Kohler Motion To Dismiss

Case 1:17-cv-00542-HG-KSC Document 26-1 Filed 01/02/18 Page 1 of 38 PageID #: 81
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
BRETT RATNER, CIVIL NO. CV 17-00542 HG-KSC
Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF

MOTION
vs.
MELANIE KOHLER and JOHN and/or

JANE DOES,
Defendants.
1555598_5
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii
I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................................1
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................................................7
III. ARGUMENT.................................................................................................10
A. The Complaint Must Be Dismissed Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) ..........10
1. The legal standard for adequately pleading a defamation claim

................................................................................................... 11
2. Mr. Ratner's Complaint fails to plausibly allege actual malice

................................................................................................... 16
B. Mr. Ratner’s Complaint Should Be Dismissed Under California’s

Anti-SLAPP Statute ............................................................................19
1. The Court should apply California’s anti-SLAPP statute.........21
2. Mr. Ratner cannot meet his burden under California’s anti-

SLAPP statute ...........................................................................26
a. Ms. Kohler’s FB Post clearly relates to a matter of public

concern ............................................................................ 28
b. Mr. Ratner cannot demonstrate a probability of

prevailing on his claim ................................................... 29
IV. CONCLUSION..................................................................................................30
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Federal Cases
Ancheta v. Watada,
135 F. Supp. 2d 1114 (D. Haw. 2001).................................................................. 15
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009).............................................................................................. 11
Ayyadurai v. Floor64, Inc.,

2017 WL 3896668 (D. Mass. Sept. 6, 2017) ........................................................ 24
Batzel v. Smith,
333, F.3d 1018, 1025 (9th Cir. 2003) ................................................................... 21
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544 (2007).................................................................................... 4, 10, 11
Besen v. Parents & Friends of Ex-Gays, Inc.,

2012 WL 1440183 (E.D. Va. Apr. 25, 2012) ....................................................... 16
Biro v. Conde Nast,

807 F.3d 541 (2d Cir. 2015) ..................................................................... 11, 13, 15
Biro v. Conde Nast,

963 F. Supp. 2d 255, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), ............................................ 13, 15, 19
Carrasco v. HSBC Bank USA Nat’l Ass’n,

2011 WL 6012944 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2011) ....................................................... 17
Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41 (1957)................................................................................................ 11
Containment Techs. Grp., Inc. v. Am. Soc. of Health Sys. Pharmacists,

2009 WL 838549 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2009) ........................................................ 24
DeRoburt v. Gannett Co.,

83 F.R.D. 574 (D. Haw. 1979) ......................................................................... 6, 25
ii
1555598_5
Earley v. Gatehouse Media Penn. Holdings, Inc.,

2013 WL 5466149 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2013) ...................................................... 12
Heineke v. Santa Clara Univ.,

2017 WL 6026248 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2017) ....................................................... 28
In re WPMK Corp.,
59 B.R. 991 (D. Haw. 1986) ................................................................................... 6
Intercon Sols., Inc. v. Basel Action Network,

969 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (N.D. Ill. 2013) ............................................................ 15, 17
Isaac v. Daniels,
2017 WL 2962890 (D. Haw. June 23, 2017) ....................................................... 17
Kukui Gardens Corp. v. Holco Capital Grp., Inc.,

2010 WL 145284 (D. Haw. Jan. 12, 2010) .......................................................... 23
Lemen v. Allstate Ins. Co.,

938 F. Supp. 640 (D. Haw. 1995) ......................................................................... 22
Madison v. Frazier,
539 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2008) ................................................................................ 17
Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC,

715 F.3d 254 (9th Cir. 2013) ...................................................................... 1, 27, 30
Manzari v. Associated Newspapers Ltd.,

830 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2016) ................................................................................ 12
Mayfield v. National Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc.,

674 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2012) .............................................................. 11, 14, 15, 19
McKee v. Cosby,
236 F. Supp. 3d 427, 452 (D. Mass. 2017) ........................................................... 29
Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc.,

816 F.3d 686 (11th Cir. 2016) ....................................................................... Passim
iii
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New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,

376 U.S. 254 (1964).................................................................................... 5, 12, 16
Pan Am Sys., Inc. v. Hardenbergh,

871 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D. Me. 2012) .......................................................................... 17
Parisi v. Sinclair,
845 F. Supp. 2d 215 (D.D.C. 2012) ...................................................................... 16
Patton v. Cox,
276 F.3d 493 (9th Cir. 2002) ................................................................................ 21
Pippen v. NBCUniversal Media, LLC.,

734 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 2013) .............................................................. 11, 13, 15, 19
Ranbaxy Labs., Inc. v. First Databank, Inc.,

2014 WL 982742 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 2014) ....................................................... 24
Resolute Forest Prod., Inc. v. Greenpeace Int'l,

2017 WL 4618676 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2017) ........................................................ 6
Rodriguez v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.,

2009 WL 10676972 (D. Haw. June 12, 2009) ................................................. 6, 11
Roe v. Doe,
2009 WL 1883752 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2009)...................................................... 14
Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Committee,

669 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2012)....................................................................... 11, 14, 19
Thomas v. L.A. Times Commc’ns, LLC,

189 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (C.D. Cal. 2002) ................................................................ 12
Tobinick v. Novella,
108 F. Supp. 3d 1299 (S.D. Fla. 2015) ..................................................... 22, 23, 24
Troxel v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co.,

2015 WL 4603099 (D. Haw. July 30, 2015) .......................................................... 8
iv
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U.S. ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.,

190 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 1999) .......................................................................... 20, 21
Wynn v. Chanos,
75 F. Supp. 3d 1228 (N.D. Cal. 2014) .................................................................. 14
State Cases
Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity,

969 P.2d 564 (Cal. 1999) ...................................................................................... 28
Cho v. Chang,
219 Cal. App. 4th 521 (2013) ............................................................................... 27
Contemporary Servs. Corp. v. Staff Pro Inc.,

61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 434 (Ct. App. 2007) ................................................................... 27
Dickinson v. Cosby,
225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 430 (Ct. App. 2017) ................................................................. 28
DuPont Merck Pharm. Co. v. Superior Court,

92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755 (Ct. App. 2000) ................................................................... 29
Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc.,

52 P.3d 685 (Cal. 2002) ........................................................................................ 28
Mikelson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n,

107 Hawaii 192, 111 P.3d 601 (2005) .................................................................. 22
Rodriguez v. Nishiki,
65 Haw. 430, 653 P.2d 1145 (1982) ................................................................. 6, 12
State Statutes
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16 (West 2015) .................................................... Passim

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1) ...................................................................... 27
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16 (b)(2) ...................................................................... 27
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e) ...................................................................... 20, 27
D.C. Code Ann. § 16-5502 (West) ......................................................................... 20
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 634F-1 ........................................................................................ 20
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Haw. Rev. Stat. § 634F–2(1) (2012) ....................................................................... 22

La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 971........................................................................... 20
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31.150 (West) ....................................................................... 20
Federal Rules
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).................................................................................... Passim

Fed. R. Evid. 201 ...................................................................................................... 1
Other Authorities
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 150 (1971) ....................................... 25
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
Defendant Melanie Kohler (“Kohler”) submits this memorandum of law in
support of her motion to dismiss and strike the complaint filed by Plaintiff Brett
Ratner (“Ratner”).
I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Mr. Ratner is a powerful, well-known Hollywood director and producer. He
has filed this defamation lawsuit with a single purpose: to silence and intimidate
Ms. Kohler—and other women like her—from coming forward with stories of
grave sexual mistreatment at his hands. This case thus raises significant First
Amendment concerns. To overcome them, and to comply with basic requirements
of notice pleading, Mr. Ratner must allege his claim with particularity. But
instead, he has filed a three-page complaint that exemplifies conclusory pleading:
rather than include facts to support his claim and make it plausible, he alleges as
“facts” the underlying legal elements of defamation liability. It is black letter law
that a complaint like the one filed here flunks Rule 12(b)(6).
Although Mr. Ratner decided not to include any factual allegations in his
Complaint, this case cannot be understood in isolation. See Fed. R. Evid. 201
(authorizing judicial notice of relevant, uncontestable adjudicative facts); Makaeff
v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 259 n.2, 266–67 (9th Cir. 2013). More than a
dozen other women have publicly accused Mr. Ratner of sexual assault, sexual
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harassment, or some combination thereof. Some of these claims surfaced years
ago.1 But many of them were first publicly reported by the Los Angeles Times on
November 1, 2017. 2 As a wave of discourse about sexual assault and harassment
swept across the nation, the LA Times published the stories of six women—some
of them famous actors and none of them Ms. Kohler—who stated that Mr. Ratner
had engaged in sexual misconduct. Each of these women alleged some form of
sexual harassment or assault by Mr. Ratner; for example, one of them revealed that
Mr. Ratner had forced her to perform oral sex on him. Almost immediately,
1
See, e.g., Danielle Berrin, The Morning After: What I Learned From Brett Ratner
Hitting on Me, THE JEWISH JOURNAL, Nov. 9, 2011, available at
http://jewishjournal.com/newspulse/97928/ (reporter’s claim that she had to
“repeatedly remov[e] [Ratner’s] hands from between [her] legs”); Ryan
Kavanaugh Attacks Brett Ratner in Deleted Twitter Tirade, HOLLYWOOD
REPORTER (Aug. 9, 2016, 10:29 PM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/
news/ryan-kavanaugh-attacks-brett-ratner-921290 (reporting that an individual
accused Ratner of being the “epitome” of “casting couch”); Vince Mancini, Olivia
Munn Says Brett Ratner Masturbated To Her While Eating Shrimp, UPROXX,
(Nov. 4, 2011), http://uproxx.com/filmdrunk/olivia-munn-says-brett-ratner-
masturbated-to-her-while-eating-shrimp/.
2
See Amy Kaufman & Daniel Miller, Six Women Accuse Filmmaker Brett Ratner
of Sexual Harassment or Misconduct, LA TIMES, Nov. 1, 2017,
http://www.latimes.com/business/hollywood/la-fi-ct-brett-ratner-allegations-
20171101-htmlstory.html. On November 19, in a follow-up story, four other
accounts of assault and harassment were published by the Los Angeles Times,
including one claiming Ratner watched as Russell Simmons raped a woman. See
Amy Kaufman, Daniel Miller & Victoria Kim, Russell Simmons and Brett Ratner
Face New Allegations of Sexual Misconduct, LA TIMES, Nov. 19, 2017,
http://beta.latimes.com/business/hollywood/la-fi-brett-ratner-russell-simmons-
20171119-htmlstory.html; see also Rachel Abrams, Brett Ratner, Prominent
Producer, Accused of Sexual Misconduct, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/01/business/brett-ratner-sexual-
harassment.html?_r=0.
2
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reports surfaced that Warner Brothers planned to sever ties with Mr. Ratner,
Playboy Enterprises had halted its plans to work with him on a Hugh Hefner
Biopic, and his talent agency was reviewing whether to continue working with
him.3
A few hours after these reports emerged—and in an apparent effort to
intimidate other women from speaking out—Mr. Ratner filed this case against Ms.
Kohler. The Complaint alleges that she, and she alone, defamed him in a
Facebook post that had been published for less than two hours in mid-October
2017 (the “FB Post”).4 That post accused Mr. Ratner of rape and described the
encounter in considerable detail. According to Mr. Ratner, that FB Post renders
Ms. Kohler responsible for the damage that his personal and professional
reputation has sustained. To the best of our knowledge, Mr. Ratner has not sued
any of his other accusers, many of whom are far more wealthy and famous than
Ms. Kohler, and whose accounts were published in national press.
3
See Ryan Faughnder & Daniel Miller, Warner Bros. Cuts Ties with Brett Ratner
After Sexual Misconduct Allegations, LA TIMES, Nov. 1, 2017,
http://www.latimes.com/business/hollywood/la-fi-ct-brett-ratner-warner-bros-
20171101-story.html.
4
See David Streitfeld, As Sex Accusations Flood Social Media, Lawyers Gear Up
for Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/03/
technology/sex-accusations-social-media-lawsuits.html?_r=1 (“Social media has
overflowed with sexual misconduct allegations during the last few weeks. The
450-word post that Melanie put on Facebook probably had the shortest life — a
few hours.”).
3
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Mr. Ratner’s Complaint purports to state a claim in three conclusory
sentences. Indeed, his “factual allegations” total only 190 words. Without
explanation, the Complaint quotes only a small fraction of Ms. Kohler’s FB Post.
It then alleges—with no further detail—that this statement was “false, fabricated,
and fictional,” and that Ms. Kohler published it with “knowledge of its falsity,
maliciously, and with the intent to harm Plaintiff’s reputation and standing.”
That’s it. The Complaint does not address the rest of Ms. Kohler’s post; it does not
explain why the selected statement is false or what relationship (if any) Mr. Ratner
had with Ms. Kohler; and it alleges zero facts suggesting why Ms. Kohler would
have been motivated to lie about Mr. Ratner raping her. Most significantly, the
Complaint does not describe as false the portions of Ms. Kohler’s post in which
she explains her motives for publishing it: “I can’t be an advocate for women
speaking out if I don’t speak out too . . . Now at least I can look myself in the
mirror and not feel like part of me is a coward or a hypocrite. Exhibit “A.”
As the Supreme Court has made clear, such threadbare, conclusory
allegations are patently insufficient as a matter of law. In Iqbal and Twombly, the
Court held that all federal plaintiffs must plead “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). Thus, a plaintiff may not simply recite the elements of a legal claim
without pleading any factual allegations to make his claim plausible. This is not a
4
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controversial requirement, nor is it an onerous one. But it establishes some ground
rules for pleading cases in federal court that this Complaint comes nowhere close
to satisfying.
In a defamation case like this one—involving speech about a public figure
on a matter of public importance—the Iqbal/Twombly pleading standard actually
does double duty. Even as it filters out conclusory pleadings under Rule 12(b)(6),
it also safeguards core First Amendment principles. See New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (requiring proof of “actual malice” when
public figures file defamation claims). It does so by requiring public figures to do
more than merely allege, on their own say so, that unflattering statements were
false. Instead, they must offer particularized factual allegations to make their
claims plausible. Without this rule, public figures could chill valuable speech by
filing barebones, boilerplate defamation complaints, thus saddling their accusers
with the substantial costs of defending a lawsuit and undertaking discovery. As
this Court has recognized: “Claims for defamation/false light invasion of privacy
must be specifically pled . . . The general rule of liberally construing a complaint
when considering 12(b)(6) motions is inapplicable to certain
traditionally disfavored causes of action, including defamation.” Rodriguez v.
Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., CIVIL No. 09-00024 HG-LEK, 2009
WL 10676972, at *9 (D. Haw. June 12, 2009) (citation omitted).
5
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The Complaint must also be dismissed for a distinct and equally clear
reason: failure to satisfy the applicable provisions of California’s anti-SLAPP
statute.5 Under Hawaii’s choice of law principles, California law applies to the
anti-SLAPP analysis. Not only is Mr. Ratner from California, but all of his alleged
injury occurred there, and all of the events underlying Ms. Kohler’s statement took
place in Los Angeles. Further, California has a strong interest in encouraging
speech about a sexual assault that took place within its borders by one of its
residents. Applying California’s anti-SLAPP law, the Complaint must be struck
because Mr. Ratner cannot meet his burden of showing that he is likely to succeed
on the merits. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16 (West 2015).
5
Applying California law for purposes of anti-SLAPP does not necessarily require
the Court to apply California law for purposes of the defamation claim. DeRoburt
v. Gannett Co., 83 F.R.D. 574, 581 n. 29 (D. Haw. 1979). (“Traditional choice of
law rules have . . . been used to apply different rules of law to different issues
arising in the same case.”); see also In re WPMK Corp., 59 B.R. 991, 995 (D.
Haw. 1986). Nevertheless, the substantive standard for defamation against public
figures is the same in California as it is in Hawaii. Compare Resolute Forest
Prod., Inc. v. Greenpeace Int'l, No. 17-CV-02824-JST, 2017 WL 4618676, at *7
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2017), with Rodriguez v. Nishiki, 65 Haw. 430, 440, 653 P.2d
1145, 1151 (1982).
6
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II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

In his Complaint, Mr. Ratner describes himself as an “accomplished and
well-known film director who resides in Los Angeles.” Compl. ¶ 4. Ms. Kohler
is currently a resident of Hawaii. Compl. ¶ 3.
In mid-October 2017, as an unprecedented number of women and men came
forward to share their stories of sexual abuse, Ms. Kohler published a post on
Facebook in which she stated that Mr. Ratner had raped her years earlier, when she
lived in Los Angeles. On November 1, 2017, the Los Angeles Times printed a
story detailing six different women’s accounts of sexual mistreatment by Mr.
Ratner. That story was republished in the New York Times, USA Today, the
Guardian, and many other papers. Hours after it first appeared, Mr. Ratner filed
the instant Complaint.
Mr. Ratner’s Complaint contains the following three paragraphs of relevant
allegations:
(7) Commencing on or about October 20, 2017, Defendant recklessly

and/or intentionally posted a statement on her Facebook page
claiming that “Brett Ratner raped [her];” Ratner “was a rapist on at
least one night in Hollywood about 12 years ago;” and Ratner “preyed
on me as a drunk girl [and] forced himself upon me.
(8) Plaintiff contends that the Defendant’s aforementioned statement

is entirely false, fabricated, and fictional.
(9) Plaintiff contends that the Defendant’s aforementioned statement

was published by the Defendant with knowledge of its falsity,
maliciously, and with the intent to harm Plaintiff’s reputation and
standing.
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Compl. ¶¶ 7–9.
The Complaint contains no other factual allegations suggesting that Ms.
Kohler’s statement is false. Likewise, the Complaint does not contain any
allegations explaining why Ms. Kohler, who moved to Hawaii eight years ago
(and lives in Hawaii with her husband and young son), was motivated to lie about
an encounter with Mr. Ratner. The Complaint offers no particularized allegations
at all about Ms. Kohler, or about any relationship she may ever have had with Mr.
Ratner. For example, there are no allegations that Ms. Kohler ever worked for Mr.
Ratner, knew Mr. Ratner, threatened to sue Mr. Ratner, lied in order to gain
anything from Mr. Ratner, or had any particular reason to injure Mr. Ratner.
Certainly, there is not (and could not be) any plausible explanation for why, living
with her family in Hawaii, Ms. Kohler would have anything whatsoever to gain
from lying about a sexual assault by Mr. Ratner that took place in Los Angeles
many years ago.
It is telling that the Complaint excludes most of Ms. Kohler’s FB Post,
which provides a compelling, comprehensive, and highly detailed account of her
experience with Mr. Ratner, as well as an explanation for why she decided to share
her story. The FB Post is indisputably incorporated into the Complaint by
reference and may be considered at this stage. Troxel v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr.
Co., No. CIV. 14-00342 LEK-RLP, 2015 WL 4603099, at *2 (D. Haw. July 30,
8
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2015) (“[C]ourts must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other
sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to
dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and
matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” (internal citation omitted)).
Here is the full text:
My hands are shaking even as I try to write this. It’s not something
I’ve ever told anyone in my entire life.
Not even my closest friends at the time.
Brett Ratner raped me. He is a famous director and producer in
Hollywood.
If there is a chance of changing the [H]ollywood culture, the
American culture, it has to happen now while people are listening.
I tell this story in hopes that if he’s done it to others that they might
have the confidence to come forward. And if he hasn’t, that maybe he
can be accountable for the way he’s treated the nobodies of the world
or at least the way he’s treated me.
Even if he treats all the somebodies of the world with respect and
decency, he is not a public monster like Harvey and I don’t think
anyone has much bad to say about him professionally, that doesn’t
mean he can do this in the dark shadows of the night when he thinks
no one is looking. He was a predator and a rapist on at least one night
in Hollywood about 12 years ago.
It happened when I worked at Endeavor Talent Agency in
[H]ollywood. It was 2004 or 2005. I won’t go into the details here to
spare the people who don’t want to hear them but I’m willing to share
my story with anyone who needs to hear it.
Long story short, he preyed on me as a drunk girl who as alone at a
club at the end of the night, he took me back to Robert Evans house,
he forced himself upon me after I said no and no and no again, and
then left me there. He just got up, didn’t say a word, got in his car and
left and I laid there humiliated and broken on the floor. The rest of
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the night is fuzzy, I must have stumbled out of the house and called a
cab and I went home and erased it from my mind.
I’m embarrassed, humiliated, ashamed, and I wish I could go back to
forgetting it ever happened. But if I do that, if we all do that, then it
keeps happening. We have to come forward. I can’t be an advocate
for women speaking out if I don’t speak out too.
Brett Ratner raped me. I’m saying his name, I’m saying it publicly.
Now at least I can look myself in the mirror and not feel like part of
me is a coward or a hypocrite. I’m standing up and saying this
happened to me and it was not okay
Come what may, it is the right thing to do.
Exhibit “A.”
III. ARGUMENT
Ms. Kohler’s motion to dismiss should be granted for two reasons. First,
Mr. Ratner has failed to meet basic pleading standards for a defamation claim.
And second, his claim is a strategic lawsuit against public participation and is thus
barred by California’s anti-SLAPP law.
A. The Complaint Must Be Dismissed Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
A public figure like Mr. Ratner cannot lawfully chill speech about his
conduct by filing a complaint that merely recites the elements of his cause of
action. Yet that is precisely what Mr. Ratner has sought to achieve here. Stripped
of its conclusory allegations, the Complaint is essentially a blank piece of paper. It
lacks any factual allegation from which this Court can infer that Ms. Kohler’s FB
Post was false or was published with actual malice. The Complaint must therefore
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be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007).
1. The legal standard for adequately pleading a defamation

claim
Prior to Iqbal and Twombly, plaintiffs were entitled to proceed past a motion
to dismiss so long as it was not utterly “beyond doubt” that they could substantiate
their claims for relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). But that
is no longer the law. The Supreme Court has since made it clear that a plaintiff
must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (emphasis added). Under this standard, “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Where
the legal elements of a claim provide the framework for a complaint, “they must be
supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679 (emphasis added).
Like any other complaint filed in federal court, a defamation complaint must
satisfy these requirements. See Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 816 F.3d 686, 702
(11th Cir. 2016); Biro v. Conde Nast, 807 F.3d 541, 544-45 (2d Cir. 2015); Pippen
v. NBCUniversal Media, LLC., 734 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2013); Schatz v.
Republican State Leadership Committee, 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012); Mayfield
v. National Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 674 F.3d 369, 377 (4th Cir.
2012); Rodriguez v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., CIVIL No. 09-
11
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00024 HG-LEK, 2009 WL 10676972, at *9 (D. Haw. June 12, 2009) (holding that
“claims for defamation . . . must be specifically pled”).
Defamation cases, however, also implicate distinct First Amendment
concerns. When a public figure like Mr. Ratner alleges a defamation claim, the
Constitution holds him to a higher standard.6 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964). Specifically, he must plead—and later prove—that the
defendant acted with “actual malice.” Id. The Hawaii Supreme Court has held
that this means that a plaintiff must plead and prove that a defendant engaged in a
“deliberate falsification” of facts or acted with “reckless disregard” of the truth.
Rodriguez v. Nishiki, 65 Haw. 430, 436, 653 P.2d 1145, 1149 (1982) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). This standard applies to both media
defendants like the Los Angeles Times and to “nonmedia” defendants like Ms.
Kohler. Id. at 436-37.
As many federal courts have held, the interaction of this “actual malice”
requirement with the strictures of Iqbal and Twombly requires defamation plaintiffs
to surmount an unusually “onerous” burden at the pleading stage. Earley v.
6
Here, Mr. Ratner’s own allegations conclusively establish his status as a public
figure. As alleged in the Complaint, Mr. Ratner “is an accomplished and well
known film director and producer.” Compl. ¶ 4. This statement alone is sufficient
for the Court to find that Plaintiff is a public figure. See Thomas v. L.A. Times
Commc’ns, LLC, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1011 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d, 45 F. App’x
801 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Manzari v. Associated Newspapers Ltd., 830 F.3d
881, 888 (9th Cir. 2016).
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Gatehouse Media Penn. Holdings, Inc., No. 12-Civ-1886, 2013 WL 5466149, at
*6 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2013). It is no longer adequate to plead that the defendant
made the allegedly libelous statement with knowledge of its falsity, rather, facts
must be pleaded to nudge the claim across the line from conceivable to plausible.
Indeed, the plausibility requirement of Iqbal and Twombly applies not only
to pleading events that are alleged to have occurred in the physical world, but to
allegations concerning a party’s state of mind as well. See Pippen v.
NBCUniversal Media, LLC., 734 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2013) (“States of mind
may be pleaded generally, but a plaintiff still must point to details sufficient to
render a claim plausible.”). Thus, in the context of alleged defamation of a public
figure, a plaintiff is required to plausibly allege actual malice on the part of the
defendant. One court has explained this rule as follows:
Iqbal itself squarely holds that, where a particular state of mind is a

necessary element of a claim, defendant’s pleading of that state of
mind must be plausible and supported by factual allegations.
Moreover, given the difficulty of proving actual malice, as well as the
fact that actual malice must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence in order for a plaintiff to succeed, it stands to reason that
Rule 12(b)(6) should play a particularly important role in testing the
plausibility of a plaintiff's defamation claim.
Biro v. Conde Nast, 963 F. Supp. 2d 255, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 807 F.3d 541
(2d Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted); accord Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc.,
816 F.3d 686, 702 (11th Cir. 2016) (applying Iqbal and holding that “a defamation
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suit may be dismissed for failure to state a claim where the plaintiff has not pled
facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference of actual malice”).
Simply put, a defamation plaintiff like Mr. Ratner cannot satisfy the
“demanding burden for pleading actual malice” by merely reciting the elements of
the claim. Wynn v. Chanos, 75 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1239 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Roe v. Doe, No. 09-Civ-682, 2009
WL 1883752, at *14 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2009) (dismissing a complaint that
contained only a “conclusory boilerplate allegation that [defendants] acted ‘falsely,
maliciously, fraudulently and oppressively’” as “insufficient to state a cause of
action in a case where actual malice is required”). Bare allegations that a
defendant’s statements “were known by [defendant] to be false at the time they
were made,” and “were malicious or were made with reckless disregard as to their
veracity” are “precisely the sort of allegations that Twombly and Iqbal rejected.”
Mayfield, 674 F.3d at 377-78; accord Schatz, 669 F.3d at 56 (use of “actual-
malice buzzwords,” including allegations that the defendant knew that her
statements were false, are “merely legal conclusions, which must be backed by
well-pled facts”).
Based on these principles, every Court of Appeals, including the First,
Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh, to have considered the issue post-
Iqbal/Twombly has agreed that a public figure defamation plaintiff cannot “make
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out a plausible malice claim” unless he has laid out “enough facts from which
malice might reasonably be inferred.” Schatz, 669 F.3d at 58; see also Michel, 816
F.3d at 707 (dismissing complaint for failure to satisfy this requirement); Biro v.
Conde Nast, 807 F.3d 541, 541 (2d Cir. 2015) (same); Pippen, 734 F.3d at 616
(same); Mayfield v. National Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 674 F.3d 369,
369 (4th Cir. 2012) (same). Courts have allowed such claims to proceed only
where the plaintiff alleged, with particularity, a plausible motivation for the
defendant’s malicious act. See, e.g., Intercon Sols., Inc. v. Basel Action Network,
969 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1057 (N.D. Ill. 2013), aff'd, 791 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2015).
Although based in pleading rules, this doctrine is heavily influenced by First
Amendment considerations. See Ancheta v. Watada, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1122
(D. Haw. 2001). As one court has explained, Iqbal has a “particular value” in
defamation cases, since Rule 12(b)(6) “not only protects against the costs of
meritless litigation, but provides assurance to those exercising their First
Amendment rights that doing so will not needlessly become prohibitively
expensive.” Biro, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 279. In a similar vein, the Eleventh Circuit
has observed:
[A]pplication of the plausibility pleading standard makes particular

sense when examining public figure defamation suits. In these cases,
there is a powerful interest in ensuring that free speech is not unduly
burdened by the necessity of defending against expensive yet
groundless litigation. Indeed, the actual malice standard was designed
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to allow publishers the “breathing space” needed to ensure robust

reporting on public figures and events.
Michel, 816 F.3d at 702 (citing Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271-72). These principles
apply with full force to this litigation and compel the conclusion that Mr. Ratner
has failed to state a claim.
2. Mr. Ratner’s Complaint fails to plausibly allege actual

malice
As explained above, courts require particularized factual allegations that
support a plausible inference of actual malice. Here is Mr. Ratner’s entire
allegation of malice from the Complaint:
Plaintiff contends that the Defendant’s aforementioned statement was

published by the Defendant with knowledge of its falsity, maliciously,
and with the intent to harm Plaintiff’s reputation and standing.
Compl. ¶ 9. In short, Mr. Ratner has done nothing more than allege a legal
conclusion. Stripped of its conclusory language, there are literally no factual
allegations in the Complaint supporting any plausible inference that Ms. Kohler’s
statement was made with actual malice.
Under Iqbal and Twombly, that alone requires dismissal. Using legal
“buzzwords” to restate the applicable legal standard does not satisfy Rule 12(b)(6).
See, e.g., Besen v. Parents & Friends of Ex-Gays, Inc., No. 12-Civ-204, 2012 WL
1440183, at *5-7 (E.D. Va. Apr. 25, 2012) (dismissing defamation claim where
plaintiff provided “bald contentions” that failed to explain how the statements were
false and did not allege facts demonstrating malice); Parisi v. Sinclair, 845 F.
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Supp. 2d 215, 218-19 (D.D.C. 2012) (dismissing libel and invasion of privacy
claims where plaintiffs made only “conclusory” allegations of actual
malice); Carrasco v. HSBC Bank USA Nat’l Ass’n, No. 11-Civ-2711, 2011 WL
6012944, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2011) (dismissing slander of title claim where
plaintiff made only boilerplate allegations of actual malice).
Not surprisingly, the Complaint here stands in stark contrast to the few post-
Iqbal/Twombly cases holding that public figure defamation complaints adequately
alleged actual malice. In such cases, plaintiffs have specifically alleged what was
false about the statement, and have alleged a plausible account of the defendants’
motive for lying. In Intercon Solutions., Inc., for example, the court denied a
motion to dismiss where the plaintiff had alleged that the “defendant’s actions
were motivated by its desire to ‘create a false reputation as a crusader and ethical
leader in the e-recycling industry’ and ‘to increase enrollment in [its] “e-Stewards”
certification program and increase its revenues.’” 969 F. Supp. 2d at 1057. The
Complaint here, by contrast, contains no allegations elaborating on Mr. Ratner’s
conclusory assertions of falsity and actual malice.7
7
These core principles of pleading defamation are not somehow rendered
inapplicable by virtue of the fact that in this case, Ms. Kohler’s FB Post accuses
Mr. Ratner of rape. In other words, the doctrine of defamation per se, which
applies to accusations of rape, see, e.g., Isaac v. Daniels, CIVIL No. 16-00507
DKW-RLP, 2017 WL 2962890, at *6 (D. Haw. June 23, 2017), does not alter the
pleading requirements for actual malice. See, e.g., Madison v. Frazier, 539 F.3d
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Absent any factual allegations by Mr. Ratner suggesting any plausible
motivation on Ms. Kohler’s part to lie, the Court cannot draw any inferences
regarding Ms. Kohler’s state of mind when she wrote the FB Post in 2017—years
after Mr. Ratner raped her. Indeed, it is telling that Mr. Ratner excluded most of
her FB Post from the Complaint, including the section in which Ms. Kohler
explained why she felt moved to share her story. Rather than allege with
particularity that any part of this explanation is false, Mr. Ratner simply deleted it
from his pleading.
This decision by Mr. Ratner to exclude the rest of Ms. Kohler’s FB Post
further militates in favor of dismissing the Complaint. Does Mr. Ratner believe
that Ms. Kohler’s statements were false and that they were published with actual
malice? If so, why? Does Mr. Ratner admit that he had sex with Ms. Kohler, but
deny that it was nonconsensual? Does he admit that Ms. Kohler was drunk and
that he had sex with her, but nonetheless deny that it was rape? Does he admit that
Ms. Kohler repeatedly said “no,” as she stated in her FB Post, but still somehow
claim that he did not rape her? Or perhaps he denies that he has ever met Ms.
Kohler? Mr. Ratner’s peculiar decision to lift a few lines from her FB Post and to
ignore the rest undermines any inference that his conclusory allegations of actual
malice are sufficient to compel burdensome, expensive discovery in this case.
646, 657-59 (7th Cir. 2008); Pan Am Sys., Inc. v. Hardenbergh, 871 F. Supp. 2d 6,
17 (D. Me. 2012).
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Indeed, not only did Mr. Ratner fail to allege any facts showing actual
malice, but he also deliberately concealed highly relevant facts within Ms. Kohler’s
FB Post showing that Ms. Kohler acted with honorable, non-malicious motives.
As she explains in her FB Post, “I can’t be an advocate for women speaking out if I
don’t speak out too . . . Now at least I can look myself in the mirror and not feel
like part of me in a coward or a hypocrite.” Exhibit “A.” By failing to include
those statements in the Complaint, and by failing to allege that Ms. Kohler’s
contemporaneous explanation for publishing her post is somehow false or
malicious, Mr. Ratner has all but conceded that he has no basis for alleging actual
malice here.
For all these reasons, the Complaint clearly does not satisfy Rule 12(b)(6)
and should be dismissed. See Biro, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 277; see also Michel, 816
F.3d at 707; Pippen, 734 F.3d at 616; Schatz, 669 F.3d at 56-8; Mayfield, 674 F.3d
at 378.
B. Mr. Ratner’s Complaint Should Be Dismissed Under California’s

Anti-SLAPP Statute
This Court should also strike the Complaint because it is a Strategic Lawsuit
Against Public Participation (“SLAPP”) pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP
statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16 et seq.
The hallmark of a SLAPP lawsuit is that it is “brought with the goals of
obtaining an economic advantage over a citizen party by increasing the cost of
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litigation to the point that the citizen party’s case will be weakened or abandoned,
and of deterring future litigation.” U.S. ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles &
Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 970–71 (9th Cir. 1999). Recognizing that plaintiffs may
file SLAPP lawsuits in order to improperly halt speech on important matters of
public discourse, California and Hawaii, along with several other states, have
adopted anti-SLAPP statutes to provide immunity from “lawsuits brought
primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of
speech and petition for the redress of grievances.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16.
Generally, anti-SLAPP statutes impose a duty on a plaintiff who brings a lawsuit
relating to the exercise of defendants’ First Amendment rights of free speech to
make a preliminary showing of a likelihood of success before the case can proceed.
See, e.g., La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 971; D.C. Code Ann. § 16-5502 (West);
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31.150 (West).
California’s anti-SLAPP statute is broader than Hawaii’s, and applies both to
speech made in the context of a public hearing or proceeding (as Hawaii’s does)
and to speech made in a non-testimonial context. Compare Haw. Rev. Stat. §
634F-1, with Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e). By its own terms, California’s anti-
SLAPP law “shall be construed broadly.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16. In fact,
“California’s statute, enacted in 1992, remains the strongest—and most frequently
litigated—anti-SLAPP statute in the nation for the protection of speech and
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petitioning activities.” Thomas R. Burke, Davis Wright Tremaine, Last Year’s Key
California Anti-SLAPP Decisions, Feb. 3, 2017, available at https://www.law360
.com/ articles/888023/last-year-s-key-california-anti-slapp-decisions.
1. The Court should apply California’s anti-SLAPP statute

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that because anti-SLAPP statutes confer a
substantive immunity, they must be applied in federal court. See U.S. ex rel.
Newsham, 190 F.3d at 973 (holding that the provisions of California’s anti-SLAPP
statute concerning a special motion to strike and availability of fees and costs could
apply in federal court); see also Batzel v. Smith, 333, F.3d 1018, 1025 (9th Cir.
2003), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated by Breazale v. Victim
Servs., Inc., Nos. 15-16549, 16-16495, 2017 WL 6601779 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[A]
defendant’s rights under the anti-SLAPP statute are in the nature of immunity”
because “California lawmakers wanted to protect speakers from the trial itself
rather than merely from liability.”).
Because anti-SLAPP statutes confer a substantive right, this Court, sitting in
diversity, must undertake a choice of law analysis to determine which state’s anti-
SLAPP law applies. This involves a two-part analysis. First, the Court must
determine whether there is a conflict between the potentially applicable laws of
two different states. Then, if there is such a conflict, the Court must apply “the
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forum state’s choice of law rules to determine the controlling substantive law.”
Patton v. Cox, 276 F.3d 493, 495 (9th Cir. 2002).
Here, there is clearly a conflict between California’s and Hawaii’s anti-
SLAPP statutes. While Hawaii’s anti-SLAPP law is limited to public testimony,
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 634F–2(1) (2012), California’s anti-SLAPP statute applies
broadly to any act “in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech . .
. in connection with a public issue,” including this Complaint. Cal. Civ. Proc.
Code § 425.16. See Tobinick v. Novella, 108 F. Supp. 3d 1299, 1303 (S.D. Fla.
2015) (“A genuine conflict of law exists, as Florida has no equivalent to
California’s anti-SLAPP statute.”). Thus, the Court must apply Hawaii conflict of
law rules to determine whether California’s anti-SLAPP statute applies.
“Hawaii resolves its conflict of laws issues by deciding which State has the
strongest interest in seeing its law applied to a particular case.” Lemen v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 938 F. Supp. 640, 643 (D. Haw. 1995); see also Mikelson v. United Servs.
Auto. Ass'n, 107 Hawaii 192, 198, 111 P.3d 601, 607 (2005) (“This court has
‘moved away from the traditional and rigid conflict-of-laws rules in favor of the
modern trend towards a more flexible approach looking to the state with the most
significant relationship to the parties and subject matter.’” (citation omitted)).
“[T]he interests of the states and applicable public policy reasons should determine
whether Hawaii law or another state’s law should apply.” Mikelson, 107 Hawaii at
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198, 111 P.3d at 607. In making this determination, Hawaii courts look to factors
such as “(1) where relevant events occurred, (2) the residence of the parties, and
(3) whether any of the parties had any particular ties to one jurisdiction or the
other.” Kukui Gardens Corp. v. Holco Capital Grp., Inc., No. CIV.08-00049
ACK-KSC, 2010 WL 145284, at *5 (D. Haw. Jan. 12, 2010). In this case, each of
these three factors weighs heavily in favor of applying California law here. First,
the relevant event—the rape described in Ms. Kohler’s FB Post—occurred in
California, and the alleged harm to Mr. Ratner occurred in California. See
Tobinick, 108 F. Supp. 3d at 1304 (holding that California’s anti-SLAAP law
applied because “generally, the law of the forum where the injury occurred
determines the substantive issues unless another state has a more compelling
interest”). Second, Mr. Ratner is a resident of California. And although Ms.
Kohler is currently a resident of Hawaii, she was a resident of California at the
time of the rape described in the FB Post. See Declaration of Melanie Kohler at ¶
4; Exhibit “A.” Third, Mr. Ratner has strong and significant ties to California. Mr.
Ratner is a high-profile and important director and producer in Hollywood,
including having a Star on the Hollywood Walk of Fame.8
8
See Nick Clement, Walk of Fame Honoree Brett Ratner Builds Hollywood
Production Powerhouse, Variety, Jan. 19, 2017, http://variety.com/2017/film/
spotlight/brett-ratner-walk-of-fame-james-packer-ratpac-warner-bros-kevin-
tsujihara-1201963846/.
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To be sure, the only connection between this case and Hawaii is that Ms.
Kohler now lives in Hawaii and wrote her FB Post from Hawaii. However, when
it comes to publication of information on the Internet such as Kohler’s FB Post,
courts deciding whether to apply an anti-SLAPP statute commonly recognize that a
state’s “interest in limiting frivolous litigation filed by its residents outweighs any
interest [the forum state] has in the dispute.” Tobinick, 108 F. Supp. 3d at 1304
(applying California’s anti-SLAPP statute to a case where plaintiff was from
California and defendant was from Connecticut, finding that “[a]ny relationship
that exists between the parties is not centered in a particular state, given that the
statements at issue were made on the internet”); see Ranbaxy Labs., Inc. v. First
Databank, Inc., No. 3:13-CV-859-J-32MCR, 2014 WL 982742, at *6 (M.D. Fla.
Mar. 12, 2014) (“[T]he applicable substantive law for purposes of the anti-SLAPP
statute is the state of Ranbaxy’s principal place of business, where the loss of sales
and market share was most felt.”); Containment Techs. Grp., Inc. v. Am. Soc. of
Health Sys. Pharmacists, No. 1:07-CV-0997DFHTAB, 2009 WL 838549, at *8
(S.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2009) (“Since the alleged injury here would have been felt
most severely in Indiana, Indiana law governs the dispute.”); Ayyadurai v.
Floor64, Inc., No. CV 17-10011-FDS, 2017 WL 3896668, at *4 (D. Mass. Sept. 6,
2017) (“When a natural person claims that he has been defamed by an aggregate
communication, the state of most significant relationship will usually be the state
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where the person was domiciled at the time, if the matter complained of was
published in that state. Thus, there is effectively a presumption that the law of the
state of the plaintiff's domicile will apply . . .” (citation omitted)). The same is true
for courts making choice of law determinations in the context of a defamation
claim, without reference to an anti-SLAPP statute. Cf., DeRoburt v. Gannett Co.,
83 F.R.D. 574, 580–81 (D. Haw. 1979) (“[T]he state of the plaintiff’s domicil [sic]
if the matter complained of has there been published” is the state with the greatest
interest. (citation omitted)); see also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §
150 (1971) (“When a . . . legal person, claims that it has been defamed by an
aggregate communication, the state of most significant relationship will usually be
the state where the . . . legal person, had its principal place of business at the time,
if the matter complained of was published in that state.”).
California’s interest in having its anti-SLAPP law apply is particularly
strong in this case. California enacted its anti-SLAPP law because the California
Legislature found that “there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought
primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of
speech” and “that it is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in
matters of public significance.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16. Here, Mr. Ratner’s
lawsuit threatens to chill speech that is a part of an important and historic public
discussion on sexual assault and rape in Hollywood. As one of the most high-
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profile producers and directors in Hollywood, Mr. Ratner’s conduct is an important
part of that discussion. And Mr. Ratner’s conduct already is very much a part of
that discussion. More than a dozen actresses and other women have accused him
of sexual assault and harassment—much of the alleged conduct having occurred in
California and in the course of his work in Hollywood.9 California thus has a
strong interest in ensuring a robust discussion about an issue of such importance to
the State and one of its most high-profile residents.
In short, California has the strongest interest in preventing a lawsuit that
could chill speech where: (a) the claimed sexual assault occurred within its
borders; (b) the accused is a California resident; (c) the accuser was a California
resident at the time of the rape; (d) the alleged injury occurred in California; (e) the
accused has strong and significant ties to California; and (f) the state is embroiled
in a very important and public discourse about sexual assault and harassment in
Hollywood, of which this statement is an important part.
2. Mr. Ratner cannot meet his burden under California’s anti-

SLAPP statute
Mr. Ratner cannot meet the requirements of California’s anti-SLAPP law.
Paragraph (b)(1) of California’s anti-SLAPP statute provides as follows:
9
See, e.g., Ryan Faughnder & Daniel Miller, Warner Bros. Cuts Ties with Brett
Ratner After Sexual Misconduct Allegations, L.A. Times, Nov. 1, 2017,
http://www.latimes.com/business/hollywood/la-fi-ct-brett-ratner-warner-bros-
20171101-story.html.
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A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person
in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the
United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection
with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless
the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a
probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16. An anti-SLAPP motion proceeds in two steps. In
the first step, or “prong one” the court determines whether the defendant has made
a prima facie showing that the challenged cause of action (or the plaintiff’s entire
complaint) arises from the defendant’s constitutionally protected petitioning or
free-speech activity. Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 261 (“[T]he moving defendant must
make a prima facie showing that the plaintiff’s suit arises from an act in
furtherance of the defendant’s constitutional right to free speech.”). Once that
showing is made, the burden shifts to the defendant, under prong two, to show that
he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim. See id.; Cho v. Chang, 219 Cal.
App. 4th 521, 526-27 (2013); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1), (b)(2);
Contemporary Servs. Corp. v. Staff Pro Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 434, 443 (Ct. App.
2007) (“The plaintiff must demonstrate the complaint is both legally sufficient and
is supported by a prima facie showing of facts sufficient to sustain a favorable
judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is given credit.”).
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a. Ms. Kohler’s FB Post clearly relates to a matter of

public concern
California’s anti-SLAPP statute defines “act[s] in furtherance of a person’s
right of petition or free speech” as including “any written or oral statement or
writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an
issue of public interest. Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 425.16(e). Courts have applied the
California anti-SLAPP statute to speech regarding accusations of rape or sexual
assault. Heineke v. Santa Clara Univ., No. 17-CV-05285-LHK, 2017 WL
6026248, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2017) (finding that claims based on allegedly
false accusations of sexual assault are protected speech under California’s Anti-
SLAPP law); Dickinson v. Cosby, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 430, 442 (Ct. App. 2017)
(finding that letters and press releases regarding rape accusations would constitute
speech in connection with a public issue).
Here, Ms. Kohler’s statement was made on Facebook, in a place open to the
public, and clearly concerned a matter of public concern. See Equilon Enterprises
v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 52 P.3d 685, 687 (Cal. 2002) (holding that a defendant
need not show that plaintiff’s action “was brought with the intent to chill the
defendant’s exercise of constitutional speech or petition rights” (emphasis added));
Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 969 P.2d 564, 572 (Cal. 1999)
(acknowledging that courts “whenever possible, should interpret the First
Amendment and section 425.16 in a manner favorable to the exercise of freedom
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of speech, not its curtailment” (quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, one need only
to read a newspaper, go onto the Internet, or look at the most recent cover of Time
Magazine, to see the unprecedented public discourse concerning the issues of
sexual misconduct raised in Ms. Kohler’s FB Post. See, e.g., Melissa Chan, The
Story Behind the Woman You Don’t See on TIME’s Person of the Year Cover,
TIME, Dec. 6, 2017, http://time.com/5052362/time-person-of-the-year-2017-arm-
cover/; Sophie Gilbert, The Movement of #MeToo: How a Hashtag Got Its Power,
The Atlantic, Oct. 16, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/
2017/10/the-movement-of-metoo/542979/. Accordingly, the first prong of the
analysis is clearly satisfied here.
b. Mr. Ratner cannot demonstrate a probability of

prevailing on his claim
Having satisfied prong one, Mr. Ratner’s Complaint can survive only if he
can demonstrate a “probability of prevailing” on the merits. DuPont Merck
Pharm. Co. v. Superior Court, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755, 760 (Ct. App. 2000), as
modified (Jan. 25, 2000) (“It would defeat the obvious purposes of the anti-SLAPP
statute if mere allegations in an unverified complaint would be sufficient to avoid
an order to strike the complaint.”). For the exact same reasons described in
Section I above, however, Mr. Ratner’s threadbare Complaint does not come close
to meeting this standard. Because he is a public figure, Mr. Ratner must
demonstrate not only that Ms. Kohler’s statement was false, but that it was made
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with knowledge or a reckless disregard of its falsity. While Mr. Ratner alleges that
Ms. Kohler’s FB Post is “entirely false, fabricated, and fictional,” Compl. ¶ 8, as
discussed above, this is nothing more than a conclusory statement that lacks any
factual support and is insufficient as a matter of law. See McKee v. Cosby, 236 F.
Supp. 3d 427, 452 (D. Mass. 2017) (“Plaintiff’s complaint fails to provide any
minimal factual development in support of the assertion that these statements are
‘false.’”), aff’d, 874 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2017). In other words, Mr. Ratner’s
boilerplate Complaint, which does not even satisfy the relevant pleading
requirements and should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), cannot possibly
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, as required by the California
anti-SLAPP statute. See Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 261 (“Under [California’s Anti-
SLAPP standard] the claim should be dismissed if the plaintiff presents an
insufficient legal basis for it.”).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out above, Defendant Melanie Kohler respectfully
requests that the Court dismiss the Complaint with prejudice and/or strike the
Complaint under California’s Anti-SLAPP statute and enter Judgment in her favor.
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DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, January 2, 2018.
/s/ David M. Louie

DAVID M. LOUIE, ESQ.
NICHOLAS R. MONLUX, ESQ.
JESSE D. FRANKLIN-MURDOCK, ESQ.
ROBERTA A. KAPLAN, ESQ.
JULIE E. FINK, ESQ.
JOSHUA MATZ, ESQ.
DAVIDA P. BROOK, ESQ.
Attorneys for Defendant

MELANIE KOHLER
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Kohler Motion To Dismiss

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Case 1:17-cv-00542-HG-KSC Document 26-1 Filed 01/02/18 Page 1 of 38 PageID #: 81

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII

BRETT RATNER, CIVIL NO. CV 17-00542 HG-KSC

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF

MELANIE KOHLER and JOHN and/or

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................................1

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................................................7

A. The Complaint Must Be Dismissed Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) ..........10

1. The legal standard for adequately pleading a defamation claim

2. Mr. Ratner's Complaint fails to plausibly allege actual malice

B. Mr. Ratner’s Complaint Should Be Dismissed Under California’s

1. The Court should apply California’s anti-SLAPP statute.........21

2. Mr. Ratner cannot meet his burden under California’s anti-

a. Ms. Kohler’s FB Post clearly relates to a matter of public

b. Mr. Ratner cannot demonstrate a probability of

Ayyadurai v. Floor64, Inc.,

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

Besen v. Parents & Friends of Ex-Gays, Inc.,

Biro v. Conde Nast,

Biro v. Conde Nast,

Carrasco v. HSBC Bank USA Nat’l Ass’n,

Containment Techs. Grp., Inc. v. Am. Soc. of Health Sys. Pharmacists,

DeRoburt v. Gannett Co.,

Earley v. Gatehouse Media Penn. Holdings, Inc.,

Heineke v. Santa Clara Univ.,

Intercon Sols., Inc. v. Basel Action Network,

Kukui Gardens Corp. v. Holco Capital Grp., Inc.,

Lemen v. Allstate Ins. Co.,

Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC,

Manzari v. Associated Newspapers Ltd.,

Mayfield v. National Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc.,

Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc.,

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,

Pan Am Sys., Inc. v. Hardenbergh,

Pippen v. NBCUniversal Media, LLC.,

Ranbaxy Labs., Inc. v. First Databank, Inc.,

Resolute Forest Prod., Inc. v. Greenpeace Int'l,

Rodriguez v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.,

Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Committee,

Thomas v. L.A. Times Commc’ns, LLC,

Troxel v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co.,

U.S. ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.,

Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity,

Contemporary Servs. Corp. v. Staff Pro Inc.,

DuPont Merck Pharm. Co. v. Superior Court,

Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc.,

Mikelson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n,

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16 (West 2015) .................................................... Passim

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 634F–2(1) (2012) ....................................................................... 22

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).................................................................................... Passim

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 150 (1971) ....................................... 25

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

Defendant Melanie Kohler (“Kohler”) submits this memorandum of law in

Amendment concerns. To overcome them, and to comply with basic requirements

instead, he has filed a three-page complaint that exemplifies conclusory pleading:

(authorizing judicial notice of relevant, uncontestable adjudicative facts); Makaeff

harassment, or some combination thereof. Some of these claims surfaced years