CITIZENSHIP justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally

demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has

TECSON V. COMELEC been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
Facts: on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
The present petition is brought up to challenge the qualifications of Fernando
Poe, Jr. as a presidential candidate. In particular, the issue is whether he is Jurisdiction of COMELEC over controversies relating to
considered a natural-born Filipino or not. qualifications of presidential candidates
4. Petitioners Tecson and Velex invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section
In 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the
his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the COMELEC. The provision reads:
Philippines. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his birth to be 20 August 1939 "The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
and his place of birth to be Manila. relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."
Victorino X. Fornier, initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify
FPJ and to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a 5. Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a election scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one
were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. The 1992
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal promulgated by the Supreme
Spanish subject. Granting that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could Court categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests
not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-
illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-
illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a President. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a
prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie post-election scenario.
Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe,
married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. 6. It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include
The COMELEC dismissed the petition. Motion for reconsideration was cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a
denied. Hence, this certiorari petition before the Supreme Court. The other candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
petitions filed challenge the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that,
under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Philippine Citizenship
Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic 7. There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime
issue on the case. but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects." The Spanish Constitution of
1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because of the express
Held: mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions of the Ultramar
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over decisions of the COMELEC among which this country was included, would be governed by special laws.
1. Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18
the Supreme Court per Rule 64 in an action for certiorari under Rule 65 of December 1889, which came out with the first categorical enumeration of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. who were Spanish citizens.

2. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads:“xxx Unless 8. A turning point was The Treaty of Paris entered into on 10 December
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or 1898 between Spain and the United States. Under the treaty, the native
ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy did not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens"
thereof." under American laws and were thus issued passports describing them to be
citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.
3. Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that
judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as 9. The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in
may be established by law which power "includes the duty of the courts of the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine
Organic Act of 1902. Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" Natural-born citizen, meaning
was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on 16. Under Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution, "No person may be
the 11th day of April 1899. The term "inhabitant" was taken to include 1) a elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines”
native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular
Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 17. The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who
April 1899. are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."
10. In 1912, the Congress of the United States made an amendment to the
Philippine Bill of 1902, authorizing the Philippine Legislature to provide 18. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization,
by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis- had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus
Philippine Islands who do not come within the provisions of the organic act. soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a "natural-born" citizen
of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not
11. In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law, last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa
was passed. Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood
was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.
subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date,
and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country. The case of FPJ
19. FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935
12. Under Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken Constitution. The birth certificate of FPJ disclose that he was born to Allan F.
together with existing civil law provisions at the time, women would Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American
automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign citizen, twenty-one years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and
husbands. This resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940.
incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their
legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to 20. His paternal grandfather is Lorenzo Pou, the father of Allan F. Poe.
still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Lorenzo Pou's death certificate identified him to be a Filipino. The certificate
of birth of Allan F. Po (father of FPJ) showed that he was born on 17 May
13. Under Section 1, Article III, of the 1973 Constitution, the following are 1915 to an Español father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Español mother,
citizens of the Philippines: Marta Reyes.
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution. Public documents as evidence
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines. 21. Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou,
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth
1935 Constitution. certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44,
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
"Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the
14. Section 2 of the same article also further provided that— "A female performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person
citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie
citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law to evidence of the facts therein stated."
have renounced her citizenship."
22. The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the
15. Under Section I, Article IV, of the 1987 Constitution, the following are entries made therein could be grounded on (i) the sense of official duty in the
citizens of the Philippines: preparation of the statement made, (ii) the penalty which is usually affixed to
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of a breach of that duty, (iii) the routine and disinterested origin of most such
this Constitution. statements, and (iv) the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines. exposure of such errors as might have occurred.
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and Proof of Paternity and Filiation
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. 23. Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from
08 December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil
Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to
establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or
(compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was paternity do not govern in the determination of citizenship
possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary 28. These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in
acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the
document. Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our own Civil Code.Such
distinction, however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil
24. Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law further provided that -"In case of law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law.
an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly
by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the 29. The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his
latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the citizenship status should thus be deemed independent from and not
name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code
any information by which such father could be identified." Hence, in order or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good
that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family
acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should govern. For
signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being
the same useless as being an authoritative document of recognition. applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.

25. The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of Proof of paternity under the rules on evidence
illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary 30. Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
recognition was required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a "Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person
statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person
acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it
illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as natural. occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two
Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
the child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to `pedigree' includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the
claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and might dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the
pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with
acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the lifetime of the pedigree."
presumed parent.
31. For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is
26. The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at
173, and Article 175 provide: issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred,
following: and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person whose
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such act or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private declaration.
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. 32. In the birth certificate of FPJ, nowhere in the document was the
signature of the father Allan F. Poe found. However, the duly notarized
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe
proved by: submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including FPJ) in
one house, and as one family -
27. The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied. (Article 256)
The growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of DNA Testing
illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea of 33. In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily
keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic
family in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child. codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical
residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would
clear up filiation or paternity.
34. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
(2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish Election Code. Material misrepresentation must not only be material, but
parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test also deliberate and willful. (see Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC)
as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case
comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO PH BAR VICENTE CHING
evidence. Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother
and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years
FPJ is a Filipino citizen (child of Filipino father 1935 Constitution) after he has reached the age of majority? This is the question sought to be
35. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the resolved in the present case involving the application for admission to the
citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.
on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo, citing Chiongbian vs. de Leon
and Serra vs. Republic. As explained by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, the The facts of this case are as follows:
thesis of petitioner hinged solely on pure obiter dicta on the cited cases, and Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese
thus, must fail. citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La
Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.
36. Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the
citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at
Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the the St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998
assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated September 1998, he
and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he
to prejudice or discriminate against him. must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.

37. The fact of the matter is that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November
prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never 1998, the following documents:
be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the
Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those 1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." There utterly is no cogent Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified public
justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are accountant;
none provided.
2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo,
38. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be Election Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao, La
drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and
Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his 3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth E. Cerezo,
place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other showing that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.
thatLorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization"
that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and
Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of Ching was one of the successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the
respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May 1999. However, because of
has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his
Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was
illegitimate. required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution,
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a comment on
Material misrepresentation must not only be material, but also Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the documents evidencing
deliberate and willful his Philippine citizenship.
39. While the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the
hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the
1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon 9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to
reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship"[1] in strict (sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and
compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An 10.I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps 10.00) as filing fees.
Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine
Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the
Citizen." The OSG adds that (w)hat he acquired at best was only an inchoate question raised is whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a
Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether his citizenship by election
age of majority."[2] In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.
must concur in order that the election of Philippine citizenship may be
effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making the election must be a When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935
citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made 'upon reaching Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the
the age of majority.'"[3] The OSG then explains the meaning of the phrase citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father
"upon reaching the age of majority:" followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of
majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship.[4] This right to elect
The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it
reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had been provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are
at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period citizens of the Philippines.[5] Likewise, this recognition by the 1973
may be extended under certain circumstances, as when a (sic) person Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that
concerned has always considered himself a Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it was held that Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine
an election done after over seven (7) years was not made within a reasonable citizens.[6] It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987
time. Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not
be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution.[7] If the
Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it
"reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial
peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new
relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable Constitution.[8]
period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the
Philippine Bar. 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order
to made a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof,
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship
Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the
both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching states: party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall
1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino; be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in my aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
school records and other official document; Government of the Philippines."
3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for
Filipino citizens; However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time
4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote; period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made.
5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made "upon
Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to 1995; reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon
6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with reaching twenty-one (21) years.[9] In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice
Commonwealth Act No. 625; on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this
7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this
before a notary public; Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the
8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines; pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government
to the effect that the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances
attaining the age of majority.[10] The phrase "reasonable time" has been obtaining therein are very different from those in the present case, thus,
interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was born before the
from reaching the age of majority.[11] However, we held in Cuenco vs. effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence,
Secretary of Justice,[12] that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible the requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and
rule. We said: C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to
him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period out by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine
after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a
that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court stated:
under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be
extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself
always considered himself a Filipino.[13] a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights
and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543,
Philippine citizenship is not indefinite: Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693,
Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him
became of age on February 16,1944. His election of citizenship was made on of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled.[17]
May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven
(7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs.
has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority."[14] Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,[18] where we held:
We have jurisprudence that defines 'election' as both a formal and an
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already informal process.
thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No.
625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]) the Court held
of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election
of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the
yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It exact pronouncement of the Court we held:
should be stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked
by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and "Esteban s exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age constitutes a
his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former positive act of Philippine citizenship" (p. 52: emphasis supplied)"
elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage.
citizenship by election. He has established his life here in the Philippines.

Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected
erroneously labels as informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a to have elected Philippine citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply
refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare,[15] the pertinent portion of the In Re Mallare rule.
which reads:
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time
an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he cane of age, to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office
established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for
and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves
already participating in the elections and campaigning for certain formal manifestations for these persons.
candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine
citizenship.[16] An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is
an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries.
There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he was not allowed to take his oath because of the questionable status of his
turned twenty-one (21). citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment stating that Ching was a Chinese citizen and
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected
respondent would not only have bean superfluous but would also have Philippine citizenship. The OSG adds that what he acquired at best was only
resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon
citizenship?[19] reaching the age of majority." It explains that the clause "upon reaching the
age of majority" has been construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, the age of majority which had been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to
even if we consider the special circumstances in the life of Ching like his be three (3) years. OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected
having lived in the Philippines, all his life and his consistent belief that he is a Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the
Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the
the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the
validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span Of fourteen (14) years that relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable
lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in
his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the
contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of Philippine Bar.
majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election Ching then filed a Manifestation, attaching his Affidavit of Election of
of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance.
citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is Issue:
required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine Whether Ching has elected Philippine citizenship within a “reasonable time.”
citizenship and thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's Ruling:
unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply NO. The governing charter when Ching was born was the 1935 Constitution.
glossed over. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the said Constitution, the citizenship of a
legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child
claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient.[20] One who is elected Philippine citizenship. C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to
privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such Section 1(3), Article IV, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in
citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship.
promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time
Philippine citizenship and, as a result, this golden privilege slipped away period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made.
from his grasp. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made "upon
Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the Philippine Bar. reaching the age of majority," which was 21 years of age back then. Based on
jurisprudence, the phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted to mean
// The phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted to mean that the that the elections should be made within 3 years from reaching the age of
election of Philippine citizenship should be made within 3 years from majority. However, this period may be extended under certain
reaching the age of majority. However, this period may be extended under circumstances, but such extension is not definite.
certain circumstances, but such extension is not definite. In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already
Facts: thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No.
Vicente Ching, legitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, was 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age
born in Tubao, La Union on April 11, 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age
in the Philippines. In 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable
course, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. The SC yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It
allowed Ching to take the Bar Examinations subject to the condition that he should be stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked
must submit to the Court of his proof of his Philippine Citizenship. In by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and
compliance therewith, he submitted a certification that he is certified public his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former
accountant, a voter certification that he is a registered voter in La Union, and elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law
a certification the he was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine
Tubao, La Union. In 1999, Ching passed the Bar Examinations, however, he citizenship by election. Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot
constitute what Ching erroneously labels as informal election of citizenship.
NATURAL BORN CITIZENSHIP Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that eleven years after
KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION V. ERMITA respondent Ong's birth his father was finally granted Filipino citizenship by
Filed on May 23, 2007 was this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a natural-born
Rules of Court. Petitioners are people's and/or non-governmental Filipino citizen.
organizations engaged in public and civic causes aimed at protecting the
people's rights to self-governance and justice. Respondent Executive Petitioners further argue that respondent Ong's birth certificate speaks for
Secretary is the head of the Office of the President and is in charge of itself and it states his nationality as "Chinese" at birth. They invoke the Civil
releasing presidential appointments including those of Supreme Court Code:
Justices. Respondent Gregory S. Ong is allegedly the party whose Article 410 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he books making up the civil
appointment would fill up the vacancy in this Court. register and all documents relating thereto x x x shall be prima facie evidence
of the facts therein contained." Therefore, the entry in Ong's birth certificate
Petitioners allege that: indicating his nationality as Chinese is prima facie evidence of the fact that
On May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretary, in representation of the Ong's citizenship at birth is Chinese.
Office of the President, announced an appointment in favor of respondent
Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to fill up the Article 412 of the Civil Code also provides that "[N]o entry in a civil register
vacancy created by the retirement on April 28, 2007 of Associate Justice shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order." Thus, as long as Ong's
Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. The appointment was reported the following day, May birth certificate is not changed by a judicial order, the Judicial & Bar Council,
17, 2007, by the major daily publications. as well as the whole world, is bound by what is stated in his birth
certificate.[2]
On May 18, 2007, the major daily publications reported that the appointment
was "recalled" or "held in abeyance" by Malacañang in view of the question This birth certificate, petitioners assert, prevails over respondent Ong's new
relating to the citizenship of respondent Gregory S. Ong. There is no Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated October
indication whatever that the appointment has been cancelled by the Office of 16, 1996, stating that he is a natural-born Filipino and over the opinion of
the President. then Secretary of Justice Teofisto Guingona that he is a natural-born Filipino.
They maintain that the Department of Justice (DOJ) does not have the power
On May 19, 2007, the major daily publications reported that respondent or authority to alter entries in a birth certificate; that respondent Ong's old
Executive Secretary stated that the appointment is "still there except that the Identification Certificate did not declare that he is a natural-born Filipino;
validation of the issue is being done by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)." and that respondent Ong's remedy is an action to correct his citizenship as it
appears in his birth certificate.
Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to respondent Ong
through respondent Executive Secretary is patently unconstitutional, Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari be issued annulling the
arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to appointment issued to respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this Court.
lack of jurisdiction.
Subsequently, on May 24, 2007, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for the
Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), praying that a TRO be
plain and incontestable, and that his own birth certificate indicates his issued, in accordance with the Rules of Court, to prevent and restrain
Chinese citizenship. Petitioners attached a copy of said birth certificate as respondent Executive Secretary from releasing the appointment of
Annex "H" to the petition. The birth certificate, petitioners add, reveals that respondent Ong, and to prevent and restrain respondent Ong from assuming
at the time of respondent Ong's birth on May 25, 1953, his father was Chinese the office and discharging the functions of Associate Justice of this Court.
and his mother was also Chinese.
The Court required respondents to Comment on the petition.
Petitioners invoke the Constitution: Respondent Executive Secretary accordingly filed his Comment, essentially
stating that the appointment of respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this
Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "No person Court on May 16, 2007 was made by the President pursuant to the powers
shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate vested in her by Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution, thus:
court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines." Sec. 2 of Art. IV
defines "natural-born citizens as those who are citizens of the Philippines SEC. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and Judges of lower courts shall
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared
Philippine Citizenship."[1] by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need
no confirmation.
Respondent Executive Secretary added that the President appointed
respondent Ong from among the list of nominees who were duly screened by I. PETITIONERS' LACK OF STANDING AND INABILITY TO IMPLEAD AN
and bore the imprimatur of the JBC created under Article VIII, Section 8 of INDISPENSABLE PARTY WHOSE OFFICIAL ACTION IS THE VERY ACT
the Constitution. Said respondent further stated: "The appointment, SOUGHT TO BE ANNULLED CONSTITUTE INSUPERABLE LEGAL
however, was not released, but instead, referred to the JBC for validation of OBSTACLES TO THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER AND SHOULD
respondent Ong's citizenship."[3] To date, however, the JBC has not received PREVENT THIS CASE FROM PROCEEDING FURTHER FOR
the referral. DETERMINATION ON THE MERITS BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.

Supporting the President's action and respondent Ong's qualifications, II. RESPONDENT ONG IS, IN TRUTH AND IN FACT, A NATURAL-BORN
respondent Executive Secretary submits that: CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, CONSIDERING THAT:

1. The President did not gravely abuse her discretion as she appointed a A. DY GUIOK SANTOS WAS A FILIPINO CITIZEN AT THE TIME OF HER
person, duly nominated by the JBC, which passed upon the appointee's MARRIAGE TO EUGENIO; and
qualifications.
2. Justice Gregory S. Ong is a natural-born citizen as determined by the B. HAVING BEEN BORN BEFORE JANUARY 17, 1973 OF A FILIPINO
Bureau of Immigration and affirmed by the Department of Justice, which MOTHER AND WHO ELECTED FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP UPON
have the authority and jurisdiction to make determination on matters of REACHING THE AGE OF MAJORITY, RESPONDENT ONG MEETS THE
citizenship. REQUIREMENTS UNDER ARTICLE IV, SECTIONS 1 AND 2 OF THE 1987
3. Undisputed evidence disclosed that respondent Ong is a natural-born CONSTITUTION.
citizen.
4. Petitioners are not entitled to a temporary restraining order.[4] III. THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF RESPONDENT ONG AS PRESENTED
BY PETITIONERS CAN, IN NO WAY, WITHOUT MORE, ESTABLISH
Respondent Ong submitted his Comment with Opposition, maintaining that WITH FINALITY THAT HE IS A CHINESE NATIONAL, OR DISPROVE
he is a natural-born Filipino citizen; that petitioners have no standing to file CONCLUSIVELY THAT HE IS, IN FACT, A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO,
the present suit; and that the issue raised ought to be addressed to the JBC as DESCENDED FROM "INDIOS."
the Constitutional body mandated to review the qualifications of those it
recommends to judicial posts. Furthermore, the petitioners in his view failed IV. IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR RESPONDENT ONG TO RESORT TO
to include the President who is an indispensable party as the one who JUDICIAL ACTION UNDER RULE 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT FOR
extended the appointment. HIM TO BE ABLE TO CLAIM AND ENJOY HIS RIGHTFUL STATUS AS A
NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO.
As to his citizenship, respondent Ong traces his ancestral lines to one Maria
Santos of Malolos, Bulacan, born on November 25, 1881, who was allegedly a V. THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION HAS PREEMPTIVE LEGAL
Filipino citizen[5] who married Chan Kin, a Chinese citizen; that these two AUTHORITY OR PRIMARY ADMINISTRATIVE JURIDICTION TO MAKE A
had a son, Juan Santos; that in 1906 Chan Kin died in China, as a result of DETERMINATION AS REGARDS THE CITIZENSHIP OF RESPONDENT
which Maria Santos reverted to her Filipino citizenship; that at that time ONG, AND UPON SUBSEQUENT CONFIRMATION BY THE SECRETARY
Juan Santos was a minor; that Juan Santos thereby also became a Filipino OF JUSTICE AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES, ISSUE A DECLARATION
citizen;[6] that respondent Ong's mother, Dy Guiok Santos, is the daughter of (I.E., IDENTIFICATION CERTIFICATE NO. 113878) RECOGNIZING THAT
the spouses Juan Santos and Sy Siok Hian, a Chinese citizen, who were RESPONDENT ONG IS A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO, THEREBY
married in 1927; that, therefore, respondent's mother was a Filipino citizen at RENDERING NONEXISTENT ANY CONTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENT FOR
birth; that Dy Guiok Santos later married a Chinese citizen, Eugenio Ong HIM TO ASSUME THE POSITION OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE
Han Seng, thereby becoming a Chinese citizen; that when respondent Ong SUPREME COURT.[7]
was eleven years old his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was naturalized, and
as a result he, his brothers and sisters, and his mother were included in the Petitioners, in turn, filed a Consolidated Reply, in which they asserted their
naturalization. standing to file this suit on the strength of previous decisions of this
Court, e.g., Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona[8] and Kilosbayan,
Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureau of Immigration and Incorporated v. Morato,[9] on the ground that the case is one of
the DOJ a certification and an identification that he is a natural-born Filipino transcendental importance. They claim that the President's appointment of
citizen under Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution, since his mother respondent Ong as Supreme Court Justice violates the Constitution and is,
was a Filipino citizen when he was born. therefore, attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
Summarizing, his arguments are as follows: excess of jurisdiction. Finally, they reiterate that respondent Ong's birth
certificate, unless corrected by judicial order in non-summary proceedings
for the purpose, is binding on all and is prima facie evidence of what it states, 1. That he is single/married/widower/widow, Filipino citizen and 26 years
namely, that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen. The alleged naturalization of age, having been born on May 25, 1953, at SAN JUAN RIZAL, to spouses
of his father when he was a minor would not make him a natural-born Eugenio Ong Han Seng and Dy Guiok Santos who are citizens of the
Filipino citizen. Philippines, as evidenced by the attached copy of his birth certificate marked
as Annex A (if born outside of wedlock, state so; or if Filipino citizen other
The petition has merit. than natural born, state how and when citizenship was acquired and attach
the necessary proofs: By Nat. Case #584 of Eugenio Ong Han Seng
First, as to standing. Petitioners have standing to file the suit simply as (Father) See Attached documents Annex B, B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4.
people's organizations and taxpayers since the matter involves an issue of
utmost and far-reaching Constitutional importance, namely, the qualification VERIFICATION
- nay, the citizenship - of a person to be appointed a member of this Court.
Standing has been accorded and recognized in similar instances.[10] Republic of the Philippines )

Second, as to having to implead the President as an alleged necessary party. City of Manila ) S.S.
This is not necessary since the suit impleads the Executive Secretary who is
the alter ego of the President and he has in fact spoken for her in his I, GREGORY SANTOS ONG, after being sworn, depose and state: that I
Comment. Furthermore, the suit does not seek to stop the President from am the petitioner in the foregoing petition; that the same was prepared by me
extending the appointment but only the Executive Secretary from releasing it and/or at my instance and that the allegations contained therein are
and respondent Ong from accepting the same. true to my knowledge.

Third, as to the proper forum for litigating the issue of respondent Ong's (Sgd.) GREGORY SANTOS ONG
qualification for memberhip of this Court. This case is a matter of primordial Affiant
importance involving compliance with a Constitutional mandate. As the body
tasked with the determination of the merits of conflicting claims under the SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28th day of August, 1979, City
Constitution,[11] the Court is the proper forum for resolving the issue, even of Manila, Philippines, affiant exhibiting his/her Residence Certificate No. A-
as the JBC has the initial competence to do so. ___________, issued at ________________, on
__________________, 19__.
Fourth, as to the principal issue of the case - is respondent Ong a natural-
born Filipino citizen? (Sgd.)
Notary Public
On this point, the Court takes judicial notice of the records of respondent Until December 31, 1979
Ong's petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar. PTR No. 3114917
January 19, 1979, Pasig, MM
In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, docketed as B.E. No.
1398-N filed on September 14, 1979, under O.R. No. 8131205 of that date, Doc. No. 98;
respondent Ong alleged that he is qualified to be admitted to the Philippine Page No. 10;
bar because, among others, he is a Filipino citizen; and that he is a Filipino Book No. VIII;
citizen because his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese citizen, was Series of 1979.[13]
naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, was a minor of eleven years
and thus he, too, thereby became a Filipino citizen. As part of his evidence, in In fact, Emilio R. Rebueno, Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, wrote
support of his petition, be submitted his birth certificate and the respondent Ong a letter dated October 3, 1979 stating that in connection with
naturalization papers of his father. His birth certificate[12] states that he was his Petition for Admission to the 1979 Bar Examinations, he has to submit:
a Chinese citizen at birth and that his mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a
Chinese citizen and his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was also a Chinese 1) A certified clear copy of his Birth Certificate; and
citizen. 2) A certification of non-appeal re his citizenship from the Office of the
Specifically, the following appears in the records: Solicitor General.
PETITION Respondent Ong complied with these requirements. It was on the basis of
COMES now the undersigned petitioner and to this Honorable Court these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of naturalization
respectfully states: that this Court allowed respondent Ong to take the oath as a lawyer.
It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a // Petitioner filed a petition to set aside the appointment of Gregory Ong as
naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Petitioner alleged that Ong is not a
natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot natural-born citizen and thus, is disqualified to become a member of the
amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and Supreme Court. Respondent Ermita, on the other hand, contended that Ong
his mother were naturalized along with his father. was appointed from a list of candidates given by the JBC and they have
referred the matter back to the latter for the determination of the issue
Furthermore, as petitioners correctly submit, no substantial change or regarding Ong’s citizenship. Respondent Ong contended that he is truly a
correction in an entry in a civil register can be made without a judicial order, natural-born citizen, following a series of changes in nationalities and
and, under the law, a change in citizenship status is a substantial change. whatnot with respect to his ancestors. He also contended that the petitioner
InLabayo-Rowe v. Republic,[14] this Court held that: has no standing to file the said petition.

Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial HELD:
in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon First, on the issue of standing, the petitioners have standing as the issue
the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may involved is of utmost importance—the citizenship of a person to be appointed
be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is as a member of the Supreme Court.
submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary Second, on the principal issue of the case, the Court took judicial notice of
admitted.[15] Ong’s petition to be admitted to the Philippine Bar. In his petition to be
admitted to the Philippine bar, respondent alleged that he is qualified to be
Republic Act No. 9048 provides in Section 2 (3) that a summary admitted because among others he is a Filipino citizen, and that he became a
administrative proceeding to correct clerical or typographical errors in a birth citizen because his father became a naturalized Filipino citizen and being
certificate cannot apply to a change in nationality. Substantial corrections to a minor then, thus he too became a Filipino citizen. As part of his evidence,
the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry should, he submitted his birth certificate and the naturalization papers of his father.
therefore, be effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the It was on basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of
Rules of Court.[16] no less than Ong that the Court allowed him to take his oath as a lawyer. It is
clear therefore, that from the records of this Court, Ong is a naturalized
The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status
respondent Ong's ancestors, by various births, marriages and deaths, all by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision
entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial of the trial court stating that Ong and his mother were naturalized along with
proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and citizenship. his father. Furthermore, as the petitioner correctly submitted, no substantial
The chain of evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent change in an entry in the civil register can be made without a judicial order.
Ong's mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in the Change in the citizenship status is a substantial change. The long string of
records of this Court. Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his events that Ong alleged leading to him being a natural-born citizen, all entail
alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under the time-line of three factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings.
Constitutions.[17] Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an
appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. NOTE: In this case, there has been no ouster from an appointment. There
For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing so. may be approval of the appointment but it lacks other acts that will complete
the appointment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED as one of injunction directed The last act in an appointment is the delivery of the commission. It is now up
against respondent Gregory S. Ong, who is hereby ENJOINED from to the appointee—he must accept the appointment, take an oath of office,
accepting an appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme assume office, etc. It doesn’t end here. The CSC can either reject or approve
Court or assuming the position and discharging the functions of that office, of the appointment. When the appointee doesn’t pursue all the acts to
until he shall have successfully completed all necessary steps, through the assume office, the question is whether or not he can be held liable. The law
appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural- doesn’t provide really that there is a period to accept or reject an
born Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth and citizenship. appointment.

This Decision is FINAL and IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

POE-LLAMANZARES V. COMELEC Petitioner came home to the Philippines on May 24, 2005. Her three children
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned immediately followed while her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to
as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo complete pending projects as well as to arrange the sale of their family home
Militar on September 3, 1968. Edgardo turned over custody over the infant to there. In the second half of 2005, she and her husband purchased a
his relatives, Emiliano Militar and his wife. On September 6, 1968, Emiliano condominium unit at One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan City.
registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo ). In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a lot in Corinthian Hills,
Quezon City where they built their family home and continue to reside up to
When petitioner was five years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe the present. Her children of school age also began attending Philippine
(a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a private schools.
petition for her adoption in the MTC. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted
their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from "Mary On July 7, 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Philippines pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention
However, it was only on May 4, 2006 that the OCR-Iloilo issued a new and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. In its July 18, 2006 Order, the Bureau of
Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe. Immigration (BI) declared that petitioner is deemed to have reacquired her
Philippine citizenship. She thereafter secured a Philippine passport.
Although petitioner initially enrolled in the University of the Philippines, she
opted to continue her studies abroad and left for the United States of America On October 6, 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as
in 1988. Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston College where she earned Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board
her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies. (MTRCB). Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an "Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation
On July 27, 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Llamanzares, a citizen of both of American Citizenship". From then on, petitioner stopped using her
the Philippines and the U.S., in San Juan City. Desirous of being with her American passport.
husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two
days after the wedding ceremony or on July 29, 1991. On December 9, 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate
of Loss of Nationality of the United States" effective October 21, 2010.
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to a son in April 1992. Two
daughters followed in July 1998 and June 2004, both born in the Philippines. On October 2, 2012, petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6
On October 18, 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. She years and 6 months" to the question "Period of residence in the Philippines
obtained a U.S. Passport in December 2001. before May 13, 2013." Having obtained the highest number of votes, she was
proclaimed Senator on May 16, 2013.
On April 8, 2004, petitioner came back to the Philippines to support her
father's candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections. She returned to On October 15, 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May
the U.S. on July 8, 2004. 2016 Elections. In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born
citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May
On December 13, 2004, petitioner rushed back to the Philippines upon 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from May 24,
learning of her father's deteriorating medical condition. Her father slipped 2005. This triggered the filing of several petitions in the Comelec against her.
into a coma and eventually expired. The petitioner returned to the US on
February 3, 2005 G.R. No. 221697
A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo filed a
Petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the petition in the Comelec to deny due course or cancel said COC on the ground
Philippines sometime in the first quarter of 2005. The couple began that petitioner committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she
preparing for their resettlement including notification of their children's claimed that was a natural born Filipino citizen and that she had complied
schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools for the next with the 10 year residency requirement.
semester; coordination with property movers for the relocation of their Elamparo claimed that international law does not confer natural-born status
household goods to the Philippines. As early as 2004, petitioner already quit and Filipino citizenship on foundlings. Even assuming that petitioner was a
her job in the U.S. natural-born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that status when she
became a naturalized American citizen. According to Elamparo, natural-born
citizenship must be continuous from birth.
On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner Held:
was bound by the sworn declaration she made in her 2012 COC for Senator A. Comelec Jurisdiction
wherein she indicated that she had resided in the country for only six years
and six months as of May 2013 Elections. Moreover, petitioner's residence COMELEC cannot by itself decide the qualification or lack thereof
could only be counted at the earliest from July 2006, when she reacquired of an electoral candidate; to disqualify a candidate, there must be
Philippine citizenship under RA 9225. Petitioner also allegedly failed to a prior declaration by a final judgment of a competent court.
reestablish her domicile in the Philippines. 1. The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner
should be denied due course or cancelled on the exclusive ground that she
The COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution finding that made in the certificate a false material representation. The exclusivity of the
petitioner's COC contained material representations which are false. Hence, ground should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from
petitioner's COC was cancelled. The COMELEC En Banc denied petitioner's going into the issue of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if,
motion for reconsideration. as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper
authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide
G.R. Nos. 221698-700 the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.

Three separate petitions were filed by Francisco S. Tatad, Antonio P. 2. The [electoral] tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the
Contreras and Amado D. Valdez against petitioner before the Comelec. qualifications of the President, the Vice-President, Senators and the
Members of the House of Representatives was made clear by the
Tatad filed a petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Constitution. There is no such provision for candidates for these positions.
Rules of Procedure alleging that petitioner lacks the requisite residency and Realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility
citizenship to qualify her for the Presidency. He averred that the fact that of candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules in 1993 so as to provide in
foundlings were not expressly included in the categories of citizens in the 193 Rule 25 Sec 1 (grounds for disqualification). The lack of provision for
5 Constitution is indicative of the framers' intent to exclude them. Therefore, declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a
the burden lies on petitioner to prove that she is a natural-born citizen. Tatad mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which
asserts that international conventions and treaties are not self-executory and is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule-
that local legislations are necessary in order to give effect to treaty obligations making power under Art. IX, A, Sec 6 of the Constitution, cannot do. The
assumed by the Philippines. He also stressed that there is no standard state assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of grounds for ineligibility
practice that automatically confers natural-born status to foundlings. into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the
law. (see Fermin v. COMELEC and Romualdez-Marcos vs.COMELEC )
Contreras' petition limited the attack to the residency issue. He contended
that the reckoning period for computing petitioner's residency in the 3. Given the pronouncements in Fermin and Romualdez, on September
Philippines should be from 18 July 2006, the date when her petition to 2012, Comelec amended its Rule 25, to wit:
reacquire Philippine citizenship was approved by the BI. Petitioner's physical
presence in the country before that date could not be valid evidence of Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is
reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she was then living here as an declared by final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the
American citizen and as such, she was governed by the Philippine Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
immigration laws. Constitution.

The Comelec First Division ruled that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny
and that she failed to complete the ten year residency requirement, and to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a
cancelled petitioner's COC. The COMELEC En Banc denied petitioner's Nuisance Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.
motion for reconsideration.
4. The 2012 amendment is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an
Present petition authorized proceeding for determiningbefore election the qualifications of
candidate. Such that, as presently required, to disqualify a candidate there
Petitioner instituted the present petitions for certiorari to assail the Comelec must be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent court that the
resolutions on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or found by the Commission
to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution."
5. The COMELEC does not have authority to determine the qualification of a foregoing evidence, would indicate more than ample probability if not
candidate. The facts of qualification must beforehand be established in a statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That probability
prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section
prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by executive order or 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.
Foundlings are considered natural-born citizens
6. If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she (a) Foundlings as Filipino citizens
is suffering from a disqualification "provided by law or the 13. As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While
Constitution," neither can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled or denied the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no
due course on grounds of false representations regarding his or her restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either.
qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to
qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure by which the foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers.
falsity of the representation can be found. The only exception that can be
conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity 14. The deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the
and judicial confessions. Such are bases equivalent to prior decisions against framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. Though the
which the falsity of representation can be determined. Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there was any
objection to the notion that persons of "unknown parentage" are not citizens
B. Citizenship qualification but only because their number was not enough to merit specific mention. As
Burden of proof was on private respondents to show that the Solicitor General points out, “the constitutional silence is fully explained
petitioner is not a Filipino citizen in terms of linguistic efficiency and the avoidance of redundancy, i.e, there is
7. COMELEC ruled that petitioner “has the burden to present evidence to no more need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos because they are
prove her natural filiation with a Filipino parent.” already impliedly so recognized.”

8. The burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is 15. The Court finds no intent or language permitting discrimination against
not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have shown that both foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions (1935, 1973, 1987)
of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws.
not shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility
that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high 16. Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are
probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos. Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon
the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be
Circumstantial evidence establish that Grace Poe had Filipino adopted. Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court will
parents have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino. Domestic adoption laws, i.e.
9. COMELEC said that it cannot rule that petitioner possesses blood R.A. No. 8043[Inter-Country Adoption] and R.A. No. 8552 [Domestic
relationship with a Filipino citizen when "it is certain that such relationship is Adoption], all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include foundlings as
indemonstrable”. among Filipino children who may be adopted.

10. The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their (b) Foundlings enjoy natural-born status
identities are unknown, but whether such parents are Filipinos. The Solicitor 17. Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are
General offered official statistics that from 1965 to 1975 which shows that the citizens of the Philippines from birthwithout having to perform any act to
statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."
natural-born Filipino is 99.83 %. Petitioner also presented census statistics
for Iloilo Province showing that 99.62 % of the population were Filipinos. 18. It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a
foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling certificate are “acts to
11. Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship” which make the foundling a
parents are the fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous:
Church in Iloilo City. She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal (1) "Having to perform an act" means that the act must be personally done by
bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face. the citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is done not
by the child but by the authorities.
12. There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according (2) The object of the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the
to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. All of the parents, not the citizenship of the child.
(3) The process is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that
acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born their principles are not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the
of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration on
an act to perfect it. Human Rights, Article 15(1) of which effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930
Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention on the
Citizenship of foundlings under international law Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15(1) of the
19. Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 UDHR. (see Razon vs. Tagitis and Mijares v. Ranada)
Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere of domestic
law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation 25. Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the
methodrequires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law 1961 Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent
through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. On the other with the }us sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of
hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their
theincorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land parents are nationals of the Philippines.
even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
It is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume
20. Generally accepted principles of international law include international foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in
custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general which the foundling is found
principles of law recognized by civilized nations. International customary 26. Generally accepted principles of international law, under the
rules are accepted as binding as a result from the combination of two incorporation clause in Sec 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution, are based not
elements: (a) the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part only on international custom, but also on "general principles of law
of States; and (b) a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive recognized by civilized nations," as the phrase is understood in Article 38.1
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a paragraph ( c) of the ICJ Statute.
belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a
rule of law requiring it. 27. Petitioner's evidence shows that at least 60 countries have passed
legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen, and 42 of those countries
(a) UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR (binding as treaties) follow the jus sanguinis regime. It was also pointed out that in 166 out of 189
21. The Philippines is a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human countries surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings are recognized as citizens. These
Rights ("UDHR"). The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the circumstances, including the practice of jus sanguinis countries, show that it
Rights of the Child (UNCRC). In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). as having been born of nationals of the country in which the foundling is
found.
22. The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the
Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is 28. Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this
stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot generally accepted principle of international law. In particular, R.A. No.
be accomplished by the application of our present naturalization laws, 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which "Filipino children." In all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino children
require the applicant to be at least eighteen ( 18) years old. who could be adopted.

(b) 1930 Hague Convention and 1961 UN Convention on the Repatriation under RA 9225 resulted in Grace Poe's reacquisition
Reduction of Statelessness (binding as generally accepted of her status as a natural born Filipino citizen
principles of international law) 29. The COMELEC ruled that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under
23. The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship.
Philippines, are generally accepted principles of international law. (1) The The COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must perform an act, what
first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions is reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship but only plain "Philippine
Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is citizenship."
presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth" (2) The second is
Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of 30. Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This
Statelessness under which a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to
country where he is found. his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
24. That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he 37. The cases relied on by Comelec are not applicable. In the said cases,
will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. because of the sparse evidence on residence, the Court had no choice but to
hold that residence could be counted only from acquisition of a permanent
31. COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast, the
already rejected in Bengson Ill v. HRETwhere the phrase "from birth" was evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no other
clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the time of his birth, conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S.
is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof." Neither residence (selling the house, taking the children from U.S. schools, getting
is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson quotes from the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the
Ill v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there are only two types of citizens abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating excess items to the
under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S. employment right after
there is no third category for repatriated citizens. selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the Philippines and
actually re-established her residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N,
C. Residency qualification enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying property here,
32. The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years' constructing a residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips
residence in the Philippines before the day of the elections. In answer to the abroad, her husband getting employed here). Indeed, coupled with her
requested information of "Period of Residence in the Philippines up to the eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's
day before May 9, 2016," petitioner put in "10 years 11 months" which actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when
according to her pleadings corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May 2005 petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.
when she returned for good from the U.S.
38. The COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had entered the
Requisites to acquire a new domicile Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as
33. There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: amended (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program) shows that there is no
(a) residence or bodily presence in a new locality overriding intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave
(b) an intention to remain there after one year. Included in the law is a former Filipino who has been
(c) an intention to abandon the old domicile naturalized abroad and "comes or returns to the Philippines."

34. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an Statements on residency made in 2012 COC is not conclusive ( it is
actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of the fact of residence, as borne out by the evidence, not a statement
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and in a certificate of candidacy, which shall be determinative)
definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must 39. The COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years
basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The and eleven (11) months in her 2015 COC was false because she put six ( 6)
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite years and six ( 6) months as "period of residence before May 13, 2013" in her
period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence 2012 COC for Senator. In doing so, the COMELEC automatically assumed as
at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. true the statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC as false.

Grace Poe re-established her residency in the Philippines as early 40. Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012
as May 24, 2005 (period of residence before 13 May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of
the time she submitted the COC, is bolstered by the change which the
35. When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original COMELEC itself introduced in the 2015 COC which is now "period of
domicile, which is the Philippines. Petitioner, however, presented residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016." The
voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S. COMELEC would not have revised the query if it did not acknowledge that
domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. the first version was vague.

36. It is the Comelec's position that the earliest date that petitioner could 41. According to petitioner, in her 2012 COC, she reckoned residency from
have started residence in the Philippines was in July 2006 when her April-May 2006 which was the period when the U.S. house was sold and her
application under RA 9225 was approved by the BI. Since petitioner was still husband returned to the Philippines. Petitioner could have reckoned
an American (without any resident visa) until her reacquisition of citizenship residence from a date earlier given the evidence that she had returned a year
under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24 May 2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be before. Such evidence would include her passport and the school records of
counted. her children.
42. It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC DAVID V. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
as a binding and conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in The words of our most fundamental law cannot be read so as to callously
evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means conclusive.There is exclude all foundlings from public service.
precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of residence
made in a COC was overcome by evidence. (see Romualdez-Marcos v. When the names of the parents of a foundling cannot be discovered despite a
COMELEC) diligent search, but sufficient evidence is presented to sustain a reasonable
inference that satisfies the quantum of proof required to conclude that at
43. It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy least one or both of his or her parents is Filipino, then this should be
which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has sufficient to establish that he or she is a natural-born citizen. When these
satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement." The inferences are made by the Senate Electoral Tribunal in the exercise of its
COMELEC ought to have looked at the evidence presented and see if sole and exclusive prerogative to decide the qualifications of the members of
petitioner was telling the truth that she was in the Philippines from 24 May the Senate, then there is no grave abuse of discretion remediable by either
2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it would have seen that the 2012 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court or Article VIII, Section I of the Constitution.
COC and the 2015 COC both correctly stated the pertinent period of
residency. This case certainly does not decide with finality the citizenship of every single
foundling as natural-born. The circumstances of each case are unique, and
D. Material Misrepresentation as a ground for denying due course substantial proof may exist to show that a foundling is not natural-born. The
to, and cancellation of a COC nature of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and its place in the scheme of political
powers, as devised by the Constitution, are likewise different from the other
Candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not ways to raise questions of citizenship.
necessarily constitute material misrepresentation
44. A candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 filed by petitioner Rizalito Y.
constitute material misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying David (David). He prays for the nullification of the assailed November 17,
due course to, and for the cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already 2015 Decision and December 3, 2015 Resolution of public respondent Senate
discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer Electoral Tribunal in SET Case No. 001-15.2 The assailed November 17, 2015
to a material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but should Decision3 dismissed the Petition for Quo Warranto filed by David, which
evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would sought to unseat private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares as a
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with an intention to Senator for allegedly not being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and,
deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications to run for public office. (see therefore, not being qualified to hold such office under Article VI, Section
Ugdoracion, Jr. v. COMELEC) 34 of the 1987 Constitution. The assailed December 3, 2015
Resolution5denied David's Motion for Reconsideration.

Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a foundling whose

biological parents are unknown. As an infant, she was abandoned at the
Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo.6 Edgardo Militar found her outside the church
on September 3, 1968 at about 9:30 a.m. 7 He later turned her over to Mr.
and Mrs. Emiliano Militar. 8 Emiliano Militar reported to the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar that the infant was found on September 6, 1968.9

She was given the name Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar. 10 The Local
Civil Registrar issued a Certificate of Live Birth/Foundling Certificate stating:

Circumstances: THE SUBJECT CHILD WAS FOUND IN THE PARISH

CHURCHD [sic] OF JARO, ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1968 AT ABOUT 9:30 A.M.
BY EDGARDO MILIT AR AND THE SAID CHILD IS PRESENTLY IN THE
CUSTODY OF MR. AND MRS. EMILIANO MILITARAT STA. ISABEL
STREET, JARO ... 11

On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal promulgated the
Decision granting the Petition for Adoption of Senator Poe by Spouses
Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Poe's adoptive father, Fernando Poe, Jr., ran for President of the Republic of
Sonora Poe (more popularly known as Susan Roces). 12 The Decision also the Philippines in the 2004 National Elections.32 To support her father's
ordered the change in Senator Poe's name from Mary Grace Natividad candidacy, Senator Poe and her daughter Hanna returned to the Philippines
Contreras Militar to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe. 13 On October 27, on April 8, 2004.33 After the Elections, she returned to the United States on
2005, Clerk of Court III Eleanor A. Sorio certified that the Decision had July 8, 2004.34 It was during her stay in the Philippines that she gave birth to
become final in a Certificate of Finality. 14 her youngest daughter, Anika.35

On April 11, 1980, the Office of Civil Registrar-Iloilo received the Decision of Fernando Poe, Jr. was hospitalized on December 11, 2004 and eventually
the San Juan Court Municipal Court and noted on Senator Poe's foundling "slipped into a coma."36 Senator Poe returned to the Philippines on December
certificate that she was adopted by Spouses Ronald Allan and Jesusa 13, 2004.37 On December 14, 2004, her father died. 38 She stayed in the
Poe. 15This hand-written notation appears on Senator Poe's foundling country until February 3, 2005 to attend her father's funeral and to attend to
certificate: the settling of his estate.39

NOTE: Adopted child by the Spouses Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora In 2004, Senator Poe resigned from work in the United States. She never
Poe as per Court Order, Mun. Court, San Juan, Rizal, by Hon. Judge Alfredo looked for work again in the United States.40
M. Gorgonio dated May 13, 1974, under Sp. Proc. No. 138.16
Senator Poe decided to return home in 2005. 41 After consulting her children,
Senator Poe became a registered voter in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila they all agreed to return to the Philippines to support the grieving Susan
when she turned 18 years old. 17 The Commission on Elections issued her a Roces.42 In early 2005, they notified Brian and Hanna's schools in Virginia,
Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro United States that they would be transferring to the Philippines the following
Manila on December 13, 1986. 18 semester.43 She came back on May 24, 2005.44 Her children also arrived in
the first half of 2005.45 However, her husband stayed in the United States to
On April 4, 1988, the Department of Foreign Affairs issued her a Philippine "finish pending projects, and to arrange for the sale of the family home
passport. 19 Her passport was renewed on April 5, 1993, May 19, 1998, there."46
October 13, 2009, December 19, 2013, and March 18, 2014.20 Having become
Senator, she was also issued a Philippine diplomatic passport on December Following her return, Senator Poe was issued by the Bureau of Internal
19, 2013.21 Revenue a Tax Identification Number (TIN) on July 22, 2005.47

Senator Poe took Development Studies at the University of the Philippines, On July 7, 2006, Senator Poe took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
Manila, but eventually went to the United States in 1988 to obtain her college the Philippines:48
degree.22 In 1991, she earned a bachelor's degree in Political Science from
Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts. 23 I, Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares, solemnly swear that I will support and
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws
On July 27, 1991, Senator Poe married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Llamanzares, both an American and Filipino national since birth. 24 The Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme
marriage took place in Sanctuario de San Jose Parish, San Juan, Manila. 25 authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
On July 29, 1991, Senator Poe returned to the United States with her mental reservation or purpose of evasion.49
husband.26 For some time, she lived with her husband and children in the
United States.27 On July 10, 2006, Senator Poe filed a Petition for Retention and/or Re-
acquisition of Philippine Citizenship through Republic Act No. 9225. 50 She
Senator Poe and her husband .had three (3) children: also "filed applications for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three
children who were all below eighteen (18) years of age at that time."51
Brian Daniel (Brian), Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna), and Jesusa Anika
(Anika).28 Brian was born in the United States on April 16, 1992. Hanna was The Petition was granted by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation on
born on July 10, 1998, and Anika on June 5, 2004. Both Hanna and Anika July 18, 2006 through an Order signed by Associate Commissioner Roy M.
were born in the Philippines. 29 Almoro for Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr: 52

Senator Poe was naturalized and granted American citizenship on October A careful review of the documents submitted in support of the instant
18, 2001. 30 She was subsequently given a United States passport. 31 Senator petition indicate that David was a former citizen of the Republic of the
 Philippines being born to Filipino parents and is presumed to be a natural October 5, 2008 PR359
born Philippine citizen; thereafter, became an American citizen and is now a May 21, 2009 PR105
holder of an American passport; was issued an ACT and ICR and has taken August 3, 2009 PR733
her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 2006 and November 15, 2009 PR10361
so is thereby deemed to have re-acquired her Philippine
Citizenship.53 (Emphasis in the original) On October 6, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III appointed Senator
Poe as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification
In the same Order, Senator Poe's children were "deemed Citizens of the Board (MTRCB).62 On October 20, 2010, Senator Poe executed an Affidavit of
Philippines in accordance with Section 4 of R[epublic] A[ct] No. Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation
9225."54 Until now, the Order "has not been set aside by the Department of of American Citizenship, 63 stating:
Justice or any other agency of Govemment."55
I, MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, Filipino, of legal age, and presently
On July 31, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification residing at No. 107 Rodeo Drive, Corinthian Hills, Quezon City, Philippines,
Certificates in the name of Senator Poe and her children. 56 It stated that after having been duly sworn to in accordance with the law, do hereby depose
Senator Poe is a "citizen of the Philippines pursuant to the Citizenship and state that with this affidavit, I hereby expressly and voluntarily renounce
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 . . . in relation to Administrative my United States nationality/ American citizenship, together with all rights
Order No. 91, Series of 2004 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-2-005 per and privileges and all duties and allegiance and fidelity thereunto pertaining.
Office Order No. AFF-06-9133 signed Associate Commissioner Roy M. I make this renunciation intentionally, voluntarily, and of my own free will,
Almoro dated July 18, 2006."57 free of any duress or undue influence. 64 (Emphasis in the original)
Senator Poe became a registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan The affidavit was submitted to the Bureau of Immigration on October 21,
City on August 31, 2006. 58 2010.65 On October 21, 2010, she took her Oath of Office as MTRCB
Chairperson and assumed office on October 26, 2010.66 Her oath of office
Senator Poe made several trips to the United States of America between 2006 stated:
and 2009 using her United States Passport No. 170377935.59
PANUNUMPASAKATUNGKULAN
She used her passport "after having taken her Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic on 07 July 2006, but not after she has formally renounced her Ako, si MARY GRACE POE LLAMANZARES, na itinalaga sa katungkulan
American citizenship on 20 October 2010."60 The following are the flight bilang Chairperson, Movie and Television Review and Classification Board,
records given by the Bureau of Immigration: ay taimtim na nanunumpa na tutuparin ko nang buong husay at katapatan,
Departures Flight No. sa abot ng aking kakayahan, ang mga tungkulin ng aking kasalukuyang
November 1, 2006 SQ071 katungkulan at ng mga iba pang pagkaraan nito'y gagampanan ko sa ilalim
July 20, 2007 PR730 ng Republika ng Pilipinas; na aking itataguyod at ipagtatanggol ang Saligan
October 31, 2007 PR300 Batas ng Pilipinas; na tunay na mananalig at tatalima ako rito; na susundin
October 2, 2008 PR358 ko ang mga batas, mga kautusang lega, at mga dekretong pinaiiral ng mga
April 20, 2009 PR104 sadyang itinakdang may kapangyarihan ng Republika ng Pilipinas; at kusa
July 31, 2009 PR730 kong babalikatin ang pananagutang ito, nang walang ano mang pasubali o
October 19, 2009 PR102 hangaring umiwas.
November 15, 2009 PR103
December 27, 2009 PR112 Kasihan nawa ako ng Diyos.
March 27, 2010 PR102
NILAGDAAN AT PINANUMPAAN sa harap ko ngayong ika-21 ng Oktubre
2010, Lungsod ng Maynila, Pilipinas.67(Emphasis in the original)
Arrivals Flight No.
Senator Poe executed an Oath/ Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of
November 4, 2006 SQ076 the United States68 in the presence of Vice-Consul Somer E. Bessire-Briers on
July 23, 2007 PR731 July 12, 2011.69 On this occasion, she also filled out the Questionnaire
November 5, 2007 PR337 Information for Determining Possible Loss of U.S. Citizenship.70 On
May 8, 2008 PR103 December 9, 2011, Vice Consul Jason Galian executed a Certificate of Loss of
Nationality for Senator Poe.71 The certificate was approved by the Overseas
Citizen Service, Department of State, on February 3, 2012.72 Oral arguments were held by the Senate Electoral Tribunal on September 21,
2015.91 The parties were then "required to submit their respective
Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the 2013 Elections. 73 On September [memoranda], without prejudice to the submission of DNA evidence by
27, 2012, she executed a Certificate of Candidacy, which was submitted to the [Senator Poe] within thirty (30) days from the said date."92
Commission on Elections on October 2, 2012.74 She won and was declared as
Senator-elect on May 16, 2013.75 On October 21, 2015, Senator Poe moved to extend for 15 days the
submission of DNA test results.93 The Senate Electoral Tribunal granted the
David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections, filed before the Motion on October 27, 2015 through Resolution No. 15-08.94 On November
Senate Electoral Tribunal a Petition for Quo Warranto on August 6, 5, 2015, Senator Poe filed a Manifestation regarding the results of DNA
2015. 76 He contested the election of Senator Poe for failing to "comply with Testing,95 which stated that "none of the tests that [Senator Poe] took
the citizenship and residency requirements mandated by the 1987 provided results that would shed light to the real identity of her biological
Constitution."77 parents."96 The Manifestation also stated that Senator Poe was to continue to
find closure regarding the issue and submit any development to the Senate
Thereafter, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-01 Electoral Tribunal. Later, Senator Poe submitted "the issue of her natural
requiring David "to correct the formal defects of his petition."78 David filed born Filipino citizenship as a foundling for resolution upon the legal
his amended Petition on August 17, 2015. 79 arguments set forth in her submissions to the Tribunal."97On November 6,
2015, through Resolution No. 15-10, the Senate Electoral Tribunal "noted the
On August 18, 2015, Resolution No. 15-02 was issued by the Senate Electoral [M]anifestation and considered the case submitted for resolution."98
Tribunal, through its Executive Committee, ordering the Secretary of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal to summon Senator Poe to file an answer to the On November 17, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal promulgated its
amended Petition. 80 assailed Decision finding Senator Poe to be a natural-born citizen and,
therefore, qualified to hold office as Senator.99 The Decision stated:
Pending the filing of Senator Poe's answer, David filed a Motion to Subpoena
the Record of Application of Citizenship Re-acquisition and other related We rule that Respondent is a natural-born citizen under the 1935
documents from the Bureau of Immigration on August 25, 2015. 81 Constitution and continue to be a natural-born citizen as defined under the
1987 Constitution, as she is a "citizen of the Philippines from birth, without
The documents requested included Senator Poe's record of travels and NSO having to perform any act to acquire or perfect (her) Philippine citizenship.
kept Birth Certificate. 82 On August 26, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal
issued Resolution No. 15-04 granting the Motion. 83 The same Resolution ....
directed the Secretary of the Tribunal to issue a subpoena to the concerned
officials of the Bureau of Immigration and the National Statistics Office.84 In light of our earlier pronouncement that Respondent is a natural born
Filipino citizen, Respondent validly reacquired her natural-born Filipino
The subpoenas ordered the officials to appear on September 1, 2015 at 10:00 citizenship upon taking her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
a.m. before the Office of the Secretary of the Senate bearing three (3) sets of Philippines, as required under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225.
the requested documents.85 The subpoenas were complied with by both the
Bureau of Immigration and the National Statistics Office on September 1, Under Section 11 of B.I. Memorandum Circular No. AFF. 05-002 (the
2015.86 Revised Rules Implementing R.A. No. 9225), the foregoing Oath of
Allegiance is the "final act" to reacquire natural-born Philippine citizenship.
On September 1, 2015, Senator Poe submitted her Verified Answer with (1)
Prayer for Summary Dismissal; (2) Motion for Preliminary Hearing on ....
Grounds for Immediate Dismissal/Affirmative Defenses; (3) Motion to Cite
David for Direct Contempt of Court; and ( 4) Counterclaim for Indirect To repeat, Respondent never used her USA passport from the moment she
Contempt of Court. 87 renounced her American citizenship on 20 October 2010.

On September 2, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. She remained solely a natural-born Filipino citizen from that time on until
15-05 requiring the parties to file a preliminary conference brief on or before today.
September 9, 2015. 88 The Resolution also set the Preliminary Conference on
September 11, 2015. 89 During the Preliminary Conference, the parties WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for quo warranto is
"agreed to drop the issue of residency on the ground of prescription. " 90 DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs. Petitioner comes to this Court invoking our power of judicial review through
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED. 100 (Citations omitted) He seeks to annul the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, which state its findings and conclusions on private
On November 23, 2015, David moved for reconsideration. 101 The Senate respondent's citizenship.
Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-11 on November 24, 2015, giving
Senator Poe five (5) days to comment on the Motion for Reconsideration. 102 Ruling on petitioner's plea for post-judgment relief calls for a consideration
of two (2) factors: first, the breadth of this Court's competence relative to that
Senator Poe filed her Comment/Opposition to the Motion for of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and second, the nature of the remedial
Reconsideration on December 1, 2015. 103 David's Motion for Reconsideration vehicle-a petition for certiorari-through which one who is aggrieved by a
was denied by the Senate Electoral Tribunal on December 3, 2015: 104 judgment of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may seek relief from this Court.

WHEREFORE, the Tribunal resolves to DENY the Verified Motion for I. A

Reconsideration (of the Decision promulgated on 17 November 2015) of
David Rizalito Y. David dated 23 November 2015. The Senate Electoral Tribunal, along with the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, is a creation of Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987
The Tribunal further resolves to CONFIRM Resolution No. 15-11 dated 24 Constitution.112
November 2015 issued by the Executive Committee of the Tribunal; to NOTE
the Comment/Opposition filed by counsel for Respondent on 01 December
2015; to GRANT the motion for leave to appear and submit memorandum as ARTICLE VI
amici curiae filed by Dean Arturo de Castro [and to] NOTE the The Legislative Department
Memorandum (for Volunteer Amicus Curiae) earlier submitted by Dean de
Castro before the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 15-139 (DC), entitled ....
"Amado D. Valdez, Petitoner, versus Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe
Llaman[z]ares, Respondent." SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have
an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
SO ORDERED. 105 (Emphasis in the original) the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall
On December 8, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal's Resolution was be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
received by David. 106 On December 9, 2015, David filed the present Petition the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
for Certiorari before this Court. 107 Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
On December 16, 2015, this Court required the Senate Electoral Tribunal and organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
Senator Poe to comment on the Petition "within a non extendible period of senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (Emphasis
fifteen (15) days from notice." 108 The Resolution also set oral arguments on supplied)
January 19, 2016. 109 The Senate Electoral Tribunal, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, submitted its Comment on December 30, 2015. 110 Senator
Poe submitted her Comment on January 4, 2016. 111 Through Article VI, Section 17, the Constitution segregates from all other
judicial and quasi-judicial bodies (particularly, courts and the Commission
This case was held in abeyance pending the resolution of the Commission on on Elections 113) the power to rule on contests 114 relating to the election,
Elections case on the issue of private respondent's citizenship. returns, and qualifications of members of the Senate (as well as of the House
of Representatives). These powers are granted to a separate and distinct
For resolution is the sole issue of whether the Senate Electoral Tribunal constitutional organ. There are two (2) aspects to the exclusivity of the Senate
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of Electoral Tribunal's power. The power to resolve such contests is exclusive to
jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner's Petition for Quo Warranto based on its any other body. The resolution of such contests is its only task; it performs no
finding that private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen, qualified to other function.
hold a seat as Senator under Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution.

I
The 1987 Constitution is not the first fundamental law to introduce into our
legal system an "independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to The Court has stressed that ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the [House
the legislature and specially created for that singular purpose." 115 of Representatives Electoral Tribunal] the power to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
The 1935 Constitution similarly created an Electoral Commission, House of Representatives, any final action taken by the [House of
independent from the National Assembly, to be the sole judge of all contests Representatives Electoral Tribunal] on a matter within its jurisdiction shall,
relating to members of the National Assembly. 116 This was a departure from as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court ... the power granted to the Electoral
the system introduced by prior organic acts enforced under American Tribunal ... excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court
colonial rule-namely: the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of 1916- that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same."
which vested the power to resolve such contests in the legislature itself. When
the 1935 Constitution was amended to make room for a bicameral legislature, The Court did recognize, of course, its power of judicial review in exceptional
a corresponding amendment was made for there to be separate electoral cases. In Robles vs. [House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal], the Court
tribunals for each chamber of Congress. 117 The 1973 Constitution did away has explained that while the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial
with these electoral tribunals, but they have since been restored by the 1987 interference, the Court may do so, however, but only "in the exercise of this
Constitution. Court's so-calledextraordinary jurisdiction, ... upon a determination
that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess
All constitutional provisions-under the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions-which of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing
provide for the creation of electoral tribunals (or their predecessor, the Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the
Electoral Commission), have been unequivocal in their language. The Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a
electoral tribunal shall be the "sole" judge. demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such
grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse."
In Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal: 118
In the old, but still relevant, case of Morrero vs. Bocar, the Court has ruled
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the that the power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference
jurisdiction conferred. . . . The exercise of the power by the Electoral except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident
Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended to use of power as will constitute a denial of due process."
be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature[.]" Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was characterized The Court does not, to paraphrase it in Co vs. [House of Representatives
by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete." ... Under the amended 1935 Electoral Tribunal], venture into the perilous area of correcting perceived
Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral errors of independent branches of the Government; it comes in only when it
Tribunal ... and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so
granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission .... The same may be grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution itself calls for remedial
said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 action. 121 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Constitution. 119
This Court reviews judgments of the House and Senate Electoral Tribunals
Exclusive, original jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, not in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Our review is limited to a
and qualifications of the elective officials falling within the scope of their determination of whether there has been an error in jurisdiction, not an error
powers is, thus, vested in these electoral tribunals. It is only before them that in judgment.
post-election challenges against the election, returns, and qualifications of
Senators and Representatives (as well as of the President and the Vice- I. B
President, in the case of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal) may be initiated.
A party aggrieved by the rulings of the Senate or House Electoral Tribunal
The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the scope of any review. invokes the jurisdiction of this Court through the vehicle of a petition for
Article VI, Section 17's stipulation of electoral tribunals' being the "sole" certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
judge must be read in harmony with Article VIII, Section l's express
statement that "[j]udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice ... to An appeal is a continuation of the proceedings in the tribunal from which the
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion appeal is taken. A petition for certiorari is allowed in Article VIII, Section 1 of
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or the Constitution and described in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as an
instrumentality of the Government." Judicial review is, therefore, still independent civil action. 122 The viability of such a petition is premised on an
possible. In Libanan v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal: 120 allegation of "grave abuse of discretion." 123
 The Senate Electoral Tribunal's conclusions are in keeping with a faithful and
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has been generally held to refer to such exhaustive reading of the Constitution, one that proceeds from an intent to
arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical exercise of judgment as is tantamount to give life to all the aspirations of all its provisions.
lack of jurisdiction:
Ruling on the Petition for Quo Warranto initiated by petitioner, the Senate
[T]he abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an Electoral Tribunal was confronted with a novel legal question: the citizenship
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by status of children whose biological parents are unknown, considering that the
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in Constitution, in Article IV, Section 1(2) explicitly makes reference to one's
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere father or mother. It was compelled to exercise its original jurisdiction in the
abuse of discretion is not enough: it must be grave. 124 face of a constitutional ambiguity that, at that point, was without judicial
precedent.
There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional organ such as the
Senate Electoral Tribunal or the Commission on Elections, makes manifestly Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was only asked to make
gross errors in its factual inferences such that critical pieces of evidence, a reasonable interpretation of the law while heedfully considering the
which have been nevertheless properly introduced by a party, or admitted, or established personal circumstances of private respondent. It could not have
which were the subject of stipulation, are ignored or not accounted for. 125 asked the impossible of private respondent, sending her on a proverbial fool's
errand to establish her parentage, when the controversy before it arose
A glaring misinterpretation of the constitutional text or of statutory because private respondent's parentage was unknown and has remained so
provisions, as well as a misreading or misapplication of the current state of throughout her life.
jurisprudence, is also considered grave abuse of discretion. 126 The
arbitrariness consists in the disregard of the current state of our law. The Senate Electoral Tribunal knew the limits of human capacity. It did not
insist on burdening private respondent with conclusively proving, within the
Adjudication that fails to consider the facts and evidence or frivolously course of the few short months, the one thing that she has never been in a
departs from settled principles engenders a strong suspicion of partiality. position to know throughout her lifetime. Instead, it conscientiously
This can be a badge of hostile intent against a party. appreciated the implications of all other facts known about her finding.
Therefore, it arrived at conclusions in a manner in keeping with the degree of
Writs of certiorari have, therefore, been issued: proof required in proceedings before a quasi-judicial body: not absolute
certainty, not proof beyond reasonable doubt or preponderance of evidence,
(a) where the tribunal's approach to an issue is premised on wrong but "substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
considerations and its conclusions founded on a gross misreading, if not reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion." 131
misrepresentation, of the evidence; 127
In the process, it avoided setting a damning precedent for all children with
(b) where a tribunal's assessment of a case is "far from reasonable[,] [and] the misfortune of having been abandoned by their biological parents.
based solely on very personal and subjective assessment standards when the
law is replete with standards that can be used"; 128 " Far from reducing them to inferior, second-class citizens, the Senate
Electoral Tribunal did justice to the Constitution's aims of promoting and
(c) where the tribunal's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence defending the well-being of children, advancing human rights, and
oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly guaranteeing equal protection of the laws and equal access to opportunities
unreasonable"; 129 and for public service.

(d) where the tribunal invokes erroneous or irrelevant considerations in II

resolving an issue. 130
Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells out the requirement that
I. C "[n]o person shall be a Senator unless he [or she] is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines."
We find no basis for concluding that the Senate Electoral Tribunal acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion Petitioner asserts that private respondent is not a natural-born citizen and,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. therefore, not qualified to sit as Senator of the Republic, chiefly on two (2)
grounds. First, he argues that as a foundling whose parents are unknown,
private respondent fails to satisfy the }us sanguinis principle: that is, that she
failed to establish her Filipino "blood line," which is supposedly the essence plebiscite. The preeminent consideration in reading the Constitution,
of the Constitution's- determination of who are natural-born citizens of the therefore, is the People's consciousness: that is, popular, rather than
Philippines. Proceeding from this first assertion, petitioner insists that as technical-legal, understanding. Thus:
private respondent was never a natural-born citizen, she could never have
reverted to natural-born status despite the performance of acts that We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning.
ostensibly comply with Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched
express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their
Petitioner's case hinges on the primacy he places over Article IV, Section 1 of ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case
the 1987 Constitution and its enumeration of who are Filipino citizens, more the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not
specifically on Section 1(2), which identifies as citizens "[t]hose whose fathers primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain
or mothers are citizens of the Philippines." Petitioner similarly claims that, as that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as
private respondent's foundling status is settled, the burden to prove Filipino much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common
parentage was upon her. With private respondent having supposedly failed to use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed
discharge this burden, the supposed inevitable conclusion is that she is not a compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on
natural-born Filipino. the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus,
these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a
III minimum. 135 (Emphasis supplied)

At the heart of this controversy is a constitutional ambiguity. Reading a constitutional provision requires awareness of its relation with the
whole of the Constitution. A constitutional provision is but a constituent of a
Definitely, foundlings have biological parents, either or both of whom can be greater whole. It is the framework of the Constitution that animates each of
Filipinos. Yet, by the nature of their being foundlings, they may, at I critical its components through the dynamism of these components' interrelations.
times, not know their parents. Thus, this controversy must consider What is called into operation is the entire document, not simply a peripheral
possibilities where parentage may be Filipino but, due to no fault of the item. The Constitution should, therefore, be appreciated and read as a
foundling, remains unknown. 132 Resolving this controversy hinges on singular, whole unit-ut magis valeat quam pereat. 136 Each provision must be
constitutional interpretation. understood and effected in a way that gives life to all that the Constitution
contains, from its foundational principles to its finest fixings. 137
Discerning constitutional meaning is an exercise in discovering the
sovereign's purpose so as to identify which among competing interpretations The words and phrases that establish its framework and its values color each
of the same text is the more contemporarily viable construction. Primarily, provision at the heart of a controversy in an actual case. In Civil Liberties
the actual words-text-and how they are situated within the whole document- Union versus Executive Secretary:138
context-govern. Secondarily, when discerning meaning from the plain text
(i.e., verba legis) fails, contemporaneous construction may settle what is It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one
more viable. Nevertheless, even when a reading of the plain text is already provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be
sufficient, contemporaneous construction may still be resorted to as a means considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject
for verifying or validating the clear textual or contextual meaning of the are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great
Constitution. purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should
be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of
III. A the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by
any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.
The entire exercise of interpreting a constitutional provision must necessarily
begin with the text itself. The language of the provision being interpreted is In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean
the principal source from which this Court determines the constitutional in favor of construction which will render every word operative, rather than
intent.133 one which may make the words idle and nugatory. 139(Citations omitted)

To the extent possible, words must be given their ordinary meaning; this is Reading a certain text includes a consideration of jurisprudence that has
consistent with the basic precept of verba legis. 134 The Constitution is truly a previously considered that exact same text, if any. Our legal system is
public document in that it was ratified and approved by a direct act of the founded on the basic principle that "[j]udicial decisions applying or
People: exercising their right of suffrage, they approved of it through a
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of [our] legal fixation on technical rules of grammar is no less innocuous. A pompously
system." 140 Jurisprudence is not an independent source of law. doctrinaire approach to text can stifle, rather than facilitate, the legislative
wisdom that unbridled textualism purports to bolster.
Nevertheless, judicial interpretation is deemed part of or written into the text
itself as of the date that it was originally passed. This is because judicial Third, the assumption that there is, in all cases, a universal plain language is
construction articulates the contemporaneous intent that the text brings to erroneous. In reality, universality and uniformity in meaning is a rarity. -A
effect. 141 Nevertheless, one must not fall into the temptation of considering contrary belief wrongly assumes that language is static.
prior interpretation as immutable.
The more appropriate and more effective approach is, thus,
Interpretation grounded on textual primacy likewise looks into how the text holistic rather than parochial: to consider context and the
has evolved. Unless completely novel, legal provisions are the result of the re- interplay of the historical, the contemporary, and even the
adoption often with accompanying re-calibration of previously existing rules. envisioned.Judicial interpretation entails the convergence of social
Even when seemingly novel, provisions are often introduced as a means of realities and social ideals. The latter are meant to be effected by the legal
addressing the inadequacies and excesses of previously existing rules. apparatus, chief of which is the bedrock of the prevailing legal order: the
Constitution. Indeed, the word in the vernacular that describes the
One may trace the historical development of text: by comparing its current Constitution - saligan - demonstrates this imperative of constitutional
iteration with prior counterpart provisions, keenly taking note of changes in primacy.
syntax, along with accounting for more conspicuous substantive changes
such as the addition and deletion of provisos or items in enumerations, Thus, we refuse to read Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act in isolation.
shifting terminologies, the use of more emphatic or more moderate Here, we consider not an abstruse provision but a stipulation that is part of
qualifiers, and the imposition of heavier penalties. The tension between the whole, i.e., the statute of which it is a part, that is aimed at realizing the
consistency and change galvanizes meaning. ideal of fair elections. We consider not a cloistered provision but a norm that
should have a present authoritative effect to achieve the ideals of those who
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which enumerates who are currently read, depend on, and demand fealty from the
citizens of the Philippines, may be compared with counterpart provisions, not Constitution. 145 (Emphasis supplied)
only in earlier Constitutions but even in organic laws 142 and in similar
mechanisms 143 introduced by colonial rulers whose precepts nevertheless 111.B
still resonate today.
Contemporaneous construction and aids that are external to the text may be
Even as ordinary meaning is preeminent, a realistic appreciation of legal resorted to when the text is capable of multiple, viable meanings. 146
interpretation must grapple with the truth that meaning is not always
singular and uniform. In Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. Commission on It is only then that one can go beyond the strict boundaries of the document.
Elections, 144this Court explained the place of a holistic approach in legal
interpretation: Nevertheless, even when meaning has already been ascertained from a
reading of the plain text, contemporaneous construction may serve to verify
Interestingly, both COMELEC and petitioners appeal to what they or validate the meaning yielded by such reading
(respectively) construe to be plainly evident from Section 5.2(a)'s text: on the
part of COMELEC, that the use of the words "paid for" evinces no distinction Limited resort to contemporaneous construction is justified by the realization
between direct purchasers and those who purchase via subscription schemes; that the business of understanding the Constitution is not exclusive to this
and, on the part of petitioners, that Section 5.2(a)'s desistance from actually Court. The basic democratic foundation of our constitutional order
using the word "subscriber" means that subscribers are beyond its necessarily means that all organs of government, and even the People, read
contemplation. The variance in the parties' positions, considering that they the fundamental law and are guided by it. When competing viable
are both banking on what they claim to be the Fair Election Act's plain interpretations arise, a justiciable controversy may ensue requiring judicial
meaning, is the best evidence of an extant ambiguity. intervention in order to arrive with finality at which interpretation shall be
sustained. To remain true to its democratic moorings, however, judicial
Second, statutory construction cannot lend itself to pedantic rigor that involvement must remain guided by a framework or deference and
foments absurdity. The dangers of inordinate insistence on literal constitutional avoidance. This same principle underlies the basic doctrine
interpretation are. commonsensical and need not be belabored. These that courts are to refrain from issuing advisory opinions.
dangers are by no means endemic to legal interpretation. Even in everyday
conversations, misplaced literal interpretations are fodder for humor. A
Specifically as regards this Court, only constitutional issues that are narrowly how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framer's
framed, sufficient to resolve an actual case, may be entertained. 147 understanding thereof 149 (Emphasis supplied)

When permissible then, one may consider analogous jurisprudence (that is, IV
judicial decisions on similar, but not the very same, matters or
concerns), 148 as well as thematically similar statutes and international norms Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a Philippine citizen
that form part of our legal system. This includes discerning the purpose and without the need for an express statement in the Constitution making her so.
aims of the text in light of the specific facts under consideration. It is also Her status as such is but the logical consequence of a reasonable reading of
only at this juncture-when external aids may be consulted-that the the Constitution within its plain text. The Constitution provides its own cues;
supposedly underlying notions of the framers, as articulated through records there is not even a need to delve into the deliberations of its framers and the
of deliberations and other similar accounts, can be illuminating. implications of international legal instruments. This reading proceeds from
several levels.
III. C
On an initial level, a plain textual reading readily identifies the specific
In the hierarchy of the means for constitutional interpretation, inferring provision, which principally governs: the Constitution's actual definition, in
meaning from the supposed intent of the framers or fathoming the original Article IV, Section 2, of "natural-born citizens." This definition must be
understanding of the individuals who adopted the basic document is the harmonized with Section 1's enumeration, which includes a reference to
weakest approach. parentage. These provisions must then be appreciated in relation to the
factual milieu of this case. The pieces of evidence before the Senate Electoral
These methods leave the greatest room for subjective interpretation. Tribunal, admitted facts, and uncontroverted circumstances adequately
justify the conclusion of private respondent's Filipino parentage.
Moreover, they allow for the greatest errors. The alleged intent of the framers
is not necessarily encompassed or exhaustively articulated in the records of On another level, the assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born
deliberations. Those that have been otherwise silent and have not actively unless there is substantial evidence to the contrary. This is necessarily
engaged in interpellation and debate may have voted for or against a engendered by a complete consideration of the whole Constitution, not just
proposition for reasons entirely their own and not necessarily in complete its provisions on citizenship. This includes its mandate) of defending the
agreement with those articulated by the more vocal. It is even possible that well-being of children, guaranteeing equal protection of the
the beliefs that motivated them were based on entirely erroneous premises.
law, equal access to opportunities for public service, and respecting human
Fathoming original understanding can also misrepresent history as it rights, as well as its reasons for requiring natural-born status for select public
compels a comprehension of actions made within specific historical episodes offices. Moreover, this is a reading validated by contemporaneous
through detached, and not necessarily better-guided, modem lenses. construction that considers related legislative enactments, executive and
administrative actions, and international instruments.
Moreover, the original intent of the framers of the Constitution is not always
uniform with the original understanding of the People who ratified it. V

In Civil Liberties Union: Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. This status'
commencement from birth means that private respondent never had to do
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and anything to consummate this status. By definition, she is natural-born.
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason
and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only Though subsequently naturalized, she reacquired her natural-born status
when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of upon satisfying the requirement of Republic Act No. 9225. Accordingly, she is
the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic.
convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and
as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the V.A
views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our
fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave the instrument the force of Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution enumerates who are citizens of
fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what the Philippines:
appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
 identification of native inhabitants as subjects or as indios demonstrated the
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of colonial master's regard for native inhabitants as inferior. 157 Natives were,
this Constitution; thus, reduced to subservience in their own land.

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; Under the Spanish Constitution of 1876, persons born within Spanish
territory, not just peninsular Spain, were considered Spaniards. This
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect classification, however, did not extend to the Philippine Islands, as Article 89
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and expressly mandated that the archipelago was to be governed by special
laws. 158 It was only on December 18, 1889, upon the effectivity in this
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. 150 jurisdiction of the Civil Code of Spain, that there existed a categorical
enumeration of who were the Spanish citizens, 159 thus:
Article IV, Section 2 identifies who are natural-born citizens:
(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or (b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of
perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine Spain,
citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be
deemed natural born citizens. (Emphasis supplied) (c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,

Section 2' s significance is self-evident. It provides a definition of the term (d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants
"natural-born citizens." This is distinct from Section l's enumeration of who of any town of the Monarchy.160
are citizens. As against Section l's generic listing, Section 2 specifically
articulates those who may count themselves as natural-born. 1898 marked the end of Spanish colonial rule. The Philippine Islands were
ceded by Spain to the United States of America under the Treaty of Paris,
The weight and implications of this categorical definition are better which was entered into on December 10, 1898. The Treaty of Paris did not
appreciated when supplemented with an understanding of how our concepts automatically convert the native inhabitants to American citizens. 161
of citizenship and natural-born citizenship have evolved. As- will be seen, the
term "natural-born citizen" was a transplanted, but tardily defined, foreign Instead, it left the determination of the native inhabitants' status to the
concept. Congress of the United States:

V.B Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over
which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may
Citizenship is· a legal device denoting political affiliation. It is the "right to remain in such territory or may remove therefrom . . .. In case they remain in
have rights." 151 It is one's "personal and . . . permanent membership in a the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by
political community. . . . The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy making . . . a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in
political rights, that is, the right to participate in government principally default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to
through the right to vote, the right to hold public office[,] and the right to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may reside.
petition the government for redress of grievance." 152
Thus -
Citizenship also entails obligations to the political community of which one is
part. 153 Citizenship, therefore, is intimately tied with the notion that loyalty is the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories
owed to the state, considering the benefits and protection provided by it. This hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by Congress. 162
is particularly so if these benefits and protection have been enjoyed from the
moment of the citizen's birth. Pending legislation by the United States Congress, the native inhabitants who
had ceased to be Spanish subjects were "issued passports describing them to
Tecson v. Commission on Elections 154 reckoned with the historical be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United
development of our concept of citizenship, beginning under Spanish colonial States." 163
rule. 155 Under the Spanish, the native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
were identified not as citizens but as "Spanish subjects." 156 Church records
show that native inhabitants were referred to as "indios." The alternative
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" first appeared in legislation in provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and
the Philippine Organic Act, otherwise known as the Philippine Bill of such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the
1902: 164 United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the
laws of the United States if residing therein.
Section 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside
therein, who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen The Jones Law of 1916 provided that a native-born inhabitant of the
hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children Philippine Islands was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of April 11,
born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of 1899 if he or she was "(1) a subject of Spain on April 11, 1899, (2) residing in
the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United the Philippines on said date, and (3) since that date, not a citizen of some
States, except such as shall have elected to preserve t221538heir allegiance to other country." 168
the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, There was previously the view that jus soli may apply as a mode of acquiring
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. (Emphasis supplied) citizenship. It was the 1935 Constitution that made sole reference to
parentage vis-a-vis the determination of citizenship. 169 Article III, Section 1
The Philippine Bill of 1902 explicitly covered the status of children born in of the 1935 Constitution provided:
the Philippine Islands to its inhabitants who were Spanish subjects as of April
11, 1899. However, it did not account for the status of children born in the SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
Islands to parents who were not Spanish subjects. A view was expressed that
the common law concept of jus soli (or citizenship by place of birth), which (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
was operative in the United States, applied to the Philippine Islands. 165 adoption of this Constitution

On March 23, 1912, the United States Congress amended Section 4 of the (2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the
Philippine Bill of 1902. It was made to include a proviso for the enactment by adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
the legislature of a law on acquiring citizenship. This proviso read: Philippine Islands.

Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching
provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the
United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the (5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
laws of the United States if residing therein. 166
The term "natural-born citizen" first appeared in this jurisdiction in the 1935
In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the Jones Law of Constitution's provision stipulating the qualifications for President and Vice-
1916, replaced the Philippine Bill of 1902. It restated the citizenship provision President of the Philippines. Article VII, Section 3 read:
of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as amended: 167
SECTION 3. No person may be elected to the office of President or Vice
Section 2.-Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization President, unless he be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a qualified
voter, forty years of age or over, and has been a resident of the Philippines for
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on at least ten years immediately preceding the election.
the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be While it used the term "natural-born citizen," the 1935 Constitution did not
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall define the term.
have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance
with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Article II, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution-read with the then civil law
Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, provisions that stipulated the automatic loss of Filipino citizenship by women
and except such others as have since become citizens of some other country: who marry alien husbands-was discriminatory towards women. 170The 1973
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby Constitution rectified this problematic situation:
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of Ironically, the concept of "natural-born" citizenship is a "foreign" concept
this Constitution. that was transplanted into this jurisdiction as part of the 1935 Constitution's
eligibility requirements for President and Vice-President of the Philippines.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
In the United States Constitution, from which this concept originated, the
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the term "natural-born citizen" appears in only a single instance: as an eligibility
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five. requirement for the presidency. 175 It is not defined in that Constitution or in
American laws. Its origins and rationale for inclusion as a requirement for
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. the presidency are not even found in the records of constitutional
deliberations. 176 However, it has been suggested that, as the United States
SECTION 2. A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien shall was under British colonial rule before its independence, the requirement of
retain her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, being natural-born was introduced as a safeguard against foreign infiltration
under the law, to have renounced her citizenship. 171 in the administration of national government:

The 1973 Constitution was the first instrument to actually define the term It has been suggested, quite plausibly, that this language was inserted in
"natural-born citizen." Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution response to a letter sent by John Jay to George Washington, and probably to
provided: other delegates, on July 25, 1787, which stated:

SECTION 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines Permit me to hint, whether it would be wise and seasonable to provide a
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his strong check to the admission of Foreigners into the administration of our
Philippine citizenship.172 national Government; and to declare expressly that the Command in Chief of
the American army shall not be given to nor devolve on, any but a natural
The present Constitution adopted most of the provisions of the 1973 born Citizen.
Constitution on citizenship, "except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to
correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the Possibly this letter was motivated by distrust of Baron Von Steuben, who had
1935 Constitution." 173 served valiantly in the Revolutionary forces, but whose subsequent loyalty
was suspected by Jay. Another theory is that the Jay letter, and the resulting
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution now reads: constitutional provision, responded to rumors that the Convention was
concocting a monarchy to be ruled by a foreign monarch. 177
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
In the United States, however, citizenship is based on jus soli, not jus
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of sanguinis.
this Constitution;
V.C.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
Today, there are only two (2) categories of Filipino citizens: natural born and
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect naturalized.
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. 174 A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one who is a
citizen of the Philippines "from birth without having to perform any act to
Article IV, Section 2 also calibrated the 1973 Constitution's previous acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship." By necessary implication, a
definition of natural-born citizens, as follows: naturalized citizen is one who is not natural-born. Bengson v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal178articulates this definition by dichotomy:
Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to [O]nly naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: ... A citizen who is not
shall be deemed natural born citizens. (Emphasis supplied) a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born naturalization. These attempts at analogies are misplaced. The statutory
Filipino. 179 mechanisms for naturalization are clear, specific, and narrowly devised. The
investiture of citizenship on foundlings benefits children, individuals whose
Former Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban further shed light on the capacity to act is restricted. 184 It is a glaring mistake to liken them to an adult
concept of naturalized citizens in his Concurring Opinion in Bengson: filing before the relevant authorities a sworn petition seeking to become a
Filipino, the grant of which is contingent on evidence that he or she must
naturalized citizens, he stated, are "former aliens or foreigners who had to himself or herself adduce. As shall later be discussed, Republic Act No. 9225
undergo a rigid procedure, in which they had to adduce sufficient evidence to is premised on the immutability of natural-born status. It privileges natural-
prove that they possessed all the qualifications and none of the born citizens and proceeds from an entirely different premise from the
disqualifications provided by law in order to become Filipino citizens." 180 restrictive process of naturalization.

One who desires to acquire Filipino citizenship by naturalization is generally So too, the jurisprudential treatment of naturalization vis-a-vis natural-born
required to file a verified petition. 181He or she must establish, among others, status is clear. It should be with the actual process of naturalization that
that he or she is of legal age, is of good moral character, and has the capacity natural-born status is to be contrasted, not against other procedures relating
to adapt to Filipino culture, tradition, and principles, or otherwise has to citizenship. Otherwise, the door may be thrown open for the unbridled
resided in the Philippines for a significant period of time. 182 diminution of the status of citizens.

Further, the applicant must show that he or she will not be a threat to the V.E
state, to the public, and to the Filipinos' core beliefs. 183
Natural-born citizenship is not concerned with being a human thoroughbred.
V.D
Section 2 defines "natural-born citizens." Section 1(2) stipulates that to be a
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution merely gives an enumeration. citizen, either one's father or one's mother must be a Filipino citizen.
Section 2 categorically defines "natural-born citizens." This constitutional
definition is further clarified in jurisprudence, which delineates natural-born That is all there is to Section 1(2). Physical features, genetics, pedigree, and
citizenship from naturalized citizenship. Consistent with Article 8 of the Civil ethnicity are not determinative of citizenship.
Code, this jurisprudential clarification is deemed written into the interpreted
text, thus establishing its contemporaneous intent Section 1(2) does not require one's parents to be natural-born Filipino
citizens. It does not even require them to conform to traditional conceptions
Therefore, petitioner's restrictive reliance on Section 1 and the need to of what is indigenously or ethnically Filipino. One or both parents can,
establish bloodline is- misplaced. It is inordinately selective and myopic. It therefore, be ethnically foreign.
divines Section 1 's mere enumeration but blatantly turns a blind eye to the
succeeding Section's unequivocal definition. Section 1 (2) requires nothing more than one ascendant degree: parentage.
The citizenship of everyone else in one's ancestry is irrelevant.
Between Article IV, Section 1(2), which petitioner harps on, and Section 2, it
is Section 2 that is on point. To determine whether private respondent is a There is no need, as petitioner insists, for a pure Filipino bloodline.
natural-born citizen, we must look into whether she had to do anything to
perfect her citizenship. In view of Bengson, this calls for an inquiry into Section 1(2) requires citizenship, not identity. A conclusion of Filipino
whether she underwent the naturalization process to become a Filipino. citizenship may be sustained by evidence adduced in a proper proceeding,
which substantially proves that either or both of one's parents is a Filipino
She did not. citizen.

At no point has it been substantiated that private respondent went through V.F
the actual naturalization process. There is no more straightforward and more
effective way to terminate this inquiry than this realization of total and utter Private respondent has done this. The evidence she adduced in these
lack of proof. proceedings attests to how at least one-if not both-of her biological parents
were Filipino citizens.

At most, there have been suggestions likening a preferential approach to Proving private respondent's biological parentage is now practically
foundlings, as well as compliance with Republic Act No. 9225, with impossible. To begin with, she was abandoned as a newborn infant. She was
abandoned almost half a century ago. By now, there are only a handful of require, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. If circumstantial evidence
those who, in 1968, were able-minded adults who can still lucidly render suffices for such a high standard, so too may it suffice to satisfy the less
testimonies on the circumstances of her birth and finding. Even the stringent standard of proof in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings
identification of individuals against whom DNA evidence may be tested is such as those before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, i.e., substantial
improbable, and by sheer economic cost, prohibitive. evidence. 190

However, our evidentiary rules admit of alternative means for private Private respondent was found as a newborn infant outside the Parish Church
respondent to establish her parentage. of Jaro, Iloilo on September 3, 1968.191 In 1968, Iloilo, as did most-if not all-
Philippine provinces, had a predominantly Filipino population. 192 Private
In lieu of direct evidence, facts may be proven through circumstantial respondent is described as having "brown almond shaped eyes, a low nasal
evidence. In Suerte-Felipe v. People: 185 bridge, straight black hair and an oval-shaped face." 193 She stands at 5 feet
and 2 inches tall. 194 Further, in 1968, there was no international airport in
Direct evidence is that which proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any Jaro, Iloilo.
inference or presumption; while circumstantial evidence is the proof of fact
or facts from which, taken either singly or collectively, the existence of a These circumstances are substantial evidence justifying an inference that her
particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a necessary or probable biological parents were Filipino. Her abandonment at a Catholic Church is
consequence.186 more or less consistent with how a Filipino who, in 1968, lived in a
predominantly religious and Catholic environment, would have behaved.
People v. Raganas 187 further defines circumstantial evidence:
The absence of an international airport in Jaro, Iloilo precludes the
possibility of a foreigner mother, along with a foreigner father, swiftly and
Circumstantial evidence is that which relates to a series of facts other than surreptitiously coming in and out of Jaro, Iloilo just to give birth and leave
the fact in issue, which by experience have been found so associated with her offspring there. Though proof of ethnicity is unnecessary, her physical
such fact that in a relation of cause and effect, they lead us to a satisfactory features nonetheless attest to it.
conclusion. 188 (Citation omitted)
In the other related case of Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on
Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, for instance, stipulates Elections, 195 the Solicitor General underscored how it is statistically more
when circumstantial evidence is sufficient to justify a conviction in criminal probable that private respondent was born a Filipino citizen rather than as a
proceedings: foreigner. He submitted the following table is support of his statistical
inference: 196
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
NUMBER OF FOREIGN AND FILIPINO CHILDREN BORN
(a) There is more than one circumstances; IN THE PHILIPPINES: 1965-1975 AND 2010-2014

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and FILIPINO
FOREIGN
CHILDREN BORN
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a CHILDREN BORN
YEAR IN THE
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. IN THE
PHILIPPINES
PHILIPPINES
Although the Revised Rules on Evidence's sole mention of circumstantial 1965 1,479 795,415
evidence is in reference to criminal proceedings, this Court has nevertheless 1966 1,437 823,342
sustained the use of circumstantial evidence in other proceedings. 189There is 1967 1,440 840,302
no rational basis for making the use of circumstantial evidence exclusive to 1968 1,595 898,570
criminal proceedings and for not considering circumstantial facts as valid 1969 1,728 946,753
means for proof in civil and/or administrative proceedings.
1970 1,521 966,762
1971 1,401 963,749
In criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence suffices to sustain a
conviction (which may result in deprivation of life, liberty, and property) 1972 1,784 968,385
anchored on the highest standard or proof that our legal system would 1973 1,212 1,045,290
1974 1,496 1,081,873 forward"201 with the evidence considering that which has ostensibly been
1975 1,493 1,223,837 established against him or her.
2010 1,244 1,782,877
2011 1,140 1,746,685 In an action for quo warranto, the burden of proof necessarily falls on the
2012 1,454 1,790,367 party who brings the action and who alleges that the respondent is ineligible
2013 1,315 1,751,523 for the office involved in the controversy. In proceedings before quasi-judicial
bodies such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the requisite quantum of proof
2014 1,351 1,748,782
is substantial evidence.202This burden was petitioner's to discharge. Once the
petitioner makes a prima facie case, the burden of evidence shifts to the
Source: Philippine Statistics Authority
respondent.
[illegible] 197

Private respondent's admitted status as a foundling does not establish a

Thus, out of the 900, 165 recorded births in the Philippines in 1968, only
prima facie case in favor of petitioner. While it does establish that the
1,595 or 0.18% newborns were foreigners. This translates to roughly 99.8%
identities of private respondent's biological parents are not known, it does
probability that private respondent was born a Filipino citizen.
not automatically mean that neither her father nor her mother is a Filipino.
Given the sheer difficulty, if not outright impossibility, of identifying her
The most that petitioner had in his favor was doubt. A taint of doubt,
parents after half a century, a range of substantive proof is available to
however, is by no means substantial evidence establishing a prima facie case
sustain a reasonable conclusion as to private respondent's parentage.
and shifting the burden of evidence to private respondent.
VI
Isolating the fact of private respondent's being a foundling, petitioner
trivializes other uncontroverted circumstances that we have previously
Before a discussion on how private respondent's natural-born status is
established as substantive evidence of private respondent's parentage:
sustained by a general assumption on foundlings arising from a
comprehensive reading and validated by a contemporaneous construction of
(1) Petitioner was found in front of a church in Jaro, Iloilo;
the Constitution, and considering that we have just discussed the evidence
pertaining to the circumstances of private respondent's birth, it is opportune
(2) She was only an infant when she was found, practically a newborn;
to consider petitioner's allegations that private respondent bore the burden
of proving-through proof of her bloodline-her natural-born status.
(3) She was found sometime in September 1968;
Petitioner's claim that the burden of evidence shifted to private respondent
(4) Immediately after she was found, private respondent was registered as a
upon a mere showing that she is a foundling is a serious error.
foundling;
Petitioner invites this Court to establish a jurisprudential presumption that
(5) There was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo; and
all newborns who have been abandoned in rural areas in the Philippines are
not Filipinos. His emphasis on private respondent's supposed burden to
(6) Private respondent's physical features are consistent with those of typical
prove the circumstances of her birth places upon her an impossible
Filipinos.
condition. To require proof from private respondent borders on the absurd
when there is no dispute that the crux of the controversy-the identity of her
Petitioner's refusal to account for these facts demonstrates an imperceptive
biological parents-is simply not known.
bias. As against petitioner's suggested conclusions, the more reasonable
inference from these facts is that at least one of private respondent's parents
"Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in
is a Filipino.
issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence
required by law." Burden of proof lies on the party making the allegations; 1 8
VII
that is, the party who "alleges the affirmative of the issue." 199
Apart from how private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen
Burden of proof never shifts from one party to another. What shifts is the
consistent with a reading that harmonizes Article IV, Section 2's definition of
burden of evidence. . This shift happens when a party makes a prima facie
natural-born citizens and Section 1(2)'s reference to parentage, the
case in his or her favor. 200 The other party then bears the "burden of going
Constitution sustains a presumption that all foundlings found in the
Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902.
and are thus natural-born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his
son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during
Consistent with Article IV, Section 1 (2 ), any such countervailing proof must which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all
show that both-not just one-of a foundling's biological parents are not persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
Filipino citizens. children are legitimate or illegitimate. 206

VII.A It is true that there is jurisprudence-Paa v. Chan207 and Go v.

Ramos208 (which merely cites Paa')-to the effect that presumptions cannot be
Quoting heavily from Associate Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro's entertained in citizenship cases.
Dissenting Opinion to the assailed November 17, 2015 Decision, petitioner
intimates that no inference or presumption in favor of natural-born Paa, decided in 1967, stated:
citizenship may be indulged in resolving this case.203
It is incumbent upon the respondent, who claims Philippine citizenship, to
He insists that it is private respondent's duty to present incontrovertible prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No
proof of her Filipino parentage. presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine
citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of
Relying on presumptions is concededly less than ideal. Common sense the State. 209 (Emphasis supplied)
dictates that actual proof is preferable. Nevertheless, resolving citizenship
issues based on presumptions is firmly established in jurisprudence. These pronouncements are no longer controlling in light of this Court's more
recent ruling in Tecson.
In 2004, this Court resolved Tecson on the basis of presumptions.
Moreover, what this Court stated in Paa was that "no presumption can be
Ruling on the allegations that former presidential candidate Ronald Allan indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship." This reference to
Poe (more popularly known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) was not a natural-born "the claimant" was preceded by a sentence specifically referencing the duty of
Filipino citizen, this Court proceeded from the presumptions that: first, "the respondent." The syntax of this Court's pronouncement-using the
definitive article "the"-reveals that its conclusion was specific only to Chan
Fernando Poe Jr.'s grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, was born sometime in 1870, and to his circumstances. Otherwise, this Court would have used generic
while the country was still under Spanish colonial rule; 204 and second, that language. Instead of the definite article "the," it could have used the
Lorenzo Pou's place of residence, as indicated in his death certificate, must indefinite article "a" in that same sentence: "no presumption can be indulged
have also been his place of residence before death, which subjected him to in favor of claimant of Philippine citizenship." In the alternative, it could
the "en masse Filipinization," or sweeping investiture of Filipino citizenship have used other words that would show absolute or sweeping application, for
effected by the Philippine Bill of 1902.205 This Court then noted that Lorenzo instance: "no presumption can be indulged in favor of any/every claimant
Pou's citizenship would have extended to his son and Fernando Poe Jr.'s of Philippine citizenship;" or, "no presumption can be indulged in favor
father, Allan F. Poe. Based on these, Fernando Poe. Jr. would then have been ofall claimants of Philippine citizenship."
a natural-born Filipino as he was born while the 1935 Constitution, which
conferred Filipino citizenship to those born to Filipino fathers, was in effect: The factual backdrop of Paa is markedly different from those of this case. Its
statements, therefore, are inappropriate precedents for this case. In Paa,
In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has clear evidence was adduced showing that respondent Quintin Chan was
been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of registered as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration. His father was
whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in tum, likewise registered as an alien. These pieces of evidence already indubitably
depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would establish foreign citizenship and shut the door to any presumption. In
have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not contrast, petitioner in this case presents no proof, direct or circumstantial, of
the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the private respondent's or of both of her parents' foreign citizenship.
Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino
citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that Go cited Paa, taking the same quoted portion but revising it to make it appear
having died in 1954 at 84 years old, when the Philippines was under Spanish that the same pronouncement was generally applicable:
rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death
in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the
of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be
indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt
regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state.210 (Emphasis SECTION 3. The State shall defend:
supplied)
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and
Thus, Paa's essential and pivotal nuance was lost in proverbial translation. In nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
any case, Go was decided by this Court sitting in Division. It cannot overturn cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
Tecson, which was decided by this Court sitting En Banc. development[.] (Emphasis supplied)

Likewise, Go's factual and even procedural backdrops are different from Certain crucial government offices are exclusive to natural-born citizens of
those of this case. Go involved the deportation of an allegedly illegal and the Philippines. The 1987 Constitution makes the following offices exclusive
undesirable alien, not an election controversy. In Go, copies of birth to natural-born citizens:
certificates unequivocally showing the Chinese citizenship of Go and of his
siblings were adduced (1) President;212

VII.B (2) Vice-President;213

The presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at (3) Senator;214
least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother (and are thus natural born,
unless there is substantial proof otherwise) arises when one reads the (4) Member of the House ofRepresentatives;215
Constitution as a whole, so as to "effectuate [its] whole purpose." 211
(5) Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court; 216
As much as we have previously harmonized Article IV, Section 2 with Article
IV, Section 1(2), constitutional provisions on citizenship must not be taken in (6) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission; 217
isolation. They must be read in light of the constitutional mandate to defend
the well-being of children, to guarantee equal protection of the law and equal (7) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission on Elections; 218
access to opportunities for public service, and to respect human rights. They
must also be read in conjunction with the Constitution's reasons for requiring (8) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission on Audit; 219
natural-born status for select public offices. Further, this presumption is
validated by contemporaneous construction that considers related legislative (9) Ombudsman and his or her deputies; 220
enactments, executive and administrative actions, and international
instruments. (10) Board of Governors of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas; 221 and

Article II, Section 13 and Article XV, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution (11) Chairperson and Members of the Commission on Human Rights. 222
require the state to enhance children's well-being and to protect them from
conditions prejudicial to or that may undermine their development. Fulfilling Apart from these, other positions that are limited to natural-born citizens
this mandate includes preventing discriminatory conditions and, especially, include, among others, city fiscals, 223assistant city fiscals,224
dismantling mechanisms for discrimination that hide behind the veneer of
the legal apparatus: Presiding Judges and Associate Judges of the Sandiganbayan, and other
public offices.225 Certain professions are also limited to natural-born
ARTICLE II citizens,226 as are other legally established benefits and incentives. 227
State Policies
Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens is
SECTION 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation tantamount to permanently discriminating against our foundling citizens.
building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the They can then never be of service to the country in the highest possible
youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public capacities. It is also tantamount to excluding them from certain means such
and civic affairs. as professions and state scholarships, which will enable the actualization of
their aspirations. These consequences cannot be tolerated by the
ARTICLE XV Constitution, not least of all through the present politically charged
The Family proceedings, the direct objective of which is merely to exclude a singular
politician from office. Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Sustaining this classification is not only inequitable; it is dehumanizing. It
citizens creates an inferior class of citizens who are made to suffer that condemns those who, from the very beginning of their lives, were abandoned
inferiority through no fault of their own. to a life of desolation and deprivation.

If that is not discrimination, we do not know what is. This Court does not exist in a vacuum. It is a constitutional organ, mandated
to effect the Constitution's dictum of defending and promoting the well-being
The Constitution guarantees equal protection of the laws and equal access to and development of children. It is not our business to reify discriminatory
opportunities for public service: classes based on circumstances of birth.

ARTICLE II Even more basic than their being citizens of the Philippines, foundlings are
State Policies human persons whose dignity we value and rights we, as a civilized nation,
respect. Thus:
SECTION 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities
for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by ARTICLE II
the law. State Policies

ARTICLE III SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and
Bill of Rights guarantees full respect or human rights. (Emphasis supplied)

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without VII. C

due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws. Though the matter is settled by interpretation exclusively within the confines
of constitutional text, the presumption that foundlings are natural born
ARTICLE XIII citizens of the Philippines (unless substantial evidence of the foreign
Social Justice and Human Rights citizenship of both of the foundling's parents is presented) is validated by a
parallel consideration or contemporaneous construction of the Constitution
SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of with acts of Congress, international instruments in force in the Philippines,
measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to as well as acts of executive organs such as the Bureau of Immigration, Civil
human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political Registrars, and the President of the Philippines.
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common Congress has enacted statutes founded on the premise that foundlings are
good. (Emphasis supplied) Filipino citizens at birth. It has adopted mechanisms to effect the
constitutional mandate to protect children. Likewise, the Senate has ratified
The equal protection clause serves as a guarantee that "persons under like treaties that put this mandate into effect.
circumstances and falling within the same class are treated alike, in terms of
'privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.' It is a guarantee against 'undue Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare
favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or Act of2006, provides:
oppression of inequality. "'228
SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy. - The following State policies shall be
Other than the anonymity of their biological parents, no substantial observed at all times:
distinction229 differentiates foundlings from children with known Filipino
parents. They are both entitled to the full extent of the state's protection from (b) The State shall protect the best interests of the child through
the moment of their birth. Foundlings' misfortune.in failing to identify the measures that will ensure the observance of international
parents who abandoned them-an inability arising from no fault of their own-- standards of child protection, especially those to which the
cannot be the foundation of a rule that reduces them to statelessness or, at Philippines is a party. Proceedings before any authority shall be
best, as inferior, second-class citizens who are not entitled to as much conducted in the best interest of the child and in a manner which allows the
benefits and protection from the state as those who know their parents. child to participate and to express himself/herself freely. The participation of
children in the program and policy formulation and implementation related
to juvenile justice and welfare shall be ensured by the concerned government
agency. (Emphasis supplied)
 2. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure that
Section 4(b) of the Republic Act No. 9344 defines the "best interest of the the child is protected against all forms of discrimination or
child" as the "totality of the circumstances and conditions which are most punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed opinions, or
congenial to the survival, protection and feelings of security of the child and beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians, or family members.
most encouraging to the child's physical, psychological and emotional
development." Article 3

Consistent with this statute is our ratification230 of the United Nations 1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or
Convention on the Rights of the Child. This specifically requires the states private social welfare institutions,courts of law, administrative authorities
parties' protection of: first, children's rights to immediate registration and or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
nationality after birth; second, against statelessness; and third, against consideration.
discrimination on account of their birth status. 231 Pertinent portions of the
Convention read: 2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and
care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the
Preamble rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals
legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate
The State Parties to the present Convention, legislative and administrative measures.

Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter Article 7
of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is 1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have
the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, the right from birth to a name, theright to acquire a nationality and as
far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.
Bearing in mind that the peoples of the United Nations have, in the
Charter, reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights and in 2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in
the dignity and worth of the human person, and have determined to accordance with their national law and their obligations under the relevant
promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, international instruments in this field, in particular where the child
would otherwise be stateless. (Emphasis supplied)
Recognizing that the United Nations has, in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and in the International Covenants on Human Rights, The Philippines likewise ratified232 the 1966 International Covenant on Civil
proclaimed and agreed that everyone is entitled to all the rights and and Political Rights. As with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, this
freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any kind, such as treaty requires that children be allowed immediate registration after birth
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or and to acquire a nationality. It similarly defends them against discrimination:
social origin, property, birth or other status,
Article 24
Recalling that, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United
Nations has proclaimed thatchildhood is entitled to special care and ....
assistance,
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race,
Have agreed as follows: colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth,
the right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a
Article 2 minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.

1. State parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present 2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have
Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination a name.
of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her parent'sor legal
guardian's race, colour, sex, language,religion, political or other opinion, 3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other
status. Article 26. All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without
any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect,
the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all constitutional dictum of promoting the well-being of children and protecting
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on them from discrimination. Other legislative enactments demonstrate the
any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other intent to treat foundlings as Filipino citizens from birth.
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
(Emphasis supplied) Republic Act No. 8552, though briefly referred to as the Domestic Adoption
Act of 1998, is formally entitled An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on
Treaties are "international agreement[ s] concluded between states in written Domestic Adoption of Filipino Children and for Other Purposes. It was
form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single enacted as a mechanism to "provide alternative protection and assistance
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular through foster care or adoption of every child who is neglected, orphaned, or
designation."233 Under Article VII, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution, abandoned."236
treaties require concurrence by the Senate before they become binding:
Foundlings are explicitly among the "Filipino children" covered by Republic
SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and Act No. 8552:237
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate. SECTION 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). -It shall be the duty of the
Department or the child-placing or child-caring agency which has custody of
The Senate's ratification of a treaty makes it legally effective and binding by the child to exert all efforts to locate his/her unknown biological parent(s). If
transformation. It then has the force and effect of a statute enacted by such efforts fail, the child shall be registered as a foundling and
Congress. In Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines subsequently be the subject of legal proceedings where he/she
v. Duque III, et al.:234 shall be declared abandoned. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere Similarly, Republic Act No. 8043, though briefly referred to as the Inter-
of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The Country Adoption Act of 1995, is formally entitled An Act Establishing the
transformation method requires that an international law be transformed Rules to Govern Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children, and for Other
into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local Purposes. As with Republic Act No. 8552, it expressly includes foundlings
legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional among "Filipino children" who may be adopted:
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
SECTION 8. Who May Be Adopted. - Only a legally free child may be the
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation subject of inter-country adoption. In order that such child may be considered
pursuant to Article VIL Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that for placement, the following documents must be submitted to the Board:
"[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." a) Child study;

Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go through a process b) Birth certificate/foundling certificate;
prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law
that can be applied to domestic conjlicts.235 (Emphasis supplied) c) Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of abandonment/death certificate
of parents;
Following ratification by the Senate, no further action, legislative or
otherwise, is necessary. Thereafter, the whole of government-including the d) Medical evaluation/history;
judiciary-is duty-bound to abide by the treaty, consistent with the maxim
pacta sunt servanda. e) Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and

Accordingly, by the Constitution and by statute, foundlings cannot be the f) Recent photo of the child. (Emphasis supplied)
object of discrimination. They are vested with the rights to be registered and
granted nationality upon birth. To deny them these rights, deprive them of In the case of foundlings, foundling certificates may be presented in lieu of
citizenship, and render them stateless is to unduly burden them, discriminate authenticated birth certificates to satisfy the requirement for the issuance of
them, and undermine their development. passports, which will then facilitate their adoption by foreigners:

Not only Republic Act No. 9344, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, SECTION 5. If the applicant is an adopted person, he must present a
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights effect the certified true copy of the Court Order of Adoption, certified true copy of his
original and amended birth certificates as issued by the OCRG. If the Philippine citizenship when she was naturalized an American citizen.
applicant is a minor, a Clearance from the DSWD shall be required. In case However, on July 7, 2006, she took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the applicant is for adoption by foreign parents under R.A. No. 8043, the the Philippines under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225. Three (3) days
following, shall be required: later, July 10, 2006, she filed before the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation a Petition for Reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship. Shortly
a) Certified true copy of the Court Decree of Abandonment of Child, the after, this Petition was granted.241
Death Certificate of the child's parents, or the Deed of Voluntary
Commitment executed after the birth of the child. Republic Act No. 9225 superseded Commonwealth Act No. 63 242 and
Republic Act No. 8171 243 specifically "to do away with the provision in
b) Endorsement of child to the Intercountry Adoption Board by the DSWD. Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from
natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other
c) Authenticated Birth or Foundling Certificate. 238 (Emphasis countries."244
supplied)
The citizenship regime put in place by Republic Act No. 9225 is designed, in
Our statutes on adoption allow for the recognition of foundlings' Filipino its own words, to ensure "that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
citizenship on account of their birth. They benefit from this without having to another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
do any act to perfect their citizenship or without having to complete the citizenship."245 This Court shed light on this in Calilung v. Commission on
naturalization process. Thus, by definition, they are natural born citizens. Elections:246 "[w]hat Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to
natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason
Specifically regarding private respondent, several acts of executive organs of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country." 247
have recognized her natural-born status. This status was never questioned
throughout her life; that is, until circumstances made it appear that she was a Republic Act No. 9225 made natural-born Filipinos' status permanent and
viable candidate for President of the Philippines. Until this, as well as the immutable despite naturalization as citizens of other countries. To effect this,
proceedings in the related case of Poe-Llamanzares, private respondent's Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 provides:
natural-born status has been affirmed and reaffirmed through various official
public acts. SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. - Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have
First, private respondent was issued a foundling certificate and benefitted lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of
from the domestic adoption process. Second, on July 18, 2006, she was a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine
granted an order of reacquisition of natural-born citizenship under Republic citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
Act No. 9225 by the Bureau of Immigration. Third, on October 6, 2010, the
President of the Philippines appointed her as MTR CB Chairperson-an office "I, ___________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support
that requires natural-born citizenship.239 and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the
laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
VIII Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme
authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
As it is settled that private respondent's being a foundling is not a bar to thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
natural-born citizenship, petitioner's proposition as to her inability to benefit mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
from Republic Act No. 9225 crumbles. Private respondent, a natural-born
Filipino citizen, re-acquired natural-born Filipino citizenship when, following Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
her naturalization as a citizen of the United States, she complied with the become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship
requisites of Republic Act No. 9225. upon taking the aforesaid oath.

VIII.A Section 3's implications are clear. Natural-born Philippine citizens who, after
Republic Act 9225 took effect, are naturalized in foreign countries "retain,"
"Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by that is, keep, their Philippine citizenship, although the effectivity of this
law."240 Commonwealth Act No. 63, which was in effect when private retention and the ability to exercise the rights and capacities attendant to this
respondent was naturalized an American citizen on October 18, 2001, status are subject to certain solemnities (i.e., oath of allegiance and other
provided in Section 1(1) that "[a] Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship ... requirements for specific rights and/or acts, as enumerated in Section 5). On
[b]y naturalization in a foreign country." Thus, private respondent lost her the other hand, those who became citizens of another country before the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 9225 "reacquire" their Philippine citizenship b. are in active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the
and may exercise attendant rights and capacities, also upon compliance with armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens. (Emphasis
certain solemnities. Read in conjunction with Section 2' s declaration of a supplied)
policy of immutability, this reacquisition is not a mere restoration that leaves
a vacuum in the intervening period. Rather, this reacquisition works to Thus, natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized elsewhere and wish
restore natural-born status as though it was never lost at all. to run for elective public office must comply with all of the following
requirements:
VIII. B
First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. This effects the retention
Taking the Oath of Allegiance effects the retention or reacquisition of or reacquisition of one's status as a natural-born Filipino.249 This also enables
natural-born citizenship. It also facilitates the enjoyment of civil and political the enjoyment of full civil and political rights, subject to all attendant
rights, "subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities." 248 liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws, provided the solemnities
recited in. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 are satisfied.250
However, other conditions must be met for the exercise of other faculties:
Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. -Those who retain or Constitution,251 Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as the Overseas
reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other existing laws. This is to facilitate the
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities exercise of the right of suffrage; that is, to allow for voting in elections. 252
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
Third, "mak[ing] a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. oath."253 This, along with satisfying the other qualification requirements
9189, otherwise known as "the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and under relevant laws, makes one eligible for elective public office.
other existing laws;
As explained in Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections,254 this
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the required sworn renunciation is intended to complement Article XI, Section
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution 18 of the Constitution in that "[p]ublic officers and employees owe the State
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of and this Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer or
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an
all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by
an oath; law."255 It is also in view of this that Section 5(5) similarly bars those who
seek or occupy public office elsewhere and/or who are serving in the armed
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath forces of other countries from being appointed or elected to public office in
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly the Philippines.
constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office;
Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where VIII. C
they took that oath;
Private respondent has complied with all of these requirements. First, on
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply July 7, 2006, she took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; Philippines.256 Second, on August 31, 2006, she became a registered voter of
and Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan.257 This evidences her compliance with
Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. Since she was to vote within the
(5) That the right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the country, this dispensed with the need to comply with the Overseas Absentee
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who: Voting Act of 2003. Lastly, on October 20, 2010, she executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation
a. are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of of American Citizenship.258 This was complemented by her execution of an
which they are naturalized citizens; and/or Oath/ Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United
States259 before Vice-Consul Somer E. Bessire-Briers on July 12,
2011,260 which was; in tum, followed by Vice Consul Jason Galian's issuance
of a Certificate of Loss of Nationality on December 9, 2011 261 and the
approval of this certificate by the Overseas Citizen Service, Department of
State, on February 3, 2012.262 Republic Act No. 9225 may involve extended processes not limited to taking
the Oath of Allegiance and requiring compliance with additional solemnities,
Private respondent has, therefore, not only fully reacquired natural born but these are for facilitating the enjoyment of other incidents to citizenship,
citizenship; she has also complied with all of the other requirements for not for effecting the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship itself.
eligibility to elective public office, as stipulated in Republic Act No. 9225. Therefore, it is markedly different from naturalization as there is no singular,
extended process with which the former natural-born citizen must comply.
VIII.D
IX
It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent's having had to comply
with Republic Act No. 9225 shows that she is a naturalized, rather than a To hold, as petitioner suggests, that private respondent is stateless 265 is not
natural-born, Filipino citizen. It is wrong to postulate that compliance with only to set a dangerous and callous precedent. It is to make this Court an
Republic Act No. 9225 signifies the performance of acts to perfect citizenship. accomplice to injustice.

To do so is to completely disregard the unequivocal policy of permanence and Equality, the recognition of the humanity of every individual, and social
immutability as articulated in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9225 and as justice are the bedrocks of our constitutional order. By the unfortunate
illuminated in jurisprudence. It is to erroneously assume that a natural-born fortuity of the inability or outright irresponsibility of those who gave them
Filipino citizen's naturalization elsewhere is an irreversible termination of his life, foundlings are compelled to begin their very existence at a disadvantage.
or her natural-born status. Theirs is a continuing destitution that can never be truly remedied by any
economic relief.
Status quo ante that one returns. "Re" -acquiring can only mean a reversion
to "the way things were." Had Republic Act No. 9225 intended to mean the If we are to make the motives of our Constitution true, then we can never
investiture of an entirely new status, it should not have used a word such as tolerate an interpretation that condemns foundlings to an even greater
"reacquire." Republic Act No. 9225, therefore, does not operate to make new misfortune because of their being abandoned. The Constitution cannot be
citizens whose citizenship commences only from the moment of compliance rendered inert and meaningless for them by mechanical judicial fiat.
with its requirements.
Dura lex sed lex is not a callous and unthinking maxim to be deployed
Bengson, speaking on the analogous situation of repatriation, ruled that against other reasonable interpretations of our basic law. It does command
repatriation involves the restoration of former status or the recovery of one's us to consider legal text, but always with justice in mind.
original nationality:
It is the empowering and ennobling interpretation of the Constitution that we
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This must always sustain. Not only will this manner of interpretation edify the less
means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to fortunate; it establishes us, as Filipinos, as a humane and civilized people.
his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand,if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he The Senate Electoral Tribunal acted well within the bounds of its
will be restored to his former status as a natural-born constitutional competence when it ruled that private respondent is a natural
Filipino.263 (Emphasis supplied) born citizen qualified to sit as Senator of the Republic. Contrary to
petitioner's arguments, there is no basis for annulling its assailed Decision
Although Bengson was decided while Commonwealth Act No. 63 was in and Resolution.
force, its ruling is in keeping with Republic Act No. 9225's policy of
permanence and immutablity: "all Philippine citizens of another country WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Public
shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship." 264 In Bengson' respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal did not act without or in excess of its
s words, the once naturalized citizen is "restored" or brought back to his or jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
her natural-born status. There may have been an interruption in the jurisdiction in rendering its assailed November 17, 2015 Decision and
recognition of this status, as, in the interim, he or she was naturalized December 3, 2015 Resolution.
elsewhere, but the restoration of natural-born status expurgates this
intervening fact. Thus, he or she does not become a Philippine citizen only Private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino
from the point of restoration and moving forward. He or she is recognized, de citizen qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic.
Jure, as a Philippine citizen from birth, although the intervening fact may
have consequences de facto.