SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 192685, July 31, 2013

OSCAR R. AMPIL, Petitioner, v. THE HON. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,

POLICARPIO L. ESPENESIN, REGISTRAR, REGISTER OF DEEDS, PASIG CITY,
FRANCIS SERRANO, YVONNE S. YUCHENGCO, AND GEMA O.
CHENG, Respondents.

G.R. No. 199115

OSCAR R. AMPIL, Petitioner, v. POLICARPIO L. ESPENESIN, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

No less than the Constitution maps out the wide grant of investigatory powers to the
Ombudsman.1 Hand in hand with this bestowal, the Ombudsman is mandated to
investigate and prosecute, for and in behalf of the people, criminal and administrative
offenses committed by government officers and employees, as well as private persons
in conspiracy with the former.2 There can be no equivocation about this power-and-duty
function of the Ombudsman.

Before us are consolidated petitions separately filed by Oscar R. Ampil (Ampil): (1) one
is for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court docketed as G.R. No. 192685; and
(2) the other is for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court docketed as
G.R. No. 199115.

Challenged in the petition for certiorari is the Resolution3 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-

C-07-0444-J, dismissing the criminal complaint filed by Ampil against respondents
Policarpio L. Espenesin (Espenesin), Francis Serrano (Serrano), Yvonne S. Yuchengco
(Yuchengco) and Gema O. Cheng (Cheng), and the Order4 denying Ampil’s motion for
reconsideration thereof. Ampil’s complaint charged respondents with Falsification of
Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code and violation of
Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, as amended.

The appeal by certiorari, on the other hand, assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA G.R. SP No. 113171, which affirmed the Order dated 13 July 2009 of the
Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-07-0474-J on the administrative aspect of the mentioned
criminal complaint for Falsification and violation of Republic Act No. 3019 against the
Registrar of Deeds, respondent Espenesin. Initially, the Ombudsman issued a Decision
dated 30 April 2008, finding Espenesin guilty of Simple Misconduct and meting on
Espenesin the penalty of one (1) month suspension. On motion for reconsideration of
Ampil, the Ombudsman favored Espenesin’s arguments in his Opposition, and recalled
the one-month suspension the Ombudsman had imposed on the latter.
These consolidated cases arose from the following facts.

On 9 November 1995, ASB Realty Corporation (ASB) and Malayan Insurance Company
(MICO) entered into a Joint Project Development Agreement (JPDA) for the construction
of a condominium building to be known as “The Malayan Tower.” Under the JPDA, MICO
shall provide the real property located at the heart of the Ortigas Business District,
Pasig City, while ASB would construct, and shoulder the cost of construction and
development of the condominium building.

A year thereafter, on 20 November 1996, MICO and ASB entered into another contract,
with MICO selling to ASB the land it was contributing under the JPDA. Under the
Contract to Sell, ownership of the land will vest on ASB only upon full payment of the
purchase price.

Sometime in 2000, ASB, as part of the ASB Group of Companies, filed a Petition for
Rehabilitation with Prayer for Suspension of Actions and Proceedings before the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). As a result, the SEC issued a sixty (60)
day Suspension Order (a) suspending all actions for claims against the ASB Group of
Companies pending or still to be filed with any court, office, board, body, or tribunal;
(b) enjoining the ASB Group of Companies from disposing of their properties in any
manner, except in the ordinary course of business, and from paying their liabilities
outstanding as of the date of the filing of the petition; and (c) appointing Atty. Monico
V. Jacob as interim receiver of the ASB Group of Companies.5 Subsequently, the SEC,
over the objections of creditors, approved the Rehabilitation Plan submitted by the ASB
Group of Companies, thus: cralawlibrary

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the objections to the rehabilitation plan raised by the

creditors are hereby considered unreasonable.

Accordingly, the Rehabilitation Plan submitted by petitioners is hereby APPROVED,

except those pertaining to Mr. Roxas’ advances, and the ASB-Malayan Towers. Finally,
Interim Receiver Mr. Fortunato Cruz is appointed as Rehabilitation Receiver.6 (Emphasis
supplied).

Because of the obvious financial difficulties, ASB was unable to perform its obligations
to MICO under the JPDA and the Contract to Sell. Thus, on 30 April 2002, MICO and
ASB executed their Third contract, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA),7 allowing
MICO to assume the entire responsibility for the development and completion of The
Malayan Tower. At the time of the execution of the MOA, ASB had already paid MICO ?
427,231,952.32 out of the ?640,847,928.48 purchase price of the realty.8 cralaw virtualaw library

The MOA specifies the entitlement of both ASB and MICO to net saleable areas of The
Malayan Tower representing their investments. It provides, in pertinent part: cralawlibrary

Section 4. Distribution and Disposition of Units. (a) As a return of its capital investment
in the Project, each party shall be entitled to such portion of all the net saleable area of
the Building that their respective contributions to the Project bear to the actual
construction cost. As of the date of the execution hereof, and on the basis of the total
costs incurred to date in relation to the Remaining Construction Costs (as defined in
Section 9(a) hereof), the parties shall respectively be entitled to the following (which
entitlement shall be conditioned on, and subject to, adjustments as provided in sub-
paragraph (b) of Section 4 in the event that the actual remaining cost of construction
exceeds the Remaining Construction Cost): cralawlibrary

(i) [MICO] – the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule 2 hereof.

(ii) ASB – the following net saleable area: cralawlibrary

(A) the net saleable area which ASB had pre-sold for an aggregate purchase price of
P640,085,267.30 as set forth in Schedule 1 (including all paid and unpaid proceeds of
said pre-sales);chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary

(B) the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule 3 hereof which shall be
delivered to ASB upon completion of the Project; and,

(C) provided that the actual remaining construction costs do not exceed the Remaining
Construction Cost, the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule 4 hereof
which shall be delivered to ASB upon completion of the Project and determination of its
actual construction costs. If the actual remaining construction costs exceed the
Remaining Construction Cost, sub-paragraph (b) of this Section 4 shall apply.

(b) In the event that the actual remaining construction costs exceed the Remaining
Construction Cost as represented and warranted by ASB to [MICO] under Section 9(a)
hereof, and [MICO] pays for such excess, the pro-rata sharing in the net saleable area
of the Building, as provided in sub-paragraph (a) of this Section 4 shall be adjusted
accordingly. In such event, [MICO] shall be entitled to such net saleable area in
Schedule 4 that corresponds to the excess of the actual remaining cost over the
Remaining Construction Cost.

(c) To ensure the viability of the Project, the parties agree on a single pricing system,
which [MICO] shall have the exclusive right to fix and periodically adjust based on
prevailing market conditions in consultation with, but without need of consent of, ASB,
for each party’s primary sale or other disposition of its share in the net saleable area of
the Building. In accordance with the immediately preceding provision, [MICO] hereby
adopts the selling prices set forth in Schedule 5 hereof. Each party or its officers,
employees, agents or representatives shall not sell or otherwise dispose any share of
said party in the net saleable area of the Building below the prices fixed by [MICO] in
accordance with this Section 4 (c). [MICO] shall have the exclusive right to adopt
financing and discounting schemes to enhance marketing and sales of units in the
Project and such right of [MICO] shall not be restricted or otherwise limited by the
foregoing single pricing system provision.

(d) Each party shall bear the profits earned and losses incurred as well as any and all
taxes and other expenses in connection with the allocation or sale of, or other
transaction relating to, the units allotted to each party.9

On 11 March 2005, Condominium Certificates of Title (CCTs) for 38 units10 and the

allotted parking spaces were issued in the name of ASB. On even date but prior to its
release, another set of CCTs covering the same subject units but with MICO as
registered owner thereof, was signed by Espenesin in his capacity as Registrar of Deeds
of Pasig City. Notably, Espenesin had likewise signed the CCTs which were originally
issued in ASB’s name.

On 2 April 2006, counsel for ASB wrote Espenesin calling his attention to the supposed
amendment in the CCTs which he had originally issued in ASB’s name.11 Counsel for
ASB demanded that Espenesin effect in the second set of CCTs, the registration of the
subject units in The Malayan Tower back to ASB’s name.

On 17 May 2006, Espenesin replied and explained, thus: cralawlibrary

The registration of the Malayan-ASB Realty transaction[,] from its inception up to the
issuance of titles[,] were all handled by [respondent] Atty. Francis Serrano. He
therefore appeared and we have considered him the legitimate representative of both
parties (sic). His representation, we gathered, covers the interest of both [MICO] and
[ASB] in as far as the titling of the condominium unit[s] are concerned.

Sometime ago [Serrano] requested that condominium titles over specified unit[s] be
issued in consonance with the sharing in the joint venture [MOA]. Titles were
correspondingly issued as per request, some in the name of [MICO] and some in the
name of [ASB]. Before its release to the parties, Atty. Serrano came back and
requested that some titles issued in the name of [ASB] be change[d] to [MICO]
because allegedly there was error in the issuance.

Believing it was a simple error and on representation of the person we came to know
and considered the representative of both parties, we erased the name ASB Realty
Corporation on those specified titles and placed instead the name Malayan Insurance
Company.

To our mind[,] the purpose was not to transfer ownership but merely to rectify an error
committed in the issuance of titles. And since they were well within our capacity to do,
the titles not having been released yet to its owner, we did what we believed was a
simple act of rectifying a simple mistake.12

After learning of the amendment in the CCTs issued in ASB’s name, Ampil, on 23
January 2007, wrote respondents Yuchengco and Cheng, President and Chief Financial
Officer of MICO, respectively, introducing himself as an unsecured creditor of ASB
Holdings, Inc., one of the corporations forming part of the ASB Group of
Companies.13 Ampil averred that MICO had illegally registered in its name the subject
units at The Malayan Tower which were reserved for ASB under the MOA, and actually,
already registered in ASB’s name with the Register of Deeds of Pasig City. Ampil
pointed out that the “condominium units should have benefited [him and other]
unsecured creditors [of ASB because the latter had] categorically informed [them]
previously that the same would be contributed to the Asset Pool created under the
Rehabilitation Plan of the ASB Group of Companies.” Ultimately, Ampil demanded that
Yuchengco and Cheng rectify the resulting error in the CCTs, and facilitate the
registration of the subject units back to ASB’s name.

Respondents paid no heed to ASB’s and Ampil’s demands.

As previously adverted to, Ampil charged respondents with Falsification of Public
Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Sections
3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 before the Office of the Ombudsman, alleging the
following: cralawlibrary

1. Respondents, in conspiracy, erased the name of ASB, and intercalated and

substituted the name of MICO under the entry of registered owner in the questioned
CCTs covering the subject units of The Malayan Tower; chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary

2. The alterations were done without the necessary order from the proper court, in
direct violation of Section 10814 of Presidential Decree No. 1529; chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary

3. Respondents violated Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code by: cralawlibrary

3.1 Altering the CCTs which are public documents; chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary

3.2 Effecting the alterations on genuine documents; chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary

3.3 Changing the meaning of the CCTs with MICO now appearing as registered owner of
the subject units in Malayan Tower; and

3.4 Effectively, making the documents speak something false when ASB is the true
owner of the subject units, and not MICO.

4. Ampil, as unsecured creditor of ASB, was unjustly prejudiced by the felonious acts of
respondents; chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary

5. Respondents violated Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019: cralawlibrary

5.1 Respondent Espenesin, as Registrar of the Pasig City Registry of Deeds, committed
an offense in connection with his official duties by allowing himself to be persuaded,
induced or influenced by respondent Serrano into altering the questioned CCTs; and

5.2 The actions of respondent Espenesin demonstrate manifest partiality, evident bad
faith and/or, at the least, gross inexcusable negligence.

6. Respondents Yuchengco and Cheng, being responsible officers of MICO, as principals

by inducement and conspirators of Espenesin and Serrano, are likewise liable for
falsification of the CCTs and violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No.
3019.15cralaw virtualaw library

As required by the Ombudsman, respondents filed their counter-affidavits: Espenesin

and Serrano filed individually, while Yuchengco and Cheng filed jointly. Respondents’
respective counter-affidavits uniformly denied petitioner’s charges and explicated as
follows: cralawlibrary

Respondent Espenesin countered, among others, (i) that their intention was only to

cause the necessary rectification on certain errors made on the CCTs in issue; (ii) that
since the CCTs were not yet issued and released to the parties, it is still within his
authority, as part of the registration process, to make the necessary amendments or
corrections thereon; (iii) that no court order would be necessary to effect such
changes, the CCTs still being within the control of the Register of Deeds and have not
yet been released to the respective owners; (iv) that the amendments were made not
for the purpose of falsifying the CCTs in issue but to make the same reflect and declare
the truth; and (v) that he merely made the corrections in accordance with the
representations of respondent Serrano who he believed to be guarding and
representing both the interests of MICO and ASB.

Respondent Serrano, on the other hand, argued: (i) that the units in issue are not yet
owned by ASB; (ii) that these units were specifically segregated and reserved for MICO
in order to answer for any excess in the estimated cost that it will expend in the
completion of the [Malayan Tower]; (iii) that ASB is only entitled to these reserved
units only after the [Malayan Tower] is completed and that the units are not utilized to
cover for the increase in the cost expended by MICO pursuant to Section 4(c) of the
MOA; (iv) that the [Malayan Tower] was still incomplete at the time when the
alterations were made on the CCT, hence, the claim of ownership of ASB over the
reserved units is premature and totally baseless; (v) that prior to the fulfillment of the
resolutory condition, that is, after the completion of the [Malayan Tower] and there
remains a balance in the Remaining Construction Cost, the units still rightfully belongs
to MICO; and (vi) that the alteration was made merely for the purpose of correcting an
error.

Respondents Cheng and Yuchengco, while [adopting the foregoing arguments of

Espenesin and Serrano, further averred that]: (i) [Ampil] has no legal personality to
file this suit, he being merely an unsecured creditor of ASB whose interest was not
definitively shown to have been damaged by the subject controversy; (ii) that their
participation as respondents and alleged co-conspirators of Serrano and Espenesin was
not clearly shown and defined in the complaint; (iii) the CCTs issued in the name of
ASB have not yet been entered in the Registration Book at the time when the
alterations were effected, hence, the same could still be made subject of appropriate
amendments; (iv) that the CCTs in issue named in favor of ASB were mere drafts and
cannot legally be considered documents within the strict definition of the law; (v) that
court order authorizing to amend a title is necessary only if the deed or document
sought to be registered has already been entered in the registration book; and (vi) that
MICO is the duly registered owner of the land on which [Malayan Tower] stands and
ASB was merely referred to as the developer.16

Thereafter, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Resolution in G.R. No. 192685
dismissing Ampil’s complaint. For the Ombudsman, the resolution of whether
respondents falsified the CCTs must be prefaced by a determination of who, between
MICO and ASB, is the rightful owner of the subject units. The Ombudsman held that it
had no authority to interpret the provisions of the MOA and, thus, refrained from
resolving the preliminary question of ownership. Given the foregoing, the Ombudsman
was hard pressed to make a categorical finding that the CCTs were altered to speak
something false. In short, the Ombudsman did not have probable cause to indict
respondents for falsification of the CCTs because the last element of the crime,  i.e.,
that the change made the document speak something false, had not been established.

Significantly, the Ombudsman did not dispose of whether probable cause exists to indict
respondents for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
Ampil filed a Motion for Reconsideration. However, in yet another setback, the
Ombudsman denied Ampil’s motion and affirmed the dismissal of his complaint.

On the administrative litigation front and as previously narrated, the Ombudsman found
Espenesin liable for Simple Misconduct. However, on motion for reconsideration of
Ampil praying for a finding of guilt against Espenesin for Grave Misconduct and
Dishonesty, the Ombudsman reconsidered its earlier resolution and recalled the one-
month suspension meted on Espenesin.

Thereafter, Ampil filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before
the appellate court. And as already stated, the appellate court affirmed the
Ombudsman’s resolution absolving Espenesin of not just Grave Misconduct and
Dishonesty, but also of Simple Misconduct.

Hence, this dual recourse by Ampil: first, alleging grave abuse of discretion in the
Ombudsman’s failure to find probable cause to indict respondents for Falsification of
Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code, and for their
commission of corrupt practices under Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019;
and second, raising grievous error of the Court of Appeals in affirming the
Ombudsman’s absolution of Espenesin from administrative liability.

To obviate confusion, we shall dispose of the first issue, i.e., whether probable cause
exists to indict respondents for Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of
the Revised Penal Code and for their commission of corrupt practices under Sections
3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

Despite the Ombudsman’s categorical dismissal of his complaint, Ampil is adamant on

the existence of probable cause to bring respondents to trial for falsification of the
CCTs, and for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. In fact, he
argues that Espenesin has been held administratively liable by the Ombudsman for
altering the CCTs. At the time of the filing of G.R. No. 192685, the Ombudsman had not
yet reversed its previous resolution finding Espenesin liable for simple misconduct. He
insists that the admission by respondents Espenesin and Serrano that they altered the
CCTs should foreclose all questions on all respondents’ (Espenesin’s, Serrano’s,
Yuchengco’s and Cheng’s) liability for falsification and their commission of corrupt
practices, under the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act No. 3019, respectively. In all,
Ampil maintains that the Ombudsman’s absolution of respondents is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.

G.R. No. 192685 is partially impressed with merit. Accordingly, we find grave abuse of
discretion in the Ombudsman’s incomplete disposition of Ampil’s complaint.

That the Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty bound to “investigate on its own,
or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient”17 brooks no objection. The Ombudsman’s conduct of preliminary
investigation is both power and duty. Thus, the Ombudsman and his Deputies, are
constitutionalized as protectors of the people, who “shall act promptly on complaints
filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the government x x
x, and shall, x x x notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.”18
virtualaw library
cralaw
The raison d'être for its creation and endowment of broad investigative authority is to
insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the long tentacles of officialdom that are
able to penetrate judges’ and fiscals’ offices, and others involved in the prosecution of
erring public officials, and through the execution of official pressure and influence,
quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances committed
by public officers.19
cralaw virtualaw library

Plainly, the Ombudsman has “full discretion,” based on the attendant facts and
circumstances, to determine the existence of probable cause or the lack thereof.20 On
this score, we have consistently hewed to the policy of non-interference with the
Ombudsman’s exercise of its constitutionally mandated powers.21 The Ombudsman’s
finding to proceed or desist in the prosecution of a criminal case can only be assailed
through certiorari proceedings before this Court on the ground that such determination
is tainted with grave abuse of discretion which contemplates an abuse so grave and so
patent equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.22 cralaw virtualaw library

However, on several occasions, we have interfered with the Ombudsman’s discretion in

determining probable cause: cralawlibrary

(a) To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;

(b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions;
(c) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
(d) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
(e) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
(f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
(h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
(i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance.23 (Emphasis supplied).

The fourth circumstance is present in G.R. No. 192685.

While we agree with the Ombudsman’s disquisition that there is no probable cause to
indict respondents for Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the
Revised Penal Code, we are puzzled why the Ombudsman completely glossed over
Ampil’s charge that respondents committed prohibited acts listed in Sections 3(a) and
(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Nowhere in the Resolution or in the Order denying
reconsideration thereof did the Ombudsman tackle and resolve the issue of whether
respondents violated the particular provisions of Republic Act No. 3019.

Curiously, the Ombudsman docketed Ampil’s complaint-affidavit as one “for:

Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of Section[s] 3(a) [and] (e) of [Republic
Act] No. 3019, as amended.”24 The Ombudsman even prefaced the Resolution, thus:
“[t]his has reference to the complaint filed by Oscar Ampil on [17 September 2007]
against [respondents], for Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of Sections 3,
paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended.”25 cralaw virtualaw library
The Ombudsman’s silence on the component anti-graft charges is pointed up by the
specific allegations in Ampil’s complaint-affidavit that: cralawlibrary

18. The acts of ATTY. ESPENESIN and his co-conspirators are clear violations of Section
3 paragraph (a) and/or (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act x x x; chanrobleslawlibrary

xxxx

19. On the basis of the evidence x x x and the admissions of the conspirators
themselves, ATTY. ESPENESIN is liable under both pars. (a) and (e) thereof or either of
the two. By maliciously and feloniously altering the subject CCT’s (sic), contrary to law
and to the prejudice of ASB and [Ampil], ATTY. ESPENESIN committed an offense in
connection with his official duties and he admitted having done so in conspiracy with his
co-respondents. x x x ATTY. ESPENESIN allowed himself to be persuaded, induced or
influenced into committing such violation or offense which is the substance of par. (a)
of RA 3019; chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary

20. In committing such unauthorized and unlawful alterations on the subject CCT’s
(sic), ATTY. ESPENESIN caused undue injury to ASB and to [AMPIL as an] unsecured
creditor, who is ultimately one of the beneficiaries of said CCT from the ASSET POOL
created by the SEC, and gave MICO unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his official duties as Register of Deeds of Pasig City. Such acts were
admitted by ATTY. ESPENESIN in his letter to ASB x x x. Such acts[,] taken together
with his admission[,] indubitably show ATTY. ESPENESIN’s manifest partiality, evident
bad faith and/or[,] at the least, his gross inexcusable negligence in doing the same; chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary

21. ATTY. ESPENESIN is liable under Section 3 pars. (a) and/or (e) of RA 3019[,] as
well as under Article 171 par. 6 of the RPC. ATTY. SERRANO, YVONNE S. YUCHENGCO
and (sic) GEMMA O. CHENG are also liable for violation of the said provisions of law in
conspiracy with ATTY. ESPENESIN, the latter as a principal via direct participation,
ATTY. SERRANO, as principal by inducement and YUCHENGCO and CHENG, also by
inducement[,] [who] being responsible officers of MICO ultimately benefited from said
unlawful act[.]26

and the pith of the Resolution which carefully and meticulously dissected the presence
of the first three definitive elements of the crime of falsification under Article 171(6) of
the Revised Penal Code: cralawlibrary

The first three definitive elements of the crime, albeit present, are defeated by the
absence of the fourth.

The respondents readily admitted that an alteration was indeed made on the CCTs in
issue allegedly for the purpose of correcting a mistake in the name of the registered
owner of the condominium units involved. Said alteration had obviously changed the
tenor of the CCTs considering that ASB, the initially named owner, was changed into
MICO. The first and third elements are undeniably present.

Anent the second element, the respondents argued that the CCTs in issue were mere
drafts and are not legally considered “genuine documents” within the strict definition of
the law. Albeit the contention is partially true, no proof has been shown to prove that
the CCTs issued in favor of ASB were mere drafts.

The CCTs of ASB are obviously complete. If we are to compare it with the appearance
and contents of the CCTs issued in favor of MICO, one will notice no definitive
difference between the two except that one set was named in favor of ASB and the
other set, in favor of MICO. Nothing is shown that will clearly prove that the former
were mere drafts and the latter are the final copies. As far as the appearance of the
CCTs of ASB is concerned, all appear to be complete and genuine. Proof to the contrary
must be shown to prove otherwise.

Delivery of the titles to the named owners is not a pre-requisite before all these CCTs
can be legally categorized as genuine documents. The fact that the same had already
been signed by respondent Espenesin in his capacity as Registrar of Deeds of Pasig City
and the notations imprinted thereon appeared to have been entered on March 11, 2005
at 11:55 a.m. at the Registry Books of Pasig City, the CCTs in issue are bound to be
treated as genuine documents drafted and signed in the regular performance of duties
of the officer whose signature appears thereon.27

On the whole, the Ombudsman’s discussion was straightforward and categorical, and
ultimately established that Espenesin, at the urging of Serrano, altered the CCTs issued
in ASB’s name resulting in these CCTs ostensibly declaring MICO as registered owner of
the subject units at The Malayan Tower.

Despite the admission by Espenesin that he had altered the CCTs and the
Ombudsman’s findings thereon, the Ombudsman abruptly dismissed Ampil’s complaint-
affidavit, resolving only one of the charges contained therein with nary a link regarding
the other charge of violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Indeed,
as found by the Ombudsman, the 4th element of the crime of Falsification of Public
Documents is lacking, as the actual ownership of the subject units at The Malayan
Tower has yet to be resolved. Nonetheless, this circumstance does not detract from,
much less diminish, Ampil’s charge, and the evidence pointing to the possible
commission, of offenses under Sections 3(a) and (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.

Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 reads: cralawlibrary

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of

public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: cralawlibrary

(a)  Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act

constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent
authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing
himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.

xxxx

(e)  Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or
other concessions.

The elements of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019 are: cralawlibrary

(1) the offender is a public officer;

(2) the offender persuades, induces, or influences another public officer to
perform an act or the offender allows himself to be persuaded, induced, or
influenced to commit an act;
(3) the act performed by the other public officer or committed by the offender
constitutes a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by
competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duty of
the latter. (Emphasis supplied).

Whereas, paragraph (e) of the same section lists the following elements: cralawlibrary

(1) the offender is a public officer;

(2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officer’s official,
administrative or judicial functions;
(3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence; and
(4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.28

As Registrar of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City, Espenesin is tasked, among others,
to review deeds and other documents for conformance with the legal requirements of
registration.29 Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, Amending and Codifying the
Laws Relative to Registration of Property and for Other Purposes provides: cralawlibrary

Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. – The office of the Register of

Deeds constitutes a public repository of records of instruments affecting registered or
unregistered lands and chattel mortgages in the province or city wherein such office is
situated.

It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument

presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all
the requisites for registration. He shall see to it that said instrument bears the proper
documentary and science stamps and that the same are properly cancelled. If the
instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform
the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reason therefore, and
advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of the
Decree.

Most importantly, a Registrar of the Registry of Deeds is charged with knowledge of

Presidential Decree No. 1529, specifically Sections 5730 and 108.31 cralaw virtualaw library
In the instant case, the elements of the offenses under Sections 3(a) and (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, juxtaposed against the functions of a Registrar of the Registry of
Deeds establish a prima facie graft case against Espenesin and Serrano only. Under
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, there is a prima facie case that Espenesin, at the
urging of Serrano, allowed himself to be persuaded to alter the CCTs originally issued in
ASB’s name, against the procedure provided by law for the issuance of CCTs and
registration of property. In addition, under Section 3(e) of the same law, there is
likewise a prima facie case that Espenesin, through gross inexcusable negligence, by
simply relying on the fact that all throughout the transaction to register the subject
units at The Malayan Tower he liaised with Serrano, gave MICO an unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference in the registration of the subject units.

In Sison v. People of the Philippines, we expounded on Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019:cralawlibrary

The third element of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 may be committed in three ways, i.e.,
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Proof
of any of these three in connection with the prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3(e)
of RA 3019 is enough to convict.

Explaining what "partiality," "bad faith" and "gross negligence" mean, we held: cralawlibrary

“Partiality” is synonymous with “bias” which “excites a disposition to see and report
matters as they are wished for rather than as they are.” “Bad faith does not simply
connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive
or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.” “Gross negligence has been so
defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but
wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so
far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which
even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own
property.”

In the instant case, petitioner was grossly negligent in all the purchases that
were made under his watch. Petitioner’s admission that the canvass sheets
sent out by de Jesus to the suppliers already contained his signatures because
he pre-signed these forms only proved his utter disregard of the consequences
of his actions. Petitioner also admitted that he knew the provisions of RA 7160
on personal canvass but he did not follow the law because he was merely
following the practice of his predecessors. This was an admission of a
mindless disregard for the law in a tradition of illegality. This is totally
unacceptable, considering that as municipal mayor, petitioner ought to
implement the law to the letter. As local chief executive, he should have been
the first to follow the law and see to it that it was followed by his
constituency. Sadly, however, he was the first to break it.

Petitioner should have complied with the requirements laid down by RA 7160 on
personal canvass, no matter how strict they may have been. Dura lex sed lex. The law
is difficult but it is the law. These requirements are not empty words but were
specifically crafted to ensure transparency in the acquisition of government supplies,
especially since no public bidding is involved in personal canvass. Truly, the
requirement that the canvass and awarding of supplies be made by a collegial body
assures the general public that despotic, irregular or unlawful transactions do not occur.
It also guarantees that no personal preference is given to any supplier and that the
government is given the best possible price for its procurements.

The fourth element is likewise present. While it is true that the prosecution was
not able to prove any undue injury to the government as a result of the
purchases, it should be noted that there are two ways by which Section 3(e) of
RA 3019 may be violated—the first, by causing undue injury to any party,
including the government, or the second, by giving any private party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. Although neither mode
constitutes a distinct offense, an accused may be charged under either mode
or both. The use of the disjunctive “or’ connotes that the two modes need not
be present at the same time. In other words, the presence of one would
suffice for conviction.

Aside from the allegation of undue injury to the government, petitioner was also
charged with having given unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to private
suppliers. Under the second mode, damage is not required.

The word “unwarranted” means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified;

unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason. “Advantage” means a more
favorable or improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit
from some course of action. “Preference” signifies priority or higher evaluation or
desirability; choice or estimation above another.

In order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the accused
has given unjustified favor or benefit to another, in the exercise of his official,
administrative or judicial functions. Petitioner did just that. The fact that he
repeatedly failed to follow the requirements of RA 7160 on personal canvass proves
that unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference was given to the winning suppliers.
These suppliers were awarded the procurement contract without the benefit of a fair
system in determining the best possible price for the government. The private
suppliers, which were all personally chosen by respondent, were able to profit from the
transactions without showing proof that their prices were the most beneficial to the
government. For that, petitioner must now face the consequences of his
acts.32 (Emphasis supplied).

We stress that the Ombudsman did not find probable cause to indict respondents for
falsification simply because the Ombudsman could not categorically declare that the
alteration made the CCT speak falsely as the ownership of the subject units at The
Malayan Tower had yet to be determined. However, its initial factual findings on the
administrative complaint categorically declared, thus: cralawlibrary

x x x [Espenesin] justified his action by asseverating that since the CCTs were still
under the possession and control of the Register of Deeds and have not yet been
distributed to the owners, amendments can still be made thereon.
It is worthy to note that the CCTs of ASB, at the time when the amendment was made,
were obviously complete. From its face, we can infer that all have attained the
character of a binding public document. The signature of [Espenesin] is already affixed
thereon, and on its face, it was explicitly declared that the titles have already been
entered in the Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Pasig City on March 11,
2005 at 11:55 a.m. Allegations to the contrary must be convincingly and positively
proven, otherwise, the presumption holds that the CCTs issued in the name of ASB
were regular and the contents thereon binding.

Stated in a different light, delivery of the titles to the named owners is not a
pre-requisite before all these CCTs can be legally categorized as genuine
documents. The fact that the same had already been signed by x x x Espenesin in his
capacity as Register of Deeds of Pasig City and the notations imprinted thereon
appeared to have been entered on March 11, 2005 at 11:55 a.m. at the Registry Books
of Pasig City, the CCTs in issue are bound to be treated as genuine documents drafted
and signed in the regular performance of duties of the officer whose signature appears
thereon. The law has made it so clear that it is the entry of the title in the Registration
Book that controls the discretion of the Register of Deeds to effect the necessary
amendments and not the actual delivery of the titles to the named owners.

This being the case, strict compliance with the mandates of Section 108 of P.D.
1529 is strictly called for. The provision is clear that upon entry of a certificate of title
(which definitely includes Condominium Certificate of Title) attested to by the Register
of Deeds, no amendment shall be effected thereon except upon lawful order of the
court.

In the instant case, it became obvious that after the CCTs of ASB were entered
in the Registration Book on March 11, 2005 at exactly 11:55 a.m., the
notations thereon were thereafter amended by [Espenesin] when Atty.
Serrano purportedly informed him of the alleged error inscribed therein. The
proper remedy that should have been undertaken by [Espenesin] soon after he was
informed of the error is to either initiate the appropriate petition himself or to suggest
to the parties to the MOA to file said petition in court for the amendment of the CCTs.
An amendment by way of a shortcut is not allowed after entry of the title in the
Registration Book.

xxxx

If the Regional Trial Court sitting as a land registration court is not legally authorized to
determine the respective rights of the parties to the MOA when deciding on the petition
for amendment and cancellation of title, all the more with the Registrar of Deeds who is
legally not empowered to make such determination and to cause an automatic
amendment of entries in the Registration Book on the basis of his unauthorized
determination.

[Espenesin’s] liability is grounded on the untimely and unauthorized

amendment of the CCTs in issue. This is regardless of whether the amendment
had made the CCTs speak of either a lie or the truth. What defines his error is
his inability to comply with the proper procedure set by law.33 (Emphasis
supplied).
We likewise stress that the determination of probable cause does not require certainty
of guilt for a crime. As the term itself implies, probable cause is concerned merely with
probability and not absolute or even moral certainty;34 it is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief.35 It is sufficient that based on the preliminary investigation
conducted, it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. Well-settled in jurisprudence, as in Raro v. Sandiganbayan,36 that: cralawlibrary

x x x [P]robable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts
within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime
for which he was prosecuted.37 cralaw virtualaw library

Probable cause is a reasonable ground for presuming that a matter is or may be well-
founded on such state of facts in the prosecutor's mind as would lead a person of
ordinary caution and prudence to believe — or entertain an honest or strong suspicion
— that it is so.38

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely
than not a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was
committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of
guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.39
cralaw virtualaw library

A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the
reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.40 cralaw virtualaw library

A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt.

The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. x x x Probable cause
does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction.41 (Emphasis and italics supplied).

In this instance, Espenesin explains and categorically admits that he altered, nay
corrected, 38 certificates of title which we again reproduce for easy reference: cralawlibrary

Sometime ago [Serrano] requested that condominium titles over specified unit[s] be
issued in consonance with the sharing in the joint venture [MOA]. Titles were
correspondingly issued as per request, some in the name of [MICO] and some in the
name of [ASB]. Before its release to the parties, Atty. Serrano came back and
requested that some titles issued in the name of [ASB] be change[d] to [MICO]
because allegedly there was error in the issuance.

Believing it was a simple error and on representation of the person we came to know
and considered the representative of both parties, we erased the name ASB Realty
Corporation on those specified titles and placed instead the name Malayan Insurance
Company.
To our mind[,] the purpose was not to transfer ownership but merely to rectify an error
committed in the issuance of titles. And since they were well within our capacity to do,
the titles not having been released yet to its owner, we did what we believed was a
simple act of rectifying a simple mistake.42

The letter of Espenesin itself underscores the existence of a prima facie case of gross
negligence: cralawlibrary

1. Serrano transacted the registration of the units in The Malayan Tower with the Office
of the Register of Deeds, Pasig City; chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary

2. Serrano had previously presented a joint venture agreement, the MOA, which
Espenesin followed in the initial preparation and issuance of the titles; chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary

3. Before some CCTs initially issued in ASB’s name were released, Serrano returned and
requested that some titles issued in the name of ASB be changed to MICO because
those titles were supposedly erroneously registered to ASB; and

4. Just on Serrano’s utterance and declaration which Espenesin readily believed

because he considered Serrano the representative of both parties, and without any
other documentation to base the amendment on, Espenesin erased the name of ASB
on those specified titles and replaced it with the name of MICO.

Espenesin, a Registrar of Deeds, relied on Serrano’s word alone that a supposed error
has been committed. Even if ownership of the units covered by the amended CCTs has
not been categorically declared as ASB’s given the ongoing dispute between the parties,
the MOA which Espenesin had previously referred to, allocates those units to ASB: cralawlibrary

Section 4. Distribution and Disposition of Units. (a) As a return of its capital investment
in the Project, each party shall be entitled to such portion of all the net saleable area of
the Building that their respective contributions to the Project bear to the actual
construction cost. As of the date of the execution hereof, and on the basis of the total
costs incurred to date in relation to the Remaining Construction Costs (as defined in
Section 9(a) hereof), the parties shall respectively be entitled to the following (which
entitlement shall be conditioned on, and subject to, adjustments as provided in sub-
paragraph (b) of Section 4 in the event that the actual remaining cost of construction
exceeds the Remaining Construction Cost): cralawlibrary

(i) [MICO] – the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule 2 hereof.

(ii) ASB – the following net saleable area: cralawlibrary

(A) the net saleable area which ASB had pre-sold for an aggregate purchase price of
P640,085,267.30 as set forth in Schedule 1 (including all paid and unpaid proceeds of
said pre-sales); chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary

(B) the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule 3 hereof which shall be
delivered to ASB upon completion of the Project; and,
(C) provided that the actual remaining construction costs do not exceed the Remaining
Construction Cost, the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule 4 hereof
which shall be delivered to ASB upon completion of the Project and determination of its
actual construction costs. If the actual remaining construction costs exceed the
Remaining Construction Cost, sub-paragraph (b) of this Section 4 shall apply.43

The MOA even recognizes and specifies that: cralawlibrary

E. ASB has pre-sold a number of condominium units in the Project to certain buyers as
set forth in Schedule 1 hereof, and in order to protect the interests of these buyers and
preserve the interest in the Project, the goodwill and business reputation of Malayan,
Malayan has proposed to complete the Project, and ASB has accepted such proposal,
subject to the terms and conditions contained herein, including the contribution to the
Project (a) by Malayan of the Lot and (b) by ASB of its interest as buyer under the
Contract to Sell.

xxxx

Section 3. Recognition of ASB’s Investment. The parties confirm that as of the date

hereof, ASB invested in the Project an amount equivalent to its entitlement to the net
saleable area of the Building under Section 4 below, including ASB’s interest as buyer
under the Contract to Sell.44

One fact deserves emphasis. The ownership of the condominium units remains in
dispute and, by necessary inference, does not lie as well in MICO. By his baseless
reliance on Serrano’s word and representation, Espenesin allowed MICO to gain an
unwarranted advantage and benefit in the titling of the 38 units in The Malayan Tower.

That a prima facie case for gross negligence amounting to violation of Sections 3(a) and
(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 exists is amply supported by the fact that Espenesin
disregarded the well-established practice necessitating submission of required
documents for registration of property in the Philippines: cralawlibrary

Documents Required for Registration of Real Property with the Register of Deeds: cralawlibrary

1. Common Requirements
o Original copy of the Deed or Instrument (Original Copy + 2 duplicate
copies)If the original copy cannot be produced, the duplicate original or
certified true copy shall be presented accompanied with a sworn affidavit
executed by the interested party why the original copy cannot be presented.
o Owner’s copy of the Certificate of Title or Co-owner’s copy if one has been
issued. (Original Copy + 2 duplicate copies)
o Latest Tax Declaration if the property is an unregistered land. (Original
Copy + 2 duplicate copies)
   
2. Specific Requirements
1. Deed of Sale/Transfer
   
xxxx
    
? For Corporation
   
1. Secretary’s Certificate or Board Resolution to Sell or Purchase (Original
Copy + Duplicate Copy)
2. Articles of Incorporation (for transferee corporation) (1 Certified Copy of
the Original)
3. Certificate of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that the
Articles of Incorporation had been registered . (1 Certified Copy of the
Original)
4. For Condominium or Condominium Certificate of Transfer,
affidavit/certificate of the Condominium Corporation that the sale/transfer
does not violate the 60-40 rule.(Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)
5. Subsequent transfer of CCT requires Certificate of the Condominium
Management. (Original Copy)
6. Sale by a Corporation Sole, court order is required.(Original copy of the
Court Order)
   
  Additional Requirements
   
xxxx
   
11 Condominium Projects
.
   
? Master Deed (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)
? Declaration of Restriction (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)
? Diagrammatic Floor Plan (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)
  If the Condominium Certificate of Title is issued for the first time in the
name of the registered owner, require the following:
o Certificate of Registration with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)
o Development Permit (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)
o License to Sell (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)45

Espenesin, by his own explanation, relied on nothing more than Serrano, who he “came
to know and considered as representative of both parties,” and Serrano’s interpretation
of the MOA that Serrano had brought with him.

On the whole, there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that

respondents Espenesin and Serrano committed prohibited acts listed in Sections 3(a)
and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

As regards Yuchengco and Cheng, apart from Ampil’s general assertions that the two,
as officers of MICO, benefited from the alteration of the CCTs, there is a dearth of
evidence pointing to their collective responsibility therefor. While the fact of alteration
was admitted by respondents and was affirmed in the Ombudsman’s finding of fact,
there is nothing that directly links Yuchengco and Cheng to the act.
We are aware that the calibration of evidence to assess whether a prima facie graft
case exists against respondents is a question of fact. We have consistently held that the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the extraordinary
writ of certiorari where neither questions of fact nor law are entertained, but only
questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.46 In this case,
however, certiorari will lie, given that the Ombudsman made no finding at all on
respondents possible liability for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No.
3019.

We hasten to reiterate that we are only dealing herein with the preliminary
investigation aspect of this case. We do not adjudge respondents’ guilt or the lack
thereof. The assertions of Espenesin and Serrano on the former’s good faith in effecting
the alteration and the pending arbitration case before the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission involving the correct division of MICO’s and ASB’s net saleable
areas in The Malayan Tower are matters of defense which they should raise during trial
of the criminal case.

As regards the administrative liability of Espenesin, the basic principle in the law of
public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or
omissions of a public officer, Espenesin in these cases, may give rise to civil, criminal
and administrative liability. An action for each can proceed independently of the
others.47
cralaw virtualaw library

On this point, we find that the appellate court erred when it affirmed the Ombudsman’s
last ruling that Espenesin is not administratively liable.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more

particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.48 cralaw virtualaw library

In Grave Misconduct, as distinguished from Simple Misconduct, the elements of

corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rules,
must be manifest49 and established by substantial evidence. Grave Misconduct
necessarily includes the lesser offense of Simple Misconduct.50 Thus, a person charged
with Grave Misconduct may be held liable for Simple Misconduct if the misconduct does
not involve any of the elements to qualify the misconduct as grave.51 cralaw virtualaw library

In (G.R. No. 199115), the elements particular to Grave Misconduct are, by the
Ombudsman’s own finding, present. Corruption, as an element of Grave Misconduct,
consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses
his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person,
contrary to duty and the rights of others.52 This has already been demonstrated as
discussed above. And, there is here a manifest disregard for established rules on land
registration by a Register of Deeds himself. As he himself admits in his letter, Espenesin
erased the name of ASB on the specified CCTs because he believed that Serrano’s
request for the re-issuance thereof in MICO’s name constituted simple error.

Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides: cralawlibrary

Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. No erasure, alteration, or
amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of
title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same be Register of
Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner of
other person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register
of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by
petition to the court upon the ground that the registered interests of any description,
whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate appearing on the certificate, have
terminated and ceased; or that new interest not appearing upon the certificate have
arisen or been created; or that an omission or error was made in entering a certificate
or any memorandum thereon, or, on any duplicate certificate; or that the same or any
person on the certificate has been changed; or that the registered owner has married,
or, if registered as married, that the marriage has been terminated and no right or
interests of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; or that a corporation which
owned registered land and has been dissolved has not convened the same within three
years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may
hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the
entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum
upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring
security or bond if necessary, as it may consider proper; Provided, however, That this
section shall not be construed to give the court authority to reopen the judgment or
decree of registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which
shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value and
in good faith, or his heirs and assigns, without his or their written consent. Where the
owner's duplicate certificate is not presented, a similar petition may be filed as provided
in the preceding section.

The foregoing clearly speaks of a court order prior to any erasure, alteration or
amendment upon a certificate of title.

In reversing its prior ruling, the Ombudsman cavalierly dismisses the fact of Espenesin
already signing the CCTs issued in ASB’s name as “only a part of the issuance process
because the final step in the titling procedure is indeed the release of the certificate of
title.”53 The Ombudsman further ruled: cralawlibrary

Considering that prior to the release of titles, [Espenesin] merely rectified what was
represented to this office as error in the preparation of typing or the certificates, hence,
it is wrong to subject him to an administrative sanction. This is bolstered by the fact
that, at the time of release (and perhaps even up to the present time), there was no
final determination yet from the land registration court as to who has a better
right to the property in question.54 (Emphasis supplied).

This statement of the Ombudsman is virtually a declaration of Espenesin’s misconduct.

It highlights Espenesin’s awareness and knowledge that ASB and MICO are two
different and separate entities, albeit having entered into a joint venture for the
building of “The Malayan Tower.”

As Registrar of Deeds, Espenesin was duty bound to inquire and ascertain the reason
for Serrano’s new instruction on those specific set of CCTs and not just heed
Serrano’s bidding. He heads the Office of Register of Deeds which is constituted by
law as “a public repository of records of instruments affecting registered or unregistered
lands x x x in the province or city wherein such office is situated.” He should not have
so easily taken Serrano’s word that the amendment Serrano sought was to correct
simple and innocuous error. Espenesin could have then easily asked, as he is obliged
to, for a contract or an authenticated writing to ascertain which units and parking slots
were really allotted for ASB and MICO. His actions would then be based on what is
documented and not merely by a lame claim of bona fides mistake.

Moreover, Espenesin was previously presented a MOA, and consulted this same MOA, in
the initial preparation and issuance of the 38 CCTs in ASB’s name. Certainly, a Registrar
of Deeds who is required by law to be a member of the legal profession,55 possesses
common sense and prudence to ask for documents on which to base his corrections.
Reliance on the mere word of even the point person for the transaction, smacks of
gross negligence when all transactions with the Office of the Register of Deeds,
involving as it does registration of property, ought to be properly recorded and
documented.

That the Office of the Register of Deeds requires documentation in the registration of
property, whether as an original or a subsequent registration, brooks no argument.
Again, and it cannot be overlooked that, Espenesin initially referred to a MOA albeit
Serrano worked on the registration transaction for both ASB and MICO. Subsequently,
Serrano returns, bearing ostensible authority to transact even for ASB, and Espenesin
fails to ask for documentation for the correction Serrano sought to be made, and simply
relies on Serrano’s word.

We are baffled by the Registrar of Deeds’ failure to require documentation which would
serve as his basis for the correction. The amendment sought by Serrano was not a
mere clerical change of registered name; it was a substantial one, changing ownership
of 38 units in The Malayan Tower from one entity, ASB, to another, MICO. Even just at
Serrano’s initial request for correction of the CCTs, a red flag should have gone up for a
Registrar of Deeds.

Espenesin splits hairs when he claims that it is “in the [R]egistration [B]ook where the
prohibition to erase, alter, or amend, without court order, applies.” We disagree with
Espenesin. Chapter IV on Certificate of Title of Presidential Decree No.
1529,56 specifically Sections 40, 42 and 43 belie the claim of Espenesin: cralawlibrary

Section 40. Entry of Original Certificate of Title. Upon receipt by the Register of Deeds
of the original and duplicate copies of the original certificate of title the same shall be
entered in his record book and shall be numbered, dated, signed and sealed by the
Register of Deeds with the seal of his office. Said certificate of title shall take effect
upon the date of entry thereof. The Register of Deeds shall forthwith send notice by
mail to the registered owner that his owner's duplicate is ready for delivery to him upon
payment of legal fees.

Section 42. Registration Books. The original copy of the original certificate of title shall
be filed in the Registry of Deeds. The same shall be bound in consecutive order
together with similar certificates of title and shall constitute the registration book for
titled properties.
Section 43. Transfer Certificate of Title. The subsequent certificate of title that may be
issued by the Register of Deeds pursuant to any voluntary or involuntary instrument
relating to the same land shall be in like form, entitled "Transfer Certificate of Title",
and likewise issued in duplicate. The certificate shall show the number of the next
previous certificate covering the same land and also the fact that it was originally
registered, giving the record number, the number of the original certificate of title, and
the volume and page of the registration book in which the latter is found.

Recording or entry of the titles, whether an original or a subsequent transfer certificate

of title in the record, is simultaneous with the signing by the Register of Deeds. The
signature on the certificate by the Registrar of Deeds is accompanied by the dating,
numbering and sealing of the certificate. All these are part of a single registration
process. Where there has been a completed entry in the Record Book, as in this case
where the Ombudsman found that “the signature of [Espenesin] is already affixed [on
the CCTs], and on its face, it was explicitly declared that the titles have already been
entered in the Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Pasig City on March 11,
2005 at 11:55 a.m.,” the Register of Deeds can no longer tamper with entries, specially
the very name of the titleholder. The law says that the certificate of title shall take
effect upon the date of entry thereof.

To further drive home the point, as Registrar of Deeds, Espenesin knew full well that
“there [is] no final determination yet from the land registration court as to who has a
better right to the property in question.” Espenesin’s attempt to minimize the
significance of a Registrar of Deed’s signature on a CCT only aggravates the lack of
prudence in his action. The change in the titleholder in the CCTs from ASB to MICO was
an official documentation of a change of ownership. It definitely cannot be
characterized as simple error.

Grave misconduct, of which Espenesin has been charged, consists in a public officer’s
deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. It is regarded as grave
when the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of
established rules are present.57 In particular, corruption as an element of grave
misconduct consists in the official’s unlawful and wrongful use of his station or
character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty
and the rights of others.58
cralaw virtualaw library

In sum, the actions of Espenesin clearly demonstrate a disregard of well-known legal

rules.59 The penalty for Grave Misconduct is dismissal from service with the accessory
penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of eligibility, and perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in the government service, including government-
owned or controlled corporation.60 cralaw virtualaw library

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 192685 is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The

Resolution of the Ombudsman dated 30 April 2008 in OMB-C-C-07-0444-J
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to file the
necessary Information for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019
against public respondent Policarpio L. Espenesin and private respondent Francis
Serrano.

The petition in G.R. No. 199115 is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 28 September 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 113171 and the Order dated 13 July 2009
of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-07-0474-J are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent Policarpio L. Espenesin is GUILTY of Grave Misconduct and we, thus,
impose the penalty of DIMISSAL from service. However, due to his retirement from
the service, we order forfeiture of all his retirement pay and benefits.

SO ORDERED.