Crespo vs Mogul

FACTS:

An information for estafa was filed against Mario Fl. Crespo. When the case was set for
arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending
petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal
for the filing of the information. In an order, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied
the motion. 2 A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the
arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the
appellate court. Subsequently, the Undersecretary of Justice reversed the resolution of the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against
the accused. A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal but this
motion was denied and the case was set for arraignment. The accused then filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or
temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals but such was dismissed. Hence, this petition for
review.

ISSUE: WON the trial court may refuse to grant a motion to dismiss filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review and insist on the
arraignment and trial on the merits?

HELD:

Yes. Once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains
the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he
cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the
case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion
to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or
deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that
the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed
the records of the investigation.
Dimatulac vs Villon

FACTS:

SPO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in Barangay San Nicolas, Masantol,
Pampanga by all the accused under the leadership of Mayor Santiago Yabut. A complaint for murder was
then filed against the perpetrators before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC). After appropriate
proceedings, Judge David issued a resolution finding reasonable ground to believe that the crime of
murder had been committed and that the accused were probably guilty thereof. Thereafter, the
Pampanga Assistant Provincial Prosecutor conducted a reinvestigation and her findings indicate that the
crime committed was only homicide and hereby subject to bail P 20,000.00 for each of the accused.Before the
information for homicide was filed, complainants, herein petitioners, appealed the resolution to the
Secretary of the Department of Justice. Pending appeal to the DOJ, Judge Villon set the case for arraignment.
Thereafter, the Secretary of Justice ruled that there treachery was present and directed the Provincial Prosecutor to amend
the information from homicide to murder. However, the Secretary of Justice set aside his order to amend the
information from homicide to murder considering that the appeal was rendered moot and academic by
the arraignment of the accused for homicide and their having entered their pleas of not guilty.

ISSUE:

A. WHETHER THE OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN: (1) GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS AGAINST WHOM WARRANTS OF ARREST WERE ISSUED BUT WHO HAD NOT
YET BEEN BROUGHT INTO THE CUSTODY OF THE LAW; and (2) FILING THE INFORMATION FOR
HOMICIDE DESPITE KNOWLEDGE OF THE APPEAL FROM SAID PROSECUTORS RESOLUTION
TO THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE.
B. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN PROCEEDING
WITH THE ARRAIGNMENT AND IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE
ARRAIGNMENT AND RECONSIDERATION THEREOF DESPITE HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE
PENDENCY OF THE APPEAL AND THE SUBMISSION OF VITAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT
MURDER AND NOT HOMICIDE WAS COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED.
C. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF JUSTICE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN RECONSIDERING HIS ORDER FINDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS
MURDER AND DIRECTING THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR TO AMEND THE INFORMATION
FROM HOMICIDE TO MURDER.
HELD:

A. Yes. The accused were not arrested nor surrendered, so they were never brought into the custody
of the law so the reinvestigation must not have been committed. By holding that only homicide
was committed, the Provincial Prosecutors Office of Pampanga effectively dismissed the
complaint for murder. Accordingly, petitioners could file an appeal to the Secretary of Justice. The
Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to refrain, as far as practicable, from entertaining a petition
for review or appeal from the action of the prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in
court. In any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the
Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to the discretion of the
 court. Indubitably then, there was, on the part of the public prosecution, indecent haste in the
filing of the information for homicide, depriving the State and the offended parties of due process.

B. Yes. While it may be true that he was not bound to await the DOJs resolution of the appeal, as he
had, procedurally speaking, complete control over the case and any disposition thereof rested on
his sound discretion,his judicial instinct should have led him to peruse the documents submitted
on 30 April 1996 and to initially determine, for his own enlightenment with serving the ends of
justice as the ultimate goal, if indeed murder was the offense committed; or, he could have
directed the private prosecutor to secure a resolution on the appeal within a specified time. All
told, Judge Villon should not have merely acquiesced to the findings of the public prosecutor.

C. Yes. The DOJ relinquished its power of control and supervision over the Provincial Prosecutor and
the Assistant Provincial Prosecutors of Pampanga by reconsidering its order directing the
amendment of the information from homicide to murder due to the mere fact that the accused
was already arraigned. The DOJ should have courageously exercised its power of control by taking
bolder steps to rectify the shocking mistakes so far committed and, in the final analysis, to prevent
further injustice and fully serve the ends of justice. The DOJ could have, even if belatedly, joined
cause with petitioners to set aside arraignment.

Pilapil vs Somera

FACTS:

The petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen married private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling. After about three and a half years of marriage, marital discord set in so the respondent
filed a divorce in Germany which was granted by the Schoneberg Local Court of Germany.Five months
after the grant of divorce, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of
Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner had an affair with William Chia and
another man. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the
aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. Despite the
pending petition with the Secretary of Justice, the accused was set for arraignment and her motion to
quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction was denied. Thereafter, petitioner filed a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of
the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash anchored on the main ground that the
respondent has no personality to file the criminal complaint. Subsequently, the Secretary of Justice, issued
a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the
petitioner.

ISSUE: WON the respondent, a foreigner, qualifies as an “offended spouse” after having obtained a final
divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint for adultery.

HELD:

No. The crime of adultery is a private crime and cannot be prosecuted de oficio. The law
specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. This policy was adopted out of consideration
for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the
scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a
logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed
offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal
case.

People vs. Pangilinan

FACTS:

On September 16,1997, the private complainant, Virginia Malolos filed a complaint for estafa and violation
of BP 22 against respondent, Ma. Theresa Pangilinan. Thereafter, respondent filed a civil case for
accounting, recovery of commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific
performance against private complainant. Thereafter, the respondent filed a Petition to Suspend
Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question citing as basis the pending civil action. The petition
was approved by the City Prosecutor. Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the
Department of Justice (DOJ). The Secretary of Justice reversed the prosecutor’s resolution and directed
the filing of informations for violation of BP Blg. 22.

Two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18 November 1999, were filed against respondent
Ma.Theresa Pangilinan on 3 February 2000. Thereafter, the respondent filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash
the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She
alleged that her criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription. The respondent judge
granted the motion but was reversed upon appeal. The CA reversed and held that the cases are already
prescribed. Hence, this petition for review alleging that it is the institution of criminal actions, whether
filed with the court or with the Office of the City Prosecutor, that interrupts the period of prescription of
the offense charged.

ISSUE: WON the cases for violation of BP 22 are already prescribed

HELD:

No. There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws
with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription, the institution of proceedings for
preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the period of prescription. it is unjust to deprive
the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. The
only thing the offended must do to initiate the prosecution of the offender is to file the requisite
complaint.
Solar Team vs How

FACTS:

A complaint for estafa was filed by Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. (petitioner) against Ma. Fe
Barreiro (private respondent). Judge Rolando How(public respondent) repeatedly reset the arraignment
of the private respondent until such time as the pending appeal of the private respondent with the
Secretary of Justice is resolved. Petitioner bewails the fact that six months have elapsed since private
respondent appeared or submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent court and up to now she still
has to be arraigned. She alleges that her right to due process and speedy trial relying on the provision of
Speedy Trial Act stating that the arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days from the
filing of the information, or from the date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in
which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.

ISSUE: WON the respondent erred in refusing to arraign the private respondent

HELD:

No. Procedurally speaking, after the filing of the information, the court is in complete control of
the case and any disposition therein is subject to its sound discretion.[25] The decision to suspend
arraignment to await the resolution of an appeal with the Secretary of Justice is an exercise of such
discretion. In Marcelo,[26] it was held in a number of cases that a court can defer to the authority of the
prosecution arm to resolve, once and for all, the issue of whether or not sufficient ground existed to file
the information.[27] This is in line with our general pronouncement in Crespo[28] that courts cannot
interfere with the prosecutors discretion over criminal prosecution.[29] Thus, public respondent did not act
with grave abuse of discretion when it suspended the arraignment of private respondent to await the
resolution of her petition for review with the Secretary of Justice. It bears stressing that the court is
however not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice since the court is mandated to
independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case, and may either agree or disagree with the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.