3R.epublir of tbe Jlbilipptlff~--1. _c~_f~_j-j:?

7'iZ'S7J-
~upreme <tourt
;ffllanila

EN BANC

ATTY. JOAQUIN DELOS SANTOS, G.R. No. 227467

ENGR. EVELYN M. HATULAN AND
CORNELIO V. TAMAYO, Present:
Petitioners,
GESMUNDO, CJ.,
PERLAS-BERNABE,
LEONEN,
- versus- CAGUIOA,
HERNANDO,
CARANDANG,
LAZARO-JAVIER,
INTING,
ZALAMEDA,
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, LOPEZ,M.,
Respondent. GAERLAN,
ROSARIO, and
LOPEZ, J., JJ.

Promulgated:

August 3, 2021

X---------------------------------

DECISION

ZALAMEDA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari (Petition) 1 assailing the

Commission on Audit (COA) Decision No. 2015-223 2 dated 13 April 2015

1 Rollo, pp. 3-4 I.

2
Id at 60-62; penned by Commissioner Heidi L. Mendoza, and concurred in by Commissioner Jose A.
Decision 2 G.R. No. 227467

and Notice 3 dated 12 July 2016, which affirmed the Notice ofDisallowance
(ND) No. 2007-036-101 (04)4 (subject ND) dated 19 November 2007.

Antecedents

In a memorandum dated 28 September 2004, issued by Engineer

Alexander D. Pal tao of the Technical Services COA Regional Office No. IV,
and in an audit observation memorandum (AOM) dated 14 October 2004
issued by the Audit Team Leader of the municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna,
Mayor Proceso Aguillo (Mayor Aguillo ), municipal accountant Atty. Felix L.
Galang, Jr. (Atty. Galang), municipal treasurer Elena A. Estalilla (Estalilla),
municipal treasurer, building official Engineer Manolito Barundia
(Barundia), and all the members of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC)
were requested to submit certain documents to facilitate the COA's
investigation, viz.: the approved detailed plan, "approved" statement of work
accomplished, copies of contracts and bidding documents. The requested
documents pertain to anomalous projects entered into by the municipal
government of Cabuyao, Laguna with Golden Deer Enterprises and RDC
Construction Development Corporation. 5

On 26 February 2007, Notice of Suspension (NS) No. 2007-002-101

(2004) 6 was issued, suspending in audit the aforesaid transactions of the
municipal government in the total amount of P42,594,037. 7

On 19 November 2007, COA Regional Cluster Director Eden T.

Rafanan issued the subject ND, holding Mayor Aguillo, Atty. Galang,
Estalilla, Barundia, liable for the disallowed amount. Members of the BAC,
including petitioners Atty. Joaquin Delos Santos (Atty. Delos Santos), as the
Chairman, Evelyn Hatulan (Hatulan), Cornelio Tamayo (Tamayo;
collectively, petitioners), Pastor Canceran (Canceran) and Barundia, as
members thereof, as well as Golden Deer Enterprises and RDC Construction
were also held liable in the subject ND. Petitioners appeared to have
received the ND on 08 January 2008. 8

Subsequently, COA Regional Director Luz Loreto-Tolentino (Director

Loreto-Tolentino) issued a corresponding Notice ofFinality of Decision 9

Favia.
3 Id at 71.
4
Id at 46-48.
5
Id. at 60-61.
6 Id at 72-73.
7
Id
8
Id at 46-48.
9
Id at 49-50.
Decision 3 G.R. No. 227467

(NFD) and COA Order of Execution 10 (COE) both dated 03 September

2012, holding petitioners, among others, liable for the disallowed amount.
Petitioners immediately wrote a Letter 11 dated 21 February 2013 to Director
Loreto-Tolentino requesting for review of the disallowance, and that they be
furnished copies of the documents material to the case. On 04 April 2013,
COA Regional Director Nilda Blanco replied to the petitioners' counsel
declaring the NFD and COE to be final and executory, and that the Rules
and Regulations on Settlement of Accounts and the 2009 Revised Rules of
Procedure of the COA are both silent on the power of the regional directors
to review the NFD and COE. 12

Thus, on 17 September 2013, petitioners filed with the COA Proper an

urgent motion for the issuance of order to set aside NFD and COE, and to
release documents pertinent to ND No. 200-036-101 (04), and to admit
appeal (Omnibus Motion). 13 They claimed that they did not receive the
subject ND. 14

In a Decision 15 dated 13 April 2015, the COA denied petitioners'

Omnibus Motion and declared the subject ND to be final and executory. The
COA ruled that petitioners received the subject ND based on their signatures
appearing thereon.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 16 claiming that the ND

is defective because it failed to specify the projects and contracts disallowed,
and only made references to the AOM and NS previously issued.
Additionally, they claim that they are uncertain whether there was a BAC
constituted during the term of Mayor Aguillo. 17

The COA En Banc denied the motion for reconsideration, finding that
the subject ND had long become final and executory. 18

Hence this Petition, where petitioners insist they were deprived of

their right to due process because they were held liable for the subject ND
which they did not receive. They also reiterate their objection to the failure
of the ND to specify the projects and contracts it seeks to investigate. They
assert that had . they truly received the subject ND, they would have
immediately reacted to it given the amount disallowed therein. 19

10 Id. at 51-52.
11
Id. at 53.
12 Id. at 55-56.
13 Id. at 57-59.
14 Id. at 58.
15 Id. at 60-62
16 Id. at 64-68.
11 Id.
18
ld.at71.
19
Id. at 22-40 ..
 Decision 4 G.R. No. 227467

Petitioners allege that their signatures in the subject ND are fake and
not their real signatures, and as proof thereof, they have attached documents
supposedly containing their true signatures. They surmise that their names
were being used to conceal the real perpetrators and maintain that Atty.
Delos Santos cannot recall whether there was a duly composed BAC during
the term of then Mayor Aguillo. According to petitioners, the municipal
government of Cabuyao had no records of documents pertaining to the time
pertinent to the case. Hence, they conclude that no such BAC was
constituted and they were not members of any such committee. 20

Finally, petitioners assert they should not be held liable because under
the AOM and NS, which were the bases of the subject ND, it is the
municipal accountant, Atty. Galang, who is required to submit documents
pertaining to transactions entered into by the municipal government during
Mayor Aguillo's term. 21

COA's Arguments

COA maintains that petitioners are liable for the subject ND since it
has long become final and executory. The COA argues that petitioners have
been given various opportunities to comply with its directives when they
received the AOM, NS and ND. Having failed to promptly question the
adverse findings, petitioners are now barred from appealing the same
through the instant Petition. 22

Issue

This Court is tasked to determine whether the COA committed grave

abuse of discretion when it affirmed the subject ND.

Ruling of the Court

The Petition is meritorious.

Owing .to its mandate as an independent constitutional commission,

this Court's review of decisions of the COA is generally limited to questions

20
Id. at 24-29.
21
Id. at 32-36.
22
Id. at 134-138.
 Decision 5 G.R. No. 227467

of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Questions of fact cannot be raised

except to determine whether the COA is guilty of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 23 "A finding of grave abuse of
discretion against the COA means that the audit commission is guilty of
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law or to act in contemplation of law, such as when the assailed decision or
resolution rendered is not based on law and the evidence, but on caprice,
whim and despotism. As the party alleging grave abuse of discretion,
petitioners had the burden to prove that the COA had acted in a capricious,
whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner." 24

Relatedly, "it is also a well-entrenched rule that the right to appeal is a

statutory right and one who seeks to avail of the right must strictly comply
with the requirements set forth under the pertinent law or rules." Indeed, the
Court has been strict in enforcing statutory requirements of appeal to ensure
that cases are promptly and orderly adjudicated. 25 Pursuant thereto, this
Court does not generally entertain petitions under Rule 64 which originated
from the COA's denial of a late appeal. 26 Nevertheless, this Court, in certain
cases, does not also hesitate to relax the aforesaid procedural rules on the
basis of exceptional grounds, and in order to avoid commission of injustice.

In this case, in view of several grounds, this Court finds that

petitioners should be allowed another opportunity to fully ventilate their
defenses before the COA.

Petitioners failed to establish that

their signatures were forged.

"Forgery is the 'counterfeiting' of

any writing, consisting in the
signing of another's name with intent to defraud. 27 Since it is not presumed,
forgery 'must be proved with clear, positive and convincing evidence' 28 by
the party alleging it." 29 There are various factors which may have the effect
of varying the signature of a person, such as his position while signing, the
condition of the surface on which the paper where the questioned signature
is written is placed, his state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of
pen and/or paper used. The presence of any of these circumstances may
cause changes in one's signature and does not necessarily mean that his

23
Fortune life Insurance Company, Inc." Commission on Audit, 752 Phil. 97 (2015).
24
See National Power Corp. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 242342, 10 March 2020.
25
See Bugna, Jr. v. CommissiononAudit(Resolution), UDKNo. 16666, l9January2021.
26 Id.
27
Phiiippine Savings Bank " Saka/a, G.R. No. 229450, 17 June 2020, citing BPI v. Casa Montessori
Internalionale, 474 Phil. 298, 309 (2004).
28
Id., citing Gepulle-Garbo v. Spouses Garabato, 750 Phil. 846,855 (2015).
29
Id.
 Decision 6 G.R. No. 227467

signature was forged. 30

Proving forgery entails a showing of the extent, kind and significance

of the variation in the genuine and disputed signatures of the signee. It must
be established that the difference in the signatures is due to the operation of
a different personality and not merely an expected and inevitable variation
found in the genuine writing of the same writer. It must be shown that the
resemblance is a result of a more or less skillful imitation and not merely a
habitual and characteristic resemblance which naturally appears in a genuine
writing. 31

In this case, after comparison of petitioners' specimen signatures and

those contained in the subject ND, this Court finds that petitioners failed to
establish forgery.

For Hatulan, this Court notes that her signature in the subject ND is
the same as her specimen signature in her PDS 32 dated 2 May 2001, the
document which was closest in time to the subject ND. 33 Further, even in
later documents, particularly those in the attachments 34 to the petition,
Hatulan's signatures are strikingly similar to that appearing in the subject
ND. The same conclusion applies to Tamayo. His specimen signature in his
Panunumpa sa Tungkulin 35 dated 13 January 2005 does not appear to be
substantially different from that in the subject ND .

. As to Atty. Delos Santos, although his signature in the subject ND is

different from his specimen signatures, this Court finds the same insufficient
to prove forgery. He did not present supporting evidence to clearly show that
the · difference in the appearance of the signature was caused by
another individual and not merely a variation of his own handwriting.
"Mere variance of the signatures in different documents cannot be
considered as conclusive proof that one is forged." 36 Although resort to
experts is not mandatory in the examination of alleged forged
documents, the opinions of handwriting experts would have been helpful
in the court's determination of a document's authenticity. 37 These
handwriting experts can help detennine fundamental, significant differences
in writing characteristics between the questioned and the standard or sample
specimen signatures, as well as the movement and manner of execution

30
See Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission, United Presbyterian Church, USA, 432 Phil. 895,
908 (2002).
31
Coro v. Nasayao, G.R. No. 235361, 16 October 2019.
32
Rollo, p. 101-101-A.
33
See Heirs ofAmado Celestial v. Heirs ofEditha Celestial, 455 Phil. 704 (2003).
34 Rollo, pp. 45-114.
35
Id at 110.
36
Enrile v. People (Joint Resolution), 766 Phil. 75,284 (2015).
37
See Rivera v. Sps. Chua, 750 Phil. 663, 676(2015).
Decision 7 G.R. No. 227467

strokes. 38

Interestingly, aside from the supposed differences in the signatures in

the subject ND and their alleged specimen signatures, petitioners failed to
elucidate the circumstances of the forgery, such as how and who may have
been responsible for imitating all of their signatures. For the dearth of such
clear and convincing evidence establishing forgery, this Court is constrained
to take the document as what it appears to be~ showing petitioners' receipt
thereof. Nevertheless, despite petitioners' receipt of the subject ND, this
Court finds that it did not sufficiently apprise them of the basis for the
disallowance.

The subject ND is an insufficient

notice ofpetitioners' liability.

The 1997 Rules of Procedure of the COA provide that the auditor's
findings must clearly state the basis for its findings, viz.:

SECTION 4. Report, Certificate of Settlement and Balances,

Notice of Disallowances and Charges, Order or Decision of the Auditor.
- The result of the audit work of the Auditor may be in the form of a
report, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, notice of disallowances and
charges, audit observation, order or decision which shall clearly and
distinctly state his findings of fact, conclusions, recommendations and
dispositions. The factual findings shall be adequately established by
evidence and the conclusions, recommendations or dispositions shall
be. supported by applicable laws, regulations, jurisprudence and the
generally accepted accounting and auditing principles on which the
report, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, notice of disallowances
and charges and order or decision are based. (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, jurisprudence is consistent in holding that the constitutional

rule requiring a clear and distinct statement of factual and legal basis of a
resolution/decision is an indispensable component of the litigant's right to
due process. Failure to state clear basis for its decision constitutes grave
abuse of discretion. 39

In Fontanilla v. Commissioner Proper,40 this Court found that the

COA violated the tenets of due process when the Adjudication and
Settlement Board of the COA National Office held the supervising officer

38 Tortona v. Gregorio, 823 Phil. 980, 994 (20 l 8), citing Sps. Ulep v. Court of Appeals, 509 Phil. 227, 240
(2005).
39 See Zamboanga City Water District v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 218374, 01 December 2020.
4 o 787 Phil. 713 (2016).
Decision 8 G.R. No. 227467

liable with the erring employee for the stolen cash, without including him as
respondent in the proceedings before the audit team leader and subsequently,
the appeal before the COA Regional Office. This Court stressed that due
process is, at its core, giving a person an opportunity to be heard. There is
denial of due process if a person is held liable for a charge, and his liability
is confirmed on appeal without having been notified of the accusation, and
given the opportunity to explain his case or have the ruling reconsidered.
The Court added that therein respondent's subsequent submission of a
motion for reconsideration did not cure the COA's denial of due process.
Thus, the Court set aside the COA's Decision insofar as it found therein
petitioner Fontanilla solidarily liable with his subordinate. However, it
directed Fontanilla to file his memorandum containing his evidence, or to
call for oral arguments that would allow him to present his evidence, so that
the COA can validly rule on the issue of his liability for the stolen money.

In Ab long v. Commission on Audit (Ablong), 41 this Court ruled that the

COA committed grave abuse of discretion, and ordered a remand of the case
due to its non-observance of due process. This Court noted that the COA
failed to give actual notice to the parties liable under the ND because it only
gave copies thereof to the accountant who did not inform them of the
disallowance of their Economic Relief Allowance. This Court likewise gave
credence to therein petitioners' allegation that even the supervising auditor
refused their request to be furnished copies of the NDs. In failing to give
petitioners copies of the ND, this Court found that the COA not only failed
to follow its own rules, 42 but also denied petitioners' right to due process. A
remand was therefore ordered to resolve petitioners' appeal from the subject
notices of disallowance on the merits.

Further, as in Ablang, the COA Proper cursorily denied petitioners'

request for documents on the ground of their receipt of the ND. Such
reasoning is mistaken. Given the circumstances of this case, it is the service
of the NS No. 2007-002-101(2004) dated 26 February 2007, or the earlier
AOM No. 2004-009191 dated 14 October 2004, which would have given
petitioners a real opportunity to prove the regularity of the municipality's
transactions. In other words, since petitioners were being held liable for their
failure to submit documents, logic and due process require that there must be
actual notice of the documents needed for the lifting of the suspension and
reversal of the disallowance.

41 G.R. No. 233308, 18 August 2020.

42
The Court found that Commission on Audit failed to observe Section l 0.2 of COA Circular No. 2009-
006 which provides that:
10.2 The ND shall be addressed to the agency head and the accountant; served on the
persons liable; and shall indicate the transactions and amount disallowed, reasons for the
disallowance, the laws/rules/regulations violated, and persons liable. It shall be signed by both the
Audit Team Leader and the Supervising Auditor. x x x
Decision 9 G.R. No. 227467

In the instant case, the subject ND merely stated that the reason for its
disallowance is because of "suspension maturing into disallowance." 43 It
likewise failed to enumerate the documents subject of the NS and
petitioners' direct responsibility for such documents. Evidently, petitioners
were left to speculate on the basis of suspension, or the specific documents
necessary in order to explain the municipal government's transactions with
the aforesaid contractors. Moreover, the assailed Decision No. 2015-223
dated 13 April 2015 did not contain any supporting evidentiary or
substantive basis for its denial of petitioners' appeal. Thus, following the
rulings in the above-cited case, this Court finds that remand is justified.

The case presents an exception to the

rule on immutability a/judgments.

Certainly, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1445 and the COA's Rules of
Procedure are clear on the reglementary periods to contest an adverse ruling
of the COA Auditor. Section 48 of PD 1445 44 lays down the procedure to
appeal notices of disallowance issued by agency auditors, viz:

Appeal from decision of auditors. -Any person aggrieved by the decision

of an auditor of any government agency in the settlement of an account or
claim may within six months from receipt of a copy of the decision
appeal in writing to the Commission. (Emphasis ours)

Further, under then applicable 1997 Rules of Procedure of the COA, it

is provided that:

RULE IV

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE AUDITOR

SECTION 6. Finality of the Report, Certificate of Settlement and

Balances, Order or Decision. - Unless a request for reconsideration in
filed or an appeal is taken, the report, Certificate of Settlement and
Balances, order or decision of the Auditor shall become final upon the

expiration of six (6) months after notice thereof to the parties concerned.

RULEV

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE DIRECTOR

43 Rollo, p. 46.
44
Entitled ''Ordaining and Instituting a Government Auditing Code of the Philippines," approved on 11
June 1978.
Decision 10 G.R. No. 227467

SECTION 2. How Appeal Taken. -An appeal from an order, decision or

ruling by the Auditor may be taken to the Director within six ( 6) months
after notification to the party of the report, notice of disallowance and
charges, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, order or decision
complained of, by filing with the Auditor a Notice of Appeal.

xxxx

SECTION 6. Power of Director on Appeal. - The Director may reverse,

modify, alter, or affirm the decision or ruling of the Auditor. However,
should the Director render a decision reversing, modifying or altering the
decision or ruling of the Auditor, the Director shall, within ten (10) days,
certify the case and elevate the entire record to the Commission Proper for
review and approval.

xxxx

SECTION 9. Interruption of Time to Appeal . - The receipt by the

Auditor of the Notice of Appeal and/or Motion for Reconsideration shall
stop the running of the period of appeal to the Commission Proper (6
months) and shall resume to run upon receipt by the appellant of the
Director's final decision.

RULE VI

APPEAL FROM DIRECTOR TO COMMISSION PROPER

SECTION 3. Period of Appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within the

time remaining of the six (6) months period under Section 2, Rule V,
taking into account the suspension of the running thereof under Section 9
of the same Rule.

RULE XII

Enforcement and Monitoring

Section I. Execution of Decision- Execution shall issue upon a decision

that finally disposes of the case. Such execution shall issue as a matter of
right upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has
been fully perfected.

Strictly applying the doctrine of finality and immutability of

judgment, it would appear that this Court may no longer modify the subject
ND. Verily, since petitioners received the subject ND on 8 January 2008, it is
apparent that when they filed their omnibus motion on 17 September 2013
with the COA Proper, the six-month period to appeal has already lapsed.

Nonetheless, like most procedural rules, the doctrine of immutability

Decision 11 G.R. No. 227467

of judgment has exceptions, namely: (I) the correction of clerical errors; (2)
the so-called nunc pro tune entries which cause no prejudice to any party;
(3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the
finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
Similarly, while it is doctrinally entrenched that certiorari is not a substitute
for a lost appeal, the Court has allowed the resort to a petition for certiorari
despite the existence of or prior availability of an appeal, such as: (1) where
the appeal does not constitute a speedy and adequate remedy; (2) where the
orders were also issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction; (3) for
certain special considerations, as public welfare or public policy; (4) where
in criminal actions, the court rejects rebuttal evidence for the prosecution as,
in case of acquittal, there could be no remedy; (5) where the order is a patent
nullity; and (6) where the decision in the certiorari case will avoid future
litigations. 45 In view of the most exceptional circumstances, courts may still
review the COA's decisions, particularly if the judgment would cause
manifest injustice to the parties.

In Philippine Health Insurance Corporation v. Commission on

Audit,46 the Court considered as exceptional circumstance the enactment of a
remedial legislation reclassifying PhilHealth personnel as public health
workers in setting aside an already final decision of the COA. Meanwhile in
Estalilla v. Commission on Audit (Estalilla), 47 special considerations were
given to the glaring disparity between the petitioner's measly salary as
municipal treasurer and the amount of P35,591,200.00 she was being
required to return. This. Court held that a finding of liability in that case
would greatly and negatively impact the employee's and her family's life
and livelihood.

Likewise, in Bugn,a, Jr. v. Commission on Audit,48 after finding that

petitioners were the same petitioners in Madera v. Commission on Audit,49
who were found to have acted in good faith when they performed their
respective functions in relation to the prohibited allowances, this Court
exempted the concerned local officials from personal liability on the
disallowed amounts.

In this case, aside from the defective notice of disallowance, this

Court finds that there are special circumstances similar to Estalilla that
should have precluded the COA from barring petitioners' appeal and strictly
applying the principle on immutability of judgments.

45 Philippine Health Insurance Corp. v. Commission on Audit (Resolution), G.R. No. 222710, 10
September 2019.
46 Id.
47 G.R. No. 217448, 10 September 2019.
48 Supra note 25.
49 G.R. No. 244128, 08 September 2020.
Decision 12 G.R. No. 227467

Compelling and equitable

circumstances justify a relaxation of
the principle of immutability of
judgment.

In Estalilla, this Court excluded the municipal treasurer from liability

under the notice of disallowance in the amount of P35,591,200.00 for a
wrongful charging of an expense against a different budget allocation.
Noting the disparity between the disallowed amount and her salary, the
Court opined that holding Estalilla liable would lead to disastrous
consequences to her and to her family. The same scenario applies in the
instant case. The serious and dire consequences to petitioners' lives and
property should have prompted the COA to review the correctness of the
allowance instead of stringently insisting that the disallowance has already
become final and executory.

Firstly, considering that the disallowance is not based on a supposed

positive act of petitioners, but arose from their failure to submit documents,
and given the enormous amount of disallowance, this Court finds that the
COA should have been circumspect in upholding the subject ND. The
circumstances of this case should have impelled it to, at least, grant
petitioners, who are also colleagues of Elena Estalilla in the aforesaid case,
access to relevant documents concerning the disallowance, such as, but not
limited to, the AOM dated 14 October 2004, and NS No. 2007-002-101
(2004) dated 26 February 2007. We should point out, that COA's denial of
access to documents was also a pivotal issue in Estalilla that compelled the
Court to rule that COA committed due process violations against the
petitioner therein. We found no reason to have a different conclusion here.

Further, the Court ruled in Estalilla: ·

To begin with, Estalilla's case affected her right to life and property.
Judicial notice is taken of the size of her salary as a municipal treasurer in
comparison with the disallowed amount of [Php]35,591,200.00. The huge
disparity between her salary and the liability was glaring enough. To charge
her with the solidary liability would produce very serious and dire
consequences on her precious right to life and property. The consequences
could impact negatively as well on the rest of her family. What makes the
liability even harsher was that she had not personally derived any direct or
personal benefit from the disallowed disbursements. 50

Here, the salaries of Hatulan and Tamayo are made of record51 and

so Supra note 47.

51
Rollo, p. 107; In her Personal Data Sheet dated 2 May 200 I, Hatulan stated that her monthly salary as
Municipal Engineer is Pl9,831, rollo, p. 101; while Tamayo indicated his monthly salary in 2003 and
2004 as Administrative Officer are in the amounts of Php 14,914 and Php 16,237, respectively.
Decision 13 G.R. No. 227467

thus recognized by the Court. Indeed, to hold petitioners, especially Hatulan

and Tamayo, solidarily liable for the larger amount of '1"42,594,037 given
their measly salary would undoubtedly result to their financial ruin.

The COA should conduct an

exhaustive investigation on the
transactions covered by the subject
ND.

A notice of suspension is issued on transactions or accounts which

could otherwise have been settled except for some requirements, like lack of
supporting documents or certain signatures. It is also issued on transactions
or accounts the legality/propriety of which the auditor doubts but which he
may later allow after satisfactory or valid justification is submitted by the
parties concerned. Under Section 82 52 of PD 1445, the suspension shall
become a disallowance if the charge of suspension is "not satisfactorily
explained within ninety days after receipt or notice by the accountable
officer concemed." 53

In this case, the COA held petitioners liable for their supposed failure
to submit the following documents: (1) approved detailed plan; (2) approved
detailed estimate; (3) approved statement of work accomplished; (4) copy of
contract; and (5) bidding documents (invitation to bid, notice of award and
notice to proceed). After this Court's review of the pertinent rules on
procurement, this Court finds that aside from re-investigating petitioners
who were members of the BAC, the COA should also conduct a thorough
examination on all the other parties to the procurement process, specifically
the procuring entity and contractors identified in the subject ND.

Among the factors to consider in determining the liability of public

officers in returning disallowed amounts are said officers' duties and
responsibilities and the extent of their participation in the disallowed
transaction. Thus:

52 Section 82. Auditor's notice to accountable officer of balance shown upon settlement. The auditor
concerned shall, at convenient intervals, send a written notice under a certificate of settlement to each
officer whose accounts have been audited and settled in whole or in patt by him, stating the balances
found due thereon and certified, and the charges or differences arising from the settlement by reason of
disallowances, charges, or suspensions. The certificate shall be properly itemized and shall state the
reasons for disaHowance, charge, or suspension of credit. A charge of suspension which is not
satisfactorily explained within ninety days after receipt of the certificate or notice by the
accountable officer concerned shall become a disallowance, unless the Commission or auditor
concerned shall, in writing and for good cause shown, extend the time for answer beyond ninety
days. (Emphasis supplied)
53
See Rodrigo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 362 Phil. 646 (1999).
Decision 14 G.R. No. 227467

Section 35 l of the Local Government Code provides that

expenditures of funds or use of property in violation of law shall be the
personal liability of the official or employee responsible therefor. In that
regard, in Section 16 of Circular No. 2009-006, the COA has listed the
factors to be considered in determining the liability of public officers for
disallowances, namely: (1) the nature of the disallowance/charge; (2) the
duties and responsibilities of officers/employees concerned; (3) the extent of
their participation in the disallowed/charged transaction; and (4) the amount
of damage suffered by or loss to the Government. 54 (Citation omitted)

The BAC is responsible for vetting and recommending the contractor

to the procuring entity. The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) Part
A of Republic Act No. (RA) 9184 (IRR-A), succinctly provides for the
BAC's role in the procurement process, viz:

Section 12. Functions of the BAC.

12.1. The BAC shall have. the following functions: advertise

and/or post the invitation to bid, conduct pre-procurement and pre-bid
conferences, determine the eligibility of prospective bidders, receive bids,
conduct the evaluation of bids, undertake post-qualification proceedings,
resolve motions for reconsideration, recommend award of contracts to
the head of the procuring entity or his dnly authorized representative:
Provided, however, That in the event the head of the procuring entity shall
disapprove such recommendation, such disapproval .shall be based only on
valid, reasonable and justifiable grounds to be expressed in writing, copy
furnished the BAC; recommend the imposition of sanctions in accordance
with Rule. XXIII, and perform such other related functions as may be
necessary, including the creation of a Technical Working Group (TWG)
from a pool of technical, financial and/or legal experts to assist in the
procurement process, particularly in the eligibility screening, evaluation of
bids and post-qualification. In proper cases, the BAC shall also
recommend to the head of the procuring entity the use of Alternative
Methods of Procurement as provided for in Rule XVI hereof.

12.2. The BAC shall be responsible for ensuring that the

procuring entity abides by the standards set forth by the Act and this
IRR-A, and it shall prepare a procurement monitoring report that shall be
approved and submitted by the head of the procuring entity to the GPPB
on a semestral basis. The procurement monitoring report shall cover all
procurement activities specified in the APP, whether ongoing and
completed, costing fifty million pesos ([P]50,000,000) and above for
goods and infrastructure projects, and five million pesos ([P]5,000,000)
and above for consulting services. The report shall cover major activities
from the holding of the pre-procurement conference to the issuance of
notice of award and the approval of the contract, including the standard
and actual time for each major procurement activity. It shall be submitted
in printed and electronic format within ten (10) working days after the end
of each semester. (Emphasis supplied)

54
Estalilla v. Commission on Audit, supra note 47.
Decision· 15 G.R. No. 227467

In Jason III v Commission on Audit, 55 this Court explained that the

role of the BAC is determine the eligibility of the prospective bidders based
on their compliance with the eligibility requirements set forth in the
Invitation to Bid and their submission of the legal, technical and financial
documents required under Section 23.6, Rule VIII of the IRR of RA 9184.

Indeed, under the IRR-A of RA 9184, the requirements for eligibility

to bid, contract documents, and those pertaining to its implementation, fall
within the responsibilities of the procuring entity, viz.:

Section 21. Advertising and Contents of the Invitation to Bid. -

21.1. Contents ofihe Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid

The Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid shall provide

prospective bidders the following information among others:

1. For the procurement of:

a) Goods, the name of the contract to be bid and a brief

description of the goods to be procured;

b) Infrastructure projects, the name and location of the

contract to be bid, the project background and other relevant
information regarding the proposed contract works, including a
brief description of the type, size, major items, and other important
or relevant features of the works; and

c) Consulting services, the name of the contract to be bid, a

general description of the project and other important or relevant
information;

2. A general statement on the criteria to be used by the

procuring entity for the eligibility check, the short listing of prospective
bidders, in the case of the procurement of consulting services, the
examination and evaluation of bids, and post-qualification;

3. The date, time and place of the deadline for the submission and
receipt of the eligibility requirements, the pre-bid conference if any, the
submission and receipt of bids, and the opening of bids;

4. The approved budget for the contract to be bid;

5. The source of funding;

55 Jason III v. Commission on Audit, 820 Phil. 485 (2017); see Commission on Audit v. Link Worth
International, Inc., 600 Phil. 547, 556 (2009).
Decision 16 G.R. No. 227467

6. The period of availability of the bidding documents, the place

where the bidding documents may be secured and, where applicable, the
price of the bidding documents;

7. The contract duration or delivery schedule;

8. The name, address, telephone number, facsimile number, e-mail

and website addresses of the concerned procuring entity, as well as its
designated contact person; and

9. Such other necessary information deemed relevant by the

procuring entity.

37.2. Contract Award

37.2.1. Within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) calendar days

from the determination and declaration by the BAC of the Lowest
Calculated Responsive Bid or Highest Rated Responsive Bid, and the
recommendation of the award, the head of the procuring entity or his duly
authorized representative shall approve or disapprove the said
recommendation. In. case of approval, the head of the procuring entity
or his duly authorized representative shall immediately issue the
Notice of Award to the bidder with the Lowest Calculated Responsive
Bid or Highest Rated Responsive Bid. In the case of GOCCs and GFis,
the period provided herein shall be thirty (3 0) calendar days. Within the
same period provided herein, the BAC shall notify all losing bidders of its
decision.

xxxx

37.5. Notice to Proceed

The concerned procuring entity shall then issue the Notice to

Proceed together with a copy or copies of the approved contract to the
successful bidder within seven (7) calendar days from the date of approval
of the contract by the appropriate government approving authority. All
notices called for by the terms of the contract shall be effective only at the
time of receipt thereof by the successful bidder. If an effectivity date is
provided in the Notice to Proceed by the procuring entity concerned, all
notices called for by the terms of the approved contract shall be effective
only from such effectivity date. (Emphasis supplied)

Based from the foregoing, it may be inferred that the documents

specified in the subject ND relate to the preparatory, contract award and
implementation stages of procurement, which properly pertain to the end-
user or procuring entity. As the party requesting procurement, it establishes
Decision ]7 G.R. No. 227467

the technical specifications and standards for the supplies and services it
wishes to avail, and ultimately, agrees and awards a contract to the
contractor selected by the BAC. Nonetheless, this Court also acknowledges
that petitioners are also members of the municipal government of Cabuyao
who n1ay shed light on the procurement process involving Golden Deer
Enterprises and RDC Construction. Further, as stated above, the subject ND
involves a substantial amount of government funds, specifically
l"42,594,037. Thus, in keeping with the broader interests of justice, and to
make sure that both public funds and petitioners' rights are safeguarded, this
Comt orders the remand of the instant case to the COA for the conduct of an
exhaustive investigation on the matter.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision

No. 2015-223 dated 13 April 2015 and Notice dated 12 July 2016 rendered
by the Commission on Audit is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
the case is REMANDED to the Cominission on Audit for disposition on the
merits.

SO ORDERED ..
'
 I

Decision . 18 G.R. No. 227467

\VE CONCUR:

G. G:ESMUNDO.

11.0·~- · ·
1
ESTELA ~)PERLAS-BER..~ABE .
Associate Justice

Associate Justice

.
A'4t.J~~-JAVIER
Associate Justice

H E N ~ B..iNTlNG
Associate Justice

Associate Justice

JHOSE~OPEZ .
, ,

Associate Justice
Decision 19 G.R. No. 227467

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Sectio1i 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer o_fthe opinion of the Court.

"".GESMUNDO
 ENBANC

G.R. No. 227467 - ATTY. JOAQUIN DELOS SANTOS, ENGR.

EVELYN HATULAN, and CORNELIO TAMAYO, Petitioners, v.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.

Promulgated:
August 3, 2021
x-----------·----~~7~-..t--~----x
<~--~
DISSENTING OPINION

LEONEN,J.:

The Commission on Audit is bound to adhere to the fundamental

requirements of due process in its proceedings. An accused should be duly
informed of the charges against them and be given an opportunity to defend
themself. Failure to observe their due process rights taints the whole
administrative proceedings with invalidity.

Before this Court are Atty. Joaquin Delos Santos; Engr. Evelyn M.
Hatulan; and Cornelio V. Tamayo (Delos Santos, et al.), all members of the
Bids and Awards Committee who, along with other local public officers 1 of
the government of Cabuyao, Laguna, were named accountable to pay
P42,594,03 7 .69 under Notice ofDisallowance No. 2007-036-101 (04 ), 2 owing
to a "suspension maturing into disallowance."

This Notice of Disallowance was issued on November 19, 2007, well

after Notice of Suspension No. 2007-002-101 (2004) 3 dated February 26,
2007 had lapsed. It referred to Audit Observation Memorandum No. 2004-
009-101, issued on October 14, 2004, and to another Memorandum issued on
September 28, 2004, both of which required the submission of pertinent
documents on the Cabuyao government's projects or contracts with Golden
Deer Enterprises and RDC Construction Development Corporation. 4

Delos Santos, et al. contended that they only learned about the Notice
ofDisallowance in 2013, when they received a Notice ofFinality ofDecision5
and an Order of Execution6 from the Commission on Audit, both dated

Rollo, p.7. Proceso Aguillo (mayor), Felix L. Galang, Jr. (municipal accountant), Elena A. Estelilla
(municipal treasurer), Engr. Manolito P. Barundia (building official), and Pastor Canceran, Marcelina
Marana and Manolita Barundia (members of the Bids and Awards Committee).
2
Id. at 46-48.
Id. at 72-73.
4
Ponencia, p. 2.
5
Rollo, pp. 49-50.
6
ld.at51-52.
Dissenting Opinion 2 G.R. No. 227467

September 3, 2012. On February 21, 2013, they requested a review of these

issuances and copies. of the material documents so they could answer the
charges against them. 7

However, Regional Director Nilda M. Blanco of the Commission on

Audit denied their request. She reasoned that the Notice of Disallowance
showed that petitioners had received it; that the disallowance became final
and executory when no appeal was filed within six months from receipt; and
that a review of the issuances was not in the Rules and Regulations on
Settlement of Accounts and the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the
Commission on Audit. 8

On September 17, 2013, Delos Santos, et al. filed an Omnibus Motion,

praying that the Commission on Audit set aside the Notice of Finality of
Decision and the Order of Execution, release the pertinent documents, and
admit their appeal. They maintained that they were denied due process for
not receiving the Notice ofDisallowance. 9

In an April 13, 2015 Decision, 10 the Commission on Audit denied the

Omnibus Motion. It denied Delos Santos, et al.' s claim of not receiving the
Notice of Disallowance since their supposed signatures appeared on it. As
such, the Commission ruled that the disallowance had become final. 11

Delos Santos, et al. moved for reconsideration, but were denied on the
same ground. 12 Hence, they filed this Petition. ·

Petitioners assert that the Commission on Audit gravely abused its

discretion in upholding the Notice of Finality ofDisallowance and the Order
of Execution. They maintain that they were denied due process because they
did not receive the Notice; that their signatures were forged; and that the
Notice itself did not specify the projects or contracts covered. They add that
there was no bids and awards committee around that time, and no records were
on file with the city hall certifying that the committee existed then. 13

The majority rejects petitioners' claim that they did not receive the
Notice of Disallowance. It adds that they failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that their signatures had been forged. 14 /

7
Id. at 53-54.
8
Id. at 55-56.
9
Id. at 57-59.
10 Id. at 60--<53.
11 Id. at 61--<52.
12
Id. at 71.
13
Id. at 36.
14
Ponencia, p. 6.
 Dissenting Opinion 3 G.R. No. 227467

Even so, the majority holds that the case should be remanded to the
Commission on Audit to conduct an exhaustive investigation on the matter
and allow petitioners the opportunity to thoroughly ventilate their defenses. 15
To the majority, the Notice ofDisallowance was defective because it did not
specify the facts and law on which the Commission on Audit's conclusions
were reached. Citing Estalilla v. Commission on Audit, 16 it held that the
Commission on Audit should not have strictly applied the rule on
immutability of judgment given the disparity in petitioners' salaries and the
amount to which they are being made accountable. 17

Finally, the majority finds that there must be an exhaustive

investigation on the procurement process involving the two contractors,
including the extent of the participation of petitioners and the responsible
officers of the procuring entity in the disallowed transaction. 18

I dissent.

The Commission on Audit's outright denial of the Omnibus Motion

deprived petitioners of their rights to due process, amounting to grave abuse
of discretion.

Due process in administrative proceedings demands that the tribunal

properly inform a party of the charges against them, and afford them the
opportunity to present their defenses and supporting evidence, which it must
consider in making its decision. 19 The essence of due process is the
opportunity to be heard. 20

In Ledesma v. Court ofAppeals: 21

Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him
and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative
proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the
person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process. The essence ofdue process is simply
to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration ofthe action
or ruling complained of22 (Citations omitted)

15
Id. at 8.
16
G.R. No. 217448, September IO, 2019,
<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65721> [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
17
Ponencia, p. 8.
18
Id.
19
Gutierrez v. Commission on Audit, 750 Phil. 413,430 (2015) [Per J. Leanen, En Banc].
20
Id. citing Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 565 Phil. 731-743 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
21
565 Phil. 731 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
22
Id. at 740.
Dissenting Opinion 4 G.R. No. 227467

At its basic, administrative due process is about fairness in the conduct

of proceedings. 23 What is offensive to due process is the denial of the
opportunity to be heard. 24

In Fontanilla v. Commissioner Proper, 25 this Court held that the

petitioner was denied due process when he had not been informed of being
possibly liable for the loss of government funds and was not able to explain
his side in the entire fact-finding process. The case originated from his
subordinate who, after having lost public funds, requested relief from money
accountability. The Regional Director denied this request, and upon review,
the Adjudication and Settlement Board did the same. Curiously, only at that
late stage of review was Fontanilla brought in and held solidarily liable with
his subordinate.

In rejecting the Commission on Audit's contention that there was no

denial of due process because Fontanilla was able to appeal, this Court held:

While we have ruled in the past that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration cures the defect in procedural due process because the
process of reconsideration is itself an opportunity to be heard, this ruling
does not embody an absolute rule that applies in all circumstances. The
mere filing of a motion for reconsideration cannot cure the due process
defect, especially if the motion was filed precisely to raise the issue of
violation of the right to due process and the lack of opportunity to be heard
on the merits remained.

In other words, if a person has not been given the opportunity to

squarely and intelligently answer the accusations or rebut the evidence
presented against him, or raise substantive defenses through the proper
pleadings before a quasi-judicial body (like the COA) where he or she
stands charged, then a due process problem exists. This problem worsens
and the denial of his most basic right continues if, in the first place, he is
found liable without having been charged and this finding is confirmed in
the appeal or reconsideration process without allowing him to rebut or
explain his side on the finding against him.

Time and again, we have ruled that the essence of due process is the
opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, one is heard when
he is accorded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain his case or is
given the chance to have the ruling complained of reconsidered. 26
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In Uy v. Commission on Audit,27 this Court found it unfair that the

Commission on Audit held the respondent personally liable for the
I
23
Vivo v.· Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp .. 721 Phil. 34, 39 (2013) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
24
Ablang v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 233308, August I 8, 2020,
<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/6651 O> [Per J. Reyes, Jr., En Banc]; Busuego
v. Court of Appeals, 364 Phil. 116, 126 (1999) [Per J. Purisima, Third Division].
25
787 Phil. 713 (2016) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
26
Id. at 725-726.
27
385 Phil. 324 (2000) [Per J. Puna, En Banc].
 Dissenting Opinion 5 G.R. No. 227467

petitioners' claims without giving him an opportunity to be heard and to

present evidence in his defense. It held:

Accordingly, the fundamental requirements of procedural due

process cannot be violated in proceedings be.fore the COA. In the case at
bar, former Governor Paredes was never made a party to nor served a
notice of the proceedings before the COA. While administrative agencies
exercising quasi-judicial powers are not hidebound by technical procedures,
nonetheless, they are not free to disregard the basic demands of due process.
Notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a
mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative proceedings but
an indispensable ingredient of due process. It would be unfair for COA to
hold former Governor Paredes personally liable for the claims of petitioners
amounting to millions of pesos without giving him an opportunity to be
heard and present evidence in his defense. Our rulings holding that public
officials are personally liable for damages arising from illegal acts done in
bad faith are premised on said officials having been sued both in their
official and personal capacities. 28 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Here, petitioners claim being denied due process as they were not given
a copy of the Notice ofDisallowance, and the first time they learned ofit was
when they received the Notice of Finality ofDecision and Order of Execution.
The Notice did not specify the covered projects or transactions, but merely
refen-ed to the Notice of Suspension and two Memoranda, copies of which
were likewise not furnished to petitioners. 29 The Commission on Audit,
however, brushed aside their claims simply because of the purported
signatures appearing beside their names in the Notice. 30

At the very least, the Commission on Audit should have verified

whether the signatures appearing on the Notice were indeed petitioners'. If
petitioners' disclaimers were true, then the failure to file an appeal within the
prescribed period would not have been their fault. The disallowance,
therefore, could not have attained finality.

Parenthetically, the majority has found the Notice of Disallowance

itself to be defective for failure to specify the facts and the law on which the
charges were made.

Petitioners were also not given a real opportunity to present their side.

After receiving the issuances, petitioners immediately sought their , /

review and copies of the documents material to the case. Yet, their request
was denied since the disallowance had already become final.

28
Id. at 337.
29
Rollo, pp. 13-14, 33.
30
Id. at 61.
Dissenting Opinion 6 G.R. No. 227467

Petitioners still moved for the Commission on Audit to set aside the
issuances, release the documents, and admit their appeal. Yet again, their
Omnibus Motion was denied on the ground of the disallowance's finality.

Petitioners were utterly denied due process before being held liable.
They were neither afforded the opportunity to defend their interests nor
furnished with the material documents they requested, foreclosing their efforts
to know the available remedies and adequately prepare for plausible defenses.
As Buscaino v. Commission on Audii3 1 teaches, due process mandates that
"every respondent be apprised of the nature and cause of the charge against
[them], and the evidence in support thereof be shown or made available to
[them] so that [they] can meet the charge with traversing or exculpatory
evidence." 32 That was not the case here.

Petitioners' appeal was not even admitted and ruled on its merits.
Considering the significant amount involved, the Commission on Audit
should have endeavored not only to investigate whether petitioners were
indeed served copies of the Notice of Disallowance, but more important, to
determine the substantive aspect of their participations in the disallowed
transactions and projects.

What made a thorough review more impelling were petitioners'

allegations that: ( 1) the mayor had been excluded by the Regional Director
from liability for merely approving the payments and ensuring the
completeness of documents with the municipal accountant; 33 (2) no bids and
awards committee was constituted at that time; 34 and (3) there were no records
on file with the city hall that the committee existed. 35

Procedural rules cannot outweigh one's constitutionally guaranteed

36
rights. Yet, here, the Commission on Audit blindly adhered to the
procedural rules when it denied petitioners' appeal on the ground that the
Notice ofDisallowance had become final.

In Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Commission on Audit,37 this Court

stressed that the Commission on Audit's mandate to examine, audit, and settle
government accounts and funds does not give it the authority to disregard the
basic requirements of due process. Its action in that case was found to be
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Said this Court:
/
31
369 Phil. 886 (1999) [Per J. Purisima, En Banc].
32
Buscaino v. Commission on Audit, 369 Phil. 886,902 (1999) [Per J. Purisima, En Banc].
33
Rolfo,pp.17-18.
34
Id. at 39.
35
Id. at 36.
36
Fontanilla v. Commissioner Proper, 787 Phil.713(2016) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
37
818 Phil. 429 (2017) [Per J. Leanen, En Banc].
 Dissenting Opinion 7 G.R. No. 227467

It was an error amounting to grave abuse of discretion to hold Yap

liable, and Dequita and the other bank officers of the Cotabato Branch
jointly and solidarily liable with Yap for the cash shortage without an actual
complaint being filed and without giving them the chance to defend
themselves. Thus, the assailed Decision violated the basic tenets of due
process and must be annulled and set aside. 38 (Emphasis supplied)

This Court has recognized certain justifications to suspend the rigid

application of procedural rules, including the rule on immutability of
judgments, such as:

(a) matters oflife, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension
of the rules; (e) lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby. 39 (Citations omitted)

In Lanto v. Commission on Audit, 40 this Court set aside the Commission

on Audit's decision, despite its immutability, insofar as the petitioner's
personal liability for the disallowance was concerned. This Court considered
his right to property, the existence of compelling circumstances, and the
merits of the case as sufficient justifications:

First of all, the adverse result would surely make her personally
liable for a substantial sum of monetary liability from which she had not
directly benefited, thereby prejudicing her right to property.

Secondly, tl1e petitioner's good faith in certifying to the correctness

of the payrolls based on available records about Labrador having actually
reported to work, and on her absolute lack of knowledge of his having been
dismissed and of the pendency of the c1iminal case in the Sandiganbayan
constituted compelling circumstances that justified applying the exception
in her favor. ...

And, thirdly, the fact that the petitioner was on foreign assigmnent
when the COA rendered the assailed issuances plausibly explained why she
did not seasonably assail or oppose the disallowances. We point out that
the insistence of tl1e COA that the POEA had filed in her behalf a motion
for reconsideration during her absence from the country on a foreign
assignment without the indication that she had expressly authorized the
POEA to do so did not suffice to now defeat her right to be heard. Verily,
only she could have exercised the right to be heard upon a matter that would
subject her under the law to personal liability.

In light of the foregoing circumstances, the COA's directive to

I
withhold the petitioner's salary was void and produced no legal effect. As

38
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Commission on Audit, 8 I 8 Phil. 429,453 (2017) [Per J. Leanen, En Banc].
39
Lanto v. Commission on Audit, 808 Phil. 1025, I 038 (20 I 7) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
40
808 Phil. 1025 (2017) [PerJ. Bersamin, En Banc].
Dissenting Opinion 8 G.R. No. 227467

such, the assailed COA issuances did not attain finality and immutability as
to her. 41 (Citations omitted)

More recently, in Ablang v. Commission on Audit,42 this Court has set

aside the Commission on Audit's decision for violating a party's due process
rights. We said:

It is true that a Notice of Finality of Decision and an Order of

Execution had already been rendered in this case. However, considering
the non-observance of petitioners' right to due process, the same should be
set aside. It is settled that "[v]iolation of due process rights is a
jurisdictional defect" and that "a decision or judgment is fatally defective if
rendered in violation ofa party-litigant's right to due process."43 (Citations
omitted)

Here, the Commission on Audit should have taken cognizance of

petitioners' appeal in the interest of substantial justice. Since the sum
involved ainounts to f>42,594,037.69, upholding the disallowance without
giving petitioners any opportunity to present their defense and adduce
evidence has denied them their right to due process.

The right to due process, in demanding fairness, intends liberty from

arbitrariness. 44 A decision made in violation of a party's right to due process
is gravely defective, 45 making the assailed proceeding wholly void. 46

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the Petition.

Associate Justice

41
Id. at 1039-1040.
42
G.R. No. 233308, August 18, 2020, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66510>
[Per J. Reyes Jr., En Banc].
., Id.
44
Philippine National Construction Corp. v. NLRC, 354 Phil. 274, 282 (1988) [Per J. Romero, Third
Division].
45
Id. at 280.
46
Combate v. San Jose, Jr., 220 Phil. 365,369 (I 985) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, First Division].
..

EN BANC

G.R. No. 227467 - ATTY. JOAQUIN DELOS SANTOS, ENGR.

EVELYN M. HATULAN and CORNELIO V. TAMAYO, petitioners,
versus COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

Promulgated:
August 3, 2021

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CONCURRING OPINION

CAGUIOA, J.:

I concur.

As aptly observed in the ponencia, a remand of the case to the

Commission on Audit (COA) is proper and just despite the finality of the
subject Notice ofDisallowance (ND), on the following grounds: (a) the ND
was an insufficient notice of the petitioners' liability (merely citing as it did
a previous "suspension maturing into disallowance" without further details);
(b) this case is similar to Elena A. Estalilla v. COA, 1 where the Court noted
the disparity between the disallowed amount and therein petitioner Elena
Estalilla's salary, and the COA's denial of her request for access to
documents relating to the disallowance, treating these as exceptions to the
rule on immutability of judgments; and ( c) the disallowance is not based on
a supposed positive act of the petitioners which violated procurement rules,
but on their failure to timely submit relevant documents to aid COA's audit.

The ponencia further notes that the documents requested by the COA
and which petitioners were not able to submit -

x x x [r]elate to the preparatory, contract award and implementation

stages of procurement, which properly pertain to the end-user or
procuring entity. As the party requesting procurement, it establishes the.
technical specifications and standards for the supplies and services it
wishes to avail, and ultimately, agrees and awards a contract to the
contractor selected by the BAC. Nonetheless, this Court also
acknowledges that petitioners are also members of the municipal
government of Cabuyao who may shed light on the procurement
process involving Golden Deer Enterprises and RDC Construction.2
(Emphasis supplied)

As regards the responsibilities of the Bids and Awards Committee

(BAC), the ponencia also notes that:

G.R. No. 217448, September 10, 2019.

2
Ponencia, p. 17.
' ..
Concurring Opinion 2 G.R. No. 227467

The BAC is responsible for vetting and recommending the

contractor to the procuring entity. x x x

xxxx

In Jason v. COA, this Court explained that the role of the BAC is
[to] determine the eligibility of the prospective bidders based on their
compliance with the eligibility requirements set forth in the Invitation to
Bid and their submission of the legal, technical and financial documents
required under Sec. 23.6, Rule VIII of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations ofR.A. No. 9184.

Indeed, under the IRR-A of R.A. No. 9184, the requirements

for eligibility to bid, contract documents, and those pertaining to its
implementation, fall within the responsibilities of the procuring
entity[.] xx x3 (Emphasis supplied and citation omitted)

I submit that an investigation by the COA of petitioners herein who

are members of the BAC is proper not merely because of their capability to
"shed light" on the procurement process, but precisely because it is the BAC
- among the offices within the procuring entity - which takes a central
role in any procurement and would undoubtedly participate in the
preparation and issuance of all procurement-related documents.

Section 5 of the 2003 Implementing Rules and Regulations Part A

(IRR-A) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 91844 defines the procuring entity and
the head of the procuring entity as follows:

xxxx

m) Head of the Procuring Entity. Refers to: (i) the head of the agency
or body, or his duly authorized official, for NGAs and the
constitutional commissions or offices, and branches of government;
(ii) the governing board or its duly authorized official, for GOCCs,
GFis and SUCs; or (iii) the local chief executive, for LGUs:
Provided, however, That in an agency, department, or office where
the procurement is decentralized, the Head of each decentralized
unit shall be considered as the head of the procuring entity subject
to the limitations and authority delegated by the head of the
agency, department, or office.

xxxx

q) Procuring Entity. Refers to any branch, constitutional commission

or office, agency, department, bureau, office, or instrumentality of
the Government, including GOCC, GFI, SUC and LGU procuring
Goods, Consulting Services and Infrastructure Projects.

Id. at 14-15.
4
The GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT REFORM ACT, approved on January IO, 2003. Presumably
a})plicable during the transactions subject of this case, since the disallowance was issued in 2007.
• ',
Concurring Opinion 3 G.R. No. 227467

In this case, the procuring entity is the Municipal Government of

Cabuyao, Laguna. The BAC, as part of the municipal government, is
composed of representatives of the regular offices under the Office of the
Local Chief Executive, designated as such by the local chief executive (in
this case, the mayor). 5 Within the framework of the municipal government,
the BAC is in fact the office which is expected to maintain expertise in
procurement laws and rules. As also noted in the ponencia, the BAC is
"responsible for ensuring that the procuring entity abides by the standards
set forth by [R.A. No. 9184] and this IRR-Ax x x." 6 Therefore, when the
IRR-A of R.A. No. 9184 states that the "[b]idding [d]ocuments shall be
prepared by the procuring entity following the standard forms and manuals
prescribed by the [Government Procurement Policy Board],"7 it is the BAC
that is expected to be primarily involved in said preparation.

In fact, the IRR-A gives the BAC the lead role in the conduct of
procurement actlv11les, citing the following among its duties: (a)
advertising/posting the Invitation to Bid8 (one of the documents requested by
the auditor in this case); (b) issuance of the bidding documents to
prospective bidders upon payment of the cost thereof;9 (c) issuance of
Supplemental Bid Bulletins which may involve changes in the bidding
documents; 10 and even (d) declaring a failure of bidding and conducting a re-
bidding.11

Furthermore, Section 14.1 of the 2003 IRR-A ofR.A. No. 9184 tasks
the BAC Secretariat, which is the main support unit of the BAC, with the
following duties:

xxxx

5. Take custody of procurement documents and be responsible for the sale

and distribution of bidding documents to interested bidders;

xxxx

Section 11.2.2 of the 2003 IRR-A of R.A. No. 9184 states:

11.2.2. Local Government Units
The BAC shall be composed of one (1) representative each from the regular offices
under the Office of the Local Chief Executive such as, but not limited to the following:
Office of the Administrator, Budget Office, Legal Office, Engineering Office, General
Services Offices. The end user office shall always be represented in the BAC. The Chairman
of the BAC shall be at least a third ranking permanent official of the procuring entity. The
members of the BAC shall be personnel occupying plantil/a positions of the procuring entity
concerned.
The local chief executive shall designate the members of the BAC. The members
shall elect among themselves who shall act as the Chainnan and Vice-Chairman.
Subsequent iterations of the IRR in 2009 and 2016 retain essentially the same language as the above.
6
Ponencia, p. 15, citing Section 12.2 of the 2003 IRR-A ofR.A. No. 9184.
7 2003 IRR-AofR.A. No. 9184, Section 17.1.
8
Id., Section 12.1.
9
Id., Section 17.5.
10
Id., Section 22.5.1.
II
Id., Sections 35.1 and 35.2.
•
•
Concurring Opinion 4 GR. No. 227467

10. Be the central channel of connnunications for the BAC with end users,
PMOs, other units of the line agency, other government agencies,
providers of goods, civil works and consulting services, and the
general public.

Given the foregoing, I agree with the ponencia that, in keeping with
the broader interests of justice, petitioners-members of the BAC should be
allowed an opportunity to ventilate their defenses fully and argue the
regularity of the subject procurements. Hence, the case should be remanded
to the COA for disposition on the merits.
//
/
;
/
I