Resolution

UDK-15143

Funds collected from the proposed Judiciary Support Fund shall be remitted
to the national treasury and Congress shall determine how the funds will be
used.2
Petitioner Rolly Mijares (Mijares) prays for the issuance of a writ of
mandamus in order to compel this court to exercise its judicial independence
and fiscal autonomy against the perceived hostility of Congress.3

3Republic of tbe
This matter was raised to this court through the letter4 dated August
27, 2014, signed by Mijares and addressed to the Chief Justice and the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court. The letter is captioned:

$->upreme <!Court
;fflanila
EN BANC

IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE

SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE AND FISCAL
AUTONOMY MOVEMENT VS.
ABOLITION OF JUDICIARY
DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF)
AND REDUCTION OF FISCAL
AUTONOMY.

Petition for Mandamus with Manifestation to invoke the Judicial

Independence and Fiscal Autonomy as mandated under the
Constitution5

UDK-15143
Present:

The letter was referred to the Clerk of Court En Banc for appropriate
action.6 It was then docketed as UDK-15143.7

SERENO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,*
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
REYES,
PERLAS-BERNABE,
LEONEN, and
JARDELEZA, JJ.

In the letter-petition, Mijares alleges that he is a Filipino citizen, and

a concerned taxpayer[.]8 He filed this petition as part of his continuing
crusade to defend and uphold the Constitution9 because he believes in the
rule of law.10 He is concerned about the threats against the judiciary after
this court promulgated Priority Development Assistance Fund11 case on
November 19, 2013 and Disbursement Acceleration Program12 case on July
1, 2014.
The complaint implied that certain acts of members of Congress and
the President after the promulgation of these cases show a threat to judicial
independence.

Promulgated:
2

January 21, 2015

RESOLUTION

3
4
5
6

LEONEN, J.:

7
8
9

This case involves the proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary

Development Fund 1 and replacing it with the "Judiciary Support Fund."
*
1

On official leave.
Pres. Decree No. 1949 (1984), otherwise known as Establishing a Judiciary Development Fund and for

10
11

(J

12

Other Purposes.
Carmela Fonbuena, House vs SC? Aquino allies target judicial fund, July 15, 2014
<http://www.rappler.com/nation/63378-congress-judiciary-development-fund> (visited January 20,
2015);
Jess
Diaz,
Another
House
bill
filed
vs
JDF,
July
17,
2014
<http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2014/07/17/1347045/another-house-bill-filed-vs-jdf>
(visited
January 20, 2015).
Rollo, p. 8.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. Nos. 208566, et al., November 19, 2013, 710 SCRA 1 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe,
En Banc].
Araullo
v.
Aquino,
G.R.
No.
209287,
July
1,
2014
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2014/july2014/209287.pdf> [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].

Resolution

UDK-15143

In the first week of July 2014, Ilocos Norte Representative Rodolfo

Farias filed House Bill No. 4690, which would require this court to remit
its Judiciary Development Fund collections to the national treasury.13
A week later, or on July 14, 2014, Iloilo Representative Niel Tupas,
Jr., filed House Bill No. 4738 entitled The Act Creating the Judicial Support
Fund (JSF) under the National Treasury, repealing for the purpose
Presidential Decree No. 1949.14
On the same day, President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III addressed
the nation:
My message to the Supreme Court: We do not want two equal
branches of government to go head to head, needing a third branch to step
in to intervene. We find it difficult to understand your decision. You had
done something similar in the past, and you tried to do it again; there are
even those of the opinion that what you attempted to commit was graver,
if we were to base it on your decision. Abiding by the principle of
presumption of regularity, we assumed that you did the right thing; after
all, you are the ones who should ostensibly have a better understanding of
the law. And now, when we use the same mechanismwhich, you
yourselves have admitted, benefit our countrymenwhy is it then that we
are wrong?
We believe that the majority of you, like us, want only the best for
the Filipino people. To the honorable justices of the Supreme Court: Help
us help our countrymen. We ask that you review your decision, this time
taking into consideration the points I have raised tonight. The nation hopes
for your careful deliberation and response. And I hope that once youve
examined the arguments I will submit, regarding the law and about our
economy, solidarity will ensuethus strengthening the entire
governments capability to push for the interests of the nation.15

Resolution

With regard to his prayer for the issuance of the writ of mandamus,
petitioner avers that Congress should not act as wreckers of the law18 by
threatening to clip the powers of the High Tribunal[.]19 Congress
committed a blunder of monumental proportions20 when it reduced the
judiciarys 2015 budget.21
Petitioner prays that this court exercise its powers to
REVOKE/ABROGATE and EXPUNGE whatever irreconcilable
contravention of existing laws affecting the judicial independence and fiscal
autonomy as mandated under the Constitution to better serve public interest
and general welfare of the people.22
This court resolves to deny the petition.
The power of judicial review, like all powers granted by the
Constitution, is subject to certain limitations. Petitioner must comply with
all the requisites for judicial review before this court may take cognizance of
the case. The requisites are:

Petitioner argues that Congress gravely abused its discretion with a

blatant usurpation of judicial independence and fiscal autonomy of the
Supreme Court.16
17
18

14
15

16

Carmela Fonbuena, House vs SC? Aquino allies target judicial fund, July 15, 2014
<http://www.rappler.com/nation/63378-congress-judiciary-development-fund> (visited January 20,
2015).
Id.
[English] National Address of President Aquino on the Supreme Courts decision on DAP, July 14,
2014 <http://www.gov.ph/2014/07/14/english-national-address-of-president-aquino-on-the-supremecourts-decision-on-dap/> (visited October 13, 2014). The message was originally delivered in Filipino.
Rollo, p. 6.

UDK-15143

Petitioner points out that Congress is exercising its power in an

arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility by
abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) of the Supreme
Court.17

The issue for resolution is whether petitioner Rolly Mijares has

sufficiently shown grounds for this court to grant the petition and issue a
writ of mandamus.

13

19
20
21
22
23

(1)

there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the

exercise of judicial power;

(2)

the person challenging the act must have the standing to

question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise
stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement;

(3)

the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest

opportunity; and

(4)

the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the

case.23

Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8
Id.
Id. at 9.
Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, 651 Phil. 374, 438 (2010) [Per J. Mendoza, En
Banc], citing Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, 522 Phil. 1, 27 (2006) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En
Banc] and Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 892 (2003) [Per J. Carpio Morales,
En Banc].

Resolution

UDK-15143

Resolution

No actual case or controversy

For this court to rule on constitutional issues, there must first be a

justiciable controversy. Pleadings before this court must show a violation of
an existing legal right or a controversy that is ripe for judicial determination.
In the concurring opinion in Belgica v. Ochoa:

Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution provides that:

Basic in litigation raising constitutional issues is the requirement

that there must be an actual case or controversy. This Court cannot render
an advisory opinion. We assume that the Constitution binds all other
constitutional departments, instrumentalities, and organs. We are aware
that in the exercise of their various powers, they do interpret the text of the
Constitution in the light of contemporary needs that they should address. A
policy that reduces this Court to an adviser for official acts by the other
departments that have not yet been done would unnecessarily tax our
resources. It is inconsistent with our role as final arbiter and adjudicator
and weakens the entire system of the Rule of Law. Our power of judicial
review is a duty to make a final and binding construction of law. This
power should generally be reserved when the departments have exhausted
any and all acts that would remedy any perceived violation of right. The
rationale that defines the extent of our doctrines laying down exceptions to
our rules on justiciability are clear: Not only should the pleadings show a
convincing violation of a right, but the impact should be shown to be so
grave, imminent, and irreparable that any delayed exercise of judicial
review or deference would undermine fundamental principles that should
be enjoyed by the party complaining or the constituents that they
legitimately represent.27 (Emphasis supplied)

ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis supplied)

One of the requirements for this court to exercise its power of judicial
review is the existence of an actual controversy. This means that there must
be an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court
would amount to an advisory opinion.24 As emphasized by this court in
Information Technology Foundation of the Phils. v. Commission on
Elections:25
It is well-established in this jurisdiction that . . . for a court to exercise its
power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy one
which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or
academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not
cognizable by a court of justice. . . . [C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere
academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging. The controversy must be justiciable definite and
concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic
assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the
other; that is, it must concern a real and not a merely theoretical question
24

25

Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 646 Phil. 452, 479 (2010)
[Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc], citing Republic Telecommunications Holding, Inc. v. Santiago, 556
Phil. 83, 9192 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
499 Phil. 281 (2005) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].

UDK-15143

or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy

admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.26

Petitioners failure to comply with the first two requisites warrants the
outright dismissal of this petition.
I
The petition does not comply with the requisites of judicial review

The reason for this requirement was explained in Angara v. Electoral

Commission:28
Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as
its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord
the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.29

26

27
28
29

Id. at 304305, citing Republic v. Tan, G.R. No. 145255, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 485, 492493
[Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division], Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Hayworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937),
and Vide: De Lumen v. Republic, 50 O.G. No. 2, 578 (February 1952).
J. Leonen, concurring opinion in Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013, 710 SCRA
1, 278279 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
63 Phil. 139 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
Id. at 158159.

Resolution

UDK-15143

Resolution

Montesclaros v. COMELEC30 involved the postponement of the 2002

Sangguniang Kabataan Elections and the lowering of the age requirement in
the Sangguniang Kabataan to at least 15 but not more than 18 years of
age.31 Montesclaros and other parties filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order.32 One of the reliefs prayed for was:

This court held that:

. . . petitioners instituted this petition to: (1) compel public
respondents to hold the SK elections on May 6, 2002 and should it be
postponed, the SK elections should be held not later than July 15, 2002;
(2) prevent public respondents from passing laws and issuing resolutions
and orders that would lower the membership age in the SK. . . .
....
Petitioners prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a
proposed bill lowering the membership age in the SK does not present an
actual justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial
review because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and
imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill, having
no legal effect, violates no constitutional right or duty. The Court has no
power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional
because that would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a
proposed act of Congress. The power of judicial review cannot be
exercised in vacuo. . . .

....
. . . To do so would destroy the delicate system of checks and
balances finely crafted by the Constitution for the three co-equal,
coordinate and independent branches of government.34 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)

Similar to Montesclaros, petitioner is asking this court to stop

Congress from passing laws that will abolish the Judiciary Development
Fund. This court has explained that the filing of bills is within the legislative
power of Congress and is not subject to judicial restraint[.]35 A proposed
bill produces no legal effects until it is passed into law. Under the
Constitution, the judiciary is mandated to interpret laws. It cannot speculate
on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress may or
may not pass. It cannot rule on mere speculations or issues that are not ripe
for judicial determination.36 The petition, therefore, does not present any
actual case or controversy that is ripe for this courts determination.
Petitioner has no legal standing
Even assuming that there is an actual case or controversy that this
court must resolve, petitioner has no legal standing to question the validity
of the proposed bill. The rule on legal standing has been discussed in David
v. Macapagal-Arroyo:37
Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of
justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is governed by the
real-parties-in interest rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that every action must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
Accordingly, the real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his
own right to the relief sought.

....
Thus, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the
constitutionality of a proposed bill. The Court can exercise its power of
judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before.
Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress
from passing any law, or from setting into motion the legislative mill
according to its internal rules. Thus, the following acts of Congress in the

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits.

34

30
31
32
33

433 Phil. 620 (2002) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].

Id. at 630.
Id. at 626.
Id. at 627.

UDK-15143

exercise of its legislative powers are not subject to judicial restraint: the
filing of bills by members of Congress, the approval of bills by each
chamber of Congress, the reconciliation by the Bicameral Committee of
approved bills, and the eventual approval into law of the reconciled bills
by each chamber of Congress. Absent a clear violation of specific
constitutional limitations or of constitutional rights of private parties, the
Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review over the internal
processes or procedures of Congress.

Petitioners allegations show that he wants this court to strike down

the proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund. This court,
however, must act only within its powers granted under the Constitution.
This court is not empowered to review proposed bills because a bill is not a
law.

a) To prevent, annul or declare unconstitutional any law, decree,

Comelec resolution/directive and other respondents issuances,
orders and actions and the like in postponing the May 6, 2002 SK
elections.33

35
36
37

Id. at 633635.
Id. at 634.
J. Leonen, dissenting and concurring opinion in Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335,
February 18, 2014, 716 SCRA 237, 534 [Per J. Abad, En Banc].
522 Phil. 705 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].

Resolution

UDK-15143

Resolution

Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly

illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public.
He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person.
He could be suing as a stranger, or in the category of a citizen, or
taxpayer. In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to
seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient
interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a
citizen or taxpayer.

Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or will sustain a direct
injury if the proposed bill is passed into law. While his concern for judicial
independence is laudable, it does not, by itself, clothe him with the requisite
standing to question the constitutionality of a proposed bill that may only
affect the judiciary.

A mere invocation of transcendental importance in the pleading is not

enough for this court to set aside procedural rules:
Whether an issue is of transcendental importance is a matter determined
by this court on a case-to-case basis. An allegation of transcendental
importance must be supported by the proper allegations.42

None of the determinants in Francisco are present in this case. The

events feared by petitioner are merely speculative and conjectural.
In addition to the determinants in Francisco, it must also be shown
that there is a clear or imminent threat to fundamental rights. In an opinion
in Imbong v. Ochoa:43

This court, however, has occasionally relaxed the rules on standing

when the issues involved are of transcendental importance to the public.
Specifically, this court has stated that:

The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012

should not be declared unconstitutional in whole or in any of its parts
given the petitions filed in this case.

the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed

for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the
matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.39

None of the petitions properly present an actual case or

controversy, which deserves the exercise of our awesome power of
judicial review. It is our duty not to rule on the abstract and speculative
issues barren of actual facts. These consolidated petitions, which contain
bare allegations, do not provide the proper venue to decide on fundamental
issues. The law in question is needed social legislation.

Transcendental importance is not defined in our jurisprudence, thus, in

Francisco v. House of Representatives:40
38

39

40

Id. at 755757, citing Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. 1991, p. 941, Salonga v. Warner Barnes & Co.,
88 Phil. 125, 131 (1951) [Per J. Bautista Angelo, En Banc], People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 89 (1937) [Per
J. Laurel, En Banc], Custodio v. President of the Senate, G.R. No. 117, November 7, 1945 (unreported),
Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De la Fuente, G.R. No. 2947, January 11, 1959
(unreported), Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331, 337 (1960) [Per J. Concepcion, En
Banc], and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012, 1013 (1947) [Per J. Feria,
En Banc].
Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, 651 Phil. 374, 441 (2010) [Per J. Mendoza, En
Banc], citing Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), 591 Phil. 393, 404 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc], Tatad v.
Secretary of the Department of Energy, 346 Phil. 321, 359 (1997) [Per J. Puno, En Banc], and De Guia
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 104712, May 6, 1992, 208 SCRA 420, 422 [Per J. Bellosillo, En
Banc].
460 Phil. 830 (2003) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].

UDK-15143

There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance,

the following instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme
Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of
the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear
case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public
respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack
of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised.41

....
This Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. In
People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Vera doctrine was
upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate,
Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v.
Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v.
Felix.38

10

That we rule on these special civil actions for certiorari and

prohibition which amounts to a pre-enforcement free-wheeling facial
review of the statute and the implementing rules and regulations is very
bad precedent. The issues are far from justiciable. Petitioners claim in their
class suits that they entirely represent a whole religion, the Filipino nation
and, worse, all the unborn. The intervenors also claim the same
representation: Filipinos and Catholics. Many of the petitions also sue the
President of the Republic.
41
42

43

Id. at 899, citing J. Feliciano, concurring opinion in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr., G.R.
No. 113375, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA 110, 155157 [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].
J. Leonen, concurring and dissenting opinion in Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers v. Lim, G.R. No.
187836,
November
25,
2014
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/
jurisprudence/2014/november2014/187836_leonen.pdf> 3435 [Per J. Perez, En Banc].
G.R. Nos. 204819, et al., April 8, 2014 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/rhlaw/> [Per J. Mendoza,
En Banc].

Resolution

11

UDK-15143

We should apply our rules rigorously and dismiss these cases. The
transcendental importance of the issues they want us to decide will be
better served when we wait for the proper cases with the proper parties
suffering real, actual or more imminent injury. There is no showing of an
injury so great and so imminent that we cannot wait for these cases.44
(Emphasis supplied)

The events feared by petitioner are contingent on the passing of the

proposed bill in Congress. The threat of imminent injury is not yet manifest
since there is no guarantee that the bill will even be passed into law. There
is no transcendental interest in this case to justify the relaxation of technical
rules.

Resolution

Rule 65
CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time
to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the
rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner
by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.

In this case, petitioner has not shown how he is entitled to the relief
prayed for. Hence, this court cannot be compelled to exercise its power of
judicial review since there is no actual case or controversy.
Final note
The judiciary is the weakest branch of government. It is true that
courts have power to declare what law is given a set of facts, but it does not
have an army to enforce its writs. Courts do not have the power of the
purse. Except for a constitutional provision that requires that the budget of
the judiciary should not go below the appropriation for the previous year, it
is beholden to the Congress depending on how low the budget is.49
Despite being the third co-equal branch of the government, the
judiciary enjoys less than 1%50 of the total budget for the national
government. Specifically, it was a mere 0.82% in 2014,51 0.85% in 2013,52
0.83% in 2012,53 and 0.83% in 2011.54
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses or MOOE pays for
45
46
47
48

The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum

shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.

The writ of mandamus will issue when the act sought to be performed

49
50
51

44

J. Leonen, dissenting opinion in Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014 <http://sc.judiciary.
gov.ph/microsite/rhlaw/> 12 [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc], citing Southern Hemisphere Engagement
Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 646 Phil. 452, 479 (2010) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc],
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc]; Guingona, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 415, 429 (1998) [Per J. Panganiban, First Division]; J. Mendoza, separate
opinion in Cruz v. Sec. of Environment and Natural Resources, 400 Phil. 904, 1092 (2002) [Per
Curiam, En Banc], J. Mendoza, concurring opinion in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290, 430
432 (2001) [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc], citing Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521, 31 L.Ed.2d 408,
413 (1972).

UDK-15143

is ministerial.45 An act is ministerial when it does not require the exercise of

judgment and the act is performed in compliance with a legal mandate.46 In
a petition for mandamus, the burden of proof is on petitioner to show that
one is entitled to the performance of a legal right and that respondent has a
corresponding duty to perform the act.47 Mandamus will not lie to compel
an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty
not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by
law.48

II
Requisites for the issuance of a writ of mandamus not shown
Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:

12

52

53

54

Quizon v. Commission on Elections, 569 Phil. 323, 329 (2008) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc].
Special People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda, G.R. No. 160932, January 14, 2013, 688 SCRA 403, 424
[Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
Id.
Uy Kiao Eng v. Nixon Lee, G.R. No. 176831, January 15, 2010, 610 SCRA 211, 217 [Per J. Nachura,
Third Division]. See also University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100588, March
7, 1994, 230 SCRA 761 [Per J. Nocon, Second Division].
Keynote speech by J. Leonen, General Membership of the Tax Management Association of the
Philippines, Inc., Mandarin Oriental Hotel, July 31, 2014.
The percentage is computed by dividing the total appropriations for the department over the estimated
total of the national budget.
See Rep. Act No. 10633, GAA Fiscal Year 2014, annex A, title XXIX, general summary; President
Aquino
OKs
P2.265T
2014
National
Budget,
December
20,
2013,
<http://www.gov.ph/2013/12/20/president-aquino-oks-p2-265t-2014-national-budget> (visited January
20, 2015).
See Rep. Act No. 10352, GAA Fiscal Year 2013, title XXIX, general summary; 2013 Budget Message
of President Aquino, July 24, 2012 <http://www.dbm.gov.ph/?page_id=3692> (visited January 20,
2015).
See Rep. Act No. 10155, GAA Fiscal Year 2012, title XXIX, general summary; 2013 Budget Message
of President Aquino, July 24, 2012 <http://www.dbm.gov.ph/?page_id=3692> (visited January 20,
2015).
See Rep. Act No. 10147, GAA Fiscal Year 2011, title XXIX, general summary; The Presidents Budget
Message, July 26, 2011 <http://www.dbm.gov.ph/?page_id=779> (visited January 20, 2015).

Resolution

13

UDK-15143

sundry matters such as utility payments, paper, gasoline and others.55 The
MOOE granted to the lower courts in 2014 was 1,220,905,000.00.56 While
this might seem like a large amount, the amount significantly dwindles when
divided among all lower courts in the country. Per the 2014 General
Appropriations Act (GAA), the approximate monthly MOOE for all courts
are estimated as follows:
Type of Court
Regional Trial Courts
Metropolitan Trial Courts
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
Municipal Trial Courts
Sharia District Courts
Sharia Circuit Courts

Number of
Courts57
969
106
229
468
366
5
51

It was only in 2013 that the budget allocated to the judiciary included
an item for the construction, rehabilitation, and repair of the halls of justice
in the capital outlay. The amount allocated was 1 million.59
In 2014, there was no item for the construction, rehabilitation, and
repair of the halls of justice.60 This allocation would have been used to help

The entire budget for the judiciary, however, does not only come from
the national government. The Constitution grants fiscal autonomy to the
judiciary to maintain its independence.61 In Bengzon v. Drilon:62
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in the
discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and
constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate
and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal
autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the
Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the
independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our
constitutional system is based.63

Courts, therefore, must also be accountable with their own budget.

The Judiciary Development Fund, used to augment the expenses of the
judiciary, is regularly accounted for by this court on a quarterly basis. The
financial reports are readily available at the Supreme Court website.64
These funds, however, are still not enough to meet the expenses of
lower courts and guarantee credible compensation for their personnel. The
reality is that halls of justice exist because we rely on the generosity of local
government units that provide additional subsidy to our judges.65 If not, the
budget for the construction, repair, and rehabilitation of halls of justice is
with the Department of Justice.66
As a result, our fiscal autonomy and judicial independence are often
undermined by low levels of budgetary outlay, the lack of provision for
maintenance and operating expenses, and the reliance on local government
units and the Department of Justice.

61

62

56
57
58
59
60

UDK-15143

12

In comparison, the 2014 MOOE allocation for the House of

Representatives was 3,386,439,000.0058 or about 282.2 million per
month for the maintenance and operation of the House of Representatives
compound in Batasan Hills. Even if this amount was divided equally among
the 234 legislative districts, a representatives office space would still have a
monthly MOOE allocation of approximately 1.2 million, which is
significantly higher than the average 46,000.00 allocated monthly to each
trial court.

55

14

fund the repair of existing halls of justice and the construction of new halls
of justice in the entire country, including those courts destroyed by Typhoon
Yolanda and the 2013 earthquake.

Estimated Monthly
MOOE Per Court
46,408.67
46,071.89
46,206.01
46,305.69
46,423.30
40,696.83
45,883.68

These amounts were arrived at using the following computation:

Number of Courts
x
MOOE
Total Number of Courts
____________________________________
Number of Courts

Resolution

Keynote speech by J. Leonen, General Membership of the Tax Management Association of the
Philippines, Inc., Mandarin Oriental Hotel, July 31, 2014.
Rep. Act No. 10633, GAA Fiscal Year 2014, title XXIX, sec. A, special provision 6.
These statistics came from the presentation of the judicial department during the 2015 budget
congressional hearing on September 9, 2014.
Rep. Act No. 10633, GAA Fiscal Year 2014, title I, sec. D.
Rep. Act No. 10352, GAA Fiscal Year 2013, title XXIX, sec. A.
Rep. Act No. 10633, GAA Fiscal Year 2014, title XXIX, sec. A. The judiciary, however, was allocated

63
64
65
66

a total of 174 million capital outlay for locally funded projects.

CONST., art. VIII, sec. 3 provides:
Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be
reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval,
shall be automatically and regularly released.
G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992, 208 SCRA 133, 150 [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc].
Id. at 150.
See Financial and Budget Accountability Reports of the Supreme Court of the Philippines and the
Lower Courts <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pio/accountabilityreports/> (visited January 20, 2015).
See LOCAL GOVT. CODE, title II, chap. 3, art. III, sec. 447(a)(1)(xi), LOCAL GOVT. CODE, title III, chap.
3, art. III, sec. 458(a)(1)(xi), and LOCAL GOVT. CODE, title IV, chap. 3, art. III, sec. 468(a)(1)(xi).
See Admin. Order No. 99 (1988) and Re: Guidelines on the Occupancy, Use, Operation and
Maintenance of the Hall of Justice Buildings, A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC, October 23, 2001 [Unsigned
resolution, En Banc].

Resolution

15

UDK-15143

"Courts are not constitutionally built to do political lobbying. By

constitutional design, it is a co-equal department to the Congress and the
Executive. By temperament, our arguments are legal, not political. We are
best when we lay down all our premises in the finding of facts, interpretation
of the law and understanding of precedents. We are not trained .to produce a
political statement or a media release." 67
"Because of the nature of courts, that is - that it has to decide in favor
of one party, we may not have a political base. Certainly, we should not
even consider building a political base. All we have is an abiding faith that
we should do what we could to ensure that the Rule of Law prevails. It
seems that we have no champions when it comes to ensuring the material
basis for fiscal autonomy or judicial independence." 68
For this reason, we appreciate petitioner's concern for the judiciary. It
is often only through the vigilance of private citizens that issues relating to
the judiciary can be discussed in the political sphere. Unfortunately, the
remedy he seeks cannot be granted by this court. But his crusade is not a lost
cause. Considering that what he seeks to be struck down is a proposed bill,
it would be better for him to air his concerns by lobbying in Congress.
There, he may discover the representatives and senators who may have a
similar enthusiastic response to truly making the needed investments in the
Rule of Law.

Resolution

16

UDK-15143

PRESBITERO f. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIOT. C
Associate Justice

4
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

On official leave
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

Associate J

Associate Justice

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

)YIARVIC M:V.F.
Associate Justice

IENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

67

68

JOSE

EREZ

SO ORDERED.

Keynote speech by J. Leonen, General Membership of the Tax Management Association of the
Philippines, Inc., Mandarin Oriental Hotel, July 31, 2014.
Id.

A4,uMl

ESTELA M. l>F]RLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

Associate Justice

Resolution

17

UDK-15143

CERTIFICATION
I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the court.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice