Ramil Rayos v. Philippines, Communication No.

1167/2003,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/D/1167/2003 (2004).

Communication No 1167/2003 : Philippines. 07/09/2004.

CCPR/C/81/D/1167/2003. (Jurisprudence)

Convention Abbreviation: CCPR

Human Rights Committee
Eighty-first session

5 - 30 July 2004

Views of the Human Rights Committee under

the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant

on Civil and Political Rights*

- Eighty-first session -

Communication No. 1167/2003

Submitted by: Ramil Rayos ( represented by counsel, the Free Legal Assistance
Group)
Alleged victim: The author

State party: Philippines

Date of communication: 24 March 2003 (initial submission)

The Human Rights Committee, established under article 28 of the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Meeting on 27 July 2004,
Having concluded its consideration of communication No. 1167/2003,
submitted to the Human Rights Committee on behalf of Ramil Rayos under the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

Having taken into account all written information made available to it by the
author of the communication, and the State party,

Adopts the following:

Views under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol

1.1 The author of the communication is Ramil Rayos, a Filipino national,

currently detained under sentence of death at New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa
City. He claims to be a victim of violations of articles 5, 6 paragraphs 1 and 2,
7, 9 paragraphs 1 and 2, 10 paragraph 1, and 14 paragraphs 1, 2, 3(a), (b), (g)
and 5, of the Covenant. He is represented by counsel, the Free Legal Assistance
Group. The Covenant entered into force for the State party on 23 January 1987,
and the Optional Protocol on 22 November 1989.

1.2 On 24 March 2003, the Human Rights Committee, through its Special
Rapporteur on New Communications, requested the State party, pursuant to
Rule 86 of its Rules of Procedure, not to carry out the death sentence against
the author whilst his case was before the Committee.

The facts as presented by the author

2.1 On 9 April 1997, at about 7 pm, the author arrived at his aunt's residence.
When his aunt met him outside her residence he was drunk. The author's
cousins were also outside and drunk. In their presence, the author became
unruly and destroyed several benches outside the house. Fearing that her sons
might assault the author, his aunt left the house to look for help and came
across her cousin, a policeman who agreed, at her request, to bring the author to
the municipal jail, to sleep off his intoxication.

2.2 On 10 April 1997, without being in possession of an arrest warrant as

required by Article III, Section 3(1) of the Philippine Constitution, the police
refused the author permission to leave the jail. They informed him that they
were looking for a murder suspect with long hair, and that he was a suspect.
2.3 On 11 April 1997, after two days of detention, the author was forced to sign
an extra-judicial confession, in which he admitted to having raped and killed
one Mebelyn Gaznan (1) According to the author, a policeman forced him to
sign the confession by poking a gun at him, and when he initially refused, he
was struck with the gun on his back. He was not given an opportunity to read
the confession before he signed it.

2.4 A lawyer – not of the author's own choosing – was present "to assist [him]
in giving a written confession." He did not have a lawyer prior to the
confession. For the trial, the author had a different lawyer with whom he was
only able to communicate for a few minutes at a time each day during the trial
court proceedings.

2.5 On 29 April 1998, the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City found
the author guilty of "the complex crime of rape with homicide". He was
sentenced to death by lethal injection and ordered to pay compensation of
Philippine Pesos 100,000.00 to the victim's surviving heirs.

2.6 On 7 February 2001, under its automatic review procedure, the Supreme
Court affirmed the death sentence but increased the author's civil liability to
Php 145, 000.00. On 6 September 2001, this judgment became final and
executory.

The complaint

3.1 The author claims a violation of articles 5 and 6, as on 13 December 1993

and pursuant to Act No. 7659, the State party reintroduced the death penalty by
electrocution. He claims that although article 6 does not require all State parties
to abolish the death penalty, it is clear on a joint reading of paragraphs 1 and 2
of this article, that once a State party has abolished the death penalty it is not
open to it to reintroduce it. He claims that an "extensive interpretation" of the
Covenant that would allow such a reintroduction would run counter to
paragraph 2 of article 5. In addition, he submits that the Second Optional
Protocol to the Covenant, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, the
growing worldwide trend towards abolition and the principles of international
justice as reflected in the statutes of the ICTY, ICTR and ICC require article 6
to be interpreted in a way that would prevent States parties from reintroducing
the death penalty.

3.2 The author claims a violation of article 6, paragraphs 1 and 2, as by

extending the death penalty to crimes such as kidnapping, drug related
offenses, rape and qualified bribery, the State party violates its obligation to
restrict the death penalty to the "most serious crimes". In this regard, the author
refers to the Committee's General Comment on article 6 in which the
Committee expressed the view that the phrase "most serious crime" should be
interpreted restrictively, "to mean that the death penalty should be quite an
exceptional measure". He also refers to ECOSOC resolution 1984/50 on
"Safeguards guaranteeing the protection of rights and freedoms of those facing
the death penalty", which interprets the phrase "most serious crimes" as not
going beyond intentional crimes with lethal or other extremely grave
consequences.

3.3 It is claimed that the author's rights under article 7 would be violated if he
were to be put to death, he claims that his rights would be violated under article
7, as the procedure set out in document EP 200 issued by the Bureau of
Corrections pursuant to Republic Act 8177, states that the condemned prisoner
shall only be notified of the execution date at dawn on the date of execution
itself; and that the execution must take place within 8 hours of the condemned
prisoner being informed. No provision is made for notifying the condemned
person's family, nor is any provision made to allow contact between the
individual and his family. This is said to amount to psychological torture. The
only contact the condemned prisoner may have is with a cleric or a lawyer,
which must take place through a mesh screen, with the content of the meeting
being recorded.

3.4 The author claims a violation of article 10, paragraph 1, since the above
procedure is said to violate the inherent dignity of the human person.

3.5 The author claims violations of article 9, paragraphs 1 and 2, and 14,
paragraph 3 (a), as he was deprived of his liberty without an arrest warrant, and
there are no written records showing that, at the time of arrest, he was informed
by the police of the reasons for his arrest, his right to silence and his right to
counsel.

3.6 The author claims a violation of article 14, paragraph 1, as there are no
records showing that upon his arrest, he was informed by the police of the
reasons for his arrest, his right to remain silent and his right to a lawyer of his
own choosing. In addition, the author claims that he was not accorded his right
to counsel of his choice and was not attended by police appointed counsel until
the second day of his detention.

3.7 The author claims a violation of article 14, paragraph 2, arguing that in
finding him guilty of the crimes charged, the Regional Trial Court not only
admitted but also relied on his extra-judicial confession. While the Philippine
Supreme Court, on automatic review, set aside the confession, it nonetheless
confirmed the trial court's judgment on the basis of alleged circumstantial
evidence. According to the author, such reliance on circumstantial evidence
"unduly shifted the burden of proof from the prosecution to the accused."

3.8 The author claims a violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (a), as he was not
informed of the reasons for the charges against him.

3.9 The author claims a violation of article 14, paragraph 3(b), because he did
not have adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence, or to communicate
with counsel for his trial, in that he could only consult with counsel for a few
moments during each day of the trial. He also alleges a violation of article 14,
paragraph 3(g), because he was compelled to sign a confession.

3.10 The author claims a violation of article 14, paragraph 5, on account of the
failure of the Supreme Court to give due consideration to the actual testimony
given by one Dr. Angelita Enopia, during the trial, in which she testified that "it
is possible that the child was raped" rather than clearly affirming that, on the
basis of her autopsy, she was raped. He also claims that the Supreme Court
failed to consider evidence from the official records, which allegedly tended to
exculpate the accused. By failing to do so, the Supreme Court is said to have
failed to afford the author the right to review of his sentence, as required under
article 14, paragraph 5, of the Covenant. The author explains that during the
automatic review process it is not usual for judges of the Supreme Court to hear
the testimony of any witnesses but to rely, as they did in this case, on testimony
given during the trial.

The State party's submission on admissibility and merits

4.1 By submission of 24 October 2003, the State party contests the

admissibility and merits of the communication. In general on admissibility, it
submits that all the author's claims are unsubstantiated, as they are "devoid of
merit". On the claim relating to article 9, it argues that the author failed to
exhaust domestic remedies. It submits that the author was initially escorted to
the Municipal hall not because of the crime with which he was eventually
charged and for which he was convicted, but because of disorderly behaviour.
He was placed behind bars to prevent him from inflicting injury upon himself
or others until he recovered from intoxication. He was not allowed to leave jail
the next morning as in the meantime a complaint had been lodged against him
for "rape-slay". It is submitted that the author did not raise the claim that his
arrest was in any way defective before the trial court, and is therefore precluded
from raising the issue before the Committee: under domestic law any objection,
defect or irregularity relating to an arrest must be made before an accused
enters his plea on arraignment.

4.2 On the merits and concerning article 6, paragraph 2, the State party
considers the argument advanced to be a normative one which is outside the
remit of the Committee. It is said to be purely an argument on the wisdom of
imposing the death penalty for certain offences, while the determination of
which crimes should so qualify is purely a matter of domestic discretion.
According to the State party, the Covenant does not limit the right of the State
party to determine the wisdom of a law that imposes the death penalty. The
State party contends that the constitutionality of the law on the death penalty is
a matter for the State party itself, and recalls that its Supreme Court had upheld
the constitutionality of the law in question. (2) It further argues that it does not
fall to the Committee to interpret a State party's Constitution for the purpose of
determining that State party's compliance with the Covenant.

4.3 Concerning the author's claim that the death penalty is not imposed for the
"most serious" crimes, the State party notes that States have a wide discretion
in interpreting this provision in the light of culture, perceived necessities and
other factors, as the notion "most serious crimes" is not defined any more
explicitly in the Covenant. As to the contention that article 6 must be
interpreted in such a way as to prevent States parties from reintroducing the
death penalty pursuant to the Second Optional Protocol to the Covenant, the
State party submits that this claim is without merit as it has neither signed nor
ratified this Protocol.

4.4 On the claim that the failure to set the date of execution and notify the
author in advance of this date violates articles 7 and 10, paragraph 1, the State
party submits that under to Section 15, read together with section 1, of
Republic Act No. 8177, the death sentence shall be carried out "not earlier than
one (1) year nor later than eighteen (18) months after the judgment has become
final and executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his
executive clemency powers at all times." Thus, death row inmates are assured
of up to eighteen months, from the time the judgment imposing the death
penalty becomes final and executory, during which they may seek executive
clemency and attend to all his practical and spiritual needs. The State party
challenges the claim that the author cannot bid farewell to family after
notification, as under Section 16 of Republic Act No. 8177, during the period
between notification and execution, the condemned prisoner shall, as far as
practicable, be furnished such assistance as he requests in order to be attended
to by a representative of the religion he professes, his lawyer, members of his
family and/or business partners.

4.5 The State party dismisses the allegations of violations of article 9,

paragraphs 1 and 2. It refers to its argument on admissibility abovementioned
and submits that even if the State party were to acknowledge that the arrest was
illegal, this would not be sufficient under domestic law to set aside a judgment
rendered by a court after a trial free from error.

4.6 The State party rejects as unfounded the author's claims under article 14.
The author was provided with the assistance of counsel during the preparation
of his confession. His counsel cautioned him that a confession, once executed,
could be used against him in a court of law and that the crime of which he was
charged was punishable by death. Following this advice, the author maintained
his wish to make a confession. He did not object to the counsel provided, and
therefore, under domestic law, was deemed to have made his confession
voluntarily and freely. According to the State party, if he had had an objection
to the State-counsel, he could have objected and requested another lawyer.

4.7 Concerning the author's claim that there was no official record showing that
prior to his confession, he was informed of his right to remain silent, and to be
represented by a competent and independent counsel of his choice, the State
party submits that it has been established under domestic law that "the
constitutional procedures on custodial investigations do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through direct questioning by the
authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally
admitted having committed the crime". (3) At any rate, the State party submits
that the Supreme Court, in affirming the author's conviction, did not rely on his
confession, as his guilt was established by circumstantial evidence.

4.8 As to the Supreme Court's reliance on circumstantial evidence in affirming

the author's conviction, the State party explains the circumstances in which
domestic courts accept such evidence and points out that in cases of rape with
homicide, because of the nature of the crime, the evidence against the accused
is generally circumstantial. In the State party's view, in the instant case, the
pieces of evidence, taken in their entirety, unmistakably point to the guilt of the
author. It also submits that "an alleged infringement of the constitutional rights
of the accused under custodial investigation is relevant and material only to
cases in which an extra-judicial admission or confession extracted from the
accused becomes the basis of his conviction". (4)
4.9 As to the claim that the testimony of the witnesses were not credible, the
State party submits that it was sufficiently established at trial that the witnesses
did not have any ill-motive to falsely implicate and testify against the author
and that, pursuant to the domestic law of the State party, factual findings of the
trial court made on the basis of its assessment of the credibility of witnesses are
given great weight and, barring arbitrariness, are said to be conclusive. (5)

4.10 Concerning the claim of a violation of article 14, paragraph 5, the State
party submits that the evaluation of witnesses is chiefly the function of the trial
court. The examination of factual issues is not within the remit of the Supreme
Court, and it is not required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary
evidence de novo. According to the State party, the evaluation of the credibility
of witnesses and their testimony is a matter best undertaken by the trial court
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses. It further reiterates
the trial court's summation in the author's case to the effect that the prosecution
witnesses did not have any motive to falsely implicate, or testify against, the
author.

Author's comments

5.1 By submission of 28 February 2004, the author reiterates his previous

claims. With respect to the rule that an accused must make any objection to
defects in his arrest before he enters his plea on arraignment, the author submits
that he was not informed upon his arrest, during his detention or by the trial
court of this rule and that the rule itself is contrary to his right to liberty.

5.2 As to the State party's argument that even if the arrest was illegal, this
would not be sufficient to set aside a judgment rendered after a trial free from
error, the author contests that the trial was free from such error. In support of
his claim he refers to the following: the fact that the Supreme Court, unlike the
trial court, chose not to rely on the extrajudicial confession; the fact that the
expert's evidence at trial only claimed that it was possible that the alleged
victim was raped; and that the Philippine Supreme Court has held in a number
of cases that when the accused in a criminal case is unlawfully deprived of his
right to liberty, the trial court is "ousted of jurisdiction" over that person.

5.3 As to his extrajudicial confession, the author states that the confession is the
usual sworn statement prepared by the Philippine police and was not the result
of a spontaneous statement, as asserted by the State party
Issues and proceedings before the Committee

Consideration of admissibility

6.1 Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Human

Rights Committee must, in accordance with rule 87 of its rules of procedure,
decide whether or not it is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the
Covenant.

6.2 The Committee has ascertained, in accordance with article 5, paragraph (a),
of the Optional Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under
another international procedure of international investigation or settlement.

6.3 With respect to the claims that the lack of records concerning the
circumstances of the author's arrest and the failure to afford him counsel of his
choice after being arrested constitute a violation of article 14, paragraph 1, the
Committee finds that these claims do not raise issues under article 14 but rather
issues under article 9. Consequently, these claims are considered inadmissible
ratione materiae, under article 3 of the Optional Protocol

6.4 The Committee notes that the State party objects to the admissibility of the
alleged violation of article 9 of the Covenant for non-exhaustion of domestic
remedies, arguing that any alleged irregularity in his arrest should have been
brought up prior to the author's arraignment. As it appears from an examination
of the court proceedings that the author never raised any claim that his arrest
was defective before the domestic authorities, the Committee considers that it is
precluded from considering this issue at this stage. The Committee notes that
the same circumstances apply to the author's claim of a violation of article 14,
paragraph 3(a) (para.3.5) - failure to inform him of the charges against him.
Consequently, these claims are inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic
remedies under article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol.

6.5 With respect to the claim under article 14, paragraph 2, of the Covenant, the
Committee considers that the author has failed to show how the Supreme
Court's reliance on circumstantial evidence in affirming the conviction of the
trial court violated his rights under this provision, or any other provision of the
Covenant and therefore finds this part of the claim inadmissible for non-
substantiation, pursuant to article 2 of the Optional Protocol.

6.6 With respect to the claim of a violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (g), the
Committee considers that as the author himself admits to having had counsel
assist him in preparing and making his confession, he has failed to substantiate
his claim that he was forced to sign a confession. Furthermore, it is uncontested
that the Supreme Court, when affirming the author's conviction, did not rely on
his confession. Consequently, this claim is inadmissible under article 2 of the
Optional Protocol.

6.7 As to the alleged violation of article 14, paragraph, 5 because of the way in
which the Supreme Court interpreted the witnesses' evidence, the Committee
notes that the author is primarily requesting the Committee to examine the
evaluation of facts and evidence in his case. The Committee reiterates its
jurisprudence that the evaluation of facts and evidence is best left for the courts
of States parties to decide, unless the evaluation of facts and evidence was
clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice. As the author has provided
no evidence to demonstrate that the appellate courts' decisions were clearly
arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice, the Committee considers this claim
inadmissible under article 2, of the Optional Protocol for non-substantiation for
purposes of admissibility..

6.8 As to the claim under article 5 of the Covenant, the Committee finds that
this provision does not give rise to any separate individual right. Thus, the
claim is incompatible with the Covenant and inadmissible under article 3 of the
Optional Protocol.

6.9 The Committee finds no other reason to consider the remaining claims
raised by the author inadmissible and therefore proceeds to a consideration of
the merits of the claims relating to articles 6; 5, paragraph 2; 7; 10, paragraph 1;
and 14, paragraph 3 (b), of the Covenant.

Consideration of the merits

7.1 The Committee notes the author's claims of violations under articles 7 and
10, paragraph 1, on account of the fact that he would not be notified of the of
his execution until dawn of the day in question, whereupon he would be
executed within 8 hours and would have insufficient time to bid farewell to
family members and organise his personal affairs. It further notes the State
party's contention that the death sentence shall be carried out "not earlier than
one (1) year nor later than eighteen (18) months after the judgment has become
final and executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his
executive clemency powers at all times." (6) The Committee understands from
the legislation that the author would have at least one year and at most eighteen
months, after the exhaustion of all available remedies, during which he may
make arrangements to see members of his family prior to notification of the
date of execution. It also notes that, under Section 16 of the Republic Act No.
8177, (7) following notification of execution he would have approximately
eight hours to finalise any personal matters and meet with members of his
family The Committee reiterates its prior jurisprudence that the issue of a
warrant for execution necessarily causes intense anguish to the individual
concerned and is of the view that the State party should attempt to minimise
this anguish as far as possible. (8) However, on the basis of the information
provided, the Committee cannot find that the setting of the time of the
execution of the author within eight hours after notification, considering that he
would already have had at least one year following the exhaustion of domestic
remedies and prior to notification to organize his personal affairs and meet with
family members, would violate his rights under articles 7, and 10, paragraph 1.

7.2 Regarding the claim under article 6, paragraph 2, of the Covenant, the
Committee observes that, in response to the State party's argument that the
Committee's function is not to assess the constitutionality of a State party's law,
its task is rather to determine the consistency with the Covenant of the
particular claims brought before it. (9) The Committee notes from the
judgments of both the Regional Trial Court and the Supreme Court, that the
author was convicted of the complex crime of rape with homicide under article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA No. 7659, which provides
that "When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed,
the penalty shall be death." Thus, the death penalty was imposed automatically
by operation of article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The
Committee refers to its jurisprudence that the automatic and mandatory
imposition of the death penalty constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of life, in
violation of article 6, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, in circumstances where the
death penalty is imposed without regard being able to be paid to the defendant's
personal circumstances or the circumstances of the particular offence. (10) It
follows that the automatic imposition of the death penalty in the author's case,
by virtue of article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, violated his
rights under article 6, paragraph 1, of the Covenant.

7.3 With respect to the claim of a violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (b), as the
author was not granted sufficient time to prepare his defence and communicate
with counsel, the Committee notes that the State party does not contest this
claim. Since the author was only granted a few moments each day during the
trial to communicate with counsel, the Committee finds a violation of article
14, paragraph 3 (b), of the Covenant. As the author's death sentence was
affirmed after the conclusion of proceedings in which the requirements for a
fair trial set out in article 14 of the Covenant were not met, it must be
concluded that the author's right protected under article 6 has also been
violated.

8. The Human Rights Committee, acting under article 5, paragraph 4, of the

Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is
of the view that the facts before it disclose a violation of articles 6, paragraph 1,
and 14, paragraph 3 (b), of the Covenant.

9. In accordance with article 2, paragraph 3 (a), of the Covenant, the State party
is under an obligation to provide the author with an effective and appropriate
remedy, including commutation of his death sentence. The State party is under
an obligation to avoid similar violations in the future.

10. Bearing in mind that, by becoming a State party to the Optional Protocol,
the State party has recognized the competence of the Committee to determine
whether there has been a violation of the Covenant or not and that, pursuant to
article 2 of the Covenant, the State party has undertaken to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the Covenant, the Committee wishes to receive from the State
party, within 90 days, information about the measures taken to give effect to its
Views. The State party is also requested to publish the Committee's Views.

____________________________

[Done in English, French and Spanish, the English text being the original
version. Subsequently to be issued in Arabic, Chinese and Russian as part of
the Committee's annual report to the General Assembly.]

** The following members of the Committee participated in the examination of

the present communication: Mr. Abdelfattah Amor, Mr. Nisuke Ando, Mr.
Prafullachandra Natwarlal Bhagwati, Ms. Christine Chanet, Mr. Franco
Depasquale, Mr. Maurice Glèlè Ahanhanzo, Mr. Walter Kälin, Mr. Ahmed
Tawfik Khalil, Mr. Rajsoomer Lallah, Mr. Rafael Rivas Posada, Sir Nigel
Rodley, Mr. Martin Scheinin, Mr. Ivan Shearer, Mr. Hipólito Solari Yrigoyen,
Ms. Ruth Wedgwood, Mr. Roman Wieruszewski and Mr. Maxwell Yalden.

The texts of two individual opinions signed separately by Committee members

Mr. Nisuke Ando and Ms. Christine Chanet are appended to the present
document.
APPENDIX
Individual opinion by Committee member, Mr. Nisuke Ando

Reference is made to my individual opinion in the case Carpo v. The

Philippines: Communication No. 1077/2002.

[Signed] Nisuke Ando

Individual opinion by Committee member, Ms. Chritine Chanet

I reiterate my position concerning death row as expressed in my individual

opinion on communication nos. 270/1998 and 271/1998 (Barrett v. Jamaica and
Sutcliffe v. Jamaica), Views dated 30 March 1992.

[Signed] Christine Chanet

[Done in English, French and Spanish, the French text being the original
version. Subsequently to be issued in Arabic, Chinese and Russian as part of
the Committee's annual report to the General Assembly.]

Notes

1. A 9-year-old girl whose body was found in the evening of 9 April 1997 in
the vicinity of Balingasag.

2. People v. Echegaray (GR No. 117472, judgment of 7 February 1997).

3. Alvarez v. Court of Appeals, 359 SCRA 544[2001]

4. People v. Amestuzo, 361 SCRA 184 [2001].

5. People vv. Castillo, 289 SCRA 213 [1998].

6. Section 1, Republic Act No. 8177.

7. Section 16 of Republic Act No. 8117 – "…During the interval between the
notification and execution , the convict shall, as far as possible, be furnished
such assistance as he may request in order to be attended in his last moments by
a priest or minister of the religion he professes and to consult his lawyers, as
well as in order to make a will and confer with members of his family or of
persons in charge of the management of his business, of the administration of
his property, or of the care of his descendants." However, on 8 March 2004,
counsel forwarded the text of EP 200, pursuant to which the condemned
prisoner may only meet with a priest and his lawyer but not with family
members.

8. Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica, Case no. 210/1986 and 225/1987, Views
adopted on 6 April 1989.

9. Carpo v. The Philippines, Case no. 1077/2002, Views adopted on 28 March

2003.

10. Thompson v. St. Vincent & The Grenadines, Case No. 806/1998, Views
Adopted on 18 October 2000; and Kennedy v. Trinidad & Tobago, Case No.
845/1998, Views adopted on 26 March 2002.