Chapter 1

Byzantium’s Retreating Balkan

Frontiers during the Reign of
the Angeloi (1185–1203)
A Reconsideration1
Alicia Simpson

In the course of the middle through the late twelfth century the Byzantine
emperor Manuel I Komnenos (1143–80), utilizing a combination of force
and diplomacy, managed to restore and consolidate imperial power in the
Balkans. In the western Balkans, the emperor successfully competed with
Hungary, Byzantium’s main rival for influence in the region, and gained
control of Dalmatia and the district of Sirmium, thus significantly extend-
ing the empire’s frontiers in the region. Upon the death of the Hungarian
King Stephen III in 1172, Manuel installed his protégé, Béla-Alexios, on
the Hungarian throne. Béla III (1172–96) had married the emperor’s sister-
in-law, Agnes of Antioch, and received the rank of caesar; he was therefore
a member of the Byzantine court hierarchy and subject to his superior, the
emperor. Having sworn an oath to uphold the interests of the Byzantine
emperor, he was installed as king of Hungary in the presence of an impe-
rial delegation that had accompanied him from Constantinople. At the same
time, Manuel forced the troublesome grand župan of Serbia, Stefan Nemanja
(1166–96), into submission. Nemanja was compelled to seek forgiveness in
an orchestrated ritual of public humiliation and, subsequently, to take part in
an imperial triumph staged in Constantinople as the emperor’s doulos.2 To
the east, the regions of Macedonia, Thrace, and the Paradounavon remained
trouble-free after the victory of John II Komnenos (1118–43) over the Cuman
invaders who had crossed the Danube and plundered Thrace in 1122. The
sources mention a further Cuman raid early in the reign of Manuel (1148)
which fell upon the cities located on the shores of the Danube, but none
thereafter. In fact, the surviving evidence paints a picture of tranquility in the
Balkan interior throughout the twelfth century.3

3
4 Alicia Simpson

Yet shortly after the death of Manuel in 1180 Byzantine authority in the
northern Balkans was seriously challenged by the resurgence of Hungary
and the emergence of autonomous polities in Serbia and Bulgaria. By 1182
Béla III of Hungary had annexed Dalmatia and Sirmium. The usurpation of
Andronikos I Komnenos (1183–5) sparked a raiding campaign in the region
of Niš-Braničevo extending from Belgrade to Sofia. The Hungarians presum-
ably withdrew from any territories they may have occupied in this region
following the conclusion of an alliance with Isaac II Angelos (1185–95) but
are said to have retained Dalmatia and Sirmium, which had formed Béla’s
patrimony.4 Stefan Nemanja of Serbia, whose forces had participated along
with the Hungarians in the raiding campaign of 1182–3, took the opportunity
to expand his own domains in the following years. He first conquered Kosovo
and Metohija; subsequently he occupied the city of Niš and its surrounding
region; acquired Duklja (Zeta) and the string of territories along the southern
Adriatic coastline, and penetrated into northern Macedonia, taking Skopje
and the upper Vardar.5 Finally, beginning in late 1185, the Vlach–Bulgarian
insurrection wreaked havoc on the Byzantine lands adjacent to the Haimos
Mountains (Stara Planina), Macedonia, and central Thrace, eventually lead-
ing to the establishment of the “Second Bulgarian Empire,” which was
formally recognized by Byzantium most probably in 1202.6
In order to explain this extraordinary reversal, modern scholars have
often looked to the weakness of the central government, the internal power
struggles, and the regional separatism, which characterize the period under
consideration.7 Inevitably, however, Byzantium’s retreating Balkan fron-
tiers and the rise of autonomous polities in the later twelfth century has
been viewed, consciously or unconsciously, through the prism of the Latin
capture of Constantinople in 1204. In this context, the fate of the Byzantine
Balkans is taken to reflect a state of progressive internal disintegration that
undermined imperial authority in the periphery, encouraged regional separat-
ism, and invited foreign intervention. This may appear to be the case when
we apply a holistic and long-term approach to the period in question, but
can perhaps be challenged if we examine regional and short-term develop-
ments in isolation, and at the same time, refrain from viewing the capture
of Constantinople as the culmination of a period of internal decline. In what
follows, I will briefly re-examine the political developments in Byzantium’s
northern Balkan territories during the reigns of Isaac II and his successor
Alexios III Angelos (1195–1203) in order to reconsider the collapse of the
Byzantine position in this important region in the final decades of the twelfth
century. Although there is now a wealth of scholarly literature on the northern
Balkans in this period, it has not yet affected the standard perceptions and
evaluations of the Angeloi, whose policies are viewed as mediocre at best and
disastrous at worst.8 At first glance, it is obvious that the political turmoil that
 Byzantium’s Retreating Balkan Frontiers 5

accompanied the death of Manuel Komnenos provided the pretext as well as

the opportunity for various regional rulers in the northern Balkans to assert
their independence and extend their authority at the expense of the empire.
But we need to consider why this trend persisted after the accession of Isaac
II to the throne in 1185. We also need to examine how Isaac II and Alexios III
dealt with the disturbances in the northern Balkans and assess their respective
policies within the chronological and temporal limits of the reigns.
When Isaac ascended the throne in September 1185 he was immediately
faced with the Norman invasion of the Balkans; Dyrrachion and Thessalonike
had already fallen and the Norman forces were marching unopposed towards
Constantinople. The new emperor launched a massive counter-offensive
which succeeded in swiftly expelling the invaders and subsequently negoti-
ated an important alliance (or rather a renewal of the pre-existing alliance)
with the Hungarians whereby he married the daughter of King Béla III,
Margaret, and restored the status quo ante in the western Balkans.9 The agree-
ment not only secured peace in the empire’s northwestern frontier, putting
an end to Hungarian encroachment, but also resolved the question of Serbia,
to which Béla formally renounced all claims.10 The marriage, however, pro-
duced an unexpected result. Isaac had intended that the royal wedding be
paid from the imperial estates, but demands were also made on Anchialos
and other neighboring towns, provoking the local inhabitants to rebellion.11
The situation was further aggravated when the emperor refused to enlist the
local Vlach leaders, the brothers Theodore and Asen, in the imperial forces
and grant them an estate producing a small income in the vicinity of the
Haimos Mountains.12 The two brothers enlisted the support of St. Demetrios
to their cause in order to mobilize their compatriots and launched a full-scale
rebellion.13 Without opposition they extended their control over the regions
outside the Haimos Mountains. Theodore assumed the name Peter, after
Peter I who had ruled Bulgaria in the tenth century, and was crowned tsar.
Having failed to capture Preslav, the capital of the First Bulgarian Empire,
the rebels commenced their devastating raids.14 Isaac responded with a series
of counter-offensives in the following decade, but achieved limited success.
The fighting seems to have mainly taken place in the regions extending from
Sofia and Lovitzos (Loveč) to the west, to Anchialos and Varna on the Black
Sea in the east, and as far as Arkadiopolis in Thrace to the south.15
The events of the struggle need not be recounted here. However, I would
like to draw attention to several points of interest. With regards to the ori-
gins of the rebellion, Isaac has often received the bulk of the blame. More
specifically, the emperor is said to have exercised poor judgment when he
made extraordinary demands on the inhabitants of the Haimos Mountains and
subsequently denied the modest requests of their local leaders, thus turning
regional disaffection into ethnic separatism.16 A careful reading of Niketas
6 Alicia Simpson

Choniates, our sole contemporary source for the outbreak of the rebellion,
tells a different story. The historian testifies to the following: “On account
of his stinginess the emperor did not want to pay for the wedding festivities
from the public treasury, so he collected these freely from his own lands.
But due to his pettiness he did not notice that other cities, those situated
around Anchialos, were also gleaned and that the inhabitants of the Haimos
Mountains, formerly called Mysians, now Vlachs, were provoked to wage
war against him and the Romans.”17 Significantly, he adds that the seizure of
their livestock and their own ill-treatment formed the pretext for their rebel-
lion.18 This probably means that the imperial agents exceeded their instruc-
tions and made demands not only on imperial estates in the region but also
on the towns around Anchialos, where they seized the livestock of the local
inhabitants. Isaac was therefore not being stingy but collecting provisions for
the wedding feast from his own (imperial) lands so as not to burden the public
treasury with their purchase.19
Choniates then tells us that “the instigators of this evil,” Peter and Asen,
approached the emperor encamped at Kypsella in order to justify their rebel-
lion.20 This clearly implies that they knew beforehand that their request would
be denied. As we have seen, the two brothers asked that they be recruited into
the Byzantine army and be granted an estate in the vicinity of the Haimos
that would provide them with a little revenue.21 When their request was
rejected they became angry and uttered heated words that threatened rebel-
lion. Unfortunately, Choniates does not explain why their request was denied
and the refusal seems strange when we consider that Isaac was still engaged
in fighting against the Normans, and thus presumably had every reason to
grant a request that would have boosted the size of his army. The request of
Peter and Asen must have been presented when the emperor was at Kypsella.
This was an important station point for military campaigns in the twelfth
century, and is most often recorded in connection with military preparations
and as a location for the concentration of troops.22 The only time that Isaac
would have been at Kypsella in this period was at the outset of his campaign
to recapture Dyrrachion from the Normans in the winter of 1185–6.23 So it
would seem that Peter and Asen approached the emperor at precisely the right
time. Why then was their request denied, and how could they have known
this beforehand?
In order to answer these questions we should first consider the fact that
Peter and Asen were admitted before the emperor’s presence. This suggests:
(i) that their status was somewhat more exulted than that of simple soldiers;
and (ii) that what they requested was something more than a modest land
grant.24 Second, we also need to consider the fact that Peter and Asen were
subsequently able to mobilize the inhabitants of the Haimos Mountains to
rebel against imperial authority under their leadership. This indicates that
 Byzantium’s Retreating Balkan Frontiers 7

they were already in a position of power at the local level. What that position
may have been is difficult to ascertain but perhaps the status of other promi-
nent Vlachs in Byzantine service can provide some clues.25 One such Vlach
was Dobromir Chrysos, who, according to Choniates had fought as an “ally”
in the imperial armies along with the five hundred countrymen under his
command in the initial stages of the rebellion.26 Significantly, Choniates also
notes that the rebellious Vlachs were already in possession of the forts on the
Haimos Mountains.27 If the status of Peter and Asen was in any way similar to
that of their compatriots, then that would mean that they were part of a local
military elite who based their power in the region on the forts and men under
their command.28 It would also explain why they were admitted before the
emperor and why they were able to undertake leadership of the rebellion. It
thus seems probable that at Kypsella the two brothers requested some sort of
additional (land-holding?) benefits in order to fight in the imperial armies in
this particular campaign and were refused. Whatever the case, it is important
to remember that the refusal of their request was expected and served as an
excuse for a rebellion that had already been decided.29
It is therefore clear that the outbreak of the Vlach–Bulgarian insurrection
should not be consigned to Isaac’s carelessness or misjudgment. The revolt
broke out at a most favorable occasion, that is, when the empire was still
engaged in fighting against the Norman invaders, and was provoked by the
arbitrary seizure of the local population’s livestock. Significantly, Choniates
notes that the first stirrings were already present: “Relying on the roughness
of the terrain and emboldened by their fortresses, which were many and stood
upright on steep cliffs, they had boasted of their victories against the Romans
in other times, and then finding a pretext, which is called that of Patroklos—
the confiscation of their livestock and their own ill-treatment—they leaped at
open rebellion.”30 This statement suggests an inherent desire for autonomy
as well as a tendency toward emancipation from Byzantine rule.31 Elsewhere
Choniates states that the intention of the rebels was to unite the rule of Mysia
and Bulgaria into one empire as in olden times, thus acknowledging the eth-
nic dimension of the rebellion from the outset.32 This ethnic dimension is also
borne out by the initial actions of the rebels—the appropriation of the cult of
St. Demetrios, the coronation of Peter, and the assault on Preslav—and ulti-
mately explains why a trivial cause such as the arbitrary seizure of the local
population’s livestock led to a rebellion of such massive proportions.33
Still as Choniates holds Isaac responsible for the outbreak of the conflict,
so he blames him for its escalation. Isaac moved swiftly, or as swiftly as
he could under the circumstances, personally leading the campaign into the
Haimos Mountains in the spring of 1186.34 The emperor was successful in
driving the rebels beyond the Danube, but only temporarily. The Vlach–
Bulgarians returned, and taking advantage of their Cuman allies and mountain
8 Alicia Simpson

strongholds, soon re-established themselves. Isaac personally led major cam-

paigns against them in 1187, 1188, and 1190 but could not force a decisive
encounter with the rebels, who wisely refused to engage the Byzantine army
in the open.35 These campaigns, which must have involved considerable
resources, brought forth negligible results.36 It is, therefore, unsurprising that
the emperor changed tactics: in 1192 the rebel leader Peter was won over
to the Byzantine side and the orators at the imperial court looked forward
to the imminent destruction of Asen.37 The following year Isaac entrusted
the struggle to his cousin Constantine Angelos, appointing him commander
at Philippopolis so as to bolster the Byzantine defenses in the key region of
central Thrace. Angelos seems to have recovered the initiative against the
Vlach–Bulgarians by successfully repelling their incursions, but he rebelled
against the emperor and was deprived of his command.38 Thereafter the
Vlach–Bulgarians along with their Cuman allies resumed their devastating
raids. Following the defeat of the Byzantine army led by the generals Alexios
Gidos and Basil Vatatzes at Arkadiopolis in 1194, Isaac decided to launch a
massive counter-offensive, this time with the assistance of his father-in-law,
Béla of Hungary, who was to attack the rebels from the north by way of Vidin
on the Danube.39 His plan was never realized because he was deposed in the
spring of 1195.40
The war against the Vlach–Bulgarians was therefore characterized by
temporary advances and repeated setbacks. The emperor’s efforts were frus-
trated first and foremost by the alliance between the Vlach–Bulgarians and
the Cumans. The latter contributed significantly to the success of the rebel-
lion by providing a seemingly unlimited supply of manpower from beyond
the Danube that was dedicated to raiding and pillaging.41 The alliance was
made possible because for the greater part of the twelfth century the lands of
the Lower Danube region (i.e., the Paradounavon) were lands with impover-
ished or semi-destroyed settlements and no permanent defense forces. These
conditions allowed for the ascendancy of Cuman power beyond the Danube
frontier, and when rebellion broke out in the Haimos Mountains, the Cuman
fighters easily crossed the unprotected frontiers.42 Second, the passage of the
Third Crusade (1189–90) prevented the Byzantines from taking any concrete
action against the rebels at that time. The dangerous encounter with the Ger-
man crusaders, who occupied and devastated much of Thrace, and the pos-
sibility of their collusion with the Serbs and the Vlach–Bulgarians—who had
willingly offered the crusaders their services against the Greeks in return for
recognition of their autonomous polities—ended with the signing of a peace
treaty in Adrianople (14 February 1190).43 Third, there were repeated revolts
by the Byzantine military commanders assigned to the front.44 Early in the
struggle, Isaac’s uncle, the sebastokrator John Angelos rebelled. According
to Choniates, he had achieved success by harassing the enemy with constant
 Byzantium’s Retreating Balkan Frontiers 9

attacks and preventing them from descending into the plains.45 In the sum-
mer of 1187, the celebrated general Alexios Branas rebelled and utilized the
armed forces that had been collected to fight against the Vlach–Bulgarians
to besiege Constantinople.46 Finally, we have seen that Constantine Angelos,
who had been successful in checking the advances of the Vlach–Bulgarians,
also rebelled. Thereafter, according to Choniates, the rebels destroyed every-
thing in sight, even attacking important Byzantine cities such as Philippopo-
lis, Sofia, and Adrianople.47
We must be careful not to attribute the blame for these internal struggles
on Isaac (as Choniates does). The emperor was still at pains to establish
himself firmly in power and his claim to the throne was only one in a series
of competing claims put forth by members of the extended Komnenian fam-
ily. The situation was not so unusual. Alexios I Komnenos (1081–1118) had
faced nineteen rebellions in his first twenty years in power. In the remaining
seventeen there were almost no conspiracies or insurrections, something that
suggests that it took the emperor almost two decades to completely secure
the throne.48 At the same time, he required more than ten years to pacify the
northern Balkans.49 This is not to suggest that Isaac would have eventually
been successful for he was confronted with a very different situation. The
various peoples who inhabited the Balkans, most notably the Serbs and the
Vlach–Bulgarians, were in the process of asserting their autonomy at the
expense of the empire. Increased contacts with Western Europe through
Hungarian expansionism, the Norman invasions (1081–5, 1107–8, 1185),
the passing crusades (1096–9, 1147–9, 1189–92), and the reformed papacy
encouraged their efforts by providing alternative centers of political power
to which they could readily appeal in order to legitimize their independence
from Constantinople.50 Nevertheless, all the evidence seems to confirm that
despite repeated setbacks Isaac actively sought a resolution to the conflicts in
the northern Balkans.
In 1191 the emperor conducted military operations against the Vlach–Bul-
garians and the Cumans from his base at Philippopolis. He then advanced
against the Serbs “for having ravaged the land and destroyed Skopje” and
gained what the Byzantine sources describe as a victory somewhere on the
Morava River.51 The peace treaty that followed, again according to Byzantine
sources, restored Serbia to its position of servitude and was sealed by the
marriage of Isaac’s niece, Eudokia, to Stefan Nemanja’s second son Stefan
(the First-Crowned).52 This was the first marriage contracted between the
ruling houses of Byzantium and Serbia but it did not amount to recognition
of independence or imply a new status for the Serbian territories.53 Serbia
remained a tributary state, as it had been under the Komnenoi. As Isaac
himself declared shortly thereafter, “Serbia has been subject to the empire
since ancient times and has never been given to anyone else.”54 With regard
10 Alicia Simpson

to territorial concessions, the emperor is said to have recognized Nemanja’s

entitlement to a substantial portion of the territories he had conquered in the
previous decade but the Serbian ruler was forced to return the vital lands
along the Morava, notably Niš and its surrounding area, and those in the
region of the upper Vardar, including Skopje. He also had to relinquish part
of the Kosovo-Metohija area, including Prizren and Polog.55
Following his victory over the Serbs, Isaac met with his father-in-law, Béla
of Hungary. In an oration delivered probably in 1192, Choniates speaks of
two separate meetings: the Hungarian king first traveled south to meet the
emperor in an unknown location but presumably within imperial territory.
Béla is said to have honored the emperor with gifts and made obeisance to
him. The Hungarian king is also said to have praised the imperial victory—
despite the fact that he had done nothing to encourage it—and deriving great
benefit for his own domains, he heralded the emperor’s deeds throughout
his land of the Hungarians in order to prepare the emperor’s visit. Isaac
then marched north to the Sava River for the second meeting, which prob-
ably took place at Sirmium. This was an impressively staged encounter with
the emperor arriving by ship to a ceremonial reception at which Béla and
the Hungarian elite were all present. Here, always according to Choniates,
the subordinate status of Hungary was demonstrated in a most spectacular
manner: “Thus the Istros was traversed without battle, the Hungarians bent
their knees without recourse to arms and killing, and greeted the emperor of
the Romans as their despot.”56 Choniates’s description, despite its rhetorical
flourish and propagandistic intent, suggests that these meetings were primar-
ily intended to reaffirm the Byzantine position in the region of the western
Balkans (especially with regard to Serbia) and ensure the alliance and loyalty
of the Hungarians.57
The arrangements with the Serbs and the Hungarians were not to be
taken lightly. When Béla invaded Serbia most probably at the end of 1192/
beginning of 1193, Isaac threatened to send reinforcements to the Serbs and
appealed to Pope Celestine III (1191–8) to force the Hungarians to withdraw,
thus defending Byzantine rights over the Serbian territories.58 Following the
defeat of the Byzantine forces at Arkadiopolis (1194), a location dangerously
close to Constantinople, Béla, acting as an ally of the emperor, agreed to
attack the Vlach–Bulgarians from the north in conjunction with a Byzantine
attack from the south, but the planned campaign was aborted when Isaac
was deposed while encamped at Kypsella.59 Although Isaac had relinquished
control of territories to the Hungarians and the Serbs in the western Balkans,
his policy of a peaceful resolution to the conflicts in this area can only be
described as pragmatic under the circumstances. In any case, the lands that
reverted to the Hungarian crown had only come under Byzantine control in
recent decades and only after a series of hard-fought wars (1162–7). Likewise,
 Byzantium’s Retreating Balkan Frontiers 11

the separatist tendencies of the Serbs had to be repeatedly restrained by force

in the not so distant past (1162, 1168, and 1172) and Isaac was able to secure
their submission and also to retain the Byzantine position west of the Morava,
and especially along the military road from Belgrade (through Niš, Sofia,
Phillippopolis, Adrianople) to Constantinople, and in southern Macedonia.
What is more, the emperor’s marriage diplomacy tied both Hungary and
Serbia to the Byzantine Empire; the former through alliance and the latter
through acquiescence. It is true that the Byzantine defeat at Arkadiopolis
marks the penetration of the Vlach–Bulgarians rebels into southern Thrace,
but Isaac was quick to recognize the danger and planned a massive counter-
offensive, which, as we have seen, was never realized.
The situation in the northern Balkans becomes somewhat confused dur-
ing the reign of Isaac’s successor, Alexios III. It is immediately noticeable
that the geography of the struggle during this period was transferred from
the regions of the Haimos Mountains and central Thrace to the Rhodope
Mountains, eastern and central Macedonia, and southern Thrace. This has
been taken to mean that the former areas had now effectively slipped from
imperial control.60 Yet the extent of Vlach–Bulgarian occupation during this
period remains uncertain. The major cities and outposts in the former regions
remained in Byzantine hands, including Philippopolis and Beroe in central
Thrace, and the ports of Anchialos and Varna on the Black Sea coast.61
In this context, it is significant to note that Choniates repeatedly refers to
incursions, plundering, and ravaging rather than conquest and occupation.
His narrative also makes clear the fact that in the cases where the rebels
attempted to occupy cities and fortresses, they were generally unsuccessful.
For example, in c. 1190 the Vlach–Bulgarians sacked Anchialos, took Varna,
razed Sardica, and plundered Stoumbion and Niš. But Isaac’s commanders
swiftly recovered Varna and Anchialos, strengthening the fortifications of
the latter and installing a garrison within.62 In c. 1193 the rebels set out to
attack Philippopolis, Sofia, and Adrianople; though they devastated the lands
en route, they failed to capture these cities.63 What is more, the so-called
“Bulgarian Imitative” coins, identified as such on the basis of hoards depos-
ited in the region of the Thracian Plain and the Strymon Valley between c.
1195 and c. 1210 and taken as evidence that the Vlach–Bulgarians had begun
striking their own coins, are no longer considered to have been of Bulgarian
provenance since these “faithful imitations” of Byzantine originals circulated
in all the regions of the empire between c. 1195 and c. 1250.64
Finally, we need to consider that Alexios III fought less against the Vlach–
Bulgarians, who from 1197 were led by the formidable Kalojan (Ioannitsa),
and more against the rebellious Vlach commanders employed in his service.65
Indeed, his first act as emperor was to dismiss the army amassed by his pre-
decessor to fight against the Vlach–Bulgarians and to sue for peace. Since the
12 Alicia Simpson

conditions proposed by the rebels were unacceptable, hostilities were soon

resumed. In the autumn of 1195 the Vlach–Bulgarians invaded the regions
around Serrai on the Rhodope Mountains, defeated the Byzantine forces sta-
tioned there, and captured the governor Alexios Aspietes. The emperor dis-
patched a relief force under the command of his son-in-law, the sebastokrator
Isaac Komnenos, but the latter was defeated and captured.66 When civil war
broke out in the Vlach–Bulgarian camp the following year Alexios responded
favorably to the request for Byzantine aid from the Vlach commander Ivanko
who had murdered Asen, taken possession of Tǎrnovo, and was now besieged
by an army of his compatriots led by Peter. The campaign, led by the pro-
tostrator Manuel Kamytzes, ended in a fiasco when the Byzantine forces
mutinied and refused to cross the Haimos Mountains. Since the Byzantines
failed to arrive, Ivanko was forced to flee Tǎrnovo and seek refuge in Con-
stantinople. With the opportunity to gain possession of the Vlach–Bulgarian
heartland lost the emperor seems to have given up on the idea of mounting
major campaigns against the rebels.67
His new strategy, as reflected in Choniates’s narrative, was to employ
Vlach–Bulgarian commanders to the front. The divide and rule tactic was
standard Byzantine practice for dealing with rebellious peoples but it always
carried a high risk of treason.68 On the other hand, Alexios may have been
wary of committing the empire’s resources to major campaigns against the
rebels given the repeated setbacks suffered during the reign of Isaac and his
own experience with the aborted campaign of Manuel Kamytzes. He may
have also wished to employ Vlach–Bulgarian commanders because they
were more experienced in the military tactics of their compatriots and could
also utilize their own forces in the struggle. In 1197, however, the emperor
was forced to march out against the Vlach Dobromir Chrysos, who had been
assigned the command of Strummitsa, a site not far from the regions around
Serrai, which had been recently overran by Vlach-Bulgarian rebels. Once in
Strummitsa, Dobromir Chrysos repudiated Byzantine authority, took pos-
session of the fortress of Prosakos, and extended his control over the sur-
rounding region. Following two unsuccessful campaigns the emperor came
to terms with Dobromir Chrysos: the rebel recognized Byzantine suzerainty
and retained control of Prosakos, Strummitsa, and all the neighboring lands.
He was also provided with a Byzantine bride, the daughter of the protostrator
Manuel Kamytzes.69 Not long after, the emperor was faced with the rebellion
of another Vlach commander, Ivanko (1200). The latter, having fled Tărnovo,
was well received in Constantinople. Betrothed to a Byzantine princess,
Alexios’s own granddaughter Theodora, he was entrusted with the sensitive
command of Philippopolis, from where, according to Choniates, he was not
only successful in repelling the Vlach–Bulgarian raids but also in reclaiming
numerous fortresses along the Haimos Mountains (1197–1200).70 Ivanko’s
 Byzantium’s Retreating Balkan Frontiers 13

rebellion was a grave threat. From his strongholds on the Haimos, he

extended his sway over Mosynopolis, Xantheia, and Abdera near the Aegean
coast, and subjugated the theme of Smolena in the middle Strymon Valley.
In the end the emperor managed to have the rebel seized and executed, thus
regaining control of the Rhodope region and central Thrace.71
Yet the strategy of employing Vlach commanders to the front and entrust-
ing them with important commands in areas south of the Haimos Mountains
had effectively backfired, and the emperor was continually preoccupied with
keeping them in line. In the meantime, Choniates reports that a Vlach and
Cuman raiding party crossed the Danube and reached as far as the southern
Thracian towns around Mesene and Tzouroulos (spring 1199). In a further
incursion, Cuman forces are said to have overran all of Macedonia, attacking
well-fortified cities and despoiling the monasteries on Mount Ganos, north of
the Gallipoli peninsula.72 In the following year the Vlach and Cuman raiding
parties would have reached the walls of Constantinople had not the Russians
of Galicia and Volynia attacked their lands and forced them to withdraw.73
To make matters worse, in 1201 Kalojan undertook a major expedition that
resulted in the capture of Constantia near the junction of the Rhodope and
Haimos Mountains and Varna on the Black Sea coast.74 The loss of the
important port of Varna was nothing less than devastating for Byzantium, for
it considerably undermined any future efforts to recover the territories north
of the Haimos and ceded control of the sea route between the capital and the
cities of the Lower Danube to the Vlach–Bulgarians.75
In 1202 Alexios came to terms; according to the Byzantine sources,
Kalojan agreed to withdraw to his mountains, a statement which has been
taken to mean that the Haimos Mountains now constituted the border between
Byzantium and the Vlach–Bulgarian state. In exchange for recognition of
his territories, Kalojan undertook to defend the empire against its enemies,
presumably the Cuman raiders who had recently caused such devastation but
more importantly those Vlach commanders still attempting to establish their
own principalities in imperial territory south of the Haimos Mountains.76
According to Nikephoros Chrysoberges, Kalojan assisted Alexios in his
struggle against Dobromir Chrysos, who along with his father-in-law, Manuel
Kamytzes, had rebelled once again, this time seizing Prilep and Pelagonia,
occupying Thessaly, and causing disturbances as far as Hellas and the
Peloponnesos.77 In his correspondence with Pope Innocent III (1198–1216),
Kalojan later claimed that the Byzantine emperor promised him an imperial
coronation should he come to Constantinople, and a patriarch for the church
in Tărnovo. The letter in question was written in August 1203 and in the
context of Kalojan’s efforts to gain recognition of his royal title (something
obviously not granted by the Byzantines) from Rome in exchange for submis-
sion to papal authority.78 If Alexios did make such an offer, it was certainly
14 Alicia Simpson

calculated to counter the papacy’s concerted efforts to extend its influence in

the northern Balkans.79 In the end, however, Kalojan received his crown with
the permission and blessings of Innocent III in November 1204.
With regard to the western Balkans in this period, the Byzantine sources
are almost completely silent. The Hungarians all but disappear from
Choniates’ narrative probably because relations between Byzantium and
Hungary were negatively affected by the overthrow of Isaac.80 This was a
serious development that has gone largely unnoticed. The Hungarians had
been Byzantium’s staunchest allies in the region during the previous decade
despite the intermittent conflicts that occurred between the two states.81 The
alliance, however, was entirely based on the personal ties developed between
Isaac and Béla. When these ties were severed on account of the usurpation
of Alexios, the alliance simply ended. The consequences were evident by the
beginning of the thirteenth century if not earlier. When Kalojan of Bulgaria
invaded Serbia and occupied the region of Niš in the summer of 1203, the
new Hungarian king, Imre (1196–1204), claimed that Serbia was subject to
the Hungarian crown. He also asserted that the lands that had been occupied
by Kalojan in the previous years had been given by his father (Béla III) as
a dowry to his sister Margaret, the empress of the Greeks.82 Thus, Imre felt
that the territories that comprised Margaret’s dowry—these were probably
located along the Danube frontier since Kalojan’s westward expansion had
included the conquest of Sirmium, Braničevo, and Belgrade—were right-
fully his,83 and may have claimed them as early as after the deposition of his
brother-in-law Isaac in 1195.84 What is certain is that by 1202 the Hungarian
king had claimed suzerainty over Serbia, styling himself rex Serviae.85
The change of leadership in Constantinople affected Byzantium’s rela-
tions with Serbia as well. The Serbs are mentioned in the Byzantine sources
in connection with the quarrel that developed between Stefan Nemanja’s
second son, Stefan, and his Byzantine wife, Eudokia. By this time Eudokia’s
father had ascended the Byzantine throne as Alexios III. Likewise Stefan
(rather than Nemanja’s eldest son, Vukan) inherited the Serbian throne fol-
lowing the abdication of his father (1196). The succession of Stefan rather
than Vukan was probably connected with the accession of Alexios since it
was only natural for the Serbian ruling dynasty to take advantage of its newly
established connection to the Byzantine throne. Indeed, as the son-in-law of
the new emperor Stefan was soon granted the elevated title of sebastokrator.86
This dignity, which was reserved for members of the imperial family, served
to bind the Serbian ruler to the Constantinopolitan court but at the same time
denied him independent status.87 For Alexios, whose accession had caused
the dissolution of the Byzantine–Hungarian alliance, it must have seemed
like the perfect arrangement, especially since his daughter Eudokia was now
designated “joint heir to the paternal satrapy” of her husband.88 In the event,
 Byzantium’s Retreating Balkan Frontiers 15

Stefan’s inclusion into the Byzantine imperial family was not enough to
prevent him from dismissing Eudokia and sending her back to Byzantium.89
Interestingly, Choniates tells us that Vukan, Stefan’s brother, had opposed
the divorce and attempted to dissuade Stefan from this reprehensible course
of action. When Stefan sent Eudokia away in disgrace, Vukan willingly pro-
vided her with a fitting escort to conduct her safely to Dyrrachion.90 Choniates
then notes the conflict between Stefan and Vukan for control of Serbia.91
Although he does not connect these events, it is conceivable that the repu-
diation of Stefan’s Byzantine bride presented Vukan with the opportunity to
make overtures to Byzantium. If this was the case, Alexios does not seem to
have responded. But there were other options.
As early as 1199 Vukan, who had received possession of Zeta as a consola-
tion prize for being passed over for the Serbian throne and had subsequently
declared his independence and styled himself king of Duklja and Dalmatia,
approached Innocent III with a view to acquiring recognition of his royal title
in return for submission to Rome. At the same time he sought the friendship
and support of the Hungarians. In 1201 or 1202, his brother Stefan, who
presumably felt threatened by Vukan, likewise solicited the support of the
papacy, offering his submission to Rome and seeking to obtain a royal crown
from Innocent III. In this context, Stefan’s divorce from his Byzantine bride
Eudokia can be seen as the consequence of the Serbian ruler’s attempt to
align himself with the papacy and thereby neutralize his brother’s alliances.92
Although the pope seems to have initially favored Stefan’s request, the inter-
vention of the Hungarians, who had their own plans for the Serbian territo-
ries, prevented the coronation. In 1202 Vukan seized Serbia with Hungarian
aid and recognized Hungarian suzerainty. This action, like the divorce of
Stefan and Eudokia, provoked no response from Byzantium. In the follow-
ing year Kalojan attacked Serbia, which was now was now caught between
Hungary and Bulgaria rather than Hungary and Byzantium. It should be noted
that during this period, the Byzantine emperor was entirely consumed with
fighting against the rebellion of Dobromir Chrysos and Manuel Kamytzes in
southern Macedonia and Thessaly as well as that of a certain John Spyridon-
akes in the district of Smolena.93 Thereafter, if not before, he received news of
the crusade that intended to place his nephew on the Byzantine throne.94 Thus,
any thoughts Alexios may have entertained of involvement in the western
Balkans were not to be realized.
It is difficult to reach secure conclusions on the status of the Byzantine
Balkans at the time of the arrival of the Fourth Crusade in Constantinople in
June 1203. But whereas Isaac had repeatedly committed substantial resources
to the region, fighting major campaigns against the Vlach–Bulgarian rebels
for control of the Paradounavon, the Haimos Mountains, and central Thrace,
Alexios relinquished the struggle to various Vlach leaders whom he entrusted
16 Alicia Simpson

with the command of key positions. This seems to have initially paid off,
at least in the case of Ivanko during 1197–1200, but in the long term the
emperor was entirely preoccupied with combating his own rebel command-
ers. Although by his victories over the rebels in 1200–2 Alexios was able to
recover northern Thrace and the Rhodope from Ivanko, regain the conquests
of Dobromir Chrysos in Macedonia, and expel Manuel Kamytzes from
Thessaly and John Spyridonakes from Smolena, these conflicts effectively
prevented him from making any headway against the Vlach–Bulgarian
realm proper and from intervening in the serious disturbances in the western
Balkans. Here Isaac’s policy had been realistic and successful. The change
of leadership in Constantinople, however, was crucial to the delicate bal-
ance of power in the western Balkans foremost because it marked the end of
the Byzantine–Hungarian alliance. Although it is undeniable that Byzantine
authority in the northern Balkans waned in the later twelfth century, this does
not necessarily mean that there occurred a progressive deterioration of the
imperial position in the region or that the successors of Manuel were either
unable or unwilling to preserve the frontiers as has so often been assumed. It
is not, after all, coincidental that Byzantium’s prestige declined along with the
retreat of its northern Balkan frontiers precisely during the period 1195–1203.

NOTES

1. This chapter was written in the framework of the research project SH6-1973
ISAACANG under the auspices of the Action “Supporting Postdoctoral Researchers”
of the Operational Program “Education and Lifelong Learning” co-financed by
the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Greek State. Many thanks are owed to
Tilemachos Lounghis and Vlada Stanković for their comments and suggestions.
2. On these developments, see P. Magdalino, The Empire of Manuel I Komnenos,
1143–1180 (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 78–83; P. Stephenson, Byzantium’s Balkan
Frontier: A Political Study of the Northern Balkans, 900–1204 (Cambridge, 2000),
pp. 266–9.
3. Cf. Magdalino, Manuel Komnenos, 132–7; Stephenson, Balkan Frontier, pp.
105–7, 183–6, 194–6; F. Curta, Southeastern Europe in the Middle Ages, 500–1250
(Cambridge, 2006), pp. 319–27. On the economy of the Balkan Peninsula, the con-
centration or urban settlements, and the distribution of population, see M. F. Hendy,
Studies on the Byzantine Monetary Economy, c. 300–1450 (Cambridge, 1985), pp.
35–9, 44–58, 78–90.
4. The extent of the Hungarian occupation in the region of Niš-Braničevo remains
uncertain as does the claim that Isaac II Angelos accepted Hungarian authority in
Dalmatia and Sirmium as part of the agreement with Béla III. See F. Makk, The
Árpάds and the Comnenoi: Political Relations between Hungary and Byzantium in
the 12th Century (Budapest, 1989), pp. 115–20, 176 no. 141, 177, no. 150.
 Byzantium’s Retreating Balkan Frontiers 17

5. S. Hafner, Serbisches Mittelater. Altserbische Herrscherbiographien. I. Stefan

Nemanja nach den Viten des hl. Sava und Stefans des Erstgekrönten (Graz, 1962),
pp. 87 ff.; C. Jireček, Geschichte der Serben, I (bis 1371) (Gotha, 1911; repr. Amster-
dam, 1967), pp. 264 ff.; J. V. A. Fine, The Late Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey
from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest (Ann Arbor, MI, 1987), pp.
7–9.
6. On the treaty of recognition, see Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des östro-
mischen Reiches von 565–1453, vol. II, 1025–1204, eds. F. Dölger and P. Wirth, (2nd
ed., Munich, 1995), no. 1661b.
7. See the review of the literature in M. Angold, “The State of Research: The
Road to 1204: The Byzantine Background to the Fourth Crusade,” Journal of
Medieval History 25/3 (1999), pp. 257–78.
8. A recent exception is the analytical study of M. Ritter, “Die vlacho-bulgarische
Rebellion und die Versuche ihrer Niederschlagung durch Kaiser Isaakios II. (1185–
1195),” Byzantinoslavica 71 (2013), pp. 162–210.
9. Nicetae Choniatae Historia, ed. J.-L. van Dieten (Berlin–New York, 1975), p.
368, and Nicetae Choniatae orationes et epistulae, ed. J.-L. van Dieten (Berlin–New
York, 1972), pp. 36–7, 39. On the date of the wedding (February 1186?), see J.-L.
van Dieten, Niketas Choniates. Erläuterungen zu den Reden und Briefen nebst einer
Biographie (Berlin–New York, 1971), pp. 88–9.
10. The terms of the alliance are stipulated in J. Darrouzès (ed.), Georges et
Démétrios Tornikès, lettres et discours (Paris, 1970), p. 343. On the importance
of Serbia, see V. Laurent, “La Serbie entre Byzance et la Hongrie à la vielle de la
quatrième croisade,” Revue historique du Sud-Est Européen 28 (1941), pp. 119–20;
Dölger-Wirth, Regesten, nos. 1567d, 1567e; G. Prinzing, “Das Papsttum und die
orthodox geprägte Südosten Europas, 1180–1216,” in E.-D. Hehl, H. Ringel, and H.
Seibert (eds.), Das Papsttum in der Welt des 12. Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart, 2002), p. 146.
11. Choniates, Historia, p. 368.
12. Choniates, Historia, p. 369.
13. Choniates, Historia, pp. 371–2. There is now a vast literature on the rebellion.
See R. L. Wolff, “The Second Bulgarian Empire. Its Origin and History to 1204,”
Speculum 24 (1949), pp. 167–206 = Studies on the Latin Empire of Constantinople
(London, 1976), III; C. M. Brand, Byzantium Confronts the West (1180–1204),
(Cambridge MA, 1968), pp. 88–96, 125–35; G. Cankova-Petkova, “La liberation de
la Bulgarie de la domination byzantine,” ByzBulg 5 (1978), pp. 95–121; Ph. Malin-
goudis, “Die Nachrichten des Niketas Choniates über die Enststehung des Zweiten
Bulgarischen Staates, Βυζ αντινά 10 (1980), pp. 51–147; D. Angelov, “Der Aufstand
der Asener und die Wiederherstellung des bulgarischen Staates,” Études Balkaniques
21/III (1985), pp. 3–16; Fine, Late Medieval Balkans, pp. 10–17, 25–33; Stephen-
son, Balkan Frontier, pp. 288–94, 300–12; G. Prinzing, “Die Demetrios-Kirche und
Aseniden-Aufstand. Zur chronologischen Präzisierung der Frühphase des Aseniden-
Aufstandes,” ZRVI 38 (1999/2000), pp. 257–65; and Ritter, “Die vlacho-bulgarische
Rebellion.”
14. Choniates, Historia, p. 372.
15. See in detail, Ritter, “Die vlacho-bulgarische Rebellion,” pp. 180 ff.
18 Alicia Simpson

16. See, for example, Cankova-Petkova, “La Liberation,” p. 98; Stephenson, Bal-
kan Frontier, p. 293; P. Magdalino, “The Empire of the Komnenoi,” in J. Shepard
(ed.), The Cambridge History of the Byzantine Empire, c. 500–1492 (Cambridge,
2008), pp. 655–6.
17. Choniates, Historia, p. 368.
18. Choniates, Historia, p. 368: πρόφασιν εὑρηκότες. This agrees with the account
of George Akropolites who states that the seizure of their sheep, pigs, and oxen was
the pretext for the rebellion. Cf. George Akropolites, Opera, I, ed. A. Heisenberg
(Leipzig, 1903); repr. with corrections P. Wirth (Stuttgart, 1978), p. 18.
19. I have followed the interpretation of Magdalino, Manuel Komnenos, pp. 134–5,
note 99.
20. Choniates, Historia, p. 369: μὴ δρῶντες τὴν νεωτέρισιν ἀπροφάσιστον.
21. On whether the request amounted to a pronoia grant, see M. C. Bartusis, Land
and Privilege in Byzantium: The Institution of Pronoia (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 98–9
and bibliography therein.
22. Cf. P. Soustal, Thrakien (Thrakē, Rodopē und Haimimontos), Tabula Imperii
Byzantini 6 (Vienna, 1991), pp. 330–1.
23. Cf. Brand, Byzantium Confronts the West, p. 89; Ritter, “Die vlacho-
bulgarische Rebellion,” pp. 172–3. The campaign is related by Gregory Antiochos in
Fontes Rerum Byzantinarum. Rhetorum saeculi XII orationes politicae, V. E. Regel
and N. I. Novosadskij (eds.), I (1–2) (St. Petersburg, 1892; repr. Leipzig, 1982), p.
301.
24. On the strength of Robert of Clari (La Conquête de Constantinople, ed. P.
Lauer [Paris, 1924], p. 63) it has been suggested that the two brothers were already
in Byzantine service and approached the emperor to receive further benefits. Cf.
Malingoudis, “Nachrichten,” pp. 84–8; F. Dall’Aglio, “Qualche consideratione sulla
fondazione del ‘Secondo Regno Bulgaro,’” Ricerche slavistiche 9 (2011), p. 59, note
9; Ritter, “Die vlacho-bulgarische Rebellion,” pp. 172–3.
25. According to Robert of Clari, Asen (who is confused with Kalojan) was
in charge of one of the imperial horse farms, and obliged to provide the emperor
between sixty and one hundred horses upon request (i.e., for military campaigns).
This does not tell us much, except perhaps that the brothers were pastoralists and not
landowners.
26. Choniates, Historia, p. 487: ἔνσπονδος.
27. Choniates, Historia, p. 368.
28. On this, see the comments of Alexandru Madgearu (Byzantine Military Orga-
nization on the Danube, 10th–12th Centuries [Leiden, 2013], p. 159), who views the
military services rendered by the Vlachs of the Haimos Mountains akin to those of
the feudal armies in western Europe and explains this development with reference to
the Komnenian policy of recruiting local populations (based on ethnic criteria) into
the armed forces.
29. On this, see the comments of R. Guilland, “Byzance et les Balkans sous le
règne d’Isaac II Ange (1185–1195),” in Actes du XIIe Congrès international d’études
byzantines, Ochrid 1961 (Belgrade, 1964), pp. 126–7; Cankova-Petkova, “La libera-
tion,” p. 104; L. Mavrommatis, “La formation du deuxieme royaume Bulgare vue
 Byzantium’s Retreating Balkan Frontiers 19

par les intellectuels byzantins,” Études Balkaniques 21/IV (1985), p. 34; Dall’Aglio,
“Qualche consideratione,” p. 60.
30. Choniates, Historia, p. 368.
31. On the autonomous tendencies of the local population, see A. Kolia-Dermit-
zake, “Η εικόνα των Βουλγάρων και της χώρας τους στις Βυζαντινές πηγές του 11ου
και 12ου αιώνα,” in K. Nikolaou and K. Tsiknakes (eds.), Βυζάντιο και Βούλγαροι
(1018–1185) (Athens, 2008), pp. 59–89.
32. Choniates, Historia, p. 374.
33. Chonates, Historia, pp. 371–2. Cf. Dall’Aglio, “Qualche consideratione,” pp.
61–4.
34. Choniates, Historia, pp. 371–3.
35. Choniates, Historia, pp. 394–8, 399, 428–31.
36. See, for example, Choniates’s description of the campaign of 1190: Choniates,
Orationes, pp. 3–6, and the discussion in Ritter, “Die vlacho-bulgarische Rebellion,”
pp. 196–200.
37. Sergios Kolybas, in Fontes Rerum Byzantinarum, pp. 293–5; George Tornikes,
there, pp. 264–8. Cf. A. Kazhdan, “La date de la rupture Pierre et Asen (vers 1193),”
Byz 35 (1965), pp. 164–74.
38. Choniates, Historia, pp. 435–7.
39. Choniates (Historia, p. 447) tells us that the emperor had already committed
some 216,000 gold coins to this campaign alone. Compare this with the 288,000 gold
coins sent to the Byzantine forces fighting against the Normans in 1185 (Historia, p.
357).
40. Choniates, Historia, pp. 448–52.
41. Cf. Brand, Byzantium Confronts the West, p. 88; Magdalino, Manuel Komne-
nos, pp. 133–4. On the importance of the Cumans, see A. Nikolov, “Cumani bellatores
in the Second Bulgarian State (1186–1396),” Annual of Medieval Studies at Central
European University Budapest 11 (2005), pp. 227–9; I. Vásáry, Cumans and Tatars:
Oriental Military in the Pre-Ottoman Balkans, 1185–1365 (Cambridge, 2005), pp.
13 ff.; F. Dall’Aglio, “The Interaction Between Nomadic and Sedentary Peoples on
the Lower Danube: The Cumans and the ‘Second Bulgarian Empire,’” in F. Curta and
B.-P. Maleon (eds.), The Steppe Lands and the World Beyond Them: Studies in Honor
of Victor Spinei on his 70th Birthday (Iaşi, 2013), pp. 309–10.
42. Cf. Madgearu, Byzantine Military Organization, pp. 144 ff.
43. Cf. The Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa: The History of the Expedition of the
Emperor Frederick and Related Texts, trans. G. A. Loud (Farnham, 2010), pp. 61–4,
84–5.
44. This factor is emphasized by Stephenson, Balkan Frontier, p. 304, and Ritter,
“Die vlacho-bulgarische Rebellion,” p. 209.
45. Choniates, Historia, p. 374.
46. Choniates, Historia, pp. 376–89.
47. Choniates, Historia, p. 437.
48. Cf. Angold, “Byzantine Background,” pp. 261–2.
49. On this, see Stephenson, Balkan Frontier, pp. 100–5; J. Birkenmeir, The Devel-
opment of the Komnenian Army: 1081–1180 (Leiden, 2002), pp. 71 ff.
20 Alicia Simpson

50. Cf. I. Dujčev, “Influences orientales et occidentals dans les Balkans aux Xe-
XIIe siècles,” Byzantine Studies 2 (1975), pp. 103–21; Stephenson, Balkan Frontier,
p. 300.
51. Choniates, Orationes, pp. 27–32.
52. George Tornikes, in Fontes Rerum Byzantinarum, p. 277. Cf. Dölger-Wirth,
Regesten, no. 1605.
53. In contracting the marriage, Isaac was following a trend initiated by the Kom-
nenoi, whereby daughters and nieces were wed to a variety of foreign rulers (and not
just kings and princes) so as to strengthen their ties with Byzantium and ensure their
loyalty. Cf. Magdalino, Manuel Komnenos, pp. 201–17.
54. Georges et Démétrios Tornikès, p. 343. For the position of Serbia, see V.
Stanković, “The Character and Nature of Byzantine Influence in Serbia (from the End
of the Eleventh to the End of the Thirteenth Century): Reality—Policy—Ideology,” in
M. Angar and C. Sode (eds.), Serbia and Byzantium (Frankfurt am Main, 2013), pp.
85–9.
55. See in detail, Jireček, Geschichte der Serben, pp. 273–4; Brand, Byzantium
Confronts the West, p. 94; Fine, Late Medieval Balkans, p. 26.
56. Choniates, Orationes, pp. 32–3.
57. Cf. G. Prinzing, ‘“The Esztergom Reliquary Revisited.’ Wann, weshalb and
wem hat Kaiser Isaakios II. Angelos die Staurothek als Geschenk übersandt?” in N.
Asutay-Effenberger and F. Daim (eds.), ΦΙΛΟΠΑΤΙΟΝ Spaziergang im kaiserlichen
Garten. Beitrage zu Byzanz und seinen Nachbarn (Mainz, 2012), pp. 251–2.
58. Georges et Démétrios Tornikès, p. 343. Cf. Dölger-Wirth, Regesten, no. 1614a;
Prinzing, “Das Papsttum,” pp. 149–50.
59. Brand, Byzantium Confronts the West, p. 94; Fine, Late Medieval Balkans, p.
27.
60. Cf. Brand, Byzantium Confronts the West, p. 96; Fine, Late Medieval Balkans,
p. 27.
61. The chrysobull granted to the Venetians in 1198 refers to the provincia Anchiali
and the provincia Philipupleos, Veroys, Moras et Achridij. For the text, see M. Pozza
and G. Ravegnani, I trattati con Bizanzio 992–1198 (Venice, 1993), pp. 119–37.
These provinces, along with many others located in central and northern Thrace,
and eastern and central Macedonia, are omitted from the Partitio Romaniae (1204).
According to Nikolaos Oikonomides, they remained loyal to Alexios III in opposition
to the regime of Alexios IV in Constantinople. Cf. N. Oikonomides, “La Décomposi-
tion de l’Empire Byzantine à la veille de 1204 et les origines de l’Empire de Nicée: à
propos de la Partitio Romaniae,” in XVe Congrès International d’Études Byzantines,
Athènes 1976: Rapports et co-rapports, I/1 (Athens, 1976), pp. 14–18 = Byzantium
from the Ninth Century to the Fourth Crusade: Studies, Texts, Monuments (Aldershot,
1992), XX. Cf. also Soustal, Thrakien, pp. 99–103.
62. Choniates, Historia, p. 434.
63. Choniates, Historia, p. 437.
64. The theory of Bulgarian provenance was put forth by Michael Hendy. Cf. M.
F. Hendy, Catalogue of Byzantine Coins in the Dumbarton Oaks Collection and in
the Whittemore Collection, IV (Washington, D.C., 1999), pp. 66–80, but challenged
 Byzantium’s Retreating Balkan Frontiers 21

primarily by David Metcalf and Ioannes Touratsoglou. Cf. especially Metcalf’s review
of Hendy in Numismatic Chronicle 160 (2000), pp. 396–401, and I. Touratsoglou, “La
monnaie byzantine aux XIIe-XIIIe siècles et le monnayage des trouvailles de Grèce:
à propos d’un ouvrage récent” Revue nusmimatique 158 (2002), pp. 385–404. I owe
these references—and my understanding of the issues—to the kindness of Pagona
Papadopoulou. Cf. P. Papadopoulou, De l’unité à l’éclatement: la monnaie et son
usage dans le monde byzantin (1092–1261), PhD diss. (Université Paris I, 2007), pp.
266–74.
65. Cf. Stephenson, Balkan Frontier, p. 306.
66. Choniates, Historia, pp. 465–9.
67. Choniates, Historia, pp. 469–72.
68. Cf. Stephenson, Balkan Frontier, pp. 306, 308.
69. Choniates, Historia, pp. 502–8. For the treaty, see Dölger-Wirth, Regesten, no.
1653.
70. Choniates, Historia, p. 509.
71. Choniates, Historia, pp. 509–14, 518–19.
72. Choniates, Historia, pp. 499–501, 508.
73. Choniates, Historia, pp. 523–4. This was presumably in accordance to an
agreement reached in Constantinople the previous year. Cf. Brand, Byzantium
Confronts the West, p. 132.
74. Choniates, Historia, p. 532.
75. Cf. Stephenson, Balkan Frontier, p. 310.
76. Choniates, Orationes, pp. 110–11; Nicephori Chrysobergae Ad Angelos ora-
tiones tres, ed. M. Treu, Programm des Königlichen Friedrischs-Gymnasiums zu
Breslau, 1892 (Breslau, 1892), pp. 18–21, who speaks of doulosyne, which means that
Kalojan had been granted authority over his domains by the emperor’s concession.
On the treaty, see Brand, Byzantium Confronts the West, pp. 134–5; Dölger-Wirth,
Regesten, no. 1661b.
77. For the rebellion, see Choniates, Historia, pp. 533–4; Choniates, Orationes,
pp. 108–10; Chrysoberges, Angelos orationes, pp. 15 ff. Brand, Byzantium Confronts
the West, pp. 133–4.
78. Excerpts of the letter in K. Petkov, The Voices of Medieval Bulgaria, Seventh-
Fifteenth Centuries: Records of a Bygone Culture (Leiden, 2008), pp. 221–2. On
the correspondence, see Wolff, “Second Bulgarian Empire,” pp. 190–8; Stephenson,
Balkan Frontier, pp. 309–12; Prinzing, “Das Papsttum,” pp. 166–72.
79. On Innocent III’s policy in the Balkans, see Prinzing, “Das Papsttum,” pp.
153–74 and F. Dall’Aglio, Innocenzo III e I Balkani. Fede e politica nei Regesta
pontifici (Naples, 2003).
80. Alexios does not seem to have had any meaningful diplomatic contact with
either Béla (d. 1196) or his successor, Emeric. Cf. D. Hintner, “Die Beziehung
zwischen Ungarn und Byzanz im Spiegel der Register Papst Innozenz III (1198–
1216),” in J. Dummer and J. Irmscher (eds.), Byzanz in der Europäschen Staatenwelt
(Berlin, 1983), pp. 157–60; Makk, Árpάds and the Comnenoi, p. 124.
81. See, for example, the complaints of the crusaders with regard to Béla’s stance
during the Third Crusade: Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa, pp. 58, 60–1, 79–80, 87,
22 Alicia Simpson

esp. 79: “but he [Béla] was an indefatigable protector or helper to his son-in-law the
Greek emperor, to the detriment of our men.”
82. Die Register Innocenz’ III. 7. Pontifikatsjahr, 1204/05, eds. O Hageneder and
A. Sommerlechner (Vienna, 1997), no. 127.
83. The identification of the lands that consisted Margaret’s dowry has been the
subject of scholarly debate. Most have accepted that the dowry was located in the
regions of Belgrade and Braničevo, Niš and its surrounding area, that is, the ter-
ritories said to have been occupied by Béla in 1182–3 (cf. J. R. Sweeney, “Innocent
III, Hungary, and the Bulgarian Coronation: A Study in Medieval Papal Diplomacy,”
Church History 42/3 [1973], pp. 330–2). Others, however, have located the dowry
in large part north of the Danube (cf. L. Tàutu, “Le conflit entre Johanitsa Asen et
Eméric roi de Hongrie (1202–1204): Contribution à l’ étude du problème du second
empire Valaque-Bulgare,” in Mélanges Eugène Tisserant, III, (Vatican City, 1964),
pp. 367–93. For Kalojan’s conquests, see A. Madgearu, “Confrontations between
Hungary, the Byzantine Empire and Bulgaria for the Belgrade-Vidin Border Region
in the 9th-14th Centuries,” Transylvanian Review 22/4 (2013), pp. 128–9.
84. Cf. Curta, Southeastern Europe, p. 382; Prinzing, “Das Papsttum,” p. 148.
85. J. Schmitt, “Die Balkanpolitik der Arpaden in den Jahren 1180–1241,”
Ungarn-Jahrbuch 17 (1989), p. 32; Prinzing, “Das Papsttum,” pp. 164–5.
86. On the Serbian succession, see L. Maksimovic, “Byzantinischen Herrscheride-
ologie und die Regierungsmethoden im Falle Serbien. Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis des
byzantinschen Commonwealth,” in C. Scholtz and G. Makris (eds.), ΠΟΛΥΠΛΕΥΡΟΣ
ΝΟΥΣ. Miscellanea für Peter Schreiner zu seinem 60. Geburtstag (Munich–Leipzig,
2000), pp. 180–1.
87. Maksimović, “Byzantinischen Herrscherideologie,” p. 180.
88. Choniates, Historia, p. 531.
89. The divorce has been dated to 1201 or 1202 (Jireček, Geschichte der Serben,
pp. 274–5; Fine, Late Medieval Balkans, p. 46). In Choniates’s narrative it follows the
events occurring in early 1201, and the historian specifically states that he is record-
ing what occurred immediately afterwards (cf. Choniates, Historia, pp. 530–1; van
Dieten, Erläuterungen, p. 127).
90. Choniates, Historia, pp. 531–2.
91. Choniates, Historia, p. 532.
92. Fine, Late Medieval Balkans, p. 46; Prinzing, “Das Papsttum,” p. 164, note 94;
J. C. Moore, Pope Innocent III (1160/61–1216): To Root Up and to Plant (Leiden–
Boston, 2013), pp. 73–5.
93. Choniates, Historia, pp. 533–5.
94. The rebellions were effectively crushed by spring 1202. In the autumn of 1202
Innocent III received a now-lost letter by the Byzantine emperor Alexios, request-
ing that the pope prohibit the crusaders from attacking his empire on behalf of his
nephew, the future Alexios IV. Cf. A. J. Andrea, Contemporary Sources for the Fourth
Crusade, rev. ed. (Leiden–Boston, 2008), pp. 34–5.