African Union and The Challenges of Integration
African Union and The Challenges of Integration
African Union and The Challenges of Integration
The formation of the African Union, which has been described as the
inevitable historical maturation of the ideas of Pan-Africanism and Pan-African
unity that gave rise to the establishment of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) and later The African Union (AU), remains the latest and `greatest'
achievements made in the African quest for a continental unity/unification or
integration.
The African Union was proposed by the Libyan leader Moammar Al Qaddafi
as a more effective institution for increasing prosperity in Africa. The AU was
formally established in September 2001, in Sirte. The AUs objective is to
harmonize the economic and political policies of all African nations in order to
improve pan-African welfare, and provide Africans with a solid voice in
international affairs. Supporters of the AU believe it will have a stronger charter
than the OAU, will be better funded, and will have the "teeth" that the OAU
lacked, including the power to create a common African Parliament, a Central
Bank, a common African currency and an international Court of Justice. It is hoped
that the AU will have the authority and ability to achieve economic and political
integration among member states, as well as work towards a common defense,
LITERATURE REVIEW
3
O.A.
in
Analyzing
the
Proposed African
Economic
Community opined that there are three broad approaches to regional integration.
4
The first school of thought claims that the best path to regional integration is to
create a higher supranational authority, to which participating states surrender part
of their sovereignty. This perspective, otherwise known as the Federalist Strategy,
calls for a federal structure, whereby political power is legally shared between the
national and the supranational levels of government. In this case, national
governments will have to surrender part of their sovereignty to the newly created
supranational institutions.
At the other end of the theoretical spectrum is the Functionalist Strategy.
Lodge, J. in Transparency and Democratic Legitimacy. Simply put, this approach
refers to a mere functional cooperation by participating countries. Conceivably,
this road to regional integration does not require member states to part with an iota
of their autonomy. It merely entails and encourages inter-governmental
cooperation. While the Federalist approach may be avaricious by asking for too
much too hurriedly, the Functionalist appears to be evasive and lackadaisical.
Hence, a common ground is proposed, which is a hybrid of the aforementioned
strategies.
national level, which shall endeavor to demonstrate the relevance and worthiness
of regional integration to member states. If they are successful with their modest
tasks, the argument goes; the supranational entities would be accorded more
competencies by member states. Sovereign states participates in regional
integration for various reasons because, they expect tangible benefits, whether
political, economic or social. Politically, a country may participate in a regional
scheme in order to bolster its military prowess, augment its political stature, and
deter or wade off aggression from hostile neighbors.
Similarly, countries may integrate so as to achieve economies of scale,
optimally allocate scarce resources, and accelerate economic growth or to increase
trade. Socially, countries may also participate in regional integration for
socioeconomic reasons, either to facilitate factor mobility or to stem the influx of
immigrants from less affluent neighboring countries. In any case, participating in
regional endeavors can plausibly increase the fortunes of the domestic economy.
Theoretically, and in practice, regional integration framework can be further
discussed, on the basis of whether they entail the removal of trade barriers or the
adoption of common policies.
According to Brigid Laffan in the work Integration and Co-operation in
Europe, he was of the opinion that most-favored nation, free trade area, and
customs union, which involve the elimination of trade barriers, are manifestations
6
CHAPTER PROPOSAL
CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND TO THE FORMATION OF THE
AFRICAN UNION:
7
African Union from becoming relevant or important in the new emerging world
order which is geared towards strengthening the base of her economies
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
This research traced the genesis and reasons for the
emergence of regional blocs, especially in Africa. The main reason
being that Africa wanted to be an active player in the global
economy. The discussion also notes that because the OAU failed
to facilitate meaningful growth and development in Africa, aside
other factors, it metamorphosed into the AU. The study examines
the problems the AU will contend with in its efforts to integrate
African economies and proffers solutions.
CHAPTER ONE
10
twentieth-century Pan-African associations; they pervade the resolutions of PanAfrican meetings held outside and inside the continent since 1900; they permeate
the utterances and publications of men like W.E.B. DuBois, Marcus Garvey,
George Padmore, Kwame Nkrumab, Julius Nyerere and Stokeley Carmichael.9
Thus, with simplification Pan-Africanism can be said to be a political and
cultural phenomenon which regards Africa, Africans and African descendants
abroad as a unit; it seeks to regenerate and unify Africa and promote a feeling of
oneness among the people of the African world; it glorifies the African past and
inculcates pride in African values.
It can be deduced, therefore, that the origin of Pan-Africanism or Pan-African
ideas is a relatively long one. According to V. B. Thompson, the man who first
expressed pan-African sentiments will never be known. Hence it is futile to try, as
some writers have attempted, to ascribe the phenomenon to any one man or trace
its origin to a particular year. In his words,
Of course the term "pan-African" and its derivative panAfricanism" were not coined at the time the phenomenon which they
describe emerged.... Though the words "pan-African" and "panAfricanism" became popular after the 1900 London congress, their
substance had been thought out long before. It is a struggle in which
Africans and men of African blood have been engaged since their
contact with modern Europe. 10
13
Based on the above assertion, Pan-African thinking originally began in the socalled New World becoming articulate during the century starting from the
declaration of American independence (1776).I1 It represented a reaction
against the oppression of the black man and the racial doctrines that marked
the era of abolitionism. It also found expression in the independent church
movement in the New World and Africa as well as in resistance to European
colonial ambitions in Africa.l2
The above notwithstanding, Sylvester Williams, a West Indian lawyer from
Trinidad, is said to be the first to use the term `pan-Africanism' and the first to
organize a pan-African congress in 1900.13 This was in London, where he brought
together a number of Africans and men of African descent then living in Europe to
discuss the question of colonialism and foreign domination of black peoples, racial
prejudice and the treatment of Africans in South Africa, the future of Africa and the
international standing of the only a three black states existing in the world at the
time, namely, Haiti, Ethiopia and Liberia. With the death of Sylvester Williams
shortly after the London pan-African congress, Burghardt DuBois, who had
introduced the question of independence in the London Congress, took over from
where the Late Williams had stopped and succeeded in organizing a series of five
Pan-African congresses. This earned him the name `Father of pan-Africanism'.14
14
15
Thus, African
also witnessed
process. In Africa.
16
countries, not about the desirability of an umbrella organization for the collective
expression of the aims and objectives of Pan-Africanism - for there was a
seeming consensus on this - but about the form which such an organization
should assume and the extent and substantive content of its powers and functions.
Undoubtedly, the institutionalization process of the .various pan-African
ideas was a gradual one; it obviously gained ground in the late 1950s, with the
political independence of few African states - particularly Ghana and Guinea. As
heads of government of the newly independent states of Ghana and Guinea,
Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure respectively announced after a meeting in
Accra on 23 November 1958 that they had decided to constitute their two states
into a Union, the Ghana-Guinea Union, which, they added was to be the nucleus of
a nation of west African states.
17
fact that it was the first time that African leaders of independent African states
emerging from different political regimes, and therefore different colonial language
areas, came together to make pronounces on the general desire for West African
unity.
From a sentiment for West African unity, a wider and all-embracing
commitment for continental African unity emerged on 1 St May 1959, when Kwame
Nkrumah and Sekou Toure signed a joint declaration in Conakry by which they
16
expressed their intention to broaden the basis of their Union to make. it the nucleus
of a wider `Union of Independent States of Africa' to which member states would
surrender portions of their national sovereignty' in the full interest of the African
Community. 18
In July 1959, a meeting was held in a small Liberian town of Saniquellie
between Kwame Nkrumah and William Tubman of Liberia at which they signed
the famous "Saniquellie Declaration", in which they agreed to form a loose
association to be known as "the Community of Independent African States". At the
meeting, they formulated six principles which would guide the operation of the
association, third and most important was that,
... Each state and federation; which is a member of the Community,
shall maintain its own national identity and constitutional structure.
The Community is being formed with a view to achieving unity
among independent African States. It is not designed to prejudice
the present or future international policies, relation and obligations
of the States involved."19
Although the "Saniquellie Declaration" was a modification of the earlier
declaration signed in May 1959, it however raised certain controversial issues that
led to the emergence of blocs among the new African states which represented the
two major methods of achieving African unity.
17
20
Burkina Faso. Morocco and Togo were not represented at the conference although
they were later allowed to sign the Charter.
The aims and objectives as set out by Charter establishing the organization
are: to promote the unity and solidarity of the African States; to coordinate and
intensify efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; to defend their
sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence; to eradicate all forms of
colonialism from Africa; and to promote international cooperation, having due
regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. 23
The Charter also stipulated seven principles that would guide the
interactions/relationships among members: sovereign equality of member states.;
non-interference in the internal affairs of states; respect for the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of each state and for the inalienable right to independent
existence; peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or
arbitration; unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as
well as subversive activities on the part of neighbouring states or any other state;
absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which were
still dependent; and affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all
blocs24
19
Sirte, Libya in September 1999, with determined promptings from . the Libyan
leader Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi, decided on the establishment of the African
Union, in conformity with the .objectives of the OAU Charter and the provisions of
the AEC Treaty.
The Sirte Declaration was followed by the Thirty-sixth Ordinary Session of the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Lome, Togo on 11 July 2000
where the Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted; and it was
subsequently lunched at the Thirty-seventh Ordinary Summit of the OAU, in
Lusaka, Zambia in July 2001.31 During the same period, the initiative for the
establishment of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NIEPAD) was
also establish .32 On July 9, 2002, a day after the closing ceremony of the OAU
and its last and Thirty-eighth Summit, the African Union was born.
Among others, the objectives of the Union include:
... to achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African
countries and the people of Africa; to defend the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and independence of its member states; to
accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the
continent; to promote and defend African common positions and
issues of interest to the continent and its peoples; to encourage
international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of
the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights; to promote peace, security, and stability on the
continent; to promote democratic principles and institutions,
22
Finally, the launching of the African Union in Durban, South Africa on July 9,
2002 by the First Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Union was a
momentous and seminal event, a major land mark, and indeed a turning point in
the evolution of the theory and practice of Pan-Africamsm and African
Development.
34
African Union is not simply a continuation of the OAU by another name; rather
"...tills is the beginning of a new paradigm of development in Africa. The African
Union/New Partnership for Africa's Development is a more thorough-going project
aimed at ending poverty and underdevelopment, deepening democracy and
economic governance, and more crucially, pioneering a completely new
relationship and partnership with the developed world.35
It is remarkable, in this respect, that building on almost forty years
experience in continental, regional and sub-regional cooperation and integration,
Africa began the dawn of the new millennium with a resurgent and re-invigorated
enthusiasm and a new paradigm of continental unity and development which
situate the birth of the African Union in the wider context that calls for the
emergence of a new structure, dynamics and pattern of political economy in a
23
rapidly changing system of global production, trade and interdependence. With it,
the necessary conditions that would enable the continent to play its rightful role in
the global economy, politics and in international negotiation were established36.
Lastly, apart from the expectation those African leaders would now be
committed to clean government. and strong economic policies as spelt out in the
New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), they are also expected to
commit themselves to promoting peace, security, and good governance and holding
each other accountable for their individual and collective efforts to achieve
NEPAD's economic, political, and social objectives37.
ENDNOTES
1. E. A. Ifidon, "Unity without Unification: The Development of Nigeria's
"Inside-Out' Approach to African Political Integration, 1937-1963", in
International Social Science Review, Volume 83, Numbers l & 2, 2002, pp. 46.
2. R. Goff, W. Moss, J. Terry & J. Upshur, The Twentieth Century - A Brief
Global History, 4t` Edition. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), pp. 43 - 55.
3. Ibid., pp. 376 - 389.
24
20. See J. L Osagie, "Regional Cooperation and Integration in Africa", in Omu &
Otoide (eds.), Themes in International Studies and Diplomacy, p.'183.
21.Agubuzu, From the OA U to AU.- The Challenges ofAfrican Unity and
Development in the Twenty-fist Century, pp. 21 - 22.
22.R: Uweuche (ed.), Africa Today4United Kingdom: Africa Books Ltd, 1991), p.
29.
23.Ibid., p. 21.
24. "Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)", Addis Ababa, 1963,
Article III.
25.Agubuzu, From the OA U to AU.- The Challenges ofAfrican Unity and
Development in the Twenty. fist Century, p. 22.
26.Z. Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU (New York:
African Publishers, 1977), p. 3.
27."Transition from the OAU to the African Union", Department of Foreign
Affairs of South Africa, www.dfa.gov.za. Retrieved on
07/04/09. See also Osagie, "Regional Cooperation and Integration in Africa", p.
189
28. "Study on an African Union Government: Towards a United States of Africa",
in The Union Government Doc.Assembly/AU, 2(VII)2006, pp. 27 - 30.
29.Uweuche (ed.), Africa Today, p. 39.
30.Agubuzu, From the OA U to AU.- The Challenges of African Unity and
Development in the Twenty fist Century, p. 23.
31. "The African Union, NEPAD and Human Rights: The Missing Agenda"
Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4, November 2004, p. 54.
32.1bid.
33.News Letter: African Association of Political Science, Vol. 6, No. 1, January April, 2001, pp. 24 - 28.
26
34.Agubuzu, From the OAU to AU.- The Challenges ofAfrican Unity and
Development in the Twenty-fist Century, p. 13.
35.Quoted in ibid., p. 17.
36.News Letter: African Association of Political Science, pp. 24 - 28.
37.IMFSURVEY, Vol. 31, No. 13, July 18, 2002, pp. 209 - 211.
CHAPTER TWO
ISSUES OF INTEGRATION IN AFRICA
Introduction
According to International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, the term
`integration' can be defined as "a process whereby the quality of relations
27
among autonomous social units (kinship groups, [ethnic groups], cities, trade
unions, trade associations, political parties etc) change in such a way as to
erode the autonomy of each and make it a part of a larger aggregate." 1
Narrowing this broad definition to international relations, L. N. Lindbert
defined integration in two ways: first as "the process whereby nations forego
the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies
independently of each other, seeking 'instead to make joint_ decisions or to
delegate the decision making process to a new central organs"; and secondly as
"the process whereby political actors in several distinct settings are personal to
shift their expectations and political activities to a new centre." 2
It can be observed from the above definitions that integration tends to
challenge the very foundations of realism (state sovereignty and territorial
Integrity), and this has given the term a theoretical status - the theory of
`international integration' which refers to "the process by which supranational
institutions replace national ones - the gradual shifting upward of sovereignty
from state to regional or global structures." 3 Such a shift in sovereignty to the
supranational level would probably entail some version of federalism in which
states or other political units recognize the sovereignty of a central government
while retaining certain power for themselves, as in the case of the European
Union (EU).
28
Like most continents and regions, Africa has indeed had its experience of
international integration. With the establishment of the Organization of Africa
Unity (OAU) in 1963, African states celebrated their first `success' in attempt
at continental integration. However, it was not all rosy for African leaders.
Thus, in the 38 years history of the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU), the
organization had to deal with a number of issues that hindered or slowed , down
integration in Africa. These issues were inter-state and intra-state conflicts;
racism, colonialism and apartheid in southern Africa; and economic crisis broadly classified/grouped into political and socio-economic issues.
In discussing the above issues in this chapter, we shall first examine the
initial ideological differences and disagreements among the African leaders in
the pre-OAU era, on the best way of achieving African unity.
The Initial Issue of a Consensus Approach to African Unity
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was founded at a time when
African leaders were experiencing their first taste of independence and were
anxious to consolidate their leadership. 4` Across the continent they saw the
danger posed by the divisions of language, culture and religion, by the
economic inequalities, by the controversies over boundaries arbitrarily drawn
by the colonial powers. African leaders also realized that after independence
regional cooperation would be essential to the utilization of the continent's vast
29
In the continental phase of the development of PanAfricanism in the 1950s and 1960s,...the more Africa
became divided into numerous sovereign states, the more
conflicting approaches and policies to African Unity came
to dominate the African ,international political arena 7.
The first and the second Conferences of Independent African States, held
respectively in Accra, Ghana in April 1958 and Addis Ababa, in June 1960, as
well as the first All African People's Conference, in Accra in December 1958
and the second All African People's Conference in Tunis; Tunisia in January
1960 illustrated the ideological, personality and linguistic (Arab, Anglophone
and Francophone )', differences that militated against a consensus on the form
of African continental unity. To this must be factored in external manipulation
by the Great Powers and the determination by Britain and France to maintain
their spheres of influence in their former colonies 8.
Indeed, between 1958 and 1962, a number of regional African groupings
had emerged, notably the Casablanca Group, the Monrovia Group and the
Brazzaville Twelve or, as they chose to call themselves, the Union of African
and Malagasy States (UAM), to reflect two of the leading approaches to
continental unity. On the one hand, there was the so-called Moderate Group,
comprising Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria and most of the Francophone countries,
which advocated a gradualist, neo-functionalist approach in the form of a loose
31
association of states, to African unity. On the opposite side was the so-called
Radical Group, led by Ghana, Guinea and Mali, which advocated immediate
continental political union in the form of a United States of Africa. Several
reasons , had been given for the continental division into the above three rival
blocs 9.
Despite the divisions, there was a sustained desire to unite all the
independent African states, and each of the three groups made frequent
attempts to end the division - through diplomatic channels, in the lobbies of
the UN, and at, various international gatherings attended by delegations from
African states. Because governmental policies in Africa are largely determined
by, personalities, the compromise agreement was reached by direct talks
between Heads of State during their mutual visits in the pre-1963 years, which
had been mainly preoccupied with African Unity 10 Consequently, Kwame
Nlcrumah's call for continental unity was brushed aside, and the African
leaders settled for a superficial unity which brought together African Heads of
States but not African peoples. This in no way affected the sovereignty of each
independent State, and they were left free to pursue policies in which
continental priorities were sacrificed to narrow national interests.
This
arrangement
suited
the
so-called
'Moderate'
Conservative
governments in countries such as Ethiopia (as it was then under Emperor Haile
32
11
13
many African leaders realized that the division within their ranks was
dangerous enough; it helped to heighten their jealousies, suspicions and
chauvinisms. More important, it gave the Europeans of whatever political
persuasion the best opportunity to play one group of Africans against the
33
Socio-Economic Issues
Although
political
matters
or
crises
constituted
the
primary
preoccupation of African leaders and states during the OAU years, yet these
leaders 'had also shown concern on the question of economic and social
development of the continent. It was perhaps due to this concern that the
Economic and Social Commission was established as one of the three
specialized commissions of the OAU with functions that had to do with the
economic and general welfare of the African peoples, such as initiating studies
34
and reports with regards to economic and social issues affecting the destiny of
the African peoples 16.
35
21
resulting in drafts that were discussed and approved at the meeting of OAU
Heads of State and Governments in Lagos between 28th and 29th of April
1980. The draft final Act of Lagos (as the Lagos Plan of Action was called)
was the first OAU meeting of Assembly of Heads of State and Government
devoted exclusively to economic problems of Afi-ica. 24 It focused on the
consideration of guidelines and measures for national and collective selfreliance in economic and social development for the establishment of a new
international economic order which aimed at the eventual establishment of an
African common market and leading to an African Economic Community.
At the Summit, the African leaders confirmed their full adherence to the
Plan of Action for the Economic; Social and Cultural Development of Africa;
and agreed among other things to strengthen those already existing structures
for an eventual establishment of an African Common Market which was
considered as a first step towards the creation an African economic community.
The Assembly on the same day adopted the draft for the implementation of the
Plan of Action and the setting up of an African community:
We reaffirm our commitment to set up by the year 2000, on the
basis of a treaty to be concluded, an African Economic
Community so as to ensure the economic, social and cultural,
integration of our continent, the aim of this community shall
be to promote collective, accelerated, self-reliant and self38
of the African leaders and states after and since independence, thereby leaving
the question of economic and social development at the bottom rung of the
organization's priorities 28.
One reason why economic matters/issues had been overshadowed by
political issues is that political events are usually more compelling and
spectacular, while economic. difficulties develop insidiously and are seldom so
specific or dramatic. In the words of R. Uwechue;
When are talk if the OAU's inability to achieve a satisfactory
degree of economic co-operation among African Countries
and of Africa's continued dependence on non-African powers,
we console ourselves by blaming the colonial past-and do very
little about it. When there is a Pan-African political crisis or
war, everybody talks about it and the OAU is asked to resolve
the problem. Nobody demands that it should tackle with
equal vigour and collective spirit the continent's transports,
which are ' in reality no less a danger to Africa's survival. 29
Thus, it is in these areas of political issues that the concrete achievement of the
Organization of African Unity can be assessed, particularly in the area of
decolonization and struggle against anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa 30.
In the first place, Article II (1) of the OAU Charter had provided for the
eradication of all forms of colonialism in Africa, and a Liberation Committee
was established with the responsibility of liquidating colonialism which was
seen as the principal aim of the OAU. With the continental agenda of liberation
40
of the southern -states from colonial and minority rule, the OAU liberation
committee was also tasked to channel support to the peoples of southern
Africa 31 Although more that thirty states had gained independence in the first
wave of independence in Africa before the establishment of OAU in 1963,
however in the second wave that was generally more violent, the lusophone
states of Guinea-Bissau, -Cape Verde, Mozambique, and Angola finally
overcame 400 years of colonial domination following the revolution in
Portugal in 1974. 32
Moreover; only Zambia and Malawi had joined the ranks of African self
rule by 1965, when the white settlers of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) issued
their Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). Whereas Malawi opted for
a policy of. accommodation with the white power, Tanzania and Zambia
became significantly involved with the liberation movements of Zimbabwe,
Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa 33. In fact, the headquarters of
the Liberation Committee was placed in Dar es Salam, capital of Tanzania,
which was at the time the only independent mainland state in the region.
In 1975, Spain withdrew from the Western Sahara, setting in motion a
period of unresolved continental strife over control of the territory. By 1980
the struggle against white rule in Rhodesia was crowned with success: the
41
disputes among the OAU members had been settled through direct negotiations
between states, good offices offered by third parties,, ad '/roc committees
composed' of Heads of State, and diplomatic negotiations conducted during
sessions of the Assembly of Heads of State and-Government 37.
By and large, the disputes that were submitted to the ad hoc
commissions and committees were over border and territorial claims and
allegations of subversion by some of the OAU member-states against other
member-states. There were also a few cases of civil wars in which the OAU
tried to intervene. Although Paragraph 2 of Article III of the OAU Charter
prpvi.ded for non-interference in the internal affairs of member-states, but the
OAU invariably had to intervene on the side of the established order, as in the
case of the civil wars in Zaire, Nigeria and in Chad 38. Thus, it was largely
because of the above political issues that the OAU moved with strong
determination in the last two decades or so (1980 - 2002) of its existence to
promote democracy, good governance and human right 39. These later form part
of the political orientation of the African Union.
have diverse history and were also colonized by different European powers. At
independence, the people of Africa inherited a legacy, which was tinted by
colonialism. 40 Since independence; various efforts have been made aimed at
socio-political and economic cooperation and integration. However, while
some leaders suited a stronger integration, others preferred a loose one. With
time, African leaders were able to arrive at a consensus with the establishment
of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which was a middle way between
the strong union and the federalist structure as advocated by the two groups.
Since the establishment of the OAU, and through, out its 38-year
existence, the Organization was faced with several issues of integration, which
this chapter has critically examined. Although the OAU experienced more
failures than successes, it remained a focal point for collective initiatives and
for conflict management 42. As a result of certain lapses in the-OAU Charter,
coupled with some fundamental changes that had taken place in the
international political system, African leaders moved towards establishing a
structure that would enhance the socio-economic and political life of the
African people, as well as enhance the status of African states in world
affairs 43. These efforts culminated in the transition from OAU to AU in 2002.
By the time it gave way to the African Union (AU), the OAU's
membership had grown to 53 member-states. Morocco, which had withdrawn
44
its membership in 1987 in protest against the admission of the Saharawi Arab
Republic (Western Sahara), was the only African country, which was not a
member of the OAU at its transition. 44 Although some observers have alleged
that the AU is an `old wine in new skin', one thing for sure is that the dream of
one of Africa's great leaders and heroes, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, has finally been
realized. In his closing remark at the , Casablanca Conference in 1961, Dr.
Nkrumah noted that "the future of Africa lies in a political union - a political
union in which the economic, military and cultural activities will be
coordinated for the security of our continent 45. For U. J. Ogwu, "the African
Union is not only new; it is different from the OAU. No doubt it emanated
from the OAU, but it is informed by the lessons learnt from the OAU, the
increased marginalization of Africa in the post-Cold War world, and the need
to overcome the multiple crises confronting Africa through unity, 'integration
and development 46.
The succeeding chapters shall examine how the `new' African Union has
been handling political and socio-economic problems in Africa.
45
ENDNOTES
1. D. L. Sills (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. 3 (New
York: Collier & Macmillan and the Free Pres, 1968), p. 522. See also E. B.
Hass, The Century of Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 16.
2. L. N. Lindbert, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 6.
46
47
32.Ibid., p. 6.
33.Ibid., p. 395.
34.Ibid., p. 14.
3 5. Agubuzu, From the OA U to AU.- The Challenges of African Unity
and Development in the Twenty-fist Century, p. 26.
36. Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OA U,
p.64.
37.Ibid.
3 8. Amate, Inside the OA U - Pan-Africanism in Practice, p. 431.
49
50
CHAPTER THREE
AFRICAN UNION AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS
Greater African integration has long been a cherished but elusive goal.
Political leaders at official conferences and formal summits have long promoted
the idea, although with only limited results on the ground. There is a renewed
impetus to establish closer economic and political ties among the continents
numerous countries, based on a heightened appreciation of the need for regional
integration and a clearer understanding of the past failures.
51
The flame of unity and freedom lit in the sixties has continued to glow,
though dimly, to illuminate the path of the transition from the OAU to the African
Union (AU). The AU is not a child of an impetuous inspiration but the offspring of
a gradual but dedicated progression towards ideals and commitments. The
continent has remained in dire need of solutions to its critical problems and it is
this very condition that propels the need for change and progress.
When, in the 1990s, the notion of a Pan-African Union was born again, it
was the liberation of South Africa from apartheid that helped it back to life.
Equally, there is the argument that the main influence propelling Africans towards
greater economic and political unity is globalization. Faced with a trading system
which insists on transnational capital having carte blanche, Africans became
increasingly aware that they would have to stand together if they were to defend or
advance their own cause. But even as they favoured unity in principle, they could
not necessarily agree on how closely united they should be and what forms their
unity should take.
Several years ago the OAU Summit had set up a 14-member committee to
review its charter. By 1996 when the Yaounde Declaration was issued, the Charter
Review Committee had held six sessions and had submitted, on an annual basis,
reports to the OAU summit. As Jackie Cilliers notes, not dissimilar to the impasse
52
within which the UN finds itself, the review of the OAU Charter remained the
captive of the competing national interests of a number of member states.
However, for a number of important countries, such as South Africa, the initiative
towards the establishment of the AU provided a way out of this impasse.
A major problem, indicative of the ideological divide of the 1960s, was the
vision of a single federal African states that inspired leaders like Moammar
Gaddafi, a vision which many of the states did not share but which they were
hesitant of criticizing. The Libyan initiative, it was interpreted, was intended to
enable the North African leader to break out of the prolonged diplomatic isolation
brought about by its poor relations with the US, the UK and some of the Arab
States. Notwithstanding the misgivings, the declaration adopted by the 4th Extraordinary Summit of the OAU held in Sirte, Libya, in September 1999 set the fast
track to the Constitutive Act of the AU that emerged. In July 2000, African Heads
of state met in Lom, Togo for the 36th Ordinary Summit of the OAU. At the end
of that Summit they came out with a Draft Treaty for an African Union which
would replace the OAU. Incidentally, that came a hundred years after the first-ever
Pan-African Conference was held in London.
The OAU Lusaka Summit meeting of July 2001 mandated the SecretaryGeneral to proceed, in consultation with member states, with a process to work out
the rules of procedure to launch the key structures within the AU; such as the
53
implement, monitor or advance these lofty ideals. It is recalled that in the OAU
Charter, Article 3(2) on non-interference in the internal affairs of member states led
to serious drawbacks and had negative implications for the activities of the
organization for several decades. In this period, ruthless, corrupt and
unaccountable leaders emerged across the continent, without African states or
leaders confronting them. Along with other factors, it led OAU to degenerate into
what the Kenyan statesman, Oginga Odinga, called a Trade Union of African
Heads of State.6
In the same vein, Article 30 states that governments that come to power in
future through unconstitutional means will not be allowed to participate in the
activities of the Union. Jackie Cilliers believes that the Act does not incorporate
extensive principles for democratic governance, the definition of unconstitutional
changes, or the measures that the AU would take in response to such
developments.7 These apparent contradictions, admittedly, provide an example of
the ambivalent attitude of African states towards the sensitive issue of national
sovereignty. It strengthens the impression that the AU amounts to merely giving
the OAU a fresh coat of paint without the inner structures undergoing any
renovations.8
This paper, without lapsing into unprofitable pessimism, notes that the AU
project is going to be a much more expensive undertaking than the regular amount
58
of $31 million annual budget of the OAU. Quite clearly, much thought needs to be
devoted to how the union will be funded, especially the Pan-African Parliament.
The doubts emerge against the background of the fact that by mid 2000, only 17 of
the 53 member states of the OAU were up to date in the settlement of their
financial obligations to the regular budget.9 The question is how will the additional
obligations be met, against the background of the near permanent poor showing of
African economies.
Similarly, the overlapping membership of several regional grouping with
duplicating mandates and structures leading to inadequate financing of the
integration process, poses a serious threat to continental union. Ironically, African
leaders refer to their sub-regional efforts regarding security arrangements, but they
are not ready openly to chastise their colleagues for undemocratic tendencies in
their sub-regions.
Some of the noticeable habits of the African leaders which have not altered
dramatically over the decades are obstacles to any genuine union on the continent.
These include a penchant for luxury items like expensive official vehicles,
presidential jets and the expending of inordinate amounts on running public
offices, foreign travel and diplomatic representation which cannot be sustained,
instead of engaging in pooling or coordinating representation; military spending in
excess of two percent of the GNP (any success achieved in reducing military
59
conflict
to
deal
with.10 Since
no
war
leaves
the
60
The
policies
regional
of
agreements
liberalization,
63
into
national
privatization
and
imposed
through
structural
adjustment
been
institutionalized
within
the
WTO
through
rules,
without
regard
to
regional
considerations. 18
precedence
over
preoccupations.20
sub-regional
integration
ENDNOTES
1. Jackie Cilliers, Towards the African Union, African Security Review,vol. 10,
No., 2, 2001, pp. 115-119.
2. Sule Lamido on Nigeria has no Reservation on African Union, ThisDay,
(Lagos) April 8, 2001, p. 21.
3. Jackie Cilliers, From Acronym to Action: The Seminal Assembly of the
African Union in African Security Review, vol. II, No. 1, 2002,p. 97-102.
4. See Cameroon Duodu, Give Unity a Chance, News African Magazine, July 29,
2002, pp. 20- 21.
5. See Konstanz Mulikita, The UN Security Council and the OAU: Conflict or
66
Agents
recognised
the
failure
of
Structural
CHAPTER FOUR
AFRICAN UNION AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
68
Africa have come to realise that the economic power of nations has become
by far the most dominant factor in the relevance and importance of countries in the
emerging global order. This is why even the major world powers are continuously
striving to widen and strengthen the base of their economic strength, through a
conscious effort to expand their economic space and market size. In the case of
Africa, a continent which has been marginalized for too long a time in the world
economy, integration is no longer a matter of convenience, but an indispensable
strategy for survival and development.1
The pace of globalisation, coupled with the sweeping wave of economic
liberalization, and with the imbalances in the distribution of the benefits in favor of
the strong economies, has increased the urgency for African countries to join hands
to expand, fortify, solidify and integrate their economic space, to serve as a
platform for take off and effective integration into the global economy. Regional
69
75
What the foregoing suggests is that regional integration is indispensable for Africa
to achieve meaningful economic growth and development. This is the crux of the
challenge before the nascent AU. In fact, according to New African, the aim of the
AU is to bring the deepest possible integration of the continent socially,
economically, militarily, culturally and politically.16 Specifically, the objective of
the AU, as contained in Article 3 (c) of the Constitutive Act is to accelerate the
political and socio- economic integration of the continent. In achieving the
76
77
exports from Tunisia and Cameroon often find their way to French warehouses
before being redirected to each others market shelves.22
Another challenge the AU has to contend with in its effort to promote
regional integration in Africa is the low level or inadequate/inefficient
infrastructures, especially transport and communications, in Africa. In the area of
communications: Africa has the lowest telephone density in the world yet the
highest telephone charges, and three times the rate of faults per line as in other
developing regions.23 According to a World Bank report: For every 100 people in
Africa, there are 1.2 telephone lines the lowest rate in the world. 24 The report
further adds that: Telephone calls between African countries can be 50 100
times more expensive than they are within North America.25
On transportation, the World Bank report notes that freight costs for
imports to landlocked African countries are more than twice as high as in Asia. 26
The report is right, albeit worrisome, when one considers the fact that to ship a car
from Tokyo, Japan, to Abidjan, Cote d Ivoire costs $1,500, while shipping the
same car from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to Abidjan costs up to $5,000.27 Travelling
from one African country to another usually meant first via Geneva or Paris. 28 As
Ernest Harsch points out: African businessmen frequently need to wait 6 8
weeks to get visas to visit other African countries while citizens of the UK or
France can travel to many African countries and obtain visa on arrival.29
78
79
African countries belong to more than one of these RECs, 27 countries belong to
two, 18 belong to three and one country belong to four.35
In addition to the sub-regional RECs, there are well over 100 other
multinational or bilateral groups devoted to fostering cooperation around specific
activities, such as telecommunications, aviation, maritime transport, banking, river
management, agriculture, energy and others.36 Two prominent examples in these
regard are the Arab League and the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC). According to P.O.M. Njemanze,
The membership of the Arab League is working against the
economic integration of Africa. This is because the Arab world,
which includes African countries north of the Sahara desert, is
united in the promotion of the interests of the Arabs worldwide.
The interests of the Arab League do not always agree with that of
African countries south of the sahara.37
81
ENDNOTES
1 Abraham, K. 2000. The Challenges and Prospects of Pan-African Economic
Integration. Paper presrnted at the conference on Economic Integration
and Transboundary Resources Organised by the Ethiopian International
Institute for Peace and Development (EIIPD), June, Addis Ababa
2 Ibid
3 OAU. 2001. African Union and Continental Stability M Document
82
www.allafrican.com
4 NEPAD. 2001. The New Partnership for African Development Document.
www,nepad.org
5 Babarinde, O.A. 1996. Analyzing the Proposed African Economic Community:
Lessons from the Experience of the European Union, Prepared for the Third
ECSA-World Conference on The European Union in a Changing World,
Sponsored by the European Commission, D-G X, Brussels, Belgium, 19-20
September, 1996.
6 Omoweh, A.D. 2003. Re-thinking Integration in Africa. Journal for Diplomacy
and Foreign Relations, 13(1): 34-42
7. John T. Rourke, International Politics on the World Stage (Guild ford,
Connecticut: Dushkin Publishing Group/Brown & Benchmark Publishers,
1995), p.569.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. See Africa Recovery Vol. 16 Nos. 2-3. September, 2002, p. 18.
12. The Courier: The Magazine of ACP-EU Development Cooperation. No. 188,
Setember-October 2001, p.75.
13. See UN Secretary General, Kofi Annas message to the 9th Summit of the
83
35. Ibid.
CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION
In the foregoing presentation, we have traced the genesis
and reasons for the emergence of regional blocs, especially in
Africa. The main reason being that Africa wanted to be an active
player in the global economy. The discussion also notes that
because the OAU failed to facilitate meaningful growth and
development in Africa, aside other factors, it metamorphosed into
86
the AU. The study examines the problems the AU will contend
with in its efforts to integrate African economies and proffers
solutions.
It has been stated that there has been a consensus that the aim of the AU
would be to consolidate the gains made by the OAU in its years of existence and to
advance the cause of collective action in African affairs. This paper however
acknowledges that against the backdrop of the OAUs history and the general
African condition, the new Union project fits into a prevailing condition which
does not portend radical transformation due to internal and external constraints.
New institutions and frameworks, themselves, will do little to rectify the situation
described in the Yaounde Declaration of 1996 on Africa:
At the close of the 20th century of all the regions of the world,
Africa is indeed the most backward in terms of development from
whatever angle it is viewed, and the most vulnerable as far as
security and stability are concerned.1
Although this paper in conclusion would rather err on the side of hope than
of despair, unity may not make Africa suddenly rich but it can make it difficult for
Africa to be disregarded and humiliated. Perhaps marginalization, so often decried,
is what Africa needs right now. For one thing, it will help the evolution of an
endogenous development agenda, an agenda that expresses the aspirations of the
people and can therefore elicit their support. The AU may clearly be more than old
wine in new bottles in the sense that it offers at least a new approach to Africas
87
collective efforts, but, given the continued existence of old political structures
which will shape political will, the Union might well be new wine in an old bottle.
However, the fundamental issue is really not that of recounting the benefits
but that of developing the political will among African statesmen and their
readiness to bear the costs that is required to produce and sustain an effective
union. This demands equitable burden-sharing in matters affecting the continent
and the administration of the Union. It also requires an appropriate institutional
framework with sufficient authority and capacity for implementing decisions. The
creation of the necessary democratic environment rather than mere summit
diplomatic rhetoric and the involvement of civil society in order to ensure the
building of integrated production capacities are indispensable requirements for a
solid union.
The success of the AU would require mature African statesmanship that
strikes a balance between the desires of member states to pursue their individual
interests, and the political will to forgo certain aspects of national sovereignty and
independence for the common good of the continent. African states, marginalized
by economic globalization and under severe strains from poverty, war and other
forms of degradation, cannot afford to be half-hearted in their pursuit of regional
cooperation. Otherwise, it is difficult to see how they can survive on their own in a
highly competitive global economy in the present world order.
88
Recommendations
Having identified the problems militating against economic
integration of Africa, which the AU must contend with, the
following
strategies
for
promoting
regional
integration
are
Furthermore,
since
it
has
been
identified
that
the
of
Africans
living
abroad,
corporate
taxation,
parts of the world clearly indicate that they have been facilitated
by the democratic system of government in place in those
regions. It is heartening to know that the wind of democratisation
and political reform currently blowing across regions of the world
has not excluded Africa. A period of transition from authoritarian
regimes to popular democracies is now being witnessed in many
African countries. The mutual respect and truth expected to be
fully
restored
fundamental
by
ways
the
nascent
facilitates
democratic
regional
leaders
cooperation
will
and
in
by
ENDNOTES
1 Accelerating the Pace of Regional Integration in Africa: The
Challenges
Ahead.
Opening
address
by
K.Y.
Amoako,
Executive
94
331,9
http://www..orgNews/Docs/2001/sgsm
884.doc.htm
95
July,
2001,
96
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