United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
3d 163
73 A.F.T.R.2d 94-1327, 17 Employee Benefits Cas. 2357
John Finlay MacLennan, Smith, Hulsey & Busey, Jacksonville, FL, for
plaintiffs-appellants.
John Firth Dickinson, Corbin, Dickinson, Duvall & Margulies,
Jacksonville, FL, for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida.
Before COX, Circuit Judge, MORGAN and HENDERSON, Senior
Circuit Judges.
MORGAN, Senior Circuit Judge:
The Plan in effect as of January 6, 1989, allowed reduced pension benefits for
participants who took early retirement as provided in Article IV, Sec. 1:
4 each person who is a Participant may elect to retire on or after age 55 but prior to
(c)
Normal Retirement Date, and if such person either has at least ten years of
Eligibility Service or at least five years of Service ... the person shall become
entitled to a Pension hereunder....
5 each person who is a Participant may elect to retire at any time after which the
(d)
sum of age and Service first equals or exceeds 80, and shall become entitled to a
Pension hereunder....
6
Pursuant to the merger agreement between Allied and Unison, Allied retained
liability under the Plan for benefits of Ignition Products employees not eligible
to retire or not already retired as of January 6, 1989. Allied purchased a group
annuity contract to cover their liability and assigned it to Unison. The merger
agreement also provided that employees eligible to retire as of the date of the
merger but who continued their employment with Unison would be eligible for
Plan benefits as of the date they terminated their employment with Unison.
10
After January 7, 1989, all of the appellants applied for immediate payment of
early retirement benefits, which were denied by the Plan administrator.2 The
sole basis for denying the appellants' claims for benefits was the language of
the Sec. 23 amendment to the Plan, making participants ineligible for
immediate payment of early retirement benefits as long as they were employed
by Unison.
11
After exhausting the claims review procedure provided for in the Plan, the
appellants filed the instant action. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the Plan and this appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
12
Our review of the district court's grant of summary judgment is plenary. With
respect to the Plan's denial of pension benefits, we apply an arbitrary and
capricious standard of review. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489
U.S. 101, 115, 109 S.Ct. 948, 956, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989).
DISCUSSION
13
The appellants contend that the amendment to the pension plan, formerly
adopted in August of 1989, cannot be applied retroactively so as to deny
benefits to appellants who were retired from the Plan as of January 6, 1989.
Relying on the Plan's definition of retirement,3 the appellants argue that the
merger terminated their employment with Allied, and therefore they were
technically "retired" for purposes of the Plan. Since they were no longer
employed by Allied or an affiliated company, the appellants contend that they
were entitled to immediate early retirement benefits. Further, the appellants
assert that it was arbitrary and capricious to deny appellants' claims based upon
a condition not set forth in the Plan at the time of retirement. Initially, we will
address whether it was proper for the Plan administrator to retroactively apply
the Sec. 23 amendment to appellants' applications for pension benefits. If it was
proper to apply the amendment retroactively, then we cannot say that the denial
of benefits was arbitrary and capricious.
14
The appellants contend that the Sec. 23 amendment, which requires termination
of employment with Unison in order to qualify for retirement benefits, may not
be applied retroactively if the effect is to deprive participants of benefits to
which they would otherwise be entitled. The appellants argue that the Plan, as it
existed at the time of the merger, is controlling on their applications for early
retirement benefits. The appellants contend that denial of their claims based on
a standard that was not contained in the terms of the Plan amounts to an
arbitrary and capricious decision. See Blau v. Del Monte Corporation, 748 F.2d
1348 (9th Cir.1984).
15
16 plan administrator shall furnish this summary ... not later than 210 days after the
The
close of the plan year in which the modification or change was adopted. This
disclosure date is not affected by retroactive application to a prior plan year of an
amendment which makes a material modification to the plan.
17
18
benefits upon which his employees had relied during their long years of
service.").
19
In this case, the benefits to which the appellants are entitled have not been
reduced or eliminated. Every participant who was eligible to retire and receive
benefits before the divestiture date was still eligible for those same benefits
after the merger. The timing of the receipt of benefits is entirely up to each
participant, based on when she elects to retire. The appellants' take the position
that retirement is self-executing. To the contrary, the plain language of the Plan
requires that a participant "elect to retire." Prior to the merger a participant
could have elected to retire and immediately begun to receive early retirement
benefits. After the merger and the effective date of the amendment, the same
choice was available to each appellant.
20
21
Both the Plan and applicable regulations permit employee benefit plans under
ERISA to be amended, not only prospectively, but also retroactively. In this
case, retroactive application of the Sec. 23 amendment does not deprive
participants of a benefit to which they would otherwise be entitled. Therefore,
we conclude that the amendment was properly applied retroactively to January
6, 1989.
22
In determining whether the denial of the appellants' claims was arbitrary and
capricious, "the function of the court is to determine whether there was a
reasonable basis for the decision, based upon the facts as known to the
administrator at the time the decision was made." Jett v. Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Alabama, 890 F.2d 1137, 1139 (11th Cir.1989). Since it was proper
to apply the Sec. 23 amendment retroactively to the appellants applications, it
must be considered one of the terms of the Plan in effect at the time of the
divestiture. Therefore, the plan administrator had a reasonable basis for denying
the appellants claims for benefits. In fact, the plain language of the Plan, based
on the amendment, requires that early retirement benefits be denied as long as
the appellants are employed by Unison.
23
For all of the forgoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
The record is not clear as to exactly what were the mechanics of the sale of
Ignition Products to Unison. However, both parties agree that Unison is not an
affiliated company of Allied for purposes of the Plan