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598

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 598 March 28, 1969

AURORA SORIANO DELES, complainant,

vs.
VICENTE E. ARAGONA, JR., respondent.

Vicente E. Aragona, Jr. in his own behalf.

Office of the Solicitor General for the Government.

CASTRO, J.:

This is a disbarment proceeding against Vicente E. Aragona, Jr. 1 upon a verified letter-complaint of Aurora
Soriano Deles filed with this Court on November 6, 19637 charging the former with having made, under oath, false
and unfounded allegations against her in a motion filed in Court of Agrarian Relations cases 1254 and 1255 Iloilo,
which allegedly caused her great mental, torture and moral suffering.

On November 13, 1963 this Court required the respondent to answer the complaint. On December 10, 1963 the
respondent filed his answer, affirming the truth of the allegations in the questioned motion, but claiming in his
defense that in preparing it, he relied not only upon information received but also upon other matters of public
record. He also averred that the complainant had made a similar charge against him in a counter-motion to declare
him in contempt of court filed in the same C.A.R. case which was however dismissed together with the
complainant's counterclaims when the main cases were dismissed; that the complainant failed to move for the
reconsideration of the said dismissal or to appeal therefrom; and that during the few years that he has been a
member of the bar, he has always comforted himself correctly, and has adhered steadfastly to his conviction that the
practice of law is a sacred trust in the interest of truth.

This Court, on December 14, 1963, referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report, and
recommendation. Because both parties reside in Iloilo City, the Solicitor General in turn referred the case to the City
Fiscal of Iloilo for investigation and reception of evidence. Both the petitioner and the respondent adduced evidence
in the investigation which was conducted. Thereafter, the City Fiscal forwarded to the Solicitor General the record of
the investigation, including the recommendation of the assistant city fiscal who personally conducted the
investigation that the petition for disbarment be dismissed. The Solicitor General thereafter filed with this Court his
report, concurring in the recommendation of the assistant city fiscal.

Aurora Soriano Deles (hereinafter referred to as the complainant) is the administratrix of the intestate estate of the
late Joaquina Ganzon (the deceased mother of Aurora and Enrique Soriano, Sr. who are heirs of the estate
concurrently with other forced heirs) in special proceeding 128 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.

On July 26, 1961, upon motion of Enrique Soriano, Sr. and over and above the opposition of the complainant, the
intestate court issued an order denying a proposed lease of ten hectares of the estate by the complainant to one
Carlos Fuentes and sustaining the possession of Enrique as lessee of the said land. In effect, the order likewise
sustained the possession by the brothers Federico and Carlos Aglinao of a portion of the said land being tenanted
by them upon authority of the lessee, Enrique Soriano, Sr.

In disregard of the abovementioned order, the complainant attempted to take possession of the landholdings by
placing thereon her own tenants. Predictably, the Aglinao brothers, to protect their rights, countered by filing against
a the complainant two petitions with the Court of Agrarian relations in Iloilo (hereinafter referred to as the agrarian
court), docketed therein as C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255 (hereinafter referred to as the C.A.R. cases). They alleged
in their respective petitions that they have been tenants of Enrique Soriano, Sr. since 1960 on a parcel of riceland
located in barrio Malapoc, Balasan Iloilo, held by the complainant as administratrix of the intestate estate of the
deceased Joaquina Ganzon; and that they had started to plow their leaseholds consisting of two hectares each at
the start of the agricultural year 1962-63 when "on March 7, 1962, the respondent [complainant herein] ordered one
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Bonifacio Margarejo to harrow the plowed land without the knowledge and consent" of the petitioners. Consequently,
they prayed for the issuance of an interlocutory order enjoining the complainant and her representatives from
interfering with their peaceful cultivation of the lands in question pending determination of the merits of their
petitions. However, consideration of the petitioners' prayer for the issuance of an interlocutory order of injunction
pendente lite was considerably delayed not only by reason of several postponements granted at the behest of the
complainant but also because of the assurance made by her through counsel in open court at the hearing of June
16, 1962, that neither she nor any of her men would disturb or interfere with the petitioner's possession of their
leaseholds until their petitions shall have been finally resolved.

But on June 18, 1962, barely two days after the abovementioned hearing, the complainant's men again entered the
land in question and planted rice thereon. This unauthorized entry prompted the Aglinao brothers, through their
counsel, the herein respondent Atty. Vicente Aragona, Jr. (hereinafter referred to as the respondent), to file on June
20, 1962 an "Urgent Motion for Issuance of Interlocutory Order." There being no objection by the complainant
against the said motion, and finding the same meritorious, the agrarian court issued on June 21, 1962 the
interlocutory order prayed for, directing "the respondent, her agent, or any person acting for and in her behalf to
refrain from molesting or in any way interfering with the work of the petitioners in their respective landholdings."

On June 24, 1962, upon the agrarian court's direction, the PC detachment stationed in Sara, Iloilo, served copies
of the order on the complainant's men, Bonifacio Margarejo and Carlos Fuentes, and restored the Aglinao brothers
to the possession of their landholdings. On the same day, Margarejo and Fuentes informed their landlord, the
complainant, about the said order. lawphi1.ñet

For several months thereafter nothing of significance happened in the C.A.R. cases until the palay planted on the
land in question became ripe and ready for harvest.

Then on October 2, 1962 Enrique Soriano, Sr. showed to the respondent in Iloilo City a telegram 2 which reads as
follows:

BALASAN OCT 2 62

GILDA ACOLADO

ILOILO AMERICAN SCHOOL MARIA CLARA AVENUE ILOILO CITY

TELL DADDY COMMUNICATE ARAGONA IMMEDIATELY ALBERT HARVEST TODAY....

MAMANG

The sender of the telegram was Mrs. Isabel Soriano, wife of Enrique, the addressee Gilda Acolado, their daughter.

After reading the telegram, the respondent asked Soriano whether his wife (Mrs. Soriano) was coming to Iloilo City;
when informed that she was arriving, he decided to wait for her. Mrs. Soriano arrived from Balasan in the afternoon
of that same day, October 2, 1962. She went to see the respondent, and informed the latter that it was she who had
sent the telegram upon request of the Aglinao brothers; that she was personally present when one Albert, a tenant
of the complainant, accompanied by many armed men, went to the land in question and harvested the palay thereon
over the protests of the Aglinao brothers; that upon inquiring why the said Albert and his armed companions
harvested the palay, she was told that they were acting upon orders of the complainant; and that instead of filing a
complaint with the chief of police as she originally planned, she decided instead to see the respondent without delay.

Possessed of the above information, the respondent promptly prepared and filed with the agrarian court, on
October 3, 1962, a verified "Urgent Motion to Declare Respondent in Contempt of Court" (hereinafter referred to as
motion for contempt), praying that the complainant and "her armed goons" be declared in, and punished for,
contempt of court for violating the interlocutory order of June 21, 1962. This motion for contempt elicited, on the very
same day it was filed, an instant reply from the complainant who moved to strike it out from the, records claiming
that the allegations therein libeled her, and that it was the respondent who should be punished for contempt for
deliberately misleading the agrarian court. Moreover, not content with this reply and countermotion for contempt the
complainant also lodged on October 4, 1962 a criminal complaint for libel against the respondent with the City Fiscal
of Iloilo, based on the same allegedly libelous allegations made against her by the respondent in the latter's motion
for contempt filed in the C.A.R. cases. However, after preliminarily investigating the said complaint, the assistant city
fiscal to whom it was assigned dismissed the same on the ground that the allegations of the motion for contempt
were privileged communications. The complainant did not appeal from the, said dismissal to the city fiscal; neither
did she elevate the same for review to the Department of Justice.

Meanwhile, no action was taken by the agrarian court in the C.A.R. cases on the motion for contempt filed by the
respondent against the complainant, as well as on the latter's countermotion, also for contempt, against the formal
instead, by order dated October 24, 1963, the agrarian court dismissed C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255, including the
complainant's counterclaims therein, for lack of interest to prosecute on the part of the petitioners, the Aglinao

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brothers. As a matter of course, the dismissal of the main cases carried with it the dismissed of all incidents therein,
including the motion for contempt and counter-motion for contempt. Again, the complainant did not ask for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, nor did she appeal therefrom. She filed instead the present administrative
complaint against the respondent.

The only issue raised in the present disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent, Atty. Vicente E. Aragona,
Jr., should be disciplined or disbarred for having prepared and filed under oath the "Urgent Motion to Declare
Respondent in Contempt of Court" in C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255-Iloilo, which allegedly contains false and libelous
imputations injurious to the honor of the complainant.

For easy reference, the motion for contempt is hereunder reproduced in toto.

COMES NOW the undersigned, in behalf of the petitioners in each of the above-entitled cases, and to this
Honorable Court respectfully states that:

1. Upon urgent and verified motion of the undersigned dated June 20, 1962, this Honorable Court issued an
interlocutory order dated June 21, 1962, the dispositive part of which is as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the motion meritorious, an interlocutory order is hereby issued

ordering the respondent, her agent, or any person acting for and in her behalf, to refrain
from molesting or in any way interfering with the work of the petitioners in their respective
landholdings, situated at Barrio Malapoc Balasan Iloilo, with an area of 2 hectares for each
of them, in these two cases, pending the bearing of these cases on the merits.

The Commanding Officer of the Constabulary Detachment of the 56th PC Company

stationed at Sara, Iloilo, or his duly authorized representative, is hereby ordered to
implement this order and to report to this Court his proceedings in this particular within a
week from the date of his implementation of this order.

SO ORDERED.
Iloilo City, June 21, 1962.
(SGD.) JUAN C. TERUEL
Commissioner

2. Pursuant to the above-quoted order, the Commanding Officer of the 56th PC Company stationed at Sara,
Iloilo, ordered the respondent and her men not to enter the landholdings in question and to refrain from
molesting or in any way interfering with the work of petitioners in their respective landholdings; the report of
said Commanding Officer is now on file with the records of the above-entitled cases;

3. On this date, the undersigned was just surprised when he received a telegram from the petitioners, through
Mrs. Isabel Soriano, copy of which is thereto attached as Annex "A" and made part hereof, informing the
undersigned that respondent, thru a certain Albert, with the aid of armed goons, harvested the palay of the
petitioners yesterday despite the vehement opposition of the petitioners not to enter their landholdings;

4. The said acts of respondents and her men in harvesting the palay of the petitioners, knowing fully well the
existence and implementation of the interlocutory order of this Court dated June 21, 1962, is a gross and
open defiance and disobedience of said order and a challenge to the legal processes and authority of this
Court in the peaceful administration of justice;

5. This rebellious and seditious conduct of the respondent and her men against the authority of this Court
constitutes wanton resistance and contumacious contempt of court;

6. Unless the respondent and her armed goons are declared in contempt of Court and duly punished, the
lawful orders, processes and authority of this Court would be a mockery and rendered useless by the
stubborn resistance and defiance of the respondent.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that respondent and her
armed goons be declared and punished for contempt of Court until such time that she turns over the produce
of the landholdings in question which she harvested illegally and until such time that she fully complies with
the interlocutory order of this Court.

Petitioners pray for such other relief and remedies just and equitable under the premises.

Iloilo City, October 3, 1962.

E. I. Soriano Jr. and V. E. Aragona

Counsel for the Petitioners

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Lopez Bros. Bldg., Iznart Street

Iloilo City

By:

(sgd.) VICENTE E. ARAGONA JR.

The complainant's testimony is to the effect that (1) on October 2, 1962 she was not in Balasan but in Iloilo City
where she testified at the trial of C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255 after which she left for her home which is situated
also in Iloilo City; (2) the distance between Balasan and Iloilo City is 135 kilometers, and to reach Balasan from Iloilo
City one has to travel four hours by car or six hours by bus; (3) although she knows that the person Albert,
mentioned in the motion, is Alberto Boneta, a helper of Carlos Fuentes, one of the tenants she had placed on the
lands involved in the C.A.R. cases she never met or saw Boneta or Fuentes from the time she was informed of the
interlocutory order dated June 21, 1962 in the aforesaid cases, until October 2, 1962 when the said Alberto Boneta
and several armed men allegedly harvested the crops on the lands in question; (4) she did not order Boneta to
harvest the said crops; and (5) she never visited the aforesaid lands in 1962. Her uncontradicted testimony lends
credence to her claim that she did not order Alberto Boneta to harvest, with the aid of armed men, the crops on the
Aglinao brothers' landholdings.

Nonetheless, this Court is loath to uphold the view that the preparation and the filing of the questioned motion for
contempt, furnish sufficient basis for disciplinary action against the respondent.

In People vs. Aquino 3 this Court laid down the decisional authority that

[S]tatement made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged — that is, privileged
regardless of defamatory tenor and of the presence of malice — if the same are relevant, pertinent or material
to the cause in hand or subject of the inquiry. And that, in view of this, the person who makes them — such as
a judge, lawyer, or witness — does not thereby incur the risk of being found liable thereon in a criminal
prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages. (emphasis supplied)

Since there is no doubt that the allegations made by the respondent in the questioned motion for contempt are
statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding — i.e., in C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255 — besides being
relevant, pertinent or material to the subject-matter of the said cases, they are absolutely privileged, thereby
precluding any liability on the part of the respondent.

To be sure, the charges levelled by the respondent against the complainant in the questioned pleading lack
sufficient factual basis. But even this circumstance will not strengthen the complainant's position. "The privilege is
not affected by factual or legal inaccuracies in the utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings." 4 In fact,
"Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the
charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual .... The privilege is
not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms .... A privileged communication
should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny
would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communications. The ultimate test is that of bona
fides." 5

Indeed, the actuations of the respondent were motivated by the legitimate desire to serve the interests of his
clients. For, contrary to the complainant's claim, the respondent did not rely merely on Mrs. Soriano's telegram (exh.
5) when he prepared the motion for contempt. According to his unrebutted testimony, when Mr. Soriano brought to
him the said telegram on October 2, 1962, he asked the former whether his wife, the sender of the telegram, was
coming to Iloilo City, and, when informed that she was arriving, he waited for her. True enough Mrs. Soriano saw the
respondent in the afternoon of that same day and informed him that she was personally present when one Albert, a
tenant of the complainant, accompanied by several armed men, went to the landholdings of the Aglinao brothers
and, against the objections of the latter, harvested the palay crop thereon, and that upon her inquiry, she was
informed that they were acting upon orders of the complainant.

Considering that the foregoing information which impelled the respondent to file the questioned motion for
contempt, was obtained by him first-hand from someone who claimed to have actually witnessed the incident in
question, coupled with the complainants own admission that the Albert referred to by Mrs. Soriano was indeed a
helper of Carlos Fuentes, one of the tenants whom she had illegally placed once on the landholdings of the Aglinao
brothers, it was not unseemly for the respondent to assume that Albert did act at the behest of the complainant.
After all, the complainant had, in the past, committed the same forcible act of entering the said landholdings on June
18, 1963, only two days after she had assured the agrarian court that she would not disturb or interfere with the
Aglinao brothers' possession, pending final resolution of the petitions filed by them against her. In truth it is precisely
such forcible entry into the said lands that precipitated the issuance of the very interlocutory order dated June 21,
1962 which the respondent accused her of disobeying in his motion for contempt. Unquestionably, the aforenarrated
circumstances provided the respondent a probable cause for belief in the truthfulness of the allegations which he

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couched in rather intemperate language in his motion for contempt. He had merely acted in righteous indignation
over the wrong supposedly done to his aggrieved clients — believing as he did in the truth of his charges — without
deliberate intention whatsoever to malign and villify the complainant.

The doctrine of privileged communication is not an idle and empty principle. It has been distilled from wisdom and
experience. "The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those engaged in the public service and in
the enactment and administration of law, as for the promotion of the public welfare, the purpose being that members
of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their
respective functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages." 6
Lawyers, most especially, should be allowed a great latitude of pertinent comment in the furtherance of the causes
they uphold, and for felicity of their clients they may be pardoned some infelicities of language. 7

The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the
administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to
remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of office have proved them unfit to
continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. 8 Thus, the power to disbar attorneys ought
always to be exercised with great caution, and only in clear cases of misconduct which seriously affects the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. 9

In this case, there is no evidence whatsoever tending to prove unfitness of the respondent to continue in the
practice of law and remain an officer of the court.

ACCORDINGLY, the administrative complaint against the respondent is hereby dismissed.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and
Barredo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1Admitted to the Bar in 1960.

2Exhibit 5.

3L-23908, Oct. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 555, 558.

4Sison vs. David, L-11268, Jan. 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 60.

5U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, 743.

6People vs. Aquino, supra; Sison vs. David, supra quoting 33 Am. Jur. 123-124.

7Dorado vs. Pilar, 104 Phil. 743, 748.

8In re Montagne and Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577; In re McDougall, 3 Phil. 70; 5 Am. Jur. 411; see also Re
Caughan, 24 ALR 858, 189 Cal. 491, 209 P 353; Re Rotchrock, 131 ALR 226, 16 Cal. 2d 449, 160 P2d 907;
Re Keenan, 996 ALR 679, 287 Mass. 577, 192 NE 65; Re Kerl, 8 ALR 1259, 32 Idaho 737, 188 P 40.
9Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 2 S Ct 569; 27 L Ed 552.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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