TAÑADA VS.

TUVERA
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending
that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid
and enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give
the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct
as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official
Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty
must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is
to be given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first
be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of
general application which have not been published have no force and effect.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when
the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as
to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
HELD:
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that
the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its
previous publication.
“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking,
all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law
without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as
an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it
might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a
whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity
date is fixed by the legislature.

Page 1 of 82
 Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of
the content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette,
and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule
upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows
with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as
binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full
disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot
faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn

KASILAG V. RODRIGUEZ [ 69 P 217] - F:

Responds, Rafaela Rodriguez, et al., children and heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio,
commenced a civil case to recover from the petitioner the possession of the land and its improvements
granted by way of homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio (EA).
The parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as
homestead to secure the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 plus interest. In clause V, the parties
stipulated that EA was to pay, w/in 4 1/2 yrs, the debt w/ interest thereon, in w/c event the mortgage
would not have any effect; in clause VI, the parties agreed that the tax on the land and its
improvements, during the existence of the mortgage, should be paid by the owner of the land; in clause
VII, it was covenanted that w/in 30 days from the date of the contract, the owner of the land would file
a motion in the CFI of Bataan asking that cert. of title no. 325 be cancelled and that in lieu thereof
another be issued under the provisions of RA 496; in clause VIII the parties agreed that should EA fail to
redeem the mortgage w/in the stipulated period of 4 1/2 yrs, she would execute an absolute deed of
sale of the land in favor of the mortgagee, the petitioner, for the same amount of the loan including
unpaid interest; and in clause IX it was stipulated that in case the motion to be presented under clause
VII should be disapproved by the CFI-Bataan, the contract of sale of sale would automatically become
void and the mortgage would subsist in all its force.
One year after the execution of the mortgage deed, it came to pass that EA was unable to pay
the stipulated interest as well as the tax on the land and its improvements. For this reason, she and the
petitioner entered into another verbal contract whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of
the land on condition that the latter would not collect the interest on the loan, would attend to the
payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduce improvements
thereon.
HELD: The possession by the petitioner and his receipts of the fruits of the land, considered as integral
elements of the contract of antichresis, are illegal and void agreements, bec. the such contract is a lien
and as such is expressly prohibited by Sec 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended. The CA held that petitioner
acted In BF in taking possession of the land bec. he knew that the contract he made w/ EA was an
absolute sale, and further, that the latter could not sell the land bec. it is prohibited by Sec. 116 of Act
2874.
xxx [A] person is deemed a possessor in BF when he knows that there is a flaw in his title or in the
manner of its acquisition, by w/c it is invalidated.
The question to be answered is w/n the petitioner should be deemed a possessor in GF bec. he
was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by w/c it is invalidated. Ignorance
of the flaw is the keynote of the rule. From the facts as found by the CA, we can neither deduce nor
presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from
the prohibition contained in Sec. 116. This being the case, the question is w/n GF may be premised upon
ignorance of the laws.
Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be the basis of GF but excusable ignorance
may be such basis (if it is based upon ignorance of a fact.) It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant
w/ the laws bec. he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on
the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In

Page 2 of 82
taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist
does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and
that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by Sec. 116. Thus, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the
provisions of sec. 116 is excusable and may be the basis of GF.
The petitioners being in GF, the respondents may elect to have the improvements introduced by
the petitioner by paying the latter the value thereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buy and have
the land where the improvements or plants are found, by paying them its market value to be fixed by
the court of origin, upon hearing the parties.

Kasilag v. Rodriguez, 69 PHIL 217

FACTS: Marcial Kasilag and Emiliana Ambrosio entered a contract of mortgage of improvements
of land acquired as homestead to secure the payment of the indebtedness of P1,000 plus interest. The
parties stipulated that Emilina Ambrosio was to pay the debt with interest within 4 ½ years., and in such
case, mortgage would not have any effect. They also agreed that Emiliana Ambrosio would execute a
deed of sale if it would not be paid within 4 ½ years and that she would pay the tax on the land. After a
year, it turned out that she was not able to pay the tax. Hence, they entered a verbal agreement
whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on the condition that they would not
collect the interest of the loan, would attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits
of the land, & would introduce improvement thereof.
These pacts made by the parties independently were calculated to alter the mortgage a contract clearly
entered into, converting the latter into a contract of antichresis. The contract of antichresis, being a real
encumbrance burdening the land, is illegal and void because it is legal and valid.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner should be deemed the possessor of the land in good faith because he
was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated
RULING: Yes. From the facts found established by the Court of Appeals we can neither deduce
nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside
from the prohibition contained in section 116. This being the case, the question is whether good faith
may be premised upon ignorance of the laws.
Gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good faith, but possible,
excusable ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with the laws
because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-
grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking
possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does,
that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the
latter, as a lien, was prohibited by section 116. These considerations again bring us to the conclusion
that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore,
be the basis of his good faith.

FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC

[On Matters of Retroactivity Only]
Ponente: Justice PANGANIBAN, 1996
FACTS:
Petitioner Frivaldo filed his certificate for Candidacy for Governor about 3 weeks before the
election. Private Respondent Lee, another candidate for the said position, filed a petition to disqualify
Frivaldo by reason of not being a citizen of the Philippines. A week before the election, Second Division
of COMELEC promulgated a resolution granting the petitionof Lee. A motion for Reconsideration was
filed by Frivaldo which remained unacted until after the elections. Thus, his candidacy continued and he
was voted during the elections. Few days after the Election, COMELEC En Banc affirmed the
promulgated resolution of the Second Division.
Frivaldo garnered the highest number of votes in the said election. Lee filed a petition praying
for his proclamation as Governor. Lee was then proclaimed as Governor. Frivaldo filed a petition for
annulment of the proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation alleging that he had already taken
his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines which he filed a couple of months ago before the
election.

Page 3 of 82
 Frivaldo’s motion was recognized and was then proclaimed as Governor. Lee filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by COMELEC En Banc.

ISSUES:
Private Respondent Lee filed this instant petition for Certiorari, Preliminary Injunction, and
Annulment of the COMELEC decision and resolution.
W/N Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid and legal. If it, did was it able to cure his lack of citizenship.
If not, may it be given a retroactive effect?
DECISION:
The Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of COMELEC. Under Sec. 39 of the
Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:
A Citizen of the Philippines
The court held that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate
must possess citizenship. At the same time, literally speaking, such qualification of citizenship should
thus be possessed when the “elective [elected] official” begins to govern. In the instant case, Frivaldo re-
assumed his citizenship on the very day the term of office of governor (and other elective official) began;
he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold the office and to discharge the functions
and responsibilities thereof as of said date.
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Raytheon international vs Rouzie gr 162894
FACTS
Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized & existing under the laws of
Connecticut, &Stockton Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract
BMSI hired Rouzie as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government
projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts.
Rouzie secured a service contract w/ the Rep. of Phil. on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of
rivers affected by the Mt.Pinatubo eruption & mudflows.
Rouzie filed before the NLRC a suit against BMSI and Rust International (Rust) for alleged
nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination, & breach of employment contract.
The Labor Arbiter ordered BMSI & Rust to pay Rouzie’s money claims.
Upon appeal, the NLRC reversed & dismissed Rouzie’s complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
Rouzie filed an action for damages before the RTC of La Union (where he was a resident) against
Raytheon International. He reiterated that he was not paid the commissions due him from the Pinatubo
dredging project w/c he secured on behalf of BMSI. The complaint also averred that BMSI, RUST and
Raytheon had combined & functioned as 1 company.
RAYTHEON SOUGHT THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUNDS OF FAILURE TO
STATE ACAUSE OF ACTION & FORUM NON CONVENIENS & PRAYED FOR DAMAGES BY WAY OF
COMPULSORY
COUNTERCLAIM. THE RTC DENIED RAYTHEON’S MOTION. THE CA AFFIRMED.
Raytheon’s contention: The written contract between Rouzie & BMSI included a valid choice of
law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also
mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute, namely that the parties & witnesses involved
are American corporations & citizens & the evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines,
that renders our local courts inconvenient forums. The foreign elements of the dispute necessitate the
immediate application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
ISSUES
(a) W/N the RTC had jurisdiction.
(b) W/N the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens.
RULING
(a) YES.
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a
Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it
may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties

Page 4 of 82
point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is
filed.
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and
the law & by the material allegations in the complaint, irrespective of w/n the plaintiff is entitled to
recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. The case file was an action for damages
arising from an alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the amount of
damages prayed are w/in the jurisdiction of the RTC.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Rouzi upon the filing
of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of Raytheon was acquired by its
voluntary appearance in court.
That THE SUBJECT CONTRACT INCLUDED A STIPULATION THAT THE SAME SHALL BE GOVERNED
BYTHE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT DOES NOT SUGGEST THAT THE PHILIPPINE COURTS, OR
ANY OTHER FOREIGN TRIBUNAL FOR THAT MATTER, ARE PRECLUDED FROM HEARING THE CIVIL
ACTION.
JURISDICTION & CHOICE OF LAW ARE 2 DISTINCT CONCEPTS. Jurisdiction considers whether it is
fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the
application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The
choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant case
develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.
(b) NO.
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS, A COURT, IN CONFLICTS-OF-LAWS CASES,
MAY REFUSE IMPOSITIONS ON ITS JURISDICTION WHERE IT IS NOT THE MOST “CONVENIENT” OR
AVAILABLE FORUM AND THE PARTIES ARE NOT PRECLUDED FROM SEEKING REMEDIES ELSEWHERE.
Raytheon’s averments of the foreign elements are not sufficient to oust the RTC of its
jurisdiction over the case and the parties involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens
requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense. While it
is w/c the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do
so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s
desistance.

MICIANO v. BRIMO
GR No.L-22595, November 1, 1927
50 PHIL 867

FACTS: Joseph Brimo, a Turkish national, died leaving a will which one of the clauses states that the law
of the Philippines shall govern the partition and not the law of his nationality, and that legatees have to
respect the will, otherwise the dispositions accruing to them shall be annulled. By virtue of such
condition, his brother, Andre Brimo, an instituted heir was thus excluded because, by his action of
having opposed the partition scheme, he did not respect the will. Andre sued contending that the
conditions are void being contrary to law which provides that the will shall be probated according to the
laws of the nationality of the decedent.
ISSUE: Is the condition as set by the testator valid?
HELD: No. A foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in
regard to those matters that Article 10 of the Civil Code states said national law should govern. Said
condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the
institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the
herein oppositor.

Aznar and Christensen v. Garcia

G.R. No. L-16749, 31 January 1963
FACTS:

Page 5 of 82
 Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided and
consequently was considered a California citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became
a domiciliary until his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country he had
always considered himself a citizen of California. In his will executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an
acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy of sum of
money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who was rendered to have been declared acknowledged
natural daughter.
Counsel for appellant claims that California law should be applied; that under California law, the
matter is referred back to the law of the domicile; that therefore Philippine law is ultimately applicable;
that finally, the share of Helen must be increased in view of the successional rights of illegitimate
children under Philippine law. On the other hand, counsel for the heir of Christensen contends that
inasmuch as it is clear that under Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national law of the deceased must
apply, our courts must immediately apply the internal law of California on the matter; that under
California law there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could dispose of any property
possessed by him in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to
anything and his will remain undisturbed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of Christensen?
RULING:
The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two
rules in California on the matter: the internal law which should apply to Californians domiciled in
California; and the conflict rule which should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California. The
California conflict rule says: “If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is
situated, is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile.”
Christensen being domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines, ought to be
followed.
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it
is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only
within the state. The “national law” indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted cannot,
therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the
private law of the State of California.

AZNAR vs GARCIA 7 SCRA 95

Facts:
Edward Christensen is a citizen of the State of California and domiciled in the Philippines. He
executed in his will acknowledging his natural daughter Maria Lucy Christensen as sole heir but left a
legacy of some money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who is declared by the Supreme Court in its
decision as acknowledged natural daughter of Edward C. Counsel of Helen asserts that her claim must
be increased in view of the successional rights of illegitimate children under Phil. law. Counsel of Maria
insists that Art. 16 (2) provides that the NATIONAL LAW OF THE PERSON applies in intestate and
testamentary successions and since Edward C. is a citizen of CA, its law should be applied. Lower court
ruled that CA law should be applied thus this petition for review.
Issue:
What law should be applicable – Philippine or California Law?
Ruling:
The court refers to Art. 16 (2) providing that intestate and testamentary successions with
respect to order of succession and amt. of successional right is regulated by the NATIONAL LAW OF THE
PERSON.

Page 6 of 82
California Probate Code provides that a testator may dispose of his property in the form and manner he
desires.
Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California provides that if no law on the contrary, the place where
the personal property is situated is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the
LAW OF HIS DOMICILE.
These provisions are cases when the Doctrine of Renvoi may be applied where the question of
validity of the testamentary provision in question is referred back to the decedent’s domicile – the
Philippines.
S.C. noted the California law provides 2 sets of laws for its citizens: One for residents therein as
provided by the CA Probate Code and another for citizens domiciled in other countries as provided by
Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California.
The conflicts of law rule in CA (Art. 946) authorize the return of question of law to the testator’s
domicile. The court must apply its own rule in the Philippines as directed in the conflicts of law rule in
CA, otherwise the case/issue will not be resolved if the issue is referred back and forth between 2 states.
The SC reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case back to it for decision with an
instruction that partition be made applying the Philippine law.

MATA vs AGRAVANTE
August 6, 2008
Nachura, J.
DEFINITION:
Article 19: which contains what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, is not a
panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. The object of this article is to set certain standards
which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s
duties.
STANDARDS (A19)Act with justice, Give everyone his due, and Observe honesty and good faith.*
DEFINITION
Article 21 refers to acts contra bonos mores
ELEMENTS
(1)an act which is legal;
(2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order or public policy; and
(3) is done with intent to injure.
* The common element under Articles 19 and 21 is that the act complained of must be intentional, and
attended with malice or bad faith.
*There is no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine whether or not the principle of abuse
of rights may be invoked. The question of whether or not this principle has been violated,
Depends on the circumstances of each case.
Facts
Mata owns a security agency. Respondents were former security guards who filed a complaint in the
NLRC for non-payment of salaries and wages. They then subsequently filed an affidavit complaint with
the PNP, copies were then sent to various offices including the Office of the President and the DPWH,
petitioner’s biggest client.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents furnishing of copies to the PNP, DPWH e tal was tainted with bad faith and
hence liable for damages.
Decision
Respondents not liable.
There was no malicious intent to injure petitioner’s good name and reputation. The respondents merely
wanted to call the attention of responsible government agencies in order to secure appropriate action
upon an erring private security agency and obtain redress for their grievances.
Ratio
In filing the letter-complaint with the Philippine National Police and furnishing copies thereof to seven
(7) other executive offices of the national government, the defendants-appellants may not be said to be
motivated simply by the desire to “unduly prejudice the good name and reputation” of plaintiff-

Page 7 of 82
appellee. Such act was consistent with and a rational consequence of seeking justice through legal
means for the alleged abuses defendants-appellants suffered in the course of their employment. The act
of furnishing copies was merely to inform said offices of the fact of filing of such complaint, as is usually
done by individual complainants seeking official government action to address their problems or
grievances. In the absence of proof that there was malice or bad faith on the part of the respondents, no
damages can be awarded.

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN AND RUBY LIM VS. ROBERTO REYES a.k.a. “AMAY BISAYA”
2005 Feb 28 G.R. No. 154259
FACTS:
In the evening of October 13, 1994, while drinking coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko,
respondent was invited by a friend, Dr. Filart to join her in a party in celebration of the birthday of the
hotel’s manager. During the party and when respondent was lined-up at the buffet table, he was
stopped by Ruby Lim, the Executive Secretary of the hotel, and asked to leave the party. Shocked and
embarrassed, he tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart, who was herself a guest. Not long
after, a Makati policeman approached him and escorted him out of her party.
Ms. Lim admitted having asked respondent to leave the party but not under the ignominious
circumstances painted by Mr. Reyes, that she did the act politely and discreetly. Mindful of the wish of
the celebrant to keep the party intimate and exclusive, she spoke to the respondent herself when she
saw him by the buffet table with no other guests in the immediate vicinity. She asked him to leave the
party after he finished eating. After she had turned to leave, the latter screamed and made a big scene.
Dr. Filart testified that she did not want the celebrant to think that she invited Mr. Reyes to the
party.
Respondent filed an action for actual, moral and/or exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. The
lower court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial
court, consequently imposing upon Hotel Nikko moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. On
motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its decision. Thus, this instant petition for
review.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Ms. Ruby Lim is liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code in asking Mr.
Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited by the celebrant thereof and whether or not Hotel Nikko,
as the employer of Ms. Lim, be solidarily liable with her.
RULING:
The Court found more credible the lower court’s findings of facts. There was no proof of motive
on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and to expose him to ridicule and shame. Mr. Reyes’
version of the story was unsupported, failing to present any witness to back his story. Ms. Lim, not
having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be made
liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer,
Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employees.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be responsible. Article 21 states that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim’s act cannot amount to abusive conduct.

The maxim “Volenti Non Fit Injuria” (self-inflicted injury) was upheld by the Court, that is, to which a
person assents is not esteemed in law as injury, that consent to injury precludes the recovery of
damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger.

Sapiera vs. CA

Page 8 of 82
 The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it
includes a declaration that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil
liability is not extinguished by acquittal where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (b) where
the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature; and,
(c) where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is
acquitted.
Facts:
On several occasions, petitioner Sapiera, a sari-sari store owner, purchased from Monrico Mart
certain grocery items and paid for them with checks issued by one Arturo de Guzman. These checks
were signed at the back by Sapiera. When presented for payment the checks were dishonored because
the drawers account was already closed. Private respondent Ramon Sua informed de Guzman and
petitioner about the dishonor but both failed to pay the value of the checks. Consequently, four charges
of estafa were filed against petitioner with the RTC of Dagupan City. After trial, the court a quo acquitted
petitioner of all the charges of estafa but did not rule on whether she could be held civilly liable for the
checks she indorsed to private respondent. In a petition for mandamus filed by private respondent, the
Court of Appeals rendered a decision holding petitioner liable for the value of the checks.
Issue:
Whether or not Sapiera could be held civilly liable when she was acquitted in the criminal
charges against her
Held:
Yes. Section 2, par. (b), of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, as amended, specifically provides:
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. The
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a
declaration that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is
not extinguished by acquittal where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (b) where the court
expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature; and, (c) where
the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is acquitted.
The dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner did not erase her civil liability since the
dismissal was due to insufficiency of evidence and not from a declaration from the court that the fact
from which the civil action might arise did not exist. An accused acquitted of estafa may nevertheless be
held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant. The accused should be
adjudged liable for the unpaid value of the checks signed by her in favor of the complainant.
The rationale behind the award of civil indemnity despite a judgment of acquittal when evidence
is sufficient to sustain the award was explained by the Code Commission in connection with Art. 29 of
the Civil Code, to wit:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil
liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless
instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the
court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is
derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.This
is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such
reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and
to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each
other. One affects the social order and the other private rights. One is for punishment or correction of
the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party x x x x It is just
and proper that for the purposes of imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why
should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every
private right to be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any
less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law? (Sapiera vs. CA, G.R. No.
128927. September 14, 1999)

Bobis v. Bobis

Page 9 of 82
G.R. No. 138509, 31 July 2000
FACTS:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier.
Without the said marriage been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a
second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third
marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioner’s complaint- affidavit, information for
bigamy was filed against respondent. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without
a marriage license.
ISSUE:
Whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy
RULING:
No. The subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage does
not constitute a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent
of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. Its two essential
elements are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
In Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage, cannot be said to have validly entered into the second
marriage. In the current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such
fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The reason is
that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the
case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he
contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not
erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage.
Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is,
therefore, not a prejudicial question.

PDIC vs CITIBANK
Facts:
Petitioner Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) is a government instrumentality
Respondent Citibank, N.A. (Citibank) is a banking corporation while respondent Bank of America,
S.T. & N.A. (BA) is a national banking association, both of which are duly organized and existing under
the laws of the United States of America and duly licensed to... do business in the Philippines, with
offices in Makati City... conducted an examination of the books of account of Citibank. It discovered that
Citibank, in the course of its banking business, from September 30, 1974 to June 30, 1977, received from
its head office and other foreign branches a total of P11,923,163,908.00 in... dollars, covered by
Certificates of Dollar Time Deposit
PDIC assessed Citibank for deficiency in the sum of P1,595,081.96
PDIC examined the books of accounts of BA which revealed that from September 30, 1976 to
June 30, 1978, BA received from its head office and its other foreign branches a total of P629,311,869.10
in dollars, covered by Certificates of Dollar Time
Deposit that were interest-bearing with corresponding maturity dates and lodged in their books
under the account "Due to Head Office/Branches."[7] Because BA also excluded these from its deposit
liabilities, PDIC wrote to BA on October 9, 1979,... seeking the remittance of P109,264.83 representing
deficiency premium assessments for dollar deposits.
Citibank and BA each filed a petition for declaratory relief before the Court of First Instance
(now the Regional Trial Court) of Rizal on July 19, 1979 and December 11, 1979, respectively.[9] In their
petitions, Citibank and BA sought a declaratory judgment stating that the money placements they

Page 10 of 82
received from their head office and other foreign branches were not deposits and did not give rise to
insurable deposit liabilities under Sections 3 and 4 of R.A. No. 3591 (the PDIC Charter)
Regional Trial Court, Branch 163, Pasig City (RTC) promulgated its Decision[12] in favor of
Citibank and BA, ruling that the subject money placements were not deposits and did not give rise to
insurable deposit liabilities, and... that the deficiency assessments issued by PDIC were improper and
erroneous.
Section 3(f) of the PDIC Charter... likewise excludes from the definition of the term "deposit" any
obligation of a bank payable at the office of the bank located outside the Philippines. The RTC further
stated that there was no depositor-depository relationship between the respondents and their head
office or... other branches. As a result, such deposits were not included as third-party deposits that
must be insured.
PDIC appealed to the CA which affirmed the ruling of the RTC in its October 27, 2005 Decision. In
so ruling, the CA found that the money placements were received as part of the bank's internal dealings
by Citibank and BA as agents of their respective head... offices. This showed that the head office and the
Philippine branch were considered as the same entity. Thus, no bank deposit could have arisen from the
transactions between the Philippine branch and the head office because there did not exist two
separate... contracting parties to act as depositor and depositary.
Because there was no law or jurisprudence on the treatment of inter-branch deposits between
the Philippine branch of a foreign bank and its head office and other branches for purposes of insurance,
the CA was... guided by the procedure observed by the FDIC which considered inter-branch deposits as
non-assessable.
Issues:
PDIC raises the issue of whether or not the subject dollar deposits are assessable for insurance
purposes under the PDIC Charter with the following assigned errors:... whether the funds placed in the
Philippine branch by the head office and foreign branches of Citibank and BA are insurable deposits
under the PDIC Charter and, as such, are subject to assessment for insurance premiums.
The Court's Ruling
Ruling:
A branch has no separate legal personality;
Purpose of the PDIC
PDIC argues that the head offices of Citibank and BA and their individual foreign branches are
separate and independent entities. It insists that under American jurisprudence, a bank's head office
and its branches have a principal-agent relationship only if they operate in... the same jurisdiction. In
the case of foreign branches, however, no such relationship exists because the head office and said
foreign branches are deemed to be two distinct entities.[20] Under Philippine law, specifically, Section
3(b) of R.A. No. 3591, which defines the terms "bank" and "banking institutions," PDIC contends that the
law treats a branch of a foreign bank as a separate and independent banking unit... examining the
manner by which a foreign corporation can establish its presence in the Philippines. It may choose to
incorporate its own subsidiary as a domestic corporation, in which case such subsidiary would have its
own separate and independent legal... personality to conduct business in the country. I... t is apparent
that they both did not incorporate a separate domestic corporation to represent its business interests in
the Philippines. Their Philippine branches are, as the name implies, merely branches, without a separate
legal... personality from their parent company, Citibank and BA. Thus, being one and the same entity,
the funds placed by the respondents in their respective branches in the Philippines should not be
treated as deposits made by third parties subject to deposit insurance under the PDIC Charter.
Principles:
Sokoloff v. The National City Bank of New York,[25] where the Supreme Court of New York held:
Where a bank maintains branches, each branch becomes a separate business entity with
separate books of account. A depositor in one branch cannot issue checks or drafts upon another
branch or demand payment from such other branch, and in many other... respects the branches are
considered separate corporate entities and as distinct from one another as any other bank.
Nevertheless, when considered with relation to the parent bank they are not independent agencies;
they are, what their name imports, merely branches, and... are subject to the supervision and control of
the parent bank, and are instrumentalities whereby the parent bank carries on its business, and are

Page 11 of 82
established for its own particular purposes, and their business conduct and policies are controlled by the
parent bank and their... property and assets belong to the parent bank, although nominally held in the
names of the particular branches. Ultimate liability for a debt of a branch would rest upon the parent
bank. [Emphases supplied]
Section 3(f) of the PDIC Charter:
Sec. 3(f) The term "deposit" means the unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received by a
bank in the usual course of business and for which it has given or is obliged to give credit to a
commercial, checking, savings, time or thrift account or which is... evidenced by its certificate of deposit,
and trust funds held by such bank whether retained or deposited in any department of said bank or
deposit in another bank, together with such other obligations of a bank as the Board of Directors shall
find and shall prescribe by... regulations to be deposit liabilities of the Bank; Provided, that any
obligation of a bank which is payable at the office of the bank located outside of the Philippines shall not
be a deposit for any of the purposes of this Act or included as part of the total deposits or of... the
insured deposits; Provided further, that any insured bank which is incorporated under the laws of the
Philippines may elect to include for insurance its deposit obligation payable only at such branch.
[Emphasis supplied]

Valdez v. Republic
G.R. No. 180863, 8 September 2009
FACTS:
Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl named
Nancy. They argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In
March 1972, the latter left their house. Angelita and her child waited until in May 1972, they decided to
go back to her parent’s home. 3 years have passed without any word from Sofio until in October 1975
when he showed up and they agreed to separate and executed a document to that effect. It was the last
time they saw each other and had never heard of ever since. Believing that Sofio was already dead,
petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. Virgilio’s application for naturalization in US was denied
because petitioner’s marriage with Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in March 2007, petitioner filed a petition
seeking declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of presumptive
death of Sofio.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
Pursuant to Article 83 of the Civil Code, any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall
be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, of if the absentee,
though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be
so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is
presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of
the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
Therefore, under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law and no court
declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have taken place by the
seventh year of absence, Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982. Consequently, at the time
of petitioner’s marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to petitioner’s capacity to marry, and
the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.

Silverio v. Republic
G.R. No. 174689, 22 October 2007
FACTS:

Page 12 of 82
 Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a male transsexual, that is,
“anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a “female” and that he had always identified himself
with girls since childhood. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment, breast
augmentation and sex reassignment surgery. From then on, petitioner lived as female and was in fact
engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from Rommel
Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioner. Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.
CA rendered a decision in favor of the Republic.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in his birth certificate.
RULING:
Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority which was amended by RA 9048 – Clerical Error Law which does not sanction a change
of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Before a person can legally change his given name, he
must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition,
he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to
show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order. The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein,
including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. Hence, no correction is
necessary. Article 413 of the Civil Code provides that all other matters pertaining to the registration of
civil status shall be governed by special laws.
However, there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its
effects. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed
at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant
(the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law
legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her
birth, if not attended by error is immutable.
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil
registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the
entries in his birth certificate. The remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be
addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts. Hence, petition is denied.

G.R. No. 183896

Abbas vs. Abbas
Facts:
1.) In January 1993, Syed Azhar Abbas was invited to the house of Felicitas Goo, mother of Gloria
Goo. He said he was asked to participate in a ceremony which was meant to welcome him to the
Philippines (Abbas is a Pakistani). He said he did not know that the ceremony was actually his marriage
with Gloria Goo.
2.) Later, Gloria filed a bigamy case against Abbas. Abbas allegedly married a certain Maria
Corazon Buenaventura.
3.) To avoid the bigamy case, Abbas filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
to Gloria Goo.
4.) To prove the validity of their marriage, Gloria presented a marriage contract signed by Abbas
as well as the solemnizing officer who celebrated their marriage. The marriage contract contained the
alleged marriage license issued to Abbas.
5.) Abbas presented a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar which states that the
marriage license, based on its number, indicated in the marriage contract was never issued to Abbas but
to someone else.
6.) The RTC ruled in favor of Abbas. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC on the
ground that there was no diligence to search for the real source of the marriage license issued to Abbas
(for it could be that the marriage license was issued in another municipality).

Page 13 of 82
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Abbas and Goo is void ab initio.
Held:
Yes. Their marriage lacked one of the essential requisites of marriage which is the issuance of a
valid marriage license.
The Court of Appeals is wrong in reversing the RTC. The Local Civil registrar’s certification
enjoyed probative value as her duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license. There is a presumption of regularity of official acts in favor of the local civil registrar.
Gloria was not able to overcome this presumption hence it stands to favor Abbas.
The fact that Abbas did sign the marriage contract does not make it conclusive that there was in
fact a valid marriage license issued to him nor does it cure the fact that no marriage license was issued
to Abbas. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, “The absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio.” Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides
that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning.
ZENAIDA S. BESO, complainant,
vs.
Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, MCTC, Sta. Margarita-Tarangan–Pagsanjan, Samar, respondent.
A.M. No. 99-1211 January 28, 2000
(Formerly OCA-IPI No. 98-471-MTJ)
Facts:
Petitioner Zenaida Beso and Bernardito Yman got married on August 28, 1997. After the
marriage was solemnized, the man just abandoned his wife without any reason. Because of this, the
woman had to go to the registrar to secure their marriage contract but to her surprised, no marriage
contract that had been Related imageregistered in the office of the registrar. The registrar gave advice
to Zenaida Beso to write the judge who solemnized their marriage but likewise to her surprised, Judge
Daguman who solemnized their marriage told her that her husband got all the copies of their marriage
certificate and none was even left to him or was retained to the judge.
This is the reason why Zenaida learned that the judge solemnized their marriage out of his
jurisdiction and was negligent in not retaining a copy and likewise in not registering their marriage to the
civil registrar as prescribed by law.
In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands charged with Neglect of Duty and
Abuse of Authority. In a Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge
Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not
retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Registrar with the
following facts:
(a) On August 28, 1997, the complainant and complainant’s fiancée, Bernardito A. Yman, got
married under the solemnization of the respondent in the respondent’s residence in Calbayog City,
Samar;
(b) That after the wedding, Yman abandoned the complainant;
(c) That when Yman left, the complainant inquired to the City Civil Registrar to inquire regarding
her Marriage Contract. The complainant found out that her marriage was not registered;
(d) The complainant wrote to the respondent to inquire and the former found out that all the
copies were taken by Yman and no copy was retained by the respondent.
The respondent averred with the following rationale:
(a) Respondent solemnized the marriage because of the urgent request of the complainant and
Yman. He also believed that being a Filipino overseas worker, the complainant deserved more than
ordinary official attention under present Government policy;
(b) Respondent was also leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may be not too
expensive and complicated for citizens to get married;
(c) Respondent’s failure to file the marriage contract was beyond his control because Yman
absconded with the missing copies of the marriage certificate.
(d) Respondent, however, tried to recover custody of the missing documents.

Page 14 of 82
 The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated, August 11, 1998
found the respondent Judge “…committed non-feasance in office” and recommended that he be fined
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000).
Issues:
Whether or not the respondent solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction; and,
Whether or not the respondent committed negligence by not retaining a copy and not registering the
complainant’s marriage before the office of the Local Civil Registrar.
Held:
Yes. The judge solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction.
Article 7 of the Family Code provides that marriage may be solemnized by, “Any incumbent
member of the judiciary with the court’s jurisdiction”. In relation thereto, according to Article 8 of the
Family Code, there are only three instances with which a judge may solemnize a marriage outside of his
jurisdiction:
1.1. when either or both the contracting parties is at the point of death;
1.2. when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;
1.3. where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that
effect.
In this case, none of the three instances is present.
2. Yes. The judge committed negligence.
Pursuant to Article 23 of the Family code, such duty to register the marriage is the respondent’s
duty. The same article provides, “It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage… to send
the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen (15) days after the marriage, to
the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued
by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The
solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the original
of the marriage license, and in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the
solemnization of the marriage in a place other than those mentioned in Article 8”.
The recommendation of the OCA stands.

Navarro v. Domagtoy
A.M. No. MTJ-96- 1088, 19 July 1996
FACTS:
Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on two
specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy on the
grounds of gross misconduct, ineffiency in office and ignorance of the law.
It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on
September 27, 1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has a subsisting marriage with Ida
Penaranda and that they are merely separated. It was told that Ida left their conjugal home in Bukidnon
and has not returned and been heard for almost seven years. The said judge likewise solemnizes
marriage of Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction on
October 27, 1994. The judge holds his office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the
municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50 km away.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void.
RULING:
In the first allegation, Remarriage of Gaspar Tagadan is void.
The law provides that: “A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.”; “For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the

Page 15 of 82
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code
for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse”
Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Penaranda. Whether wittingly, or
unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit
submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore
void, marriage.
The second marriage is also void.
The law provides that marriage may be solemnized by an incumbent member of the judiciary
within the court’s jurisdiction. Additionally Art. 8 of the Family Code provides that: “Marriages shall be
solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in
the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in
cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of
this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage
may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.”
In as much as respondent judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos, he was also not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By
citing the aforementioned laws and its exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced
authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil
law.
Because of the respondent’s failure to apply the legal principles applicable in these cases, the
Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law because of this he is suspended for a
period of six months.

PEOPLE VS. SANTIAGO

No. 27972
October 31, 1927
FACTS:
On November 23, 1926, herein appellant Felipe Santiago raped Felicita Masilang, his wife’s
niece, in an uninhabited place across a river in Gapan, Nueva Ecija. After the deed, he took her to the
house of his brother, Agaton Satiago, who in turn fetched a protestant minister who there and then
officiated the ceremony of their marriage. After having given money by Felipe, Felicita proceeded home
to her father and told what had just occurred.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage executed by the protestant minister is of legal effect.
HELD:
The marriage ceremony was a mere ruse by which the appellant hoped to escape from the
criminal consequence of his act. It shows that he had no bona fide intention of making her his wife and
the ceremony cannot be considered binding on her because of duress. The marriage was therefore void
for lack of essential consent, and it supplies no impediment to the prosecution of the wrongdoer.

Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas

G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization and was married to the respondent but was shocked of the infidelity on the part of his
wife. He went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was granted.
Desirous to marry another woman he now loved, the petitioner went to the Pasig Civil Registry
Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and the respondent’s marriage certificate.
Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistic’s Office informed the
petitioner that the marriage between him and the respondent still subsists under the Philippine Law and
to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, Series of 1982.

Page 16 of 82
 Accordingly, the petitioner subsequently filed at the Regional Trial Court a judicial recognition of
foreign divorce but was subsequently denied since he is not the proper party and according to Article 26
of the Civil Code, only a Filipino spouse can avail the remedy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right
to petition for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
RULING:
No, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code;
the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating
him or her to remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial
recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that
purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse
since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil
Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated
in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the
direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between
the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Noveras vs. Noveras
GR No. 188289, Aug. 20, 2014
Facts:
In Dec. 1988, David and Leticia got married. They lived in California and eventually granted
with American citizenship. Out of this marriage, they produce two children and also several properties
both in USA and Philippines.
In 2001, David returned to the Philippines to supervise their business. But after a year, Leticia
learned that David had an extra-marital affair with other woman. She then filed a petition for divorce in
California and in 2005 the court granted the decree of nullification of their marriage. Also, the California
court granted to Leticia the custody of her two minor children, as well as all the couple’s property in
USA.
In Aug. 2005, Leticia filed for Judicial Separation of Conjugal property in Baler, Aurora. In his
answer, David filed for a petition to grant him all of their properties in the Philippines considering that
Leticia got all of their properties in USA.
Issue:
Whether or not David is right in claiming all of their properties in the Philippines?
Ruling:
The court held NO. David was wrong in claiming all of their properties in the Philippines.
Article 91 of this Code, provides that property owned before and during marriage are under ACP
of Absolute Community Property.
In this case their marriage contracted in Dec. 1988, therefore ACP governs. But, considering that they
are both American citizen, the California court decision with regards to their property in USA governs.
The property in the Philippines will be equally divided between them.

David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia
obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court
awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With respect to their properties in the Philippines,
Leticia filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal properties. The Court ruled that even if the
Court applies the doctrine of processual presumption as the lower courts did with respect to the
property regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because, to begin
with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of
the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court
thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation. DAVID A. NOVERAS vs. LETICIA T. NOVERAS, G.R. No.
188289, August 20, 2014, J. Perez

Page 17 of 82
VDA. DE CATALAN V. CATALAN-LEE
G. R. No. 183622, [February 08, 2012]
DOCTRINE:
Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which maybe recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid ac-cording to their national law.
FACTS:
Orlando B. Catalan, a naturalized American citizen,allegedly obtained a divorce in the United
States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor. He then contracted a second marriage with petitioner.
When Orlando died intestate in the Philippines, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for the
issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate. While
the case was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first
marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC. The two cases were consolidated.

Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition filed by the respondent on the ground of litis
pendentia. Respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified to file
the petition. Respondent further alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner by
Felicitas Amor contending that petitioner contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite having been
married to one Eusebio Bristol.
However, the RTC acquitted petitioner of bigamy and ruled that since the deceased was a
divorced American citizen, and that divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the
marriage between him and petitioner was not valid. The RTC took note of the action for declaration of
nullity then pending filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the
pending action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petition-er for the crime of
bigamy. The RTC also found that petitioner had never been married to Bristol.
The RTC subsequently dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by
petitioner and granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the
RTC held that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she
married Orlando. The RTC held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file said petition.
The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the acquittal of petitioner in the crim. case for bigamy meant that the marriage with Bristol
was still valid.
2. Whether the divorce obtained abroad by Orlando may be recognized under Philippine jurisdiction.
HELD:
It is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the
rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando. Petition is partially
granted. Case is remanded to RTC.
1. No. The RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC in Crim.
Case that petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. It concluded that, because petitioner was
acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid.
2. Yes. Under the principles of comity, Philippine jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained
by a spouse of foreign nationality. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. Nonetheless, the fact of divorce
must still first be proven by the divorce decree itself. The best evidence of a judgment is the judgment
itself. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must
be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office.
Moreover, the burden of proof lies with the “party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving
the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have
the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. It is

Page 18 of 82
well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other
facts, they must be alleged and proved.
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s
divorce under the laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased.
Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence to
establish the fact of divorce.

DEL SOCORRO VS. WILSEM

G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
FACTS:
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed
with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a
Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son came home
to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide monthly support to their son.
However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to
Roderigo. Respondent remarried again a Filipina and resides again the Philippines particulary in Cebu
where the petitioner also resides. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for
the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the
complaint since the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the
accused, he being an alien
ISSUES:
1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the Philippine
law?
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.
RULING:
1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree
with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is
obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This does not,
however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son altogether. In international law, the
party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign
law. In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed
by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the
Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the
same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not
impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in
our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application
would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most
important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the
fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands
neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith,
such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the
child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
2. YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the foreigner is living here
in the Philippines and committed the offense here.
Under the doctrine of processual presumption, if the foreign law involved is not properly
pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or
internal law. Hence, pleading a foreign law without proving the same will bar its application in the
Philippines. NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO for and in behalf of her Minor Child RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM vs. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014, J. Peralta

MINORU FUJIKI VS. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY

G.R. No. 196049

Page 19 of 82
June 26, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s
parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact
with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara
brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left
Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010,
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition
in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage).”
RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment ·(or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to
file the petition.
Fujiki filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied upon consideration that Fujiki as a
"third person” in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the
Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized.
The OSG agreed with the petitioner that the RTC’s decision be set aside.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the
ground of bigamy.
3. Whether the RTC can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
RULING:
1. No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating
to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
2. YES. The prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. Fujiki has the personality to file a
petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay.
3. YES. The Philippine court can recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. Philippine courts already
have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the
foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. However, the Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a
criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and
duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign
judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a
citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino
party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

LEONILA G. SANTIAGO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Page 20 of 82
 G.R. No. 200233 JULY 15, 2015
Facts:
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, 3 Leonila G. Santiago and
Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information 4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her putative
husband escaped the criminal suit. 5 The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been
married to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974,
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence
of his marriage to Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang that she had already
introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the
affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not known of the first marriage. It also held that it was
incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be easily duped by a person like Santos. 8
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, "her marriage was celebrated
without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an
admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of their marriage." Thus, the trial
court convicted petitioner.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab
initio for having been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides
an exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the parties have actually lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to the celebration of their marriage. In her case, petitioner
asserted that she and Santos had not lived together as husband and wife for five years prior to their
marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage license effectively rendered their marriage
null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy. The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held
thus: Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as it was
celebrated without a valid marriage license x x x.
ISSUES:
Petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case, because she was not
aware of Santos's previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for there to be a conviction for
bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Held:
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties
depending on the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware
of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage
of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's knowledge of Santos's marriage to
Galang. Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of
the following circumstances: 19 (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her
in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person like
petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness
compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she
had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Santos.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took
place without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their
Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family
Code.
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February 1996
and that after six months of courtship,33 she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any objection from
the prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija,
prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with her, as she was residing in the house of her
in-laws,34 and her children from her previous marriage disliked him.
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for
only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least five
years prior to their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although
the records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the

Page 21 of 82
Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented
that they had actually cohabited for at least five years before they married each other. Unfortunately,
subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage, in which the solemnizing officer
stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the marriage was solemnized under
Article 34 of the Family Code.
The legal effects in a criminal case of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the marriage
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation
perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face an
anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of
(1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the
cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her marriage
contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in
an effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an
individual's deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond
between spouses.
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a marriage
and, in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery
of the sanctity of marriage.
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of
bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage license.
But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by misrepresenting
that they were exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated claim that they had
already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years prior their marriage. In violation of our law
against illegal marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while knowing full well that they had not yet
complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code.
Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to
escape criminal conviction.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is
DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice.

EN BANC
[ AM No. MTJ-07-1691, Apr 02, 2013 ]
OCA v. JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO +
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691 [Formerly A.M. No. 07-7-04-SC]
PER CURIAM:
This Court has long held that "[the] administration of justice is circumscribed with a heavy burden of
responsibility. It requires that everyone involved in its dispensation from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk live up to the strictest standards of competence, honesty, and integrity in the public
service."[1]
THE CASE
This is an administrative case that stemmed from the 6 July 2007 Memorandum of the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA).[2] The judicial audit team created by the OCA reported alleged
irregularities in the solemnization of marriages in several branches of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) and Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City.[3] Certain package fees were offered to interested
parties by "fixers" or "facilitators" for instant marriages.[4]
THE FACTS
On 3 July 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial Supervisor, proceeded to Cebu City and
headed the audit team created by OCA in investigating Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the MTCC in Cebu City.
[5] A female and male lawyer of the audit team went undercover as a couple looking to get married.
They went to the Palace of Justice and were directed by the guard on duty to go to Branch 4 and look for
a certain "Meloy". The male lawyer feared that he would be recognized by other court personnel,

Page 22 of 82
specifically the Clerk of Court of Branch 4 who was a former law school classmate. The two lawyers then
agreed that only the female lawyer would go inside and inquire about the marriage application process.
Inside Branch 4, a woman named Helen approached and assisted the female lawyer. When the female
lawyer asked if the marriage process could be rushed, Helen assured the lawyer that the marriage could
be solemnized the next day, but the marriage certificate would only be dated the day the marriage
license becomes available. Helen also guaranteed the regularity of the process for a fee of three
thousand pesos (P3,000) only.[
THE ISSUE
The issue now before this Court is whether the judges and personnel of the MTCC and RTC in
Cebu City are guilty of gross ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty or gross inefficiency and gross
misconduct, and in turn, warrant the most severe penalty of dismissal from service.
THE COURT'S RULING
The findings in the 2010 Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator are supported
by the evidence on record and applicable law and jurisprudence.
The OCA described accurately the Palace of Justice in Cebu City as a hub of swift marriages. The
respondent judges and court personnel disregarded laws and procedure to the prejudice of the parties
and the proper administration of justice.
The OCA found that Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil R. Acosta, Rosabella M. Tormis, and
Edgemelo C. Rosales are all guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty when they solemnized
marriages without following the proper procedure laid down by law, particularly the Family Code of the
Philippines and existing jurisprudence. The OCA listed down aspects of the solemnization process which
were disregarded by the judges.
Liability of Judge Anatalio S. Necessario
The OCA reported that Judge Necessario solemnized a total of one thousand one hundred
twenty-three (1,123) marriages from 2005 to 2007.[67] However, only one hundred eighty-four (184)
marriage certificates were actually examined by the judicial audit team.[68] Out of the 184 marriages,
only seventy-nine (79) were solemnized with a marriage license while one hundred five (105) were
solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code. Out of the 79 marriages with license, forty-seven (47) of
these licenses were issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu. This translates to 42.93% of the
marriages he solemnized with marriage license coming from Liloan for over a period of years.[69] There
were also twenty-two (22) marriages solemnized by the judge with incomplete documents such missing
as marriage license, certificate of legal capacity to marry, and the joint affidavit of cohabitation.[70]
Judge Necessario solemnized nine (9) marriages that had questionable supporting documents
such as marriage licenses.[71] The OCA found that the place of residence of the contracting parties
appearing in the supporting documents differ from the place where they obtained their marriage
license.[72] The documents invited suspicion because of erasures and superimpositions in the entries of
residence.[73] Likewise, in lieu of the required certificate of legal capacity to marry, a mere affidavit was
submitted by the parties.[74] Variations in the signatures of the contracting parties were also apparent
in the documents.[75]
The respondent judge solemnized forty-three (43) marriages under Article 34 of the Family
Code. These marriages appeared dubious since the joint affidavit of cohabitation of the parties show
minority of one or both of them during cohabitation.[76] For example, he solemnized on 14 May 2004
the marriage of 22-year-old Harol D. Amorin and 19-year-old Dinalyn S. Paraiso who are residents of
Lapu-Lapu City.[77]
There are also sixteen (16) marriage licenses with attached official receipts of the solemnization
fee but the corresponding marriage certificates cannot be found.[78] The presence of the receipts
implies that these marriages were solemnized.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents:
Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Cebu
City, GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he be
DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any,
and that he be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or -controlled corporation;

Page 23 of 82
 Judge Gil R. Acosta, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Cebu City, GUILTY
of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he be DISMISSED
FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that he be
disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -
controlled corporation;
Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City,
GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that she would have
been DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if
any, and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-
owned or -controlled corporation, had she not been previously dismissed from service in A.M. No. MTJ-
12-1817 (Formerly A.M. No. 09-2-30-MTCC);
Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 8, Cebu City,
GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he be
DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any,
and that he be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or -controlled corporation;
Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City, GUILTY of
violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and that she be DISMISSED
FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that she
be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
-controlled corporation;
Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court,
Cebu City, GUILTY of gross misconduct for Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
and for inducing Maricel Albater to falsify the application for marriage and that she be DISMISSED FROM
THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that she be
disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -
controlled corporation;
Desiderio S. Aranas, Process Server, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Cebu City, GUILTY
of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and that he be SUSPENDED without pay for a
period of six (6) months with a warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;
Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Cebu City, GUILTY of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and of violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code
of Conduct for Court Personnel and that she be SUSPENDED without pay for a period of six (6) months
with a warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;
Celeste Retuya, Clerk III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Cebu City, and Emma Valencia,
Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and of violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
and that they be ADMONISHED with a warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;
The complaints against Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 9, Cebu City; Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6,
Cebu City; and Marilou Cabañez, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, are DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
The case against Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, including the sworn statements of Celerina Plaza
and Crisanto dela Cerna, should be REFERRED to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the purpose of
initiating disbarment proceedings against the judge.

Capili vs. People

G.R. No. 183805, July 03, 2013
Bigamy
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the RTC. Petitioner thereafter filed a
Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of
the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that
the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the

Page 24 of 82
pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial
question in the instant criminal case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.
RULING:
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.9
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the
Information was filed on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was
contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and
Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself
declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus,
the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar
the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime
of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the
first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.

MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES v. LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO.

G.R. No. 181089;
October 22, 2012.
DOCTRINE: The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the fact
that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Cipriano married Socrates on 1976 in Aklan. On 1983, respondent married Silverio
Cipriano during the subsistence of the first marriage.
2. Respondent then filed a Petition for Annulment of her first marriage with Socrates on the grounds of
psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code. Such marriage was then declared null and
void. 3.Petitioner, Silverio’s daughter from a previous marriage, filed a case for
Bigamy against Respondent. This was with an affidavit stating that respondent failed to reveal to Silverio
that she was still married to Socrates.
4. Respondent then alleged that her marriage with Socrates had already been declared void and thus
there was no more marriage to speak of.
5. The prosecution argued that bigamy was already consummated upon filing the declaration for nullity.
6. RTC denied respondent’s motion, saying that petitioner had already committed bigamy and that such
action has not yet prescribed.
7. Respondent filed an MR, claiming that the RTC’s legal basis (jurisprudence) was not applicable since
the first marriage was contracted before the Family Code and that the annulment was granted before
the complaint for bigamy was filed.
8. RTC ruled that at the time accused had contracted the 2 nd marriage before the effectivity of the
Family Code, the existing law did not require a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition
precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage.
9. It also found that both marriages of respondent were done before the Family Code, thus laws should
be interpreted liberally for the accused.
Therefore, the absence of a judicial declaration should not prejudice the accused whose second
marriage was considered valid.
ISSUES:
1. WON the declaration of nullity of respondent’s first marriage justifies the dismissal of the Information
for bigamy filed against respondent.

Page 25 of 82
 2. WON the RTC erred in stating that the jurisprudence prior to the Family Code and in Wiegel regarding
the necessity of a declaration of nullity is ambivalent such that a person was allowed to enter a
subsequent marriage without annulment of the first, without incurring criminal liability.
RULING:
1. No. respondent is liable for bigamy
The elements of bigamy are that: a) offender has been legally married b)the marriage has not
been legally dissolved or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead c) he contracts a subsequent marriage, and d) the subsequent marriage has all the
requisites for validity. It is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage.
What is essential for the prosecution of bigamy is that the alleged second marriage, having all
the requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. In this case, when
respondent contracted the 2nd marriage with Silverio, her 1st marriage was still subsisting and had not
been declared annulled or void. Thus all elements of bigamy were alleged in the Information. Based on
the Information, the annulment of the 1 st marriage was only declared in 2003. In several cases, it was
held that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the 1 st marriage was immaterial because prior
to the declaration, the bigamy had already been consummated. Even if the accused eventually obtained
a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, the first and second marriage were
subsisting. The moment the accused contracted a 2 nd marriage without the previous one being judicially
declared null and void, bigamy was already consummated. Here, at the time of the 2 nd marriage, the first
was still subsisting. Thus bigamy was properly charge to her.
Respondent claims that the legal basis is not applicable since the declaration of nullity came
before the filing of information. But what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he
contracts a 2nd marriage during the subsistence of the first.
2. No.
In this case, respondent wants to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage and
invoke it to prevent prosecution for bigamy. Such is not possible. A party may enter into a marriage
license and there after contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the
first on the assumption that the first marriage is void.
Amelia Garcia-Quiazon, et.al. v. Ma. Lourdes Belen
G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013
Perez, J.
FACTS
Petitioner Elise Quiazon is the daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and Ma. Lourdes Belen, who are
common-law partners. When Eliseo died instestate, Elise through her mother filed a Petition for Letters
of Administration before the RTC, claiming that she is a natural child of Eliseo having conceived at the
time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Filiation was proven by her Birth
Certificate signed by Eliseo. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes, Elise impugned the
validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia Garcia-Quiazon by claiming it was bigamous.
Respondent Amelia opposed the issuance of the letters of administration asserting that the
venue of the petition was improperly laid. However, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of Elise. On
appeal, the decision was affirmed. Hence, the petition was filed before the SC raising the argument that
Elise has not shown any interest in the petition for letters of administration and that the CA erred in
declaring that Eliseo and Amelia were no legally married because Elise has no cause of action on it.
ISSUE
Whether or not Elise has a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage despite the
death of his father, hence cannot be deemed as an interested party.
RULING
Yes, Elise has a cause of action. The Court ruled that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken
place and it cannot be the source of right, such that any interested party may attach the marriage
directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties
to the marriage. Having successional rights that would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia,
Elise may without a doubt impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The
said marriage may be questioned by filing an action attaching its validity, or collaterally by raising it as an

Page 26 of 82
issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse. As a compulsory heir,
Elise has a cause of action for the declaration of nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia.
Likewise, Elise who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate is deemed to be
an interested part. An interested part is one who would be benefited in the estate. Having a vested right
in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party.
Petition is denied for lack of merit.

Amelia Garcia-Quiazon, Jenneth Quiazon and Maria Jennifer Quiazon v. Ma. Lourdes Belen, for and in
behalf of Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon
G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013
Perez, J.
FACTS:
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992. On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon
(Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.
In her Petition, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born
at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity
of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming
that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one
Filipito Sandico (Filipito).
To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of
Administration her Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was
alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth
₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise
sought her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.
ISSUE:
Did the Court err in declaring the marriage of Amelia to Eliseo void?
HELD:
No. The existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently
established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the
officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate
is a competent evidence of marriage and the certification from the National Archive that no information
relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries therein.
In a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of rights, such that
any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be
filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. Relevant to the foregoing, there is no
doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may
impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be
questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an
issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar.
Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir, has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity
of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not
extinguish such cause of action.

AURELIO V. AURELIO
G.R. No. 175367, [June 06, 2011]
DOCTRINE:
The following are the guidelines to aid the courts in the disposition of cases involving psychological
incapacity: (1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) The root
cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity
must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage; (4) Such incapacity must
also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; (5) Such illness must be grave
enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; (6) The

Page 27 of 82
essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision; (7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts; (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

FACTS:
Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March
23, 1988. They have two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.
On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94,
a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. In her petition, respondent alleged that both she and
petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying with their respective
essential marital obligations. In addition, respondent alleged that such state of psychological incapacity
was present prior and even during the time of the marriage ceremony. Hence, respondent prays that
her marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. It alleged among others that
said psychological incapacity was manifested by lack of financial support from the husband; his lack of
drive and incapacity to discern the plight of his working wife. The husband exhibited consistent jealousy
and distrust towards his wife. His moods alternated between hostile defiance and contrition. He refused
to assist in the maintenance of the family.
On the side of the wife on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly and freely.
Her feelings change very quickly – from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on her day-to-day
experiences. Her tolerance for boredom was very low. She was emotionally immature; she cannot stand
frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay to gratify her needs. She gets upset when she cannot
get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her spirits immensely. Their hostility towards each other
distorted their relationship. Their incapacity to accept and fulfill the essential obligations of marital life
led to the breakdown of their marriage.
On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition. Petitioner principally
argued that the petition failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards set by
the Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
RTC denied the petition. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage shall be declared null and void?
HELD:
Petition denied. Marriage is null and void.
RATIO:
First, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological
incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the manifestation of respondent that
the family backgrounds of both petitioner and respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root
causes of their psychological incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert psychologist clinically
identified the same as the root causes.
Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature
as to bring about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The psychologist
reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic Features.
Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality
Disorder. The incapacity of both parties to perform their marital obligations was alleged to be grave,
incorrigible and incurable.
Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with
were alleged in the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition, respondent’s
allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which states that “the husband and the wife are
obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.”

Page 28 of 82
PIMENTEL V. PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 172060,
[September 13, 2010]
DOCTRINE:
Annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is not a prejudicial question in a criminal
case for parricide.
FACTS:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap(private respondent) filed an action for frustrated
parricide against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the
RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since
the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the
civil case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
The RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals. However, The Court of Appeals ruled
that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be
immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting
the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed.
ISSUE:
Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.
HELD:
No.
RATIO:
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
In the case at bar, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for
frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide,
which punishes any person “who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.” However, the issue in the annulment of
marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the
relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is
whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The
issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed
respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage will have no effect on the
alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable
since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.

Page 29 of 82
 We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals that “the judicial
declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of
the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x.” First,
the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of
prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that “[t]here is a recognition
written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences.” In fact, the Court declared in that case that “a declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s
penal laws are concerned.”

Republic vs. Encelan,

G.R. No. 170022,
Jan. 9, 2013
Art. 36 of the Family Code, psychologically incapacity
FACTS:
In its June 5, 2002 decision, the RTC declared Cesar’s marriage to Lolita void, finding sufficient
basis to declare Lolita psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The
petitioner, through the OSG, appealed to the CA. The OSG argues that Dr. Flores’ psychological
evaluation report did not disclose that Lolita had been suffering from a psychological illness nor did it
establish its juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability; infidelity and abandonment do not constitute
psychological incapacity, but are merely grounds for legal separation
ISSUE:
How should “psychologically incapacity” under Art. 36 of the Family Code be interpreted?
How should the doubt be resolved in voiding of marriage cases?
RULING:
1) In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity
contemplates “downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations”; not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the
time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant spouse.
2) The Court stresses that marriage is an inviolable social institution protected by the State. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of its existence its existence and continuation and against its
dissolution and nullity. It cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties nor by transgressions made by
one party to the other during the marriage.

KALAW vs. FERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 166357
September 19, 2011
Psychological Incapacity Art. 36 Family Code
FACTS:
Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973,
maintained a relationship and eventually married in Hong Kong and subsequently had four children.
Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano who
gave birth to a son.
In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home and her four children with Tyrone. Meanwhile,
Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, who bore him three more children.
In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. He left his four
children from his marriage with Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a
driver.
The househelp would just call Malyn to take care of the children whenever any of them got sick.
Also, in accordance with their custody agreement, the children stayed with Malyn on weekends.
Tyrone brought the two elder children, Rio and Ria to the US. After just one year, Ria returned to
the Philippines and chose to live with Malyn.

Page 30 of 82
 Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyns family returned to the Philippines and resumed physical
custody of the two younger children, Miggy and Jay. According to Malyn, from that time on, the children
refused to go to her house on weekends because of alleged weekend plans with their father.
Nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that Malyn was psychologically
incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration
of their marriage. He further claimed that her psychological incapacity was manifested by her
immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their co-habitation
Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert,
Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyns psychological incapacity.
Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyns behavior her
sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends may reflect a
narcissistic personality disorder (NPD).
The trial court concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations under the Family Code.
The CA reversed the trial courts ruling because it is not supported by the facts on record.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological incapacity.
RULING:
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial courts
Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article 36 of the Family Code
which provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations. The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff.
The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a
serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from understanding and discharging
the essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological problem must be grave, must have
existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological
incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on
the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioners experts
heavily relied on petitioners allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty
parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioners experts opined that
respondents alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time
devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described
as constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically
incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair assessment
of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and
performing her marital and parental duties.
The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusion of
psychological incapacity.

DIÑO V. DIÑO
G.R. No. 178044,
[January 19, 2011]
DOCTRINE:
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio
under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of

Page 31 of 82
the properties of the parties. In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under
Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of
properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership.
FACTS:
Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño(respondent) got married on 14 January 1998
before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag) submitted a psychological report establishing that respondent was
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was incurable and deeply ingrained in her system
since her early formative years.
The trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the
marriage and declared their marriage void ab initio. It ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Trial court, upon motion for partial reconsideration of petitioner, modified its decision holding
that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of
the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall
only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of
the Family Code.
HELD:
Yes. The trial court’s decision is affirmed with modification. Decree of absolute nullity of the
marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial court’s decision without waiting for the liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
RATIO:
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148
of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such
as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only
after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare
therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation,
Partition and Distribution of Properties.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the
Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void
ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties.
In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties agree to a complete
separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property

Page 32 of 82
relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains,
there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could
be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because
the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the
Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in
common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the
property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the
spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under
Article 496 of the Civil Code, “[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial
proceedings. x x x.” It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding
for declaration of nullity of marriage.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014 ]
MARIETTA N. BARRIDO, PETITIONER, VS. LEONARDO V. NONATO, RESPONDENT.
FACTS:
In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta N.
Barrido, they were able to acquire a property situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City, consisting of a house and
lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-140361. On March 15, 1996, their marriage was
declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since there was no more reason to maintain
their co-ownership over the property, Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused. Thus,
on January 29, 2003, Nonato filed a Complaint for partition before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) of Bacolod City, Branch 3.
Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject property had already been sold
to their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She likewise moved for the dismissal of the
complaint because the MTCC lacked jurisdiction, the partition case being an action incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
The Bacolod MTCC rendered a Decision dated September 17, 2003, applying Article 129 of the
Family Code. It ruled in this wise:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the conjugal
property of the former Spouses Leonardo and Marietta Nonato, a house and lot covered by TCT No. T-
140361 located at Eroreco, Bacolod City, which was their conjugal dwelling, adjudicated to the
defendant Marietta Nonato, the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to
remain.
Nonato appealed the MTCC Decision before the RTC. On July 21, 2004, the Bacolod RTC
reversed the ruling of the MTCC. It found that even though the MTCC aptly applied Article 129 of the
Family Code, it nevertheless made a reversible error in adjudicating the subject property to Barrido.
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision on November 16, 2006. It held that since the property's
assessed value was only P8,080.00, it clearly fell within the MTCC's jurisdiction. Also, although the RTC
erred in relying on Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 147, the dispositive portion of its
decision still correctly ordered the equitable partition of the property.
ISSUES:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MTCC HAD JURISDICTION TO TRY
THE PRESENT CASE.
II.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LOT COVERED BY TCT NO. T-
140361 IS CONJUGAL AFTER BEING SOLD TO THE CHILDREN, JOSEPH LEO NONATO AND JOSEPH
RAYMUND NONATO.
III.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ARTICLE 129 OF THE FAMILY CODE
HAS NO APPLICATION IN THE PRESENT CASE, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.[6]
RULING:
The petition lacks merit.

Page 33 of 82
 Contrary to Barrido's contention, the MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or
those affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property.[7] Section 33 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 129[8] provides:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in civil cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not
exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed
value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691)[9]
Here, the subject property's assessed value was merely P8,080.00, an amount which certainly
does not exceed the required limit of P20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila to fall within the
jurisdiction of the MTCC. Therefore, the lower court correctly took cognizance of the instant case.
The records reveal that Nonato and Barrido's marriage had been declared void for psychological
incapacity under Article 36[10] of the Family Code. During their marriage, however, the conjugal
partnership regime governed their property relations. Although Article 129[11] provides for the
procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, Article 147 specifically covers the
effects of void marriages on the spouses' property relations.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry
shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said party's
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.[16] Efforts in the care and
maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common
property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry.[17]
Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property during the
subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts,
work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares. Barrido, however, claims that the
ownership over the property in question is already vested on their children, by virtue of a Deed of Sale.
But aside from the title to the property still being registered in the names of the former spouses, said
document of sale does not bear a notarization of a notary public. It must be noted that without the
notarial seal, a document remains to be private and cannot be converted into a public document,[21]
making it inadmissible in evidence unless properly authenticated.[22] Unfortunately, Barrido failed to
prove its due execution and authenticity. In fact, she merely annexed said Deed of Sale to her position
paper. Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in common by Nonato and Barrido, which
should be divided in accordance with the rules on co-ownership.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated November 16, 2006, as well as its Resolution dated January 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00235, are
hereby AFFIRMED.

Ting v. Ting
G.R. No. 166562, 31 March 2009
FACTS:
Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez met each other in medical school and they married each other
after several years. Years after, Benjamin became a full-fledged doctor and he practiced at the Velez
Hospital owned by Carmen’s family. Benjamin and Carmen had six children during their marriage. But
after 18 years of marriage, Carmen went to court to have their marriage be declared void on the ground
that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated. She alleged that even before she married Benjamin,
the latter was already a drunkard; that Benjamin was a gambler, he was violent, and would rather spend
on his expensive hobby; that he rarely stayed home and even neglected his children and family
obligations.

Page 34 of 82
 Carmen presented an expert witness, Dr. Oñate, to prove Benjamin’s psychological incapacity.
However, Oñate merely based her findings on the statement submitted by Benjamin. Oñate was not
able to personally examine Benjamin because at that time, Benjamin was already working as an
anaesthesiologist in South Africa. On his part, Benjamin opposed the petition. He also presented his own
expert witness to disprove Carmen’s allegations. Obra was not able to personally examine Benjamin but
he also evaluated the same deposition evaluated by Oñate. Also, Benjamin submitted himself for
evaluation to a South African doctor (Dr. Pentz) and the transcript of said evaluation was submitted to
Obra and the latter also evaluated the same. Obra found Benjamin not to be psychologically
incapacitated.
The trial court, and eventually the Court of Appeals, ruled in favor of Carmen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Benjamin Ting’s psychological incapacity was proven.
RULING:
No, the totality of evidence presented by respondent was insufficient to prove that petitioner is
psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that
he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage 18 years ago.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an absolute insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at
the inception of the marriage should be a disorder so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s defects were present at the time of the
celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew that
petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is
insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the
evidence presented prove such defects to be incurable. The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should
have been the significant evidence in determining whether to declare the marriage between the parties
null and void. Sadly, however, the Court was not convinced that the opinions proiced by these experts
strengthened respondent’s allegation of psychological incapacity. The two provided absolutely
contradicting psychological evaluations.

Mendoza vs. Republic

G.R. 157649,
Nov. 12, 2012
Psychological Incapacity
FACTS:
Petitioner wife appeals the decision promulgated on March 19, 2003, whereby the CA reversed
the judgment of the RTC declaring her marriage with respondent Dominic C. Mendoza as null and void.
The CA held the testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses insufficient to establish Dominic’s psychological
affliction to be of such a grave or serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted.
Petitioner assails the CA’s refusal to be bound by the expert testimony and psychiatric
evaluation she had presented in the trial of the case, and the CA’s reliance on the pronouncements in
Dagdag, Hernandez and Pesca, supra. She contends that the report on the psychiatric evaluation
conducted by Dr. Samson more than complied with the requirements prescribed in Santos v. Court of
Appeals and Molina. She insists that the CA should have applied the ruling in Marcos v. Marcoso the
effect that personal medical or psychological examination was not a requirement for a declaration of
psychological incapacity.
ISSUES:
1. Is OSG appeal no longer required under A.M. No. 02-11-10?
2. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented was enough to support a finding of
respondent’s psychological incapacity.
RULING:
The contention is grossly erroneous and unfounded. The Resolution nowhere stated that
appeals by the OSG were no longer required. On the contrary, the Resolution explicitly required the OSG

Page 35 of 82
to actively participate in all stages of the proceedings. The obvious intent of the Resolution was to
require the OSG to appear as counsel for the State in the capacity of a defensor vinculi (i.e., defender of
the marital bond) to oppose petitions for, and to appeal judgments in favor of declarations of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby ensuring that only the meritorious cases for the
declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity-those sufficiently evidenced by
gravity, incurability and juridical antecedence-would succeed.
2. We consider the CA’s refusal to accord credence and weight to the psychiatric report to be
well taken and warranted. The CA correctly indicated that the ill-feelings that she harbored towards
Dominic, which she admitted during her consultation with Dr. Samson, furnished the basis to doubt the
findings of her expert witness; that such findings were one-sided, because Dominic was not himself
subjected to an actual psychiatric evaluation by petitioner’s expert; and that he also did not participate
in the proceedings; and that the findings and conclusions on his psychological profile by her expert were
solely based on the self-serving testimonial descriptions and characterizations of him rendered by
petitioner and her witnesses.
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and
understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the
psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable,
are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best,
courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of
a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always base its decision
not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in
the course of the proceedings.

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals,

320 SCRA 76, Dec.08, 1999
FACTS:
Lucita and Marcio met in Philippine Christian University in Dasmarinas when lucita was Marcio’s
teacher for two consecutive semesters. Lucita was 5 years older than Marcio. They later on became
sweethearts and eventually got married. They also had a child. Lucita supported the family as her
husband continued studying, supported by his parents. The first few years of their marriage went okay.
But this eventually changed. Marcio had an extra-marital relation with another student who was also
married. When Lucita discovered this, he asked Lucio to end it. He promised to but did not fulfill it and
left their conjugal home and child. After some time, he returned to Lucita and she accepted him.
However, his attitude worsened when he got employed to Reynold Philippines, Inc.
He engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct during the latter part of 1986. As a result, private
respondent contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner. Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a
heated argument, private respondent hit their eldest child who was then barely a year old. Private
respondent is not close to any of their children as he was never affectionate and hardly spent time with
them.
On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the RTC a petition seeking the annulment of her
marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity. RTC and CA denied the
petition. Hence, this case.
ISSUE:
W/N Marcio is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations
HELD:
The psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage, must exist at
the time of the celebration of marriage. More so, chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment, gambling and
use of prohibited drugs are not grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse. Certainly,
petitioner-appellant’s declaration that at the time of their marriage her respondent-husband’s character
was on the “borderline between a responsible person and the happy-go-lucky,” could not constitute the
psychological incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Page 36 of 82
Intestate Estate of Vda. De Carungcong vs. People
Facts:
William was married to Zenaida. They have two daughters, Karen and Wendy. Zenaida died
ahead of her mother Manolita, William's mother-in-law. In 1992, William made Manolita sign special
powers of attorney appointing Wendy, then only 20 years old, as Manolita’s attorney-in-fact to sell and
dispose four valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay City. William told Manolita (who was already completely
blind) that the documents she was signing was merely for paying taxes. Believing William's
misrepresentation, Manolita signed the documents. The parcels of land were sold and William
misappropriated the proceeds thereof amounting to P22,034,000.
After the death of Manolita, Mediatrix, one of the surviving daughters, filed a petition for the
settlement of Manolita’s intestate estate before the RTC praying the she be appointed administratrix
thereof. After her appointment as such, Mediatrix learned from her niece Wendy about the fraudulent
sale of the parcels of land and the misappropriation committed by William. Thus, as the duly appointed
administrator of the estate of her deceased mother, she filed a case for estafa against her brother-in-
law, William.
William moved to quash the Information claiming that under Article 332 (1) of the RPC, his
relationship to Manolita, his mother-in-law exempts him from criminal liability. The RTC sustained
William’s motion and dismissed the information. The court said that the death of Zenaida did not
extinguish the relationship by affinity of her husband William and her mother Manolita, and therefore
Article 332(1) exempting him from criminal liability was still applicable. The CA affirmed the decision.
Issues:
1. Did the death of Zenaida dissolve the relationship by affinity of her surviving spouse William and her
mother Manolita?
2. Should William be exempt from criminal liability for reason of his relationship to Manolita?
Held:
1. There are two views on the subject:
The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity terminates with the
dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce which gave rise to the relationship of affinity
between the parties. Under this view, the relationship by affinity is simply coextensive and coexistent
with the marriage that produced it. Its duration is indispensably and necessarily determined by the
marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as the marriage subsists, such that the death of a
spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by affinity of the surviving spouse to the deceased spouses blood
relatives.

The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity between the
surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the
deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced children or not. Under this view, the
relationship by affinity endures even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of
the death of one of the parties to the said marriage. This view considers that, where statutes have
indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the tie of affinity between these people and their
relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married parties.
After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views, we hold that the second
view is more consistent with the language and spirit of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
First, the continuing affinity view has been applied in the interpretation of laws that intend to benefit
step-relatives or in-laws. Since the purpose of the absolutory cause in Article 332(1) is meant to be
beneficial to relatives by affinity within the degree covered under the said provision, the continuing
affinity view is more appropriate.
Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of relatives by affinity in the same line is couched in
general language. It made no distinction between the spouse of ones living child and the surviving
spouse of ones deceased child.
Third, the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal. That relationship by
affinity is not affected by the death of one of the parties to the marriage that created it is more in accord
with family solidarity and harmony.

Page 37 of 82
Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is to resolve all doubts in
favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the accused.
Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the relationship by affinity created
between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse survives the death of
either party to the marriage which created the affinity. (The same principle applies to the justifying
circumstance of defense of ones relatives under Article 11[2] of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating
circumstance of immediate vindication of grave offense committed against ones relatives under Article
13[5] of the same Code and the absolutory cause of relationship in favor of accessories under Article 20
also of the same Code.)
2. No. The coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with
another crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through falsification.

The Information against William charges him with estafa. However, the real nature of the offense is
determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not by the designation of the offense. What controls
is not the title of the Information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the
Information. In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the
nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the Information.

A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that William is being charged not with simple
estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. He resorted to
falsification of public documents (particularly, the special power of attorney and the deeds of sale) as a
necessary means to commit the estafa. Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not
simple estafa but the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, he cannot avail
himself of the absolutory cause provided under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code in his favor.

The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal. Thus, the action provided
under the said provision simply concerns the private relations of the parties as family members and is
limited to the civil aspect between the offender and the offended party. When estafa is committed
through falsification of a public document, however, the matter acquires a very serious public dimension
and goes beyond the respective rights and liabilities of family members among themselves. Effectively,
when the offender resorts to an act that breaches public interest in the integrity of public documents as
a means to violate the property rights of a family member, he is removed from the protective mantle of
the absolutory cause under Article 332 (Intestate Estate of Vda. De Carungcong vs. People, G.R. 181409,
February 11, 2010).

ISIDRO ABLAZA V. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010

DOCTRINE:
The plaintiff must be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit. Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest.
Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a “proper interest” can file the action.

FACTS:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the RTC in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration
of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without
a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the
marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being
the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real
properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and

Page 38 of 82
that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and
Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.
On October 18, 2000, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that petition is filed out of time and
that petitioner is not a party to marriage. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC on the ground that the action must be filed
by the proper party, which in this case should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage. Hence, this
appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the declaration of nullity of the
marriage of his deceased brother?

HELD:
Yes. The applicable law when marriage was contracted between Cresenciano and Leonila on December
26, 1949, is the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the
rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for
declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the
petitioner. The case was reinstated and its records returned to RTC for further proceedings.

Ratio:
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SCexplicitly provides the limitation that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such
limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. This specifically extends only to marriages covered by
the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in
application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.
Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the
estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like
the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother
under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code. The plaintiff must still be
the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is
basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real
party in interest. Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a “proper interest” can file the action. One
having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action.
When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause
of action.

SSS vs Azote GR 29741 (2015)

FACTS:
On June 19, 1992, respondent Edna and Edgardo, a member of the SSS, were married in civil rites. On
April 27, 1994, Edgardo submitted Form E-4 to the SSS with Edna and their three older children as
designated beneficiaries. Thereafter, Edgardo submitted another Form E-4 to the SSS designating his
three younger children as additional beneficiaries. On January 13, 2005, Edgardo passed away. Shortly
thereafter, Edna filed her claim for death benefits with the SSS as the wife of a deceased-member. It
appeared, however, from the SSS records that Edgardo had earlier submitted another Form E-4 with a
different set of beneficiaries, namely: Rosemarie Azote (Rosemarie), as his spouse; and Elmer Azote
(Elmer),as dependent. Consequently, Edna’s claim was denied. Her children were adjudged as
beneficiaries and she was considered as the legal guardian of her minor children. Edna filed a petition
with the SSC to claim the death benefits, lump sum and monthly pension of Edgardo. She insisted that
she was the legitimate wife of Edgardo. In its answer, the SSS averred that there was a conflicting
information in the forms submitted by the deceased. Summons was published in a newspaper of general
circulation directing Rosemarie to file her answer. Despite the publication, no answer was filed and
Rosemarie was subsequently declared in default. SSC dismissed Edna’s petition for lack of merit. The SSC
further wrote that the National Statistics Office (NSO) records revealed that the marriage of Edgardo to

Page 39 of 82
one Rosemarie Teodora Sino was registered on July 28, 1982. Consequently, it opined that Edgardo’s
marriage to Edna was not valid as there was no showing that his first marriage had been annulled or
dissolved.

ISSUE: W/N Edna should be adjudged as the widow of the deceased, thus, entitled to the benefits

RULING: No. The law in force at the time of Edgardo’s death was RA 8282. Applying Section 8(e) and (k)
of R.A. No. 8282, it is clear that only the legal spouse of the deceased-member is qualified to be the
beneficiary of the latter’s SS benefits. In this case, there is a concrete proof that Edgardo contracted an
earlier marriage with another individual as evidenced by their marriage contract. Edgardo even
acknowledged his married status when he filled out the 1982 Form E-4 designating Rosemarie as his
spouse.

It is undisputed that the second marriage of Edgardo with Edna was celebrated at the time when the
Family Code was already in force. For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code
for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.

Using the parameters outlined in Article 41 of the Family Code, Edna, without doubt, failed to establish
that there was no impediment or that the impediment was already removed at the time of the
celebration of her marriage to Edgardo. Settled is the rule that "whoever claims entitlement to the
benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence." Edna could
not adduce evidence to prove that the earlier marriage of Edgardo was either annulled or dissolved or
whether there was a declaration of Rosemarie’s presumptive death before her marriage to Edgardo.
What is apparent is that Edna was the second wife of Edgardo. Considering that Edna was not able to
show that she was the legal spouse of a deceased-member, she would not qualify under the law to be
the beneficiary of the death benefits of Edgardo.

SANTIAGO CARINO, petitioner vs. SUSAN CARINO, defendant

G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

Facts:
During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S. Carino, he contracted two marriages, the first with Susan Nicdao
Carino with whom he had two offsprings (Sahlee and Sandee) and with Susan Yee Carino with whom he
had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation. In 1988, Santiago passed away under the care of
Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims
for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government
agencies. Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 and Yee received a total of P21,000.00. Yee
filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao, contending that the marriage of the latter
with Santiago is void ab initio because their marriage was solemnized without the required marriage
license. The trial court ruled in favor of Yee, ordering Nicdao to pay Yee half of acquired death benefits.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Santiago Carino and Susan Nicdao is void for lack of marriage license.

Ruling:
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of Nicdao and Carino was
solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage and the absence thereof, subject
to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, the marriage does not fall
within any of those exceptions and a marriage license therefore was indispensable to the validity of it.
This fact is certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila. Such being the case, the
presumed validity of the marriage of Nicdao and Carino has been sufficiently overcome and cannot

Page 40 of 82
stand. The marriage of Yee and Carino is void ab initio as well for lack of judicial decree of nullity of
marriage of Carino and Nicdao at the time it was contracted. The marriages are bigamous; under Article
148 of the Family Code, properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall
belong to the co-ownership. The decision of the trial court and Court of Appeals is affirmed.

SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner, v. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.

G.R. No. 132529, 2 February 2001
Facts:
In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao Cariño. He had 2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4
contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Cariño. In 1988, prior to his second marriage,
SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage
with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a
total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for
collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her
marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but
the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage
license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the
previous marriage on SPO4’s funeral.
Issue:
Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive legitimes.
Held:
The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid marriage license. The
marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized without the
judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC,
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of
a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering
such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final
judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.

The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage is
void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall belong to
him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop
even if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each other for
there were no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their
situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything they
earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party – this
includes salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have
contributed at all.

Bobis vs Bobis Case

FACTS:
On October 21, 1985, respondent Isagani contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce. Without said
marriage having been annulled, Isagani contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda on January

Page 41 of 82
25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia. An information for bigamy was filed against
Isagani based on Imelda's complaint. Sometime thereafter, Isagani initiated a civil action for the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a
marriage license. Isagani then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy
invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal
case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal case.
Issue:
Does the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a
prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy?
Held:
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. It must appear not
only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution
of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the criminal case.
Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in
the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed. Its
two essential elements are:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action;
and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage,
requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. The
clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity
or invalidity of the marriage.
Isagani, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be
said to have validly entered into the second marriage. He was for all legal intents and purposes regarded
as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Any decision in the civil
action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the
subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of
the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.
Respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter
to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and
eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family
Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first
marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration
of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite -
usually the marriage license - and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a
declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would
render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova:

(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent
courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is
beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted
for bigamy. (Bobis vs Bobis Digest, G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000)

DIVISION
[ GR No. 182760, Apr 10, 2013 ]
REPUBLIC v. ROBERT P. NARCEDA +
RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J.:
The present case stems from a Petition for Review[1] filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner),
praying for the reversal of the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 14 November 2007 and its
subsequent Resolution[3] dated 29 April 2008. The CA dismissed the appeal of petitioner, because it

Page 42 of 82
supposedly lacked jurisdiction to decide the matter. It held that the Decision[4] of the Regional Trial
Court of Balaoan, La Union (RTC) declaring the presumptive death of Marina B. Narceda (Marina) was
immediately final and executory, "because by express provision of law, the judgment of the RTC is not
appealable."[5]
Robert P. Narceda (respondent) married Marina on 22 July 1987. A reading of the Marriage Contract[6]
he presented will reveal that at the time of their wedding, Marina was only 17 years and 4 months old.
According to respondent, Marina went to Singapore sometime in 1994 and never returned since.[7]
There was never any communication between them. He tried to look for her, but he could not find her.
Several years after she left, one of their town mates in Luna, La Union came home from Singapore and
told him that the last time she saw his wife, the latter was already living with a Singaporean husband.[8]
In view of her absence and his desire to remarry,[9] respondent filed with the RTC on 16 May 2002 a
Petition for a judicial declaration of the presumptive death and/or absence of Marina.[10]
The RTC granted respondent's Petition in a Decision[11] dated 5 May 2005, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment declaring the PRESUMPTIVE
DEATH of MARINA B. NARCEDA for all legal intents and purposes of law as provided for in Rule 131, Sec.
3(w-4), Rules of Court, without prejudice to the effect of re-appearance of the absent spouse.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the foregoing Decision to the CA.
According to petitioner, respondent failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with the diligence
required by law and enough to give rise to a "well-founded" belief that she was dead.[13]
The CA dismissed the appeal ruling that the hearing of a petition for the declaration of presumptive
death is a summary proceeding under the Family Code and is thus governed by Title XI thereof.[14]
Article 247 of the Family Code provides that the judgment of the trial court in summary court
proceedings shall be immediately final and executory. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED OUTRIGHT on the
GROUND OF LACK OF JURISDICTION, and this Court hereby reiterates the fact that the RTC Decision is
immediately final and executory because by express provision of law, the judgment of the RTC is not
appealable.
SO ORDERED.[15]
The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was likewise denied through the CA's 29 April 2008
Resolution.[16]
Petitioner now comes to this Court, through Rule 45, alleging as follows:
The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.[17]
Respondent has failed to establish a well-founded belief that his absentee spouse is dead.[18]

The OSG insists that the CA had jurisdiction to entertain the Petition, because respondent had failed to
establish a well-founded belief that his absentee spouse was dead.[19] The OSG cites Republic v. CA
(Jomoc),[20] in which this Court ruled:
By the trial court's citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that the petition of
Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire
to contract a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a "summary proceeding,"
following above-quoted Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a summary
proceeding under the Family Code, not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for
which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a
Notice of Appeal from the trial court's order sufficed. (Emphasis in the original)[21]
The CA points out, however, that because the resolution of a petition for the declaration of presumptive
death requires a summary proceeding, the procedural rules to be followed are those enumerated in
Title XI of the Family Code. Articles 238, 247, and 253 thereof read:
Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules provided for in this Title shall
apply as regards separation in fact between husband and wife, abandonment by one of the other, and
incidents involving parental authority.

Page 43 of 82
 Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings
filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable.
The appellate court argues that there is no reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal in
summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code, because the judgments rendered thereunder, by
express provision of Article 247, are immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties.[22] In
support of its stance, it cited Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino (Bermudez-Lorino),[23] in which this Court
held:
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which
to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section
247, Family Code, supra, are "immediately final and executory." It was erroneous, therefore, on the part
of the RTC to give due course to the Republic's appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of
the case to the Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of law, is
immediately final and executory. As we have said in Veloria vs. Comelec, "the right to appeal is not a
natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege." Since, by express
mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in
Family Law are "immediately final and executory," the right to appeal was not granted to any of the
parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of
presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of
November 7, 2001.[24]
We agree with the CA.
Article 41 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years
shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.
This Court has already declared in Republic v. Granda[25] that Jomoc cannot be interpreted as having
superseded our pronouncements in Bermudez-Lorino, because Jomoc does not expound on the
characteristics of a summary proceeding under the Family Code; Bermudez-Lorino, however, squarely
touches upon the impropriety of an ordinary appeal as a vehicle for questioning a trial court's decision in
a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code.
[26]
As explained in Republic v. Tango,[27] the remedy of a losing party in a summary proceeding is not an
ordinary appeal, but a petition for certiorari, to wit:
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately
final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's
judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under
Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a
petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition
should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be
sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and
the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of
choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is
because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of
judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.

Page 44 of 82
When the OSG filed its notice of appeal under Rule 42, it availed itself of the wrong remedy. As a result,
the running of the period for filing of a Petition for Certiorari continued to run and was not tolled. Upon
lapse of that period, the Decision of the RTC could no longer be questioned. Consequently, petitioner's
contention that respondent has failed to establish a well-founded belief that his absentee spouse is
dead[28] may no longer be entertained by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The 14 November 2007 Decision of the Court Appeals and
its subsequent 29 April 2008 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 85704, dismissing the appeal of the Republic
of the Philippines are AFFIRMED.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Balaoan, La Union in Special Proceeding No. 622 dated 5 May
2005 declaring the presumptive death of Marina B. Narceda is hereby declared FINAL and EXECUTORY.

ARTICLE 44
– If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and
all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are
revoked by operation of law.

EXPLANATION:
A person wanting to remarry must first obtain a court decision declaring the previous marriage void
before getting married.
The law makes reference of the subsequent marriage after the declaration of presumptive death of
the absent spouse but before its court declaration, proof is required in order for the court to declare
absent spouse presumptively dead.
The petitioner should prove before the court that she/he exerted earnest and diligent effort to locate
the absent spouse.
If the spouse knew the whereabouts of the absent spouse or connived with subsequent spouse and
files for the declaration of presumptive death of the said spouse and remarry, their act is in bad faith.
The net effect in this subsequent marriage is void. There is no need to perform positive act of revocation
because the law itself revokes the same and all donation by reason of marriage and testamentary
dispositions made by one in favor of the other is also void, so all properties is reverted to the former
owner.

CASE DIGEST
CELERINA J. SANTOS
VS.
RICARDO T. SANTOS
FACTS:
On 2007, RTC declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos presumptively dead after her husband, respondent
Ricardo had filed a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of
remarriage. In his petition, Ricardo alleged that when they move to Tarlac and things went wrong with
their financial status, Celerina left to work abroad as Domestic Helper in Hong Kong and was never heard
from her again; He claimed that he exerted effort to locate Celerina; that it was 12 years from the date
of his RTC petition since Celerina left. He believed that she passed away. And in 2008 Ricardo remarried.
On the other hand, Celerina filed a petition that she learned about Ricardo’s petition only sometimes in
2008 when she could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other
appropriate remedies.
On the same year, she filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the court of appeal on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She
also never left and worked as a domestic helper abroad. It was not true that she had been absent for 12
years. Ricardo was aware that she left their conjugal dwelling in Quezon City. It was he who left the
conjugal dwelling in 2008 to cohabit with another woman. She was deprived of any notice of and
opportunity to oppose the petition declaring her presumptive dead.
ISSUE:

Page 45 of 82
Whether or not the declaration of appearance of a presumptively dead spouse in accordance with
Article 42 of the family Code is the proper remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgement declaring
presumptive death.
RULING:
An action for Annulment of judgement is proper when the declaration of presumptive death is obtained
fraudulently. It is the remedy when RTC’s judgement, order or resolution has become final, and the
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.

Munoz vs. Ramirez

G.R. No. 156125,
[August 25, 2010]

DOCTRINE:
Property acquired during marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse is excluded from the community
property; When the value of the paraphernal property is considerably more than the conjugal
improvement, said paraphernal property does not become conjugal property.

FACTS:
The residential lot in the subject property was registered in the name of Erlinda Ramirez, married to
Eliseo Carlos (respondents). On April 6, 1989, Eliseo, a Bureau of Internal Revenue employee, mortgaged
said lot, with Erlinda’s consent, to the GSIS to secure a P136,500.00 housing loan, payable within twenty
(20) years, through monthly salary deductions of P1,687.66. The respondents then constructed a thirty-
six (36)-square meter, two-story residential house on the lot. On July 14, 1993, the title to the subject
property was transferred to the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, dated April 30, 1992,
executed by Erlinda, for herself and as attorney-in-fact of Eliseo, for a stated consideration of
P602,000.00.
On September 24, 1993, the respondents filed a complaint with the RTC for the nullification of the deed
of absolute sale, claiming that there was no sale but only a mortgage transaction, and the documents
transferring the title to the petitioner’s name were falsified. The respondents presented the results of
the scientific examination conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation of Eliseo’s purported
signatures in the Special Power of Attorney dated April 29, 1992 and the Affidavit of waiver of rights
dated April 29, 1992, showing that they were forgeries. The petitioner, on the other hand, introduced
evidence on the paraphernal nature of the subject property since it was registered in Erlinda’s name.
The RTC ruled for petitioner finding that the property is paraphernal and consequently, the NBI finding
that Eliseo’s signatures in the special power of attorney and in the affidavit were forgeries was
immaterial because Eliseo’s consent to the sale was not necessary. The CA reversed and held that
pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas v. Hon. Fortun,
the subject property, originally Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property, became conjugal property
when it was used as collateral for a housing loan that was paid through conjugal funds – Eliseo’s
monthly salary deductions.
ISSUE:
Whether the subject property is paraphernal orconjugal
HELD:
The property is paraphernal property of Erlinda.
RATIO:
As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have
been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal
unless the contrary is proved. In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the residential
lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal ownership pursuant to Articles
92and 109 of the Family Code. The residential lot, therefore, is Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property.
Moreover, we cannot subscribe to the CA’s misplaced reliance on Article 158 of the Civil Code and
Calimlim-Canullas. As the respondents were married during the effectivity of the Civil Code, its
provisions on conjugal partnership of gains (Articles 142 to 189) should have governed their property

Page 46 of 82
relations. However, with the enactment of the Family Code on August 3, 1989, the Civil Code provisions
on conjugal partnership of gains, including Article 158, have been superseded by those found in the
Family Code (Articles 105 to 133).
Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the Civil Code, provides the solution in
determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate property of the
spouses, at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses.
Applying the said provision to the present case, we find that Eliseo paid a portion only of the GSIS loan
through monthly salary deductions. From April 6, 1989 to April 30, 1992, Eliseo paid about P60,755.76,
not the entire amount of the GSIS housing loan plus interest, since the petitioner advanced the
P176,445.27 paid by Erlinda to cancel the mortgage in 1992. Considering the P136,500.00 amount of the
GSIS housing loan, it is fairly reasonable to assume that the value of the residential lot is considerably
more than theP60,755.76 amount paid by Eliseo through monthly salary deductions. Thus, the subject
property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of Erlinda at the time she contracted with the
petitioner; the written consent of Eliseo to the transaction was not necessary. The NBI finding that
Eliseo’s signatures in the special power of attorney and affidavit were forgeries was immaterial.
Nonetheless, the RTC and the CA apparently failed to consider the real nature of the contract between
the parties (where the SC found that the contract is an equitable mortgage and not one of sale).

Fuentes vs. Roca

G.R. No. 178902,
[April 21, 2010]

FACTS:
Sabina Tarroza owned a land in Canelar,Zamboanga City and she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca
(Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to
petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses). They met in the office of Atty. Romulo D.
Plagata whom they asked to prepare the documents of sale and signed an agreement to sell that Atty.
Plagata prepared. It expressly stated that the sale was to take effect in six months. Within six months,
Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife,
Rosario Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale.
Upon Tarciano’s compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to take possession of the
lot and pay him an additional pay besides the downpayment, depending on whether or not he
succeeded in demolishing the house standing on it. If Tarciano was unable to comply with these
conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become owners of the lot without any further formality and
payment.
The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata who then worked on the other requirements
of the sale. According to the lawyer, he went to see Rosario in one of his trips to Manila and had her sign
an affidavit of consent. After 6 months, a new title was issued in the name of the spouses who
immediately constructed a building on the lot. Thereafter Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife
Rosario who died nine months afterwards.
Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely, respondents(collectively, the
Rocas), filed an action for annulment of sale and re-conveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses
before the RTC.
The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void since Tarciano’s wife, Rosario, did not give her
consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus prayed that the
property be reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid
Tarciano.

The spouses denied the Rocas’ allegations. They presented Atty. Plagata who testified that he personally
saw Rosario sign the affidavit at her residence. He admitted, however,that he notarized the document in
Zamboanga City four months later. All the same, the Fuentes spouses pointed out that the claim of
forgery was personal to Rosario and she alone could invoke it. Besides, the four-year prescriptive
period for nullifying the sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed.
ISSUES:

Page 47 of 82
1. Whether Rosario’s signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarciano’s sale of their
conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged?
2. Whether the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already
prescribed?
3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to annul
that sale?
HELD:
It was forged
It did not prescribe
The heirs of Rosario may bring an action to annul the sale.
RATIO:
1. The key issue in this case is whether or not Rosario’s signature on the document of consent had been
forged. For, if the signature were genuine, the fact that she gave her consent to her husband’s sale of
the conjugal land would render the other issues merely academic. The SC agreed with the CA that the
signature was forged.
While a defective notarization will merely strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a
private instrument, that falsified jurat, taken together with the marks of forgery in the signature, dooms
such document as proof of Rosario’s consent to the sale of the land. That the Fuentes spouses honestly
relied on the notarized affidavit as proof of Rosario’s consent does not matter. The sale is still void
without an authentic consent.

2. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not
the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property
to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect on August
3, 1988.
When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in place the system of conjugal partnership of gains
on their property relations. While its Article 165 made Tarciano the sole administrator of the conjugal
partnership, Article 166 prohibited him from selling commonly owned real property without his wife’s
consent. Still, if he sold the same without his wife’s consent, the sale is merely voidable. Article 173 gave
Rosario the right to have the sale annulled during the marriage within ten years from the date of the
sale. Failing in that, she or her heirs may demand, after dissolution of the marriage, only the value of the
property that Tarciano fraudulently sold.
But, as already stated, the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal
Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code on Property Relations
Between Husband and Wife. Further, the Family Code provisions were also made to apply to already
existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested rights.
Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already
established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256.
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period
within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It simply
provides that without the other spouse’s written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same
would be void.
Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has no force and
effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that are declared void by positive
provision of law, as in the case of a sale of conjugal property without the other spouse’s written consent.
But, although a void contract has no legal effects even if no action is taken to set it aside, when any of its
terms have been performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what
has been given under it. This action, according to Article 1410 of the Civil Code does not prescribe.

Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale and re-
conveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without their mother’s (his wife’s) written consent.
The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an action.

Page 48 of 82
3. As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the
property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of
the property to their heirs,

CONSOLACION VILLANUEVA vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

GR No. 74577
192 SCRA 21
December 4, 1990
FACTS:
Dorothea and Teodoro Aranas borrowed P18,000 from private respondent Jesus Bernas,
mortgaging as collateral their father Modesto’s property, Lot 13-C. In the loan agreement between
them on Oct. 30, 1975, the Aranas described themselves as the absolute co-owners. When Dorothea
and Teodoro failed to pay the loan, Bernas caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage in 1977
and acquired the land as the highest bidder. After the foreclosure sale, the Aranases executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition in 1978, in which they adjudicated the same lot 13-C unto themselves in equal
share pro-indiviso. Bernas then consolidated his ownership over the lot when the mortgagors failed to
redeem it withn the reglementary period, and had the title in the name of Modesto cancelled and
another TCT issued in his name.
On November 24, 1978, herein petitioner Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas
(witness to the deed of mortgage in 1975) filed a complaint with the RTC of Roxas ity against
respondents spouses Jesus and Remedios Bernas, for the cancellation of the TCT under the name of the
Bernases, and they (Villanueva and Aranas) be declared co-owners of the land. Petitioner alleged that
spouses Modesto and Victoria Aranas in 1987 and 1958 executed two separate wills: first bequeathing
to Consolacion and Raymundo and to Dorothea and Teodoro, in equal shares pro diviso, all of said
Victoria’s shares from the conjugal partnership property; and second Modesto’s interests in his conjugal
partnership with Victoria as well as his separate properties bequeathed to Dorothea and Teodoro (his
illegitimate children). The trial court dismissed the complaint, declaring herein respondents as the legal
owners of the disputed property.
Upon appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) affirmed the lower court’s decision in
toto.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villanueva had a right over Lot 13-C and the improvements thereon made by
Victoria rendered the lot as conjugal property.
HELD:
Lot 13-C was not a conjugal partnership property of Victoria and Modesto. It was Modesto’s
exclusive, private property, which he inherited from his parents. Moreover, since Victoria died ahead of
Modesto, Victoria did not inherit said lot from him and therefore had nothing of Lot 13-C to bequeath by
will of otherwise to Consolacion.
Article 158 of the Civil Code says that improvements, whether for utility or adornment made on
the separate property of the spouses through advancements from the partnership or through the
industry of either spouse belong to the conjugal partnership, and buildings constructed at the expense
of the partnership during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses also pertain to the
partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.
Proof, therefore, is needful of the time of the making or construction of the improvements and
the source of the funds used therefor in order to determine the character of the improvements as
belonging to the conjugal partnership or to one spouse separately. No such proof was presented or
proffered by Villanueva. What is certain is that the land on which the improvements stand was the
exclusive property of Modesto and that where the property is registered in the name of one spouse only
and there is no showing of when precisely the property was acquired, the presumption is that is belongs
exclusively to said spouse [PNB vs. CA, 153 SCRA 435, 1987]. It is not therefore possible to declare the
improvements to be conjugal in character.
Furthermore, Bernas’ mode of acquisition of ownership over the property appears in all respect
to be regular, untainted by any defect whatsoever. Bernas must therefore be deemed to have acquired
indefeasible and clear title to Lot 13-C which cannot be defeated or negated by claims subsequently
arising and of which he had no knowledge or means of knowing prior to their assertion and ventilation.

Page 49 of 82
Beumer v. Amores
G.R. 195670
December 3, 2012
Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner, a Dutch national, assails the decision of CA which affirmed the decision of RTC Negros
Oriental. Petitioner and Filipina respondent’s marriage was nullified by basis of the former’s
psychological incapacity. Petitioner thus filed for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership praying for
distribution of the properties acquired during their marriage which include 4 lots of land acquired
through purchase and 2 lots by inheritance. RTC ruled that all parcels of land be given to the
respondent, tools, and equipment in favor of the petitioner and the two houses on Lots 1 and 2142 as
co-owned by the parties.
ISSUE:
Is the petitioner entitled to assail the decision of the RTC and CA?
HELD:
The petition lacks merit. Firstly, foreigners may not own lands in the Philippines. However, there are no
restrictions on the ownership of buildings or structures on lands of foreigners. As such, the two houses
on Lots 1 and 2142 are considered co-owned by the parties.

AGUETE V. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

G.R. No. 170166,
[April 6, 2011]
DOCTRINE:
Where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly
so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
FACTS:
Spouses Jose Ros and Estrella Aguete filed acomplaint for annulment against PNB before the Court of
First Instance of Rizal.
Jose Ros previously obtained a loan in the amount of P115,000.00 from PNB and as security, a real
estate mortgage over a parcel of land with TCT. No. T-9646 was executed. Upon maturity, the loan
remained unpaid and an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding on the mortgaged property was instituted
by PNB. After the lapse of a year, the property was consolidated and registered in the name of PNB.
Estrella Aguete, claiming she had no knowledge of the said loan nor the mortgage constituted on the
land which is part of their conjugal property, contested the transactions and filed for an annulment of
the proceedings. She interposed in her defense that the signatures affixed on the documents were
forged and that the proceeds of the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family.
RTC ruled for the spouses, stating that Aguete may during their marriage and within ten years from the
transaction mentioned, may ask the court for an annulment of the case. On notice of appeal by PNB,
Court of Appeals reversed this ruling and found for PNB, stating that forgery was concluded without
adequate proof. It also found that the loan was used in the expansion of the family business.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
How is the benefit to the family proven so as to render the loan contracted by the husband binding upon
the conjugal property?
HELD:
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, that contract falls within the term “x x x x
obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.”
Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the
signing of the contract. Where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the
law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
Court denies the petition.

Page 50 of 82
RATIO:
Annulment of the contract will only be granted upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent to
the transaction. Even as Aguete disavows the documents supposedly acknowledged before the notary
public, the document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due
exececution. It has in its favor the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence so
clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to the falsity of the certificate.
Petitioners did not present any corroborating witness, such as a handwriting expert, who could
authoritatively declare that Aguete’s signatures were really forged.
In her testimony, Aguete confirmed that Ros engaged in such business, but claimed to be unaware
whether it prospered. Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or
profession by which he contributes to the support of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive
and private debts. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed,
such may still be charged against the conjugal property of the spouses.

Pana v. Heirs of Juanite

G.R. No. 164201
Dec. 10, 2012

FACTS: Petitioner Efren Pana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others were accused of murder. Efren was
acquitted but Melecia and another person was found guilty and was sentenced to the penalty of death
and to pay each of the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally for civil indemnity and damages.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ,
resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia. Subsequently, a
notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution were issued.

Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied
properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia.
ISSUE: WON the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for
the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case.
HELD: Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during
the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.
The payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon the spouses may be enforced against the
partnership assets if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be
insufficient.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of her own, the
above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced
against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have
been covered.

FLORES V. LINDO
G.R. No. 183984,
[April 13, 2011]

FACTS:
Respondent Edna Lindo obtained a loan from Petitioner Arturo Flores amounting to P400,000 and
secured it with a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage. The mortgage covered property in the name of Edna
and her husband, co-respondent Enrico Lindo, Jr. Edna likewise signed a Promissory Note and the Deed
for herself and for Enrico as his attorney-in-fact.
She issued three checks as partial loan payments, all of which were dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
Flores therefore filed a complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage with damages. The RTC ruled that
petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure as the Deed was without consent and authority of
Edna’s husband. The Deed was executed on October 31, 1995, while the Special Power of Attorney was

Page 51 of 82
executed by Enrico only on November 4, 1995. Accordingly, the mortgage is void pursuant to Article 96
of the Family Code. The RTC, however, ruled that petitioner may still recover the loan through a
personal action against Edna, but that it had no jurisdiction over the said personal action which should
be filed where plaintiff or defendant resides.
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages. The respondents alleged that Enrico was
not a party to the loan because it was contracted by Edna without Enrico’s signature. They also prayed
for the dismissal of the case on grounds of improper venue, res judicata and forum-shopping. The RTC
ruled that res judicata will not apply to rights, claims or demands which, though growing out of the same
subject matter, constitute separate or distinct causes of action.
The Court of Appeals set aside the RTC ruling. It noted that petitioner allowed the earlier decision of the
RTC to become final and executory without asking the courts for an alternative relief. The Court of
Appeals stated that petitioner merely relied on the declarations of these courts that he could file a
separate personal action and thus failed to observe the rules and settled jurisprudence on multiplicity of
suits, closing petitioner’s avenue for recovery of the loan.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether the promissory note and deed of mortgage are void
(2) Whether there remains an available remedy for petitioner

HELD:
(1) NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the
court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Emphasis
supplied)
Article 124 of the Family Code of which applies to conjugal partnership property, is a reproduction of
Article 96 of the Family Code which applies to community property.
Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide that the powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without the written consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance without
the written consent shall be void. However, both provisions also state that “the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse x x x beforethe offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.”
In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were executed on 31 October
1995. The Special Power of Attorney was executed on 4 November
1995. The execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the continuing
offer as a binding contract between the parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid
contract.

(2) YES. In Chieng v. Santos, this Court ruled that a mortgage-creditor may institute against the
mortgage-debtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. The Court
ruled that the remedies are alternative and not cumulative and held that the filing of a criminal action
for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was in effect a collection suit or a suit for the recovery of the
mortgage-debt. In that case, however, this Court pro hac vice, ruled that respondents could still be held
liable for the balance of the loan, applying the principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at
the expense of another.

Page 52 of 82
The principle of unjust enrichment is provided under Article 22 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall
return the same to him.
There is unjust enrichment “when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a
person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and
good conscience.” The principle of unjust enrichment requires two conditions: (1) that a person is
benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at the expense of
another. The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching
himself at the expense of another without just cause or consideration. The principle is applicable in this
case considering that Edna admitted obtaining a loan from petitioners, and the same has not been fully
paid without just cause. The Deed was declared void erroneously at the instance of Edna, first when she
raised it as a defense before the RTC, Branch 33 and second, when she filed an action for declaratory
relief before the RTC, Branch 93. Petitioner could not be expected to ask the RTC, Branch 33 for an
alternative remedy, as what the Court of Appeals ruled that he should have done, because the RTC,
Branch 33 already stated that it had no jurisdiction over any personal action that petitioner might have
against Edna.
Edna should not be allowed to unjustly enrich herself because of the erroneous decisions of the two trial
courts when she questioned the validity of the Deed

CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES

L-2877 (38 SCRA 284)
March 31, 1971
FACTS:
In 1956, herein appellant’s brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law
spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years
after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or September 13, 1962, Felix died.
Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral
relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication
executed by her in 1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes
thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at
the time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code
inapplicable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-
law relationship.

HELD:
While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during
marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality requires
that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.
As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to prohibit
donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy
to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials.
The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result in
appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half
of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half.
Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their
children to the other half.

Page 53 of 82
QUIAO V. QUIAO
G.R. No 176556,
[July 04, 2012]
FACTS:
Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido).
RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor
children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the spouses
subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.
Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children because Brigido is the offending spouse.
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days later or after
more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a
Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.”
RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties
after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts.” It further held that after
determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children
because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant
to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code,
instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision
under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal
separation.

ISSUES:
1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal
partnership of gains is applicable in this case. – Art 129 will govern.
2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights over½of the properties in the conjugal
partnership– NO.
3. Is the computation of “net profits” earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the
computation of “net profits” earned in the absolute community? NO.

RATIO:
1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current family code, the default
rule is that In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property
relations between husband and wife.
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses’ marriage the operative law is already the
Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to
Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the
regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over
half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code,
which provides: “All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband
and wife.”
While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if there is due process and
such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that
the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in
his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the

Page 54 of 82
petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and
inventory of all the community properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for legal separation
was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial court
termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim
being deprived of his right to due process.

3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become joint
owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage,
and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code)
form the common mass of the couple’s properties. And when the couple’s marriage or community is
dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the
proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.
In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established that the spouses
have no separate properties, what will be divided equally between them is simply the “net profits.” And
since the legal separation½share decision of Brigido states that the in the net profits shall be awarded to
the children, Brigido will still be left with nothing.
On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article142
of the Civil Code, “the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property
and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of
the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts.
The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the
spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.
In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate
properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of
the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided
equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the
petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor
of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in
the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership
regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.

HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. et. al. v. SERVACIO and GO

G.R. No. 157537,
[September 7, 2011]
FACTS:
Gaviola and Protacio, Jr. entered into a contract ofsale of a parcel of land. 23 years later,
Protacio, Jr executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver affirming under oath that it was his father
Protacio Go, Sr.(Married to Marta Go) who purchased the said property. Subsequently, Protacio Go
together with his son Rito Go sold a portion of the property to herein respondent Ester Servacio. On
March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused to heed their
demand; hence this case for the annulment of sale of the property. The contention of the petitioner was
that following Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the property became conjugal property; and that the sale of
the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr.
and Marta was null and void pursuant to Article 130 of the Family Code. Servacio and Rito countered
that Article 130 of the Family Code was inapplicable; that the want of the liquidation prior to the sale did
not render the sale invalid, because the sale was valid to the extent of the portion that was finally
allotted to the vendors as his share; and that the sale did not also prejudice any rights of the petitioners
as heirs, considering that what the sale disposed of was within the aliquot portion of the property that
the vendors were entitled to as heirs.
The RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not
the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr. Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the
property. Aggrieved, the petitioners went all the way up to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:

Page 55 of 82
 Whether Article 130 of the Family Code was applicable.
HELD:
The appeal lacks merit.
Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the Family Code,any disposition of the conjugal
property after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation;
otherwise, the disposition is void. Upon Marta’s death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved,
pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among
Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal
partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation.
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta’s share in the
conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s share without
an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then,
all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s share. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his
undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest,
but not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners
without the consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-
owners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Marta’s share.
Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability of the rules on dissolution
of the conjugal partnership is “without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws.”
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of
possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-
owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to
remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra]
In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of
any portion that might not be validly sold to her.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 198908, August 03, 2015 ]
VIRGINIA OCAMPO, PETITIONER, VS. DEOGRACIO OCAMPO, RESPONDENT.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
Decision[1] dated August 11, 2010 and Resolution[2] dated October 5, 2011, respectively, of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 82318, which denied the petitioner's appeal and motion for
reconsideration.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On September 10, 1990, petitioner Virginia Sy Ocampo (Virginia) filed a Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of her Marriage with Deogracio Ocampo (Deogracio) before Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 87, on the ground of psychological incapacity, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-90-6616.[3]
On January 22, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision[4] declaring the marriage between
Virginia and Deogracio as null and void, the dispositive portion of which reads:
As to the couple's property relations, their conjugal partnership of gains shall necessarily be
dissolved and liquidated but since the petitioner has not submitted any detailed and formal listing or
inventory of such property, the court cannot act now on the liquidation aspect. The parties are given
thirty (30) days to submit an inventory of their conjugal partnership for the purpose of liquidation.
The decision became final, since no party appealed the judgment annulling the marriage.
On March 31, 1999, the trial court directed the parties to submit a project of partition of their
inventoried properties, and if they failed to do so, a hearing will be held on the factual issues with regard
to said properties. Having failed to agree on a project of partition of their conjugal properties, hearing
ensued where the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective stand.
On January 13, 2004, the trial court rendered the assailed Order[6] stating that the properties
declared by the parties belong to each one of them on a 50-50 sharing.
On February 2, 2004, Virginia filed a Notice of Appeal before the trial court.

Page 56 of 82
 On February 13, 2004, Deogracio filed a Motion to Deny and/or Dismiss the Notice of Appeal
and for immediate execution pursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-1-10.
On February 20, 2004, the trial court denied the aforesaid motion to deny and/or dismiss the
notice of appeal for lack of merit.
On March 4, 2004, Deogracio filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On March 22, 2004, the trial
court denied anew the motion for reconsideration.
In the disputed Decision dated August 11, 2010, the Court of Appeals denied Virginia's appeal.
Virginia moved for reconsideration, but was denied in a Resolution dated October 5, 2011.
ISSUE:
Thus, the instant petition for review substantially questioning whether respondent should be
deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership of gains by reason of bad faith and psychological
perversity.
HELD:
The petition lacks merit.
While Virginia and Deogracio tied the marital knot on January 16, 1978, it is still the Family Code
provisions on conjugal partnerships, however, which will govern the property relations between
Deogracio and Virginia even if they were married before the effectivity of the Family Code.
Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to conjugal
partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquired
under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during
the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. Hence, the burden of proof is on the party
claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the requirement that the properties
must first be proven to have been acquired during the marriage before they are presumed conjugal.[7]
The applicable law, however, in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and
liability is concerned, is Article 129[8] of the Family Code in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code.[9]
The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void under Article 36[10] of the
Family Code, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.[11] Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void, as in this case.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in
equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the
termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or
waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.[12]
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal
impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or
without the benefit of marriage. It is clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to operate, the man and the
woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void, as in the instant
case. The term "capacitated" in the first paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal capacity of a
party to contract marriage. Any impediment to marry has not been shown to have existed on the part of
either Virginia or Deogracio. They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife. However, their
marriage was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.[13]

Page 57 of 82
 From the foregoing, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry should,
therefore, be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate
in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said
party's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household. Efforts in the care and
maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common
property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry.[14]

Thus, the trial court and the appellate court correctly held that the parties will share on equal
shares considering that Virginia failed to prove that the properties were acquired solely on her own
efforts, to wit:
This Court keenly observes that only testimonial evidence was presented by the parties
respectively, to prove and dispute the claim of the other with regard to the properties and assets
acquired during the marriage. In the absence, therefore, of any documentary evidence to prove the
contrary, all the properties acquired by the spouses during the marriage are presumed conjugal. Further,
the testimonial evidence adduced by the petitioner aimed at establishing that respondent took no part
in acquiring said properties failed to convince this Court that the latter be given only a meager share
thereof.
While it may be true that management of the businesses referred to herein may have been
actively undertaken by the petitioner, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioner was able to do so without the
invaluable help of respondent. Even a plain housewife who stays all the time in the house and take[s]
care of the household while the husband indulges in lucrative and gainful activities is entitled to a share
in the same proportion the husband is, to the property or properties acquired by the marriage. In the
same breadth, respondent must be considered to be entitled to the same extent. Petitioner's claim that
the seed money in that business was provided by her mother and that, had it not been for that reason,
the properties now subject of controversy could not have been acquired. That may be true but the Court
is not prone to believe so because of insufficient evidence to prove such contention but petitioner's self-
serving allegations. Of course, attempts to establish respondent as an irresponsible and unfaithful
husband, as well as family man were made but the testimonies adduced towards that end, failed to fully
convince the Court that respondent should be punished by depriving him of his share of the conjugal
property because of his indiscretion.[16]
In the instant case, both the trial and appellate courts agreed that the subject properties were in
fact acquired during the marriage of Virginia and Deogracio. We give due deference to factual findings of
trial courts, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, as in this case. A reversal of this finding can
only occur if petitioners show sufficient reason for us to doubt its correctness. There is none, in this
case.
Likewise, we note that the former spouses both substantially agree that they acquired the
subject properties during the subsistence of their marriage.[17] The certificates of titles and tax
declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code.
All properties acquired by the spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose name the properties are
registered, are presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise. The presumption is not rebutted by the
mere fact that the certificate of title of the property or the tax declaration is in the name of one of the
spouses only. Article 116 expressly provides that the presumption remains even if the property is
"registered in the name of one or both of the spouses."[18] Thus, the failure of Virginia to rebut this
presumption, said properties were obtained by the spouses' joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
jointly owned by them in equal shares. Accordingly, the partition of the former spouses' properties on
the basis of co-ownership, as ordered by the RTC and the appellate court, should be affirmed, and not
on the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 11, 2010 and the Resolution
dated October 5, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82318 are AFFIRMED. The case is
REMANDED to the trial court for proper disposition.

G.R. No. 202932

October 23, 2013

Page 58 of 82
EDILBERTO U. VENTURA JR., Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES PAULINO and EVANGELINE ABUDA, Respondents.
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the Decision1 dated 9 March 2012 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 92330 and the Resolution2 dated 3 August 2012 denying the motion for
reconsideration. The Decision and Resolution dismissed the Appeal dated 23 October 2009 and affirmed
with modification the Decision3 dated 24 November 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
32 (RTC-Manila).

The Facts
The RTC-Manila and the CA found the facts to be as follows:
Socorro Torres (Socorro) and Esteban Abletes (Esteban) were married on 9 June 1980. Although Socorro
and Esteban never had common children, both of them had children from prior marriages: Esteban had
a daughter named Evangeline Abuda (Evangeline), and Socorro had a son, who was the father of
Edilberto U. Ventura, Jr. (Edilberto), the petitioner in this case.
Evidence shows that Socorro had a prior subsisting marriage to Crispin Roxas (Crispin) when she married
Esteban. Socorro married Crispin on 18 April 1952. This marriage was not annulled, and Crispin was alive
at the time of Socorro’s marriage to Esteban.
Esteban’s prior marriage, on the other hand, was dissolved by virtue of his wife’s death in 1960.
According to Edilberto, sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of a lot situated at 2492 State
Alley, Bonifacio Street, Vitas, Tondo, Manila (Vitas property). The remaining portion was thereafter
purchased by Evangeline on her father’s behalf sometime in 1970.4 The Vitas property was covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 141782, dated 11 December 1980, issued to "Esteban Abletes, of legal
age, Filipino, married to Socorro Torres."5
Edilberto also claimed that starting 1978, Evangeline and Esteban operated small business
establishments located at 903 and 905 Delpan Street, Tondo, Manila (Delpan property).6
On 6 September 1997, Esteban sold the Vitas and Delpan properties to Evangeline and her husband,
Paulino Abuda (Paulino).7 According to Edilberto: when Esteban was diagnosed with colon cancer
sometime in 1993, he decided to sell the Delpan and Vitas properties to Evangeline. Evangeline
continued paying the amortizations on the two (2) properties situated in Delpan Street. The
amortizations, together with the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php 200,000.00), which
Esteban requested as advance payment, were considered part of the purchase price of the Delpan
properties. Evangeline likewise gave her father Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) for the purchase of
the Vitas properties and she shouldered his medical expenses.8
Esteban passed away on 11 September 1997, while Socorro passed away on 31 July 1999.
Sometime in 2000, Leonora Urquila (Leonora), the mother of Edilberto, discovered the sale. Thus,
Edilberto, represented by Leonora, filed a Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Sale before the RTC-
Manila. Edilberto alleged that the sale of the properties was fraudulent because Esteban’s signature on
the deeds of sale was forged. Respondents, on the other hand, argued that because of Socorro’s prior
marriage to Crispin, her subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor
her heirs can claim any right or interest over the properties purchased by Esteban and respondents.9
The RTC-Manila dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
The RTC-Manila ruled that the marriage between Socorro and Esteban was void from the beginning.10
Article 83 of the Civil Code, which was the governing law at the time Esteban and Socorro were married,
provides:
The RTC-Manila ruled that the lack of a judicial decree of nullity does not affect the status of the union.
It applied our ruling in Niñal v. Badayog:12
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the
nullity of a marriage. x x x
In its Decision17 dated 9 March 2012, the CA sustained the decision of the RTC-Manila. The dispositive
portion of the CA Decision reads:

The Ruling of this Court

Page 59 of 82
We deny the petition.
Edilberto admitted that in unions between a man and a woman who are incapacitated to marry
each other, the ownership over the properties acquired during the subsistence of that relationship shall
be based on the actual contribution of the parties. He even quoted our ruling in Borromeo v. Descallar24
in his petition:
It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition
of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal
contribution do not apply.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas property shows that the parcel of
land is co-owned by Esteban and Socorro because: (1) the Transfer Certificate of Title was issued on 11
December 1980, or several months after the parties were married; and (2) title to the land was issued to
"Esteban Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro Torres."26
We disagree. The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone.1âwphi1
The phrase "married to Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show that
Socorro co-owned the property.27 The evidence on record also shows that Esteban acquired ownership
over the Vitas property prior to his marriage to Socorro, even if the certificate of title was issued after
the celebration of the marriage. Registration under the Torrens title system merely confirms, and does
not vest title. This was admitted by Edilberto on page 9 of his petition wherein he quotes an excerpt of
our ruling in Borromeo:
Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of confirming the fact of its
existence with notice to the world at large. Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere
possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that
respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and
absolutely make her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent.
Edilberto claims that Esteban s actual contribution to the purchase of the Delpan property was
not sufficiently proven since Evangeline shouldered some of the amortizations. Thus, the law presumes
that Esteban and Socorro jointly contributed to the acquisition of the Del pan property.
We cannot sustain Edilberto s claim. Both the RTC-Manila and the CA found that the Delpan
property was acquired prior to the marriage of Esteban and Socorro. Furthermore, even if payment of
the purchase price of the Delpan property was made by Evangeline, such payment was made on behalf
of her father.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 9 March 2012 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 92330 is AFFIRMED.

SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and
EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA,
G.R. No. 171914,
July 23, 2014,
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law.
Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos
submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial approval,
and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision
promulgated on November 11, 2005,[1] whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification
the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati City.
[2] The CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the husband in a condominium
unit, and in the law books of the husband acquired during the second marriage.
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip,
Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with his first
wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially married in a civil

Page 60 of 82
ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Parañaque, Rizal on September 10, 1947 and later
solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948. In
ATTY. LUNA's marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan
Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L.
Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA
eventually agreed to live apart from each other in February 1966 and agreed to separation of property,
to which end, they entered into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to
dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from
the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto.
Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY.
LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD
returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko
(LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.
ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz
and used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted until the death
of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks, office
furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA's son of the
first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit belonging
to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz
& Associates.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law books,
office furniture and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the heirs
of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, on September 10, 1999, docketed as Civil Case
No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired during the existence of
the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that since they had no
children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent
of ¾ pro-indiviso share consisting of her ½ share in the said properties plus her ½ share in the net estate
of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to her in the latter's last will and testament; and that the heirs of
ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her share in the subject properties.
The complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the ¾ portion of the subject
properties; that the same be partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals on the condominium unit
pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be appointed to preserve ad
administer the subject properties; and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay attorney's fees
and costs of the suit to SOLEDAD.
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by
Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage involving
Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial
approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent
marriage.
Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to Soledad was void for being bigamous, on the ground that
the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered
by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna
Given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the presumption
that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds and effort remained. It should
then be justly concluded that the properties in litis legally pertained to their conjugal partnership of
gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole ownership of the 25/100 pro indiviso share of
Atty. Luna in the condominium unit, and of the law books pertained to the respondents as the lawful
heirs of Atty. Luna.

SPOUSES CHARLIE FORTALEZA and OFELIA FORTALEZA

Page 61 of 82
v.
SPOUSES RAUL LAPITAN and RONA LAPITAN
15 August 2012 | Del Castillo,
FACTS:
Sps. Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza obtained a loan from Sps. Rolando and Amparo Lapitan in the amount
of P1.2M subject to 34% interest per annum. As security, Sps. Fortaleza executed a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over their residential house & lot in Barrio Anos, Los Baños, Laguna. When Sps. Fortaleza
failed to pay their indebtedness including interests and penalties, the creditors Lapitan applied for
extrajudicial foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage before the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-
Officio Sheriff of Calamba City. At the auction sale, the creditor’s son Dr. Raul Lapitan and his wife Rona
emerged as the highest bidders at the amount ofP2.5M. They were then issued a Certificate of Sale
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Calamba City and annotated at the back of the TCT. The one-
year redemption period expired without the spouses Fortaleza redeeming the mortgage. Spouses Raul
and Rona Lapitan executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership and caused the cancellation of the
TCT held by Sps. Fortaleza and the registration of the subject property in their names under a new TCT.
Despite the foregoing, Sps. Fortaleza refused the Sps. Lapitan’s formal demand to vacate and surrender
possession of the property.
 Sps. Lapitan filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of writ of possession with RTC, Br35 of Calamba
City, alleging that as new registered owners of the subject property, they were entitled to its possession.
Sps. Fortaleza questioned the validity of the real estate mortgage and the foreclosure sale. They argued
that the mortgage was void because the creditors bloated the principal amount by the imposition of
exorbitant interest. RTC: Ordered issuance of a writ of possession ministerial duty of the court since the
redemption period had expired &a new title had already been issued in the name of Sps. Lapitan. Sps.
Fortaleza’s MR: Subject property is their family home and is exempt from foreclosure sale. MR denied.
CA: Dismissed the appeal and affirmed RTC Ruling.
ISSUE:
 W/N the subject property is a family home exempt from forced sale.
RULING:
No.
 As a rule, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment. However, Article 155(3)
of the Family Code explicitly allows the forced sale of a family home “for debts secured by mortgages on
the premises before or after such constitution.” 
In this case, there is no doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily executed on January 28, 1998 a deed
of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property which was even notarized by their original counsel
of record.
And assuming that the property is exempt from forced sale, spouses Fortaleza did not set up and
prove to the Sheriff such exemption from forced sale before it was sold at the public auction . As
elucidated in
Honrado v. Court of Appeals: While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article
153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the
sale of the property at public auction.
Failure to do so would stop the party from later claiming the exemption.
Certainly, reasonable time for purposes of the law on exemption does not mean a time after the
expiration of the one-year period for a judgment debtor to redeem the property. The spouses Fortaleza
neither filed an action nor made a formal offer to redeem the subject property accompanied by an
actual and simultaneous tender of payment. It is also undisputed that they allowed the one-year period
to lapse from the registration of the certificate of sale without redeeming the mortgage.
For all intents and purposes, spouses Fortaleza have waived or abandoned their right of redemption.
 Although the rule on redemption is liberally interpreted in favor of the original owner of the property,
we cannot apply the privilege of liberality to accommodate the Sps. Fortaleza due to their negligence or
omission to exercise the right of redemption within the prescribed period without justifiable cause.

DE MESA V. ACERO

Page 62 of 82
G.R. No. 185064,
[January 16, 2012]
DOCTRINE:
Rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution:
First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3,
1988 must be constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution;
Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was
constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;

Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by
operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the
Family Code.
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family
Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the
sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not sufficient
that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for
exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff.

FACTS:
Araceli De Mesa is married to Ernesto De Mesa.They purcahsed a parcel of land located in
Meycauayan, Bulacan. A house was contracted in the said property, which became their family home. A
year after, Arceli contracted a loan in the amount of P100,000 from Claudio Acero, which was secured
by a mortgage on the said parcel of land and house. Araceli issued a check for the payment of the loan.
When Acero presented the check to the bank it was dishonored because the checking account was
already closed. Acero demanded payment. However, Spouses De Mesa still failed to pay. Acero filed a
complaint for violation of B.P. 22 in the RTC. The RTC acquitted the Spouses but ordered them to pay
Acero P100,000 plus legal interest. A writ of execution was issued to levy on the said property.
The house and lot was sold in the public auction and Acero was the highest bidder. Acero leased
the property to Juanito Oliva, who defaulted payment for several years. Oliva contends that the Acero
spouses are not the owners of the property.
The MTC rendered a Decision, giving due course to Spouses Acero’s complaint and ordering the
Spouses De Mesa and Oliva to vacate the subject property. Spouses De Mesa contend that they are the
rightful owners of the property. The MTC also stated that from the time a Torrens title over the subject
property was issued in Claudio’s name up to the time the complaint for ejectment was filed, the
petitioners never assailed the validity of the levy made by the Sheriff, the regularity of the public sale
that was conducted thereafter and the legitimacy of Acero’s Torrens title that was resultantly issued.
Spouses De Mesa filed an action to nullify the TCT issued to Acero. Spouses De Mesa contend
that the subject property is a family home, which is exempt from execution under the Family Code and,
thus, could not have been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying the writ of execution. RTC
dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property, as a family home, may be subject to execution in this case.

HELD:
YES, the subject property is family home but is subject to execution.In general, the family home is
exempt from execution. However, the person claiming this privilege must assert it at the time it was
levied or within a reasonable time thereafter.

RATIO:

Page 63 of 82
For the family home to be exempt from execution,distinction must be made as to what law applies
based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment
debtor or his successors claiming such privilege.
The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution, could
be summarized as follows:
First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988
must be constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions
of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution;
Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are
automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was
constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;

Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by
operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the
Family Code.
Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987 when Spouses De Mesa
got married. There was no showing, however, that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted
as a family home in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code took
effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became a family home by operation of law and was thus
prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners were thus correct in asserting that the subject
property was a family home.
Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and, thus, should have been exempt from
execution, Spouses De Mesa should have asserted the subject property being a family home and its
being exempted from execution at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter. They
are stopped from claiming the exemption of the property from execution.

EULOGIO VS BELL
GR NO. 186322
JULY 8, 2015

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] in CA-G.R. SP
No. 87531 which granted the Petition for Certiorari filed by respondents and enjoined the execution sale
of their family home for the satisfaction of the money judgment awarded to petitioners in Civil Case No.
4581, and the Resolution[2] which denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
FACTS:
Respondents Paterno William Bell, Jr., Florence Felicia Victoria Bell, Paterno Ferdinand Bell III,
and Paterno Benerano IV (the Bell siblings) are the unmarried children of respondent Spouses Paterno C.
Bell and Rogelia Calingasan-Bell (Spouses Bell). In 1995, the Bell siblings lodged a Complaint for
annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against petitioners Enrico S.
Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio (the Eulogios). It was docketed as Civil Case No. 4581 at the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Batangas City, Branch 84. The Complaint sought the annulment of the contract of sale
executed by Spouses Bell over their 329-square-meter residential house and lot, as well as the
cancellation of the title obtained by petitioners by virtue of the Deed.
The RTC granted respondents' prayers, but declared Spouses Bell liable to petitioners in the
amount of PI million plus 12% interest per annum. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated 15 July
1998 reads as
Accordingly, (1) the Register of Deeds of Batangas City is hereby ordered to cancel Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-131472 in the name of defendants Enrico S. Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio and to reconstitute
(sic) Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-680-(5997) as "family home" of the plaintiffs Florence Felicia
Victoria C. Bell, Paterno William C. Bell Jr., Paterno Ferdinand C. Bell III, Paterno Benerano C. Bell IV and

Page 64 of 82
fourth party plaintiffs Paterno C. Bell Sr. and Rogelia Calingasan Bell; or in the alternative to issue a new
Transfer Certificate of Title under the same tenor;
On 9 June 2004 the RTC issued a Writ of Execution, as a result of which respondents' property
covered by the newly reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 54208 [formerly RT-680
(5997)] was levied on execution. Upon motion by respondents, the trial court, on 31 August 2004,
ordered the lifting of the writ of execution on the ground that the property was a family home.[6]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the lifting of the writ of execution. Invoking
Article 160 of the Family Code, they posited that the current market value of the property exceeded the
statutory limit of P300,000 considering that it was located in a commercial area, and that Spouses Bell
had even sold it to them for P1 million.[7]

The RTC, on 13 October 2004, set the case for hearing to determine the present value of the family
home of respondents. It also appointed a Board of Appraisers to conduct a study on the prevailing
market value of their house and lot.[8]
Respondents sought reconsideration of the above directives and asked the RTC to cite
petitioners for contempt because of forum-shopping.[9] They argued that petitioners' bid to determine
the present value of the subject property was just a ploy to re-litigate an issue that had long been
settled with finality.
The RTC, however, denied the Motion for Reconsideration[10] of respondents and directed the
commissioners to canvass prospective buyers of their house and lot.[11]
On 23 November 2004, respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Injunction before the CA,
[12] where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87531.
On 31 July 2008, the CA rendered its Decision granting respondents' Petition for Certiorari, but it
rejected their theory that res judicata had already set in.
The appellate court ruled that the RTC Decision, which had become final and executory, only
declared respondents' house and lot as a family home. Since the issue of whether it may be sold in
execution was incidental to the execution of the aforesaid Decision, there was as yet no res judicata.
Still, the CA found that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
execution sale of the subject family home after finding that its present value exceeded the statutory
limit. The basis for the valuation of a family home under Article 160, according to the appellate court, is
its actual value at the time of its constitution and not the market/present value; therefore, the trial
court's order was contrary to law.[17]
Issues
The issues to be resolved are: (1) whether petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping; (2) whether a
hearing to determine the value of respondents' family home for purposes of execution under Article 160
of the Family Code is barred under the principle of res judicata; and (3) whether respondents' family
home may be sold on execution under Article 160 of the Family Code.

The Court's Ruling

The Court denies the Petition for lack of merit.
Petitioners are not guilty of forum-shopping.
The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment through means other than by appeal or certiorari.[20] Forum shopping does not apply to
cases that arise from an initiatory or original action that has been elevated by way of appeal or certiorari
to higher or appellate courts or authorities. This is so because the issues in the appellate courts
necessarily differ from those in the lower court, and the appealed cases are but a continuation of the
original case and treated as only one case.[21]
Respondents contend that the Decision in Civil Case No. 4581, which declared that property in
dispute was a family home, had long attained finality. Accordingly, respondents maintain that
petitioners' bid to re-litigate the present value of the property in the course of the execution
proceedings is barred by res judicata, and that petitioners should be cited for contempt of court because
of forum-shopping.[22]

Page 65 of 82
 Petitioners' bid to satisfy the above judgment cannot be considered an act of forum shopping.
Simply, the execution of a decision is just the fruit and end of a suit and is very aptly called the life of the
law.[24] It is not separate from the main case. Similarly, the filing of the instant Petition as a
continuation of the execution proceedings does not constitute forum shopping. Seeking a reversal of an
adverse judgment or order by appeal or certiorari does not constitute forum shopping. Such remedies
are sanctioned and provided for by the rules.[25]
Indeed, as will be presently discussed, the causes of action in the main proceedings in Civil Case
No. 4581 and the consequent execution proceedings are identical. Suffice it to say, however, that the
danger of a multiplicity of suits upon one and the same cause of action, which the judicial policy against
forum shopping seeks to prevent, does not exist in this case.
Re-litigating the issue of the value of respondents' family home is barred by res judicata.
In this case, the trial court's final decision in Civil Case No. 4581 bars petitioners' move to have the
property in dispute levied on execution.

There is no question that the main proceedings in Civil Case No. 4581 and the subsequent execution
proceedings involved the same parties[31] and subject matter.[32] For these reasons, respondents
argue that the execution sale of the property in dispute under Article 160 of the Family Code is barred
by res judicata, since the trial court has already determined that the value of the property fell within the
statutory limit.
The CA held that the trial court's Decision, which is indisputably final, only settled the issue of
whether the property in dispute was a family home. The CA ruled thus: We rule that there is no res
judicata.
But the issue as to whether or not a family home could be the subject of an execution sale was
not resolved by the trial court. This issue[was] raised only when the writ of execution was issued and
hence, [was not] resolved with finality. Thus, the issue before this Court is whether or not the [f]amily
[h]ome of petitioners under the facts and circumstances of the case could be the subject of a writ of
execution and sold at public auction.[33]
The Court disagrees with the CA.

"Cause of action" is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another.[34] It may be
argued that the cause of action in the main proceedings was the sale of the property in dispute, while in
the execution proceedings it was the indebtedness of Spouses Bell to petitioners.
The settled rule, however, is that identity of causes of action does not mean absolute identity.
Otherwise, a party could easily escape the operation of res judicata by changing the form of the action
or the relief sought.[35] The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain
whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity of the facts
essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the
two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case would be a bar to the subsequent
action. Hence, a party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of
presenting the case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall
not be twice litigated between the same parties or their privies.[36]
Applying the above guidelines, the Court finds that the entirety of Civil Case No. 4581 - including
the bid of petitioners to execute the money judgment awarded to them by the trial court - is founded on
a common cause of action. Records show that the sole evidence submitted by petitioners during the
execution proceedings was the Deed of Sale, which the trial court had nullified in the main proceedings.
Concomitantly, the very same defense raised by petitioners in the main proceedings, i.e., that they had
bought the property from Spouses Bell for P1 million - was utilized to substantiate the claim that the
current value of respondents' family home was actually PI million. In fact, the trial court's order for
respondents' family home to be levied on execution was solely based on the price stated in the nullified
Deed of Sale.
Res judicata applies, considering that the parties are litigating over the same property.
Moreover, the same contentions and evidence advanced by the petitioners to substantiate their claim
over respondents' family home have already been used to support their arguments in the main
proceedings.

Page 66 of 82
 Any lingering doubt on the application of res judicata to this case should be put to rest by the
trial court's discussion of the nature and alienability of the property in dispute, to wit:
The second issue is about the allegation of the plaintiffs that the family home which has been
constituted on the house and lot in question is exempt from alienation and that its value does not
exceed P300,000. Paterno Bell, Sr. testified that the two-storey house was built in 1947 and was made of
wood and hollow blocks. He inherited it in 1976 from his parents and has been living there with his
family. In 1976, when an extra-judicial settlement was made of the estate of his parents, the fair market
value of the house was P70,000.
The foregoing points plainly show that the issue of whether the property in dispute exceeded the
statutory limit of P300,000 has already been determined with finality by the trial court. Its finding
necessarily meant that the property is exempt from execution. Assuming for the sake of argument that
causes of action in the main proceedings and in the execution proceedings are different, the parties are
still barred from litigating the issue of whether respondents' family home may be sold on execution sale
under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.

Respondents' family home cannot be sold on execution under Article 160 of the Family Code.
Unquestionably, the family home is exempt from execution as expressly provided for in Article 153 of
the Family Code.[39]
It has been said that the family home is a real right that is gratuitous, inalienable and free from
attachment.[40] The great controlling purpose and policy of the Constitution is the protection or the
preservation of the homestead - the dwelling place. A houseless, homeless population is a burden upon
the energy, industry, and morals of the community to which it belongs. No greater calamity, not tainted
with crime, can befall a family than to be expelled from the roof under which it has been gathered and
sheltered.[41] The family home cannot be seized by creditors except in special cases.[42]
The nature and character of the property that debtors may claim to be exempt, however, are
determined by the exemption statute. The exemption is limited to the particular kind of property or the
specific articles prescribed by the statute; the exemption cannot exceed the statutory limit.[43]
To summarize, the exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or attachment is
limited to P300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas, unless those maximum values are
adjusted by law. If it is shown, though, that those amounts do not match the present value of the peso
because of currency fluctuations, the amount of exemption shall be based on the value that is most
favorable to the constitution of a family home. Any amount in excess of those limits can be applied to
the payment of any of the obligations specified in Articles 155 and 160.

Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons constituting it, its
owners, or any of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
provided the following conditions obtain: (a) the actual value of the property at the time of its
constitution has been determined to fall below the statutory limit; and (b) the improvement or
enlargement does not result in an increase in its value exceeding the statutory limit.[45] Otherwise, the
family home can be the subject of a forced sale, and any amount above the statutory limit is applicable
to the obligations under Articles 155 and 160.
Petitioners maintain that this case falls under the exceptions to the exemption of the family
home from execution or forced sale. They claim that the actual value of respondents' family home
exceeds the P300,000 limit in urban areas. This fact is supposedly shown by the Deed of Sale whereby
private respondents agreed to sell the property for PI million way back in 1995. Therefore, the RTC only
properly ordered the execution sale of the property under Article 160 to satisfy the money judgment
awarded to them in Civil Case No. 4581.[47]
As earlier discussed, it has been judicially determined with finality that the property in dispute is
a family home, and that its value at the time of its constitution was within the statutory limit. Moreover,
respondents have timely claimed the exemption of the property from execution.[48] On the other hand,
there is no question that the money judgment awarded to petitioners falls under the ambit of Article
160.
Notwithstanding petitioners' right to enforce the trial court's money judgment, however, they
cannot obtain its satisfaction at the expense of respondents' rights over their family home. It is

Page 67 of 82
axiomatic that those asserting the protection of an exception from an exemption must bring themselves
clearly within the terms of the exception and satisfy any statutory requirement for its enforcement.[49]
During the execution proceedings, none of those facts was alleged - much less proven - by
petitioners. The sole evidence presented was the Deed of Sale, but the trial court had already
determined with finality that the contract was null, and that the actual transaction was an equitable
mortgage. Evidently, when petitioners and Spouses Bell executed the Deed of Sale in 1990, the price
stated therein was not the actual value of the property in dispute.
The Court thus agrees with the CA's conclusion that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the sale on execution of the property in dispute under Article 160. The trial court
had already determined with finality that the property was a family home, and there was no proof that
its value had increased beyond the statutory limit due to voluntary improvements by respondents. Yet,
it ordered the execution sale of the property. There is grave abuse of discretion when one acts in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of one's judgment, as in this case in
which the assailed order is bereft of any factual or legal justification.[50]

PERLA V. BARING (G.R. NO. 172471;

NOVEMBER 12, 2012)
CASE DIGEST: ANTONIO PERLA v. MIRASOL BARING and RANDY PERLA

FACTS:
Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and petitioner Antonio Perla (Antonio) were allegedly
neighbors. Eventually, they became sweethearts. When Mirasol became pregnant, Antonio allegedly
assured her that he would support her. However, Antonio started to evade her.
Mirasol and her then minor son, Randy Perla (Randy), filed before the RTC a Complaint for support
against Antonio. Mirasol and Randy thus prayed that Antonio be ordered to support Randy. During the
trial, Mirasol presented Randys Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal Certificate indicating her and
Antonio as parents of the child. Mirasol testified that she and Antonio supplied the information in the
said certificates. The RTC rendered a decision ordering Antonio to support Randy, which was affirmed by
CA.
ISSUE:
Is Randy entitled for support from Antonio?
HELD:
Mirasol and Randy's Complaint for support is based on Randy's alleged illegitimate filiation to
Antonio. Hence, for Randy to be entitled for support, his filiation must be established with sufficient
certainty. The Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and
filiation. An order for x xx support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the
family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by
clear and convincing evidence.
In the case at bar, Mirasol and Randy failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio. The
Certificate of Live Birth and baptismal certificate of Randy have no probative value to establish Randys
filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the same. A certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the
putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. Also, while a baptismal certificate may
be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament
on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child's paternity. Thus, x xx
baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be
admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on the Court. However,
this rule admits of certain exceptions such as when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures or when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts. As this
case falls under these exceptions, the Court is constrained to re-examine the factual findings of the
lower courts. GRANTED.

Page 68 of 82
Aguilar vs. Siasat
G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015
Doctrine/s:
To repeat what was stated in De Jesus, filiation may be proved by an admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, and such
due recognition in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child,
and no further court action is required.
Facts:
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar died intestate without debts leaving two parcels
of land. Petitioner Rodolfo Aguilar filed a case for mandatory injunction with damages against
respondent Siasat alleging that he is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses. Thus, he
was entitled to the said parcels of land. Respondent on the other hand claimed that petitioner is not the
son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who was raised by the Aguilar
spouses out of generosity and kindness of heart. That petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the
Aguilar spouses and since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his wife, Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the latter
inherited the conjugal share of the former. RTC ruled that petitioner is not deemed vested with
sufficient interest in this action for failure to support evidentiary evidence to show his filiation to the
spouses. The decision of the RTC was affirmed in toto with stating that the use of a family surname
certainly does not establish pedigree. Hence, plaintiff-appellant’s evidence failed to hurdle the “high
standard of proof” required for the success of an action to establish one’s legitimate filiation when
relying upon the provisions regarding open and continuous possession or any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws.
Issue/s:
Whether or not SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit “G”) satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and
relationship under Article 172 of the Family Code particularly[paragraph] 3 thereof in conjunction with
Section 19 and Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
Thus, applying the foregoing pronouncement to the instant case, it must be concluded that
petitioner who was born on March 5, 1945, or during the marriage of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar[28] and before their respective deaths[29] has sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate
issue of the Aguilar spouses. As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilar's SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit "G")
satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172
of the Family Code; by itself, said document constitutes an "admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned."
Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live Birth since all the records
covering the period 1945-1946 of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed, which
necessitated the introduction of other documentary evidence particularly Alfredo Aguilar's SSS Form E-1
(Exhibit "G") to prove filiation. It was erroneous for the CA to treat said document as mere proof of
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under the second paragraph of Article
172 of the Family Code; it is evidence of filiation under the first paragraph thereof, the same being an
express recognition in a public instrument.
To repeat what was stated in De Jesus, filiation may be proved by an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned,
and such due recognition in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of
the child, and no further court action is required. And, relative to said form of acknowledgment, the
Court has further held that:
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules
respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private
handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation,
there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the
acknowledging parent; and

Page 69 of 82
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by
the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the "paramount consideration" in
resolving questions affecting him. Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child
of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
This case should not have been so difficult for petitioner if only he obtained a copy of his
Certificate of Live Birth from the National Statistics Office (NSO), since the Bacolod City Civil Registry
copy thereof was destroyed. He would not have had to go through the trouble of presenting other
documentary evidence; the NSO copy would have sufficed. This fact is not lost on petitioner; the
Certification dated January 27, 1996 issued by the Bacolod City Civil Registry (Exhibit "Q") contained just
such an advice for petitioner to proceed to the Office of the Civil Registrar General at the NSO in Manila
to secure a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth, since for every registered birth in the country, a copy of
the Certificate of Live Birth is submitted to said office.
As to petitioner's argument that respondent has no personality to impugn his legitimacy and
cannot collaterally attack his legitimacy, and that the action to impugn his legitimacy has already
prescribed pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, the Court has held before that Article
263[31] refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person is not a
man's child by his wife. However, the present case is not one impugning petitioner's legitimacy.
Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not
a child of Jose at all.[32]
Finally, if petitioner has shown that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses, then he is
as well heir to the latter's estate. Respondent is then left with no right to inherit from her aunt
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar's estate, since succession pertains, in the first place, to the descending direct
line.[33]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The August 30, 2006 Decision and December 20, 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 64229, as well as the August 17, 1999 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 49 in Civil Case No. 96-9591 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent Edna G. Siasat is hereby ordered to SURRENDER to the petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar
the owner's duplicates of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462) 1070.

JESSE U. LUCAS V. JESUS S. LUCAS

G.R. No. 190710,
[June 6, 2011]
FACTS:
Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of
Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse alleged that he is the son of his
mother Elsie who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He also submitted
documents which include (a) petitioner’s certificate of live birth; (b) petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c)
petitioner’s college diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a
degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate of
Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles
from different newspapers about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.
Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting that the
petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him. Meanwhile, Jesse
filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and
hence set the case for hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot
be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father.
Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse
failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the
case of Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima facie case, affirmative defences, presumption of legitimacy, and
physical resemblance between the putative father and the child.
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A new hearing
was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant

Page 70 of 82
petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that the four significant
aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and held that DNA testing should not be allowed
when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.
ISSUE:
Whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order
HELD:
Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA testing
since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner.
RATIO:
Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. The statement in
Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which
parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by
these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective
evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the
proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s observation that
petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case is herefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a
party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.

Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the
accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the appropriate court may, at any time, either
motu proprio or on application of any person, who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a
DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the
following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was not
previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA
testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a
scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information
that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which
the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule
shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party,
including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This does not mean,
however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said
conditions are established.

Grande v. Antonio
GR. No. 206248,
18 February 2014
FACTS:
Respondent [the father] filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the
two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to
Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial
conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his children’s surname
as Antonio citing the “best interest of the child”. Respondent’s petition was granted by RTC and
modified by the CA. In CA’s decision, it reversed the granting of the custody of the two children to the
respondent but affirmed the surname change to of the same to Antonio. Aggrieved, wife filed petition
for certiorari in SC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the father can exercise parental authority and consequently, custody, over his
illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation.
Whether or not the father has the right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate
children upon his recognition of their filiation.
RULING:

Page 71 of 82
 On the first issue, no, petitioner cannot exercise custody over the children.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence, respondent’s prayer
has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor
children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.
Respondent Antonio failed to prove that petitioner Grande committed any act that adversely affected
the welfare of the children or rendered her unsuitable to raise the minors; she cannot be deprived of
her sole parental custody over their children.
On the second issue, the answer is still a no.
An acknowledged illegitimate child isunder no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father.
Even if IRR of RA 9255 provides that a surname change “shall” be necessary upon recognition of
paternity, it is of no moment. The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of “may” in Art. 176
rendering the use of an illegitimate father’s surname discretionary governand illegitimate children are
given the choice on the surnames by which they will be known. Case is remanded to lower court to
determine the choice of said children.

SUSAN LIM-LUA VS. DANILO LUA

G.R. Nos. 175279-80
June 5, 2013
FACTS:
Susan Lim-Lua filed a petition against Danilo Lua for a declaration of nullity of marriage with a
prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children amounting to P500,000.00 per month.
Citing respondent’s huge earnings from salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses here
and abroad.
After due hearing, RTC cited Art. 203 of the Family Code, stating that support is demandable from the
time plaintiff needed the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand, and thus
also granted support pendente lite of P250,000.00.
The husband filed for Motion for Reconsideration asserting that petitioner is not entitled to spousal
support considering that she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children and
respondent has continued to support the family for their sustenance and well- being in accordance with
family’s social and financial standing.
The husband also assert that the P250,000 monthly support and the 1,750,000.00 retroactive support is
unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for not having considered the needs of the
respondent
MR denied thus he appealed to the CA wherein it reduced the monthly support to P115,000.00 which
ruling was no longer questioned by both parties.
The controversy between the parties resurfaced when respondent’s compliance with the final CA
decision indicated that he deducted from the total amount in arrears (P2,645,000.00) the sum of
P2,482,348.16, representing the value of the two cars for the children, their cost of maintenance and
advances are given to the petitioner and his children.
CA ruled in favor of the husband that the expenses incurred by the husband be considered advances
which may be properly deducted from the support in arrears due to the petitioner and the two children.
Thus ordered the deduction of the amount of PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears
of Danilo to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two children.
ISSUE:
Whether certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted from the total
support in arrears owing to the petitioner and her children.
RULING.
The SC partly granted CA’s decision. First, is to resume payment of his monthly support of
PhP115,000.00 pesos starting from the time payment of this amount was deferred by him. Second, that

Page 72 of 82
only the amount of Php 648,102.29 may be allowed as deductions from the accrued support pendente
lite for petitioner and her children and not PhP3,428,813.80 (rendered by the CA).

Calderon v. Roxas
G.R. No. 185595,
January 9, 2013
Facts:
Petitioner, Ma. Carminia C. Calderon and private respondent Jose Antonio F. Roxas, were married on
December 4, 1985and their union produced four children.
On January 16, 1998, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
On May 19, 1998, the trial court issued an Order granting petitioner’s application for support pendente
lite.
The aforesaid order and subsequent orders for support pendente lite were the subject of G.R. No.
139337 entitled “Ma. Carminia C.Roxas v. Court of Appeals and Jose Antonio F. Roxas” decided by this
Court on August 15, 2001.
The Decision in said case declared that “the proceedings and orders issued by the trial court in the
application for support pendente lite (and the main complaint for annulment of marriage) in the re-filed
case, that is, in Civil Case No. 97-0608 were not rendered null and void by the omission of a statement in
the certificate of non-forum shopping regarding the prior filing and dismissal without prejudice of Civil
Case No. 97-0523 which involves the same parties.”
The assailed orders for support pendente lite were thus reinstated and the trial court resumed hearing
the main case.
On motion of petitioner’s counsel, the trial court issued an Order dated October 11, 2002 directing
private respondent to give support in the amount of P42,292.50 per month starting April 1, 1999
pursuant to the May 19, 1998 Order. On February 11, 2003, private respondent filed a Motion to Reduce
Support citing, among other grounds, that theP42,292.50 monthly support for the children as fixed by
the court was even higher than his then P20,800.00 monthly salary as city councilor.
After hearing, the trial court issued an Order dated March 7, 2005 granting the motion to reduce
support and denying petitioner’s motion for spousal support, increase of the children’s monthly support
pendente lite and support-in-arrears.
Petitioner’s motion for partial reconsideration of the March 7, 2005 Order was denied on May 4, 2005.In
her appeal brief, petitioner emphasized that she is not appealing the Decision dated May 16, 2005 which
had become final as no appeal therefrom had been brought by the parties or the City Prosecutor or the
Solicitor General.
Petitioner pointed out that her appeal is “from the RTC Order dated March 7, 2005, issued prior to the
rendition of the decision in the main case”, as well as the May 4, 2005 Order denying her motion for
partial reconsideration. By Decision dated September 9, 2008, the CA dismissed the appeal on the
ground that granting the appeal would disturb the RTC Decision of May 16, 2005 which had long
become final and executory.
The CA further noted that petitioner failed to avail of the proper remedy to question an interlocutory
order. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the matter of support pendente lite are interlocutory or final.
Held:
Petitioner contends that the CA failed to recognize that the interlocutory aspect of the assailed orders
pertains only to private respondent’s motion to reduce support which was granted, and to her own
motion to increase support, which was denied. Petitioner points out that the ruling on support in arrears
which have remained unpaid, as well as her prayer for reimbursement/payment were in the nature of
final orders assailable by ordinary appeal. SC disagrees.
An interlocutory order merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to
resolve the merits of the case. In contrast, a judgment or order is considered final if the order disposes
of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of the same action.

Page 73 of 82
Clearly, whether an order or resolution is final or interlocutory is not dependent on compliance or
noncompliance by a party to its directive, as what petitioner suggests.
Moreover, private respondent’s obligation to give monthly support in the amount fixed by the RTC in
the assailed orders may be enforced by the court itself, as what transpired in the early stage of the
proceedings when the court cited the private respondent in contempt of court and ordered him
arrested for his refusal/failure to comply with the order granting support pendente lite. A few years
later, private respondent filed a motion to reduce support while petitioner filed her own motion to
increase the same, and in addition sought spousal support and support in arrears. This fact underscores
the provisional character of the order granting support pendente lite.
Petitioner’s theory that the assailed orders have ceased to be provisional due to the arrearages incurred
by private respondent is therefore untenable.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action
under Rule 65provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion.
Having chosen the wrong remedy in questioning the subject interlocutory orders of the RTC, petitioner's
appeal was correctly dismissed by the CA.

GR No. 206220,
Aug 19, 2015
LUIS UY v. SPS. JOSE LACSAMANA AND ROSAURA* MENDOZA +
FACTS:
The subject of the litigation involves a parcel of land known as Lot 5506 of the Cadastral Survey of
Batangas plan (LRC) SWO-2817, L.R. Case No. N-445, L.R.C. Record No. N-22499. The land, situated in
Barrio Alangilan, Batangas City, contains an area of 484 square meters under Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-24660.[4] The land was previously owned by spouses Anastacio Manuel and Mariquita de
Villa (Spouses Manuel) under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-2840.
On 4 May 1979, petitioner Luis Uy (Uy) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pallocan West,
Batangas City, Branch 4, a Complaint[5] for Declaration of Nullity of Documents with Damages against
respondents Petra Rosca (Rosca), and spouses Jose Lacsamana and Rosaura Mendoza (Spouses
Lacsamana).
In the Complaint, Uy alleged that he was the lawful husband of Rosca. He stated that they lived together
as husband and wife from the time they were married in 1944 until 1973 when they separated and lived
apart. Uy and Rosca had eight children.
Uy alleged that on 29 January 1964,[6] he and his wife acquired a 484 square meter residential land for a
consideration of P1,936 evidenced by a Deed of Sale[7] from the Spouses Manuel. The sellers' OCT No.
0-2840 was cancelled and TCT No. T-24660 was issued in the name of "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G.
Uy."

On 15 June 1964, Uy and Rosca allegedly purchased, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale,[8]
another residential land adjacent to the 484 square meter land from the spouses Felix Contreras and
Maxima de Guzman (Spouses Contreras). The second purchase consisted of 215 square meters, as
declared under Tax Declaration No. 61724, for a consideration of P700. Thereafter, a split level house
with a floor area of 208.50 square meters was constructed on the 484 square meter land.

Uy further alleged that Rosca, in gross and evident bad faith, executed and signed a false and simulated
Deed of Sale[9] dated 18 April 1979 on the 484 square meter land, together with the house erected
thereon, for a consideration of P80,000 in favor of Spouses Lacsamana.
Uy prayed that (1) the Deed of Sale dated 18 April 1979 executed by Rosca in favor of Spouses
Lacsamana be declared null and void with respect to his rights, interest, and ownership; (2) that
defendants be directed to pay, jointly and severally, to Uy the amounts of P100,000 as moral damages,
P10,000 as attorney's fees, P2,000 as expenses incident to litigation, plus costs of suit; (3) upon

Page 74 of 82
declaration of the nullity of the Deed of Sale, the Register of Deeds of Batangas City and the City
Assessor be directed to register Uy as the sole owner of the real properties; (4) if defendant Spouses
Lacsamana are found by the court to be buyers in good faith, Rosca be ordered to turn over to Uy the
entire proceeds of sale of the properties and be adjudged to pay the damages; and (5) that the sum of
P600,000 taken by Rosca from Uy be collated into the mass of the conjugal partnership properties.

In her Answer with Counterclaim dated 22 May 1979, Rosca denied the allegations of Uy and claimed
that she lawfully acquired the subject real properties using her paraphernal funds. Rosca added that she
was never married to Uy and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. In her
Counterclaim, Rosca prayed that the court award her (1) P200,000 as moral damages; (2) P100,000 as
exemplary damages; (3) P12,000 as attorney's fees; (4) P3,000 as incidental litigation expenses; and (5)
costs of suit. Spouses Lacsamana also filed their Answer with Counterclaim dated 21 May 1979 claiming
that they were buyers in good faith and for value and that they relied on the Torrens title which stated
that Rosca was the owner of the subject property.

In the meantime, Uy questioned the registrability of the Deed of Sale before the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Batangas City. The Register of Deeds elevated the matter, on consulta,[10] with the Land
Registration Commission (LRC) because of an affidavit subsequently filed by Uy contesting the sale and
alleging, among others, that the property was conjugal in nature and sold without his marital consent.

In a Resolution[11] dated 7 November 1979, the LRC decided in favor of registration stating that since
the property in question was registered in Rosca's name, such circumstance indicated that the property
belonged to Rosca, as her paraphernal property. The LRC added that litigious matters, such as a protest
from the other party based on justifiable and legal grounds, were to be decided not by the Register of
Deeds but by a court of competent jurisdiction.
On 18 February 1981, Uy died.[13] His two daughters, Lydia Uy Velasquez (Lydia) and Shirley Uy
Macaraig (Shirley) substituted him in the case. Fifteen years later or on 10 May 1996, Rosca also died.
[14] Earlier, respondent Jose Lacsamana died on 20 March 1991.[15]

Meanwhile, on 24 December 1982, Spouses Lacsamana sold the property to Corazon Buena (Buena)
through a Deed of Absolute Sale.[16] Thus, both Rosca and the Spouses Lacsamana were substituted by
Buena as respondent in this case.

During the trial, Uy presented the testimonies of his two daughters, Lydia and Shirley, as his own
witnesses, as well as Rosca, as an adverse witness.

Lydia testified that the Uy family lived in the house built on the land acquired by Uy and Rosca. She
alleged that the house existed until it was demolished by Buena's agent sometime in 2006. Lydia also
stated that the funds used to construct the family dwelling came from Uy's business. Shirley
corroborated the testimony of Lydia on all material points.

Rosca, on the other hand, testified that sometime before or during World War II, she and Uy cohabited
and settled in Batangas. The couple attempted to formalize their marital union with a marriage
ceremony. However, the celebration was not consummated because of the bombings which occurred
on the day of the ceremony. Likewise, they were unable to secure a marriage contract.

Rosca stated that on 29 January 1964, she alone purchased, as sole vendee, with money coming from
her own personal and paraphernal funds, the land covered by OCT No. 0-2840 and owned by Spouses
Manuel. Thereafter, on 15 June 1964, she again purchased, using her own personal and paraphernal
funds, the land adjacent to the first purchased property owned by Spouses Contreras and covered by
Tax Declaration No. 61724. Immediately after, she caused the construction of a split level house on the
land using her own paraphernal funds which became their family dwelling.

Page 75 of 82
Rosca alleged that Uy had an affair with another woman and sired children with her which led to their
physical separation before the year 1973. On 17 September 1976, Rosca obtained a real estate loan in
the amount of P50,000 from Philippine Banking Corporation (PBC) using the house and lot as collateral.
In support of this loan, Rosca executed an Affidavit of Ownership[17] dated 27 September 1976, stating
that (1) she was the lawful and sole owner of the 484 square meter land, together with the building
erected thereon, and (2) the land was registered under her name and that the phrase "Petra Rosca,
married to Luis G. Uy" in TCT No. T-24660 was merely a description of her status.

Defendants offered the testimony of Rosca, Atty. Teodulfo Dequito, Jr., Rosaura Mendoza, and Buena.

Atty. Teodulfo Dequito, Jr. testified that Uy questioned the registrability of the Deed of Sale before the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Batangas City. The Register of Deeds elevated the matter on consulta
with the LRC, which issued a Resolution dated 7 November 1979 recognizing Rosca as the sole registered
owner of the property.

Rosaura Mendoza testified that she and her husband purchased, in the amount of P80,000, the 484
square meter property of Rosca on 18 April 1979 through a Deed of Absolute Sale of House and Lot.[18]
The Registry of Deeds of Batangas City cancelled TCT No. T-24660 and issued TCT No. T-35[19] in favor of
the spouses. Then, Spouses Lacsamana mortgaged the property to PBC for P48,000. Upon full payment
of the mortgage debt on 15 April 1982, PBC issued a Release of Real Estate Mortgage.

Buena testified that she purchased the same property under TCT No. T-35 from Spouses Lacsamana on
24 December 1982 for a consideration of P80,000. Consequently, the Registry of Deeds of Batangas City
cancelled TCT No. T-35 and issued TCT No. T-3244[20] in her name. Likewise, the Assessor's Office of
Batangas City issued Tax Declaration No. 90210.[21]

Before the resolution of the case, Shirley and Lydia filed a Motion for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order. They claimed that Buena entered the property and caused the
construction of structures without any court order. Consequently, the RTC issued an Order dated 21
September 2007 granting the preliminary injunction. Thereafter, the case was submitted for resolution.

In a Decision[22] dated 21 April 2009, the RTC decided the case in favor of respondents. The lower court
found that (1) there was no valid marriage between Uy and Rosca; (2) the Deed of Sale executed by
Rosca over the house and lot in favor of Spouses Lacsamana was valid; and (3) both parties were not
entitled to their respective claims for damages.
Uy filed an appeal[24] with the CA. In a Decision[25] dated 14 September 2011, the CA affirmed the
ruling of the trial court. The appellate court found that respondents were able to overthrow the
presumption of marriage and that the subject property was Rosca's paraphernal property. The appellate
court also upheld the validity of the sale.
The Issue
The main issue for our resolution is whether the Deed of Sale dated 18 April 1979, executed by Rosca
alone, without Uy's consent, in favor of Spouses Lacsamana, is valid.
HELD:
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.

Uy contends that the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca is not valid for being simulated or fictitious for lack
of consideration and consent. Uy states that no proof was presented by Spouses Lacsamana to show
that they actually paid P80,000 to Rosca for the purchase of the property. Uy also insists that he did not
give his consent to the sale which prejudiced his rights and interest. Uy argues that Rosca did not give
physical possession of the house and lot to the alleged buyers. Further, Uy adds, without admitting that
the sale is valid, that the consideration paid was unreasonably low and unconscionable such that it
constitutes an equitable mortgage. Uy insists that Spouses Lacsamana and Buena cannot be considered
buyers in good faith.

Page 76 of 82
Respondents, on the other hand, assert that the contentions of Uy rely on the re-examination and re-
evaluation of the evidence of the parties which had previously been passed upon exhaustively by both
the trial and appellate courts. Respondents added that only questions of law may be raised under Rule
45. Since the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts were supported by substantial evidence
and none of the recognized exceptions allowing this Court to exercise its power to review is present,
then the petition should be dismissed.

We agree with respondents.

The issues raised by Uy had been thoroughly passed upon by the trial and appellate courts. We find no
reason to disturb their factual findings. In petitions for review on certiorari as a mode of appeal under
Rule 45, like in the present case, a petitioner can raise only questions of law. Here, Uy would like us to
review again the factual circumstances surrounding the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca with the
Spouses Lacsamana and to declare the Deed of Sale invalid for being simulated due to lack of
consideration and consent. Clearly, these are questions of fact which are within the purview of the trial
and appellate courts to determine. Also, the issues raised do not come within the purview of the
recognized exceptions[28] for this Court to take cognizance of the case. We have reiterated time and
again that this Court is not the proper venue to consider factual issues as it is not a trier of facts.

Here, the main issue in determining the validity of the sale of the property by Rosca alone is anchored
on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage. There is a presumption established in our Rules "that a
man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage."[29] Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage.[30] However, this
presumption may be contradicted by a party and overcome by other evidence.

Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. In Pugeda v. Trias,[31] we held that
testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage, as well as
the person who officiated at the solemnization of the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove
the fact of marriage.

Documentary evidence may also be shown. In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals,[32] we held that the best
documentary evidence of a marriage is the marriage contract itself. Under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage
Law of 1929,[33] as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 114,[34] which is applicable to the present
case being the marriage law in effect at the time Uy and Rosca cohabited, the marriage certificate,
where the contracting parties state that they take each other as husband and wife, must be furnished by
the person solemnizing the marriage to (1) either of the contracting parties, and (2) the clerk of the
Municipal Court of Manila or the municipal secretary of the municipality where the marriage was
solemnized. The third copy of the marriage contract, the marriage license and the affidavit of the
interested party regarding the solemnization of the marriage other than those mentioned in Section 5 of
the same Act shall be kept by the official, priest, or minister who solemnized the marriage.

Here, Uy was not able to present any copy of the marriage certificate which he could have sourced from
his own personal records, the solemnizing officer, or the municipal office where the marriage allegedly
took place. Even the findings of the RTC revealed that Uy did not show a single relevant evidence that he
was actually married to Rosca. On the contrary, the documents Uy submitted showed that he and Rosca
were not legally married to each other. The pertinent portions of the RTC Decision state:

x x x In the case under consideration, the presumption of marriage, on which plaintiff Uy anchored his
allegations, has been sufficiently offset. Records reveal that there is plethora of evidence showing that
plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca were never actually married to each other, to wit:

Page 77 of 82
First. In his Petition for Naturalization as a Filipino citizen filed before the then Court of First Instance of
Batangas on 12 November 1953, plaintiff Uy himself stated in the fifth paragraph of his Petition, to
quote: "I am married (not legally)."

Second. The Sworn Statement of no less than the Governor of the Province of Batangas executed in
support of the plaintiff Uy's Petition for Naturalization categorically states, in Nos. 2 and 4 thereof, that
plaintiff Uy was married (not legally).

Third. The Immigrant Certificate of Residence shows that as late as 9 October 1951, plaintiff Uy also
known by his Chinese name of Uy Suan Tee, regarded himself as "single" when filling up his civil status
therein.

Fourth. The Alien Certificate of Registration No. 83758 establishes that plaintiff Uy was an alien duly
registered with the Bureau of Immigration of the Philippines and that his civil status was single.

Fifth. The Affidavit of Vicente J. Caedo, a prominent citizen of Batangas, establishes in Nos. 2 and 4
thereof that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to defendant Rosca.

Sixth. The testimony of defendant Rosca as an adverse witness reveals that plaintiff Uy was not legally
married to her because their marriage was not consummated.

For his part, plaintiff Uy tried to justify the non-presentation of their marriage certificate by presenting
public documents, namely:

First. Decision in the case entitled: "In the matter of the Petition of Uy Suan Tee alias Luis G. Uy, to be
admitted a citizen of the Philippines";

Second. Certificate of Live Birth of Violeta Uy, daughter of plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca and the
descriptive word "legitimate" showing that Violeta Uy was legitimate;

Third. Death Claim under SSS Employee Compensation executed and signed by defendant Rosca, stating
that she is the wife of plaintiff Uy;

Fourth. Various pictures of the plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca with their children;

Fifth. Special Power of Attorney executed by defendant Rosca dated 19 July 1985 wherein she admitted
being the wife of plaintiff Uy;

Sixth. Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 3 August 1982 executed by defendant Rosca admitting she is the
widow of plaintiff Uy which was not testified to nor identified by Rosca;

Seventh. Affidavit of Ownership dated 27 September 1976 signed by defendant Rosca admitting her
status as married;

to establish the fact of his marriage with defendant Rosca. Likewise, plaintiff Uy presented defendant
Rosca as an adverse witness purportedly to elicit from her the fact of his marriage with the latter.
However, this presumption had been debunked by plaintiff Uy's own evidence and most importantly, by
the more superior evidence presented by the defendants.

While it is true that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca cohabited as husband and wife, defendant Rosca's
testimony revealed that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to her because their marriage was not
consummated. In People vs. Borromeo, this Court held that persons living together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, absent any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. Consequently, with the presumption of marriage sufficiently overcome, the onus probandi of

Page 78 of 82
defendant Rosca shifted to plaintiff Uy. It then became the burden of plaintiff Uy to prove that he and
defendant Rosca, were legally married. It became necessary for plaintiff Uy therefore to submit
additional proof to show that they were legally married. He, however, dismally failed to do so.[35]

Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was legally married to Rosca, their property relations
would be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which applies when a couple living together were
not incapacitated from getting married. Article 147 provides:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed
to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party
of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination
of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the
co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any
or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In
all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.

The provision states that properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed co-owned unless there
is proof to the contrary. We agree with both the trial and appellate courts that Rosca was able to prove
that the subject property is not co-owned but is paraphernal.

First, in the Resolution dated 7 November 1979 of the LRC in LRC Consulta No. 1194, Rosca was
recognized as the sole registered owner of the property.[36]

Second, in the Deed of Sale dated 29 January 1964 between Spouses Manuel and Rosca covering the
484 square meter land, Uy served as a mere witness to Rosca's purchase of the land as evidenced by his
signature under "signed in the presence of."[37] This could only mean that Uy admitted the paraphernal
nature of Rosca's ownership over the property.

Third, in the Affidavit of Ownership dated 27 September 1976 executed by Rosca in support of her real
estate loan application with PBC in the amount of P5 0,000, Rosca stated that she was the sole and
lawful owner of the subject property and that the land was registered under her name and that the
phrase "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy" in TCT No. T-24660 was merely a description of her status.
[38]

Last, the title to the property in the name of "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy" was notice to the
world, including her heirs and successors-in-interest, that such belonged to Rosca as her paraphernal
property.[39] The words "married to" were merely descriptive of Rosca's status at the time the property
was registered in her name.[40] Otherwise, if the property was conjugal, the title to the property should
have been in the names of Luis Uy and Petra Rosca.[41]

Page 79 of 82
In Ruiz v. Court of Appeals,[42] the property subject of the mortgage was registered in the name of
"Corazon G. Ruiz, of legal age, married to Rogelio Ruiz, Filipinos." This Court ruled that the title is
registered in the name of Corazon alone because the phrase "married to Rogelio Ruiz" is merely
descriptive of the civil status of Corazon and should not be construed to mean that her husband is also a
registered owner.

Based on the evidence she presented, Rosca was able to sufficiently overcome the presumption that any
property acquired while living together shall be owned by the couple in equal shares. The house and lot
were clearly Rosca's paraphernal properties and she had every right to sell the same even without Uy's
consent.

Uy further contends that the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca is not valid for being simulated or fictitious
for lack of consideration. Uy states that no proof was presented by Spouses Lacsamana to show that
they actually paid P80,000 to Rosca for the purchase of the property or even if there was consideration,
such was unreasonably low and unconscionable. Thus, Spouses Lacsamana and Buena cannot be
considered as buyers in good faith.

We disagree.

Uy did not present any proof to show that Rosca did not receive any consideration for the sale. Neither
did he submit any evidence, whether documentary or testimonial, showing the fair market value of the
property at the time of the sale to prove that the purchase price was unreasonably low or
unconscionable. It was even mentioned by the appellate court that "appellants failed to prove that on
April 18, 1979, the property might have been worth millions of pesos." Thus, Uy's allegations lack
sufficient substantiation.

Moreover, the factual findings of the appellate court carry great weight and are binding on this Court
when they coincide with the factual findings of the trial court. This Court will not weigh the evidence all
over again since payment of the purchase price and the consideration for the sale are factual issues
which cannot be raised in this petition.

In sum, we find that the Deed of Sale, executed by Rosca on her paraphernal property in favor of
Spouses Lacsamana, is valid.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 14 September 2011 and Resolution
dated 1 March 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93786.

SO ORDERED.

SALLY GO-BANGAYAN vs. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR.

G.R. No. 201061,
July 3, 2013,
CARPIO, J.]
TOPIC: Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage (Article 148)
DOCTRINE:
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by
them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions, in accord with Article 148.
FACTS:
Benjamin and Sally developed a romantic relationship in 1979. Sally’s father was against the
relationship. Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported
marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage contract
would not be registered. Sally filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents
against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition

Page 80 of 82
for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court
on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid
marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in
accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the properties
during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children.
A total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from
the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous.

ISSUES:
Whether the marriage between Benjamin and Sally are void for not having a marriage license
Whether Art. 148 should govern Benjamin and Sally’s property relations
Whether bigamy was committed by the petitioner
HELD:
YES.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and,
at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a
license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, “shall be void from the
beginning.” In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It
was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-
07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the
month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35which made their marriage
void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general
rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely
simulated or fictitious are “inexistent and void from the beginning.” Thus, the Court of Appeals did not
err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void
ab initio and non-existent.
YES.
The property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to
the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in
bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in
the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by
them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s
father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before the trial court even
admitted that “Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of properties to his children and their
respective spouses which included Sally x x x.”
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the CA is more in accord with
the evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally as spouses. The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of
Benjamin with the descriptive title “married to Sally.” The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783
were registered in the name of Sally with the descriptive title “married to Benjamin” while the
properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of Sally as a single

Page 81 of 82
individual. We have ruled that the words “married to” preceding the name of a spouse are merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without
proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article
148 of the Family Code.
3. NO.
On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be
null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there
being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their
marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first
marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed. For
bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity
except for the existence of a prior marriage.In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage.
Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed
marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented themselves as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.

A.M NO. RTJ-12-2326,

JANUARY 30, 2013
BECKETT VS SARMIENTO
Facts:
Geoffrey Beckett, an Australian was previously married to Eltesa Densing Beckett, a Filipina and out of
marriage, Geoffrey Beckett Jr. was born.
In 2006, Eltesa filed a case against Beckett in violation of R.A 7160 followed by a suit for the declaration
of nullity of marriage. For his part, Beckett commenced criminal charges against Eltesa, one was for
adultery. Both ended in sala of Judge Olegario Sarmiento Jr.

The couple’s legal battle ended when Judge Sarmiento rendered judgment based on a compromise
agreement and categorically agreed that Beckett shall have full and permanent custody over Geoffrey Jr,
5 years old, subject to visitation rights of Eltesa.
Eltesa failed to return the custody of Geoffrey Jr. to Beckett prompting him to file a case against Eltesa in
violation of R.A 7160 and for the turnover of Geoffrey Jr under his custody.
After going through proceedings, Judge Sarmiento rendered a judgment granting the custody of
Geoffrey Jr to Eltesa.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Sarmiento is guilty of gross ignorance of the law in granting the custody of
Geoffrey Jr. to Eltesa.
Ruling:
No. In disputes concerning post-separation custody over a minor, the well-settled rule is that no child
under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons
to order otherwise. And if already 7 years of age, the child’s choice as to which parents he prefers shall
be respected, unless the parent chosen proves to be unfit. Further, in all actions concerning children,
whether undertaken by public or private social institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or
legislative bodies, the best interest of the child shall be a primary consideration.
A custody agreement can never be regarded as a “permanent and unbending”, such that agreement
would no longer be to the child’s best interest.
Thus, Judge Sarmiento is correct in granting the custody of Geoffrey Jr. to Eltesa.

Page 82 of 82