12/8/2018 G.R. No.

167398

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

AUGUSTUS GONZALES and G.R. No. 167398

SPOUSES NESTOR VICTOR and
MA. LOURDES RODRIGUEZ, Present:
Petitioners,
CARPIO,* J.,
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
-versus- BRION,**
PERALTA, and
SERENO,*** JJ.

QUIRICO PE, Promulgated:

Respondent.
August 9, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

[1]
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision
[2]
dated June 23, 2004 and Resolution dated February 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
Twentieth Division, in CA-G.R. SP No. 73171, entitled Quirico Pe v. Honorable Judge Rene
Hortillo, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 31,
Augustus Gonzales and Spouses Engr. Nestor Victor and Dr. Ma. Lourdes Rodriguez, which granted
[3]
the petition of respondent Quirico Pe. The CA Decision reversed and set aside the Order dated
September 23, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 31, which dismissed
respondent's appeal for non-payment of docket and other lawful fees, and directing the issuance of
[4]
the writ of execution for the implementation of its Decision dated June 28, 2002 in favor of the
petitioners and against the respondent. The CA Decision also directed the RTC to assess the
appellate docket fees to be paid by the respondent, if it has not done so, and allow him to pay such
fees and give due course to his appeal.
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The antecedents are as follows:

Respondent Quirico Pe was engaged in the business of construction materials, and had been
transacting business with petitioner Spouses Nestor Victor Rodriguez and Ma. Lourdes Rodriguez.
The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) awarded two contracts in favor of
petitioner Nestor Rodriguez for the following projects, namely, construction of Lanot-Banga Road
(Kalibo Highway) km. 39 + 200 to km. 40 + 275 Section IV (Aklan side) and concreting of Laua-an
Pandan Road (Tibial-Culasi Section), Province of Antique. In 1998, respondent agreed to supply
cement for the construction projects of petitioner Spouses Rodriguez. Petitioner Nestor Rodriguez
availed of the DPWHs pre-payment program for cement requirement regarding the Lanot-Banga
Road, Kalibo Highway project (Kalibo project), wherein the DPWH would give an advance
payment even before project completion upon his presentment, among others, of an official receipt
for the amount advanced. Petitioner Nestor Rodriguez gave Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
Check No. 6563066 to respondent, which was signed by co-petitioners (his wife Ma. Lourdes
Rodriguez and his business partner Augustus Gonzales), but leaving the amount and date in blank.
The blank LBP check was delivered to respondent to guarantee the payment of 15,698 bags of
[5]
Portland cement valued at P1,507,008.00, covered by Official Receipt No. 1175, issued by
respondent (as owner of Antique Commercial), in favor of petitioner Nestor Rodriguez (as owner of
Greenland Builders). However, a year later, respondent filled up blank LBP Check No. 6563066, by
placing P2,062,000.00 and June 30, 1999, corresponding to the amount and date.

[6]
On December 9, 1999, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint for Declaration of
Payment, Cancellation of Documents and Damages against respondent with the RTC, Branch 31,
Iloilo City, docketed as Civil Case No. 25945. The amended complaint alleged that they entrusted
blank LBP Check No. 6563066 to respondent so as to facilitate the approval of the pre-payment
application of petitioner Nestor Rodriguez with the DPWH. They stated that the blank LBP check
would serve as collateral to guarantee the payment for 15,698 bags to be used for the Kalibo project,
amounting to P1,507,008.00, and that after payment of the said amount, respondent would return the
LBP check. According to them, after having paid respondent the amount of P2,306,500.00, which is
P139,160.00 more than the amount of P2,167,340.00 (representing the value for 23,360 bags of
cement taken for the Kalibo project), they were cleared of any liability.

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[7]
On January 6, 2000, respondent filed an Answer to Amended Complaint, averring that he
had so far delivered 40,360 bags of cement to petitioners who remitted P2,306,500.00, thereby
leaving an outstanding amount of P2,062,000.00. He countered that when petitioners stopped the
bank-to-bank online payments to him, he filled up the amount of P2,062,000.00 and made the LBP
check payable on June 30, 1999. The LBP check was dishonored for being drawn against
insufficient funds (DAIF). By way of compulsory counterclaim, he sought recovery of the balance
of P2,062,000.00, with interest at 24% from January 29, 1999 until fully paid as actual damages.

[8]
In the Pre-trial Order dated January 28, 2000, the trial court determined the following to be
the delimited issues, to wit:

(1) whether plaintiffs [herein petitioners] liability to defendant [herein respondent] for 15,698
bags priced at P1,507,008.00 subject of the earlier-mentioned pre-payment program and covered by
the blank LBP Check No. 6563066 has already been paid, hence, plaintiffs are no longer liable to the
defendant for this amount;

(2) whether this LBP Check No. 6563066 should not be returned by defendant to plaintiffs, or
failing in which, should now be declared as cancelled, null and void;

(3) whether plaintiffs have completely paid to the defendant the price of the cement used for
the Kalibo project which specifically is the amount of 23,360 bags of cement valued in the total
amount of P2,167,340.00;

(4) whether plaintiffs are entitled to damages and attorneys fees; and

(5) whether this case be dismissed and with the dismissal of the complaint to proceed with the
[9]
counterclaim.

[10]
In a Decision dated June 28, 2002, the trial court, applying Section 14 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, found that respondents subsequent filling up of LBP Check No. 6563066 in the
amount of P2,062,000.00 was not made strictly in accordance with the authority given to him by
petitioner Nestor Rodriguez, and that since one year had already lapsed, the same was not done
within a reasonable time. As to the 23,360 bags of cement for the Kalibo project, valued at
P2,167,340.00 which was subject of previous transactions, the trial court ruled that the same had
been fully paid and considered a settled issue. Consequently, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of
the petitioners and against the respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, as
follows:

1. Declaring plaintiffs' obligation to the defendant for the cement supplied for the Kalibo (Lanot-
Banga) Road Construction Project in the amount of P2,167,340.00 as already and fully paid, hence,
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plaintiffs are no longer liable to the defendant;

2. Declaring Land Bank Check No. 6563066 dated June 30, 1999 for P2,062,000.00 as null and void
and without any legal effect;

3. Ordering defendant to pay each plaintiff the sums of P100,000.00 as actual damages; P500,000.00
as moral damages; P200,000.00 as attorney's fees and P2,000.00 per hearing as appearance fee;
P50,000.00 as miscellaneous actual and necessary litigation expenses; and

4. To pay the costs.

Defendant's counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED.

[11]
SO ORDERED.

After receipt of a copy of the said RTC Decision on July 26, 2002, respondent filed a Notice of
Appeal on July 30, 2002.

[12]
In an Order dated August 5, 2002, the trial court gave due course to respondent's appeal, and
directed the Branch Clerk of Court to transmit the entire records of the case to the CA.

On August 26, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, to Dismiss Appeal, and
[13]
for Issuance of Writ of Execution, stating that respondents appeal should be dismissed as the
same was not perfected due to non-payment of docket and other lawful fees as required under
Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Claiming that since the respondents appeal was not
perfected and, as a consequence, the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002 became final and executory,
petitioners sought the issuance of a writ of execution for the implementation of the said RTC
[14]
Decision. To buttress their motion, petitioners also appended a Certification dated August 19,
2002, issued by the Clerk of Court of the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) of the RTC, Iloilo City,
certifying that no appeal fees in the case had been paid and received by the OCC.

In the Order dated September 23, 2002, the trial court dismissed respondent's appeal and
directed the issuance of a writ of execution to implement the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002.

On October 2, 2002, the Clerk of Court and Ex-officio Provincial Sheriff of Iloilo issued the
[15]
Writ of Execution directing the execution of the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002.

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On October 7, 2002, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
[16]
Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order,
seeking to set aside the RTC Order dated September 23, 2002 (which dismissed his appeal and
directed the issuance of a writ of execution to implement the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002),
and to enjoin the implementation of the Writ of Execution dated October 2, 2002.
[17]
In a Resolution dated October 9, 2002, the CA granted the respondents prayer for
[18]
Temporary Restraining Order and, in the Resolution dated August 20, 2003, approved the
respondents injunction bond and directed the Division Clerk of Court to issue the writ of preliminary
injunction.

On August 20, 2003, the Division Clerk of Court issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
[19]
thereby enjoining the implementation of the Writ of Execution dated October 2, 2002.

On June 23, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The assailed order and writ of execution of the
Regional Trial Court must be, as it is hereby, SET ASIDE. The trial court is hereby ordered to assess
the appellate docket fees, if it has not done so, and allow the petitioner to pay such fees and give due
course to the petitioner's appeal. No costs.

[20]
SO ORDERED.

[21]
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration on August 24, 2004, which, however,
[22]
was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated February 23, 2005.

Hence, petitioner filed this present petition raising the sole issue that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE

LOWER COURT AND ALLOWING RESPONDENT TO BELATEDLY PAY THE REQUIRED
APPELLATE DOCKET AND OTHER LEGAL FEES.
Petitioners allege that since respondent failed to pay the docket and other legal fees at the time he
filed the Notice of Appeal, his appeal was deemed not perfected in contemplation of the law. Thus,
petitioners pray that the CA decision be set aside and a new one be rendered dismissing the
respondents appeal and ordering the execution of the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002.

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On the other hand, respondent, citing Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, maintains that his
appeal has been perfected by the mere filing of the notice of appeal. Respondent theorizes that with
the perfection of his appeal, the trial court is now divested of jurisdiction to dismiss his appeal and,
therefore, only the CA has jurisdiction to determine and rule on the propriety of his appeal. He
raises the defense that his failure to pay the required docket and other legal fees was because the
RTC Branch Clerk of Court did not make an assessment of the appeal fees to be paid when he filed
the notice of appeal.

The petition is meritorious.

In cases of ordinary appeal, Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that the appeal to the
CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a
notice of appeal with the RTC (the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from)
and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. Section 3 thereof states that the appeal shall be
taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.
Concomitant with the filing of a notice of appeal is the payment of the required appeal fees within
the 15-day reglementary period set forth in Section 4 of the said Rule. Thus,

SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Within the period for taking an appeal, the
appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from,
the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall
be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the record on appeal.

[23]
In reversing the ruling of the trial court, the CA cited Yambao v. Court of Appeals as
justification for giving due course to respondents petition and ordering the belated payment of
docket and other legal fees. In Yambao, the CA dismissed therein petitioners appeal from the RTC
decision for failure to pay the full amount of the required docket fee. Upon elevation of the case, the
Court, however, ordered the CA to give due course to their appeal, and ruled that their subsequent
payment of the P20.00 deficiency, even before the CA had passed upon their motion for
reconsideration, was indicative of their good faith and willingness to comply with the Rules.

The ruling in Yambao is not applicable to the present case as herein respondent never made any
payment of the docket and other lawful fees, not even an attempt to do so, simultaneous with his
filing of the Notice of Appeal. Although respondent was able to file a timely Notice of Appeal,
however, he failed to pay the docket and other legal fees, claiming that the Branch Clerk of Court
did not issue any assessment. This procedural lapse on the part of the respondent rendered his

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appeal with the CA to be dismissible and, therefore, the RTC Decision, dated June 28, 2002, to be
final and executory.

[24] [25]
In Far Corporation v. Magdaluyo, as with other subsequent cases of the same ruling, the
Court explained that the procedural requirement under Section 4 of Rule 41 is not merely directory,
as the payment of the docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and
jurisdictional. It bears stressing that an appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege. An
ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC to the CA must be made within 15 days
from notice. And within this period, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful
fees must be paid to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from. The requirement of paying the full amount of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed
period is not a mere technicality of law or procedure. The payment of docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appeal is
not perfected. The appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
and the Decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory. Further, under Section 1
(c), Rule 50, an appeal may be dismissed by the CA, on its own motion or on that of the appellee,
on the ground of the non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary
period as provided under Section 4 of Rule 41. The payment of the full amount of the docket fee is
an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In both original and appellate cases, the court
acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees.

Respondents claim that his non-payment of docket and other lawful fees should be treated as
mistake and excusable negligence, attributable to the RTC Branch Clerk of Court, is too superficial
to warrant consideration. This is clearly negligence of respondent's counsel, which is not excusable.
Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have
[26]
guarded against. Respondent's counsel filed a notice of appeal within the reglementary period
for filing the same without, however, paying the appellate docket fees. He simply ignored the basic
procedure of taking an appeal by filing a notice of appeal, coupled with the payment of the full
amount of docket and other lawful fees. Respondents counsel should keep abreast of procedural
laws and his ignorance of the procedural requirements shall bind the respondent. In National Power
[27]
Corporation v. Laohoo, we ruled that therein counsels failure to file the appeal in due time does
not amount to excusable negligence. The non-perfection of the appeal on time is not a mere
technicality. Besides, to grant therein petitioners plea for the relaxation of the rules on technicality
would disturb a well-entrenched ruling that could make uncertain when a judgment attains finality,

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leaving the same to depend upon the resourcefulness of a party in concocting implausible excuses to
justify an unwarranted departure from the time-honored policy of the law that the period for the
perfection of an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional.

The CA took cognizance over the case, based on the wrong premise that when the RTC
issued the Order dated August 5, 2002 giving due course to respondents Notice of Appeal and
directing the Branch Clerk of Court to transmit the entire records of the case to the CA, it ipso facto
[28]
lost jurisdiction over the case. Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules explains that the court of origin
loses jurisdiction over the case only upon the perfection of the appeal filed in due time by the
appellant and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. Withal, prior to the transmittal
of the original records of the case to the CA, the RTC may issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the prevailing party, as in this case, the issuance of the writ of execution
because the respondents appeal was not perfected.
Moreover, Section 13, Rule 41 of the Rules states that the CA may dismiss an appeal taken
from the RTC on the ground of non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the 15-day
reglementary period:

SEC 13. Dismissal of appeal. Prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on
appeal to the appellate court, the trial court may motu proprio or on motion dismiss the appeal for
having been taken out of time, or for non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period. (As amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, May 1, 2000.)

Since respondents appeal was not perfected within the 15-day reglementary period, it was as
if no appeal was actually taken. Therefore, the RTC retains jurisdiction to rule on pending incidents
lodged before it, such as the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, to Dismiss Appeal, and for
Issuance of Writ of Execution, filed on August 26, 2002, which sought to set aside its Order dated
August 5, 2002 that gave due course to respondents Notice of Appeal, and directed the issuance of a
writ of execution. Having no jurisdiction over the case, the prudent thing that the CA should have
done was to dismiss the respondents appeal for failure to pay the appeal fees, and declare that the
RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002 has now become final and executory.

As an incidental matter on the propriety of petitioners petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules, respondent raises the argument that since the subject of the present petition is
the writ of preliminary injunction granted by the CA (in favor of the respondent enjoining the
execution of the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002), in CA-G.R. SP No. 73171, which is
interlocutory in nature, petitioners petition should be denied for being the wrong remedy. In other
words, respondent advances the theory that since the assailed CA Decision dated June 23, 2004
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partakes of an interlocutory order, i.e., enjoining the finality of the RTC Decision dated June 28,
2002, petitioners should have availed of the remedy of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Respondents argument is unfounded. The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of

the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is not identical to a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. Rule 45 provides that decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in
any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to Us
by filing a petition for review on certiorari, which would be but a continuation of the appellate
[29]
process over the original case. Therefore, petitioners filing of the present petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper and adequate remedy to challenge the Decision dated June 24,
2004 and Resolution dated February 23, 2005 of the CA.

To recapitulate, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must strictly comply with the
[30]
requirements of the rules, and failure to do so leads to the loss of the right to appeal. The rules
require that from the date of receipt of the assailed RTC order denying ones motion for
reconsideration, an appellant may take an appeal to the CA by filing a notice of appeal with the
RTC and paying the required docket and other lawful fees with the RTC Branch Clerk of Court,
within the 15-day reglementary period for the perfection of an appeal. Otherwise, the appellant's
appeal is not perfected, and the CA may dismiss the appeal on the ground of non-payment of docket
and other lawful fees. As a consequence, the assailed RTC decision shall become final and
executory and, therefore, the prevailing parties can move for the issuance of a writ of execution.

Since the CA erroneously took cognizance over the case, its Decision dated June 23, 2004
and Resolution dated February 23, 2005 should be overturned, and the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction issued on August 20, 2003 should likewise be lifted. Thus, the RTC Decision dated June
28, 2002 is reinstated and, as the said decision having become final and executory, the case is
remanded for its prompt execution.

While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal
within the reglementary period is not a mere technicality. It raises jurisdictional problem, as it
deprives the appellate court of its jurisdiction over the appeal. After a decision is declared final and
executory, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as a losing party has the right to

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appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality
[31]
of the decision on the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 23, 2004 and
Resolution dated February 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 73171, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction, issued by the Court of Appeals
on August 20, 2003, is LIFTED.

The Decision dated June 28, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Iloilo City is
REINSTATED and, in view of its finality, the case is REMANDED for its prompt execution.
SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

* Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, per Special Order No. 1059 dated August 1, 2011.
** Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, per Special Order No. 1056 dated July 27, 2011.
*** Designated as an additional member, per Special Order No. 1028 dated June 21, 2011.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Vicente L. Yap, with Associate Justices Arsenio J. Magpale and Ramon M. Bato, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp.
30-38.
[2]
Id. at 39-40.
[3]
Per Presiding Judge Rene S. Hortillo, records, vol. 1, p. 347.
[4]
Id. at 312-340.
[5]
Id. at 28.
[6]
Id. at 58-63.
[7]
Id. at 74-88.
[8]
Id. at 129-131.
[9]
Id. at 130-131.
[10]
Sec. 14. Blanks; when may be filled. Where the instrument is wanting in any material particular, the person in possession thereof has
a prima facie authority to complete it by filling up the blanks therein. And a signature on a blank paper delivered by the person making the
signature in order that the paper may be converted into a negotiable instrument operates as a prima facie authority to fill it up as such for any
amount. In order, however, that any such instrument when completed may be enforced against any person who became a party thereon prior
to its completion, it must be filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given and within a reasonable time. But if any such
instrument, after completion, is negotiated to a holder in due course, it is valid and effectual for all purposes in his hands, and he may
enforce it as if it had been filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given and within a reasonable time.
[11]
Records, Vol. I, p. 340.

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[12]
Id. at 342.
[13]
Id. at 343-345.
[14]
Id. at 346.
[15]
Rollo, pp. 67-68.
[16]
Id. at 41-65.
[17]
CA rollo, p. 95-97.
[18]
Id. at 256-257.
[19]
Id. at 258-259.
[20]
Rollo, pp. 30-38.
[21]
CA rollo, pp. 336-350.
[22]
Rollo, pp. 39-40.
[23]
G.R. No. 140894, November 27, 2000, 346 SCRA 141.
[24]
G.R. No. 148739, November 19, 2004, 443 SCRA 218, 226-227, 229. (Citations omitted.)
[25]
Rural Bank of the Seven Lakes (S.P.C.), Inc. v. Dan, G.R. No. 174109, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 476, 488-489; KLT Fruits, Inc. v.
WSR Fruits, Inc., G.R. No. 174219, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 713, 727-728; Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Homena-Valencia, G.R. No.
173942, October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 252, 259-260; Cu-Unjieng v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139596, January 24, 2006, 470 SCRA 594,
603-604; Bacarra v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 162445, October 20, 2005, 473 SCRA 581, 586.
[26]
Ruiz v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 166386, January 27, 2009, 577 SCRA 29, 44. (Citations omitted.)
[27]
G.R. No. 151973, July 23, 2009, 593 SCRA 564, 591.
[28]
SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal, effect thereof. A partys appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the
notice of appeal in due time.
xxxx
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the
expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
xxxx
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of
indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.
[29]
Emcor Incorporated v. Sienes, G.R. No. 152101, September 8, 2009, 598 SCRA 617, 626-627, citing Mercado v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 150241, November 4, 2004, 441 SCRA 463, 469; Hanjin Engineering and Construction Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
165910, April 10, 2006, 487 SCRA 78, 99.
[30]
M.A. Santander Construction, Inc. v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 136477, November 10, 2004, 441 SCRA 525, 528.
[31]
National Power Corporation v. Laohoo, supra note 27.

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