McGill V GCSDA Pet 11-10
McGill V GCSDA Pet 11-10
McGill V GCSDA Pet 11-10
10-_______
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In The
Supreme Court of the United States
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COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831
QUESTION PRESENTED
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED................................... i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ..................... ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................. v
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ....... 1
OPINIONS BELOW............................................. 1
JURISDICTION ................................................... 1
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND REG-
ULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ............. 1
INTRODUCTION ................................................ 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............................. 2
A. Statutory Framework ................................ 2
B. Factual Background .................................. 5
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION .... 10
REVIEW IS NECESSARY BECAUSE SIX
COURTS OF APPEALS ARE EVENLY DI-
VIDED AS TO WHETHER ALL PRIVATE
LITIGATION APPLYING FEDERAL LAW
IN FEDERAL COURTS IS EXCLUDED
FROM RFRA’S SCOPE .................................... 10
A. The Ruling Below Joins One Side Of A
Circuit Split Regarding RFRA’s Appli-
cation That Will Not Be Resolved Absent
This Court’s Review ................................... 10
B. The Decision Below Contravenes RFRA’s
Text And The History Of Its 2000
Amendments .............................................. 15
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
1. RFRA’s broad text demonstrates its
applicability to all private civil ac-
tions in federal court ........................... 15
2. The ruling below is contrary to RFRA
and its amendment’s legislative his-
tory....................................................... 20
C. The Sixth Circuit’s Holding Addresses An
Issue Of Continuing Importance And
This Case Presents The Issue In An Ideal
Posture ....................................................... 23
CONCLUSION..................................................... 26
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES:
Barr v. City of Sinton, 295 S.W.3d 287 (Tex.
2009) ........................................................................24
Board of Directors of Rotary International v.
Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) ..........19
Boggan v. Mississippi Conference of the United
Methodist Church, 433 F. Supp. 2d 762 (S.D.
Miss. 2006), aff ’d, 222 Fed. App’x 352 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 813 (2007) ..................13
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640
(2000) .......................................................................19
Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church
(In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996),
vacated, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997), reinstated,
141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
811 (1998) ..........................................................12, 16
Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church
(In re Young), 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 811 (1998) .......................... 4, 13, 15
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) .... 4, 18, 24
Combs v. Homer-Center School District, 540
F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2008) ............................................24
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) .....................4
Diggs v. Snyder, 775 N.E.2d 40 (Ill. App. Ct.
2002) ........................................................................24
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S.
614 (1991) ................................................................16
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
EEOC v. Catholic University of America, 83
F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996)...................................13, 15
Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) ........2, 3, 17
Guinan v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of
Indianapolis, 42 F. Supp. 2d 849 (S.D. Ind.
1998) ........................................................................24
Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96 (2d Cir.
2006) .................................................... 8, 9, 11, 12, 13
Hunt v. Hunt, 648 A.2d 843 (Vt. 1994) ......................22
In re Multi-Circuit Episcopal Church Property
Litigation, 76 Va. Cir. 873 (2008) ...........................24
Intermountain Fair Housing Council v. Boise
Rescue Mission, No. CV-08-205, 2010 WL
1913379 (D. Idaho May 12, 2010)...........................24
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) .............................17
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922
(1982) .......................................................................17
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964) .......................................................................17
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) ......................19
Powell v. Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343 (D. Colo.
1994) ........................................................................24
Presbyterian Church in the United States v.
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presby-
terian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969) ........................17
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-day Advent-
ists, 440 F. Supp. 2d 211 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) ...............24
Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir.
2008) ..................................................................12, 15
Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Medical Center,
192 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 1999) ...................................14
Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria¸ 442 F.3d
1036 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 881
(2006) .......................................................................13
Tort Claimants Committee v. Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Portland (In re Roman Catho-
lic Archbishop of Portland), 335 B.R. 842
(Bankr. D. Or. 2005) ................................................23
United States v. Wilkerson, 361 F.3d 717 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 908 (2004) ..................12
Urantia Found. v. Maaherra, 895 F. Supp. 1335
(D. Ariz. 1995) .........................................................23
Watson v. Boyajian, 309 B.R. 652 (B.A.P. 1st
Cir. 2004) .................................................................23
Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia
Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 958 (2001) .... 14, 15, 23
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114 .........................................................................6
§ 1125(a) ....................................................................6
§ 1125(c) .....................................................................6
§ 1125(d)(1) ................................................................6
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb(a)(2) ............................................................3
§ 2000bb(a)(4) ............................................................3
§ 2000bb(b)(1) ......................................................3, 17
§ 2000bb(b)(2) ............................................................3
§ 2000bb-1 ...............................................................15
§ 2000bb-1(a) .............................................................3
§ 2000bb-1(b) ...........................................................18
§ 2000bb-1(b)(2) .........................................................3
§ 2000bb-1(c) .............................................................3
§ 2000bb-2 .................................................................4
§ 2000bb-2(1) .....................................................15, 18
§ 2000bb-2(4) .............................................................5
§ 2000bb-3(a) ....................................................... 5, 11
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc .....................................................................4
§ 2000cc-5(7) ..............................................................5
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA), Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1488 ................................................................. passim
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA), Pub. L. No. 106-274,
114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc
et seq.) ....................................................... 4, 5, 22, 24
LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS:
David Ackerman, Congressional Research
Serv., Library of Congress, The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act and the Religious
Freedom Act: A Legal Analysis (1992) ....................20
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991:
Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm.
on Civil & Const. Rights of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 102d Cong. (1992)............................21
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hear-
ing on S. 2969 Before the Senate Comm. on
Judiciary, 102d Cong. (1992)..................................21
Religious Liberty: Hearing Before the S. Judi-
ciary Comm., 106th Cong. (1999) .....................19, 22
H.R. Rep. No. 106-219 (1999) ...............................20, 22
145 Cong. Rec. H5588 (daily ed. July 15, 1999) ........22
145 Cong. Rec. H5590 (daily ed. July 15, 1999) ........19
145 Cong. Rec. H5591 (daily ed. July 15, 1999) ........22
x
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
OTHER AUTHORITIES:
Availability of Money Damages under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 18 Op.
O.L.C. 180 (1994) ....................................................18
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed., 1st reprint
2004) ........................................................................16
Brief of United States as Intervenor, In re
Young, 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996) (No. 93-
2267) ........................................................................16
Drew S. Days, III, When the President Says
‘No’: A Few Thoughts on Executive Power and
the Tradition of Solicitor General Independ-
ence, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 509 (2001) ...........16
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Walter McGill respectfully petitions for a writ of
certiorari to review the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Sixth Circuit (App., infra, 1a-
32a) is reported at 617 F.3d 402. An earlier decision
of the district court is reported at 624 F. Supp. 2d
883. The opinion of the district court entering a
finding of contempt (App., infra, 33a-36a) is not
reported but is available at 2010 WL 99404.
JURISDICTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit issued its opinion on August 10, 2010.
This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28
U.S.C. § 1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND
REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is set
forth at App., infra, 37a-40a.
INTRODUCTION
The court of appeals weighed in on a circuit split
regarding the proper interpretation of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The recurring
question that has now evenly divided six circuits is
whether RFRA has any application to civil actions
between private parties in federal court applying
2
1
Currently pending before the district court is a report and
recommendation by a magistrate judge that petitioner be found
in contempt for encouraging another person to restore the signs
to the church, as well as for failing to comply with discovery
requests. Dt. Ct. Dkt. 136 at 6, 8. Petitioner himself is currently
in Africa doing mission work. Id. at 3.
11
2
Hankins remains the law in the Second Circuit. The Sixth
Circuit noted (App., infra, 20a) that in a subsequent case a
different panel of the Second Circuit expressed a preference for
the views of the dissent in Hankins. See Rweyemamu v. Cote,
520 F.3d 198, 204 (2d Cir. 2008). But that decision did not and
could not have overturned Hankins. See United States v.
Wilkerson, 361 F.3d 717, 732 (2d Cir.) (panel bound by prior
panel decision unless overruled en banc or by Supreme Court),
cert. denied, 543 U.S. 908 (2004).
13
3
The United States ultimately withdrew its appellate brief
in that case (which urged that RFRA applied but that the
religious claimant should lose) because the President did not
believe it was supportive enough of the religious claimant. In re
Young, 82 F.3d at 1413; Drew S. Days, III, When the President
Says ‘No’: A Few Thoughts on Executive Power and the Tradition
of Solicitor General Independence, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
509, 517-518 (2001).
17
4
In this case, for example, respondents claim that the
district court gave them the “ongoing authority” to enter peti-
tioner’s church “to remove and permanently dispose of [petition-
er’s] signs and promotional materials that violate the Injunction
Order.” Dt. Ct. Dkt. 148 at 4 n.1.
18
5
That was, moreover, precisely what Congress expected
would happen. See 145 Cong. Rec. H5590 (daily ed. July 15,
1999) (statement of Rep. Conyers) (federal law “would require
individuals proceeding under such State and local antidiscrimi-
nation law to prove that the law they wish to utilize is a least
restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental
interest”); see also Religious Liberty: Hearing Before the S.
Judiciary Comm., 106th Cong. 155, 163 (1999) (in response to
questions on this point, Gene C. Schaerr and Chai Feldblum
both noted that the burden would initially fall on private
plaintiffs but that relevant government agencies and interest
groups could intervene to defend the law if needed).
20
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the petition for a
writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
CHARLES L. HOLLIDAY SETH M. GALANTER
SPRAGINS, BARNETT & Counsel of Record
COBB, PLC BRIAN R. MATSUI
312 East Lafayette MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
Jackson, TN 38301 2000 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 887-6947
[email protected]
BENJAMIN R. CARLISLE
MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
1290 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10104
NOVEMBER 8, 2010
1a
APPENDIX A
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
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COUNSEL
ARGUED: Charles L. Holliday, SPRAGINS,
BARNETT & COBB, PLC, Jackson, Tennessee, for
2a
OPINION
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I. BACKGROUND
The district court discussed the relevant back-
ground of the litigation:
General Conference Corporation of
Seventh-day Adventists . . . is a corporation
whose principal place of business is located
in Maryland. ([Docket Entry (“D.E.”)] No. 37,
Pls.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 9.)
The other Plaintiff, General Conference of
Seventh-day Adventists . . . is an unincor-
porated association that represents the in-
terests of the Seventh-day Adventist Church.
(Id. ¶ 10.) The General Conference was
formed in 1863, marking the official organi-
zation of the Seventh-day Adventist Church.
(D.E. No. 21, George W. Reid ThD’s Expert
Report ¶ 13.) The church grew out of several
congregations that believed that Christ’s
Second Advent was imminent and that the
Sabbath should be observed on the seventh
day of the week. (Id. ¶ 1.) The Plaintiffs’
expert, George Reid ThD, asserts that none
of these early churches called themselves
“Seventh-day Adventist” and that it was not
until the congregations came together to cre-
ate a formal church structure that the name
“Seventh-day Adventist” was chosen. (Id.
¶¶ 8-10.) Since the official formation of the
church, the names “Seventh-day Adventist”
and “SDA” have been used by the Seventh-
day Adventist Church as the church’s name,
and as its trade name in advertising and
publishing. (D.E. No. 37, Pls.’ Statement of
Undisputed Facts ¶ 40.) The church today
4a
1
The plaintiffs do not allege that McGill infringed the
trademark for “General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists.”
6a
II. ANALYSIS
McGill appeals the denial of his motion to dis-
miss, the grant of partial summary judgment to the
plaintiffs, and the entry of default judgment against
him. As the plaintiffs point out, although McGill
appealed the default-judgment order, he did not
present argument regarding that order in his brief
and has thus waived any argument that the order
should not have been entered. See Radvansky v. City
of Olmsted Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 311 (6th Cir. 2005).
The failure to challenge the default-judgment order,
however, does not end our inquiry. A default judgment
does not preclude review of whether the allegations in
the complaint, if taken as true, “were sufficient to
state a claim and support a judgment of liability.”
United States v. Conces, 507 F.3d 1028, 1038-39 (6th
Cir. 2007); see also Bank One of Cleveland, N.A. v.
Abbe, 916 F.2d 1067, 1079-80 (6th Cir. 1990). Fur-
thermore, it is not clear that the default-judgment
order superseded the summary-judgment order. Thus,
we review the district court’s denial of McGill’s mo-
tion to dismiss and its partial grant of the plaintiffs’
motion for summary judgment. In both cases, our
review is de novo. Autozone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373
F.3d 786, 792 (6th Cir. 2004); Bird v. Parsons, 289
F.3d 865, 871 (6th Cir. 2002).
In challenging those orders, McGill makes four
arguments: (1) the district court lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction; (2) the district court should have
dismissed the case or denied summary judgment
under RFRA; (3) Seventh-day Adventism is a religion
11a
A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
McGill argues that the First Amendment pre-
cluded the district court from exercising jurisdiction
because the district court could not apply neutral
principles of trademark law without resolving an
underlying doctrinal dispute: to wit, who are the
“true” Seventh-day Adventists. He argues in the
alternative that we should create a prudential excep-
tion of sorts to relinquish jurisdiction in cases like the
one at bar.
As this case involves the enforceability of
intellectual-property rights, it makes sense to con-
sider the Supreme Court’s precedents in the area
of church property disputes. See Maktab Tarighe
Oveyssi Shah Maghsoudi, Inc. v. Kianfar, 179 F.3d
1244, 1246-48 (9th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court
has recognized that “First Amendment values are
plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is
made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of
controversies over religious doctrine and practice.”
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1960).
But the Court has also held that courts may apply
“neutral principles of law” to resolve church property
12a
2
It is relevant, however, whether “Seventh-day Adventist”
describes a church or organization or, instead, a religion. If it
describes a religion, then the term would not be subject to
trademark protection. This is not a jurisdictional issue, but
rather an issue about the validity of the trademarks. We address
it below in Part C.
14a
B. RFRA
McGill claimed below that the enforcement of the
plaintiffs’ trademarks would violate his Free Exercise
Clause rights because his religion mandates him to
call his church “Creation Seventh Day Adventist.” He
argues, in essence, that his religious beliefs require
him to violate the law and that the enforcement of the
law against him is therefore unconstitutional.
15a
3
Because we hold that RFRA does not apply to suits be-
tween private parties, we do not reach the issues of whether
McGill waived the defense by failing to raise it in his answer
and whether the district court properly denied leave to amend
his answer.
18a
4
As the district court explained, the plaintiffs’ marks have
become “incontestable” under the Lanham Act. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1065 (explaining that a mark can attain this status if it is
registered for five years and no adverse decision as to its
ownership or validity has been rendered). In Sovereign Order of
Saint John of Jerusalem, Inc. v. Grady, 119 F.3d 1236 (6th Cir.
1997), a panel of this court held that because the name of the
(Continued on following page)
22a
5
In their reply to McGill’s response to their summary-
judgment motion below, the plaintiffs stated that their organiza-
tion’s “members are followers of the Christian faith.” SJ Reply at
2 (Doc. 59).
24a
D. Summary Judgment
Finally, McGill challenges the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs on trade-
mark infringement of the mark “Seventh-day Advent-
ist.” The plaintiffs claim that the default-judgment
order moots this issue because that order resolved the
entire case – that is, it provided an independent basis
for granting relief as to the “Seventh-day Adventist”
mark. McGill replies that the default-judgment order
pertained only to those claims that were not resolved
at summary judgment.
Both parties find support for their positions in
the district court’s own language. As McGill points
out, the district court concluded the default-judgment
order by stating that “default judgment will be
awarded to the Plaintiffs on their remaining claims.”
McGill, 2009 WL 1505738, at *7 (emphasis added).
On the other hand, other language in the order
28a
6
Under this rule, advanced in Broderick & Bascom Rope
Co. v. Manoff, 41 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1930), a party can “be re-
quired to keep a safe distance away” from using terms that re-
semble the validly trademarked terms, even though the former
are not themselves protected. Id. at 354.
29a
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM
the district court’s denial of McGill’s motion to dis-
miss, its grant of partial summary judgment to the
plaintiffs, and its default judgment against McGill.
7
McGill raised a number of defenses in his answer, but he
did not argue them at summary judgment and he does not do so
on appeal.
33a
APPENDIX B
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
GENERAL CONFERENCE
CORPORATION OF SEVENTH-
DAY ADVENTISTS and
GENERAL CONFERENCE OF
SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS,
an Unincorporated Association,
Plaintiffs, No. 06-1207
v.
WALTER MCGILL, d/b/a
CREATION SEVENTH DAY
ADVENTIST CHURCH, et al.,
Defendants.
www.thefourthangel.net
www.home.comcast.net/~creation-sabbath
www.home.comcast.net/~barbara_lim
www.home.comcast.net/~crmin
The Court further holds that Plaintiffs or their
agents should be and are permitted to remove and
permanently dispose of Defendant’s signs and promo-
tional materials that violate the Injunction Order,
with the costs of such removal and disposal to be
taxed to Defendant. Defendant’s counsel should
accompany Plaintiffs or their agent(s) during the
removal of any infringing materials, and prior to the
removal of any such signs or materials, Plaintiffs’
counsel shall notify Defendant and any building
managers, property owners, or landlords who may be
affected. Finally, the Court ORDERS the Defendant
to pay attorneys’ fees and costs to the Plaintiffs in the
amount of $35,567.00.
IT IS SO ORDERED this, the 6th day of Janu-
ary, 2010.
s/ J. DANIEL BREEN
UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGE
37a
APPENDIX C
§ 2000bb. Congressional findings and declara-
tion of purposes
(a) Findings
The Congress finds that –
(1) the framers of the Constitution, recog-
nizing free exercise of religion as an unalien-
able right, secured its protection in the First
Amendment to the Constitution;
(2) laws “neutral” toward religion may bur-
den religious exercise as surely as laws in-
tended to interfere with religious exercise;
(3) governments should not substantially
burden religious exercise without compelling
justification;
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990) the Supreme Court virtually
eliminated the requirement that the gov-
ernment justify burdens on religious exercise
imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth
in prior Federal court rulings is a workable
test for striking sensible balances between
religious liberty and competing prior gov-
ernmental interests.
(b) Purposes
The purposes of this chapter are –
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as
set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
38a
§ 2000bb-2. Definitions
As used in this chapter –
(1) the term “government” includes a
branch, department, agency, instrumentality,
and official (or other person acting under
color of law) of the United States, or of a
covered entity;
(2) the term “covered entity” means the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, and each territory and posses-
sion of the United States;
(3) the term “demonstrates” means meets
the burdens of going forward with the evi-
dence and of persuasion; and
(4) the term “exercise of religion” means
religious exercise, as defined in section
2000cc-5 of this title.
§ 2000bb-3. Applicability
(a) In general
This chapter applies to all Federal law, and the
implementation of that law, whether statutory or
otherwise, and whether adopted before or after No-
vember 16, 1993.
40a