G.R. No. 149724. August 19, 2003.

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,

represented herein by its Secretary, HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ,
petitioner, vs. DENR REGION 12 EMPLOYEES, represented by BAGUIDALI
KARIM, Acting President of COURAGE (DENR Region 12 Chapter),
respondents.
Administrative Law; Department of Environment and Natural Resources; Rules of
Procedure; Rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical
manner, as rules of procedure are used only to help secure and not to override
substantial justice.—This Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be
simply disregarded for these prescribed procedures ensure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice. However, it is equally true that litigation is not merely a
game of technicalities. Time and again, courts have been guided by the principle that
the rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical manner, as
rules of procedure are used only to help secure and not to override substantial
justice. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than
promote justice, it is always within the power of this Court to suspend the rules, or
except a particular case from its operation.

Constitutional Law; Executive Department; Powers; Doctrine of Qualified Political

Agency; Under this doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the executive department, and the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
Executive Departments.—It is apropos to reiterate the elementary doctrine of
qualified political agency, thus: Under this doctrine, which recognizes the
establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations
are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or
the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive. This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President
as provided for under Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution.

Same; Same; Same; Reorganization; The trial court should have taken judicial notice
of R.A. No. 6734, as implemented by E.O. No. 429, as legal basis of the President’s
power to reorganize the Executive Department, specifically those administrative
regions which did not vote for their inclusion in the ARMM.—The trial court should
have taken judicial notice of R.A. No. 6734, as implemented by E.O. No. 429, as legal
basis of the President’s power to reorganize the executive department, specifically
those administrative regions which did not vote for their inclusion in the ARMM. It
is axiomatic that a court has the mandate to apply relevant statutes and
jurisprudence in determining whether the allegations in a complaint establish a
cause of action. While it focuses on the complaint, a court clearly cannot disregard
decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it. In resolving
the motion to dismiss, the trial court should have taken cognizance of the official acts
of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments because they are proper
subjects of mandatory judicial notice as provided by Section 1 of Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court.

Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; It is basic in our form of government that
the judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the acts of the Executive
or Legislative Department.—It is basic in our form of government that the judiciary
cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the acts of the executive or the
legislative department, for each department is supreme and independent of the
others, and each is devoid of authority not only to encroach upon the powers or field
of action assigned to any of the other department, but also to inquire into or pass
upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions
made by the other departments.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The court’s exercise of the judicial power, pervasive and
limitless it may seem to be, still must succumb to the paramount doctrine of
separation of powers.—Unless there is a clear showing of constitutional infirmity or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the Court’s
exercise of the judicial power, pervasive and limitless it may seem to be, still must
succumb to the paramount doctrine of separation of powers.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor Generalfor petitioner.

Hamlet M. Pahm for private respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review assailing the Resolutions dated May 31, 2000 of 1

the Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R.
SP No. 58896, and its Resolution dated August 20, 2001, which denied the
2

motion for reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:

On November 15, 1999, Regional Executive Director of the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources for Region XII, Israel C. Gaddi, issued a
Memorandum directing the immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional
3

Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal (formerly Marbel), South Cotabato.

The Memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR Administrative Order No.
99-14, issued by then DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles, which reads in
part:
Subject: Providing for the Redefinition of Functions and Realignment of
Administrative Units in the Regional and Field Offices:

Pursuant to Executive Order No. 192, dated June 10, 1987 and as an interim
administrative arrangement to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in delivering its
services pending approval of the government-wide reorganization by Congress, the
following redefinition of functions and realignment of administrative units in the
regional and field offices are hereby promulgated:

Section 1. Realignment of Administrative Units:

The DENR hereby adopts a policy to establish at least one Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or Administrative Unit per Congressional
District except in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and the
National Capital Region (NCR). The Regional Executive Directors (REDs) are hereby
authorized to realign/relocate existing CENROs and implement this policy in
accordance with the attached distribution list per region which forms part of this
Order. Likewise, the following realignment and administrative arrangements are
hereby adopted:

xxx xxx xxx

1.6. The supervision of the Provinces of South Cotabato and Sarangani shall be
transferred from Region XI to XII.
4

Respondents, employees of the DENR Region XII who are members of the
employees association, “COURAGE”, represented by their Acting President,
Baguindanai A. Karim, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato, a
petition for nullity of orders with prayer for preliminary injunction.

On December 8, 1999, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order

enjoining petitioner from implementing the assailed Memorandum. The
dispositive portion of the Order reads:
“WHEREFORE, defendants DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles and Regional
Executive Director Israel C. Gaddi are hereby ordered to cease and desist from doing
the act complained of, namely, to stop the transfer of DENR [Region] 12 offices from
Cotabato City to Koronadal (Marbel), South Cotabato.

xxx xxx xxx

SO ORDERED.” 5

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss, raising

the following grounds:
I

The power to transfer the Regional Office of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) is executive in nature.

II

The decision to transfer the Regional Office is based on Executive Order No. 429,
which reorganized Region XII.

III

The validity of EO 429 has been affirmed by the Honorable Supreme Court in the
Case of Chiongbian vs. Orbos (1995) 245 SCRA 255.
 IV

Since the power to reorganize the Administrative Regions is Executive in Nature

citing Chiongbian, the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition.6

On January 14, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
“CONSEQUENTLY, order is hereby issued ordering the respondents herein to cease
and desist from enforcing their Memorandum Order dated November 15, 1999
relative to the transfer of the DENR Regional Offices from Region 12 to Region 11 at
Koronadal, South Cotabato for being bereft of legal basis and issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on their part, and they
are further ordered to return back the seat of the DENR Regional Offices 12 to
Cotabato City.

SO ORDERED.” 7

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated April 10,
2000. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was filed before the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 58896. The petition was dismissed
outright for: (1) failure to submit a written explanation why personal service
was not done on the adverse party; (2) failure to attach affidavit of service; (3)
failure to indicate the material dates when copies of the orders of the lower
court were received; (4) failure to attach certified true copy of the order
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration; (5) for improper verification,
the same being based on petitioner’s “knowledge and belief,” and (6) wrong
remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 to substitute a lost appeal. 8

The motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated August 20,
2001. Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:
9

RULES OF PROCEDURE CAN NOT BE USED TO DEFEAT THE ENDS OF

SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE

II

THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT DATED 14 JANUARY 2000 WHICH

WAS AFFIRMED IN THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTIONS OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS DATED 31 MAY 2000 AND 20 AUGUST 2001 IS PATENTLY ILLEGAL
AND SHOULD BE NULLIFIED, CONSIDERING THAT:

A.RESPONDENTS HAVE NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PETITIONER AS

THEY HAVE NO RIGHT TO CAUSE THE DENR REGION 12 OFFICE TO
REMAIN IN COTABATO CITY.

B.THE STATE DID NOT GIVE ITS CONSENT TO BE SUED.

C.THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT DATED 14 JANUARY 2000 IS

CONTRARY TO THE RULE OF PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS.
D.IN ANY EVENT, THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT DATED 14
JANUARY 2000 IS CONTRARY TO THE LETTER AND INTENT OF EXECUTIVE
ORDER NO. 429 AND REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6734.

E.THE DETERMINATION OF THE PROPRIETY AND PRACTICALITY OF THE

TRANSFER OF REGIONAL OFFICES IS INHERENTLY EXECUTIVE, AND
THEREFORE, NON-JUSTICIABLE. 10

In essence, petitioner argues that the trial court erred in enjoining it from
causing the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices, considering that it
was done pursuant to DENR Administrative Order 99-14.

The issues to be resolved in this petition are: (1) Whether DAO-99-14 and the
Memorandum implementing the same were valid; and (2) Whether the DENR
Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR.

Prefatorily, petitioner prays for a liberal application of procedural rules

considering the greater interest of justice.

This Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be simply
disregarded for these prescribed procedures ensure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice. However, it is equally true that litigation is not
merely a game of technicalities. Time and again, courts have been guided by
the principle that the rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid
and technical manner, as rules of procedure are used only to help secure and
not to override substantial justice. Thus, if the application of the Rules would
11

tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within the power of
this Court to suspend the rules, or except a particular case from its
operation.12

Despite the presence of procedural flaws, we find it necessary to address the

issues because of the demands of public interest, including the need for
stability in the public service and the serious implications this case may
cause on the effective administration of the executive department. Although
no appeal was made within the reglementary period to appeal, nevertheless,
the departure from the general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari
cannot be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal is justified because the
execution of the assailed decision would amount to an oppressive exercise of
judicial authority. 13

Petitioner maintains that the assailed DAO-99-14 and the implementing

memorandum were valid and that the trial court should have taken judicial
notice of Republic Act No. 6734, otherwise known as “An Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,” and its implementing Executive
Order 429, as the legal bases for the issuance of the assailed DAO-99-14.
14

Moreover, the validity of R.A. No. 6734 and E.O. 429 were upheld in the case
of Chiongbian v. Orbos. Thus, the respondents cannot, by means of an
15

injunction, force the DENR XII Regional Offices to remain in Cotabato City,
as the exercise of the authority to transfer the same is executive in nature.
It is apropos to reiterate the elementary doctrine of qualified political agency,
thus:
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated
by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. 16

This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for
under Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

However, as head of the Executive Department, the President cannot be

expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the
time. He may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet members except
when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of
the situation demand that he acts personally. 17

In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, this Court upheld the continuing

18

authority of the President to carry out the reorganization in any branch or

agency of the executive department. Such authority includes the creation,
alteration or abolition of public offices. The Chief Executive’s authority to
19

reorganize the National Government finds basis in Book III, Section 20 of

E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, viz:
Section 20. Residual Powers.—Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President
shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are
provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above or
which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law.

Further, in Larin v. Executive Secretary, this Court had occasion to rule:

20

This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the law.
What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772
which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the
President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national
government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to
abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and
activities and to standardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two
decrees is unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that “all laws,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed or revoked.” So far, there is yet no law amending or repealing
said decrees.
Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the President
to reorganize the National Government may validly be delegated to his
cabinet members exercising control over a particular executive department.
Thus, in DOTC Secretary v. Mabalot, we held that the President—through
21

his duly constituted political agent and alter ego, the DOTC Secretary—may
legally and validly decree the reorganization of the Department, particularly
the establishment of DOTC-CAR as the LTFRB Regional Office at the
Cordillera Administrative Region, with the concomitant transfer and
performance of public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a regional
office of the LTFRB.

Similarly, in the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the
DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from
Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by
the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the
President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.

The trial court should have taken judicial notice of R.A. No. 6734, as
implemented by E.O. No. 429, as legal basis of the President’s power to
reorganize the executive department, specifically those administrative
regions which did not vote for their inclusion in the ARMM. It is axiomatic
that a court has the mandate to apply relevant statutes and jurisprudence in
determining whether the allegations in a complaint establish a cause of
action. While it focuses on the complaint, a court clearly cannot disregard
decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it. In 22

resolving the motion to dismiss, the trial court should have taken cognizance
of the official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments
because they are proper subjects of mandatory judicial notice as provided by
Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government
and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of
the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the
official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines,
the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (Emphasis
supplied)

Article XIX, Section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 provides:

SECTION 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall
take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units
provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall
be held not earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty (120) days
after the approval of this Act: Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting
favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion
in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative
regions: Provided, however, That the President may, by administrative
determination, merge the existing regions.
Pursuant to the authority granted by the aforequoted provision, then
President Corazon C. Aquino issued on October 12, 1990 E.O. 429, “Providing
for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao.” Section 4
thereof provides:
SECTION 4. REGION XII, to be known as CENTRAL MINDANAO, shall include
the following provinces and cities:

Provinces

Sultan Kudarat

Cotabato

South Cotabato

Cities

Cotabato

General Santos

The Municipality of Koronadal (Marinduque) in South Cotabato shall serve as the

regional center.

In Chiongbian v. Orbos, this Court stressed the rule that the power of the
President to reorganize the administrative regions carries with it the power
to determine the regional centers. In identifying the regional centers, the
President purposely intended the effective delivery of the field services of
government agencies. The same intention can be gleaned from the preamble
23

of the assailed DAO-99-14 which the DENR sought to achieve, that is, to
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the DENR in delivering its services.

It may be true that the transfer of the offices may not be timely considering
that: (1) there are no buildings yet to house the regional offices in Koronadal,
(2) the transfer falls on the month of Ramadan, (3) the children of the affected
employees are already enrolled in schools in Cotabato City, (4) the Regional
Development Council was not consulted, and (5) the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, through a resolution, requested the DENR Secretary to
reconsider the orders. However, these concern issues addressed to the wisdom
of the transfer rather than to its legality. It is basic in our form of government
that the judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the acts of
the executive or the legislative department, for each department is supreme
24

and independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority not only to
encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of the other
department, but also to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom
of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the other
departments. 25

The Supreme Court should not be thought of as having been tasked with the
awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. Unless there is
a clear showing of constitutional infirmity or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the Court’s exercise of the judicial
power, pervasive and limitless it may seem to be, still must succumb to the
paramount doctrine of separation of powers. After a careful review of the
26

records of the case, we find that this jurisprudential element of abuse of

discretion has not been shown to exist. WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the petition for review is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58896 dated May 31, 2000 and August 20, 2001,
as well as the decision dated January 14, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cotabato City, Branch 15, in Civil Case No 389, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The permanent injunction, which enjoined the petitioner from
enforcing the Memorandum Order of the DENR XII Regional Executive
Director, is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug (Actg. Chairman), Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr. (C.J.),Abroad on Official Business.

Petition granted, resolutions reversed and set aside.

Note.—The doctrine of separation of powers constitutes an inseparable bar

against the Supreme Court’s interposition of its power of judicial review to
review the judgment of Congress rejecting the former President’s claim that
he is still the President, albeit on leave and that his successor is merely an
acting President. (Estrada vs. Desierto, 356 SCRA 108[2001])

——o0o——