NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES, VULNERABILITIES AND WAY AHEAD

Introduction

1. Protecting the nation’s maritime interests against all contemporary and

emerging threats was the foundational cause for the genesis of Indian Coast Guard

(ICG). This remains the core objective of the ICG and is an endeavour in perpetuity.

2. History bears testimony to the fact that the maritime interest of a nation is an

intrinsic constituent to its wellbeing and progress. The oceans have been umbilicaly

connected to human evolution and endeavours. Mankind has fathomed great

opportunities in the seas, both legitimate and illegitimate. Since the ancient past,

seas have been used for conquest, trade, cultural exchanges etc, whilst the

delinquent have found safe haven and fertile hunting grounds in the oceans and this

remains an eternal phenomenon.

3. As the global maritime consciousness has sharpened, competition for the

finite maritime resources has been intensifying, leading to conflict of interests

between nations. Similarly the diverse geopolitical priorities of nations also find

expression in the maritime domain. The technological developments of modern age

have deepened the relevance of the maritime resources in realising a nation’s

national objectives. Correspondingly the threats to maritime prosperity have also

been evolving dynamically.

4. India has abundant maritime resources to be harnessed from its vast maritime

zones and valuable opportunities to leverage its privileged geographic disposition.

Consequently, India faces a variety of threats designed to undermine the nation’s

maritime interests. The Indian Ocean Region has been focus of relentless attempts

by various nations to exert their influence and dominate the region. Our maritime

interests are also threatened by entities seeking to clandestinely exploit the maritime

resources or breach maritime security for consummating their nefarious purposes.

Besides the threats emerging from these deliberate attempts, our maritime interests

need to be protected from the attendant risks associated with bonafide domestic

endeavours. The geopolitical machinations, persistence of the illicit entities and need

to sustain legitimate human activities in the seas, forms a complex and volatile

maritime threat scenario.

5. In this milieu, accomplishment of the ICG charter is faced with multiple and

mutating security challenges. ICG needs to be prescient, proactive and

perspicacious to neutralise extant threats and be prepared for future threats.

Security Challenges

6. Security challenges in apropos of ICG, is a confluence of a variety of distinct

aspects. Therefore, to determine and comprehend the new security challenges

facing ICG, the following causative components needs to be systematically

examined:-

(a) The paradigm of security in the context of ICG.

(b) Different security requirements in each paradigm.

(c) Conditions breeding new security challenges.

Security Paradigms in Context of ICG

7. The different security paradigms in the context of ICG, is a function of the

intent which determines direction of the security efforts and therefore can be

categorised in two broad categories as follows:-

(a) Security provided by ICG.

(b) Security needed by ICG.

8. Security Provided by ICG. The security requirement under this paradigm

comprises of all elements of maritime security which ICG is expected to provide and

includes the following:-

(a) Maritime Zones Security

(b) Marine Environment Security

(c) Energy Security

(d) Economic Security

(e) Human Security

(f) National Security

9. Security Needed by ICG. This paradigm comprises of all aspects of

security needed for maintaining the optimum operational capacity of ICG

uninterrupted and includes the following :-

(a) Assets Security

(b) Cyber Security

(c) Information Security

(d) Personnel Security

(e) Crypto Security

Conditions Breeding New Security Challenges

10. There is a constellation of security challenges, both external and internal,

which ICG has to deal with. Most of the security challenges are existing and known

viz terrorism, smuggling, arms trafficking etc, while new ones are spawning.

11. The new security challenges are of two kinds:-

(a) Existing security challenges which have assumed different dimension,

shaped by circumstances.

(b) Fresh security challenges emerging from the circumstances.

12. The circumstances can be, change in world order, fluid geopolitical

alignments, environmental issues, technology etc. Examination of such new

developments will reveal the new security challenges for ICG.

New Security Challenges : Reasons and Manifestation

13. Sub Conventional Warfare. The emergence of Pakistan nurtured Taliban

regime in Afghanistan is the beginning of a new epoch in the sub-conventional

warfare against India. The global acknowledgement received by Taliban has already

legitimatised the terrorist regime and paves the way for eventual formal recognition

by international community. The entrenched ideological fanaticism of the Taliban

regime is its core strength and hence the group is unlikely to reform. The emergence

of Taliban regime presents multiple options to mentor nations to target India through

sub-conventional warfare. The combat experience gained by Taliban terrorists along

with their easy access to funds, equipment, safe haven etc will encourage audacious

operations against Indian security forces. Scores of terrorist groups, especially anti-

India groups, will now gain renewed vigour and support. Their tactics may adopt
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more brazen methods and may even resort to deliberate confrontation with ICG

units. Besides the traditional threats, the new threats posed by this contemporary

geo-political mishap is as follows:-

(a) Aggressive attempts to breach Maritime Security, employing merchant

ships, commandeered vessels of Indian security agencies etc.

(b) Use aerial or underwater drones for remote controlled attacks.

(c) Deliberately entice boarding teams and take them hostage or harm

them.

14. Continental Shelf. The Indian maritime zone is presently till the extremities

of the Indian EEZ and comes under the purview of ICG. The ICG force composition,

surveillance endurance, response strategy etc have been planned as per the existing

expanse of the Indian maritime zones. India has submitted its claim for Continental

Shelf extending beyond the EEZ to the UN Committee on Legal Continental Shelf

(UNCLCS), which on award will further expand the Indian maritime zones. The

significant extension of maritime zone, will require corresponding resources and new

regulations to be protected by ICG.

15. Climate Change. There is compelling evidence to the deleterious effects of

climate change (Min of Earth Sciences, GoI, 2020) which impacts all walks of human

life. The complete repercussions of climate change is still nebulous, however raise of

sea levels, erosion of coastline, effect on marine life, altered patterns of ocean

storms etc have been predicted with certainty. Oceans, the medium in which ICG

operates is set to change significantly due to climate change and ICG will have to

prepare for the far reaching impact of the phenomenon.

16. Chinese Fishing Militia. The Chinese Fishing Militia(CFM) is an integral

component of its naval power. Chinese Fishing Armed Militia is state trained and has

a history of successfully assisting the PLA Navy to prevail upon its adversaries

(RAND CORP, 2020). The Chinese Distant Water Fishing Fleet(DWF) is a global

delinquent and concern for coastal nations. The Chinese Fishing Militia has played

an important role to advantage China in maritime territorial disputes. The Chinese

Fishing Militia is well armed and has used swarming to successfully overwhelm

foreign Coast Guard or Naval units in the South China Sea. Dominance of Indian

Ocean has been a Chinese agenda and its fishing fleet is an useful tool to further the

agenda. China is known to foist false territorial claims through vague historical

accounts and then impose ownership on such territory through its fishing fleets.

Fig 1 : Chinese Distant Fishing Fleet Global Presence

(Source : https://ipdefenseforum.com/2021/02/chinas-distant-water-fishing-fleet-
harms-developing-countries-economies-food-security/)

Owning ports in IOR, will allow China some obscure reason to claim territory in the

Indian Ocean eventually. The proliferation of Chinese ports in IOR nations enables

China to dramatically enhance their fishing fleet in the Indian Ocean and also provide

prolonged sustenance to the fishing fleet. The presence of Chinese Fishing Fleet is
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an immediate threat to marine resources, safety and livelihood of India’s fishermen

and in long term to India’s territorial integrity. The techniques employed by Chinese

fishing militia in South China Sea can be replicated in Indian Ocean also against ICG

units and fishermen. ICG presently does not have a firm policy to deter the Chinese

Fishing Boats in Indian maritime zones.

17. Information Security. Information Security refers to the mechanism which

ensures confidentiality, integrity and availability of information (CSRC). ICG units are

repositories of classified data and also generate large volume of data themselves.

The confidentiality, integrity and availability of such data is not only crucial for the

functioning of ICG but also vital to national security. The infirmity of Information

Security in ICG is due to following:-

(a) Confidentiality. The permeation of technology into all aspects of our

lives has enhanced the quality of life and thereby it has become inseparable.

However these gadgets have associated security vulnerabilities which are

threat to confidentiality of information and if succumbed to, will have far

reaching implications.

(b) Availability. ICG generates a large amount of information which

includes critical operational information through CSN, SITREPs etc. This data

can produce vital information for threat appreciation, deployment planning,

etc. Presently the data handling mechanism undermines the availability data

in processed form to assist decision makers. The consolidated, correlated and

prompt availability of all relevant information is imperative for comprehensive

decision making. Presently there is no centralised mechanism for fusing

information from various sources and archiving it, to be available for analysis

and decision making.

Security Continuum

18. Though the security requirements of ICG are classified in different categories,

they are all interlinked and constitute a Security Continuum. Threats will have

cascading effect on multiple categories of security and correspondingly the same

vulnerability of ICG will correlate to security challenges from different sources.

Hence, measures to improve one category of security will also have beneficial

effects on other categories also.

ICG Vulnerabilities and Way Ahead

19. The vulnerabilities which exacerbate the new security challenges are the

attributes of external constraints and also intra-ICG factors. Enhancing manpower

and resources may be the most appropriate measure to eliminate a vulnerability,

however it may not be feasible in all the cases. Being conscious of this fact,

leveraging available resources, strengthening regulations etc may be offer a method

to mitigate the vulnerabilities.

20. Need for Tactical Guidance. ICG on-scene commanders have to deal with

diverse security challenges at sea. The actions of on-scene commanders to address

each security situation should be shaped on basis of clear guidelines from the apex

level, which will stipulate the parameters of acceptable risk, constraints, restraints

etc. Presently such tactical guidance is not available to guide the response of on-

scene commanders. In absence of tactical guidance, the responses will be

inconsistent and will vary entirely based on the on-scene commander’s

understanding of acceptable risk, propensity to use force and interpretation of the

security implications of the situation. This response discretion may lead to mission
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abandonment, or mission pursuit despite unacceptable risks and also cause

significant post incident implications like diplomatic consternation or political dispute

etc.

21. Way Ahead. ICG on-scene commanders are confronted with a variety of

situations, wherein all may not be within the unit’s capacity to deal with immediately

or alone. The situations which are to be dealt by an ICG unit, may also require a

nuanced approach. Hence the on-scene commander requires tactical guidance to

fashion his response. Comprehensive Tactical Guidelines should issued pan-ICG

and the following aspects may be considered in the tactical guidance:-

(a) Guidelines for deciding to respond immediately or to seek

reinforcement.

(b) Guidelines to appreciate the threat based on the situational symptoms.

(c) Defining the parameters for acceptable risks, use of force, collateral

damage etc.

(d) Guidelines to assess the security implications of the situation.

(e) Guidelines on addressing the situation viz resources to be employed,

method of employment etc.

(f) Imposing limits to the commander’s response independence and

authorities to be consulted in situations beyond such response independence.

22. Mitigating Threat to Own Units. The ICG threat evaluation should factor in

the probability of ICG units being the primary targets at sea. Presently OPV, FPV,

ACV and IB are all interchangeably deployed in the same areas based on their

endurance and irrespective of their self defence capabilities, which varies vastly as
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per class of ship. The self defence capability of ICG IB/ACV is modest and would be

ineffectual against any directed attack. Attack against warships is not an uncommon

tactic and there are contemporary instances, therefore ICG should guard against it.

23. Way Ahead. Foremost, there should be a realisation that ICG units

deployed alone at sea are vulnerable to attack. The ideal solution would be to equip

units with adequate manpower and self defence systems. However both may not be

immediately forthcoming due to the financial restraints. Therefore the following

measures may be adopted to minimise threats to ICG units at sea:-

(a) Classify deployment areas as per the associated threats perceived to

ICG units in the area.

(b) Formulate policy to regulate deployment of units to areas as per the

threat classification.

(c) It is recommended that OPVs should be deployed to high threat areas,

FPVs and ACVs in medium threat areas.

(d) However, in case of operational exigencies, deployment of FPVs in pair

to high threat areas may be resorted to. Similar should be the case for ACV

also.

(e) IB should be strictly deployed for only anchorage patrol and low threat

immediate response operations. In case of extreme situations, IB may be

deployed for operations in high/medium threat areas, however only under the

cover of OPV/FPV.

(f) Coordinated patrol with Indian Navy to be instituted in high threat

areas, which is to be kept under constant surveillance.

24. Hardening Force Protection. ICG units whilst in harbour are least

prepared for self defence. Hence ICG units should be provided with adequate

protection from threats whilst in harbour. Presently force protection measures for

ships and ACVs in harbour is suboptimal. Berthing of ICG ships in unsecured refit

yards, jetties viz fishing jetty etc is not uncommon. The security perimeter at such

locations is nonexistent and the units are extremely vulnerable to attacks. Due to

manpower constraints, the units by themselves will be not able to protect all its flanks

for prolonged periods.

25. Way Ahead. Utilisation of unprotected jetties, beaching areas etc. should

be ceased immediately. Security should be primary consideration for any

infrastructure being considered for use by ICG units. Ships berthed in ports have the

inherent protection of the port security. Services of Defence Security Corps should

be availed as far as possible. In case of non-availability of DSC, services of private

security companies should be availed to augment the ship’s security, as is being

done for OTM complexes. Technology like CCTV/ Night vision camera, intruder alert

system etc should be employed to augment the unit staff’s capability to detect and

respond to any threat.

26. Under Utilisation of Surveillance Data. ICG has multiple surveillance

resources viz ships, aircraft, Coastal Surveillance System(CSS), LRIT, MRCC,

intelligence, etc, which gathers large volume of surveillance data continuously.

Robust analysis of the data received from continuous maritime surveillance is critical

for trend analysis, threat evaluation, prediction and for optimising asset deployment.

However the data generated from these sources is not being fully leveraged as they
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are monitored separately. Any correlation of information from different sources is

incidental and exclusively through human intervention. The human capacity for such

function is limited due to the large volume of data generated from diverse sources

and the speed at which it is generated. In the absence of comprehensive analysis of

surveillance data, ICG is handicapped in realising the complete potential of the

available resources to maintain maritime security.

27. Way Ahead. Big Data Analytics is the modern data analysis technology

trend that has capability to handle large volume of complex data. Big Data is

described as data that is massive in volume, complex in form, growing exponentially

and is unmanageable by traditional data processing software (ORACLE). The

surveillance data generated by ICG resources has all the characteristics of Big Data.

Big Data analytics has found widespread civil and military application. The

technology is commercially available and can be customised to ICG requirements.

The availability of contemporary IT equipment and a secure Wide Area Network

connecting all ICG stations are enablers for seamless data exchange and data

analysis. Big Data analytics can be employed to elicit the information buried in the

vast quantity of surveillance data. Hence adoption of Big Data Analytics should be

immediate term goal for ICG to bolster maritime security.

28. Augmenting Training. The operational challenges encountering ICG are

inevitable and it is essential that ICG units are prepared to handle the challenges.

The core to such preparation is to develop SoPs, carefully accounting for available

manpower, equipment etc in context of the operational situation and then training

personnel to execute the SoP. All armed forces depend on their indigenous training
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institutions to train its personnel. The ICG academy is in a nascent stage and may

take considerable time to be functionally established. Presently CGTC Kochi and two

CG Workup Teams (East and West) are the only institutions engaged in training. All

the three agencies are operating with modest manpower and limited resources.

CGTC Kochi was established to be a centre of expertise on niche ICG domains and

to impart training on exclusive ICG functions. However, due to the lack of adequate

faculty, it is just a venue where external faculty is invited for almost all subjects.

Similarly CG Workup Team(CGWT) was established to train ships to perform as per

established standards and SoPs. The capacity of CGWT is also limited due to

manpower constraint. Hence, these ICG institutions have limited capacity to refine

SoPs and impart training.

29. Way Ahead. The ICG Academy, once established, will resolve the tactics

development and training issues. However in the interim following measures should

be adopted:-

(a) CGWT

(i) The manpower augmentation of CGWT to be pursued

vigorously with GoI. Till then attach an OPV to each CGWT to augment

the manpower available.

(ii) Specialist officers and EPs should be borne onboard these

ships.

(iii) These ships will serve as OST OPV and be deployed only for

OST function.

(iv) The manpower available can be used for augmenting CGWT

and more ships can be put through OST.

(b) CGTC Kochi

(i) Manpower of CGTC Kochi to be enhanced.

(ii) ICG is availing training from various external organisations

including foreign agencies. These personnel to be posted at CGTC

Kochi for downstream training and developing ICG specific SoPs.

(iii) Utilise international linkages of ICG to assess and learn the

SoPs employed by foreign CG agencies.

30. Inadequate Monitoring of Merchant Ships. Post 26/11 attacks the security

focus had shifted to monitoring fishing boats, as the perpetrators had

commandeered IFB for infiltration. Now ICG efforts are firmly rooted to IFBs and the

threat emanating of commercial ships has been not been consistently addressed.

ICG is not monitoring the commercial shipping traffic, their antecedents and

behaviour for developing threat perception.

31. Way Ahead. Culture of boarding merchant ships by ICG units should be

revived. A merchant ship threat matrix should be developed based on the each

ship’s antecedents like flag, crew nationality, owners, charterer, last few ports of call,

history of violation etc. Based on the threat matrix the ships should be monitored and

boarded. A database of the threat matrix should be created for historical correlation.

Fisher folks should be encouraged to report any merchant ship found transacting

with any fishing boat, barge etc. IBs should be routinely deployed for anchorage

patrol and investigating the merchant vessel and other shipping traffic plying near to

VAs/VPs.
 15

32. Drone Attacks. The remote control technology has matured rapidly in the

past decade and has been effectively been deployed both during conventional and

sub-conventional warfare. Low cost aerial drones and underwater drones are

commercially available and are easy to use. The remote operated drones can be

deployed at sea from any type of vessel including fishing boats. The remote

controlled drones are a threat to both ICG ships as well as commercial ships at sea.

33. Way Ahead. Government regulation should be instituted to restrict the

operation of remote drones, both aerial and underwater, in the entire Indian maritime

zones. This will facilitate ICG units to act against any vessel or off shore installation

operating drone unauthorisedly. Equip all ICG units, both afloat and ashore, with

drone defence systems at the earliest. In the interim, SoPs may be developed to

defend ICG units from drone attacks, which can include following measures:-

(a) Areas near IMBL or extremities of EEZ to be considered as Drone

Threat Zones, due to the likelihood of adversary planning drone attack being

in these areas as it will facilitate expeditious escape into safe haven post

attack.

(b) ICG Units operating in Drone Threat Zones to assume highest degrees

of readiness to defend itself.

(c) Personnel to be trained to use ship’s main armament and small arms to

target drones.

(d) Patrolling in Drone Threat Zones to be in company as far as possible.

34. Volatile VBSS. Presently, the VBSS operations are characterised as

“Compliant” and Non-compliant” based on the attitude of the subject vessel,

determined during pre-boarding investigation. The characterisation of VBSS

operations has been based on subject vessel’s willingness to be subjected to

boarding with a presumption that confrontation with ICG was not the vessel’s plan.

However the tactic where a vessel entices an ICG boarding team, posing as

compliant, and then taking them hostage or inflicting harm, is a possibility

considering the increasing audacity of the non-state actors. The temptation to use

such tactic against ICG ships would be also considering the fact that ICG units

predominantly operate independently. Such scenario can be classified as “Volatile

VBSS” and SoPs to deal with the situation needs to be developed.

35. Way Ahead. Volatile VBSS should be considered as plausible situation and

SoPs may be instituted accordingly. The SoP for Volatile VBSS can include

following:-

(a) Areas near IMBL or extremities of EEZ to considered as High Risk

Zones, as it affords expeditious escape into safe haven post execution of

plans.

(b) As far as possible conduct VBSS operations only after the subject

vessel leaves High Risk Area and enters in Medium Risk Area.

(c) Monitor the movement of the subject vessel to identify if it is

deliberately remaining in High Risk Area and positioning itself near to escape

routes.

(d) Correlate the vessels credentials and route history for threat analysis.

(e) In case of conducting VBSS in High Risk Area due to operational

exigency, provide reinforcement to the ICG unit.

(f) Marshall the subject vessel away from escape routes.

(g) Adopt aggressive posture throughout the VBSS operation.

(h) Follow all precautions of VBSS to prevent the boarding parting from

being vulnerable during the operation.

36. Chinese Fishing Militia. The Chinese Fishing Militia(CFM) is an ominous

threat to our maritime security and economic security. The CFM will indulge in

incremental encroachment and gradually increase intensity of their activity, in

tandem with increasing Chinese influence in the region.

37. Way Ahead. The CFM should be dealt with firmly and constantly thwarted

both by force and regulation. India should strengthen Regional Fishery Management

Organisations to restrict the CFM activity. Indian government should institute a

regulation which authorises use force by ICG and IN ships against CFM, akin to the

Chinese Coast Guard use of force law. Entry of CFM to Indian ports and maritime

zones should be prohibited.

38. Invasion of Technology. Easy availability of miniaturised, feature rich, high

end technology gadgets pose grave security threat, especially as ICG units handle

considerable volume and variety of classified information. Such gadgets coupled with

the internet are the prime facilitators for HUMINT and SIGINT. Espionage by a

compromised individual can be easily accomplished in ICG units, due to the routine

accessibility to classified information as a part of their official function.

39. Way Ahead. As gadgets like smart phones, watches etc have become

essential part of everyday life and the prohibition of gadgets will be ineffectual,

especially as ICG ships has in-living personnel. Therefore, instead of complete

prohibition, a combination of practical control measures and continuous awareness

measures should be adopted. The practical measures to contain the threat of

technology can include following:-

(a) Earmarking specific areas inside the unit where devices are prohibited.

Such spaces should include MSO, bridge, operations room etc.

(b) Place such sensitive areas under constant surveillance, viz CCTV etc.

(c) Install mobile phone detectors in such sensitive spaces. Mobile phone

detectors are inexpensive and commercially available.

(d) Install door sensors on chest containing crypto publications or other

sensitive material to alert concerned authorities in the unit when the chest is

opened. Such detectors are inexpensive and commercially available.

(e) Make provisions for personnel to deposit their gadgets onboard while

the unit is engaged in sensitive operations.

(f) Continuously educate personnel on the adverse consequences of

indiscretion while using smart phones, social media etc.

(g) Institute strict punishments for violations and give it wide publicity. A

policy of no-leniency towards violators should be strictly followed.

40. Discerning Approaching Challenges. ICG is an organisation whose

charter and functioning is affected by international events and global phenomenon

viz climate change, new maritime laws, etc. Any organisation which has clear

understanding of the challenges lying in future only will be able to prepare for future.

All known and plausible future events should be analysed for impacts on ICG. Once

such impacts are identified, the action plan can be conceived.

41. Way Ahead. In case of ICG the two impending phenomenon are:-

(a) Climate Change. Climate change is altering the earth and its oceans

irreversibly. Hence ICG has to initiate measures to adapt best to the unfolding

environmental eventuality.

(b) Way Ahead. ICG needs to determine the multifarious impacts of

climate change with the help of professional institutions, viz IIT etc. Once such

impacts are comprehensively understood, actions to contain the impact can

be initiated. The threats engendered due to climate change are the following:-

(i) ICG Infrastructure. Most of the ICG infrastructure is located

close to coast line. The rise in sea levels and coastline erosion will

threaten the survival ICG infrastructure. The immediate measure will be

to audit ICG infrastructure for their vulnerability to raising sea levels,

soil erosion etc. Subsequently determine measures to mitigate the

vulnerability and institute them appropriately.

(ii) Navigation Safety. By default, ICG vessels have to navigate

close to coast/islands etc which are not well surveyed and frequented

by other ships. The climate change will alter sea current patterns,

seabed profile and depths etc. ICG units operating in such areas are to

be sensitised and any variation of depth profile observed should be an

alert that there may likelihood of sea bed altering.

(iii) Extreme Weather. The climate change is expected to increase

the frequency of Cyclones in the Northern Indian Ocean (Min of Earth

Sciences, GoI, 2020). This will lead to drastic increase in SAR

functions, especially for fishermen, which will be an operational

challenge. The weather forecasting equipment, practices etc will have

to be overhauled, especially for ICG ships as they operate

independently. ICG will have to re-evaluate the types of ships in the

inventory along with ratio of FPV to OPVs which has better sea

keeping.

(iv) Materiel Maintenance. The change in sea water characteristic

viz salinity etc will have definite implication on the materiel maintenance

capability of ICG. As ICG is developing its own ship repair facilities,

their capacity to be in tune with the changing requirements will have to

be evaluated.

(v) Realignment of Baselines. Sea level raise is among the most

significant effect of climate change. This will cause realignment of

baselines leading to contradicting claims from nations about their notion

of the maritime zones limits and IMBL also. In case such disputes are

not resolved, perceived encroachments are inevitable due to domestic

maritime activities like fishing, exploration, extraction, etc being

pursued. In the absence of an international or mutually agreed

regulation to resolve climate change induced claims on maritime zones,

the situation can lead to explosive confrontations.

42. Continental Shelf. The extend of Indian maritime zone is set to expand

further on award of Continental Shelf extending beyond the EEZ. Protection of the

extended Continental Shelf will be under the purview of ICG.

43. Way Ahead. The strategy for protection of the extended Continental Shelf

will have to be drawn-up in advance by ICG. The need for force accretion, manpower

enhancement and corresponding support infrastructure should be calculated and

incorporated in future development plans. Similarly regulatory imperatives for ICG to

pursue its mandate in the Continental Shelf also needs to be determined and put in

place.

Conclusion

44. India has to pursue its developmental goals without being overwhelmed by

the threats of sub-conventional warfare, environmental upheavals and host of other

challenges. Robustness of India’s maritime security will be a key enabler in the

nation’s progress towards the stated developmental goals. Hence the salience of

ICG will continue to grow.

45. The Indian Coast Guard has to deal with a constellation of maritime security

challenges within the parameters of constraints and restraints. The maritime security

landscape is characteristically in constant flux and can only be prevailed upon with a

robust strategy. Security strategists need to have a vision which looks over the

horizon without losing sight of the past while being focussed on the present.

46. Our security strategy should be organic, account for all vulnerabilities and

leverage available resources whilst be future oriented and seek mandatory

resources.
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region: A report .

ORACLE. (n.d.). https://www.oracle.com/in/big-data/what-is-big-data/. Retrieved

RAND CORP. (2020, APR). https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/04/a-short-history-of-

UNCLCS. (n.d.).
https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_ind_48_2009.h
tm. Retrieved SEP 2021, from UNCLCS.