Cook County SAO-Facebook, Cambridge Analytica Complaint
Cook County SAO-Facebook, Cambridge Analytica Complaint
Cook County SAO-Facebook, Cambridge Analytica Complaint
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2018-CH-03868
CALENDAR: 11
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CIRCUIT COURT OF
COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
CHANCERY DIVISION
COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CHANCERY DIVISION CLERK DOROTHY BROWN
Plaintiff,
v.
Defendants.
Plaintiff People of the State of Illinois brings this Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial
against Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”), and SCL Group Limited and Cambridge Analytica LLC
follows:
the personal data of more than 50 million Facebook users in the United States, including millions
of users in Illinois. This data trove included Facebook users’ ages, interests, pages they’ve liked,
groups they belong to, physical locations, political affiliation, religious affiliation, relationships,
and photos, as well as their full names, phone numbers, email addresses, and physical addresses.1
1
Craig Timberg, et al., Bannon Oversaw Cambridge Analytica's Collection of Facebook
Data, According to Former Employee, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2018), https://wapo.st/2FYS1kE.
1
2. Though this data was supposedly private and protected from disclosure by
Facebook’s user and developer policies, Cambridge Analytica knew that it could access this
nearly unlimited trove of data using Facebook’s existing developer tools, an open secret that was
Facebook users on “Mechanical Turk”—an online marketplace where people around the world
contract with others to perform various tasks—and offered to pay them to download and use a
4. About 270,000 American voters installed the app and took the personality quiz in
return for $1 to $2. But Cambridge Analytica wasn’t interested in just the answers. What it really
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wanted—and what it got by virtue of being a developer on the Facebook platform—was the
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ability to collect Facebook data from each quiz taker and all of their Facebook friends. In this
way, Cambridge Analytica parlayed 270,000 personality quiz submissions into a comprehensive
5. This kind of mass data collection was not only allowed but encouraged by
Facebook, which sought to keep developers building on its platform and provide companies with
all the tools they need to influence and manipulate user behavior. That’s because Facebook is not
flagged and investigated by Facebook in 2014.3 But when it learned that the harvesting of data
2
See, e.g., Emil Protalinski, Stalkbook: Stalk Anyone, Even If You’re Not Facebook
Friends, CNET (July 23, 2012), https://www.cnet.com/news/stalkbook-stalk-anyone-even-if-
youre-not-facebook-friends/.
3
Chloe Aiello, Developer Behind The App At The Center Of Data Scandal Disputes
Facebook's Story, CNBC (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/21/aleksander-kogan-
2
was intended to build personality profiles for academic uses, Facebook allowed the data
collection to resume. A year later, Facebook discovered that the data was being used for
electioneering purposes and discreetly asked Cambridge Analytica to delete the data. Notably, it
never confirmed that the data was actually deleted or notified its users of the privacy breach.
million Facebook users to create “psychographic profiles” for the 2016 American presidential
election. These profiles—which included each user’s name, home address, phone number,
education, birthday, voter records, and political tendencies, alongside a sophisticated personality
analysis—allowed Cambridge Analytica to “identify the most persuadable voters” and target
them with so-called “fake news” on various platforms, including Facebook.4 By its own
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admission, this combination of misappropriated data, psychographic profiling, and fake news
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8. While Facebook has, a full three years later, condemned Cambridge Analytica’s
unauthorized data collection, its actions are far more consistent with Facebook’s mission than
Facebook wants to let on. Though it may have started as a social network, Facebook’s business
model has shifted over the years into what is now one of the biggest data mining companies in
the world. Facebook now uses its platform—which has essentially become a data aggregation
machine disguised as a social network—to manipulate users into making the decisions that
facebook-shouldve-known-how-app-data-was-being-used.html.
4
How Facebook Could Profile Voters For Manipulation, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 20,
2018), https://bit.ly/2uhKp7v; Hilary Osborne, What Is Cambridge Analytica? The Firm At The
Centre Of Facebook's Data Breach, GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2018), https://bit.ly/2prhWXb.
5
CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA, Make America Number 1, https://ca-
political.com/casestudies/casestudymakeamericanumber12016 (last visited Mar. 23, 2018).
3
Facebook and its business partners want them to make.6
9. Facebook shifted its business model in this way because it recognized that it can
be even more profitable if it could harness and sell the ability to dependably influence its users’
behavior to third parties. Facebook therefore encouraged developers and researchers to collect
and analyze Facebook user data so that it could better learn how to manipulate its own users’
moods and influence what they purchase and even how they vote. Facebook even conducted
experiments on its own users, including experiments aimed at influencing their moods and
10. This lawsuit seeks to right the wrongs created by Cambridge Analytica’s and
Facebook’s blatant disregard and misuse of sensitive, personal data belonging to the People of
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the State of Illinois. Accordingly, the People of the State of Illinois, by and through Cook County
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State’s Attorney Kimberly M. Foxx, seeks civil penalties and all appropriate injunctive relief to
address, remedy, and prevent harm to Illinois residents resulting from Defendants’ misconduct.
PARTIES
11. Plaintiff People of the State of Illinois, by and through Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s
Attorney of Cook County, Illinois, brings this action in the public interest for and on behalf of
12. Defendant Facebook, Inc. is a corporation existing under the laws of the State of
Delaware, with its principal place of business located at 1 Hacker Way, Menlo Park, California
94025.
6
See, e.g., Sam Machkovech, Report: Facebook Helped Advertisers Target Teens Who
Feel “Worthless”, ARSTECHNICA (last updated May 1, 2017.), https://bit.ly/2pBgf9G.
7
See, e.g., Kasmir Hill, 10 Other Facebook Experiments On Users, Rated On A Highly-
Scientific WTF Scale, FORBES (July 10, 2014),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/07/10/facebook-experiments-on-
users/#254ffa9b1c3d.
4
13. Defendant SCL Group Limited is a UK private limited company with offices
located in London, England. Defendant SCL Group Limited is the parent company of Defendant
under the laws of the State of Delaware, with offices located in New York City and Washington,
D.C. Defendant Cambridge Analytica LLC is a subsidiary of Defendant SCL Group Limited.
15. Pursuant to the Illinois Constitution art. VI, §9, this Court has subject matter
16. This Court has jurisdiction over Defendants pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-209
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because they conduct business transactions in Illinois, have committed tortious acts in Illinois,
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and have transacted substantial business in Illinois that caused harm in Illinois.
transactions in Cook County and the causes of action arose, in part, in Cook County.
18. Cambridge Analytica is a political consulting firm that promises to provide its
largely a secret to the general public. On March 18, 2018, one of its senior programmers—
including its role in “hijacking” the profiles of millions of Facebook users in order to influence
8
See Matthew Rosenberg, et al., How Trump Consultants Exploited The Facebook Data
Of Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2HH74vA.
5
the 2016 United States Presidential election.9
American political campaigns began in 2013, when its now-suspended Chief Executive Officer
Alexander Nix was still heading the elections division of SCL Group Limited.10 At the time, Nix
set out create a team of data analysts, psychologists, and political operatives that could
successfully use data analytics to model U.S. voter behavior, and assess how American voters’
inherent psychological traits affected their voting decisions. Using that data, the company would,
21. The group—not yet formally organized, but still an entity within SCL Group
States.12 Mercer helped the group finance a $1.5 million pilot test of their psychographic
22. On December 31, 2013, this internal team at SCL Group formally organized in
9
Carole Cadwalladr, ‘I Made Steve Bannon’s Psychological Warfare Tool’: Meet The
Data War Whistleblower, GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2018), https://bit.ly/2HGFvCD.
10
SCL Group similarly provides data, analytics and strategy-related consulting, but
primarily offers its services to governments and military organizations throughout the world.
SCL Group boasts having conducted “behavior change programs” in over 60 countries (i.e.,
psychological warfare).
11
Rosenberg et al., supra note 8.
12
Sasha Issenberg, Cruz-Connected Data Miner Aims To Get Inside Voters’ Heads,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-11-12/is-the-
republican-party-s-killer-data-app-for-real- (describing Robert Mercer as the “fourth-largest”
individual political donor in the United States).
13
Rosenberg et al., supra note 8.
6
the United States as Cambridge Analytica.14
II. To Help Its Customers Influence U.S. Political Elections, Cambridge Analytica
Developed A Fraudulent Scheme To Harvest The Data Of Millions of American
Voters.
23. In 2014, Cambridge Analytica sought out a relationship with U.S. Senator Ted
Cruz’s planned campaign for the Republican presidential nomination. At the time, the company
realized it did not possess nearly enough data about American voters for a U.S. presidential
campaign.15
24. The company needed a vast amount of data on virtually every American voter and
knew it could not simply purchase that information. As such, Cambridge Analytica engineered a
“Academic Research.”
25. In June 2014, Defendants entered into an arrangement with Cambridge University
researcher Aleksandr Kogan and his company Global Science Research to collect the data they
26. Kogan was the key to gathering the quantity and quality of data Defendants
“thisisyourdigitallife.”18
14
Andy Kroll, Cloak and Data: The Real Story Behind Cambridge Analytica’s Rise and
Fall, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/03/cloak-and-
data-cambridge-analytica-robert-mercer/.
15
Rosenberg et al., supra note 8.
16
Id.
17
A Facebook application is an interactive software application developed to run on and
utilize the Facebook platform.
18
Id.
7
27. Facebook being one of the largest data mining companies in the world,
Cambridge Analytica knew it could take advantage of its developer platform—and, in particular,
its Graph API19—to gather swaths of data about every user and their friends who took the
thisisyourdigitallife quiz.
28. Although primarily recognized for its eponymous social network, Facebook is
also one of the largest data mining companies in the world. With over 200 million users in the
United States alone, Facebook has exclusive access to an exorbitant amount of personal
consumer data.20
29. Facebook is uniquely able to directly link the data it accumulates on individuals’
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digital behaviors with the additional personal data that it extracts from users’ Facebook accounts.
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The result is that Facebook obtains a holistic look at specific consumers’ online and offline
advertising to its users through its platform.22 It is therefore in Facebook’s interests to encourage
third party developers to utilize its platform so that it can gather even more information about
8
30. That’s where Facebook’s Software Development Kit (“SDK”)23 comes in.
Facebook’s SDK allows third party developers to add Facebook-related features to their websites
or services. These features permit the developer’s service to interact with Facebook in various
ways. Relevant here is the ability to include a “Facebook Login,” which lets visitors login to a
31. When an individual visits or uses a service using Facebook’s SDK (e.g., an app
that includes a Facebook Login), information about the individual’s online activities are
transmitted back to Facebook. Facebook benefits from the additional behavioral information it
receives and the app developer, in the Facebook Login example, benefits because its users can
individuals seeking to take the personality quiz had to use their Facebook account credentials to
access it.
33. Under the false pretense of operating a personality test for academic research
purposes, Kogan was able to get 270,000 Facebook users to take his personality quiz.
34. To be clear, Cambridge Analytica, by way of Kogan, paid the majority of the
270,000 individuals to take his personality quiz. Kogan used a service called Amazon
Mechanical Turk—which is an online platform that allows developers to hire people (sometimes
called “turkers”) to do simple tasks for small fees—to pay individuals $1 or $2 to complete the
23
An SDK generally refers to a set of software development tools that allow programmers
to develop applications that interface with a specific software platform. Here, Facebook’s SDK
allows Facebook to release code for third party developers to use in order to interact with
Facebook’s platform.
9
test.
35. There were two conditions: First, turkers had to be American. Second, turkers had
36. By having turkers use Facebook Login to log into the personality quiz,
Defendants were able capitalize on the unguarded nature of Facebook’s developer platform. That
meant developers were able to collect data on the Facebook user taking the test and information
37. That is, at that time, developers only needed permission from the user of the app
to access their friend’s list. Once armed with this permission, a developer could then gather the
profile information of all the app user’s Facebook friends25 simply by querying the Graph API.26
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38. Kogan’s academic research cover allowed him to gather the data at a rapid rate for
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Cambridge Analytica.
39. In fact, Cambridge Analytica’s data grab of 50 million users was eventually
flagged and investigated by Facebook in 2014. But when it learned that the harvesting of this
data was to build personality profiles for academic purposes, Facebook allowed the data
collection to resume.27
24
Sue Halpern, Cambridge Analytica, Facebook, and the Revelations of Open Secrets, New
Yorker, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/cambridge-analytica-facebook-and-the-
revelations-of-open-secrets (last visited March 23, 2018).
25
Jonathan Albright, The Graph API: Key Points in the Facebook and Cambridge
Analytica Debacle, Medium, https://medium.com/tow-center/the-graph-api-key-points-in-the-
facebook-and-cambridge-analytica-debacle-b69fe692d747 (last visited March 23, 2018).
26
For this reason, it is also likely that Facebook’s unrestricted developer tools were used by
thousands of other companies to collect user data without consent. See Iraklis Symeonidis et al.,
Collateral Damage of Facebook Apps: Friends, Providers, and Privacy Interdependence, ICT
Sys. Sec. & Privacy Prot. IFIP Advances in Info. & Commc’n Tech. 194–208 (2016), available
at https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/456.pdf.
27
In 2015, Facebook learned the truth about why Cambridge Analytica was collecting the
10
40. Through these unfair and deceptive practices, Defendants were able to eventually
use the Facebook Login portal to gather the personal information of over 50 million Facebook
users, including their ages, interests, pages they’ve liked, groups they belong to, physical
locations, political affiliation, religious affiliation, relationships, and photos, as well as their full
names, phone numbers, email addresses, and physical addresses. And for the 270,000 survey
takers, Cambridge Analytica even had access to their private messages on Facebook.28
41. This data was exactly what Defendants needed: rich personal data about users that
was not only extremely valuable for “psychographic profiling” as explained in Section III below,
but also detailed enough so that it could be matched to other records already in Cambridge
Analytica’s possession. With this information in hand, Cambridge Analytica could—and did—
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embark on its primary mission: creating a psychographic profile of every American adult in
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order to provide data analytics and messaging-related support for U.S. federal election
campaigns.29
data—to influence and manipulate voters in the 2016 presidential election. In response,
Facebook approached Cambridge Analytica requesting it delete the trove of data it had amassed.
While Cambridge Analytica informed Facebook that it deleted the information, it never verified
this fact and simply took the word of a company which had knowingly and intentionally violated
Facebook’s policies to steal 50 million users’ information. And most importantly, Facebook
never notified the 50 million affected Facebook users of the major privacy breach.
28
Greg Price, Facebook Did Nothing To Stop Cambridge Analytica Data Breaches, New
Class-Action Federal Lawsuit Claims, Newsweek, http://www.newsweek.com/facebook-
cambridge-analytica-data-lawsuit-855600(last visited March 23, 2018).
29
In many ways, Cambridge Analytica’s use of the data aligned with Facebook’s own
intentions with its users’ information. As noted, Facebook has a long history of performing
experiments on its user base without their knowledge or consent. Facebook has sought to
manipulate users’ moods, actions on the website, interactions with Facebook “friends,” and
voting behaviors. See, e.g., Robinson Meyer, Everything We Know About Facebook’s Secret
Mood Manipulation Experiment, THE ATLANTIC (June 28, 2014), http://theatln.tc/2l8BoZt;
Robert M. Bond, et al., A 61-Million-Person Experiment In Social Influence And Political
Mobilization, NATURE (Sept. 13, 2012), available at https://bit.ly/2G4c9hd.
11
II. Facebook Has A Rich History of Experimenting On Its Users.
statisticians, and psychologists to capitalize upon its access to vast amount of user data. Since as
early as 2012, the Core Data Science team been conducting psychological experiments known as
human subject research – actively intervening in people’s (online) environments, measuring the
behavioral impact of those interventions, and publishing the results in scientific journals.
43. For example, over a one-week period in January 2012, Facebook manipulated the
News Feeds30 of nearly 700,000 Facebook users so that they contained proportionally fewer
posts containing either positive or negative content, depending on which experimental group the
participant was assigned to. This manipulation was, in some cases, drastic. Some participants, for
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example, had ninety percent of posts containing positive emotional content removed from their
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News Feed.
Facebook then observed the corresponding emotional content of the participants’ News Feed
posts. The effects were described in an article published in a major, peer-reviewed academic
journal (“the Kramer Article”).31 And they were, while small, statistically significant. Users
exposed to proportionally fewer positive posts generated less positive content themselves, and
vice versa. In other words, people exposed to more sad content were made sad, and people
exposed to more happy content were made happy. And all of this occurred unbeknownst to the
30
The News Feed is the primary way that users consume content on Facebook. It is a
scrollable series of “stories” generated by a user’s friends, where “stories” may be anything from
photos of friends to textual posts written by friends to linked news articles.
31
Adam D.I. Kramer, Jamie E. Guillory, and Jeffrey T. Hancock, Experimental Evidence of
Massive-Scale Emotional Contagion Trough Social Networks, 111 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. USA
8788 (2014), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/111/24/8788.full.html (last accessed
October 1, 2014).
12
participants – the experiment showed “that emotional states can be transferred to others via
emotional contagion, leading people to experience the same emotions without their
awareness.”32
45. Highlighting the significance of the experiment, the Kramer Article noted that
“given the massive scale of social networks such as Facebook, even small effects [like the
manipulation of Facebook News Feeds] can have large aggregated consequences” and concluded
that “the well-documented connection between emotions and physical well-being suggests the
46. This “Emotional Manipulation Experiment” is just the tip of the iceberg.
Facebook has conducted and published scores of similar experiments in the past, and intends to
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47. Facebook has conducted and continues to conduct a wide array of human subject
research experiments. For example, in one experiment conducted in 2010, Facebook tested how
much of an effect it could have on a user’s likelihood to vote.34 For that experiment (the “Voting
Manipulation Experiment”), every single American who signed onto Facebook on voting day—
48. Other published Facebook experiments have tested things ranging from the effect
of hiding links that friends shared with each other (approximately 253 million experiment
32
Id. (emphasis added).
33
Id. at 8790 (emphasis added).
34
Robert M. Bond et al., A 61-Million-Person Experiment in Social Influence and Political
Mobilization, 489 NATURE 295 (2012), available at
http://cameronmarlow.com/media/massive_turnout.pdf (last accessed October 1, 2014).
35
Eytan Bakshy, The Role of Social Networks in Information Diffusion, WWW: Int’l World
13
users’ online shopping purchases (approximately 1.2 million experiment subjects),36 to the effect
49. At one point, Facebook was running so many experiments on its users that “some
[members of the Core Data Science Team] worried that the same users, who were anonymous,
obtaining informed consent. Sheryl Sandberg, for example, explained that the Emotional
noted in a Facebook post defending his experiment that Facebook has “been working on
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51. In fact, Facebook issued a blog post defending their ongoing practice of
conducting human subject research without obtaining informed consent.40 In that post, Facebook
Wide Web Conf. 2012, available at http://cameronmarlow.com/media/bakshy-the_role-
2012b.pdf (last accessed October 1, 2014).
36
See Sean J. Taylor, Eytan Bakshy, Sinan Aral, Selection Effects in Online Sharing:
Consequences for Peer Adoption, available for download at
https://www.facebook.com/publications/266725986806102/ (last accessed October 1, 2014).
37
Eytan Bakshy, Dean Eckles, Rong Yan, Itamar Rosenn, Social Influence in Social
Advertising: Evidence from Field Experiments, available at http://arxiv.org/pdf/1206.4327v1.pdf
(last accessed October 1, 2014).
38
See Reed Albergotti and Elizabeth Dwoskin, Facebook Study Sparks Soul-Searching and
Ethical Questions, Wall St. J., June 30, 2014, available at
http://online.wsj.com/articles/facebook-study-sparks-ethicalquestions-1404172292.
39
R. Jai Krishna, Sandberg: Facebook Study Was ‘Poorly Communicated’, available at
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/07/02/facebooks-sandberg-apologizes-for-news-feed-
experiment/ (last accessed October 1, 2014).
40
See “Research at Facebook,” available at
14
explicitly acknowledges the problematic nature of the Emotional Manipulation Experiment. But
instead of agreeing to abide by the same laws all other research organizations do (and obtain
informed consent from its users), Facebook concludes that a few self-regulated changes to its
52. And Facebook’s job postings reaffirm their commitment to the continuation of
internal human subject research. One posting, for the position of “Data Scientist, Identity
Research & Modeling” seeks a candidate with a Ph. D. and an expertise in “social psychology”
53. The reason that Facebook is conducting these experiments and publishing the
results is to demonstrate its influence over user behavior. Though selling ad space has generated
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enormous profits for Facebook already, Facebook knows that advertisers, political campaigns,
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and its business partners will pay exponentially more money for the ability to manipulate its
54. Facebook knows that this capability is especially attractive to political campaigns,
which, as Facebook knows, are spending record amounts of money on political ads, even in non-
election years.42 It therefore began developing tools for campaigns that wanted to target certain
segments with political ads, including by tracking users to determine their political leanings and
http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2014/10/research-at-facebook/ (last accessed August 23, 2018).
41
Facebook Job Posting, available at
https://www.facebook.com/careers/department?dept=data&req=a0IA000000CzAeDMAV (last
accessed October 1, 2014).
42
Megan Janetsky, Low transparency, low regulation online political ads
skyrocket, OPENSECRET, https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2018/03/low-transparency-low-
regulation-online-political-ads-skyrocket/ (last visited March 23, 2018).
15
55. This demonstration sent a signal to the public at large that it has the ability to
influence and manipulate the behavior of users on its platform, especially with respect to voting.
56. By doing so, Facebook tacitly invited electioneering companies like Cambridge
Analytica to harvest its data for purposes of profiling users and targeting them with tailored
messaging that would dependably influence and manipulate their behavior. It is through this lens
that the relationship between Facebook and Cambridge Analytica must be viewed.
57. Armed with Facebook’s own political targeting tools and a trove of sensitive data
it was not supposed to have access to, Cambridge Analytica was able to create “psychographic
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profiles” on millions of American voters that it used to “significantly influence . . . the outcome
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detailed psychological analysis of an individual using various data points about their interests,
activities, opinions, and motivations. These data points can then be layered on top of
assessments of a person’s innate personality characteristics with predictions of, for instance, their
voting behavior, to create hyper-focused predictions about not only what people will do, but
60. The personality traits that Cambridge Analytica has claimed can be predicted
43
Make America Number 1, CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA
http://cambridgeanalytica.org/casestudies/casestudymakeamericanumber12016+&cd=1&hl=en&
ct=clnk&gl=us (last visited Mar. 23, 2018).
16
through psychographic profiling included, most importantly, a person’s OCEAN ratings, a
common personality type classification method that looks at five factors: Openness,
Analytica has claimed to be able to predict—based on the data it possesses—an individual’s age,
political views, religion, profession, whether they are fair-minded or suspicious of others, and
even (ironically) whether they prefer to disclose facts about themselves to others or value their
privacy.
61. According to Cambridge Analytica, this allowed its clients to bypass individuals’
cognitive defenses by appealing directly to their emotions, using increasingly segmented and
sub-grouped personality type designations and precisely targeted messaging based on those
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designations.45
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62. Using these techniques, Cambridge Analytica claims to have “provided the
Donald J. Trump for President campaign with the expertise and insight that helped win the White
House.”46 Cambridge Analytica provided the Donald J. Trump for President campaign with its
Facebook data-enabled psychographic profiling tool to help, on information and belief, with
voter identification and outreach, advertising spending decisions, voter turnout modeling, and
even helping to set then-candidate Trump’s travel schedule based on where Cambridge Analytica
believed he would be most likely to drum up support within the “swing states” crucial to his
44
Erin Brodwin, Here’s the personality test Cambridge Analytica had Facebook users
take, BUSINESS INSIDER, http://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-personality-test-cambridge-
analytica-data-trump-election-2018-3
45
Nina Burleigh, How Big Data Mines Personal Info To Craft Fake News And Manipulate
Voters, NEWSWEEK (June 8, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/2017/06/16/big-data-mines-
personal-info-manipulate-voters-623131.html.
46
Donald J. Trump for President, CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA,
https://political.production.k8s.e.cambridgeanalytica.org/casestudies (last visited March 23,
2018).
17
securing of the presidency.
63. The data was not just used for purposes of motivating enthusiastic Trump
supporters, or even just to target and convince skeptical or undecided voters. Rather, Cambridge
Analytica used its data to also engage in a broad voter suppression campaign to discourage
supporters (or potential supporters) of Trump’s opponent, Hillary Clinton, from voting. For
example, Cambridge Analytica used its psychographic profiling tool to help generate a brand of
Trump-affiliated super PAC, Make America Number 1—was watched over 30 million times
64. Broadly, this psychographic mapping tool was crucial to Trump’s campaign
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strategy, and thus, its ultimate success: Trump was elected president, and Cambridge Analytica
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walked away millions of dollars richer, with a clear confirmation that its psychographic mapping
was working.
65. Plaintiff People of the State of Illinois incorporates the foregoing allegations as if
66. Section 2 of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act,
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suppression or omission of any material fact, with intent that others rely
upon the concealment, suppression or omission of such material fact, or the
use or employment of any practice described in section 2 of the ‘Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act’, approved August 5, 1965, in the conduct of
any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful whether any person
has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby. In construing this
section consideration should be given to the interpretations of the Federal
Trade Commission and the federal courts relating to Section 5 (a) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act.
conduct constituting a deceptive act or practice declared unlawful under Section 2 of the ICFA,
inasmuch as it knowingly made deceptive and false representations about the nature of its
survey-taking app, the nature of the data it was collecting, and the purposes for which the data
68. Cambridge Analytica intended that Facebook and the public, including Illinois
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residents, rely on its deceptive representations and communications regarding the supposedly
“academic” purpose of its app and the reasons it was collecting troves of their personal Facebook
data.
exfiltrating the Facebook data of 50 million users without their consent and in direct violation of
the Facebook user and developer agreements, which expressly require developers to agree to the
following terms:
1. You will only request the data you need to operate your application.
2. You may cache data you receive through use of the Facebook API in order
to improve your application’s user experience, but you should try to keep
the data up to date. This permission does not give you any rights to such
data.
* * *
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4. Until you display a conspicuous link to your privacy policy in your app,
any data accessed by your app (including basic account information) may
only be used in the context of the user’s experience in that app. A user’s
friends’ data can only be used in the context of the user’s experience on
your application.
6. You will not directly or indirectly transfer any data you receive from us,
including user data or Facebook User IDs, to (or use such data in
connection with) any ad network, ad exchange, data broker, or other
advertising or monetization related toolset, even if a user consents to such
transfer or use. By indirectly we mean you cannot, for example, transfer
data to a third party who then transfers the data to an ad network. By any
data we mean all data obtained through use of the Facebook Platform
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data.
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* * *
9. You will not sell or purchase any data obtained from us by anyone. If you
are acquired by or merge with a third party, you can continue to use user
data within your application, but you cannot transfer data outside your
application.
* * *
11. You cannot use a user’s friend list outside of your application, even if a
user consents to such use, but you can use connections between users who
have both connected to your application.
70. Cambridge Analytica violated these mandatory user privacy protections by posing
as an academic researcher, gaining access to Facebook user data under false pretenses, using
such data for psychographic analysis and electioneering, harvesting users’ friend lists for
psychographic analysis and electioneering, disclosing all collected and harvested user data to its
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affiliates and clients, and reaping substantial profits therefrom.
71. This conduct was unlawful because it violated the personal privacy rights of
72. This conduct was also deceptive and unfair. Many other consulting firms attempt
purchasing and compiling readily-available consumer and voter file data to create detailed voter
profiles.
illicitly collecting the Facebook data on millions of Illinois residents, through a false promise
74. Thus, Cambridge Analytica’s conduct constitutes an unfair and deceptive act or
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75. Pursuant to 815 ILCS 505/7(b), the penalty for violating the ICFA is a sum not to
exceed $50,000, or, if the Court finds that Defendants’ above-described practices were intended
76. In addition to any other civil penalty provided, if a person is found by the Court to
have engaged in any method, act, or practice declared unlawful under the ICFA, and the
violation was committed against a person 65 years of age or older, the Court may impose an
additional civil penalty in a sum not to exceed $10,000 per violation. 815 ILCS 505/7(c).
77. Plaintiff People of the State of Illinois incorporates the foregoing allegations as if
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78. The ICFA prohibits conduct that is deceptive or unlawful.
consumers that were knowingly false. Specifically, Facebook represented to its users that their
personal data would be protected in accordance with its user and developer agreements.
80. Despite these material representations, Facebook permitted third parties, including
Cambridge Analytica, to collect and harvest its users’ personal data, including such sensitive
information as their private messages, for purposes of profiling and targeting them with tailored
81. Facebook had actual knowledge that Cambridge Analytica gained unauthorized
access to its users’ personal data without their knowledge or consent and in express violation of
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its user and developer agreements, yet did not put a stop to it.
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Facebook’s decision, upon learning that Cambridge Analytica had misappropriated user data for
political purposes, to conceal the breach from its users and do nothing more than quietly (and
83. By concealing this misconduct from its users, Facebook avoided backlash over its
blatant misrepresentations from its users and preserved the strength of its data mining operation
84. Facebook allowed Cambridge Analytica to secretly harvest its users’ data and
build psychographic profiles of each of them so that it could influence and manipulate their
85. Facebook admits that it violated its users’ privacy rights by allowing Cambridge
Analytica to harvest their data. On March 21, 2018, Facebook’s Chief Executive Officer Mark
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Zuckerberg issued a public statement conceding that it breached the trust of “the people who
share their data with us and expect us to protect it.”48 Facebook Chief Operating Officer Sheryl
Sandberg likewise conceded that Facebook committed “a major violation of the people’s trust”
when it allowed Cambridge Analytica to collect user data and that she “deeply regret[s] that
86. Facebook’s conduct constitutes an unfair and deceptive act or practice under the
ICFA.
87. Pursuant to 815 ILCS 505/7(b), the penalty for violating the ICFA is a sum not to
exceed $50,000, or, if the Court finds that Facebook’s above-described practices were intended
88. In addition to any other civil penalty provided, if a person is found by the Court to
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have engaged in any method, act, or practice declared unlawful under the ICFA, and the
violation was committed against a person 65 years of age or older, the Court may impose an
additional civil penalty in a sum not to exceed $10,000 per violation. 815 ILCS 505/7(c).
89. Plaintiff People of the State of Illinois incorporates the foregoing allegations as if
90. Pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-701, this Court “may make binding declarations of
rights, having the force of final judgments . . . including the determination . . . of the
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declaration of the rights of the parties interested.”
92. Plaintiff People of the State of Illinois seeks a judgment declaring that
93. Upon information and belief, Defendants remain in possession of the highly
personal Facebook user data that it unlawfully obtained. Millions of Illinois residents will
continue to suffer or be vulnerable to injury, unless this is rectified through injunctive relief.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff People of the State of Illinois respectfully requests that the
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B. Fining Defendants $50,000 for violating the ICFA or, if the Court finds that
Defendants engaged in the above-described conduct with intent to defraud, $50,000 for each
such violation;
above involving an Illinois resident 65 years of age or older for each day such violation has
F. Awarding such and other injunctive and declaratory relief as is necessary; and
G. Awarding such other and further relief as the Court deems reasonable and just.
JURY DEMAND
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Dated: March 23, 2018 Respectfully submitted,
Tel: 312.589.6370
Fax: 312.589.6378
Firm ID: 62075
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