SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 188611

Appellee,
Present:

CARPIO, J.,

Chairperson,

NACHURA,
- versus -
PERALTA,

ABAD, and

PEREZ,* JJ.

Promulgated:
BELEN MARIACOS,

Appellant.
June 16, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718, which affirmed the decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 29, San Fernando City, La Union, in Criminal Case No. 7144,
finding appellant Belen Mariacos guilty of violating Article II, Section 5 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.

The facts of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:

Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was charged in an Information, dated November 7,

2005 of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165, allegedly committed
as follows:

That on or about the 27th day of October, 2005, in the Municipality

of San Gabriel, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport, deliver
7,030.3, (sic) grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops without the
necessary permit or authority from the proper government agency
or office.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned on December 13, 2005, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. During
the pre-trial, the following were stipulated upon:

1. Accused admits that she is the same person identified in the

information as Belen Mariacos;

2. That accused is a resident of Brgy. Lunoy, San Gabriel, La Union;

 3. That at the time of the arrest of the accused, accused had just
alighted from a passenger jeepney;

4. That the marijuana allegedly taken from the possession of the

accused contained in two (2) bags were submitted for
examination to the Crime Lab;

5. That per Chemistry Report No. D-109-2005, the alleged drug

submitted for examination gave positive result for the presence
of marijuana;

6. That the drugs allegedly obtained from the accused contained

(sic) and submitted for examination weighed 7,030.3 grams;

7. The Prosecutor admits the existence of a counter-affidavit

executed by the accused; and

8. The existence of the affidavits executed by the witnesses of the

accused family (sic): Lyn Punasen, Mercedes Tila and Magdalena
Carino.

During the trial, the prosecution established the following evidence:

On October 26, 2005, in the evening, the San Gabriel Police Station of San Gabriel, La
Union, conducted a checkpoint near the police station at the poblacion to intercept
a suspected transportation of marijuana from Barangay Balbalayang, San Gabriel, La
Union. The group at the checkpoint was composed of PO2 Lunes B. Pallayoc (PO2
Pallayoc), the Chief of Police, and other policemen. When the checkpoint did not
yield any suspect or marijuana, the Chief of Police instructed PO2 Pallayoc to
proceed to Barangay Balbalayang to conduct surveillance operation (sic).

At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with a
secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage
of marijuana had been loaded on a passenger jeepney that was about to leave for
the poblacion. The agent mentioned three (3) bags and one (1) blue plastic
bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with an O.K. marking. PO2 Pallayoc
then boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. While the
vehicle was in motion, he found the black backpack with an O.K. marking and
peeked inside its contents. PO2 Pallayoc found bricks of marijuana wrapped in
newspapers. He then asked the other passengers on top of the jeepney about the
owner of the bag, but no one knew.

When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with the
other passengers. Unfortunately, he did not notice who took the black backpack
from atop the jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the said bag and
three (3) other bags, including a blue plastic bag, were already being carried away by
two (2) women. He caught up with the women and introduced himself as a
policeman. He told them that they were under arrest, but one of the women got
away.

PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was later identified as herein accused-
appellant Belen Mariacos, and the bags to the police station. At the police station,
the investigators contacted the Mayor of San Gabriel to witness the opening of the
bags. When the Mayor arrived about fifteen (15) minutes later, the bags were
opened and three (3) bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, two (2) round
bundles of marijuana, and two (2) bricks of marijuana fruiting tops, all wrapped in a
newspaper, were recovered.

Thereafter, the investigators marked, inventoried and forwarded the confiscated

marijuana to the crime laboratory for examination. The laboratory examination
showed that the stuff found in the bags all tested positive for marijuana, a
dangerous drug.

When it was accused-appellants turn to present evidence, she testified that:

On October 27, 2005, at around 7:00 in the morning, accused-appellant, together

with Lani Herbacio, was inside a passenger jeepney bound for the poblacion. While
the jeepney was still at the terminal waiting for passengers, one Bennie Lao-ang
(Lao-ang), her neighbor, requested her to carry a few bags which had been loaded
on top of the jeepney. At first, accused-appellant refused, but she was persuaded
later when she was told that she would only be carrying the bags. When they
 reached the poblacion, Lao-ang handed accused-appellant and her companion, Lani
Herbacio, the bags, and then Lao-ang suddenly ran away. A few moments later, PO2
Pallayoc was upon them, arresting them. Without explanation, they were brought to
the police station. When they were at the police station, Lani Herbacio disappeared.
It was also at the police station that accused-appellant discovered the true contents
of the bags which she was asked to carry. She maintained that she was not the
owner of the bags and that she did not know what were contained in the bags. At
the police station (sic) she executed a Counter-Affidavit.[3]

On January 31, 2007, the RTC promulgated a decision, the dispositive portion
of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Belen Mariacos GUILTY as charged and
sentences here (sic) to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P500,000.00.

The 7,030.3 grams of marijuana are ordered confiscated and turned over to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for destruction in the presence of the Court
personnel and media.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Appellant appealed her conviction to the CA. She argued that the trial court
erred in considering the evidence of the prosecution despite its
inadmissibility.[5] She claimed that her right against an unreasonable search
was flagrantly violated by Police Officer (PO)2 Pallayoc when the latter
searched the bag, assuming it was hers, without a search warrant and with no
permission from her. She averred that PO2 Pallayocs purpose for
apprehending her was to verify if the bag she was carrying was the same one
he had illegally searched earlier. Moreover, appellant contended that there
was no probable cause for her arrest.[6]
Further, appellant claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus
delicti of the crime.[7] She alleged that the apprehending police officers violated
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, as amended by Board
Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990, which prescribes the procedure in the
custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses,
and articles. The said regulation directs the apprehending team having initial
custody and control of the drugs and/or paraphernalia, immediately after
seizure or confiscation, to have the same physically inventoried and
photographed in the presence of appellant or her representative, who shall be
required to sign copies of the inventory. The failure to comply with this
directive, appellant claimed, casts a serious doubt on the identity of the items
allegedly confiscated from her. She, likewise, averred that the prosecution
failed to prove that the items allegedly confiscated were indeed prohibited
drugs, and to establish the chain of custody over the same.

On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), argued that the warrantless arrest of appellant and the warrantless
seizure of marijuana were valid and legal,[8] justified as a search of a moving
vehicle. It averred that PO2 Pallayoc had reasonable ground to believe that
appellant had committed the crime of delivering dangerous drugs based on
reliable information from their agent, which was confirmed when he peeked
into the bags and smelled the distinctive odor of marijuana.[9] The OSG also
argued that appellant was now estopped from questioning the illegality of her
arrest since she voluntarily entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and
participated in the trial and presented her evidence.[10] The OSG brushed aside
appellants argument that the bricks of marijuana were not photographed and
inventoried in her presence or that of her counsel immediately after
confiscation, positing that physical inventory may be done at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending team, whichever was
practicable.[11]

In a Decision dated January 19, 2009, the CA dismissed appellants appeal and
affirmed the RTC decision in toto.[12] It held that the prosecution had
successfully proven that appellant carried away from the jeepney a number of
bags which, when inspected by the police, contained dangerous drugs. The CA
ruled that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of carrying and conveying
the bag that contained the illegal drugs, and thus held that appellants
warrantless arrest was valid. The appellate court ratiocinated:

It must be stressed that PO2 Pallayoc had earlier ascertained the contents of the
bags when he was aboard the jeep. He saw the bricks of marijuana wrapped in
newspaper. That said marijuana was on board the jeepney to be delivered to a
specified destination was already unlawful. PO2 Pallayoc needed only to see for
himself to whom those bags belonged. So, when he saw accused-appellant carrying
the bags, PO2 Pallayoc was within his lawful duty to make a warrantless arrest of
accused-appellant.

xxxx

Firstly, this Court opines that the invocation of Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution is misplaced. At the time, when PO2 Pallayoc looked into the contents
of the suspicious bags, there was no identified owner. He asked the other
passengers atop the jeepney but no one knew who owned the bags. Thus, there
could be no violation of the right when no one was entitled thereto at that time.

Secondly, the facts of the case show the urgency of the situation. The local police
has been trying to intercept the transport of the illegal drugs for more than a day, to
no avail. Thus, when PO2 Pallayoc was tipped by the secret agent of the Barangay
Intelligence Network, PO2 Pallayoc had no other recourse than to verify as promptly
as possible the tip and check the contents of the bags.

Thirdly, x x x the search was conducted in a moving vehicle. Time and again, a search
of a moving vehicle has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor
vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought. Thus, under the facts, PO2 Pallayoc could not be
expected to secure a search warrant in order to check the contents of the bags
which were loaded on top of the moving jeepney. Otherwise, a search warrant
would have been of no use because the motor vehicle had already left the
locality.[13]

Appellant is now before this Court, appealing her conviction.

Once again, we are asked to determine the limits of the powers of the States
agents to conduct searches and seizures. Over the years, this Court had laid
down the rules on searches and seizures, providing, more or less, clear
parameters in determining which are proper and which are not.

Appellants main argument before the CA centered on the inadmissibility

of the evidence used against her. She claims that her constitutional right
against unreasonable searches was flagrantly violated by the apprehending
officer.

Thus, we must determine if the search was lawful. If it was, then there
would have been probable cause for the warrantless arrest of appellant.

Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution provides:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

Law and jurisprudence have laid down the instances when a warrantless
search is valid. These are:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section

12 [now Section 13], Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence;

2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:

 (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest
in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police

who had the right to be where they are;

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and;

(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without

further search.

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the

vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.[14]

Both the trial court and the CA anchored their respective decisions on the fact
that the search was conducted on a moving vehicle to justify the validity of the
search.

Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted

exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be made
except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the
existence of probable cause.[15]

In People v. Bagista,[16] the Court said:

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures

admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a
warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the seizure of
evidence in plain view.
 With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the
ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be
searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.

This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to

conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause.
When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless
search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search
have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find
the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.

It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as

exceptions to the requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the
officer effecting the arrest or seizure must have been impelled to do so
because of probable cause. The essential requisite of probable cause must be
satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully
conducted.[17] Without probable cause, the articles seized cannot be admitted
in evidence against the person arrested.[18]

Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported

by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the
existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the
items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to
seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be searched.[19]

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual

belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion
therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the
part of the peace officers making the arrest.[20]

Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily
liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of
practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the
place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of
the issuing judge a requirement which borders on the impossible in instances
where moving vehicle is used to transport contraband from one place to another
with impunity.[21]

This exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be

obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling house or other immobile
structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is
conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since they
can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must
be sought.[22]

Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this
case is valid. The vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was
about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It
would be unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before conducting
the search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The
searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough
time to board the vehicle before the same left for its destination.

It is well to remember that on October 26, 2005, the night before

appellants arrest, the police received information that marijuana was to be
transported from Barangay Balbalayang, and had set up a checkpoint around
the area to intercept the suspects. At dawn of October 27, 2005, PO2 Pallayoc
met the secret agent from the Barangay Intelligence Network, who informed
him that a baggage of marijuana was loaded on a passenger jeepney about to
leave for the poblacion. Thus, PO2 Pallayoc had probable cause to search the
packages allegedly containing illegal drugs.
 This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
provides:

SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.A person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof
in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.[23]

For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid

arrest. Although, generally, a warrant is necessary for a valid arrest, the Rules
of Court provides the exceptions therefor, to wit:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has

committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he

has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who

has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail
and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.[24]
 Be that as it may, we have held that a search substantially
contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police has
probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.[25]

Given that the search was valid, appellants arrest based on that search is
also valid.

Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002

states:

SEC. 5 Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and

Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall
be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy
regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.

The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon
any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense,
deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such
transactions.

In her defense, appellant averred that the packages she was carrying did not
belong to her but to a neighbor who had asked her to carry the same for him.
This contention, however, is of no consequence.
 When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of
prohibited drugs, the ownership thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of
ownership of the confiscated marijuana is not necessary.[26]

Appellants alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid

defense. Lack of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting
circumstances where the crime charged is malum prohibitum, as in this
case.[27] Mere possession and/or delivery of a prohibited drug, without legal
authority, is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.[28]

Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws, are regulatory statutes. They

are rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the
affairs of society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita. Laws
defining crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior directed not against
particular individuals, but against public order.[29]

Jurisprudence defines transport as to carry or convey from one place to

another.[30] There is no definitive moment when an accused transports a
prohibited drug. When the circumstances establish the purpose of an accused
to transport and the fact of transportation itself, there should be no question
as to the perpetration of the criminal act.[31] The fact that there is actual
conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting was
committed and it is immaterial whether or not the place of destination is
reached.[32]

Moreover, appellants possession of the packages containing illegal drugs

gave rise to the disputable presumption[33] that she is the owner of the
packages and their contents.[34] Appellant failed to rebut this presumption. Her
uncorroborated claim of lack of knowledge that she had prohibited drug in her
possession is insufficient.

Appellants narration of facts deserves little credence. If it is true that Bennie

Lao-ang merely asked her and her companion to carry some baggages, it is but
logical to first ask what the packages contained and where these would be
taken. Likewise, if, as appellant said, Lao-ang ran away after they disembarked
from the jeepney, appellant and her companion should have ran after him to
give him the bags he had left with them, and not to continue on their journey
without knowing where they were taking the bags.

Next, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of
the crime. In particular, she alleged that the apprehending police officers failed
to follow the procedure in the custody of seized prohibited and regulated
drugs, instruments, apparatuses, and articles.

In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the

existence of all dangerous drugs is a sine qua non for conviction. The
dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of that crime.[35]
Thus, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 prescribes the procedure for custody
and disposition of seized dangerous drugs, to wit:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 further
provides:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as
well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated,
seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and

control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items.

PO2 Pallayoc testified that after apprehending appellant, he immediately

brought her to the police station. At the station, the police requested the
Mayor to witness the opening of the bags seized from appellant. When the
Mayor arrived, he opened the bag in front of appellant and the other police
officers. The black bag yielded three bricks of marijuana wrapped in
newspaper, while the plastic bag yielded two bundles of marijuana and two
bricks of marijuana fruiting tops.[36] PO2 Pallayoc identified the bricks. He and
PO3 Stanley Campit then marked the same. Then the seized items were
brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.
It is admitted that there were no photographs taken of the drugs seized, that
appellant was not accompanied by counsel, and that no representative from
the media and the DOJ were present. However, this Court has already
previously held that non-compliance with Section 21 is not fatal and will not
render an accuseds arrest illegal, or make the items seized inadmissible. What
is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items.[37]

Based on the testimony of PO2 Pallayoc, after appellants arrest, she was
immediately brought to the police station where she stayed while waiting for
the Mayor. It was the Mayor who opened the packages, revealing the illegal
drugs, which were thereafter marked and sent to the police crime laboratory
the following day. Contrary to appellants claim, the
prosecutions evidence establishes the chain of custody from the time of

appellants arrest until the prohibited drugs were tested at the police crime
laboratory.

While it is true that the arresting officer failed to state explicitly the
justifiable ground for non-compliance with Section 21, this does not necessarily
mean that appellants arrest was illegal or that the items seized are
inadmissible. The justifiable ground will remain unknown because appellant
did not question the custody and disposition of the items taken from her
during the trial.[38] Even assuming that the police officers failed to abide by
Section 21, appellant should have raised this issue before the trial court. She
could have moved for the quashal of the information at the first instance. But
she did not. Hence, she is deemed to have waived any objection on the matter.

Further, the actions of the police officers, in relation to the procedural

rules on the chain of custody, enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions. Courts accord credence and full faith to the
testimonies of police authorities, as they are presumed to be performing their
duties regularly, absent any convincing proof to the contrary.[39]

In sum, the prosecution successfully established appellants guilt. Thus, her

conviction must be affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
 Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

*
Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza per Raffle dated February 22, 2010.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., with Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a
member of this Court) and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, concurring; rollo, pp. 2-13.
[2]
CA rollo, pp. 13-29.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 2-5.
[4]
CA rollo, p. 29.
[5]
Id. at 45.
[6]
Id. at 48.
[7]
Id. at 50.
[8]
Id. at 108.
[9]
Id. at 112.
[10]
Id. at 113.
[11]
Id. at 114-115.
[12]
Rollo, p. 13.
[13]
Id. at 8-9.
[14]
People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868, 879-880 (1998). (Citations omitted.)
[15]
Asuncion v. Court of Appeals, 362 Phil. 118, 126 (1999), citing Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 257
SCRA 430 (1996); and People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122 (1991).

[16]
G.R. No. 86218, September 18, 1992, 214 SCRA 63, 68-69. (Citations omitted.)
[17]
People v. Aruta, supra note 14, at 880.
[18]
Except when the prohibited items are in plain view.
[19]
People v. Aruta, supra note 14, at 880, citing People v. Encinada, 345 Phil. 301 (1997).
[20]
People v. Doria, 361 Phil. 595, 632 (1999).
[21]
People v. Lo Ho Wing, supra note 15, at 128-129, citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153
(1925); People v. Del Mundo, 418 Phil. 740 (2001).
[22]
Salvador v. People, 502 Phil. 60, 72 (2005).
[23]
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 126.
[24]
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 113.
[25]
People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007, 516 SCRA 463, citing People v. Tudtud, 458 Phil.
752 (2003).
[26]
People v. Del Mundo, supra note 21, at 751. (Citations omitted.)
[27]
Id., citing People v. Sy Bing Yok, 309 SCRA 28, 38 (1999).
[28]
People v. Beriarmente, 418 Phil. 229, 239 (2001).
[29]
People v. Doria, supra note 20, at 618. (Citations omitted.)
[30]
People v. Peaflorida, G.R. No. 175604, April 10, 2008, 551 SCRA 111, 125.

[31]
People v. Jones, 343 Phil. 865, 877 (1997).

[32]
People v. Correa, G.R. No. 119246, January 30, 1998, 285 SCRA 679, 700.

[33]
Section 3 (j) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court states:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions.The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxxx
(j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker
and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership
over, are owned by him.
[34]
See People v. Del Mundo, supra note 21.
[35]
People v. Kimura, 471 Phil. 895, 909 (2004), citing People v. Mendiola, 235 SCRA 116, 120 (1994).
[36]
CA rollo, p. 16.
[37]
People v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 178876, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 421, 436-437, citing People v. Del
Monte, 552 SCRA 627 (2008).
[38]
See People v. Pringas, G.R. No. 175928, August 31, 2007, 531 SCRA 828; People v. Sta. Maria, G.R. No.
171019, February 23, 2007, 516 SCRA 621, 633.
[39]
People v. Santiago, G.R. No. 175326, November 28, 2007, 539 SCRA 198, 223.