WP Sec B

SIMATIC
Security concept
PCS 7 and WinCC - Basic document
Whitepaper
Preface
Aim of the security concept
References
Definitions
Strategies of the security

concept
Implementing the security

strategies in security
solutions
Appendix
04/2008
A5E02128732-01
Safety instructions
This manual contains instructions intended to ensure personal safety, as well as to protect equipment against
damage. Instructions relating to your personal safety are indicated by a warning triangle, which does not appear
with instructions solely relating to material damage. Warning notices appear as shown below, in descending order
of hazard priority.
DANGER
indicates that death or severe personal injury will result if proper precautions are not taken.
WARNING
indicates that death or severe personal injury may result if proper precautions are not taken.
CAUTION
with a warning triangle indicates that minor personal injury may result if proper precautions are not taken.
CAUTION
without a warning triangle indicates that property damage may result if proper precautions are not taken.
NOTICE
indicates that an unwanted result or state may occur if the relevant instruction is not observed.
If several hazard levels are applicable, the warning notice corresponding to the highest level is always used. If a
warning notice with a warning triangle relates to the risk of personal injury, a warning relating to material damage
may also be added to that same warning notice.
Qualified Personnel
The equipment/system to which this documentation applies must always be set up and operated in accordance
with this manual. Commissioning and operation of a device/system may only be performed by qualified personnel.
Qualified personnel, as used in the safety-related information in this documentation, is defined as persons who
are authorized to commission, to ground, and to tag equipment, systems and circuits in accordance with
established safety practices and standards.
Correct Usage
Note the following:
WARNING
The equipment may only be used for the applications described in the catalog and the technical description, and
only in conjunction with equipment or components from other manufacturers which have been approved or
recommended by Siemens. This product can only function correctly and safely if it is transported, stored,
assembled, and installed correctly, and operated and maintained as recommended.
Trademarks
All product names marked with the copyright symbol are trademarks of Siemens AG. Other product names in
this document may be trademarks and third parties using these names for their own purposes may infringe upon
the rights of the trademark owners.
Disclaimer of Liability
We have checked the content of this manual for agreement with the hardware and software described. Since
deviations cannot be precluded entirely, we cannot guarantee full agreement. The information in this manual is
reviewed regularly and any necessary corrections will be included in subsequent editions.
Siemens AG
Automation and Drives
P.O. Box 48 48
90327 NUREMBERG
GERMANY
Document order number: A5E02128732-01

04/2008
Copyright Siemens AG 2008.

Modifications reserved
Contents
1
Preface ...................................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1
Validity............................................................................................................................................5
1.2
Structure and organization of the document..................................................................................5
1.3
Required knowledge ......................................................................................................................6
1.4
Employed products ........................................................................................................................7
Aim of the security concept........................................................................................................................ 9
References .............................................................................................................................................. 11
Definitions................................................................................................................................................ 13
4.1
Designations, terms and abbreviations........................................................................................13
4.2
Name conventions in figures and examples ................................................................................20
Strategies of the security concept............................................................................................................ 23

5.1
Defense in depth..........................................................................................................................25
5.2
Division into security cells ............................................................................................................28
5.3
Role-based access control...........................................................................................................30
5.4
Role-based grouping and management, central and local data storage and configuration ........34
Security concept PCS 7 and WinCC - Basic document

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Contents
Implementing the security strategies in security solutions........................................................................ 35

6.1
6.1.1
6.1.2
6.1.3
6.1.4
Security cells and network architecture .......................................................................................39

High security large plants.............................................................................................................41
Secure plants ...............................................................................................................................44
Secure small plant .......................................................................................................................47
Secure security cells connection..................................................................................................49
6.2
6.2.1
6.2.2
6.2.3
6.2.4
6.2.5
Secure access techniques ...........................................................................................................52

Secure Web publishing ................................................................................................................53
Secure integration of manufacturing control ................................................................................54
Protected service access .............................................................................................................55
Protected remote control through remote process control computer and remote engineering ...58
Secure integrated systems ..........................................................................................................59
6.3
Hardening.....................................................................................................................................60
6.4
6.4.1
6.4.2
6.4.3
Management and configuration ...................................................................................................62

Managing computers and users...................................................................................................62
Managing networks and network services...................................................................................64
Managing role-based operator control permissions.....................................................................66
6.5
Patch management and security updates ...................................................................................70
6.6
Virus scanners .............................................................................................................................73
6.7
Logging, audit, maintenance and asset management.................................................................76
6.8
Security tests................................................................................................................................77
Appendix.................................................................................................................................................. 81

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Preface
1.1
Validity
"Security Concept PCS 7 and WinCC" incrementally replaces prior documents and
recommendations "Security Concept PCS 7" und "Security Concept WinCC", both in Version
1, and is valid as of WinCC V6.2 and PCS 7 V7.0 or later.
"Security Concept PCS 7 and WinCC" should be considered a set of recommendations and
is intended to support SIMATIC customers in creating a secure network for production
plants. The recommendations are based on the latest technology, current standards and the
features of the employed products.
1.2
Structure and organization of the document

"Security Concept PCS 7 and WinCC" is a document collection of requirements and
recommendations consisting of several parts:
The basic document is a central guide and provides an overview of the document
collection.
This document is the basic document. It describes the general principles of the security
concept and potential approaches for solutions. The basic document should be considered a
single entity. All additional detail documents assume the reader has read the basic
document. The following list shows the structure of the basic document:
Sections 1-4: Required information for understanding the security concept
Section 5: Security strategies and their basic principles
Section 6: Implementation of the security strategies for security solutions and references
to specialized detail documents
The detail documents explore specific solutions and their recommended

configuration in detailed form, always focusing on a particular topic or product.
In the detail documents you can find detailed recommendations on important security topics,
which should facilitate the implementation of the principles and solution approaches
presented in the basic document.
These detail documents are supplemented, updated and published separately to ensure they
are always up to date.
You can find information on the "Security Concept PCS 7 and WinCC" document collection
in the Internet at the following
address:http://support.automation.siemens.com/WW/view/de/28580051
http://support.automation.siemens.com/WW/view/en/28580051

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Preface
1.3
Required knowledge
This document collection is aimed at anyone involved in configuring, commissioning and
operating automated systems based on Siemens SIMATIC PCS 7 and SIMATIC WinCC.
The basic document can also be used as an overview for decision makers or as an
introduction to the topic.
The following knowledge is required for the implementation of the detail documents:
Management of IT typical in the office environment
Configuration of the employed SIMATIC products
Configuration of the employed products from third parties.

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Preface
1.4
Employed products
The following products, product versions and add-ons are used in the solution approaches
described in this document collection:
"Microsoft Windows Server 2003" (with SP1 or later) as the basic operating system for
server functions such as: Process control stations (e.g. OS server), operator control and
monitoring stations (e.g. WinCC server), Terminal Service, Active Directory domain
controller, name services (e.g. DNS, WINS), network services (e.g. Virtual Private
Networks, Routing and Remote Access, Radius, Firewall), infrastructure services (e.g.
certification bodies, Windows Software Update Services), and Web services.
"Microsoft Windows XP" (with SP2 or later) as the basic operating system for client
functions such as: Process control stations (e.g. OS client), operator control and
monitoring stations (e.g. WinCC client), Terminal Service client, VPN client, Web client
and firewall client.
"Microsoft Internet Security and Acceleration (MS ISA) Server 2006" as the main
firewall system and access point to the production networks from office or intranet
networks.
"Siemens SIMATIC PCS 7 V7.0" (and later) as a special hardened process control
system and "Siemens SIMATIC WinCC V6.2" (and later) as a special hardened process
visualization system (operator control & monitoring system), both installed on the abovementioned Microsoft Windows Server 2003 or Microsoft Windows XP operating
systems.
"Siemens SIMATIC Logon Service" in a Windows domain environment as a combination

secure authentication, fail-safe centralized logon and centralized user and operator
management or as logon server in Windows workgroups for combining centralized logon
and centralized user and operator management.
"SIMATIC PCS 7 OS Web Server und Client", "SIMATIC WinCC Webnavigator Server
and Client" and "SIMATIC DataMonitor Server und Clients", each used as a dedicated
Web server, offer secure publishing via the MS ISA server as access point.
"SIMATIC SCALANCE S" and "SIMATIC SCALANCE X" product families as security
modules and network peripherals for robust Industrial Ethernet with increased
availability, especially suited for use in industrial environments.
Additional products, product versions and options may also be used, as explained in the
individual detail reports.
The selection of the "Microsoft Internet Security and Acceleration (MS ISA) Server 2006"
as the main firewall system and access point for the production networks is in part based on
the long-term, close and successful cooperation between Microsoft und Siemens in software
development.
The Microsoft Corp. has also been positioned in the Gardner Inc. report, "Visionaries of the
SSL VPN Magic Quadrant". This report evaluates Microsofts Internet Security and
Acceleration Server (ISA Server) and the Microsoft developed Virtual Private Network, which
is based on the Secure Sockets Layer Protocol (Microsoft: secure sockets layer virtual
private network (SSL VPN) )" server, both summarized in the "Intelligent Application
Gateway (IAG)".
Microsofts ISA Server offers a centralized and consolidated appliance for network perimeter
defense, remote access, endpoint security and application-layer protection.

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Preface

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The highest priority in automation is the unconditional maintenance of control over
production and process by the operating personnel, even in the event of security threats.
Preventing or limiting the spread of a security threat for plants and networks should occur
while maintaining full operator control and monitoring of production and process.
The "Security Concept PCS 7 and WinCC" is intended to ensure that only authenticated
users can perform authorized (permitted) operations through operating option assigned to
them for authenticated devices. These operations should only be performed via defined and
planned access routes to ensure safe production or coordination of a job without danger to
humans, the environment, product, goods to be coordinated and the business of the
enterprise.
The "Security Concept PCS 7 and WinCC" therefore recommends the use of the latest
available security mechanisms. This means selecting all solutions and configurations so that
the plant manager uses all currently available security mechanisms and technologies, as
well as products from Siemens and third parties if they are required to achieve the highest
possible security of his plant. Depending on the security needs of the plant manager, the
responsibilities involved or existing implemented security mechanisms, the configurations
presented here can be implemented and scaled as shown or in adapted form. However, this
should be carefully planned in each individual case by all involved technicians, specialists,
administrators and officers. To achieve the highest possible security, adapted configurations
should never contradict the basic principles of this security concept.
This document collection is intended to facilitate the cooperation of network administrators of
company networks (IT administrators) and automation networks (automation engineers),
allowing the exploitation of the advantages provided by the networking of process control
technology and the data processing of other production levels without increasing security
risks at either end.
This document collection should be considered a set of recommendations and is intended to
support SIMATIC customers in creating a secure network for production plants. The
recommendations are based on the latest technology, current standards and the features of
the employed products.

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References
The following internationally recognized norms and standards are observed to ensure that
this document collection is future-proof and includes third parties and their products in the
security concept:
ISA - Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society
ISA-95 "Enterprise Control System Integration"

-
Part 1: "Models and Terminology"
Part 2: "Object Model Attributes"
Part 3: "Models of Manufacturing Operations Management "
ISA-99 "Security Guidelines and User Resources for Industrial Automation and Control
Systems"
-
Part 1: "Concepts, Terminology and Models"
Part 2: "Establishing an Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security

Program"
Part 3: "Operating an Industrial Automation and Control System Security Program"
Part 4: "Specific Security Requirements for Industrial Automation and Control

Systems"
TR-99.00.01-2004 "Security Technologies for Manufacturing and Control Systems"
TR-99.00.02-2004 "Integrating Electronic Security into the Manufacturing and

Control Systems Environment"

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References
ISO/IEC - International Organization for Standardization / International Engineering Consortium
15408 "Information Technology Security-Techniques Common Criteria for

Information Technology Security Evaluation"
17799 "Code of practice for information security management"
27001 "Information security management systems Requirements"
62443 "Security for Industrial Process Measurement and Control Network and System"
61784-4 "Profile for Secure Data Communication in Industrial Networks"
NAMUR - International User Association of Automation Technology in Process Industries
NA 67 "Information Protection for Process Control Systems (PCS)"
NA 103 "Usage of Internet Technologies in Process Automation"
NA 115 "IT-Security for Industrial Automation Systems:"
FDA - Food Drug Administration
FDA 21 CFR 11 "Electronic Records; Electronic Signatures"
Additional future-proof measures are:
12
Close consultation on the security needs of customers and plant managers (for example,
through the PCS User Club or selected security-critical references plants and reference
customers)
Cooperation with independent institutions and organizations (for example, OPC

Foundation, ISA, ISCI, ARC, OMAC, MsMUG, PCSF, PCSRF)
Close interaction with other manufacturers and suppliers (Microsoft, for example).

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Definitions
This section defines designations, terms and abbreviations as they are used in this
document collection.
Some terms from previous documents require updating due to work in the field of
standardization and the need to present SIMATIC customers this document collection with a
uniform, internationally recognized terminology and set of concepts.
Most designations, terms and abbreviations are taken from internationally recognized
standards (e.g. ISA-95, ISA-99) or the latest documentation of the respective manufactures
(see source information).
4.1
Designations, terms and abbreviations
Plant, automation plant

A production or manufacturing system (including all distributed I/O, sensors, actuators,
drives, network and software components, buildings, control cabinets, cabling, operating and
administration personnel) consisting of networked process control, process visualization,
automation and engineering systems
Plant PC, plant computer

A computer located in the plant manager's area of responsibility and managed there.
Plant administrator
A plant administrator is a user in a network who manages the plant PCs in the plant
manager's area of responsibility. The plant administrator is not necessarily an operator.
User:
(ISA-99): "A person or part of an organization or automatic process accessing a system with
or without access permission."
A real or virtual person who is logged on (for example, the user logged on to the desktop of
the respective operating system or an automatic desktop logon).

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Definitions
Operator, plant operator

An operator (or plant operator) is a real person logged on to the automation plant. This
person is trained and authorized to operate this plant (for example, the operator logged on in
PCS 7).
Computer name
The computer name is one way of identifying a computer in the network. It corresponds to
the host part of the FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name), if a DNS assignment has been
made (DNS suffix assignment). The computer name may match the NetBIOS name of the
computer, if the computer name does not exceed 15 characters and both names have not
been intentionally selected to differ.
DCS, distributed control system

(ISA-99): "A type of control system in which the system elements are distributed but
operated as coupled. In general, the time constants of the coupling are substantially less
than those for SCADA systems.
Note:
Distributed process control systems are usually used in the context of continuous processes,
such as the generation of electrical energy, refining of oil and gas, production of chemicals or
pharmaceuticals and manufacture of paper; they are also used in discrete processes such
as manufacturing, packaging and warehousing of automobiles and other goods."
Domain
(ISA-99): "Environment or context which is defined by a security policy, security model or
security architecture and includes a group of system resources as well as the corresponding
group of system entities that have permission to access these resources."
(Windows): Logical group of computers on which a version of the Microsoft Windows
operating system is run and which uses a central, common directory database (referred to as
Active Directory as of Windows 2000). The Active Directory contains the user accounts and
security information for the resources in this domain. Each person who uses the computers
within a domain is assigned a unique user account or unique user name. This account can
be assigned access permissions to resources within the domain.
(Windows): A model for managing local Windows networks, corresponds to a local security
zone with centralized management of resources and represents an administrative border.
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Definitions
Domain controller (DC)

(Windows): A domain contains the directory of computers that are configured as "domain
controllers". A domain controller is a server that manages all security-related aspects of the
individual users and domain interactions. The security services and administration services
are centrally managed on this server.
(Windows): A domain controller is a server for centralized authentication and authorization of
computers and users in a computer network.
Firewall
(ISA-99): "Belongs to the connection between networks and restricts data traffic between
connected networks.
Note:
A firewall can be either an application, which is installed for general purposes on an
appropriate computer, or a dedicated platform (appliance), which forwards or discards
packets in a network. The firewall typically serves to define zone borders. A firewall usually
works with restriction rules, which allow only specific ports to be opened."
Firewall types
Serve to better distinguish tasks and application locations in this document collection:
Front-end firewall
A front-end firewall protects the perimeter. Only uniquely identified, real persons have
access via verifiable communication (application filter). Uniquely identified and trusted
devices may be permitted access (e.g. via IPSec) by declaring exceptions.
Back-end firewall
A back-end firewall protects the PCN production network from the perimeter and other
trusted networks (e.g. MON). The back-end firewall must be realized as a performancebased solution for uniquely identified, trusted devices.
Three-homed firewall
A three-homed firewall is a combination front-end and back-end firewall, with a separate
"minimal perimeter" for scalable security solutions.
Access point firewall

(Special case) An access point firewall is exclusively used for maintenance tasks,
permitting access to a security cell, which otherwise would require no connection (e.g. to
MES).

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Definitions
Control center;
(ISA-99): "Central location at which a group of resources are operated.
Note:
In an industrial infrastructure, one or more control centers usually serve to monitor and
coordinate operating procedures. These are usually connected via a WAN (Wide Area
Network) in complex plants with several control centers, for example, a fail-safe control
center at another location. A control center contains the SCADA host computer and
associated display device for operators, as well as supporting information systems, such as
an archive server."
Network names
Network names facilitate the assignment of groups of networked systems with similar areas
of application in this document collection, e.g.:
16
ECN - Enterprise Control (Systems) Networks

Designation for a network as component of a security cell or security zone, which
contains the ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning) system. This is usually the same
network cloud as the so-called office network.
MON Manufacturing Operations Network

Designation for a network as component of a security cell or security zone, which
contains the MES (Manufacturing Execution Systems). This is usually the same network
cloud as the so-called office network or a special network or part of a production control
network (PCN). The service personnel also use this network in many cases.
PCN Process Control (Systems) Network

Designation for a network as component of a security cell or security zone of the plant,
which contains the PCS (Process Control Systems), DCS (Distributed Control Systems)
or SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems. This is always a socalled plant, terminal or HMI network. This should be a special and separate network.
The service personnel also use this network in many cases.
CSN Control Systems Network

Designation for a network as component of a security cell or security zone of the plant,
which contains the automation systems. The PCS or DCS or SCADA server systems are
also connected to the CSN to be able to establish contact to the automation systems.
CSN involves the so-called plant network or the so-called plant bus. It should be a
special and separate network that is not used for data communication between
computers and whose bandwidth and availability are reserved for the automation
systems.
FDN Field Device Network

Designation for a network as component of a security cell or security zone of the plant in
which only automation systems and field devices are connected to one another.
Perimeter perimeter network

Designation for a separate and firewall-protected network used for policy-based data
communication by means of perimeter techniques.

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Definitions
Perimeter network, perimeter, demilitarized zone (DMZ)

(ISA-99): "Segment of the perimeter network, which is logically located between internal and
external networks"
Note:
The purpose of the so-called demilitarized zone on the one hand is to enforce the policy of
the internal network for information exchange to the outside world as well as to restrict
access of non-trusted external sources to public information only, and, on the other hand,
thereby shield the internal network from attack from the outside world.
Note: In the context of industrial automation and control systems, "internal network" usually
means the network or segment on which the protective mechanisms primarily concentrate.
For example a process control network is considered an "internal network" if it is connected
to an "external" enterprise network."
Process control network (general)

(ISA-99): "Networks which are normally connected to time-critical equipment for controlling
physical processes (see "Secure network").
NOTE: The process control network can be divided into zones and there may be several
separate process control networks within a company or location".
Process control equipment (general)

(ISA-99):" A category that includes distributed process control systems, programmable logic
controllers, SCADA systems, dedicated consoles for HMI interfaces, as well as sensor
equipment and control instruments in the field or managing and controlling the process.
Note: The term also encompasses Fieldbus networks, in which control logic and control
algorithms are executed on intelligent electronic devices that coordinate their actions".

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Definitions
Industrial automation and control systems (IACS) (general)

(ISA-99): "The term encompasses control systems for use in manufacturing and industrial
process plants and facilities, in building automation, in plants with geographical distributed
operating procedures and those of utility companies (i.e. electricity, gas and water
companies), in production and distribution plants such as pipelines for crude oil as well as
other industrial branches, for example, traffic networks in which processes are automated or
remotely controlled.
(ISA-99): "A combination of personnel, hardware and software, which affects the physical
("Security") and the information technological ("security") secure and reliable performance of
an industrial process or is capable of influencing this performance. These systems include:
Industrial process control systems, e.g. distributed process control systems (DCSs),
programmable logic controllers (PLCs), remote terminal units (RTUs), intelligent
electronic devices, SCADA systems (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition),
networked electronic sensor, control systems, as well as monitoring and diagnostic
systems.
In this context, process control systems demonstrate, regardless if they are physically
separate or in integrated form, basic functions of process control systems as well as
safety-instrumented systems (SIS).
Assigned information systems, for example, systems for advanced or variable

controlling, online optimizer, monitors for permanently installed devices, graphic user
interfaces, process history, MES (Manufacturing Execution Systems) as well as plant
information management systems.
Assigned internal interfaces, network interfaces, machine interfaces or user interfaces

that provide functions for controlling, safety and manufacturing operations for continuous
and batch processes, discrete and other processes".
Remote access
(ISA-99): "Form of access control based on determination of identity, in which the system
entities, identified and subjected to access control, represent function-related positions in an
organization or a process".
Remote client
(ISA-99): "Resource outside the process control network, which is temporarily or
continuously linked to a host computer in the process control network via a communication
connection in order to directly or indirectly access part of the control equipment in the
process control network".
Role-based access control

(ISA-99): "Form of access control based on determination of identity, in which the system
entities, identified and subjected to access control, represent function-related positions in an
organization or a process".
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Definitions
Support PC / PG
Separate mobile support PC of a support employee (e.g. support programming device,
support laptop)
Support station
Stationary support PC, which is either physically located in the plant as an ES in the PCN
and is therefore part of the plant or a remote ES located in a perimeter network / MON and
therefore a trusted, remote plant PC.
Defense in depth
(ISA-99): "Security architecture, which assumes that each point representing a security
measure can be overcome and probably will be overcome.
NOTICE: The concept of defense in depth encompasses a staged or layered structure of
security and identification measures and mechanisms (even on the level of single station
systems). It has the following features:
Attackers must expect to be detected when attempting to penetrate or circumvent the

individual layers.
A vulnerability in one layer of this architecture can be compensated by defense

measures in other layers.
The system security for its own layer structure within the overall hierarchical structure of
the network security".

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Definitions
4.2
Name conventions in figures and examples

Names, designations and symbols are used in the figures and examples to facilitate the use
of this document.
Designations for networks in this document collection

Until now, the bus designation of the individual manufacturer, the name of the employed
medium or a special system feature was typically used to name individual networks.
However, this is no longer sufficient to describe the security cell or automation cell, the area
of responsibility or the security layer / security zone in which this network is available. To
meet the resulting current demands for a uniform naming convention for a variety of
networks, the following network designations are used in this security concept and the
figures it contains.
Figure 4-1
The network designations and the basic colors used (red, yellow, green) in Figure 4-1,
identify the networks, production levels (according to ISA-95) and their security zone
(according to ISA-99). The automation levels (MCS according to ISA-95) in this security
concept are divided into further networks for specific tasks (green, blue, violet). This division
is required by the various requirements for bandwidth, availability, reaction capability and
climatic resistance and safety.
Bus designations such as: Plant bus (for CSN), terminal bus (for PCN), H1 bus, field device
bus, I/O bus etc., as well as previously used network / security level designations such as
ERP network, MES network, DCS network, office network etc., continue to be valid to
describe the medium, the application type or topology.
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Definitions
Demo plant of the examples in this document collection

A concrete demo production plant including a complete network topology (IP addresses,
computer names), associated DNS name spaces and a domain management is described in
the following examples to provide a clear overview. The following designations are used in
the figures as placeholders:
"plant" or "plant1A", "plant1B" are placeholders for specific customer plant names.
"enterprise", "business-unit1", "department2" etc. are placeholders for company names

and the organizational departments and corresponding production areas.
An appendix of this document provides a network overview of the complete plant, the DNS
name space and the domain management forest.
The following division of the DNS name space of the plant facilitates assignment and
simultaneously represents a basic recommendation. The real DNS name space may deviate
from this depending on the number and size of plants and the existing DNS / Active Directory
domain forest. You should always use the following structure when designing networks:
enterprise.com Complete external name space of the company for remote access and
Web publishing in the Internet
enterprise.local Complete internal name space of the company (Intranet)
department1.enterprise.localIntranet name space for the enterprise layer (office

network) of department 1 responsible for production area 1
manufacturing-execution1.production1.enterprise.local Internal name space of the

manufacturing control of plant 1
production1.enterprise.local Complete internal name space of the process control of

plant 1
plant1A.production1.enterprise.local or plant1B. production1.enterprise.local Internal

name space of the process control unit 1A (basically, plant1B for unit 1B etc.)
perimeter1.production1.enterprise.local Internal name space of the perimeter network

of plant 1 (is also used in this way for publishing in the Intranet)
production1.enterprise.comExternal (e.g. in Internet) published name space of the

perimeter network of plant 1

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Definitions
22

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Strategies of the security concept

Targeted protection against each and every current or future threat or method of attack from
the inside or outside is not possible. With that said, this security concept deals with general
defense strategies designed to protect against the following threats:
1. Denial of service
2. Circumvention of specific security mechanisms (such as "Man in the middle")
3. Intentional maloperation through permitted actions (such as password theft)
4. Maloperation through non-configured user rights
5. Data spying (e.g. of recipes and business secrets or operational plans for plants and
their security mechanisms)
6. Manipulation of data (e.g. to downplay the importance of alarms)
7. Deletion of data (e.g. log files to cover up attack activities)
The following defense strategies serve as an overall approach to supplement the required
and desired access types and operator control options with the majority of available security
mechanisms in a multi-level defense (defense in depth) with numerous security layers. The
table provides an overview of the important goals and strategies that are described in the
following sections.
Goals and strategies
Section in Security concept
Comprehensive protection against security

threats through access-based, multi-level
defense.
Defense in depth
Increased availability and proliferation

prevention of security threats through
division into task-based security cells.
Division into security cells
Preventing the misuse of role-based

access control for users, software
components and devices.
Reaction to current and future security

threats with centralized maintenance,
servicing, updating and distributed security
of the employed products with defined
distribution routes.
Role-based grouping and management, central and

local data storage and configuration
Individual security measures (e.g. IP Security or VPN) can be used several times or
simultaneously fulfill various requirements. These security measures are described once for
all situations in common and noted for the given security solution with references to the
command description.
The various security measures and strategies may influence one another for better or worse.
Each case requires that a correct balance be found for availability, security, comfort and
performance. If there is a conflict in this regard in one of the described security solutions, it
will be noted.

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The main aim of the following descriptions for the individual security strategies and their
implementation in a system is to support the plant designer and operator in assembling the
latest security measures so that future security measures can be specifically and efficiently
supplemented.
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5.1
Defense in depth
From the point of view of the plant manager, secure access to the components of his plant
should allow him to perform regularly occurring tasks. This access is realized through a
variety of components and mechanism of process control and process visualization. The
risks associated with such access differ. These access actions are classified more exactly as
"access types" from the customer's point of view in the following.
Figure 5-1
The defense in depth strategy in this documentation is not a simple list of the security
measures used in process control engineering, for example, encryption, authentication,
authorization etc.; it is a description of practical application of these security measures in the
various "layers of protection", exactly adapted to the "types of access" from the customer's
point of view and shown in overview in Figure 5-1.

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Access is only allowed from specifically authenticated network devices and by authorized
users. "Data exchange" and "realtime controlling" in this overview represent the IT
connection among the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems on the business layer,
the Manufacturing Execution Systems (MES) for manufacturing control and the
Manufacturing Control System (MCS) of the automation layer. Servicing and upkeep of the
various systems is summarized as "maintenance", for example, regular installation of
security updates or the collection and analysis of diagnostics and log files. "Support"
represents required remote access for updating, upgrading or trouble-shooting the employed
systems.
Examples of access types
Data exchange / information exchange: Data and information exchange between various
production levels, neighboring plants, onshore/offshore components, automation and
security cells.
Realtime controlling / remote controlling: Control or remote support of onshore to

offshore or different plants or between the remote control center and the plant.
Maintenance: Normal monitoring and archiving of diagnostic information, data backups,

updates or fine tuning of configurations).
Support: All engineering activities, upgrades or changes of the process control system,
as well as error diagnostics and correction.
The overview of Figure 5-1 refers to a "realtime data" access type, which represents a
combination of "data exchange" and "realtime controlling". This combination access type
usually results from the employed access method or the bundling of several functions by the
plant manager. From a security point of view, however, this mixed access type should be
avoided, since the security measures used are too different and compromise solutions often
mean increased risk.
Planning the plant or plant migration involves consulting with the plant manager and, based
on the required access types, deciding which of the following security mechanisms and
security layers need to be implemented:
1. Physical protection (i.e. control of the physical access to spatial areas, building,
individual rooms, cabinets, devices, resources, cables and wiring) -> must be aimed at
security cells and responsible persons. It is also important to realize physical protection
at remote single station systems.
2. Single access point to each security cell (should be a firewall system) for the
authentication of users, employed devices and applications, for the direction-based
access control and the assignment of access permissions as well as for detection of
break-in attempts. -> Functions as a main access point to the network of a security cell
und serves as the first point of a control for access rights to networks levels.
3. Perimeter zone techniques should be used. This means in this case the use of data that
is exported and not directly intended for process control, available on a system (data
medium, database) located between the main access point for data (the so-called frontend firewall) and the deeply embedded access point for data (the so-called back-end
firewall) or in the third network segment of a three-homed (located in three networks)
firewall.
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4. Standard application layer filtering techniques should be used (i.e. an access

mechanism that allows each and every command to be checked on the highest level of
analysis for available access rights as well as for malicious or criminal intent (usually
realized for standard Web servers, published by the front-end firewall), and does not
hinder the control of the process if failure occurs).
-
Scanning of incoming viruses (generally corresponding to this technique or part of

this technique) means that all files and readable data entering any systems of the
plant are scanned by the first system, which allows access to the file/data and
reading of the file/data.
5. Certificate-based authenticated and encrypted communication should always be used

when the perimeter zone technique or standard application layer filtering technique are
not available. This can take place using tunneling protocols such as PPTP (Point-ToPoint Tunneling Protocol), L2TP (Layer Two Tunneling Protocol) or IPSec (IP Security)
filtering or even via channels that are also secured by server-based certificates, for
example RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol), a Windows Server 2003 terminal server
securely published via HTTPS or Windows Server 2003 Web server via the firewall using
SSL (Secure Sockets Layer ) technology.
6. Secure authentication and single sign-on should only be used when an Active Directory
domain under Windows provides an advanced function for delegating the authentication
instead of formula-based authentication, for example NTLM V2, Kerberos or a SecurID
card. This provides the network administrator with centralized, time-based and rolebased password policies as well as group-based access right management and a
standardized audit trail. System hardening means firewall protection against access from
any location outside the own security cell, careful prior configuration of access control
lists (ACL) and their access control entries (ACE) to protect all objects accessible via
remote access, for example files, registry entries and applications (DCOM), in addition to
restricting all systems to tasks specifically assigned to them.
7. Security updates (generally corresponding to this technique or part of this technique)
means that system security updates and virus signature updates need to be available
and installed as quickly as possible. Some procedures described in section "Patch
management and security updates" need to be followed to prevent the security update
from interfering in currently running processes.
8. Management of operator control permissions for each Siemens application when
necessary. This is the "last line of defense", also referred to as "role-based access
control". It should be realized or practiced by the plant manager and his operating
personnel. An extreme example for this is the use of the write-protected "PCS 7
Webnavigator" clients or write-protected "WinCC Webnavigator" clients, in which it is
hard-wired that no change can be made to the data of the process control system and
which therefore make them suited for presentation purposes or write-protected
information systems.

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5.2
Division into security cells

The strategy for dividing plants and connected plants into security cells increases the
availability of the overall system. Failures or security threats that result in failure can thereby
be restricted to the immediate vicinity.
During the planning of the security cells, the plant is first divided into process cells and then
into security cells based on the security measures.
Process cells and security cells

Process cells represent specific production-related zones, sections, sub-areas or units and
must fulfill the following conditions:
A process cell must be an autonomous "operational plant or unit", which can run for a
certain period of time without connection to the rest of the plant or plant units, i.e. a
process cell must be and remain independently operational for a time.
All elements that belong to a process cell must be connected directly to one another
(e.g. not via leased lines). Technically, this is a LAN (Local Area Network).
Plant units that cause high network and computer load, e.g. if they have to be connected
from the outside via expensive security mechanisms, should always be integrated
directly in the process cell.
One or more process cells become a security cell when the following conditions are met:
28
Only trusted and authorized persons with appropriate instruction are given access to a
security cell. The following accesses must be strictly controlled:
-
Physical access to the production areas and process control rooms
Operation of the process control system and manual production sections
Access to file system and configuration of the process control stations
Access to computer and control networks, their power supplies and infrastructures
(e.g. network services, domain controllers)
Legitimacy of all access to a security cell must be checked beforehand. This means
persons and devices must be authenticated and authorized, for example.
Every access must be recorded or monitored by an authorized person, e.g. bodily

access, file access, support work etc.

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Summary
The planning of security cells is based on actual areas of responsibility, the separable
process cells, the physical access possibilities and the resulting network design and access
protection.
Operation of individual security cells or segments is enabled by temporary loss of units in the
infrastructure (e.g. network shown in red in Figure 5-2).
This means information and services which is generated on the outside and required within
the security cell must be buffered or substituted within the respective security cell using
suitable measured (e.g.: recipes and material data, network services such as name
resolution, IP address assignment, user authentication).
Figure 5-2
Figure 5-3
The entire system is protected if a security threat occurs within a security cell (e.g. a virus as
shown in red in Figure 5-3). The security threat has no influence on other security cells or
their members. The overall system can continue to be operated while the security threat is
being eliminated.

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5.3

The strategy of role-based access control includes restriction to minimally required rights and
functions for users, operators, devices, network and software components.
Close consultation on the following aspects is required to achieve effective protection with
this strategy without restricting normal activities:
Access control for the respective plant and its area protection
Intended use of individual devices and software components
Organization of the production and its areas of responsibility and thereby for the plant
manager
Administration of the plant
Responsibilities of the operator
This consultation can be based on the production levels and the production process, and this
is described below.
Note: In certain branches (such as oil & gas) or in small plants, the only division to be made
is for local and remote access to a plant, in other words, there is no MES / ERP connection.
Security for simple remote access is described in the section "Secure access techniques".
The organization of the production process (see Figure 5-4) is in many ways based on the
three layers ERP, MES and MCS, which are defined by ISA-95.
Figure 5-4
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The areas of responsibilities for resources (e.g. personnel, material, plants) within a
company is based on the production process and must reflect the relationship to the
respective structures and plant components:
Rights management for users and computer (e.g. using domain management)
Assignments of the plant operator (e.g. through user management in the software of the
process control systems)
Software components (e.g. through local access rights of the software on the computer)
Device
Network (e.g. including the administration of the network and the network access)
In general, there is already an administration for the IT infrastructure and the office computer
(labeled as "Responsible ERP administrator" in Figure 5-5). The separate, specialized
administration for the automation devices and process control plants (labeled as
"Responsible MCS administrator" in Figure 5-5) must also take on the administration of the
production-related computer systems, since the responsibility for the entire production level)
belongs to the production manager and his staff.
Figure 5-5

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To prevent security gaps, the areas of responsibilities need to be exactly delineated,

including the network and administration levels, in consultation with the other production
levels.
Figure 5-6
To realize the area of responsibilities, the network design and the technical options for
controlling the network traffic for the individual networks (shown for example in Figure 5-6
with firewalls and perimeter) must correspond to these areas of responsibilities.
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The administration of users and computers in domains must be adapted to these areas of
responsibilities. Figure 5-7 provides an example of the connection through different types of
trust relationships between administration domains (Windows) of the office IT (ERP layer)
and the production IT (MCS layer). In the figure, the manufacturing control area (MES layer)
does not have its own IT administration; it is managed by either the office IT or production IT
area, depending on where the involved users and computers of a company spend the most
time.
Figure 5-7
The trust relationships between domains facilitate secure, mutual identification of users in
these domains. The trusted users can be given access to the other domains.
The plant manager (production manager) is responsible for the practical restriction of the
process operator control permissions for the individual plant operators. The settings are
made in the process control system or process visualization applications (e.g. via
SIMATIC Logon).
Note
A unauthorized user can change settings of the administrative rights if the plant operator
are set incorrectly on the operating system level.
Each process control station, software component or network hardware should only be able
to perform the tasks locally or in the network as stipulated by the manufacturer. This
restriction reduces the potential for damage due to an "assumed security credential" of a
user or device.

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5.4
Role-based grouping and management, central and local data

storage and configuration
This section describes administrative tasks for servicing, maintenance and updating of a
plant, which need to be specifically planned and ensured due to their strategic importance.
The requirements for servicing, maintenance and updating of a plant are very similar in
regard to the security solutions.
Requirements
All tasks should be always realized and managed from a central location (e.g. backup
server, Windows Update Service server etc.).
All tasks must use the distribution and security routes configured in the given plant (e.g.
network connections, firewall connections etc.).
The grouping of systems with the same settings or functions (e.g. in the Windows
Software Update Service) reduces the susceptibility to error from individual local
configurations.
Critical plant units must be defined and grouped in such a way that these groups can be
edited independent of one another without having to stop the entire plant operation.
The following groups may be created, for example:
-
All master systems of redundant server pairs in a "Master group"
All standby systems in a "Standby group"
Tasks
1. Software updates: Planning and execution of centralized distribution of software
updates e.g. security updates, hotfixes, installations, virus signature updates, upgrades,
project updates etc. from a central location to the individual components to be updated.
2. Software configuration: Planning and execution of centralized system configurations,
e.g. operating system, virus scanner, Windows update etc. from a central configuration
server to the individual systems to be configured.
3. Backup and restore: Planning and execution of local and centralized backup of data,
programs, operating systems etc. with a central storage location and restoring such
backups.
4. Reporting and diagnostics: Planning and execution of centralized backup of local
diagnostics data, log files, reports etc. for centralized reporting of local events.
Any deviations should only be made after consulting with the plant manager.
An example for this is only local storage of data / backup files, since the loss of the local
storage location means that this data would no longer be available.
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Implementing the security strategies in security

solutions
The successful implementation of the security strategies in security solutions for actual
automation plants with SIMATIC PCS 7 and SIMATIC WinCC, can only be achieved with
responsible cooperation of all those involved. This specifically includes:
Manufacturer (development, system test, security test)
Project engineer and integrator (planning, construction, factory acceptance test)
Plant manager (operation and administration)
The strategies and their implementation must be observed and updated throughout the
entire service life of a plant and beyond (beginning at the bid proposal, planning and design,
continuing through the migration and up to the demolition of the plant).
The following aspects enable the security concept described here to reach its full potential in
automation plants:
The use of stabile, fault-tolerant and system-tested SIMATIC products.

These products demonstrate the basic hardening (IP hardening) and predefined security
settings, for example, from the Siemens Security Control (SSC) and have been
especially designed for industrial application.
Configuration that uses the latest technology and standards allows a plant design
adapted to the security demands.
Security solutions can only reach their full potential when the plant and components are
operated carefully and responsibly in accordance with the intended use declared by the
manufacturer.

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Implementing the security strategies in security solutions
The following table provides an exemplary overview of the security solutions recommended
here for implementing the above-mentioned security strategies. These security solutions are
explained in the following sections and described in greater depth in the respective detail
documents. They are intended to provide support to responsible-minded plant managers in
fulfilling their job of improving the security of their automation plants.
Security solutions
Section in Security concept
Secure plant configurations:
High security large plants
Secure plants
Secure small plant
Secure security cells connection
Security cells and network architecture
Secure plants
Secure small plant
Protection of typical access types
Secure access techniques
Prehardened process control engineering
Hardening
Secure configuration of:
Users and computers
Networks and network services
Management and configuration
Managing computers
Managing networks and network services
Managing role-based operator control

permissions
Operator control permissions
Regular updating to close newly discovered

security gaps
Patch management and security updates
Checking incoming files for harmful content
Virus scanners
Recording security-related and process specific

data
Logging, audit, maintenance and asset

management
Regular check and improvement of security

level
Security tests
A basic requirement for each of the following security solutions is the use of reliable network
peripherals.
All security solutions and test configurations in the examples of the document collection are
therefore shown with components of the SCALANCE product family of SIMATIC NET. The
process control network (PCN) and the control system network (CSN) are realized as rings
with fast media redundancy. The increased availability of these networks results from the
very fast reconfiguration time of the network following a fault. This feature of the products
was specially developed for use in industrial environments.
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Figure 6-1 shows an example configuration from the SIMATIC NET product catalog.
Figure 6-1
The connected terminals in Figure 6-1 do not need to immediately break logical
communication connections every time there is a network interruption in the ring. Breaking
the communication connections would result in an uncontrolled runtime process or
emergency stop of the plant. SIMATIC NET uses a special procedure for controlling the
media redundancy to achieve the required, very fast reaction time. The reconfiguration of a
network to a functioning network structures is thereby ensured within fractions of a second.
In a ring of 50 SCALANCE switches, therefore, the reconfiguration of the network following a
fault (such as a wire break or switch failure) is completed in less than 0.3 seconds. The
connected terminals remains unaffected by the change in the network. The control of the
process or application is assured at all times.

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In addition to the realization of fast media redundancy in the ring, SIMATIC NET switches
also offer the required functionality for fast redundant connection of rings or network
segments. Rings or any type of network segment structures can be connected via two
switches.
You can find detailed information on SIMATIC NET as network peripherals at:
http://www.automation.siemens.com/net/index_00.htm
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6.1
Security cells and network architecture
Definition of access points for the security cells

Network access points should fulfill the following basis requirements:
Block prohibited data traffic to the process control and process visualization systems
Enable permitted data traffic and the normal operation of the process control and
process visualization systems
Access points can be:
Front-end firewall
A front-end firewall protects the perimeter and allows access to Web publications of the
perimeter and remote dialing options of the back-end firewall.
Back-end firewall
A back-end firewall protects the PCN production network and allows mainly certificatebased, encrypted and signed access of individual trusted remote stations and trusted
networks (e.g. MON of the MES manufacturing control system) and remote and support
access to the PCN.
Three-homed firewall
A three-homed firewall is a combination front-end and back-end firewall, with a separate
"minimal perimeter" for scalable security solutions.
Access point firewall (special case)

An access point firewall is exclusively used for maintenance tasks, permitting access to
a security cell, which otherwise would require no connection (e.g. to MES).
Back-end router (e.g. SCALANCE S)

A back-end router enables load decoupling with high throughput, usually in combination
with an upstream three-homed firewall.
The security cell and network designs are intended to finely delineate the area of
responsibility of the plant manager (e.g. from the IT administration of the ECN and office
network). This means the plant manager must have explicit administrative rights and
privileges in his security cell. The decision as to which security cell and network designs
should be implemented is generally influenced by the importance and size of the plant, its
spatial division, the determined risk and the available budget. The examples in the following
sections provide an overview.

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39
The following criteria were generally used for selecting and labeling the plant examples:
40
A plant example is referred to as "high security" when it features the highest possible
number of security layers (e.g. the front-end/back-end firewall combination is more
secure than a single firewall, because if the front-end firewall is breached by an attack,
the production-related network is still protected by the back-end firewall).
A plant example is referred to as "secure" when it features basic security mechanisms

(e.g. the perimeter technique of Web publishing instead of direct access to the Web
server).
A plant example is referred to as "large" when it has its own infrastructure (e.g. domain
controller) or is connected to the data processing of the company (e.g. connected to the
MES layer via SIMATIC IT and therefore to SAP).
A plant example is referred to as "normal" (and therefore lacks a special label) when a
classic DCS is installed in it as a multiple station system (without a special infrastructure)
and contains only rudimentary connections or its own MES.
A plant example is referred to as "small" when is mainly a single station system or

multiple station system without connection to other plants or the data processing of the
company.

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6.1.1

A high security large plant is a plant example with its own perimeter and infrastructure, its
own network services and administration, protected service access, protected remote
control, secure Web publishing and protected manufacturing control connection.
Figure 6-2 below is a simplified design of a secure large production plant in which the areas
are color-codes as follows:
The PCN (green network).
The CSN (blue network).
The upstream perimeter network (brown network) belonging to the responsibility area of
the plant, protected by a front-end firewall and back-end firewall.
A trustworthy MON for the manufacturing control system MES (yellow network) can be
operated within the plant.
The office and company network ECN (red network) secures itself optionally via its own
firewall. This is based on the assumption that the access of non trusted computers to the
WAN/Intranet cannot always be controlled. The WAN/Intranet here more or less
represents an example of an open company network.
All three production-related areas (green, yellow, brown) are protected as security cells and
are independently operational for a defined period of time.
The web-based access from the ECN to a Web server of the plant in the perimeter is made
through Web publication of the front-end firewall. User activities can be checked and
recorded there using application filters. The process control Web server (e.g. OS Web
server) in the perimeter fetches its data from the process control servers (e.g. OS server) in
the PCN via a certificate-based, signed connection (IPSec) through the back-end firewall.
The back-end firewall checks if this connection can be authenticated and established by the
two nodes. This ensures high performance and the security that only known and trusted
systems from the perimeter are permitted targeted access to specific systems of the PCN
from the perimeter via the back-end firewall.

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Support and remote access can take place using several access types and routes. Access is
centrally authenticated, authorized and logged through the back-end firewall.
You can find additional information on this in the "Protected service access" section.
Figure 6-2
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Detailed plant description
Process control multiple station system in a security cell (green)
Administration and authentication within the PCN through Active Directory using a
separate, independent PCN domain (production domain)
Important network service are provided within the PCN, for example:
-
Name resolution (WINS, DNS)
Address assignment (DHCP)
Time synchronization (NTP, SNTP)
Remote, trusted clients and server of the process control systems (e.g. Web servers,
MES servers) without direct process interface, are integrated via encrypted or signed
communication in the PCN security cell. The mutual authentication is made through
certificates; the back-end firewall allows for configured IPSec traffic.
The perimeter network contains Web servers. These devices publish process control
data that has been or will be swapped out and functions as an application gateway. The
Web servers provided web-based services such as a certificate authority, security
update service etc..
Non-trusted devices in the ECN office network obtain user-based access to Web-based
publishing of the production plant in the perimeter from front-end firewall through
perimeter techniques. The authentication takes place through a server-end encrypted
connection (HTTPS) using user name and password.
Trusted users from the MES manufacturing control working in the ECN office network,
can be given access to data for selected applications via firewall client software of the
front-end firewall. The use of these applications depends on whether or not an
application can assume the function of the firewall client (Winsock conform and user
context compatible).
Additional information
You can find detailed information on this in the Internet at the following address:

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6.1.2
Secure plants
A secure plant is a plant example with a three-homed firewall and minimal perimeter,
integrated manufacturing control, but without its own infrastructure.
Figure 6-3 below is a simplified design of a secure production plant in which the areas are
color-codes as follows:
The separate "minimal" perimeter network (brown network) belonging to the

responsibility area of the plant, protected by a three-homed firewall.
A trustworthy MON for the manufacturing control system MES (yellow network) can be
operated within the plant.
The office and enterprise network ECN (red network) optionally protects itself with a
separate firewall, in the assumption that the access of trusted computers to
All production-related areas (green, brown) are protected by a common security cell.
The web-based access from the ECN to a Web server in the "minimal" perimeter is made
through Web publication of the three-homed firewall. User activities can be checked and
recorded there using application filters. The Web server of the process control system in the
"minimal" perimeter fetches its data from the servers of the process control system in the
PCN via a certificate-based, signed connection (IPSec) through the three-homed firewall.
This ensures high performance and the security that only known and trusted server are
permitted access to the PCN from the "minimal" perimeter via the three-homed firewall.
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The support and remote access can be made via several access methods and routes, but is
always centrally authenticated and authorized through the three-homed firewall; this is
described in more detail in section "Protected service access".
Figure 6-3

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Detailed plant description
Multiple station system in a security cell (green and brown) with separate "minimal"
perimeter (brown)
Since the perimeter of the enterprise and office network (not shown in the figure) does
not belong to the responsibility of the plant operator and therefore cannot be used as the
DMZ of the plant, plant data to be published is made available via an additional,
separate "minimal" perimeter at the three-homed firewall.
Alternatively, specially hardened systems located in the ECN and under the
responsibility and physical control of the plant operator can be given specific access to
special data and services of the plant.
These systems always represent a special configuration and need to be individually

planned and adapted to the plant. The plant operator must be informed of deviations
from the strategies of this security concept. This information is essential if it restricts the
users' area of responsibility or can be influenced by other administrators.
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6.1.3
Secure small plant

A secure small plant is an example of a security cell connected via an access point firewall to
an external, unprotected network, although all process control functions are implemented
within the security cell. This category includes multiple station systems, those with Web
clients for example, as well as any number of single station systems.
Figure 6-4 below is a simplified design of a secure small production plant in which the areas
are color-codes as follows:
The entire security cell is protected by an access point firewall that belongs to its own
area of responsibility.
The office and enterprise network ECN (red network) optionally protects itself with a
separate firewall, in the assumption that the access of trusted computers to
The production-related area (green) is protected by a security cell.

Note
Systems operated exclusively within a security cell should never be connected to an
external, unprotected network unless it is absolutely necessary. Service access represents
the only exception. In general, one or several single station systems should not be
operated with a direct connection to runtime in an unprotected network (i.e. outside a
security cell), since control of the process is endangered even by a single potential
security threat (too few security layers).

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Figure 6-4
The support and remote access for servicing can be made with a variety of access methods
and access routes, but must always be centrally authenticated and authorized at the
additional firewall (access point firewall) for this security cell.
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6.1.4

The connections between mutually trusted security cells must be made available via
encrypted tunnel communication, such as IPSec or SSL/VPN Tunnel. These security
mechanisms have no influence on other communication within the security cell. The
communication leaving the security cell is encrypted and restricted in its performance.
Notice
All tunnel mechanisms and firewalls are potential "rupture joints" of the network.
For example, the data transmission of a firewall is highly restricted if the firewall goes into a
safe state due to a detected attack. All plant units must be designed in such a way that
enables the plant to remain operational even during a temporary failure of the security cell
connection.

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49
Security cell connections are realized between the following components:
The access points (back-end firewall, three-homed firewall, access point firewall)
The security cell participants (local IPSec filter rules of the individual operating systems)
The security lead gear (SCALANCE S security modules)
Figure 6-5 shows an example of two security cells (production units plant1A and plant1B)
protected by access point firewalls. The cells use a common MES component in the plant1A
unit. Both firewalls allow configured IPSec communication between the MES component and
the stations of the process control system of the second plant1B unit. The MES component
and the participating process control stations are configured for certificate-based IPSec
communication. Communication is established when one of the participating destination IP
addresses is addressed.
Figure 6-5
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Figure 6-6 shows a security cell connection of the CSN implemented for "Industrial Ethernet"
with SCALANCE S security modules. The communication between the automation systems
specially developed for industrial application cannot be tunneled through a conventional IT
firewall. On the one hand, the increased computer load for end-to-end encryption from
automation systems would generally lead to decreased performance, and such an IT firewall
would not sufficiently protect this communication on the other hand, since no filter rules are
available for this. This task is assumed by the specially developed security modules of the
SCALANCE S product series, which enable protected data communication of automation
and process control system between the plant1A and plant1B units (Figure 6-6 below).
Figure 6-6
You can find additional information on the SIMATIC SCALANCE S product series here:
http://www.automation.siemens.com/net/html_00/produkte/040_ind_sec.htm

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6.2
Secure access techniques
Definition of access techniques

The implementation of the "defense in depth" security strategy involves specific access
techniques depending on the access type and security cell design.
One of the following access types is described as the access technique in each of the
examples below (see Sections 6.2.1 to 6.2.4):
52
Data exchange / information exchange:

Data exchange between various production levels, neighboring plants, onshore/offshore
components, automation and security cells
Access technique: Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden. and Fehler!
Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden.
Realtime controlling / remote controlling:

Control or remote support of onshore to offshore or different plants or between the
remote control center and the plant
Access technique: Protected remote control through remote process control computer
and remote engineering and Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden.
Maintenance:
Monitoring and archiving of diagnostic information, data backups, updates or fine tuning
of configurations
Access technique: Secure integrated systems and Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht
gefunden werden.
Support:
All engineering activities, upgrades or changes of the process control system, as well as
error diagnostics and correction
Access technique: Protected service access
Realtime data:
Combination of "Data exchange" and "Realtime controlling"
Access technique: Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden. and Secure
integrated systems

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6.2.1
Secure Web publishing

One of the most modern and secure access techniques is Web publishing. This involves
protecting the Web pages of the Web server in the perimeter against external attacks at the
front-end firewall. The protection is made possible by the identity change to the published
MS ISA server. The name and IP address of the respective Web server are thus not
subjected to direct access. The front-end firewall functions as a "representative" of the Web
server. The network topology and IP address of the perimeter are not visible to the external
network. The dynamic status-based monitoring of the data traffic on the application level in
combination with user-based application, command and data filters control each and every
opening of a Web page.
For Web servers which require authentication and encryption for client access, MS ISA
Server 2006 offers excellent security through filtering on the application level using SSL-toSSL bridging. In contrast to most other firewalls, MS ISA Server 2006 can check encrypted
data before it is forwarded to the respective Web server. The firewall decrypted the SSL data
flow, performs a status-based check, encrypts the data again and forwards it to the
published Web server.
The MS ISA server can authenticate users based on the local firewall or an Active Directory
user database. In addition to the integrated Windows authentication, MS ISA Server 2006
also offers RSA SecurID, RADIUS, RADIUS-OTP, LDAP, Kerberos and form-based
authentication for this. Especially the use of Remote Authentication Dial-in User Service
(RADIUS) and the capability of delegating authentication requirements of the MS ISA Server
2006 within the framework of defense in depth offers an even better possibility of protecting
the accounts and user management against direct access. With the "Kerberos Protocol
Transition and Constrained Delegation", the authentication can even be performed for
Kerberos servers not based on Microsoft.
The following information and network services of a production network can be made
available to an external network via Web publishing, for example:
Security update (e.g. Microsoft Windows Software Update Services Server)
Certificate management (e.g. Microsoft Certification Authority, CA)
Production data (e.g. SIMATIC PCS 7 OS Web Server)
Production data (e.g. SIMATIC WinCC Web Navigator Server)
Production data overview (e.g. SIMATIC WinCC Plant Intelligence, WinCC DataMonitor
Server)
Manufacturing control data (e.g. SIMATIC WinCC OPC XML DA Server)
Diagnostic data (e.g. SIMATIC WinCC Scope (Diagnostics))
Additional information about provision, maintenance and support of
Microsoft ISA Server 2006 is available here:
http://www.microsoft.com/germany/technet/prodtechnol/isa/2006/library/default.mspx.

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6.2.2
Secure integration of manufacturing control

Trusted clients or servers of manufacturing control (MES or IMS) without a direct process
interface are integrated via encrypted communication (e.g. IPsec) in the security cell in the
following cases:
When protocols and mechanisms are used for internal data exchange, which was developed
for operation within local networks and domains (e.g.
OPC/SQL/OLE/OLEDB/ODBC/DCOM).
The mutual authentication of encrypted communication is made via certificates. The
authorization is made with Windows-based (e.g. DCOM) and application-specific access
rights.
54

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6.2.3
Protected service access

Support and remote dialup is gaining in importance due to the increasingly growing
distances between support staff and plants requiring servicing (e.g. support personnel on
land, the plant on a ship) and places high demands on the security solutions due to the
additional potential security risks.
Firstly, more exceptions need to be defined at the access points (access point firewalls), and
secondly, hostile code can be executed in the plant with administrative rights via a support
PC - even unintentionally.
To ensure the highest possible security for the plant to be serviced, all access must be
centrally authenticate and authorized at the access point firewall using a combination of
several techniques and security mechanisms. "Direct dialup" to the device to be serviced
offers verification options too weak to be taken into consideration.
Depending on the type of planned dialing - local or remote and the service access, a
variety of requirements and solutions emerge based on the expected risk.
Local dialup
Local dialup, physically within the plant, can only be made through a trusted device and
through a trusted user. A special support station is used, for example a stationary
engineering station (ES) in the plant or a mobile support PC from a member of the support
staff. A stationary ES is secured by the same mechanisms as those used for all process
control systems within the plant. If a mobile support PC is used, in contrast, it needs to be
checked manually or via mechanisms. Such mechanisms include, for example, quarantine
dialup and network access protection.
Remote dialup
The employed security techniques depend on specific risk with remote dialup. The following
additional factors must be taken into consideration in comparison to local dialup:
Type of dialing medium
Type dialing device
Purpose of the access
Dialing medium
-
Point-to-point connections on layer 1-2 (e.g. ISDN, modem, serial) -> lower risk,
since only specified devices can dial (depending on the technology)
Point-to-point connections on layer 3-4: (e.g. VPN, PPTP, L2TP) -> higher risk for
the access point, since anyone (device or user) can be used to dial up a connection

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Dialing device
-
Specified support PC used only for this purpose -> lower risk, since the support PC,
its configuration and its security level is known
Any, anonymous support PC-> very high risk, unknown security level
Purpose of the access

-
Support for the process control system software -> little risk, since access only
needs to be guaranteed for software which is usually proprietary
Support for the process control configuration -> little risk, since access only needs to
be guaranteed for configuration data
Administrative access -> high risk, since this involves full access to complete
systems
Access to devices in the CSN -> very high risk, since it is very difficult to restrict
access to the process in the plant
Servicing access
Servicing access is made after dialup.
The following options are recommended based on specific roles:
Remote servicing / remote engineering (VPN client with a service application)
Remote desktop (VPN client with remote desktop for ES, OS or any, uniquely defined
target system)
Remote terminal (VPN client with access to terminal server and applications released for
this purpose on the terminal client)
Remote assistance (VPN client with NetMeeting for ES, OS or any, uniquely defined
target system)
The authorization for servicing tasks is made via user name and password on the servicing
software or on the terminal.
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Summary
The resulting requirements on the access techniques and their protection in summary:
All access should be made via a VPN connection with quarantine dialup at the firewall.
The questions to be answered, depending on the degree of risk, are how to secure this
connection (e.g. encryption level) and which criteria to apply in the quarantine test.
The authentication for the VPN dialup is made with user name and password at the
firewall. The firewall verifies this logon via Radius or Kerberos on the logon server (e.g.
domain controller) or in the local user management.
If the access is made with a specified support PC via the software of the process control
system, the support PC connected via VPN can be secured like a remote process
control computer.
If administrative access or even access to the CSN is required, it can only be performed
via Remote Desktop, NetMeeting or remote support to the selected plant PCs and the
stationary ES.
Which of the above-mentioned accesses is allowed for a given user, is decided by the
ISA server based on the user name entered for establishing the VPN tunnel.

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6.2.4
Protected remote control through remote process control computer and

remote engineering
Remote control and remote engineering of a plant place very high demands on the security
concept which is to be implemented. Misuse can result in a great deal of damage.
In general, there is a difference between trusted devices and non-trusted devices.
Trusted devices are those under the control of a plant manager and administered by
him. Remote, trusted computers of the process control systems (clients, servers and
engineering stations) without direct process interface, are integrated via encrypted
communication in the security cell.
-
The mutual authentication of the encrypted communication is made via certificates

(e.g. Windows IPSec or upstream SCALANCE S security modules).
The authorization is made with Windows-based (e.g. DCOM) and applicationspecific access rights.
Non-trusted devices are those temporarily integrated in the plant, even if they are being
used by a trusted person. These devices can be given user-based access to Web
publications of the process control system. Access is made via perimeter techniques
through the front-end firewall.
-
The authentication takes place through server-end encryption (e.g. HTTPS) using
user name and password.
The authorization is made with Windows-based and Web application-specific access

rights.
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6.2.5
Secure integrated systems

Secure integration of auxiliary systems with additional or parallel access to the process is
explained using an example of the "Process Information Management and Acquisition"
system (PIMAQ). Since access of the PIMAQ system is made simultaneously to the control
of the process control system, the PIMAQ system must be connected in the following way in
order to realize the strategies of this security concept:
1. The PIMAQ communication server with direct access to the automation systems in the
CSN should be placed in the PCN.
2. The PIMAQ server in the perimeter and the PIMAQ communication server in the PCN
are connected through a certificate-based IPSec tunnel via the back-end firewall in such
a way that enables the back-end firewall to detect the correct configuration of the tunnel
(including the mutual authentication of the nodes in the VPN).
3. The PIMAQ server permanently provides the collected and archived data for the PIMAQ
Web clients or the IP21Explorer clients in the ECN (the office network or Intranet). The
Web server of the PIMAQ server is published via the front-end firewall in the ECN for
this.
The following options are available for the authentication of the remote clients of this
auxiliary systems:
Authentication through firewall client software installed at the client end, which logs on
users at the firewall and subsequently allows access to the server.
Authentication on the servers and Web servers of these systems, based on applicationspecific access rights. This authentication is documented by and the responsibility of the
respective manufacturer.
Clients or servers of auxiliary systems with very high communication load must be operated
within the security cell to prevent the firewall from blocking the data flow.

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6.3
Hardening
For SIMATIC PCS 7 and SIMATIC WinCC, hardening means deactivating or restricting
functions and programs that are not required for the operation of the computer within the
plant environment.
Potential security threats can only be effectively limited if each and every member of the
security cell is hardened.
The following measures are required for hardening:
Disabling / removal of unneeded services
Use of a firewall to restrict the external availability of services which are only needed
locally
Use of a firewall to restrict the external availability of services to defined network

addresses or protocols and which are only needed by specifically known network
devices or external application
Restriction of the availability of services to those needed by specifically known devices

or users using an exactly defined access permission via the local security system (e.g.
the COM-/DCOM security configuration) of the component service administration
Restriction of local and remote file, registry, sharing and database access to specific and
known local groups, users, services and applications
SIMATIC Security Control

SIMATIC Security Control is a program that can perform application-specific hardening of a
computer in a local IP subnet. SIMATIC Security Control is integrated by default in
SIMATIC PCS 7 and SIMATIC WinCC.
The option enabling SIMATIC Security Control to automatically perform the settings for
hardening must be explicitly confirmed when the program is installed.
The communication to non-configured devices or to other subnets, as well as the use of nonconfigured users is not possible or extremely restricted.
Note the following when changing the plant configuration or changing the role of users:
The local firewall configuration or the local group membership needs to be adapted.
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Local group memberships

The rights required for operation is preconfigured to special local "SIMATIC" Windows
groups by the setup routine of the individual SIMATIC products. Newly created users must
be made a member of at least these local "SIMATIC" Windows groups if they are to use
these products.
Additional membership in the normal Windows groups (e.g. Power users, Users) is required
for local operation. Any required local membership in the normal Windows groups is
described in the respective product documentation.
Component service security (COM & DCOM)

The required rights for local and remote access to administrative objects and programming
interfaces of the Windows COM components, COM+ and DCOM applications are
preconfigured to special local "SIMATIC" Windows groups at the end of the setup routine for
the SIMATIC products.
Local Windows firewall

If you do not want to operate SIMATIC products within a local IP subnet, you need to adapt
the settings of the local Windows firewall for the devices involved to the IP subnets or
individual IP addresses used.
IPSec Bypass Technology

The use of "IPSec Bypass Technology" represents a special measure. The use of local
IPSec filter rules makes it possible to establish IPSec-protected communication to another
computer without special configuration of the local Windows firewall. This communication
connection requires either Kerberos authentication and there membership in an Active
Directory domain of the computer involved or specially provided certificate.

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61
6.4
Management and configuration
6.4.1
Managing computers and users

The management of computers and users in a production plant can be organized centrally
through a Windows domain (Active Directory domain) or distributed in Windows workgroups.
Mixed configurations of central and distributed management are also generally possible.
Required mixed configurations should be specifically adapted for each plant. Experience
shows that incorrect configurations occur more often with distributed configured components
and conflicting settings are hard to find in such cases.
One advantage of central management is the importance of reduced maintenance efforts
and the substantially higher security achieved, for example, by using domain internal
Kerberos authentication instead of NTLM authentication within a workgroup.
The decision to use distributed or central management should be made based on the
number systems to be maintained or the necessity (e.g. company security policies) of using
an Active Directory domain.
An Active Directory domain always creates the following requirements:
Redundant user management
Use of Kerberos authentication
Public key infrastructure (can also be used for IPSec)
Central "single sign-on" user logon and verification
Central user logon and verification from an "foreign" domain (e.g. via a "one-sided trust"
to another network with its own Active Directory management)
Central group policy based configuration e.g.

-
Distribution of security updates
IPSec bypass technology
Software installations
Group memberships
Regardless of the type of management (distributed or central), the responsibility and

management areas of the IT department in the office network and the plant operating
personnel must be carefully defined.
The following examples clarify the importance of defining the areas of responsibility and
management:
62
An administrator of the IT department cannot inadvertently reboot the plant PC or

configure it incorrectly.
An administrator of the plant operator personnel cannot inadvertently change the domain
settings of foreign domains.

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If management is to be performed through a domain, an administration plan must always be

developed. The administration plan defines the design of the infrastructure including the
name space, domains structure, forest and trusts for other domains, e.g. the office domain.
The decision about the infrastructure design strongly depends on the number of plants, the
size of the plants and the amount of work associated with them. The company policies must
also be taken into consideration and implemented as well.
In general, segregated forests are recommended for the office networks and production
networks, since the protection of data, permissions and rights are made separately for both
forests, as is the directory replication. Only organizational changes, configuration changes
and adding new domains to the forest have an effect throughout the forest. Access to
resources is enabled by one-way or two-way trusts for the forest. Since each forest (office
and production) is managed separately, adding a forest increases the management
expenditure considerably. Forest trusts facilitate the management of a segmented Active
Directory infrastructure within a company, in that it supports cross-forest access to resources
and other objects.
The appendix provides a figure which offers an example of three different management
scenarios:
Scenario 1 shows two independent forests for the business and production layers,
connected by a bidirectional transitive forest trust
Scenario 2 shows two independent forests for the business and production layers,
connected only by actually needed unidirectional intransitive trusts between the
production domain and individual department domains of the business layer
Scenario 3 shows a forest for the business layer and the domain forest below it for a
dependent production domain
You can find additional information on the topic "Creating a new forest" here:
http://technet2.microsoft.com/windowsserver/en/library/31ce4349-7046-496a-a3cfa8b49f7dbb5e1031.mspx
You can find additional information about cross-forest access to resources in several forests
here: http://technet2.microsoft.com/windowsserver/en/library/517b4fa4-5266-419c-97916fb56fabb85e1031.mspx

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63
6.4.2
Managing networks and network services

The management of the local network settings, the networks and required network services
of a production plant can be organized distributed or centrally.
Mixed configurations of central and distributed management are also generally possible.
Required mixed configurations should be specifically adapted for each plant. Experience
shows that incorrect configurations occur more often with distributed configured components
and conflicting settings are hard to find in such cases.
One advantage of central management is the importance of reduced maintenance
expenditures and the substantially higher security achieved, for example by the following
options:
Use of domain internal Kerberos authentication instead of NTLM authentication within a

workgroup
Automatic DNS registration when using a DHCP-DNS server network
The decision to use distributed or central management should be made based on the
number systems to be maintained or the necessity of using central management.
The necessity of an Active Directory domain is described in more detail in the section
"Managing computers and users".
Central management (usually domains)

All required information and settings can be configured centrally:
IP address via DHCP (automatic address assignment)
Name resolution DNS, WINS (automatic, central name registration, can be subsequently
queried by other network nodes)
Time synchronization (NTP, SNTP)
Distributed management (usually workgroups)

All required information and settings must be configured locally.
Be aware that the following settings are often the source of errors in complex plants, since
typographical errors or duplicate entries easily occur:
64
IP address (serves to uniquely identify a network node in a network)
Computer name and NetBIOS computer name (serves to uniquely identify a computer
for persons and applications in the network)
Name resolution (used to convert the computer name (FQDN) and NetBIOS computer
name of a computer into an IP address)

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You can find additional information about the topic of "PCS 7 Time Synchronization" at the
following addresses:
http://support.automation.siemens.com/WW/view/en/28518882 and

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65
6.4.3
Managing role-based operator control permissions

The unique identification of persons and the assignment of permissions to these persons
belong to the most important security measures of every company.
The following describes the special consideration for automation in regard to the
management of role-based operator control permissions and their integration in the security
concept of PCS 7 and WinCC.
Difference between a user and an operator

A difference is made at logon to a process control computer between logging on to the
operating system by a user and logging on to the process control system by the operator.
The user has the right to use or administer specific applications of the process control
system; within these applications (e.g. WinCC Runtime) the operator has the operator
control permissions to perform operations in the automation plant and thereby control the
process. The minimal principle is applied for assigning all rights and permissions. This
means that users and operators receive only those rights that are required to fulfill their jobs.
Automatic logon of the user

The permanent graphic display of the runtime and the operator control is in the foreground
for visualization in process control systems. The operator logs off from the software of the
process control system and usually does not close the graphic display. This is in contrast to
the logoff of a user, who started the software of the process control system. Automatic logon
of a user can be configured for specific products (e.g. for SIMATIC WinCC) to end the
graphic display and prevent unauthorized start of applications by the operating personnel.
The user used for this does not correspond to a real person, it is a representative of the
process control system software and a product-specific system account (e.g. with SIMATIC
WinCC this product-specific system account is a member of the SIMATIC HMI group).
The product-specific system account is not a system account of the operating system.
Rights management of the user

The rights management of users in the Windows operating system is realized according to
the strategies recommended by Microsoft. SIMATIC Security Control creates the required
SIMATIC groups during the installation of a SIMATIC product (e.g. WinCC), the members of
which can start and use this product.
The administrator organizes the users with the same job into groups. The administrator
creates a user account for such a user and enters the user in the available SIMATIC groups.
This allows the user to use the software.
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Rights management of the operator

Operator management and its role assignment is configured via SIMATIC Logon and the
configuration dialogs of the individual components (e.g. SIMATIC WinCC: "WinCC
UserAdministrator"). SIMATIC Logon consists of the following components:
SIMATIC Logon Service:

Central access protection for SIMATIC applications and plant areas
SIMATIC Logon Role Management:

Role management for applications and their assignment to Windows groups including
assignment of permissions
SIMATIC Electronic Signature:

Creation of electronic signatures for state transitions in the process and for accessing
the process
SIMATIC Logon Event Log Viewer:

Takes on the task of recording and displaying events for an application
The basic idea of SIMATIC Logon is the central availability of the logon information
("single sign-on" principle) for the operator. The tried-and-proven security mechanisms of
the Window logon and user management is used for this purpose. Name, logon name
and password (identity) of the operator are stored as a Windows user account in the
Windows domain (or in the local user database) and are made available for
authentication of an operator via the SIMATIC Logon Service. The role-based operator
control permissions are configured through the operator's membership to Window
groups of the same name.

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67
Logon via SIMATIC Logon Service

SIMATIC Logon Service is the basis of SIMATIC Logon. Figure 6-7 shows the process that
runs automatically when a user wants to log on for an application (e.g. SIMATIC WinCC), if
SIMATIC Logon is integrated in the application.
The user logs on and off for the application exclusively through the SIMATIC Logon Service.
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Central and fail-safe rights management with SIMATIC Logon

The use of SIMATIC Logon in combination with an Active Directory domain enables faulttolerant and fail-safe authentication (and logon) of operators, if at least two domain
controllers are realized in each domain and security cell.
Local domain user accounts of the production domain are used to configure operators.
Selected user accounts can also be assigned access rights through trust-linked office
domains.
In addition to central operator management with SIMATIC Logon, a local emergency
operator permission must be created in case the SIMATIC Logon Service cannot be reached
due to complete network failure.
Distributed rights management without SIMATIC Logon

Operator permission management for a specific SIMATIC application (e.g.
WinCC Useradministrator) can also be made fully local, although this is not recommended
due to security reasons.

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69
6.5
Patch management and security updates

Patch management is a regular procedure for installing patches on plant computers. The
following questions need to be answered during the planning:
Which patches are to be installed?
When are patches to be installed?
In what order are patches to be installed?
What method should be used to install these patches on the plant computers?
Patch management for a plant is only effective when they are part of a comprehensive
security concept. Patch management and security updates alone generally cannot protect a
plant against security threats.
Patch and security updates
Patch
The term patch for Microsoft means all types of updates, service packs, feature packs
and similar installations, regardless as to whether or not these relate to security.
Security updates
The term security update, in contrast, is exclusively security-related.
Using path management

Patch management should never inhibit runtime operation of a plant. The following
configuration have been tested and are recommended to ensure this:
70
Central patch management

Patch management should be performed centrally for reasons of management but also
for technical security reasons (not every computer downloads its patches from Microsoft;
a server, preferably located in a perimeter network, centrally downloads the patches
once and then distributes them to the plant computers).
The plant administrator is therefore provided centralized configuration and monitoring
and the plant computers require no Internet access. The patch server, located in a
perimeter network separated by a firewall, accesses the Internet, device or a higher-level
patch server in the Intranet.
Windows Server Update Service (WSUS)

WSUS is recommended for central patch management. It is provided free-of-charge by
Microsoft and offers all the functions required for patch management.
WSUS offers a variety of different patch classes for almost all Microsoft products.

Whitepaper, 04/2008, A5E02128732-01
Update classes
The introduction of WSUS and the further development of Windows Update to Microsoft
Update (patches for numerous Microsoft products) has created new classifications for
the individual patches:
-
Definition updates
Feature packs
Service packs
Security updates
Tools
Drivers
Update rollups
Critical updates
Updates
The following updates are important for safe and stable plant operation:
Security updates: Corrects errors that can be used to attack the system. This is why it is
important to install security updates as quickly as possible.
Critical updates: Corrects errors in the software, for example, display errors, errors
leading to increased processor load, or errors that result in failure of the operating
system. Critical updates should therefore be installed at regular intervals.
These two update classes are subjected to a compatibility test for specific versions of each
SIMATIC product and rated as compatible when the test is completed successfully. A list of
tested patches is permanently available in the Internet. You can find information on this at
the end of this section.
Patching the systems is not used as the only security measure to protect a plant or the
enterprise network. The realization of defense in depth (application of all security techniques
described in this security concept) means a potential attacker must first overcome multiple
security barriers before he might exploit weak points from a lacking security update. This
protection gives you more time to evaluate and test patches to be installed.

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71
Procedure for path management

Since maintaining control over the process is the most important rule, the installation time for
the patches must be specifically selected by the administrator. Firstly, many patches require
the system to be rebooted; secondly patches may create problems, although this seldom
occurs. It is therefore recommended to test the patches beforehand on a separate test
system. In addition, you should form groups (for example, one group with all master servers
and one with all standby servers) and install the patches group-by-group.
Figure 6-8
Information on the topic: "What is the procedure for implementing Microsoft Security Patches
in SIMATIC WinCC?" can be found here:
Information on the topic: "What is the procedure for implementing Microsoft Security Patches
in SIMATIC PCS 7?" can be found here:
72

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6.6
Virus scanners
Using virus scanners in a plant is only effective when they are part of a comprehensive
security concept. A virus scanner alone generally cannot protect a plant against security
threats.
Definitions
Virus scanner client

Computer which is examined for viruses and managed by the virus server.
Virus scanner server

Computer which centrally manages virus scanner clients, loads virus signature files and
deploys them on the virus scanner clients.
Using virus scanners

The use of a virus scanner should never inhibit runtime of a plant. Ultimately, this means that
even a virus infected computer should not be shutdown immediately, if this results in losing
control of the production process. A virus scanner should therefore fulfill the following
requirements for application in industrial control components (IACS):
The virus scanner must be installable without its own firewall if a local firewall adapted to
runtime is to be used.
The virus scanner clients can be divided into (product-specific and tasks-specific) groups
and configured separately.
It must be possible to disable automatic distribution of virus signatures and other

updates.
It must be possible to distribute virus signatures and other updates manually and groupby-group.
It must be possible to scan files and the system manually and group-by-group.
If a virus is detected, it should be possible to configure a message without having to

automatically perform a file action such as "Delete", "Wipe" etc.
All messages must be logged on the virus scanner server.
It should be possible to suppress the local message window on a virus scanner client,
since it may hide important process control messages.
Note
The installation of software is often a process that represents a serious and complicated
change to the system involved. The storage location of the files to be installed must
always be free of viruses (e.g. a file server with its own virus scanner or a DVD that has
been scanned for viruses). A virus scanner may not unnecessarily inhibit or corrupt the
installation; it should therefore be possible to completely deactivate it during installation if
problems occur.

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73
Basic virus scanner architecture

The following section recommends a virus scanner architecture for the implementation of the
requirements described above.
A virus scan server receives its virus signatures from the update server of the respective
virus scan manufacturer in the Internet or from an upstream virus scan server and manages
its virus scan clients.
Additional administrative access to the virus scanner server is possible via a Web console.
Figure 6-9
Several virus scanner servers can be used, depending on the manufacturer. They can be
arranged in a hierarchy.
74

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Once the virus scanner server has obtained the virus signatures and checked them in a test
plant, the virus signatures are distributed group-by-group to the virus scanner clients. Four
groups have been created in the following figure, for example. More or fewer groups can be
created, depending on the requirements of the plant. However, there should always be at
least two groups.
Figure 6-10

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75
6.7
Logging, audit, maintenance and asset management

The capability of detecting attempted and actual security threats is rapidly developing. Due
to the requirements for verification in many branches, more and more functions, such as
reporting and event log evaluation, must be included in current security concepts. Runtime
must still continue without interference in spite of the additional load, however.
The following reporting can be configured and evaluated as needed, in addition to the alarm
and messaging systems of process control for example:
Local event logs
Domain controller event logs
Firewall event logs
Virus scanner logs
Audit trail
Asset management in plant engineering involves the management of equipment, activities

and measures that are employed to maintain or increase the value of the plant.
Asset management is a very sensitive subject in the field of security engineering, since this
data also presents a weak point in a plant. In general, asset management and its
administrative rights should be restricted to the functional area within the plant's security cell.
The procedures described in "Secure access techniques" section can be used to publish
maintenance data beyond the borders of the security cell. This reliably prevents direct
access from the outside for example, to sensors or actuators on the field level.
76

Whitepaper, 04/2008, A5E02128732-01
6.8
Security tests
To keep a plant security up-to-date, previously implemented security measures must be
tested at regular intervals, and updated and supplemented if needed. This is necessary
because the rapidly developing technology creates new security requirements on the one
hand, and new threats are arising all the time on the other.
Network administrators can employ so-called "Security scanner" automated tests on target
systems. Security scanners rely on special databases, for example those of the SANS
Institute (SysAdmin, Networking and Security). They provide you with a list the latest known
and widespread security gaps, for example, the CVE list (Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures). Security scanners check for known vulnerabilities on the examined system.
Security scans are basically divided into two categories:
Blackbox scan
Whitebox scan
Blackbox scan
A blackbox scan checks a given system for security vulnerabilities from the point of view of
the attacker, who has no internal information about the system. The system is considered a
closed unit in a blackbox scan, i.e. neither the configuration nor the network structure of the
target system is known.
In a blackbox scan, the vulnerabilities identified from the outside are recognized as points of
attack (e.g. open ports, available services, etc.). Any additional opportunities for attack
offered to the hacker by the system once these vulnerabilities have been exploited remains
open.
Whitebox scan
In contrast to a blackbox scan, a whitebox scan relies on internal system information. Here
too, a given system is examined for weaknesses, but this time from the point of view of an
administrator. A whitebox scan (also referred to a glass box scan) examines the individual
components of the system and their interaction, and determines the configuration critical for
security as needed.
The whitebox scan also detects dangers, arising from outdated versions of user software, for
example, or from neglected user account management.
Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer (MBSA)

The MBSA tool is recommended for Whitebox scans in this security concept. It can be used
for the following purposes:
Searching one or more computer for vulnerabilities, from poor user management for
example
Determination of the availability of security updates for one or more computers

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77
Penetration tests
Penetration test tools are special security scanners. Penetration tests are performed with the
resources and methods that an hacker would use to gain unauthorized access to the system.
Notice
A running process control plant should never be checked with penetration test tools! The
use of penetration test tools is always associated with the risk of permanent damage to
the tested system (or the installation or configuration of the system).
The use of security scanners in the Whitebox Scan or the service period (plant stoppage)
must be supported by the manufacturer for each product; this may need to be assured
beforehand!
Additional tools can be used, for example, for security tests in laboratory environments:
Port scanner
Network/OS vulnerability scanner
Application/database vulnerability scanner
Password cracker (attention, first check current legal regulations!)
File search and analysis tool
Network analyzer
Exploit tool
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79
Appendix
Norms and standards

Since the ISA-99 series is currently one of the most important security standard for
protecting industrial automation plants, the following is a excerpt (marked in blue) from ISA99.00.01 Part 1, which itself describes the structure of the new standards:
ISA-99.00.01 Part 1: Scope, Concepts, Models and Terminology

Part 1 (this standard) establishes the context for all of the remaining standards in the
series. by defining a common set of terminology, concepts and models for electronic
security in the industrial automation and control systems environment.
ISA-99.00.02 Part 2: Establishing a Manufacturing and Control Systems Security

Program
Part 2 will describe the elements of a cyber security management system and provide
guidance for their application to industrial automation and control systems. This part also
provides detailed support in relation to process activities and key elements for
developing a management system for cyber security.
ISA-99.00.03 Part 3: Operating a Manufacturing and Control Systems Security

Program
Part 3 will address how to operate a security program after it is designed and
implemented. This includes definition and application of metrics to measure program
effectiveness.
ISA-99.00.04 Part 4: Specific Security Requirements for Manufacturing and Control

Systems
Part 4 defines the characteristics of industrial automation and control systems, which
distinguish themselves from other IT systems based on the security aspect. Based on
these distinguishing characteristics, the standard clarifies the specific security
requirements for this category of systems.

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81
Appendix
Beyond this, the ISA-99 committee has presented to date two technical reports on the topic
of electronic safety in the field of industrial automation and control systems.
ANSI/ISA-TR-99.00.01-2004 Security Technologies for Manufacturing and Control

Systems
Technical Report 1 describes various security technologies in regard to their application
in industrial automation and control systems. This report will be updated in the future to
take changes in the technology into consideration.
ANSI/ISA-TR-99.00.02-2004 Integrating Electronic Security into the Manufacturing and

Control Systems Environment
Technical Report 2 describes how electronic security can be integrated in industrial
automation and control systems. The content of this report will be replaced by this
standard upon the conclusion of the standards in Part 2.
Names in the figures

The following divisions of the DNS name spaces facilitate the assignments in the demo
plant:
enterprise.com
Complete external name space of the company for remote access and Web publishing in
the Internet
enterprise.local
Complete internal name space of the company (Intranet)
department1.enterprise.local
Intranet name space for the enterprise layer (office network) of department 1 responsible
for production area 1
82
manufacturing-execution1.production1.enterprise.local
Internal name space of the manufacturing control of plant 1
production1.enterprise.local
Complete internal name space of the process control of plant 1
plant1A.production1.enterprise.local or plant1B. production1.enterprise.local

Internal name space of the process control unit 1A (basically, plant1B for unit 1B etc.)
perimeter1.production1.enterprise.local
Internal name space of the perimeter network of plant 1 (is also used in this way for
publishing in the Intranet)
production1.enterprise.com
External (e.g. in Internet) published name space of the perimeter network of plant 1

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Appendix
Figure 7-1 Basic design of the demo plant

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83
Appendix
Figure 7-2: Basic DNS name space of the demo plant
84

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Appendix
Figure 7-3: Basic design of the domain management in the demo plant

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85
Appendix
86

Whitepaper, 04/2008, A5E02128732-01

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SIMATIC

Aim of the security concept

Strategies of the security

Implementing the security

Document order number: A5E02128732-01

Copyright Siemens AG 2008.

Structure and organization of the document..................................................................................5

Required knowledge ......................................................................................................................6

Employed products ........................................................................................................................7

Aim of the security concept........................................................................................................................ 9

Designations, terms and abbreviations........................................................................................13

Name conventions in figures and examples ................................................................................20

Strategies of the security concept............................................................................................................ 23

Division into security cells ............................................................................................................28

Role-based access control...........................................................................................................30

Security concept PCS 7 and WinCC - Basic document

Implementing the security strategies in security solutions........................................................................ 35

Security cells and network architecture .......................................................................................39

Secure access techniques ...........................................................................................................52

Management and configuration ...................................................................................................62

Patch management and security updates ...................................................................................70

Virus scanners .............................................................................................................................73

Logging, audit, maintenance and asset management.................................................................76

Security concept PCS 7 and WinCC - Basic document

Structure and organization of the document

Sections 1-4: Required information for understanding the security concept

Section 5: Security strategies and their basic principles

The detail documents explore specific solutions and their recommended

Security concept PCS 7 and WinCC - Basic document

Management of IT typical in the office environment

Configuration of the employed SIMATIC products

Configuration of the employed products from third parties.

Security concept PCS 7 and WinCC - Basic document

"Siemens SIMATIC Logon Service" in a Windows domain environment as a combination

Security concept PCS 7 and WinCC - Basic document

Security concept PCS 7 and WinCC - Basic document

Aim of the security concept

Security concept PCS 7 and WinCC - Basic document

Aim of the security concept

Security concept PCS 7 and WinCC - Basic document

ISA - Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society

ISA-95 "Enterprise Control System Integration"

Part 1: "Models and Terminology"

Part 2: "Object Model Attributes"

Part 3: "Models of Manufacturing Operations Management "

Part 1: "Concepts, Terminology and Models"

Part 2: "Establishing an Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security

Part 3: "Operating an Industrial Automation and Control System Security Program"

Part 4: "Specific Security Requirements for Industrial Automation and Control

TR-99.00.01-2004 "Security Technologies for Manufacturing and Control Systems"

TR-99.00.02-2004 "Integrating Electronic Security into the Manufacturing and

Security concept PCS 7 and WinCC - Basic document

ISO/IEC - International Organization for Standardization / International Engineering Consortium

15408 "Information Technology Security-Techniques Common Criteria for

17799 "Code of practice for information security management"

27001 "Information security management systems Requirements"

61784-4 "Profile for Secure Data Communication in Industrial Networks"

NAMUR - International User Association of Automation Technology in Process Industries

NA 67 "Information Protection for Process Control Systems (PCS)"