Gravador v. Mamigo G.R. No. L-24989
Gravador v. Mamigo G.R. No. L-24989
Gravador v. Mamigo G.R. No. L-24989
L-24989 1 of 3
granted his petition. Immediate execution was ordered, as a result of which the petitioner was reinstated.
The respondents appealed directly to this Court.
On July 6, 1967 the petitioner asked for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that the issues posed thereby had
become moot with his retirement from the service on December 11, 1966 and the payment to him of the
corresponding retirement benefits. We deem it necessary, however, to review the trial court's decision on the merits,
considering that the computation of retirement annuities is based among other things, on the number of years of
service of a retiree, and that payment of benefits already made to the petitioner on the basis of December 11, 1901
as the date of his birth would not exempt him from the obligation to make a refund should this Court ultimately
rule that he was actually born November 26, 1897, as the respondents claim.
The controversy on the petitioner's date of birth arose as a result of the conflicting records of the Division of
Schools of Negros Oriental. On the one hand the pre-war records show his date of birth to be November 26, 1897.
These records consist of two Insular Teachers Cards and one Employee's Record Card. It is on the basis of these
records that the Superintendent of Schools determined the petitioner's age to be 66 years, 8 months and 22 days on
August 15, 1964.
On the other hand, the post-war records, consisting of an Elementary Teacher's Report Card, an Employee's Record
Card, and an Employee's Record of Qualifications, state that the petitioner was born on Dec. 11, 1901. These are
the records on which the petitioner bases his claim.
The problem is aggravated by two uncontroverted facts, namely, that the records of the church where the petitioner
was baptized were destroyed by fire, and that the municipal civil register contains no record. of the petitioner's
birth.
According to the trial court, the post-war records were intended to replace the pre-war records and therefore the
correct date of birth of the petitioner is December 11, 1901. The court also took into account the verified answer in
a cadastral proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, dated March 15, 1924, filed by the
petitioner's brother, Romulo Gravador, now deceased. It is therein stated that the petitioner, said to be one of the
co-owners of a piece of land, was at the time 23 years old.
The respondents now contend that the trial court erred in placing full reliance on the post-war records to establish
the date of birth (December 11, 1901) of the petitioner. They argue that these records were made only because it
was thought that the pre-war records had been lost or destroyed, but as some pre-war records had since been
located, the date contained in the pre-war records should be regarded as controlling and that the finding of the
Superintendent of Schools that the petitioner was born on November 26, 1897 is an administrative finding that
should not be disturbed by the court.
That the findings of fact of administrative officials are binding on the courts if supported by substantial evidence, is
a settled rule of administrative law, But whether there is substantial evidence supporting the finding of the
Superintendent of Schools is precisely the issue in this case. The school official based his determination of the
petitioner's age on the pre-war records in the preparation of which the petitioner does not appear to have taken a
part. On the other hand, the petitioner post-war records which he personally accomplished to prove the date of his
birth.
It is our considered view that the lower court correctly relied upon the post-war records, for three cogent reasons.
In the first place, as Moran states, although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he
may testify as to his age as he had learned it from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an
assertion of a family tradition. Indeed, even in is application for back pay which he filed with the Department of
Finance, through the Office of the Superintendent of Schools, on October 7, 1948, the petitioner stated that the date
of his birth is December 11, 1901. He repeated the same assertion in 1956 and again in 1960 when he asked the
Government Service Insurance System and the Civil Service Commission to correct the date of his birth to
December 11, 1901.
In the second place, the import of the declaration of the petitioner's brother, contained in a verified pleading in a
Gravador v. Mamigo G.R. No. L-24989 3 of 3
cadastral case way back in 1924, to the effect that the petitioner was then 23 years old, can not be ignored. Made
ante litem motam by a deceased relative, this statement is at once a declaration regarding pedigree within the
intendment and meaning of section 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, December 11, 1901 is established as the date of birth of the petitioner not only by evidence of family
tradition but also by the declaration ante litem motam of a deceased relative.
Finally, the patties are agreed that the petitioner has a brother, Constantino, who was born on June 10, 1898 and
who retired on June 10, 1963 with full retirement pay. The petitioner then could not have been born earlier than
Constantino, say in 1897 as pre-war records indicate, because Constantino is admittedly older than he.
Still it is argued that the petitioner's action was prematurely brought because he had not availed of all
administrative remedies. This argument is without merit. Suit for quo warranto to recover a public office must be
brought within one year. Before filing this case the petitioner waited for eight months for the school officials to act
on his protest. To require him to tarry a little more would obviously be unfair to him since on April 13, 1965, when
this case was filed, he had only four months left within which to bring the case to court. There was neither manner
nor form of assurance that the decision of the Director of Public Schools would be forthcoming. The rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply where insistence on its observance would result in the
nullification of the claim being asserted.
Accordingly, the judgment a quo is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., took no part.