us for action. There is
In addition to conceptualization, we have adding-in, which helps to a problem with assessing this material as correct or incorrect; the second
account for the sense we have of experiencing a gap-less panorama. consolidation does not cover the whole scene or provide all the details.
This last part is accomplished at least largely by experience-based add- The gaps, however, need not be in the world itself, and an accurate
ing or filling-in. Here our sense of what we see goes far beyond what we grasp of what is seen involves an at least implicitly employed distinc-
get from the consolidation of saccades and the resulting objects. tion between gaps in the experience and gaps in what is experienced.
We add in descriptions of things we do see, such as “my neighbor’s The situation is quite like that of maps. Given a map with an X on it,
child,” “the President of the United States,” and “someone bald from and told that it shows where the treasure is, one does not begin to know
chemotherapy,” where what makes these descriptions true is arguably how to look for the treasure. Even the information that the map gives
not some feature that affects our retinas. Not only may visual reports of our environment is not enough. We need more of an interpretation,
add on such descriptions, but we can also correctly put into them things not just about the scale and orientation of the map, but also in many
we do not – in some clear sense – see at all. For example, one might say situations, we need information about, for example, how we incorpo-
one saw someone next to the bear enclosure or over by the pond even rate in our plans all the things in the environment that are not on the
though neither the enclosure nor the pond were visually accessible from map. Even in the wonderfully detailed survey maps of England can be
where one stood. Though these descriptions of ‘extra, unseen things’ are seriously ambiguous. Is a broken down and decayed fence the fence on
part of descriptions of seen things, we can also add in things independ- the map? Or is that a bit further on? Is this raised clump of stones the
ently of describing other things. Thus, asked what a burgled store looked decayed burial mound or not?
like when I entered it, I might report that the vegetables were over to the We can see much of the adding-in as at least part of the interpretation
right of the door even though all I got were some unbound shapes and of our schematic take. Such adding-in is typically automatic and very
colors in my peripheral vision. That sort of material can be transformed rapid. If we employ pre-verbal conceptual abilities that recent theorists
into a report about things seen if we have good epistemic grounds for drawing on sensory experience describe (Barsalou 1999; Prinz 2002), we
taking it to be that which causes in some way our experience. should expect the adding on to have phenomenological import. This
The adding-in that takes us from the schema to the completed scene is because of the close connection on such accounts between sensory
in fact draws on a host of factors, including surely our grasp of the rela- experience and the deployment of concepts. Consequently, as we have
tion between our environment and our movement, results from further been stressing, what we report ourselves as seeing, and what it feels like
saccading and conceptualization of its products, past experience with phenomenologically to have seen these objects, are quite different from
the location and kinds of things to be seen, cultural conventions about the initial schema. The initial schema is often enough for action, but it
artifactual objects, the input of other senses, and so on and so forth. falls far short of what we ordinarily think of as what we see.
The result is that we no longer have a somewhat schematic and partial A familiar point in the philosophical literature on vision provides an
scene; rather, as our sensory reports reveal, we have a much fuller pic- important clue for how the adding or filling-in is nonetheless an appro-
ture of the environment. We may still, however, not have the detailed priate thing to do. It is often said that sensory experience is transparent
grasp of the faces before us, for example. We may also completely miss and that even if we try to describe its features, in fact we describe the
out on things we do not expect, including motorcycles, or things we features of objects. As Gil Harman has famously remarked:
look for frantically, such as car keys.
When you see a tree, you do not experience any features as intrinsic
5 Vision and truth to your experience. Look at a tree and try to turn your attention to
the intrinsic features of the visual experience. I predict that the only
What should we say now to the idea that vision is a matter of truth- features you will find to turn your attention to will be features of the
revealing inner experience? The second consolidation allows us a presented tree. (Harman 1990: 667)
226 Anne Jaap Jacobson Seeing as a Social Phenomenon 227

What we have seen provides something of a correction on this view. 6 The politics of seeing
Our intrinsic experience is very partial and cannot account by itself for
the full description we give of our environment; rather our conceptuali- Given recent research, we can see reports of our perceptual experience
zation and adding-in creates our understanding of the environment. To as close to reports of the environment. Their content draws on the
articulate our understanding is normally just to describe what is in the resources of agreed upon classifications, themselves reflecting shared
environment we have experienced. We learn locutions such as “I see” causal knowledge. The community’s role in bringing out such a state of
in the context of experiencing a world full of already named kinds. We affairs is highly significant. Community reactions can also contribute
cannot report seeing a cat unless we have mastered the reports of there to an increased accuracy in our views about what is plainly available.
being a cat. From this perspective, “I see the cat” reports an epistemic Given such a role for the community, we might expect that vision is
achievement, not an internal experience. We could say that the initial more of a site of political activity than it might have first occurred to
schema we get is more like an invitation to describe our environment us. And some of it is highly gendered in ways that produce different
than some sort of message about all that is there. visual abilities in men and women. But other aspects react also to race,
That we are as a species designed for action too rapid to require much ethnicity, and class. Many of the effects we will look at are foreshad-
higher level engagement (Montague and Quartz 1999; Montague 2003; owed above.
Allman 2005; Montague 2007) – still less of internal debates – suggests
that beliefs are a separate product caused by an action-oriented vision 6.1 The effects of bias
and a great deal of background information. To hold that in addition to One variable in one’s experience is attention, and stereotypes, con-
the beliefs, the experience has that content appears to multiply entities scious or not, can have a large influence on what one attends to. As
without necessity. a consequence, seeing may not be believing, but believing may cre-
Theorists who believe we have truth-revealing inner experience have ate much of the seeing. For example, vision can reinforce stereotypes.
arguments in their arsenal that I consider elsewhere (Jacobson forth- Even implicit biases that draw on stereotypes we might not articulate
coming). Principal among these is the claim that the subjective simi- can prime us for noticing items related to the stereotypes. The result is
larities between genuine seeing, on the one hand, and illusions and visual experiences that enact and confirm bias. For example, if we have
hallucinations on the other, reveals an ontology needed by theories of the stereotype of black men as dangerous then we will be primed to
vision. In reply I argue that the idea that subjective similarities provide pick out items around him that might be weapons. Perhaps worse, the
an ontology for science has proved in error enough times to now be more stereotypically black a man is, the more he is to be seen as danger-
incredible. ous (Eberhardt et al. 2004). This puts darker black men at considerable
We have seen enough to provide strong support for the idea that risk in the criminal justice system.
learned material affects our perceptual reports in a way that goes far Many factors such as these reduce the evidential value of eyewit-
beyond the visual data that we receive and process in early vision, the ness testimony. Nonetheless, prosecutors tend to place great weight on
visual processing that does not draw on background knowledge and them, and to be skeptical of any concerns that jurors may be mislead
beliefs. As a consequence, much of our reporting of our visual experi- (Mukamel et al. 2010). The website of the Innocence Project tells us:
ences that incorporate the rich panorama are the products of a great deal
of learning, including learning to employ the classifications encoded in Eyewitness misidentification is the single greatest cause of wrongful
our language. The result is the product of the physical world, our eyes convictions nationwide, playing a role in more than 75% of convic-
and brain, and our culture. The accuracy we aim for in our reports, tions overturned through DNA testing. While eyewitness testimony
when that is our aim, depends on extensive practice and corrections can be persuasive evidence before a judge or jury, 30 years of strong
as we learn to bring our culture and the visual input together. In the social science research has proven that eyewitness identification is
next section, we will look briefly at some of the features of vision that often unreliable. Research shows that the human mind is not like
become highlighted when we look at it in this way. a tape recorder; we neither record events exactly as we see them,
228 Anne Jaap Jacobson Seeing as a Social Phenomenon 229

nor recall them like a tape that has been rewound. Instead, witness can place it on the side of the instinctive. Some more recent theorists
memory is like any other evidence at a crime scene; it must be pre- have consigned the instinctive to the female brain, arguing that the
served carefully and retrieved methodically, or it can be contami- analytical brain of men is what is needed for science and leadership,
nated. (Innocence Project) for example (Baron-Cohen 2003). We come full circle in finding that
vision’s excellence and women are both consigned to a ‘lower order’
6.2 Who sees what? than that needed for genuine truth-seeking.
Another area of feminist concern comes into view when we realize
vision is used to build potentially social narratives of what there is. This 7 In Conclusion
feature fits in with the fact that there can be public standards for com-
petent seeing, and that socialization can make a large difference to a As Alva Noë has pointed out, it can seem natural to think of vision
child’s ability to meet them. In stereotypical situations, young men may in terms of a photograph-like experience (Noë 2004). However, recent
unable to itemize the various components of diaper changing that are research makes us aware of how wrong that model is, as Noë also main-
on a shelf, while a young woman may be lost at the sight of a car motor. tains. The product of the visual system is, in contrast to a photograph,
It is arguable that the benefits of this arrangement are to the men. There incomplete and partial in striking ways that vary with our interests and
are serious ramifications, then, for the gender-specific socialization beliefs. Vision is for meeting the organism’s needs in its environment,
children receive. We know, for example, that spatial imagination can be and not for deciding complex matters of fact.
important for, among other things, doing well on various parts of the This chapter has focused to some extent on the resulting gap between
SAT exams and later pursuing careers in quantitative fields. But it looks perception and our ordinary view about it, much of the latter reflected
increasingly as though spatial imagination is developed through visual in the completeness of the examples in the literature of perceptual
interactions with the environment. Boys’ games may well be more help- reports. I have argued that the gap signifies the extent to which our
ful here than the stereotypical girls’ domestic play. seemingly individual views about the world are replete with influences
Some of the evidence that the effect is environmental is that envi- from social contexts, particularly those in which we learn to conceptu-
ronmental factors can correct some of the deficits. For example, women alize our environment. In acquiring terms, one also experiences agree-
who play video games for ten hours increase their ability to rotate fig- ment in judgment, a foundation for public discourse.
ures spatially so that they are close to the abilities of their male coun- Arguing that we can understand perceptual reports as more like pub-
terparts (Jing, Spence et al. 2007). IQ scores, it appears, can draw on lic performances than like reports on internal experiences goes on the
gendered and malleable abilities. ‘analytic’ side of project of providing a socially embodied theory of cog-
nition. It is prepares us, though, for the realization that our conception
6.3 Vision and embodiment of vision can disguise many ways in which vision has a political dimen-
One final feature we can note is that the emphasis in philosophy on sion. This chapter has just begun investigating that dimension.
vision and truth-acquisition and the consequent neglect of vision’s
excellence in facilitating acting and social connections enacts a famil-
iar bifurcation present in philosophy at least since Descartes. This is
the divide between cognition very narrowly construed in terms of
truth-seeking and bodily matters, such as actions and shared emotions.
Traditionally, the body and emotions are considered outsiders in the
philosophical realm, and their frequent and familiar identification
with women assigns to women, on a symbolic level at least, a position
on the margins of philosophy.
The appropriation of vision as a servant of those who seek truth is
worth pursuing a bit. Vision’s role in social connections and in action