100 avionics news march 2011

1. INTRODUCTION
White Paper Objectives
Primary objectives will be:
1. Understand the history and theory of Airborne Weather Radar.
2. Understand how Weather Radar systems operate from the pilots perspec-
tive.
3. Understand how to properly interpret the pilots complaint, discrepancy or
squawk.
4. Understand flight-line troubleshooting and repair of Airborne Weather Radar
systems.
5. Understand Radar Stabilization, and how to perform a Radar Stabilization
Alignment.
Reasons For Weather Radar
Three common threats to aircraft are turbulence, hail and windshear at low alti-
tude. All three of these are by-products of thunderstorms. Weather radar is a popular
method of alerting the flight crew to the presence and location of thunderstorms.
An airborne weather radar is technically called a Weather AVOIDANCE Radar.
The radar system will provide the pilot with the necessary weather information to
avoid, not penetrate, severe and dangerous weather.
Safety
Radar systems can be dangerous and life threatening if warnings and cautions
are not followed. The manufacturers maintenance manuals contain numerous warn-
I NDUSTRY
Airborne Weather Radar
S T O R Y B Y D A V I D W . M A N S E N , T E X A S G Y R O
EDI TOR S NOTE:
Avionics News will present
this white paper, authored by
TexasGYRO, in multiple parts.
This white paper presentation is
for training purposes only. Its
sole intent is to improve the
maintenance technicians
knowledge and understanding of
airborne weather radar systems.
Refer to manufacturers most
current technical data,
maintenance and/or installation
manuals or pilots guides
whenever performing maintenance
on aircraft or aircraft components.
Theory & Operation for More Effective Troubleshooting
avionics news march 2011 101
Airborne Weather Radar
ings and cautions which must be followed.
High Voltage
High voltage and high currents exist in radar systems that can and
will KILL you! Typical high voltage drive to the display is 12,500 volts.
The pulse transformer in the RT generates a 5,000 volt 5 Amp pulse
to excite the magnetron. Use caution when covers are removed.
RF Radiation
A microwave oven uses a magnetron to transmit high power RF
radiation into a shielded enclosure to heat and cook. Most weather
radar systems use this very same device to generate their high power
RF signal. This RF radiation can damage the human body or ignite
flammable liquids. When operating a Weather Radar system, always
be aware of the following:
Never transmit inside a closed hanger.
Never transmit toward a fuel truck.
Consider all radar systems to transmit in test, until confirmed
otherwise.
When operating the system on the bench, always attach a dummy
load to the RT.
Transmitter power, proximity/distance and time/duration are all
factors that affect the damage that RF radiation can do. Consult FAA
Advisory Circular AC 20-68B (Radiation Safety) for additional informa-
tion on RF exposure and permissible levels.
Magnets
Magnetrons in the Receiver/Transmitter contain strong mag-
netic magnets. Use caution around radar indicators and computers.
Magnets can magnetize and distort display colors and cause loss of
data to computer disk drives.

2. HISTORY
Political
The political climate at the end of World War II did not give much
credit to Germany for technological advancements. Also, the destruc-
tion and division of post-war Germany made the discovery and credit
Continued on following page
102 avionics news march 2011
for German radar advances difficult.
The well publicized scenario of British radar superiority at the begin-
ning of World War II is quite simply not true. There is no doubt that
Britain led the world in appreciating the strategic importance of radar,
but German radar sets in the late 1930s and early 1940s were superior
to British systems.
The technological promise of radar and its realistic use are two
vastly different matters. The German Luftwaffe had superior radar
equipment, but never developed a realistic strategy for its use. The
Germans blindly placed their sole radar focus on offensive navigational
systems. The British had a large, clumsy, dead end technology sys-
tem in their Chain Home Radar System. However, they developed a
Command and Control system, called the Filter Room that was vastly
superior in concept and implementation. This Filter Room was the real
hero in the defense of Britain.
The Filter Room was a command and control center that received
radar data from each Chain Home station. Azimuth data was derived
via triangulation, accuracy calibrations were performed and target
information was then plotted on a large map. Friendly fighter radio traf-
fic was monitored, and targets were thus identified as either friendly or
hostile. With a clear picture of approaching threats, Filter Room com-
manders were able to match limited fighter resources to the greatest
threat.
Early Radar Development
Radar principles have been known since the turn of the century. In
1904, Christian Hlsmeyer, a German inventor was granted a British
patent for a system using radio waves to remotely detect the presence
of a metallic body, such as a ship. On the morning of May 10, 1904,
he demonstrated that he could locate a ship from a distance of five
kilometers. These modern concepts would be forgotten and not redis-
covered for another 30 years.
In the mid 1930s, radar principles were well known and being
actively developed by Japan, Germany, Russia, America and Britain;
yet it was the British who had the most pressing need, and Nazi
aggression caused the British to increase their defensive capability.
German Radar Development
Dr. Rudolph Khnold of the German Navy re-invented radar in
1933, while working on a project to detect underwater objects (eventu-
ally called Sonar) by bouncing sound waves off of objects. He theo-
rized and created a system using radio waves that worked above the
water. Khnold did this with no knowledge of Christian Hlsmeyers
prior (1904) radar research. In 1934, Khnold demonstrated to
German officials the ability to spot ships more than seven miles away.
During this demonstration he inadvertently detected a seaplane mov-
ing in front of the radar, discovering by accident the use of radar for
aircraft detection.
Germany named this system the Freya, with the Luftwaffe receiv-
ing the first operational set in 1938. The name came from the Norse
Goddess Freyja. Freya would become the primary German early-
warning radar, vastly superior to any British system at the time. Freya
was a steerable and semi-mobile system operating at a frequency of
120MHz to 130MHz, PRF (Pulse Repetition Frequency) of 500Hz,
PW (Pulse Width) of 3m (micro) seconds and peak power output of 15
to 20 kilowatts. It had a maximum range of 160 kilometers, yet it had
difficulty accurately determining altitude.
British Radar Development
In 1934, the British Ministry set up special task force under Sir
Henry Tizard, called the Tizard Commission to investigate different
and exotic defensive means. One such means was a Death Ray for
which a special reward of 1,000 was offered to anyone who could
successfully kill a sheep at 100 meters.
Robert Watson Watts, a British scientist was consulted by Sir Henry
Tizard to determine if such a death ray was feasible. It was quickly
determined to be impossible, but Watts theorized that RF Radiation
could be used to detect aircraft.
Watts proposed the idea of radio detection, but before the British
Ministry would commit the considerable funds necessary for develop-
ment, they required a successful demonstration.
On the morning of Feb. 26, 1935, the 43 year old Watson Watts and
an assistant drove a small van loaded with electronics to a country field
near the British village of Daventry. There he monitored and adjusted
his displays while a RAF Bomber flew back and forth between two
nearby BBC radio towers. They were able to detect a disturbance in
the RF from the towers and track the bomber at an unbelievable range
of eight miles. What was not known until many years later was that the
brilliant Watts had quietly instructed the RAF bomber captain to trail a
long aerial wire behind the aircraft to enhance the chance of success.
On this very same day, Adolf Hitler appointed Reichsmarschall
(Marshal of the Empire) Hermann Goering as head of the German
Luftwaffe with the sole intent of creating an Air Force to destroy every-
thing that stood in the path of the Nazi advance.
The German blitzkrieg of 1936 against Spain showed the world how
air raids could rapidly destroy an enemy with very little warning. Being
an island, Britain had plenty of warning of any impending surface
attack. The German use of air attacks in the attacks on Spain proved
the urgent need for a British defensive warning system and kicked the
development of radar into overdrive.
Soon, 350-foot tall radar towers began to spring up along the east-
ern British coast. This became the Chain Home Radar System and
was completed in 1938. Chain Home towers were 20 miles apart, had
a range of 100 miles and used triangulation between towers to deter-
mine azimuth. They were not accurate in altitude detection, requiring
constant calibration and adjustment by the Filter Room.
The Chain Home system was acceptable for daylight intercepts
where the radar only had to get fighters to within a couple of miles to
intercept the German bombers. At night, the fighters had to be guided
to within about 500 yards to visually acquire the targets.
AIRBORNE WEATHER RADAR
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104 avionics news march 2011
Chain Home operated on a frequency of 22MHz. In good weather
it could detect an aircraft at 10,000 feet 100 miles out. Later in the war
the frequency was increased to 50MHz to avoid interference with other
towers, noise and to prevent enemy jamming.
Because most British men were involved in the imminent war with
Germany, these radar sites were staffed almost exclusively by women.
During the early days of operation, the Chain Home Radar System
operators observed that weather systems would affect the perfor-
mance of their radar. This was the first known indication that radar
could be used for weather detection. It wasnt until 1941 that the mili-
tary became serious about using radar for meteorological purposes.
During the Battle of Britain, Germany greatly outnumbered Britain
in terms of aircraft. Britains Chain Home Radar and Filter Room
enabled them to marshal their precious few fighters to quality daylight
intercepts of German Bombers. Germany had more than 3,000 aircraft
compared to Britains mere 600 fighters.
German Actions on British Radar Stations
Some officers in the German high command had thoughts that the
British towers held a military purpose. Hermann Goering outfitted the
776 foot Graf Zeppelin LZ130 with electronics monitoring equipment
and flew three missions along the British coast from May to August of
1939. These were the worlds first electronics surveillance missions.
The British tracked the Graf Zeppelin on radar.
German scientists discounted the idea that a radar system could
be operated in the HF band. Britains system operated at 22MHz
while the German systems operated at 120MHz. The Germans were
searching this higher frequency band, thus detecting nothing. They
concluded from this that the British had no operational radar and
wrongly summarized that that this was some type of aircraft landing
aid system.
During the summer of 1940, Hermann Goering was poised to
unleash massive air raids on Britain. General Wolfgang Martini,
Luftwaffe Head of Signals, believed that the towers dotting the eastern
shores of Great Britain were more than just aircraft landing aids.
Martini convinced Goering to bomb these towers. On Sunday, Aug. 8,
1940, the Luftwaffe attacked the Chain Home towers. These towers
were difficult to bomb from the air and of all the stations attacked, only
one tower was damaged. Goering was so focused in his belief that
the British had no working radar system he never attacked the towers
again. This was one of many major blunders he committed as the
head of the German Luftwaffe.
Need for Airborne Systems
The accuracy of the land based Chain Home Radar System
was acceptable to guide the fighters sufficiently close to for daylight
intercepts, however, not nearly close enough to visually acquire the
target at night. Chain Home was not mobile and did nothing to detect
German U-boats on the surface.
An airborne system was desperately needed to overcome these
shortcomings of the Chain Home system.
The transmitters and antennas of the Chain Home System would
never fit in any aircraft. A smaller device, as well as a system operat-
ing on a shorter wavelength (higher frequency) was urgently needed.
Two British scientists invented the magnetron, a small high power
short wavelength transmission device. This incredible invention
changed everything in radar technology.
American Radar Development
In August 1940, Winston Churchill commissioned Sir Henry Tizard
to go to America, taking with him the ultra top secret magnetron and
many more military technology secrets. The missions purpose was
to enlist Americas aid in manufacturing military equipment and the
sharing of certain military secrets.
This and many other military secrets were given to America
cart blanche, no strings attached. Britain wanted the Americans to
share the technology of the Norden Bomb-Sight to use on their own
bombers. However, America was not yet at war and Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, fearing that British bombers would be shot down over
enemy territory, denied their request for the Norden Bomb-Sight.
The magnetron advanced the American radar development by
two years.
Soon after the Tizard mission, America opened the Radiation
Laboratory (commonly called the Rad Lab) at Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT). Under the guidance of Vannevar Bush,
Americas top physicists and scientists were recruited for a crash
program to expedite the development of radar systems.
The Rad Lab developed radar systems at an incredible pace. By
the end of World War II, more than 150 different models of radar
systems were designed for use in aircraft, submarine, battleship and
costal defense. The American industrial might built more than one mil-
lion radar sets for military use by both the American and British forces.
Dismissing valuable radar data played a disastrous role at Pearl
Harbor. The U.S. Army had deployed five mobile radar sets, each
with a range of 150 miles, on the island of Oahu, Hawaii. On Dec. 7,
1941, one of these sets detected multiple targets while conducting
training operations. The operators on duty detected incoming aircraft
and relayed this information up the chain of command. The lieuten-
ant on duty, having heard a vague rumor of incoming American
bombers due around this time, wrongly dismissed the report as
irrelevant.
This disaster alerted the American military to the importance of
radar and significantly sped up its deployment.
A radar navigational system called Eagle guided the B-29,
Enola Gay to Japan on the morning of Aug. 6, 1945, where she
dropped Little Boy, the first atomic weapon used in war. At 8:15
a.m., four separate radar altimeters detonated Little Boy above
Hiroshima. Three days later, a similar system was used over
Nagasaki, thus ending Japans will to fight, and the war in the
Pacific. q
AIRBORNE WEATHER RADAR
Continued from page 102
Part 2 of this white paper will appear in the
April edition of Avionics News.