EN BANC

UDK-15143, January 21, 2015

IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

AND FISCAL AUTONOMY MOVEMENT v. ABOLITION OF JUDICIARY
DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND REDUCTION OF FISCAL AUTONOMY.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

This case involves the proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund1 and
replacing it with the “Judiciary Support Fund.” Funds collected from the proposed
Judiciary Support Fund shall be remitted to the national treasury and Congress shall
determine how the funds will be used.2 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioner Rolly Mijares (Mijares) prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order
to compel this court to exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against
the perceived hostility of Congress.3 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

This matter was raised to this court through the letter4 dated August 27, 2014, signed
by Mijares and addressed to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court. The letter is captioned:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Petition for Mandamus with Manifestation to invoke the Judicial Independence and
Fiscal Autonomy as mandated under the Constitution5
The letter was referred to the Clerk of Court En Banc for appropriate action.6 It was
then docketed as UDK-15143.7 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the letter-petition, Mijares alleges that he is “a Filipino citizen, and a concerned

taxpayer[.]”8 He filed this petition as part of his “continuing crusade to defend and
uphold the Constitution”9 because he believes in the rule of law.10 He is concerned
about the threats against the judiciary after this court promulgated Priority
Development Assistance Fund11 case on November 19, 2013 and Disbursement
Acceleration Program12 case on July 1, 2014.

The complaint implied that certain acts of members of Congress and the President after
the promulgation of these cases show a threat to judicial independence.

In the first week of July 2014, Ilocos Norte Representative Rodolfo Fariñas filed House
Bill No. 4690, which would require this court to remit its Judiciary Development Fund
collections to the national treasury.13 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

A week later, or on July 14, 2014, Iloilo Representative Niel Tupas, Jr., filed House Bill
No. 4738 entitled “The Act Creating the Judicial Support Fund (JSF) under the National
Treasury, repealing for the purpose Presidential Decree No. 1949.”14 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On the same day, President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III addressed the nation: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

My message to the Supreme Court: We do not want two equal branches of government
to go head to head, needing a third branch to step in to intervene. We find it difficult to
understand your decision. You had done something similar in the past, and you tried to
do it again; there are even those of the opinion that what you attempted to commit was
graver, if we were to base it on your decision. Abiding by the principle of “presumption
of regularity,” we assumed that you did the right thing; after all, you are the ones who
should ostensibly have a better understanding of the law. And now, when we use the
same mechanism—which, you yourselves have admitted, benefit our countrymen—why
is it then that we are wrong?

We believe that the majority of you, like us, want only the best for the Filipino people.
To the honorable justices of the Supreme Court: Help us help our countrymen. We ask
that you review your decision, this time taking into consideration the points I have
raised tonight. The nation hopes for your careful deliberation and response. And I hope
that once you’ve examined the arguments I will submit, regarding the law and about
our economy, solidarity will ensue—thus strengthening the entire government’s
capability to push for the interests of the nation.15
The issue for resolution is whether petitioner Rolly Mijares has sufficiently shown
grounds for this court to grant the petition and issue a writ of mandamus.

Petitioner argues that Congress “gravely abused its discretion with a blatant usurpation
of judicial independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court.”16 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioner points out that Congress is exercising its power “in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility by abolishing the ‘Judiciary
Development Fund’ (JDF) of the Supreme Court.”17 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

With regard to his prayer for the issuance of the writ of mandamus, petitioner avers
that Congress should not act as “wreckers of the law”18 by threatening “to clip the
powers of the High Tribunal[.]”19 Congress committed a “blunder of monumental
proportions”20 when it reduced the judiciary’s 2015 budget.21 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioner prays that this court exercise its powers to “REVOKE/ABROGATE and
EXPUNGE whatever irreconcilable contravention of existing laws affecting the judicial
independence and fiscal autonomy as mandated under the Constitution to better serve
public interest and general welfare of the people.”22 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

This court resolves to deny the petition.

The power of judicial review, like all powers granted by the Constitution, is subject to
certain limitations. Petitioner must comply with all the requisites for judicial review
before this court may take cognizance of the case. The requisites are: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
   
(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject
act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
   
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
   
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.23
Petitioner’s failure to comply with the first two requisites warrants the outright dismissal
of this petition.

The petition does not comply with the requisites of judicial review

No actual case or controversy

Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution provides that: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ARTICLE VIII

Judicial Department

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
(Emphasis supplied)
One of the requirements for this court to exercise its power of judicial review is the
existence of an actual controversy. This means that there must be “an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.”24 As
emphasized by this court in Information Technology Foundation of the Phils. v.
Commission on Elections:25
It is well-established in this jurisdiction that “. . . for a court to exercise its power of
adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy — one which involves a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other
similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. . . . [C]ourts do not sit to
adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging.” The controversy must be justiciable — definite and concrete, touching on
the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the
pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand,
and a denial thereof on the other; that is, it must concern a real and not a merely
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from
an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.26
For this court to rule on constitutional issues, there must first be a justiciable
controversy. Pleadings before this court must show a violation of an existing legal right
or a controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. In the concurring opinion
in Belgica v. Ochoa: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Basic in litigation raising constitutional issues is the requirement that there must be an
actual case or controversy. This Court cannot render an advisory opinion. We assume
that the Constitution binds all other constitutional departments, instrumentalities, and
organs. We are aware that in the exercise of their various powers, they do interpret the
text of the Constitution in the light of contemporary needs that they should address. A
policy that reduces this Court to an adviser for official acts by the other departments
that have not yet been done would unnecessarily tax our resources. It is inconsistent
with our role as final arbiter and adjudicator and weakens the entire system of the Rule
of Law. Our power of judicial review is a duty to make a final and binding construction
of law. This power should generally be reserved when the departments have exhausted
any and all acts that would remedy any perceived violation of right. The rationale that
defines the extent of our doctrines laying down exceptions to our rules on justiciability
are clear: Not only should the pleadings show a convincing violation of a right, but the
impact should be shown to be so grave, imminent, and irreparable that any delayed
exercise of judicial review or deference would undermine fundamental principles that
should be enjoyed by the party complaining or the constituents that they legitimately
represent.27 (Emphasis supplied)
The reason for this requirement was explained in Angara v. Electoral Commission:28
Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and
to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this
manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through
their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.29
Petitioner’s allegations show that he wants this court to strike down the proposed bills
abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund. This court, however, must act only within
its powers granted under the Constitution. This court is not empowered to review
proposed bills because a bill is not a law.

Montesclaros v. COMELEC30 involved the postponement of the 2002 Sangguniang

Kabataan Elections and the lowering of the age requirement in the Sangguniang
Kabataan “to at least 15 but not more than 18 years of age.”31 Montesclaros and other
parties filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order.32 One of the reliefs prayed for was: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

a) To prevent, annul or declare unconstitutional any law, decree, Comelec

resolution/directive and other respondents’ issuances, orders and actions and the like in
postponing the May 6, 2002 SK elections.33
This court held that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

. . . petitioners instituted this petition to: (1) compel public respondents to hold the SK
elections on May 6, 2002 and should it be postponed, the SK elections should be held
not later than July 15, 2002; (2) prevent public respondents from passing laws and
issuing resolutions and orders that would lower the membership age in the SK. . . .

....

Petitioners’ prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering
the membership age in the SK does not present an actual justiciable controversy. A
proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill
creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill,
having no legal effect, violates no constitutional right or duty. The Court has no power
to declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be in
the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress. The power
of judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. . . .

....

Thus, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a

proposed bill. The Court can exercise its power of judicial review only after a law is
enacted, not before.

Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress from passing any
law, or from setting into motion the legislative mill according to its internal rules. Thus,
the following acts of Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers are not subject to
judicial restraint: the filing of bills by members of Congress, the approval of bills by
each chamber of Congress, the reconciliation by the Bicameral Committee of approved
bills, and the eventual approval into law of the reconciled bills by each chamber of
Congress. Absent a clear violation of specific constitutional limitations or of
constitutional rights of private parties, the Court cannot exercise its power of judicial
review over the internal processes or procedures of Congress.

....

. . . To do so would destroy the delicate system of checks and balances finely crafted by
the Constitution for the three co-equal, coordinate and independent branches of
government.34 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Similar to Montesclaros, petitioner is asking this court to stop Congress from passing
laws that will abolish the Judiciary Development Fund. This court has explained that the
filing of bills is within the legislative power of Congress and is “not subject to judicial
restraint[.]”35 A proposed bill produces no legal effects until it is passed into law. Under
the Constitution, the judiciary is mandated to interpret laws. It cannot speculate on the
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress may or may not pass. It
cannot rule on mere speculations or issues that are not ripe for judicial
determination.36 The petition, therefore, does not present any actual case or
controversy that is ripe for this court’s determination.

Petitioner has no legal standing

Even assuming that there is an actual case or controversy that this court must resolve,
petitioner has no legal standing to question the validity of the proposed bill. The rule on
legal standing has been discussed in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo:37
Locus standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question.” In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule as
contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It
provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest.” Accordingly, the “real-party-in interest” is “the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit.” Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the relief
sought.

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who
asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a
representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently
from any other person. He could be suing as a “stranger,” or in the category of a
“citizen,” or ‘taxpayer.” In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to
seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.”

....

This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held
that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury
as a result.” The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v.
President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers’ Association v. De la Fuente,
Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v.
Felix.38
Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or will sustain a direct injury if the
proposed bill is passed into law. While his concern for judicial independence is laudable,
it does not, by itself, clothe him with the requisite standing to question the
constitutionality of a proposed bill that may only affect the judiciary.

This court, however, has occasionally relaxed the rules on standing when the issues
involved are of “transcendental importance” to the public. Specifically, this court has
stated that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional
plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.39
Transcendental importance is not defined in our jurisprudence, thus, in Francisco v.
House of Representatives:40
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following
instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the
case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and
(3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised.41
A mere invocation of transcendental importance in the pleading is not enough for this
court to set aside procedural rules: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Whether an issue is of transcendental importance is a matter determined by this court

on a case-to-case basis. An allegation of transcendental importance must be supported
by the proper allegations.42
None of the determinants in Francisco are present in this case. The events feared by
petitioner are merely speculative and conjectural.

In addition to the determinants in Francisco, it must also be shown that there is a clear
or imminent threat to fundamental rights. In an opinion in Imbong v. Ochoa:43
The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 should not be
declared unconstitutional in whole or in any of its parts given the petitions filed in this
case.
None of the petitions properly present an “actual case or controversy,” which deserves
the exercise of our awesome power of judicial review. It is our duty not to rule on the
abstract and speculative issues barren of actual facts. These consolidated petitions,
which contain bare allegations, do not provide the proper venue to decide on
fundamental issues. The law in question is needed social legislation.

That we rule on these special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition — which
amounts to a pre-enforcement free-wheeling facial review of the statute and the
implementing rules and regulations — is very bad precedent. The issues are far from
justiciable. Petitioners claim in their class suits that they entirely represent a whole
religion, the Filipino nation and, worse, all the unborn. The intervenors also claim the
same representation: Filipinos and Catholics. Many of the petitions also sue the
President of the Republic.

We should apply our rules rigorously and dismiss these cases. The transcendental
importance of the issues they want us to decide will be better served when we wait for
the proper cases with the proper parties suffering real, actual or more imminent injury.
There is no showing of an injury so great and so imminent that we cannot wait for
these cases.44 (Emphasis supplied)
The events feared by petitioner are contingent on the passing of the proposed bill in
Congress. The threat of imminent injury is not yet manifest since there is no guarantee
that the bill will even be passed into law. There is no transcendental interest in this
case to justify the relaxation of technical rules.

II

Requisites for the issuance of a writ of mandamus not shown

Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Rule 65

CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS

SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.— When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent,
immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required
to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by
the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.

The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided
in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.cralawred

The writ of mandamus will issue when the act sought to be performed is
ministerial.45 An act is ministerial when it does not require the exercise of judgment and
the act is performed in compliance with a legal mandate.46 In a petition for mandamus,
the burden of proof is on petitioner to show that one is entitled to the performance of a
legal right and that respondent has a corresponding duty to perform the
act.47 Mandamus will not lie “to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to
do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is
not entitled by law.”48 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In this case, petitioner has not shown how he is entitled to the relief prayed for. Hence,
this court cannot be compelled to exercise its power of judicial review since there is no
actual case or controversy.

Final note

The judiciary is the weakest branch of government. It is true that courts have power to
declare what law is given a set of facts, but it does not have an army to enforce its
writs. Courts do not have the power of the purse. “Except for a constitutional provision
that requires that the budget of the judiciary should not go below the appropriation for
the previous year, it is beholden to the Congress depending on how low the budget
is.”49chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Despite being the third co-equal branch of the government, the judiciary enjoys less
than 1%50 of the total budget for the national government. Specifically, it was a mere
0.82% in 2014,51 0.85% in 2013,52 0.83% in 2012,53 and 0.83% in 2011.54 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses or MOOE “pays for sundry matters such as
utility payments, paper, gasoline and others.”55 The MOOE granted to the lower courts
in 2014 was P1,220,905,000.00.56 While this might seem like a large amount, the
amount significantly dwindles when divided among all lower courts in the country. Per
the 2014 General Appropriations Act (GAA), the approximate monthly MOOE for all
courts are estimated as follows: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Estimated Monthly MOOE

Type of Court Number of Courts57
Per Court
Regional Trial Courts 969 P46,408.67
Metropolitan Trial Courts 106 P46,071.89
Municipal Trial Courts in
229 P46,206.01
Cities
Municipal Circuit Trial
468 P46,305.69
Courts
Municipal Trial Courts 366 P46,423.30
Shari’a District Courts 5 P40,696.83
Shari’a Circuit Courts 51 P45,883.68
These amounts were arrived at using the following computation: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Number of
x MOOE      
Courts
--------------------
         
-------
Total Number of
    / 12  
Courts
------------------------------------------------
     
-------------------------------------
 Number of Courts      
In comparison, the 2014 MOOE allocation for the House of Representatives was
P3,386,439,000.0058 or about P282.2 million per month for the maintenance and
operation of the House of Representatives compound in Batasan Hills. Even if this
amount was divided equally among the 234 legislative districts, a representative’s office
space would still have a monthly MOOE allocation of approximately P1.2 million, which
is significantly higher than the average P46,000.00 allocated monthly to each trial
court.

It was only in 2013 that the budget allocated to the judiciary included an item for the
construction, rehabilitation, and repair of the halls of justice in the capital outlay. The
amount allocated was P1 million.59 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In 2014, there was no item for the construction, rehabilitation, and repair of the halls of
justice.60 This allocation would have been used to help fund the repair of existing halls
of justice and the construction of new halls of justice in the entire country, including
those courts destroyed by Typhoon Yolanda and the 2013 earthquake.

The entire budget for the judiciary, however, does not only come from the national
government. The Constitution grants fiscal autonomy to the judiciary to maintain its
independence.61 In Bengzon v. Drilon:62
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The
imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional
offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to
fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but
especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers
upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based.63
Courts, therefore, must also be accountable with their own budget. The Judiciary
Development Fund, used to augment the expenses of the judiciary, is regularly
accounted for by this court on a quarterly basis. The financial reports are readily
available at the Supreme Court website.64 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

These funds, however, are still not enough to meet the expenses of lower courts and
guarantee credible compensation for their personnel. The reality is that halls of justice
exist because we rely on the generosity of local government units that provide
additional subsidy to our judges.65 If not, the budget for the construction, repair, and
rehabilitation of halls of justice is with the Department of Justice.66 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As a result, our fiscal autonomy and judicial independence are often undermined by low
levels of budgetary outlay, the lack of provision for maintenance and operating
expenses, and the reliance on local government units and the Department of Justice.

“Courts are not constitutionally built to do political lobbying. By constitutional design, it

is a co-equal department to the Congress and the Executive. By temperament, our
arguments are legal, not political. We are best when we lay down all our premises in
the finding of facts, interpretation of the law and understanding of precedents. We are
not trained to produce a political statement or a media release.”67 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“Because of the nature of courts, that is – that it has to decide in favor of one party, we
may not have a political base. Certainly, we should not even consider building a political
base. All we have is an abiding faith that we should do what we could to ensure that the
Rule of Law prevails. It seems that we have no champions when it comes to ensuring
the material basis for fiscal autonomy or judicial independence.”68chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

For this reason, we appreciate petitioner’s concern for the judiciary. It is often only
through the vigilance of private citizens that issues relating to the judiciary can be
discussed in the political sphere. Unfortunately, the remedy he seeks cannot be granted
by this court. But his crusade is not a lost cause. Considering that what he seeks to be
struck down is a proposed bill, it would be better for him to air his concerns by lobbying
in Congress. There, he may discover the representatives and senators who may have a
similar enthusiastic response to truly making the needed investments in the Rule of
Law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.