Eileen May E.

Fudan
Ph.D major in Educational Management
Republic of the Philippines Congress of the Philippines Metro, Manila
Third Regular Session Begun and held in Metro, Manila, on Monday, the
twenty- fifth day of July, nineteen hundred and ninetyfour.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7877 AN ACT DECLARING SEXUAL HARASSMENT

UNLAWFUL IN THE EMPLOYMENT, EDUACATION OR TRAINING
ENVIRONMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "Anti-Sexual Harassment
Act of 1995."
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State shall value the dignity of every
individual, enhance the development of it human resources, guarantee full
respect for human rights, and uphold the dignity of workers, employees,
applicants for employment, students or those undergoing training, instruction
or education. Towards this end, all forms of sexual harassment in the
employment, education or training environment are hereby declared unlawful.
Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined.
Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an
employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor,
professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence
or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education
environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from
the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for
submission is accepted by the object of said Act. (a) In a work-related or
employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when: (1) The
sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment,
reemployment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said
individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges;
or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or

classifying the employee which in a way would discriminate, deprive or

diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said
employee; (2) The above acts would impair the employees rights or privileges
under existing labor laws; or (3) The above acts would result in an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive environment for the employee. (b) In an education or
training environment, sexual harassment is committed: (1) Against one who is
under the care, custody or supervision of the offender; (2) Against one whose
education, training, apprenticeship or tutorship is entrusted to the offender; (3)
When the sexual favor is made a condition to the giving of a passing grade, or
the granting of honors and scholarships, or the payment of a stipend,
allowance or other benefits, privileges, or considerations; or (4) When the
sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for
the student, trainee or apprentice. Any person who directs or induces another
to commit any act of sexual harassment as herein defined, or who cooperates
in the commission thereof by another without which it would not have been
committed, shall also be held liable under this Act.
Sec.4. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a Work-related,
Education or Training Environment. It shall be the duty of the employer or
the head of the work-related, educational or training environment or
institution, to prevent or deter the commission of acts of sexual harassment
and to provide the procedures for the resolution, settlement or prosecution of
acts of sexual harassment. Towards this end, the employer or head of office
shall: (a) Promulgate appropriate rules and regulations in consultation with the
jointly approved by the employees or students or trainees, through their duly
designated representatives, prescribing the procedure for the investigation or
sexual harassment cases and the administrative sanctions therefor.
Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to prosecution in the proper courts
for unlawful acts of sexual harassment. The said rules and regulations issued
pursuant to this section (a) shall include, among others, guidelines on proper
decorum in the workplace and educational or training institutions. (c) Create a
committee on decorum and investigation of cases on sexual harassment. The
committee shall conduct meetings, as the case may be, with other officers and
employees, teachers, instructors, professors, coaches, trainors and students or
trainees to increase understanding and prevent incidents of sexual
harassment. It shall also conduct the investigation of the alleged cases
constituting sexual harassment. In the case of a work-related environment, the
committee shall be composed of at least one (1) representative each from the
management, the union, if any, the employees from the supervisory rank, and
from the rank and file employees. In the case of the educational or training

institution, the committee shall be composed of at least one (1) representative

from the administration, the trainors, teachers, instructors, professors or
coaches and students or trainees, as the case maybe. "The employer or head of
office, educational or training institution shall disseminate or post a copy of
this Act for the information of all concerned.
Sec. 5. Liability of the Employer, Head of Office, Educational or Training
Institution. The employer or head of office, educational training institution
shall be solidarily liable for damage arising from the acts of sexual harassment
committed in the employment, education or training environment if the
employer or head of office, educational or training institution is informed of
such acts by the offended party and no immediate action is taken thereon.
Sec. 6. Independent Action for Damages. Nothing in this Act shall preclude
the victim of work, education or training-related sexual harassment from
instituting a separate and independent action for damages and other
affirmative relief.
Sec. 7. Penalties. Any person who violates the provisions of this Act shall,
upon conviction, be penalized by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month
nor more than six (6) months, or a fine of not less than Ten thousand pesos
(P10,000) nor more than Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000), or both such fine
and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. Any action arising from the
violation of the provision of this Act shall prescribe in three (3) years.
Sec. 8. Separability Clause If any portion or provision of this Act is declared
void and unconstitutional, the remaining portions or provisions hereof shall not
be affected by such declaration.
Sec.9. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations,
other issuances, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec.10. Effectivity Clause. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after
its complete publication in at least two (2) national newspaper of general
circulation

Anti-Sexual Harassment Case Sample:

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION

DIOSCORO F. BACSIN, G.R. No. 146053

Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

EDUARDO O. WAHIMAN, Promulgated:

Respondent.
April 30, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner Dioscoro F. Bacsin questions

the Decision dated August 23, 2000 of the First Division of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 51900, which affirmed Resolution No. 98-0521
dated March 11, 1998 and Resolution No. 99-0273 dated January 28, 1999,
both issued by the Civil Service Commission (CSC), dismissing petitioner from
the service for Grave Misconduct.
Facts of the Case
Petitioner is a public school teacher of Pandan Elementary School, Pandan,
Mambajao, Camiguin Province. Respondent Eduardo O. Wahiman is the father
of AAA, an elementary school student of the petitioner.
AAA claimed that on August 16, 1995, petitioner asked her to be at his office to
do an errand. Once inside, she saw him get a folder from one of the cartons on
the floor near his table, and place it on his table. He then asked her to come
closer, and when she did, held her hand, then touched and fondled her
breast. She stated that he fondled her breast five times, and that she felt afraid.
A classmate of hers, one Vincent B. Sorrabas, claiming to have witnessed the
incident, testified that the fondling incident did happen just as AAA related it.

Petitioner was charged with Misconduct in a Formal Charge dated February 12,
1996 by Regional Director Vivencio N. Muego, Jr. of the CSC.
In his defense, petitioner claimed that the touching incident happened by
accident, just as he was handing AAA a lesson book. He further stated that the
incident happened in about two or three seconds, and that the girl left his
office without any complaint.[

Resolution of the CSC

In Resolution No. 98-0521 dated March 11, 1998, the CSC found petitioner
guilty of Grave Misconduct (Acts of Sexual Harassment), and dismissed him
from the service. Specifically, the CSC found the petitioner to have committed
an act constituting sexual harassment, as defined in Sec. 3 of Republic Act No.
(RA) 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in
Resolution No. 99-0273 dated January 28, 1999.
Decision of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner then brought the matter to the CA under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, the recourse docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51900.
Petitioner raised the following issues before the CA:
1. Whether or not there were efforts by [AAA], her parents and the Honorable
Civil Service Commission to magnify the accidental touching incident
on August 16, 1995;
2. Whether or not the guilt of the petitioner was supported by the evidence on
record; and
3. Whether or not there was irregularity in the imposition of the penalty of
removal.
In resolving the case, the CA determined that the issue revolved around
petitioners right to due process, and based on its finding that petitioner had
the opportunity to be heard, found that there was no violation of that
right. The CA ruled that, even if petitioner was formally charged with
disgraceful and immoral conduct and misconduct, the CSC found that the
allegations and evidence sufficiently proved petitioners guilt of grave
misconduct, punishable by dismissal from the service.
The Issues Before Us

The petitioner now raises the following issues in the present petition:
1. Whether or not the petitioner could be guilty of acts of sexual harassment,
grave misconduct, which was different from or an offense not alleged in the
formal charge filed against him at the inception of the administrative case.
2. Assuming petitioner was guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct and
misconduct as charged by complainant, whether or not the penalty of dismissal
from the service imposed by the Civil Service Commission and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals is in accord with Rule XIV, Section (23) of the Omnibus Civil
Service Rules and applicable rulings.
3. Whether or not the charge of Misconduct, a lesser offense, includes the
offense of Grave Misconduct; a greater offense.
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner argues that the CSC cannot validly adjudge him guilty of an offense,
such as Grave Misconduct (Acts of Sexual Harassment), different from that
specified in the formal charge which was Misconduct. He further argues that
the offense of Misconduct does not include the graver offense of Grave
Misconduct.
This argument is unavailing.
As Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission teaches:
The charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be
drafted with the precision of information in a criminal prosecution. It is
sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge against him; what
is controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of
the offense.

It is clear that petitioner was sufficiently informed of the basis of the charge
against him, which was his act of improperly touching one of his students.
Thus informed, he defended himself from such charge. The failure to designate
the offense specifically and with precision is of no moment in this
administrative case.

The formal charge, while not specifically mentioning RA 7877, The Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act of 1995, imputes on the petitioner acts covered and penalized
by said law. Contrary to the argument of petitioner, the demand of a sexual
favor need not be explicit or stated. In Domingo v. Rayala, it was held, It is true
that this provision calls for a demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor.
But it is not necessary that the demand, request, or requirement of a sexual
favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be
discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. The CSC found,
as did the CA, that even without an explicit demand from petitioner his act of
mashing the breast of AAA was sufficient to constitute sexual
harassment. Moreover, under Section 3 (b) (4) of RA 7877, sexual harassment
in an education or training environment is committed (w)hen the sexual
advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the
student, trainee or apprentice. AAA even testified that she felt fear at the time
petitioner touched her. It cannot then be said that the CSC lacked basis for its
ruling, when it had both the facts and the law. The CSC found the evidence
presented by the complainant sufficient to support a finding of grave
misconduct. It is basic that factual findings of administrative agencies, when
supported by substantial evidence, are binding upon the Court.
Leaving aside the discrepancy of the designation of the offense in the formal
charge, it must be discussed whether or not petitioner is indeed guilty, as found
by the CA and CSC, of Grave Misconduct, as distinguished from Simple
Misconduct. From the findings of fact of the CSC, it is clear that there is
misconduct on the part of petitioner. The term misconduct denotes intentional
wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior.
We agree with the rulings of the CSC and the CA.
In grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law,
or flagrant disregard of established rule must be manifest. The act of petitioner
of fondling one of his students is against a law, RA 7877, and is doubtless
inexcusable. The particular act of petitioner cannot in any way be construed as
a case of simple misconduct. Sexually molesting a child is, by any norm, a
revolting act that it cannot but be categorized as a grave offense. Parents
entrust the care and molding of their children to teachers, and expect them to
be their guardians while in school. Petitioner has violated that trust. The
charge of grave misconduct proven against petitioner demonstrates his
unfitness to remain as a teacher and continue to discharge the functions of his
office.

Petitioners second argument need not be discussed further, as he was rightly

found guilty of grave misconduct. Under Rule IV, Section 52 of the CSC
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases, Grave Misconduct carries with it the
penalty of dismissal for the first offense. Thus, the penalty imposed on
petitioner is in accordance with the Rules.
Petitioner was not denied due process of law, contrary to his claims. The
essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an
opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
These elements are present in this case, where petitioner was properly
informed of the charge and had a chance to refute it, but failed.
A teacher who perverts his position by sexually harassing a student should not
be allowed, under any circumstance, to practice this noble profession. So it
must be here.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and
the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 51900 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice