REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

CASE DIGESTS 2023

1. REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 135 SCRA 156

Topics : Public Forestal Land; Spanish Titles

Petitioner : REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Respondents : C.A., SPOUSES PRUDENCIO MAXINO and TARCIANA
MORALES, PEDRO GONZALES, ROGELIO AQUINO,
Minor represented by his father, Manuel Aquino, and
ALEJANDRO, SOCORRO, MERCEDES, CONCHITA, REMEDIOS
and FLORA, all surnamed CONSOLACION.

FACTS:

This case is about the validity of the registration of 885 hectares of public forestal land
located in Mulanay, Quezon.

 Prudencio Tesalona owns 970 H of land.

 Prudencio’s gratuitous adjustment title granted him possessory rights over
pasture land with an area of 29 H but not ownership over 970 H of grazing land.
 The land was divided into 885 H for Lot 1 and 84 H for Lot 2, which is not
involved in this case.
 Prudencio died in 1905. Heirs: Maria and Lucila.
 The two heirs sold their father’s estate to Tarciana Morales Maximo, w/o
extrajudicial settlement.
 Signed a "quit-claim", which states that in consideration of P200 the Tesalona
sisters "releases and forever quitclaim unto the said Vendee" the 29-hectare land
described in the composition title.
 The boundaries and areas stated in Tesalona's tax declarations reveal that a
different land.
 The title states that the 29H land was located in Brgy. Yamay.
 In his tax declarations the land was located in Brgy. Cambuga, now Anonang.
 CFI Gumaca, Quezon rendered an order to register Lot 1 in the names of the
spouses Prudencio Maxino and Tarciana Morales. OCT was issued.
 8years later, the Republic of the Philippines filed an amended petition to annul
the decision, decree and title on the ground that they are void.
 The land in question was part of the unclassified public forest.
 The possessory information title relied upon by the Maxino spouses covered
only 29 hectares of land and not 885 hectares.
 The Maxino opposed but was denied.
 Order was served but was received by the Solicitor General's Office a year later.
 Solicitor General filed a motion for extension of time to submit a record on
appeal.
 CA denied the petition because the 1970 order had allegedly long become final
and unappealable. The reglementary 30-day period for appeal has elapsed.

Issue: WON the registration of public forestall land is valid.

Held:

Lot 1, the 885-hectare area registered by the Maxinos, is within the public forest, not
alienable and disposable nor susceptible of private appropriation.

The basis of the claim of the Maxinos is a Spanish title, a gratuitous composition title or
adjustment title issued on July 30, 1888 to Prudencio Tesalona pursuant to the Royal
Decree of December 26, 1884 for 29 hectares of pasture land (pasto de animales).

It is axiomatic that public forestal land is not registerable. Its inclusion in a title,
whether the title be issued during the Spanish regime or under the Torrens system,
nullifies the title.

Possession of public forestal lands, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership (Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183, 1199;
Director of Lands vs. Salazar, supra).

Spanish titles are not indefeasible (Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, supra, p. 1198). The
instant case bears similarities to Ramirez and Bayot de Ramirez vs. Director of Lands, 60
Phil. 114, where an adjustment title issued in 1896 was held to be void because it was
fraudulent and it covered public forestal land not subject to registration.

Presidential Decree No. 892 effective February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of
Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings.

SUPREME COURT DECISION:

 The decision of the Appellate Court and CFI Gumaca were reversed and set aside.
 The application for registration of Lot 1, Psu-175880 is dismissed
2. CHING VS. MALAYA, 153 SCRA 412

Topic : Court Jurisdiction, Ejectment Case

Petitioners : JOSE CHING and CARIDAD CHING

Respondents: HON. ANTONIO Q. MALAYA, as Presiding Judge of the
CFI of Laguna, Branch IV, Hon. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, as
Presiding Judge of the CFI of Laguna Branch II, and Spouses
CESAR ALVARADO and ARACELI ALVARADO

FACTS:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks a reversal of the
decision of the respondent court nullifying the judgment of the municipal court in a
forcible entry case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

 The property in question consists of a residential house and lot covered by

TCT No. T-85126 and registered in the name of Jose Ching in RD Laguna.
 The basis of the registration is a deed of sale executed in his favor by Felix Carpio,
the former owner, who bought it from Brigido Alvarado (Cesar’s father).
 It is a clean title with no encumbrance on the land, no adverse claim or notice of lis
pendens annotated in the certificate.
 Chings filed an ejectment case against Alvarados who forced their way into the
disputed premises and refused to vacate the same despite repeated demands.
 Alvarados argued that the property belonged to them by right of inheritance.
 The municipal court issued an order to Alvarados to vacate the disputed property.
 CA set aside municipal court decision as it had no competence to resolve the case
as it involved a question of ownership.

ISSUE: WON municipal court had the authority to try and decide the case involving
adverse assertions of ownership over the property.

HELD:

The Supreme Court sited the Balatbat case, the deed of sale invoked by the defendant
was allegedly executed by the plaintiff, who denied its authenticity, In other words, the
transaction in question was purportedly between the plaintiff and the defendant as
vendor and vendee.
In the instant case, the private respondents were not a party to the contract of sale
invoked by the petitioners. It was being challenged by respondent Cesar Alvarado only
as an alleged heir of Brigido Alvarado, who had transferred it to Felix Carpio, who in
turn had sold it to the petitioners.
Without preempting any decision in that annulment case, we make the observation that
even if the private respondents should succeed therein, he would not thereby
necessarily acquire full ownership of the property in question. Assuming the validity of
the holographic will be invoked, he would be entitled to only an indefinite portion of
the testator’s estate as long as no partition thereof shall have been effected.

For this reason alone, the respondent’s claim of ownership over the particular house
and lots in question could be dismissed as untimely and untenable.

Finally, the fact that the petitioners themselves adduced evidence of ownership over
the property in question did not have the effect of divesting the municipal court of its
jurisdiction.

SUPREME COURT DECISION:

 The petition is GRANTED.

 The decision of the respondent court was set aside.

 The municipal court decision was reinstated, with costs against the private
respondents.

 This decision is immediately executory.

3. UMBAY VS. ALECHA, 135 SCRA 427
[G.R. No. 67284. March 18, 1985.]

Topic :
Petitioners : TEOFISTO, FELICISIMO and MAXIMO, all surnamed UMBAY,
and FILOMENA, FRANCISCO, SUSANA, CELERINA and
JOSEFA, all surnamed ENANORIA
Respondents: PLACIDO ALECHA, NICOLASA LABAJO and INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, 

FACTS:

This case is about the right of the heirs of the registered owner of a parcel of land with
an area of 2,265 square meters to recover a portion thereof with an area of 500 square
meters allegedly usurped by the adjoining owner.ch

 Natalio Enanoria was the owner of OCT#10933 located in Carcar, Cebu.

 He died in 1924.
 In 1963 his heirs asked a surveyor to relocate the lot. They discovered 500sqm was
occupied by Placido Alecha, the owner of the adjoining lot.
 Alecha refused to vacate the disputed portion. He removed the concrete
monuments. The heirs sued Alecha.
 The trial court ordered Alecha and his wife to vacate the said 500-square-meter
portion. The Appellate Court reversed that decision and dismissed the complaint
of the Enanoria heirs.

ISSUE:

WON the heirs of Enanoria lost the 500sqm registered land from Alecha by prescription
and barred by laches.

HELD:

The petitioners’ action to recover the 500 sqm cannot be barred by laches because they
are aware of the encroachment only after they hired a surveyor in 1963.

Laches presupposes waiver of one’s right. There was no waiver in this case.

The action of the heirs of Enanoria to recover the 500 sqm land does not prescribe and
cannot be barred by laches. Nor can Alecha acquire that 500 sqm area by prescription
because it is covered by a Torrens title.
Section 47 of the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529 effective June 11, 1978),
provides that "no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner
shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession" (Estella v. RD Rizal, 106
Phil. 911, 914)

Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his
hereditary successors because the latter merely step into the shoes of the decedent by
operation of law and are merely the continuation of the personality of their predecessor-
in-interest (Barcelona v. Barcelona, 100 Phil. 251, 257).

In the 1915 case of Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, the real purpose of the Torrens
system is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its legality. "Once a
title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the
portals of the court, or sitting in the ‘mirador de su casa’, to avoid the possibility of
losing his land."cr

Thus, a registered owner of land who lost possession thereof in 1925, when it was taken
by the municipality of Pasay for road purposes, is not barred from recovering
compensation for said land in 1958 or 33 years later. The reason is that registered land
are not subject to prescription. It was an error to dismiss the landowner’s complaint on
the ground of laches and prescription (Alfonso v. Pasay City, 106 Phil. 1017; Herrera v.
Auditor General, 102 Phil. 875).

Adverse, notorious and continuous possession under a claim of ownership for the
period fixed by law is ineffective against a Torrens title (Tuason v. Bolaños, 95 Phil. 106;
111; Vda. de Recinto v. Inciong, L-26083, May 31, 1977, 77 SCRA 196; J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, L-23480, September 11, 1979, 93 SCRA 146).

Title to land can no longer be acquired by prescription after a Torrens title has been
issued for it (Dimson v. Rural Progress Administration, 90 Phil. 714, 717; Fernandez v.
Aboratigue, L-25313, December 28, 1970, 36 SCRA 476).c

The right to recover possession of registered land is imprescriptible because possession

is a mere consequence of ownership (Atun v. Nuñez, 97 Phil. 762).

WHEREFORE,

 the judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and set aside.

 That of the trial court is affirmed.
4. PNB VS. INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK, 199 SCRA 508
G.R. No. 86679, July 23, 1991

Topic : Extrajudicial Foreclosure; Jurisdiction; Prescription

Petitioner : PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
Respondents : INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK and CA.

Facts:

PNB filed a petition for the cancellation of a memorandum of encumbrance annotated

upon its 16 TCTs with RTC Alaminos, Pangasinan. There is an annotation on these
subject properties re: "Notice of Levy re Civil Case No. 69035, CFI-Manila, Continental
Bank vs. Archimedes J. Balingit and Ely Suntay Balingit" for a total sum of P96,636.10,
as entry No. 285511 at the back of TCT # 49020 and 49021.

Sps Balingit spouses failed to settle their loan obligation with PNB and consequently
PNB extrajudicially foreclosed under Act 3135, as amended, the 16 properties covered
by the real estate mortgages. The sheriff s certificate of sale was registered with RD
Alaminos, Pangasinan in 1972. Upon the expiration of the one-year legal redemption
period, PNB consolidated in its name the ownership of all the foregoing mortgaged
properties for which new TCTs were issued in its name. However, the annotation of the
notice of levy in favor of private respondent was carried over to and now appears as the
sole annotated encumbrance in the new titles of PNB.

In 1986, International Corporate Bank, as successor in interest of the defunct

Continental Bank, filed an opposition to the petition contending that, since it was not
informed of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, the new and consolidated titles
over the foreclosed properties issued in favor of herein petitioner are null and void.

RTC rendered a decision, denying the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

CA asserted that the lower court erred in ruling that (1) there is an adverse claim or
serious objection on the part of opposition rendering the case controversial and
therefore should be threshed out in an ordinary case; and (2) it has no jurisdiction to
entertain and act on the contested petition.

PNB filed a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court challenging the
decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC Alaminos, Pangasinan, which
dismissed PNB's application for the cancellation of annotations of an encumbrance on
its TCT.

ISSUE: WON the lower court has the jurisdiction to try and heard the case on adverse
claim or serious objection on the part of the oppositor.
HELD:

RTC Jurisdiction

The Supreme Court said - the rule that was adopted by CA in its decision to the effect
that RTC sitting as a land registration court has limited jurisdiction and has no
authority to resolve controversial issues, which should accordingly be litigated in a
court of general jurisdiction, no longer holds.

The basis - Section 2 of PD 1529 (The Property Registration Decree) which took effect
on June 11, 1979, gave RTC, acting as land registration courts, the exclusive jurisdiction
not only over applications for original registration of title to lands, including
improvements and interests therein, but also over petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such
applications or petitions.

Also sited Section 110 of Act 496 (Land Registration Act), the CFI, sitting as a land
registration court, has the authority to conduct a hearing, receive evidence, and decide
controversial matters with a view to determining whether or not the filed notice of
adverse claim is valid.

In the case of Averia, Jr. vs. Caguioa, etc., et al.,:

In Section 2 of the Id P.D. No. 1529, it is clearly provided that:

Sec. 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. — Judicial proceedings

for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be
based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system.

Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for
original registration of titles to lands, including improvements and interest therein,
and over a petition filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions . . .

Right of Subsequent Lien Holder

 ICB is a subsequent lien holder.

  Its rights over the mortgaged property are inferior to that of petitioner as a
mortgagee.
 ICB acquires only the right of redemption vested in the mortgagor, and his rights
are strictly subordinate to the superior lien of the anterior mortgagee. 
 After the foreclosure sale, the remedy of the second mortgagee is limited to the
right to redeem by paying off the debt secured by the first mortgage.

The rule:

Upon a proper foreclosure of a prior mortgage, all liens subordinate to the mortgage are
likewise foreclosed, and the purchaser at public auction held pursuant thereto acquires
title free from the subordinate liens.

Register of Deeds is authorized to issue the new titles without carrying over the
annotation of subordinate liens.

The failure of the subsequent attaching creditor to redeem, within the time allowed by
Section 6 of Act 3136, the land which was sold extrajudicially to satisfy the first
mortgage, gives the purchaser a perfect right to secure the cancellation of the annotation
of said creditor's attachment lien on the certificates of title of said land.

In the case of BPI et al. vs. Noblejas, et al.:

"(a)ny subsequent lien or encumbrance annotated at the back of the

certificates of title cannot in any way prejudice the mortgage previously
registered, and the lots subject thereto pass to the purchaser at the public
auction sale free from any lien or encumbrance. Otherwise, the value of
the mortgage could be easily destroyed by a subsequent record of an
adverse claim, for no one would purchase at a foreclosure sale if bound by
the posterior claim. . . . This alone is sufficient justification for the
dropping of the adverse claim from the new certificates of title to be issued
to her, as directed by respondent Commissioner in his opinion subject of
this appeal."

The contention of ICB that the extrajudicial foreclosure is null and void for failure of
PNB to inform them of the said foreclosure and the dates of redemption to exercise its
prerogatives under the law is untenable.

There being no contractual stipulation. Personal notice is not necessary and what
governs is the general rule in Section 3 of Act 3135, as amended, which directs the
posting of notices of the sale in at least three (3) public places of the municipality where
the property is situated, and the publication thereof in a newspaper of general
circulation in said municipality.

In effect, the levy in favor of Continental Bank from the judgment of CFI Manila is
without force and effect, prescribed for it was not implemented for more than 10 years.
Properties levied upon by execution must be sold at public auction within the period of
ten (10) years during which the judgment can be enforced by action.

SUPREME COURT DECISION:

- the judgment of CA was SET ASIDE.

- ordered the annotations of the notice of levy in favor of Continental Bank, now
substituted by ICB, on PNBs TCTs CANCELLED.

G.R. No. L-57757 August 31, 1987

Topic : Prescription
Petitioner : PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
Respondents : CA, PRAGMACIO VITUG AND MAXIMO VITUG

Facts:

During the lifetime of Clodualdo Vitug he married two times.

 First wife - Gervacia Flores - he had 3 children

 Second wife - Donata Montemayor - he had 8 children

In 1929 Clodualdo died intestate so his estate was settled and distributed in Special
Proceeding No. 422 in the CFI Pampanga wherein Donata was the Administratrix. 

In 1952, Donata (2nd wife of Clodualdo Vitug), mortgaged to PNB parcels of land
covered by TCT 2289 to guarantee the loan granted by the PNB to Salvador Jaramilla
and Pedro Bacani.

In 1963, Donata mortgaged TCTs 2887 & 2888 in favor of PNB to guarantee the loan of
her son Salvador Vitug.

TCTs 2287, 2288 & 2289 were all in the name of Donata Montemayor, a widow, at the
time they were mortgaged to PNB and were free from all liens and encumbrances. 

Salvador Vitug, Salvador Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani all defaulted the loan in which
PNB foreclosed TCT Nos. 2887, 2888 & 2889. Sold at public auction and likewise PNB
was the buyer. A new title was issued in its name. 

In 1969, PNB sold the TCT Nos. 2887 & 2888 Jesus M. Vitug, Anunciacion V. de
Guzman, Prudencia V. Fajardo, Salvador Vitug and Aurora V. Gutierrez in those names
the corresponding titles were issued. 

In 1970, Donata’s sons - Pragmacio and Maximo filed an action for partition and
reconveyance with damages in the CFI Pampanga against Marcelo Mendiola, special
administrator of the intestate estate of Donata Montemayor who died earlier, Jesus
Vitug, Sr., Salvador, Natalia, Prudencia, Anunciacion, all surnamed Vitug, Antonio,
Francisco, Aurora, Pedro, Honorio, Corazon, Anselmo, Benigno, Eligio Jesus and Luz,
all surnamed Fajardo and the PNB.

The 30 parcels of land claimed to be the conjugal property of the spouses Donata
Montemayor and Clodualdo Vitug of which they claim a share of 2/11 of 1/2 thereof.
They assailed the mortgage to the PNB and the public auction of the properties as null
and void. They invoked the case of Vitug vs. Montemayor, L-5297 decided by this Court
on Oct. 20, 1953 which is an action for partition and liquidation of the said 30 parcels of
land wherein the properties were found to be conjugal in nature.
In 1975, CFI dismissed the complaint. CA reversed and set aside the CFI decision with
modification that the sale at public auction of the 22 parcels be considered valid with
respect to the 1/2 thereof.

Issue:

Does the presumption of conjugality of properties acquired by the spouses during

coverture provided for in Article 160 of the Civil Code apply to property covered by a
Torrens certificate of title in the name of the widow?

Held:

In this case, the 3 TCTs were mortgaged to the PNB they were registered in the name
of Donata Montemayor, widow.

The rule is that a person dealing with a registered land has a right to rely upon the face
of the torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except
when the party has actual knowledge of facts that would impel reason to inquire.

A Torrens title concludes all controversy over ownership of the land covered by a final
degree of registration. Once the title is registered the owner may rest assured without
the necessity of stepping into the portals of the court or sitting in the mirador de su
casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land. 

Article 160 of the Civil Code provides as follows:

Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife.

PNB is a mortgagee in goodfaith in which PNB was not aware to any flaw of the title of
the mortgagor. 

Actions for recovery of real property and for partition are real actions, are actions
in personam that bind only the particular individuals who are parties thereto. The PNB
not being a party in said cases is not bound by the said decisions. Nor does it appear
that the PNB was aware of the said decisions when it extended the above describe
mortgage loans.

If the PNB knew of the conjugal nature of said properties it would not have approved the
mortgage applications covering said properties of Donata Montemayor without requiring
the consent of all the other heirs or co-owners thereof. Moreover, when said properties
were sold at public auction, the PNB was a purchaser for value in good faith.

Pragmacio and Maximo Vitug are now estopped from questioning the title of Donata
Montemayor to the said properties. They were in possession of the property for a long
time and they knew that the same were mortgaged by their mother to the PNB and
thereafter were sold at public auction, but they did not do anything.  17 years later they
asserted their rights thus they are guilty of laches. 

SUPREME COURT DECISION:

Court of Appeals decision was REVERSED and set aside