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    Kenneth Oye - Game Theory

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    sid_srms
    This document discusses three sections of an essay on international cooperation. The first section discusses how payoff structures affect cooperation and strategies to alter payoffs to improve cooperation. The second section discusses how the potential for repeated interactions (the "shadow of the future") impacts cooperation and strategies to lengthen interactions and improve recognition of cooperation/defection. The third section explains how cooperation is harder with more players and strategies to promote cooperation in these situations by reducing necessary players or increasing likelihood of cooperation with many players.

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    Kenneth Oye - Game Theory

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    sid_srms
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    This document discusses three sections of an essay on international cooperation. The first section discusses how payoff structures affect cooperation and strategies to alter payoffs to improve cooperation. The second section discusses how the potential for repeated interactions (the "shadow of the future") impacts cooperation and strategies to lengthen interactions and improve recognition of cooperation/defection. The third section explains how cooperation is harder with more players and strategies to promote cooperation in these situations by reducing necessary players or increasing likelihood of cooperation with many players.

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    This document discusses three sections of an essay on international cooperation. The first section discusses how payoff structures affect cooperation and strategies to alter payoffs to improve cooperation. The second section discusses how the potential for repeated interactions (the "shadow of the future") impacts cooperation and strategies to lengthen interactions and improve recognition of cooperation/defection. The third section explains how cooperation is harder with more players and strategies to promote cooperation in these situations by reducing necessary players or increasing likelihood of cooperation with many players.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    49 views1 page

    Kenneth Oye - Game Theory

    Uploaded by

    sid_srms
    This document discusses three sections of an essay on international cooperation. The first section discusses how payoff structures affect cooperation and strategies to alter payoffs to improve cooperation. The second section discusses how the potential for repeated interactions (the "shadow of the future") impacts cooperation and strategies to lengthen interactions and improve recognition of cooperation/defection. The third section explains how cooperation is harder with more players and strategies to promote cooperation in these situations by reducing necessary players or increasing likelihood of cooperation with many players.

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    of 1

    In the section entitled "Payoff Structure: Mutual and Conflicting Preferences," I discuss how

    payoffs affect the prospects for cooperation and present strategies to improve the prospects
    for cooperation by altering payoffs. Orthodox game theorists identify optimal strategies given
    ordinally defined classes of games, and their familiar insights provide the starting point for the
    discussion. Recent works in security studies, institutional microeconomics, and international
    political economy suggest strategies to alter payoff structures and thereby improve the
    prospects for cooperation.

    In the next section, entitled "Shadow of the Future: Single-play and Iterated Games," I discuss
    how the prospect of continuing interaction affects the likelihood of cooperation; examine how
    strategies of reciprocity can provide direct paths to cooperative outcomes under iterated
    conditions; and suggest strategies to lengthen the shadow of the future. In addition, this
    section shows that recognition and control capabilities- the ability to distinguish between
    cooperation and defection by others and to respond in kind-can affect the power of reciprocity,
    and suggests strategies to improve recognition capabilities.

    In the third section, "Number of Players: Two-Person and N-Person Games," I explain why
    cooperation becomes more difficult as the number of actors increases; present strategies for
    promoting cooperation in N- actor situations; and offer strategies for promoting cooperation by
    reducing the number of actors necessary to the realization of common interests.
    Game theorists and oligopoly theorists have long noted that cooperation becomes more
    difficult as numbers increase, and their insights provide a starting point for discussions Recent
    work in political economy focuses on two strategies for promoting cooperation in thorny N-
    person situations: functionalist analysts of regimes suggest strategies for increasing the
    likelihood and robustness of cooperation given large numbers of actors;" analysts of ad hoc
    bargaining in international political economy suggest strategies of bilateral and regional
    decomposition to reduce the number of actors necessary to the realization of some mutual
    interests, at the expense of the magnitude of gains from cooperation.
    Each of the three circumstantial dimensions serves both as an explanation of cooperation and
    as a target of strategies to promote cooperation. The concluding section of this essay provides a
    roadmap to our efforts to test these preliminary explanations and strategies. By applying this
    common analytic framework to cases in economic and security affairs and by searching for
    explicit parallels and differences in the incidence, causes, and prospects for cooperation, the
    authors hope to contribute to a deeper understanding of international cooperation.

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